On the Minos
Abstract
This thesis is a study of Plato’s Minos, the subject matter of which is law. The dialogue depicts Socrates conversing with an anonymous companion, and it begins with Socrates abruptly asking the companion “what is law for us?” The question that sets the Minos in motion culminates in a perplexing answer: law wishes to be the discovery of what is. The first part of this thesis examines the portion of the dialogue that leads up to the aforementioned definition of law; in particular, it looks at what the definition suggests about law, and its relation to the other definitions (of which there are two) that precede it. The second part turns to the companion’s response to the third definition, which changes the course of the dialogue from an attempt to answer the opening question to a defense of an altered version of the third definition—that law is the discovery of what is. This section of the dialogue comprises two attempts made by Socrates to defend, or prove, that version of the third definition. Both of these proofs ultimately fail, but their failure, that is, the reason for their failure, shows why law can only wish to be the discovery of what is. The third part focuses on the third and final proof of the altered version of the third definition, which comes in the form of a defense of the titular Minos’ laws. The success of this proof, which persuades the companion of the altered version of the third definition, indicates what can be attained by law in light of the inadequacy revealed in the dialogue. By drawing out our expectations for law, and demonstrating the chasm between those expectations and what is possible, the Minos clarifies the limits of law; at the same time, by showing why law falls short, it also points beyond law. In this way the Minos indicates the common ground shared between politics and philosophy—and the latter’s superiority.