A Nuclear Family

Abstract

This dissertation examines British nuclear policymaking during the late 1970s and early 1980s with a focus on its political implications. Highlighting the important link between nuclear politics and alliance coordination, the dissertation demonstrates that at a time of increased Alliance disunity (over Vietnam, détente, etc.) NATO policymakers achieved a broad consensus on theater nuclear policy that in effect stabilized the Alliance against the crises of the 1970s. The dissertation focuses especially on the U.K.’s role in this; British policymakers’ unique ability to mediate between the U.S. and continental Europe contributed enormously to the success of NATO in this period. Taking the British decision to update its strategic nuclear weapons and the coterminous debates in NATO over theater nuclear weapons, carried out against the backdrop of heightened public opposition and debate, it argues that nuclear politics played an integral role in structuring alliances and that this recalibration not only precipitated the end of the Cold War, but also ensured the Alliance’s post-Cold War viability. This research revises our understanding of the Cold War. This dissertation demonstrates that the Cold War, traditionally regarded as a bipolar conflict between superpowers, was often waged through alliances and that the policy preferences of lesser alliance partners mattered tremendously. The dissertation, furthermore, provides evidence for the way in which British policymakers retained an unexpected and disproportionate influence for the U.K. in world affairs—via their ability to successfully mediate within NATO