From Consciousness to Life: Phenomenology and the Religious Phenomenon in Husserl, Heidegger, and Kierkegaard

Author: Gregory P. Floyd

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From Consciousness to Life: Phenomenology and the Religious Phenomenon in Husserl, Heidegger, and Kierkegaard

Gregory P. Floyd

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract: In my dissertation I aim to reconstruct the basic principles of Heidegger’s fledgling attempt at a phenomenology of religion in his 1920 and 1921 courses on St. Paul and St. Augustine. In order to understand the parameters and the stakes of that project I consider it light of Husserlian phenomenology as well as broader German trends in “scientific” [Wissenschaftliche] philosophy, theology, and history of religions. The measure of Heidegger’s success is his account of “formal indication,” which endeavors to provide a reflective (i.e. philosophical) articulation of life without privileging a particular theoretical standpoint. This attempt leads him to reconceive phenomenology as a hermeneutics of factual life and to shift his emphasis from a phenomenology of religious consciousness to a phenomenology of religious life. What distinguishes this account is its focus on the “motivated” or “enacted” nature of meaning from out of life. After reconstructing and elaborating Heidegger’s account I note a problematic tendency toward over-formalization that focuses exclusively on the enactment sense (Vollzugsinn) at the expense of the content sense (Gehaltsinn). I enlist the aid of Kierkegaard, whom Heidegger is reading carefully at this point in time, to show why a focus on the appropriative nature of meaning does not require one to ignore its content. I conclude by suggesting some ways that a modified version of Heidegger’s formally indicative philosophy of religion still may prove useful to us today.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 1: Husserl and Heidegger: Ways into Life</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§1. <em>In media res</em>: From Phenomena to Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§2. A Religious Way into Life?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3. <em>Encyclopedia Britannica</em> and the Parting of Ways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4. A Brief <em>Proviso</em>: Difference and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§5. Conclusion: Religious Questions and Impulses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 2: Heidegger and Theological Wissenschaft</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§1. Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§2. Reading Heidegger’s <em>Jugendschriften</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3. The Phenomenology of Religion: A New Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4. The “Introduction” to the “Phenomenology” of “Religion”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§5. Protestant Theology: Heidegger and the Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6. How Meaning Means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§7. Conclusion: Motivating Phenomenology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 3: The Phenomenology of Religion: A Promise Un/Fulfilled</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§1. Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§2. Husserl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3. Heidegger’s <em>Formale Anzeige</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4. Formal Indication as Phenomenological Method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§5. Formal Indication: Radicalizing Husserl in response to Natorp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6. Formal indication as the kind of questioning that is the activity of philosophy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4: Formally Indicating Paul

§1. The Pauline Kehre

§2. Originary Explication

§3. Renunciation

§4. Vorgriff

§5. The Problem of Religious Experience

§6. Pauline Exposure: Proclamation and Affliction

§7. Temporality as Such: Eschatology as Past, Present and Future in Paul’s *Epistle to the Thessalonians.*

§8. Conclusion: A Broken Temporality of Remainders

Chapter 5: From the Selbstwelt to the Self: Augustine and the Heterogeneous Self

§1. Introduction: Augustine and Neo-Platonism

§2. Augustine and the Heterogeneous Self.

§3. *Beata Vita et Veritas*

§4. *Tentatio*

§5. Conclusion: *Molestia*

Chapter 6: A Formal Problem and a Climacean Response

§1. Introduction

§2. A Formal Problem

§3. Johannes Climacus and the Ladder of Factical Descent

§4. Conclusion: A Truth Indirectly Communicated

A Concluding Postscript
The world does not need words. It articulates itself in sunlight, leaves, and shadows. The stones on the path are no less real for lying uncatalogued and uncounted. The fluent leaves speak only the dialect of pure being. The kiss is still fully itself though no words were spoken.

And one word transforms it into something less or other – *illicit, chaste, perfunctory, conjugal, covert.* Even calling it a *kiss* betrays the fluster of hands glancing the skin or gripping a shoulder, the slow arching of neck or knee, the silent touching of tongues.

Yet the stones remain less real to those who cannot name them, or read the mute syllables graven in silica. To see a red stone is less than seeing it as jasper – metamorphic quartz, cousin to the flint the Kiowa carved as arrowheads. To name is to know and remember.

The sunlight needs no praise piercing the rainclouds, painting the rocks and leaves with light, then dissolving each lucent droplet back into the clouds that engendered it. The daylight needs no praise, and so we praise it always – greater than ourselves and all the airy words we summon.

By Dana Gioia
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A dissertation is in many ways a labor of love. In a particular sense, it is a labor of what Augustine calls *amor studii*, the love that obtains between a person and her questions and their answers. This is the love that is prerequisite for knowledge and the love that grows deeper with knowledge. Yet, while the love of knowledge is particular to academic work, it is not perhaps the principal love required for undertaking such work. Our academic interests and our academic lives are made possible not only by a personal love of truth, but also, and in the first place, by the love of others – mentors, family, and friends.

I would like first to acknowledge the insight, attentiveness, and encouragement of my advisor, Dr. Jeffrey Bloechl, who in word and deed has demonstrated that the examined life, a life of philosophical reflection, is worthwhile not merely for oneself, but also for one’s students, colleagues, and community. I would also like to thank Dr. Vanessa Rumble, who introduced me, not only to Kierkegaard, but to a manner of engaging with and thinking alongside this peculiarly rich and challenging figure. I am grateful to Dr. Merold Westphal for taking time to be part of my committee. His extensive and erudite work in the philosophy of religion has been an important source of insight and inspiration for my own work, both in its rigor and breadth and also, more significantly, for the all-too-rare spirit of generosity in which it is undertaken. More generally, I am indebted to many faculty here at BC who in their lectures, during their office hours, and amidst brief conversations in the hallways have not only taught me about the philosophical tradition, but modeled for me its virtues. Special thanks to Drs. Marina McCoy, Andrea Staiti, Dan McKaughan, Mary Troxell, David Storey, Fr. Richardson and Fr. Imbelli. Finally, were it not for the generous support and genuine community of the Lonergan Institute I might never have studied
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I would like to thank my parents, Gregory and Maureen Floyd, for their love and support and a home to come home to — and for only asking sparingly and delicately “when” I would finish my dissertation. A special thank you to my siblings and sister-in-law for believing in me even when they could not believe what I was doing. The beauty and generosity of your lives, vocations, and families has been a welcome corrective to tendency to isolation and self-importance characteristic of the academic life. And to my young nieces, Kennedy and Zoey, thank you for daily reminders of the beautiful gratuitousness of life and the transformative spontaneity of love.

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### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title / Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td><em>The Concept of Anxiety</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUP</td>
<td><em>Concluding Unscientific Postscript.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td><em>Being and Time</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA 2</td>
<td><em>Sein und Zeit</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA 8</td>
<td><em>Was heisst Denken?</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA 9</td>
<td><em>Wegmarken</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA 56/57</td>
<td><em>Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA 58</td>
<td><em>Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie</em> (WS1919-20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA 60</td>
<td><em>Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA 61</td>
<td><em>Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPP</td>
<td><em>Basic Problems in Phenomenology</em> (WS 1919-20)</td>
</tr>
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<td>LI</td>
<td><em>Logical Investigations</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td><em>Ideas for a Pure phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy</em>, Book I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIA</td>
<td><em>Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle</em></td>
</tr>
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<td>PRL</td>
<td><em>Phenomenology of Religious Life</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHFTS</td>
<td><em>Reading Heidegger from the Start</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDP</td>
<td><em>Towards the Definition of Philosophy</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

I. Why a Philosophy of Religion?

As I understand it, the basic question confronting a phenomenologist of religion is this: In what sense is the *phenomenology* of religion a form of the philosophy of religion? Or, to put it a slightly different way, in what way can philosophy as phenomenology help us speak meaningfully about religion? The need to ask this question and the value in devoting time and intellectual energy to articulating its answers stems from the contradictory witness of religious history. Religion has been the motive for many of the greatest feats of human intellect, art, and of human compassion. It has given people an understanding of love and solidarity that can inspire heroic sacrifices and transform entire communities. It has made important contributions to philosophical discourse. However, it has also been the motive for great acts of violence, acts of physical and psychological harm. Our modern society in the western world is born out of and in reaction to the failure of common religious beliefs to sufficiently unite people within national boundaries and across them. The legacy of the political philosophies of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau is the
reduction and privatization of religion and therewith a reconceiving of what religious experience
and value are. Some see in this a positive development; others see in it a necessary one. Regardless
of the interpretive stance we take, we can still ask if something has been lost in the transition. The
values of love and compassion, of the common good, of sacrifice and the alleviation of suffering
no longer resonate in, let alone ground, our social and political discourses. This is, in part, because
religion is thought to define people by distinguishing them from each other rather than by uniting
them.

What does a phenomenology of religion have to offer this situation? The kind of research
I am proposing must defend itself in response to two important questions. The first question is,
Why a philosophy of religion at all? Are not those purposes and aims better served by
anthropology, sociology, and history? Secondly, should the first question be answered we must
still ask why a phenomenology of religion? What might this add to the traditional routes already
chartered by natural theology, the religious “epistemology” of warranted belief, or a kind of
philosophical psychology of brain states and affections.

To the first question I think we can make at least two replies. To begin with the most
evident: we live in a world that persists, against all odds according to many, in being religious.
Unfortunately, this often takes the form of a militant fundamentalism. Where this is the case for a
political majority it can become a violent religious imperialism or, when a minority, an entrenched
social ballast. However, the simple assertion of liberal democratic values has been and will
continue to prove to be an insufficient response. Attempting to undermine the viability of religion or its importance will only further affirm the basic set of assumptions animating the religiously inflected violence and social hostility so characteristic of the early 21st century. What is needed is a kind of rigorous argumentation from within a religious frame that would promote the development of authentic religious attitudes and values and, in doing so, correct their harmful deformations. Part of this process is a clear and philosophically guided laying out of the various positions and alternatives and a careful demand for evidence – even perhaps the evidence of faith – for the positions we hold and according to which we live.

As I understand it, a phenomenological approach to the philosophy of religion is a phenomenology of religious life in a full and expansive sense. As such it enables us to talk accurately about what it means to be religious through the careful articulation and explication of the religious practices that constitute that way of life. As philosophy, the phenomenological approach is distinct from – though I think complementary to – other approaches such as the natural theology of Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas, an apologetic approach, or the approach of thinkers in the analytic tradition. It does not begin from debates about the status and warrant of revelation or its personal, social and political status; it begins instead with the experiences of people who live in light of that revelation. It attempts to understand what they are doing and how the world “shows up” for them within a religious horizon.
From another point of view, the phenomenologist might contend that we cannot really answer the first question – *Why a philosophy of religion?* – until we answer the second: *Why a phenomenology of religion?* To ask this question is really to ask three equally basic questions: Why philosophy at all? Why a philosophy of experience (i.e., phenomenology)? Why a phenomenology of *religious* experience?

1) *Why philosophy?* If we take as an initial point of departure the traditional position that philosophy is a *love of wisdom* and take wisdom (*sophia*) to be a possibility of a rational human being – a kind of excellent behavior, an *arête* governing the comportment of our minds in their encounter with the world – then we might claim that philosophy in its original and underdetermined sense was not developed at all, it was discovered. We philosophize in the first place because we can reason. But *about what* do we reason? Rational activity is a *supervening* activity and to that extent a *founded* activity: it only exists in relation to experience, and by experience here we mean the entire complex of our sensible, affective, interpersonal, and intellectual manners of interacting with the world around us. That reality suggests the answer to our second question.

2) *Why a philosophy of experience (i.e., a phenomenology)?* It is because experience is the necessary starting point of philosophical reflection. Phenomenology need not be the whole of
philosophy, but, in a general sense at least, it is its starting point. We can of course tell a different more detailed story about the historical genesis of phenomenology and the specific set of epistemic and ontological questions to which it intended to offer a response. However, the nature of that response is precisely the claim that the ultimate *raison d’être* of philosophy is that it is a means of clarifying our experience of the world; of understanding what is already latent in that experience such that we can communicate and collaborate and, in the process, come to understand ourselves.

*Why should we want to do this?* What other recourse do we have? If our experience of and in the world cannot offer us material for understanding and evaluating it, will the search for an external standard of measurement be any less relative? It is this process of the thoughtful discernment of one’s personal and communal experience that uncovers the meaningfulness of life and the values that structure it.

3) To our third question then: *Why a phenomenology of religious experience?* To this we must answer that any other approach to the religious phenomenon—however illuminative and legitimate—is in some sense derivative. Studying religion as a social or historical phenomenon presupposes religious persons who in their living constitute the meaning of that phenomenon and are the occasion for its principal expression. Yet a religious person is not in her first or preeminent sense the holder of an intellectual position; rather she is someone who has undergone or continues to undergo religious experience. That experience can encompass a wide range of phenomena.
ranging from the individual and mystical to the communal and liturgical. It is a complex aggregate of creedal statements, personal experience, shared practice, ethical commitments and action, as well as trust in other people. Whatever religion is, it is not first and foremost beliefs, but rather beliefs follow upon the experience of something more elemental. Thus, we must understand in part what it means for someone to be religious in order to understand more precisely how religion has exercised and continues to exercise social and global influence.

II. Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religion

Any discussion of the phenomenology of religion must contend with Heidegger. There can be no gainsaying the fact that it is Heidegger who transforms – whether we think that a development or a deformation – the rigorous science intended by Husserl into a hermeneutic phenomenology. It is significant that many of the major differences between them are worked out by Heidegger in his early Freiburg courses on religion. *It is in developing a phenomenology of religion that Heidegger first realizes that a phenomenology of religious consciousness is insufficient to the task, and that what is called for is a fuller phenomenology of religious life.*

Yet, Heidegger is not merely in dialogue with Husserl, but also with a wide range of thinkers from different places in the German academy. His phenomenology of religious life is forged in view of and in response to these larger debates. To each he poses the same question:
“We must now understand in what way this philosophy of religion refers to religion, whether it grows out from the meaning of religion, or whether religion is not rather [apprehended as] an object and forced into philosophical disciplines—that is to say, integrated into material complexes that already exist in themselves before religion” (PRL 27/19).

What Heidegger critiques here, is the uncritical adoption of either natural-scientific or metaphysical categories as those of the philosophy of religion. He engages at length with Ernst Troeltsch for whom the philosophy of religion was the search for the religious *a priori* which he believes operates according to a law-like orderedness. For Troeltsch, once we have grasped this law of religious development we can, so to speak, see where religion is heading and must then aid it in its authentic development (*ethical imperative*). In distinction from a Kantian paradigm, biblical historians like Hermann Gunkel and Wilhelm Bousset, claim the scientific rigor of the study of religion can only be guaranteed through the adoption of a set of categories modeled on the natural and historical sciences.

Heidegger does not deny the real advances made by either theologians or by biblical historians. He is, however, contesting their claim to priority in determining the primary sense of the religious and the best method for uncovering that primary sense. St. Paul is a helpful case in point. For Heidegger, the form-critical analysis of the epistolary character of the Pauline writings can furnish helpful information about the historical context, formal character, and cultural
significance of letter writing in the first century CE. However, to suggest that this is equivalent to a theological or philosophical understanding of those same writings is incorrect: “the point of departure is misguided as much according to the science of history as phenomenologically. One approaches the matter entirely externally” (81/56). Such an external standpoint, by definition, cannot grasp what is new in the use to which traditional forms of expression are put.

Thus, Heidegger argues that to simply divide the study of religion up, as Troeltsch does, between psychology, history, epistemology, and metaphysics is to admit that one has not truly grasped the unity that underlies affective states, transcendental structures, and historical events. Each of these approaches operates with an unacknowledged and predetermined “idea of God” [Gottes Idee] and so, “arise not from religion itself qua religion. [But rather] from the outside religion is observed and integrated as an object. The philosophy of religion itself is [only] the science of religion” (27/19). For Heidegger, by contrast, as a primordial science, philosophy in its first instance is phenomenology and as such it cannot begin from an assumed scientific standpoint. By extension, therefore, a phenomenology of religion cannot begin with a predetermined object, but rather has as its primary task the pre-determining investigation of the religious phenomenon.

In developing his phenomenological approach, Heidegger not only rejects the models of scientific criticism and Kantian philosophy; he also radically transforms Husserl’s conception of phenomenology. It was Husserl who initially set Heidegger the task of developing a phenomenology of religion by which he likely intended Heidegger to develop a regional ontology
of the religious, i.e., a phenomenology of religious consciousness. As early as 1917 he had recommended Rudolph Otto’s *Das Heilige* to Heidegger as a partial example of what such a phenomenology of religion might look like. Husserl thought Otto’s work was incomplete because it turned from phenomenology to theology—a defect Heidegger was meant to correct. However, far from completing Otto’s work, Heidegger critiques it for its limitations as only a phenomenology of religious consciousness, a critique that redounds to Husserl’s proposed phenomenology of religion. The problem with a phenomenology of religious consciousness is that it takes from religion “only that which has the character of consciousness” and what we mean by consciousness, “correspond[s] to the entirely particular concept of consciousness of the philosophy used as a foundation, [and therefore] standardize[s] the entire formulation of the problem” (76/53). In the case of Otto, his operative notion of consciousness is still at heart Cartesian: a transparently rational ego in relation to the irrational numinous, which it cannot master and so before which cowers in fear and fascination. For Heidegger Otto’s need to resort to the inappropriate categories of the rational and irrational shows that he has misunderstood consciousness; that, “[he has] no true insight yet into living consciousness and its original worlds.” (333/251) In Otto religion becomes a question only of consciousness and so is separated from its full-bodied worldly performance. Heidegger’s own proposal of a phenomenology of religious life (*religiöse Lebens*) will be something quite distinct from a phenomenology of religious consciousness.
III. How, then, a phenomenology of religion?

It is, of course, not enough to critique. Heidegger must propose an alternative *Religionsphilosophie*, and he calls this a phenomenology of religious life. Its starting point is “to see how religion and philosophy comport themselves, how religion becomes an object for philosophy” (28/19). His critical engagement with Troeltsch, Gunkel, Boussett, and Otto brings to relief by way of contrast some general components of his own approach.

1. First, the primal phenomenon of a phenomenology of religion is “faith in the existence of God [Existenz Gottes],” which is gained “in a non-cognitive manner” (28/19). It is not the extra-temporal lawfulness of the religious *a priori* as in Troeltsch, nor the total set of historical circumstances and relations under which religious events took place as in the case of the biblical historians, and neither is it the proto-phenomenology of Otto, which attempts to make of the holy a *noema* for theoretical observation. Faith is the primal phenomenon of Heidegger’s *Religionsphilosophie* and because it is a comportment of the believer, it can “be interpreted only from out of the essential experiential context of historical consciousness” (333/251).

2. Second, then, because religion, like philosophy, is not first an object but a kind of comportment, philosophy cannot simply bracket and evaluate “it” – we are the “it”, so to speak. Instead, the
phenomenologist must wait and attend to the enacted nature of religion in concrete and particular contexts from which he can then preliminarily derive the categories of its interpretation.

3. Third, as a corollary, since phenomenology and science relate to phenomena in fundamentally different ways, they cannot study religion in the same way. Phenomenology’s claim to provide the more primordial manner of engagement suggests it could open up new and old avenues of description. For example, Heidegger notes, critically, that Otto’s concept of the *numinous* is in reality the concept of the holy *minus* its traditional ethical and rational components. Since Schleiermacher’s response to Kant, defenders of religion have felt the need to make such a radical distinction between religion on the one hand and metaphysics and ethics on the other. Heidegger, by contrast, asks suggestively: “Does this attachment [of the ethical and rational moments] belong somehow to the originary structure of the numinous?” (334/252).

If these three characteristics can be taken as the general goals of Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion, the pressing question is still, *how does he propose to meet them?* Heidegger’s method, first worked out in his early courses on St Paul and St Augustine, has two essential moments. The first is a new account of meaning and the second is his practice of *formal indication*—to each of these we will gesture and then begin.
1) *Meaning*. Heidegger repeatedly insists that we understand experience as both content and activity: the *experienced what* and the *experiencing of that what*. Thus, phenomenology’s leading back of philosophy to original experience (its reduction) must be equally a consideration of *what* is experienced and *how* it is experienced. Experience here is not a detached speculative surveying, but rather “a confrontation-with, the self-assertion of the forms of what is experienced” (9/7).

Heidegger describes it as “a living toward something” in which “the living and the lived of experience...[are not two distinct objects, but together] constitute a single unity” (BPP 55, 56).

This attention to the *experiencing of experience* is not simply a retreat to immediacy (contra Natorp). Philosophical reflection on factical life does not impoverish or denude it, but rather allows its temporal and contingent fullness to be thought. This original account of the significance of factical life and, within that, of religious experience, will have to proceed along both these lines, which are in reality two irreducible moments of a single complex phenomenon.

In his religion courses Heidegger comes to see that, in addition to the content-meaning (*Gehaltsinn*), the how-meaning of an object must be further subdivided into relational-meaning (*Bezugsinn*) and enactment-meaning (*Vollzugsinn*). To question the meaning of phenomena therefore requires us to ask three distinct questions: What am I experiencing? How am I relating to it? How is that relation enacted (or: what motivated me to relate to it (e.g., the religious) in this way?) (63/43). In answering these questions, Heidegger reconfigures the Husserlian account of fulfilled and empty intentions into his three meaning-strata of the *Gehaltsinn, Bezugsinn*, and
Vollzugsinn. The Vollzugsinn, in particular, will prove crucial for grasping phenomena at their appropriately basic level because it is at that level that I first ask what relation would be most appropriate to the phenomenon under investigation and why.

2) Formal Indication. Heidegger proposes to question phenomena at the level of factual life by means of a procedure he calls formal indication [formale Anzeige]. It is his attempt to explain how a phenomenology of experience can be reflective without being theoretically abstractive. He defines it as “the methodical use of a sense”—one of the three mentioned—“that becomes a guiding one for phenomenological explication” (56/38)\(^1\). Parallel to Gehaltsinn, Bezugsinn, Vollzugsinn, stand object, consciousness, world. Heidegger has made it clear he intends to privilege the enacted nature of meaning and so too the worldly or worlded character of thinking that supplies the ground of enactment and which determines the nature of our intentional relations (theoretical or other) and objectivity. By emphasizing the non-reducible condition of world, formal indication reverses the Cartesian priority of the subject by attending to the priority and ineluctability of the worldly significance of whatever shows up for such a subject. The consequence of this form of engagement is the deflection of any “uncritical lapse” into some

\(^1\) In other words, Heidegger is asking what is the most original way of attending to reality. The theoretical may be explanatory, but at what cost is such an explanation gained? What falls out of view?
specific conception (e.g., of religion or the human being or justice) that would foreclose pursuit of the genuine sense of the phenomenon.

Heidegger finds a model for this in Paul who he claims “rejects the understanding of Christianity from pre-given forms of religion” and desires instead, “a complete break with the past: Paul wants to say that he has not come to Christianity through a historical tradition, but through an original experience” (69/49). The original explication of an original experience is not only Paul’s goal, but Heidegger’s as well.

IV. Scope and Sequence

Chapter one has three related objectives. First, to categorize the various modes under which Heidegger’s relationship to religion can be considered. Second, to examine his relationship to Husserl in biographical and conceptual terms in order to understand where the principal philosophical differences lie. Third, to suggest, merely by way of an overture, to what degree the development of a hermeneutic phenomenology from out of Husserl’s transcendental science of essences is a development rather than a dissolution of the method, and how it is provoked in a particular way by Heidegger’s attempt to formulate a phenomenology of religion in 1920-21.

Chapter two turns to the first of those religion courses and situates its proposed project of a phenomenology of religious life within the broader context of the academic study of religion in
the new German university. The novelty of Heidegger’s approach is clearest when set against not only Husserl’s phenomenology, but other models of non-confessional engagement with the religious phenomenon.

Chapter three investigates the central methodological innovation of these courses, formal indication [formal Anzeige], which outlives Heidegger’s professional interest in the philosophy of religion and remains a defining feature of his philosophical approach at least through the 1930’s and perhaps for the entirety of his career.

Chapters four and five then turn to Heidegger’s readings of Paul and Augustine to observe how formal indication works and what it brings to light when applied to early Christian eschatology (Paul) and the experience of tentatio described in Augustine’s Confessions.

In Chapter six we raise some critical questions about the tendency toward over-formalization in Heidegger’s account and suggest some places in his earlier readings where phenomena are passed over or described one-sidedly on account of this decision to emphasize enactment over content. We conclude by suggesting that Kierkegaard is an important influence on Heidegger at this stage in his thinking and that he provides us with resources for amending Heidegger’s account to make it more fruitful for future investigations of religious life.

To the things themselves!
Chapter 1

Husserl and Heidegger: Ways into Life

“The companion of my search was Luther and its model Aristotle, whom the former hated. Kierkegaard provided impulses, and Husserl gave me my eyes.” – Heidegger

“A Jesuit by education, he became a Protestant through indignation; a scholastic dogmatician by training he became an existential pragmatist through experience; a theologian by tradition, he became an atheist in his research, a renegade to his tradition cloaked in the mantle of its historian.” – Karl Löwith

§1. In media res: From Phenomena to Foundation

This chapter explores two vexed questions in early phenomenology exemplified by the quotes above. The first is that of the relationship between Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, which cannot be discussed in philosophical terms without also being discussed in biographical ones. The second is that of the young Heidegger’s relationship to religion, and that trajectory of questioning will take us from this chapter into subsequent ones. This second question, perhaps more so than the first, appears to admit of a strictly philosophical treatment, which would consist in identifying,
interpreting, and evaluating Heidegger’s written statements on phenomenology, faith and theology, as well as his critique of onto-theology. However, this is impossible for a few reasons. First, even if we were to limit ourselves to Heidegger’s published statements about philosophy and religion they would be hard to reconcile. In his early lecture courses he contends that the primitive Christian community first grasps the historical sense of existence (facticity) and so “lives temporality” in a unique way. Yet, a decade later, without explicitly revising or renouncing that early position, he claims that the Christian way of life is a “mortal enemy” of the philosophical way of life. Secondly, Heidegger’s public statements about the relationship between phenomenology and religion must also be measured against his private statements about his faith, which continue over the course of his life from his earliest days as an altar boy and seminarian to the final days before his death. He described this recurrence of faith to Jaspers as his “thorn in the flesh.” This apparent inability to extract himself from the originary world of Christian language and meaning is itself a profile of religious experience and therefore ingredient to its investigation. It suggests a way in which religion can prove generative for philosophy. So biography cannot be incidental to this investigation. Third, there is a claim to be made that Heidegger’s strong division between a phenomenological and a theological way of being in the world is itself suspiciously

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isomorphic with Luther’s understanding of the radical separation between scholastic philosophy and faith, though Heidegger pitches his tent on one side of the ravine and Luther on the other. Thus, even the claim of a radical distinction between phenomenological and theological thinking may not be theologically neutral. Finally, we cannot grasp the particular sense in which Heidegger’s account of phenomenology is hermeneutic unless we attend to the debates surrounding biblical hermeneutics prevalent in Germany at the time. Those debates are the backdrop against which Heidegger forges a new approach to the philosophy of religion, which he describes as a phenomenology of religious life, which is also, in its first iteration, a scriptural hermeneutics.

The question of Heidegger’s relationship to Husserl and that of his relationship to religion are related to one another. From the beginning the religious milieu of Heidegger’s thought, his early religious preoccupations, and his formal theological training distinguish him from Husserl, nor was Husserl unaware of the driving interests of his “phenomenologist of religion.” Yet, as it ran its course, this difference in initial orientation led to differences in the very conception of phenomenology. Heidegger attempts to construct a (Husserlian) phenomenology of religious consciousness, but is forced to reformulate his philosophy as a phenomenology of religious life. This is the first and defining step towards the “hermeneutics of facticity,” but in this movement much is lost or won. In it the basic relationship of philosophical description to life is at stake. In effect, Heidegger contends that Husserl’s return to life (zu den Sachen selbst) fails to grasp the
way in which life – the concourse between Dasein and world – generates the categories of its own interpretation. Rather than beginning with the fact of science and attempting to derive a more basic set of categories (intentional forms), he proposes that the deeper and primary possibility of phenomenology is to engage in the original clarification of facticity as such. Yet, for this to be truly original – a primordial science – it cannot privilege or presuppose any theoretical frame. This ultimately entails a rethinking of the leading senses of being, intuition, and understanding. In this rethinking Heidegger attempts to move from a consideration of phenomena “on hand” for consciousness to the givenness of both consciousness and phenomena in facticity. Whether this is a development of phenomenology or its dissolution is a question that we have yet to settle.

§2. A Religious Way into Life?

What is the role of the religious in Heidegger’s movement from consciousness to life? It is certainly the occasion for that development. Does it also contribute something essential? To answer this question, first we must distinguish the various ways one might consider Heidegger’s relation to religion. We can parse that question in at least five ways – an interpretive *quinque viae*. The first way is biographical. What did Heidegger in fact say regarding “the faith of his birth”? When did he say it, and in what context? Such first-person statements are the ineluctable starting point of a phenomenology of religion that is also to be a hermeneutics of facticity. A second way is to
examine not *indexical statements*, but *philosophical statements* about the relations obtaining between faith, theology, and phenomenology. In Heidegger’s case, this record often confirms that of the first way, but also conflicts with it at times. Beyond these two forms of direct speech, a third way examines how the forms of Heidegger’s thought are indebted to Christian models. A fourth way is to ask to what degree and in what way a set of preoccupations arising out of a religious lifeworld motivate Heidegger’s lines and manner of research. Heidegger thinks that a unique experience of time and history arises in the early Christian communities. Does that experience elevate the factical to a level of philosophical interest because in the Christian doctrine of Incarnation facticity – historical contingency – has shown itself capable of disclosing the divine? These first four ways make it clear that Heidegger, often despite his best efforts, remained a thinker deeply indebted to religion. A fifth and final way, both hermeneutical and phenomenological, asks about this struggle for emancipation and its frustration. This struggle engaged Heidegger until his death and for that reason it is a struggle that often subverts his own claims. Therefore, Heidegger – the believer, the philosopher, the apostate – offers us an opportunity for reflection just as Paul and Augustine did for him. The fact that his religious history and varied commitments remained alive enough to be in fruitful, if also sometimes painful, conflict with his philosophical work suggests that the question of the relation between philosophy and religion was not settled and

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warrants our further attention. We will take up the first of these five ways here in order to understand the peculiar formation of the young privatdozent and historian of medieval philosophy who came to work with Edmund Husserl and became, for a while, a leading practitioner of his phenomenological method.

§2.1 Heidegger’s Early Religious Lebenswelt

A set of tensions constitute the Lebenswelt of Heidegger’s childhood and adolescence. The first was between his family’s Catholic orthodoxy and the religio-political pressures of liberal Protestantism that reached their apogee in von Bismarck’s Kulturkampf. The second was between that same orthodoxy, later galvanized around the Modernist Oath and Pope Pius X’s Pascendi Gregis and Lamentabili, and the secularizing tendencies of modernism. Much has been said about Heidegger’s early formation in ultramontanist and anti-modernist Messkirch and we need not repeat it in detail here. What is sometimes overlooked in this oft-rehearsed history is that fact that Heidegger’s early religious context was one of constant debate. His early life and his early career are beset in a variety of ways by what we might call the Religionsfrage. He is firmly on one side of this debate until at least 1916, but it is nonetheless a very different context than the pre-

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Reformation medieval world to which he devoted the first decade of his studies. It is a world in which religion, its nature, meaning and relation to life, is at issue.

The Religionsfrage is by no means an abstract one for Heidegger. As a promising student he traveled to episcopal schools in Constance (1903) and later Freiburg (1907) to receive his education. In Constance he lived with other Catholic students in Konradihaus, a minor seminary, while attending the local grammar school where they were exposed to anticlericalism and thought less intellectually capable than their non-dogmatic peers. In his final year, in order to qualify for the “Eliner studentship” he enrolled in the prestigious Bertoldgymnasium in Freiburg and resided at St. Georg seminary. The Eliner studentship provided for its recipients to study for a doctorate in Catholic theology in Freiburg. Fatefully, Fr. Konrad Gröber, future archbishop of Freiburg, gave Heidegger Brentano’s On the Manifold sense of Being as a parting gift. After a brief period of candidacy with the Jesuits (October 1909) he enrolled in Theology at Freiburg (WS 1909) where he came under the influence of the theologian Carl Braig. In 1911 Heidegger is forced to give up his theological studies on account of his health. These biographical details are philosophically significant because they constitute the “situation” within which we must interpret Heidegger’s

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7 For more details on this period of Heidegger’s life see Ott, Heidegger, 48-58.
8 Cf. McGrath’s The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy, esp. pp.25-59; also referenced in Ott, p.58 ff.
9 Heidegger writes in a “Recollective ‘vita’” in 1957 that, “the decisive and therefore ineffable, influence on my own later academic career came from two men...the one was Carl Braig... The other was the art historian Wilhelm Vöge” (Jahreshefte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften 1957/58 (Heidelberg, 1959) 20-21 / BH 10). Cf. op. cit., for McGrath’s helpful discussion of Braig as an underappreciated influence on Heidegger’s preoccupation with ontology, critique of modernism, and the hermeneutical approach to the history of philosophy.
10 Ott suggests this incident in 1911 along with his previous dismissal from the Jesuits (1909) and his later 1916 failure to acquire the chair in Catholic philosophy leave Heidegger with a “grudge” against the Catholic Church. These events inaugurate a personal dialectic between Heidegger and the faith of his birth that occurs within the larger cultural, political, and intellectual dialectics concerning religion and the political and intellectual spheres.
pronouncements on religion in order to appreciate their force and horizon. That situation is the motivational complex of a young man who has spent the first 22 years of his life trying to become a Catholic priest, first a Jesuit then a secular cleric, only to be turned away repeatedly on account of his health. He then pursues, for another 5 years, a career path directing him toward a professorship in Christian (Catholic) philosophy, which is also ultimately frustrated. This frustration is partly remedied when he is brought back from Marburg to be Husserl’s successor. He spends the remainder of his career writing and teaching in what Husserl referred to as “arch-Catholic Freiburg.”

There is a religious inflection to Heidegger’s published work from the beginning. In 1912, he published his first two articles, which, though philosophical, are published in Catholic journals to attract the attention of Catholic faculty. After his dissertation using Husserl and Lask to refute psychologism he writes a habilitation using insights from neo-Kantianism and Husserlian phenomenology to reclaim aspects of Duns Scotus. That work was an opening salvo for a program of research dedicated to a recovery of medieval thought. In 1915 he described it as follows,

“My increasing interest in history facilitated for me a more intense engagement with the philosophy of the middle ages, an engagement that I recognized as necessary for a radical extension of Scholasticism. …This investigation [into The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus] has also engendered in me the plan for a comprehensive

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11 As it turns out, the primary text of Heidegger’s habilitation, Grammatica Speculativa, was in fact authored by Thomas of Erfurt not, as he thought, Duns Scotus.
presentation of medieval logic and psychology in the light of modern phenomenology… If I am permitted to assume the duties of scientific research and teaching, my life’s work will be dedicated to the realization of this plan.”

Heidegger’s proposed program is aptly characterized as a “rehabilitation of the middle ages,” achieved by bringing phenomenological insight to bear on scholastic logic and psychology. While certainly tailored to the position for which he was applying, there is no reason to suggest, as some have, that Heidegger is disingenuous in his proposal.

Heidegger’s early career was as a Christian philosopher. He began that career in 1916 as a privatdozent in Freiburg teaching a course titled “Basic Trends of Ancient and Scholastic Philosophy.” That same year he was passed over for the professorship in Christian Philosophy, which was the first in a series of confessionally embroiled searches for an academic appointment. The following year, Heidegger was passed over for a second appointment, this time at (Protestant) Marburg for a teaching position in the history of medieval philosophy. The cause appears to have been Husserl’s cool and detached report to Natorp (who had initiated the inquiry) in which he remarks, “That [Heidegger] is confessionally tied [to Catholicism] is quite certain.”

Two years later in February 1920 Husserl initiates a correspondence with Natorp about another open position.

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13 McGrath, Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy, 42
14 See Robert Vigliotti, “The Heidegger’s Ambitions for the Chair of Christian Philosophy (II) and Hugo Ott’s Charge of Opportunism” in Studia Phaenomenologica I, 3-4, 323-350. Vigliotti argues that Ott’s characterization of Heidegger in his Biographie is misleading because it fails to take into account the particular context of Catholic university culture and philosophy at the time of Heidegger’s early career. He also fails to understand that Heidegger’s one time desire to reinvigorate scholasticism was not disingenuous but sincere, and modeled on the work of Carl Braig (his teacher) and Herman Schell.
15 Kisiel and Sheehan, Becoming Heidegger, 355
in Marburg. In the course of this second letter he regrets\textsuperscript{16} his misrepresentation of Heidegger in their earlier correspondence and insists that he has “freed himself from dogmatic Catholicism” and “cut himself off from the sure and easy career of a ‘philosopher of the catholic worldview.’”\textsuperscript{17} Yet, Heidegger is passed over once again. It will not be until 1923 that he succeeds in securing an assistant professorship.

Between Husserl’s two letters to Natorp occurs what Kisiel calls the “interregnum”. This is two-year period from 1917-1919 that Heidegger describes as one of intense soul-searching. It results in a profound a reorientation of his professional career. In the fateful year of 1919, the same year Heidegger receives the unusual appointment as Husserl’s paid assistant, he writes to his friend and colleague Fr. Englebert Krebs that,

> “Epistemological insights extending to the theory of historical knowledge have made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me—but not Christianity and metaphysics, which, however, [I now understand] in a new sense.”\textsuperscript{18}

Heidegger explains that the previous two years had been spent struggling for a “basic clarification of my philosophical position.” The result of this clarification was the adherence of Heidegger and his wife to a “non-dogmatic” form of Protestantism with “no fixed confessional ties.” The turn to Lutheranism was not as unprecipitated as it might appear, nor was it unrelated to a second career

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\textsuperscript{16} “Long after the fact I have had some second thoughts that bother me” (Briefwechsel 5: 139-41 / BH 366).

\textsuperscript{17} Kisiel and Sheehan, *Becoming Heidegger*, 367

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 96
of reading involving Luther, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky that had engaged Heidegger for years. We will have occasion to look at some of these authors in great detail below. For our present purposes, three related points must be made. First, Heidegger’s turn from a dogmatic Catholicism to a non-dogmatic Protestantism was not a turn away from the philosophical consideration of religion as such, far from it. Second, it corresponds roughly with his own appropriation of Husserl’s understanding of the methodological atheism of phenomenological description. Thirdly, it coincides with a certain interest on Husserl’s part in a description of “religious consciousness” precipitated by the publication of Rudolph Otto’s *The Idea of the Holy*.

In turning to a non-dogmatic Protestantism Heidegger did not reject his orientation as a Christian philosopher, but only redirected it. Two months after his letter to Englebert Krebs, he wrote to Elisabeth Blochmann and described his philosophical itinerary as, “repeated new forays into the true origins, preliminary works for the phenomenology of religious consciousness – [...] continually learning in my association with Husserl.” Not only did Heidegger pursue his studies in the philosophy of religion with renewed interest, he also took Husserl to be a teacher and collaborator in the enterprise. Rudolph Otto was Husserl’s colleague at Gottingen and it appears his work, *Das Heilige*, held Husserl’s attention. He wrote to Otto as well as to Heidegger

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19 Judith Wolfe has argued recently that Heidegger discovered the phenomenological method, together with Protestantism, in large part as a means to adequately describing religious experience” (*Heidegger and Theology*, 33).
20 Heidegger/Blochmann *Briefwechsel* 16/BH 368 (Trans. Kiesel)
21 He writes to Otto that, “I was drawn to your book *Das Heilige*, and it has had a stronger effect on me than almost any other book in years.” Husserl, *Briefwechsel* 7, 205-208 /BH 365 – 367. The book was recommended to him by Heidegger and Heinrich Ochsner.
registering the same praise and the same critique: the book beings as a phenomenology of religion and ends as theology. He suggests to Otto that there is a need for greater analysis of the phenomena before arriving at “a theory of religious consciousness” that would be philosophical. He writes to Heidegger, who appears to have brought the work to Husserl’s attention, and suggests that he would be in a good position to offer a phenomenological critique of it of the work, but more importantly to begin to do what Otto did not. This history is illuminative for its suggestion that for a time Husserl and Heidegger shared a vision of a philosophy of religion that would be a phenomenology of religious consciousness. He concludes his letter to Heidegger, then serving as a weatherman in the war, as follows: “Each must do his part as if the salvation of the world depended on it: I in phenomenology, you as a full-time weatherman and a part-time phenomenologist of religion.”

The collaboration was not to last. Already, less than a year into his assistantship with Husserl disagreements over how to approach the religious caused Heidegger much frustration. In October 1920, as he reluctantly prepares his course on the phenomenology of religion, he writes Karl Löwith that, “I myself am no longer even regarded as a ‘philosopher,’ I am ‘actually still a theologian.’” In a letter to Löwith later that same year he refers to himself as a “Christian theo-

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22 “It seems to me that the metaphysician (theologian) in Herr Otto has swept up Otto the phenomenologist and carried him away on his wings” (ibid).
23 Ibid.
24 cf. Husserl’s fourth letter to Heidegger on the front in Briefwechsel 4:131-36 / BH 361
25 Ibid.
26 From an unpublished transcript of the letter edited by Klaus Stichweh; translated and introduced by Theodore Kisiel in BH 370.
“logian,” perhaps attempting to distinguish an account (logos) of theos other than Husserl’s proposed study of the “consciousness of God.”

Whatever the interpretive possibilities and aporia of these statements, for our present purposes it is clear enough that the Heidegger prior to Being and Time, by any account and certainly by the accounts (positive and negative) of his contemporaries, is a religious thinker within the Christian tradition, and this in two senses. First, the philosophical training and resources available to him were communicated within a confessionally committed milieu and the horizon of his professional life was that of confessionally committed institutions. Second, Heidegger’s intellectual preoccupations during this period were religious. His account of Pauline eschatology, for example, is not as some have argued merely an occasion to develop a distinct approach to phenomenology, but is central to his nascent phenomenology of religion. What we find there is a philosophy of religion conceived as a phenomenological hermeneutics that is a direct response to the enervating limitations of a strictly historical critical method with its presupposed account of meaning alongside a critique of certain elements of Husserlian phenomenology.

§2.2 Theo-logical Turns and Returns

The history of Heidegger’s relationship to Husserl and to religion helps situate his early attempt at a philosophy of religion. Yet our interest is not merely interpretive, it is also evaluative
and finally *phenomenological*. Understanding the role Christian factical life plays in Heidegger’s contribution to philosophical discourse provides us with a perspective from which to evaluate the contemporary debate about the borderlands between phenomenology and the religious. Our opening questions thus transcend merely historical interest because they cut to the heart of a central debate about what is essential to phenomenology thematically and methodologically. To what does phenomenology relate itself and how does it relate itself? In this debate, religion has been the other to phenomenology. It either delineates a borderland that cannot be crossed into or one from which, having been crossed into, we must return, or it supplies the screen against which phenomenology’s implicit presuppositions can be seen, questioned, and perhaps transcended. Dominique Janicaud was the most helpful and forceful contemporary thinker to delineate the issue and suggest the stakes of its resolution. This account, written before the German publication of Heidegger’s religion courses, presupposes a distinction between a first phenomenologically useful Heidegger and a “later” poetic figure who had given up any pretention to phenomenology. This distinction, however proves untenable on historic, thematic, and phenomenological grounds.

Janicaud’s work began as a report conducted at the request of the International Institute of Philosophy into the apparent contemporary multiplicity and seeming irreconcilability of phenomenologies. It is a critical history and theoretical critique of the “new phenomenologists”, a

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moniker whose essential set included precursor Immanuel Levinas and a second generation of French phenomenological thinkers including Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Luis Chretien, and Michel Henry. The report evolved into a polemic against “perversions of phenomenological method for explicit or implicit theological ends.” This intrusion of theological concerns was prepared for in an anticipatory way by the “later Heidegger” and Ricoeur, and effected through the works of Levinas, Marion, and their French phenomenological compatriots. These latter displaced the positive work of describing phenomena and replaced it with a quest for the “essence of phenomenality” and the “advent of the originary.” In so doing they dispensed with the central principles of phenomenological methodology the “Principle of All Principles” as well as the reduction and eidetic intuition.

Janicaud insists that he does not argue as a “Husserlian.” Whatever “true phenomenology” is and whether it exists “cannot be decided in advance, in terms of an overarching critical system, but must be considered on a case-by-case basis.” What he envisions seems to be less a single phenomenology than a multiplicity of investigations unified by an unwavering commitment to a few certain methodological principles. Yet, while he envisioned a future constellation of phenomenologies different than Husserl, his critique is intended to preserve what has always been

28 Janicaud, *The Theological Turn*, 3
29 In *Ideas I*, §24 Husserl writes: “No conceivable theory can make us stray from the principle of all principles: that each intuition affording [something] in an originary way is a legitimate source of knowledge, that whatever presents itself to us in ‘Intuition’ in an originary way (so to speak, in its actuality in person) is to be taken simply as what it affords itself as, but only within the limitations in which it afford itself there” (Ideas 1, 35). *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*. Translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. (Hackett Publishing, 2014).
30 Janicaud, *The Theological Turn*, 7
the essential character and goal of his predecessor’s conception of phenomenology since its incipient formulations: that it be scientific\textsuperscript{31}. The rhetoric of “scientificity” has, of course, Kant’s first \textit{Critique} as a proximate predecessor and Descartes as a more remote one. Like the earlier French mathematician, Husserl’s pretension to phenomenology as a \textit{mathesis universalis}\textsuperscript{32} entails that it be presuppositionless. It can neither borrow principles from another science, nor leave to a yet-more-general science the elaborations of its basic presuppositions: It is that science. This implies that its methodology must comprise principles that are self-generated. In other words, the very experience phenomenology sets out to describe, clarify, and, ultimately, whose essence it purports to identify must generate the principles of that activity and the “categories” of that description. Moreover, it must do this not only for an experience, but for any experience as such, for the intentional experience of an object in general.

Thus, at a first general level of comparison, Husserl, Heidegger, and Janicaud agree that phenomenology’s \textit{return zu den Sachen selbst} is a reflective return to life. Heidegger’s early attempts to define philosophy as a “primordial science” [\textit{Urwissenschaft}] and his preoccupation with “factual life experience” are therefore in continuity with Husserl’s basic statement of phenomenology. Perplexing to Heidegger in a different way is the question of \textit{how}. How do we

\textsuperscript{31} For example, the essay to which we will turn shortly and with which Heidegger was much taken as a student: “Phenomenology as Rigorous Science.” Despite the fact that this is a very early programmatic essay that is prior to the key distinction between the phenomenological and transcendental reductions and therewith phenomenology psychology and transcendental phenomenology, the basic commitment to a scientific phenomenology is clear and remains unchanged for the duration of Husserl’s career.

\textsuperscript{32} “Formal ontology is pure logic in its full extension to the \textit{mathesis universalis}” or the “eidetic science of objects in general” (\textit{Ideas I}, p.17).
enter the stream of life reflectively without arresting its flow? This is the problem, *in nuce*, of the hermeneutic circle between facticity and thought. That problem, Heidegger reminds us, is not to avoid the circle, but “to enter it in the right way.” Ultimately, Heidegger’s account would drive us to decide whether phenomenology is a return to life or a rigorous science, since, he claims, it cannot be both in the sense Husserl intends. To these issues and related questions we shall return shortly.

Janicaud argues that, “without Heidegger’s *Kehre* there would be no theological turn. Assuredly.” Heidegger’s *Kehre* is a turn from a phenomenology of the visible to the invisible. This is apparent, argues Janicaud, in his 1973 Zahringen Seminars whose central phenomena is paradoxically the *unapparent* [*Unscheinbaren*], which is described variously as “that which hides” or is “covered over” and, in particular, that which cannot be reduced to an appearance. Interpreting Heidegger, Janicaud writes:

“[For Heidegger,] Husserl still understands being as an objective given, whereas Heidegger tries to think its ‘truth’ as the ‘unconcealing’ of presence. From there, everything is no longer related in intentionality, but consciousness is more originally situated in the ‘ek-static’ of *Dasein.*”

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34 Janicaud, *The Theological Turn*, 31
35 ibid., 29
What is striking about Janicaud’s account is neither the suggestion that Heidegger is responsible for the possibility of the theological turn nor his account of the unapparent, but rather the suggestion that this is somehow a feature of the “later” Heidegger. Recent research has called into question the accuracy and explanatory power of the so-called Kehre between an early and a late stage in Heidegger’s thinking. We need not enter into that debate here to suggest that the unapparent as it is here described is already a theme in Being and Time in the way in which the ontological existentia of Dasein are unapparent in the peculiar way that they are signaled as already being covered over in Dasein’s average everydayness. Perhaps themes from Being and Time are revisited here and even developed further. So be it. However, if the turn to the unapparent or hidden opens up phenomenology’s encounter with the religious this is in reality a re-turn to Heidegger’s earliest preoccupations with the religious phenomena which could not “show up” for a phenomenology conceived within the strict parameters of Husserl’s strenge Wissenschaft. Therefore, Janicaud is right to argue that Heidegger’s sense for the hiddenness of things poses a fundamental problem to the Husserlian understanding of constitution, yet this is a challenge that goes back not only as far as Being and Time, but to his earliest engagement with religion and the revised account of meaning it leads to.

36 We have already had occasion to note the works of Van Buren (1995), McGrath (2001), Wolfe (2013, 2014), and Coyne (2015), all of whom suggest a certain thematic continuity that obtains over and despite varying periods of emphasis.

37 Jason W. Alvis, in conversation with Günter Figal’s recent Unscheinbarkeit: Der Raum der Phänomenologie (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015) has proposed other ways of translating and understanding “Unscheinbarkeit” in the 1973 Seminars. He signals its problematic French and English translation as invisible which falls into the um/sicht polarity that the phenomena of hiddenness (the “inconspicuous” in his translation) is meant to move beyond. See his forthcoming, Phenomenologies of the Inconspicuous: Heidegger and the Theological Turn in French Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press)
The distinction between *earlier* and *later* becomes problematic in a second register. Whatever Heidegger’s incompatibilities with the “new phenomenologists,” it is not clear we can draw a neat distinction between early phenomenology on the one hand constituted by Husserl and Heidegger and a later or “second generation” theological phenomenology on the other. This presupposes an ability to clearly align Husserl and Heidegger so as to clearly delineate them from later thinkers, including the “later” Heidegger. Yet it is Heidegger himself who claimed that without his “theological origins” he would never “have been led to philosophy,” and lest we interpret that as a merely historical statement, he adds that, “our origins are always before us.”

As it concerns early phenomenology *tout court,* then, these religious origins and their consequences for Heidegger’s phenomenological orientation are apparent from his first Freiburg period. This is born out both by close study of Heidegger’s early writings, and also on the testimony of those who knew them.

Therefore, if we want to adjudicate the “legitimacy” of conflicting approaches, we must look not to a later theological turn, but to the essential differences between a pure eidetic and transcendental phenomenology, a *Wissenschau,* and a hermeneutic phenomenology of factical life.

We can organize an investigation of the differences between Husserl and Heidegger around three guiding questions: What is the method of phenomenology? What is the content of

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39 To Edith Stein, for example, the differences were apparent from the beginning. See Edith Stein. *Life in a Jewish Family.* (Washington: ICS Publications, 1986). See especially, Ch. X: The *Rigorosum* in Freiburg (1916), 397 ff.
phenomenology? And, finally, what is the goal of phenomenology? In a strange twist of irony, the kind to which history is a perennial witness, it turns out that the contemporary theological *turn* is in fact a *return* to a set of preoccupations and insights characteristic of the “earliest” Heidegger whose later work *Being and Time* represented a, perhaps, “secular” turn.

§3. *Encyclopedia Britannica*\(^{40}\) and the Parting of Ways

Heidegger’s attempt to formulate a phenomenology of religious life, specifically of Christian religious life, led to a set of insights into the conditions and structure of (religious) meaning that, in turn, led him to reformulate Husserlian phenomenology as a hermeneutics of facticity. In order to understand how Heidegger’s religious formation and concerns led to his reconceiving of phenomenology, we must understand what were the major points of disagreement between him and Husserl. Thus, what remains for us here is to examine what was for a time a deeply fruitful philosophical *Mitdenken* and warm friendship as well as its dissolution, while attending to the way the religious phenomenon in particular raised fundamental questions about phenomenology as such. We will do this by way of a “genealogical reduction” by which we will be led back from an

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obvious point of rupture where the differences are clear to the possible origins of these differences and their intensification in Heidegger’s early religion courses.

It will be helpful to gain access to the relevant distinctions by way of an evident point of rupture. One such point is the fraught and ultimately unsuccessful collaboration of the two phenomenologists on the article “Phenomenology” for the Encyclopedia Britannica in the late autumn of 1927. This was the point at which it became clear to Husserl just how far his best and brilliant student had moved from his original and pioneering conception of phenomenology. The article is a helpful point of departure for our own investigation for a few reasons. First, in its final version it presents a relatively mature statement of Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology. Second, Heidegger’s commentary on Husserl’s initial daft (Draft B) illuminates the principal areas of disagreement between them. Third, Heidegger contributes an introduction and first section to Draft B, later rejected by Husserl, which signal his distinct way into phenomenology and through it into life. Fourth, in the final version Husserl anticipates the lines of critique suggested by Heidegger’s comments on the earlier draft, though he does this indirectly.

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41 The desire for the article was due in no small part to misleading or misunderstood statements by Husserl on the nature of phenomenology and his own important evolution between the Logical Investigations and Ideas I from a type of descriptive realism to a transcendental phenomenology.  
42 Four months later, after the fourth and final “Draft D” of the article, Husserl’s comments to Ingarten that, “The new Encyclopedia article has given me a lot of trouble, chiefly because once again and in an original way, I thought through my fundamental procedure and respectfully concluded that Heidegger, as I now must believe, has not understood this procedure nor, consequently, the whole sense of the method of phenomenological reduction” in Briefwechsel 3, 236–237 / BH 389.
In its final German version⁴³ “Phenomenology” is a relatively mature statement of Husserl’s phenomenology. Here, for example, we see very clear distinctions between empirical psychology, phenomenological psychology, and transcendental phenomenology, which were lacking in Husserl’s 1917 “Inaugural Lecture” at Freiburg ten years earlier. He argues that these distinctions are methodologically justified by clarifying different psychological and transcendental reductions that distinguish the field of phenomenological psychology from that of transcendental phenomenology. A first phenomenological reduction delineates the field of phenomenological psychology that provides the \textit{a priori} ground for empirical psychology and thereby raises it to the level of an exact science. A further transcendental reduction enables a suspension of all particularity still operative in the first phenomenological reduction and yields “transcendental ‘inner’ experience” that is constituted by the duality of an apperceived I and an apperceiving I which open up “the limitless transcendental field of being.”⁴⁴ The securing of this field of being justifies transcendental phenomenology as a distinct and originary science and therefore as the ground of ontology and the foundation of all other sciences.

In September of 1927 Husserl drafted the article and sent it to Heidegger at Marburg. What are we to make of this gesture? Husserl was already aware that his former student was moving

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⁴³ The final English translation that appeared in the encyclopedia is quite another matter. Christopher V. Salmon translated it and in the process reduced it from 7,000 German words to 4,000 English words. Headings were changed, removed, and added. The combined tasks of translating and editing resulted in more than a few infelicitous condensations of key terms and principles. We will refer to the revised translation of the final German version produced by R.E. Palmer in \textit{Husserl: Shorter Works}, edited by McCormick and Elliston. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 30ff.

⁴⁴ Husserl, “Phenomenology,” 30
phenomenology in a different direction. He had helped correct the galleys\textsuperscript{45} of *Being and Time* and published it in his own *Jahrbuch*. Therefore, while he was perhaps too inclined the first time through to forgive what was unclear and to give his assistant and friend the benefit of the doubt for what seemed unscientific\textsuperscript{46}, it was also clear that Husserl was under no illusions about the basic difference in approach taken by Heidegger, even if he had yet to grasp its depth. He wrote to a friend in August of that year that: “On the face of it, *[Being and Time]* distances itself entirely from my analytic phenomenology, which builds from below to the heights.”\textsuperscript{47} Nor did he suffer from a lack of colleagues suggesting to him that, “Heidegger’s phenomenology is something totally different from mine.”\textsuperscript{48} For all that, however, Heidegger remained the “heir” to whom “the future of phenomenological philosophy” was to be entrusted. In this context, then, the article represents a final rapprochement between these early phenomenologists and friends, a last attempt by Husserl to cull the “exceptional, albeit unclarified, intellectual energy” of the author of *Being and Time*\textsuperscript{49}. It was an attempt that ultimately miscarried.

In October, Heidegger agreed to collaborate on a second draft for which he wrote an introduction and a first section titled “The Idea of a Pure Psychology,” while Husserl wrote a lengthy final section titled “Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology”

\textsuperscript{45} cf. letter to Fritz Kaufmann April 20, 1926: “We are helping with correcting Heidegger’s *Being and Time* and are now on the fourth galley. It gives me a great deal of satisfaction. I’m working enthusiastically” (*Briefwechsel* 3:347 / BH 377).

\textsuperscript{46} cf. ibid: “I was surprised by the newfangled language and style of thinking. Initially, I trusted he emphatic declaration: it was the continuation of my own research.”

\textsuperscript{47} Husserl, *Briefwechsel* 3, 455–56 / BH, 383

\textsuperscript{48} ibid. 402

\textsuperscript{49} Witten in a letter from Husserl to Alexander Pfänder on 1 Jan, 1931 in Husserl, *Briefwechsel* 2, 180–86 / BH 401, trans. by Burt Hopkins.
composed of two subdivisions dealing with the “historical intertwining” of phenomenological psychology and transcendental philosophy, and a second division arguing for the distinctiveness and necessity of a transcendental phenomenology. Heidegger returned his draft with annotations and a letter that included three appendices. In the first appendix he poses a series of critical questions pertaining to Husserl’s account of the phenomenological method. The outline of “Draft B” is thus the following:
INTRODUCTION:

THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
AND
THE REGRESS TO CONSCIOUSNESS

PART I

THE IDEA OF A PURE PSYCHOLOGY

1. The Object of Pure Psychology
2. The Method of Pure Psychology
   a) The Phenomenological Reduction
   b) The Eidetic Analysis
3. The Basic Function of Pure Psychology

PART II

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

The First Division of Part II
   The Historical Intertwining of Phenomenological and Transcendental Phenomenology, and the Need to
   Distinguish the Two.
   Section One
   Section Two
The Second Division of Part II
   1. The Transcendental Problem
   2. Psychologism as a False Solution
   3. Transcendental Reduction and the Semblance of Doubling
   4. Pure Psychology as a Propaedeutic to Transcendental Phenomenology

HEIDEGGER'S LETTER AND APPENDICES

Letter to Husserl (October 22, 1927)

Appendix I: Difficulties With Issues
Appendix II: re Arrangement of Pages 21ff.
Appendix III.
After receiving Heidegger’s draft Husserl proceeded to write the article alone. While the final (fourth) draft bears little resemblance to what Heidegger wrote, Husserl suggested to him that, though not what Heidegger would have liked, the article retained something of his suggestions.51

The final German version of the article, as the first, draws clear distinctions between pure (phenomenological) psychology and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of that distinction, the final section explains how transcendental phenomenology enables for the first time a truly universal science grounding all other exact sciences. In the final subsections he argues that transcendental phenomenology is ontology: “the a priori science of all conceivable beings. … A phenomenology properly carried through is the truly universal ontology.” 52 Only as a truly transcendental science can phenomenology give the other exact sciences a ground that transcends their historical genesis and transcendental naïveté. Thus, for Husserl, phenomenology is a descriptive method that involves a stepwise reduction that first brackets the “world” of objectively posited objects (phenomenological reduction), and within this field of psychic acts and objective meanings it takes a further step back “from the factual to the essential form, the eidos.” 54 The transcendental reduction brackets the empirical ego as such and therewith the particularity of the

51 “[EB Article] turned out nicely, although quite differently from the way you would like to have it, even though something essential [of your suggestions] was retained” in Husserl, Briefwechsel 4, 148–49 / BH 385. This forces us to qualify Herbert Spiegelberg’s suggestion that “nothing of Heidegger’s draft for version II was absorbed in the final text” made in Husserl, Shorter works, 18.
52 Husserl, “Phenomenology,” 32
53 Husserl: “The universal époche of the world as it becomes known in consciousness (the “putting it in brackets”) shuts out from the phenomenological field the world as it exists for the subject” (“Phenomenology,” 24).
54 Husserl, “Phenomenology,” 25
bracketing consciousness rendering its reflection transcendental. The content isolated by this method is the transcendental field of pure consciousness, i.e., absolute being; and that the goal of such a phenomenology is the development of a primordial scientific philosophy that enables the methodical reform of the sciences. With this conception of phenomenology in mind we will consider Heidegger’s own “Introduction” and his comments and questions to Husserl. This will make clear the dominant issues separating an eidetic and a hermeneutic phenomenology.

§3.1 Heidegger’s three questions: Being, Self, and World

Heidegger’s response to Husserl revolves around three questions: (1) Whether the problematic of phenomenology is that of being or knowing, (2) Whether the phenomenological self is the transcendental ego, and (3) Whether the phenomenological self is truly without a world.

A. Being and Knowing: Whether ontology is formal or fundamental?

Husserl and Heidegger come to phenomenology from fundamentally different standpoints. Husserl, the mathematician, is concerned with the problem of universal knowledge: the conditions and structures of consciousness that make human communication and collaboration possible. Heidegger, the theo-logian and student of medieval philosophy, is concerned with being. This

55 Husserl, “Phenomenology,” 23
difference in orientation is signaled right from the start of their collaboration on the article in the way they introduce phenomenology. Heidegger’s introduction begins with the Greeks and the question of being and goes on to situate phenomenology within a history of philosophical attempts to answer that question. Husserl, by contrast, begins with the epistemic problem of knowledge, problematizes the ground of pure science and goes on to show how phenomenology offers a solution. This difference in basic standpoint – the question of being and the question of knowing – leads to a deeper and more problematic disagreement over the nature of ontology: whether it is formal or fundamental.

It is clear that for Heidegger the question of being is the context of all other questions, including epistemic ones. He traces the history of philosophy from Parmenides through Plato and Aristotle to Descartes and Kant in order to show the priority of the question of being, the Seinsfrage. Husserl, by contrast, begins from the fact of scientific knowledge and its transcendental naïveté, eschewing a historical approach for a problematic one. It is in response to the transcendental problem that the transcendental reduction and therewith phenomenology proper are conceived. But is the guiding question of philosophy how it can address the transcendental problem? Or is it, rather, as Heidegger suggests, how phenomenology can clarify the being of beings? In other words, is first philosophy a science of consciousness (“epistemology”) or is it ontology? For Husserl, “eidetic phenomenology” is “first philosophy” and makes possible an “all-embracing ontology.” Yet, that ontology is limited to the transcendental field of consciousness. The leading sense
(Vorgriff) of being, thus labors under a set of assumed and borrowed epistemic parameters, which, according to Heidegger, subvert the nature of its questioning. Phenomenology cannot be merely the clarification of experience by cataloging the basic structures of consciousness. This approach is hampered, argues Heidegger, by an understanding of scientificty that takes its bearings from Descartes and Kant and the search of pure self-evidence and leads Husserl to privilege an account of pure consciousness where experience is immediate and complete in a way that it cannot be.

It is important to note that the difference here is not (yet) a disagreement about method, but about what conclusions result from the same methodological tool – the reduction. Heidegger argues that the distinctive activity of philosophy is “to understand entities as entities, that is to say, with regard to their being56,” and that proposed answers to this question have been hampered by the difficulties of learning to ask it in the right way. For him, no less than Husserl, philosophy as phenomenology clarifies being through reflection on consciousness: it is the “principle-based determination and systematic exploration of the field that is to be disclosed by this return57.” Yet, for Heidegger the full transcendental problematic is not that we should be able to know, but rather that there should be beings able to known at all. Thus, the Seinsfrage is what opens the article and what opens the philosophical problematic within which phenomenology has its meaning. Phenomenology is fundamental ontology and this can only be sought in the existential analytic of

56 “Phänomenologie” in Gesammelte Werke 9, 257 / BH 307
57 Ibid.
Dasein\textsuperscript{58}. Husserl, by contrast, reserves his discussion of ontology for the final division of the article where by “ontology” he means “formal ontology,”\textsuperscript{59} which denotes the basic set of characteristics of any object for consciousness. It clarifies the constitution of “a mere form of essence,” discovering, so to speak, the essence of essences: “an empty form…suited to every possible essence, an essence that in its formal universality subsumes under itself all universalities, even the highest material universality and prescribes laws to them through the formal truths pertaining to it.”\textsuperscript{60}

On account of its universal formalism, this “onto-logic”\textsuperscript{61} of consciousness unites the various sciences by grounding their objects in a single unified account that “prescribes to the material ontologies a formal constitution common to them all.”\textsuperscript{62} Thus, for Husserl, the raison d’etre of phenomenology – the justification of its claims to be a discrete science and to ground all other sciences – is the discovery and elucidation of the most general formal ontology under which fall the more specific material ontologies of, for example, the natural sciences. Formal ontology grounds all possible kinds of knowledge in a basic account of what it is for something to be an object for consciousness. Such an ontology is presented as “the systematic unity of all conceivable

\textsuperscript{58} cf. GA 2: 13/BT 34; also: “…it [is] necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme, as the being that is ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein, in order to confront the cardinal problem, question of the meaning of being” (GA 2: 37/BT 61).
\textsuperscript{59} Cf. Ideas 1 §10, EJ §1, FTL §54. For Husserl, the goal of transcendental phenomenology is the explication of “formal constitution” which discovers not essences but “a mere form of essence.”
\textsuperscript{60} Ideas 1: §10.
\textsuperscript{61} Van Buren coined this term to refer to Heidegger’s own proposed project around the time of his habilitation when he was reading Husserl, especially the Logical Investigations, very closely. Husserl refers to his notion of formal ontology as “pure logic” in “Phenomenology”, 322.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
a priori sciences”  

For him too, then, ontology is the goal of phenomenology; however, it is an end point rather than a point of departure. The phenomenological process culminates in a formal ontology in the service of essences, and this reduction from “the factual to the essential form” is what secures for philosophy its scientific status.

Heidegger takes issues with the idea of phenomenology as a science of essences for two reasons. First, it occludes the question of being by incorporating borrowed standards or categories of objectivity and interpretation. It is thus forced first through the Caudine forks of the epistemic-transcendental problematic. He aptly summarized this critique a few years later explaining that,

“To be’ means for [Husserl] nothing other than true being, objectivity, true for a theoretical, scientific knowing. Here there is no inquiry into the specific being [Sein] of consciousness, of the experiences, but rather into a distinctive manner of being an object for an objective science of consciousness.”

In other words, Heidegger claims that the ‘things” to which Husserl returns are not in fact the things themselves, but the objectivities of scientific consciousness. Husserl’s reduction, therefore, does not go back are enough: “[He] inquires into the essence, but not the existence, of consciousness.”

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63 “[Phenomenology] brings to realization the Leibnizian idea of an universal ontology as the systematic unity of all conceivable a priori sciences…Phenomenology is the science of all conceivable transcendental phenomenon...it is eo ipso the a priori science of all conceivable beings” Husserl, “Phenomenology” in Husserl: Shorter Works. Eds McCormick and Elliston. (UND: 1981)

64 Ideas 1: “Pure or transcendental phenomenology will be established, not as a science of facts, but instead as a science of essences (as an “eidetic” science), a science which aims exclusively at securing “knowledge of essences” and no “facts” at all” (Ideas 1, 3).


66 ibid, 239
The second issue is that the transcendental reduction leads consciousness back not to concrete Dasein, but to a transcendental subject of which we are now incapable of asking how the question of being is posed by such a subject. The answer to the question of being has been preemptively determined to be a matter of theoretical consciousness. It can only be approached once we have been brought back to the transcendental field of being secured for us by the transcendental reduction. For Heidegger, however, the problematic of philosophy is not how it can be scientific, but rather how it contributes “in the service of the guiding question of the philosophical problematic, namely, the question about the being of entities.” Such a problematic is not solved by reducing the relevant phenomena from factical life to transcendental consciousness, but rather in “returning to consciousness” to understand what it is in factical life. For Heidegger there is a fundamental heterogeneity between the king of onto-logic that characterizes formal ontology and the kind of being that is Dasein’s own. The latter, Existenz, is a kind of being unique to Dasein and it does not admit of comprehensive theoretical clarification because it cannot be fully abstracted from the factic: “Existing is always factical. Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity.”

What is philosophically significant about the Britannica article, and also paradigmatic for debates between phenomenologists from then until now, is that the tension between Husserl and

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67 BH 207
68 “The factuality of the fact [Tatsache] of one’s own Dasein is at bottom quite different ontologically from the factual occurrence of some kind of mineral, for example” (SZ, H56)
69 GA 2: 192 / BT 236
Heidegger results from different ontologies arrived at by appeal to the same evidence and reduction. For both, phenomenology involves the “leading-back” of consciousness from its involvement in the natural attitude (Husserl) or average everydayness (Heidegger) in order to make manifest phenomena already operative, but unnoticed in our daily performance. The central question, however, is: To what are we led back? In Husserl’s case it is in the noetic-noematic experiences of consciousness, while for Heidegger it is the worldly understanding of being that those experiences presuppose. Sheehan notes this distinction suggesting that, “For Heidegger this first-order ‘constitution,’ […] makes possible both the second-order constitutive functions of acts of consciousness and the third-order reflective-thematic performances of ‘reductions’” 70 Sheehan characterizes the difference between Husserl and Heidegger as that of a “reduction” back to consciousness as the absolute entity and an “existential in-duction” forward. The second is a methodological reconfiguration in light of the truth that Dasein is never a mere entity or merely a field of transcendentally purified being, but rather a “radical opening.” Therefore, the question of knowing cannot be considered prior to the question of being since it is the condition of the possibility of that question – indeed, any question – being raised in the first place. This reconfiguration leads to a reconceiving of the questioning self. For Heidegger the guiding question of philosophy – What is the being of entities? – can only be answered by understanding that being whose being is at issue for it and whose being is a being-in-the-world.

70 Sheehan, Becoming Heidegger, 305
B. *Fundamental Ontology and the Reconceiving of the Self*

Whether philosophical inquiry begins with the question of being or the question of knowing has consequences for our understanding of the being who asks these questions. This basic difference in orientation leads to different conceptions of the self. The tension between Husserlian and Heideggerian conceptions of the self becomes clear in the way each conceives of pure psychology. In its basic themes and outline Heidegger’s draft of "Idea of a Pure Psychology" is not remarkably different from what appears in Husserl’s final version. Both describe and defend the intentional nature of consciousness, the possibility of retracting the intentional gaze to focus on the “modes of lived experience” wherein phenomena appear, the possibility of modifying those modes of appearance from, for example, perception, to willing, and valuing; both acknowledge the role of intersubjectivity and also describe a further eidetic reduction within an already phenomenologically reduced psychic sphere that “prescinds from all psychic facticity”\(^1\) where what is important is not whether I or them or us are having these experiences, but that they are possible for consciousness.

The object of pure psychology is the self, which Heidegger defines as something that exists “on the basis of its abiding convictions, decisions, habits, and character traits,” and is ultimately dependent on “typical forms of possible synthesis and flows within a closed psychical nexus.”\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Heidegger, “Phenomenology,” BH 311
\(^2\) ibid., 309
In its various forms of directedness, intentionality is the movement of living consciousness and therefore its formal structure is essential to an account of the self: “The intentionality of lived experiences shows itself to be the essential structure of the pure psychic. The whole of a complex of lived experiences…exists at each moment as a self (an “I”) and as this self is lived factically in community with others.”

The pertinent question for both Husserl and Heidegger is how we are to access this self. The mode of access – the methodological restraints and directives – must be taken from the nature of the object itself. Since what we are after in pure psychology is the nature of the psychic self and since the defining feature of that self is intentionality we must methodologically isolate the different modes of intentionality constituent in any conscious experience and then differentiate it into formal types. This two-step process is achieved through the phenomenological reduction and then a further eidetic reduction. The phenomenological reduction isolates the pure psyche that remains that “factically singular context of life experience of this particular here-and-now [jeweiligen] self.” The field of experience available through the phenomenological reduction is further reduced through the eidetic reduction which prescinds from the factual particularity of this ego’s intentional experience treating it only as an “exemplary basis” for the “free variation of

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73 Ibid.
74 For Heidegger, eidetic reduction “lays out the essential structures of particular kinds of lived experience, their forms of interrelation and occurrence” (Gesammelte Werke 9 260 / BH 310).
75 Ibid, 311.
This “pure” psychology grounds empirical psychology as an exact science because although it originated from empirical observation it uncovers the necessary conditions (forms of psychic life) for any individual psychic act – thus far, substantial agreement.

The issue about which Husserl and Heidegger circle is the degree to which facticity is suspended. As Heidegger presents it here, a phenomenological psychology suspends facticity and yet does not. It suspends the factual doxic modes of consciousness that constitute our basic believing-in-the-world of everyday life. Yet, the self isolated thereby remains a “complex of lived experiences.” In other words, the phenomenological reduction suspends factical particularity at the ontic level with respect to particular times and places, but facticity remains essential to an ontological account of the self. Thus, the reduction cannot suspend particularity absolutely, but only the mode in which that particularity is available. To be a self I need not be here now, but I need always be somewhere at some time. Thus, the structure of the self is always that of consciousness in its consciousness of a world that is the original condition of its possibilities, among them the phenomenological and eidetic reductions. A key corollary for Heidegger, is that facticity not only provides for the possibility of phenomenology, but also the motivation for it. If the world could not somehow become an occasion of wonder for us, what motivation would we have for leading consciousness back to its ground?

An implication of this is that phenomenological analysis of perception is not a description of factical empirical experiences, but a laying out “of the necessary structural system without which a synthesis of manifold perceptions, as perception of one and the same thing, could not be thought” (Gesammelte Werke 9 261 / BH 311). That is to say, it isolates the invariant within the variations of factical experience.
We can already anticipate what will be the neuralgic point between our two phenomenologists. Both agree on the necessity of the *phenomenological* reduction. For Husserl, though, it necessitates the further *transcendental* reduction from the pure factical ego to the pure transcendental ego. For Heidegger this move is illegitimate since it (on his reading) deprives the consciousness of its world and thereby the condition of its own possibility.

C. *Die Weltfrage: “Does the transcendental ego have a world?”*

Husserl addresses the transcendental reduction in the latter section of “Draft B” titled “Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology.” This is divided into two sections with various subsections:

**The First Division of Part II:** The Historical Intertwining of Phenomenological and Transcendental Phenomenology, and the Need to Distinguish the Two.
1. Section One
2. Section Two

**The Second Division of Part II:**
1. The Transcendental Problem
2. Psychologism as a False Solution
3. Transcendental Reduction and the Semblance of Doubling
4. Pure Psychology as a Propaedeutic to Transcendental Phenomenology
Heidegger’s lack of commentary or major amendment to the “Frist Division” and the first two sections of the “Second Division” indicates his basic agreement with Husserl on the nature of phenomenological psychology. When Husserl turns to the transcendental reduction and transcendental phenomenology, however, the questions come readily and come often.

According to Husserl, the phenomenological psychologist enacts a “universal epoche of the world” in which she shuts out the world as it usually exists for us in simple absoluteness and provides the “world” as given in consciousness, reducing the natural unities of external things existing in the world to “bracketed” unities in the manifold modes of consciousness. She brackets the particular factual world that affords the objects of intentionalities in order to isolate the unique psychic components of our intentional relationship to that world. In doing so she inhibits every co-accomplishment of objective positing produced in unreflective consciousness: “every judgmental drawing-in of the world as it ‘exists’ for [her] straightforwardly.”77 The agent that enacts these reductions, however, remains a being present in the world, only now, through eidetic variation, that world is a variety of possible real worlds and not the concrete world in which she inevitably also stands. Thus, the phenomenological psychologist studies a self who is still a subject “considered purely and simply as present in a possible spatial world.”78 For Husserl, therefore, the

77 “Phenomenology,” 24.
78 EB 29
phenomenological psychologist remains transcendentally naïve – the “general thesis” of the world has yet to become a problem for her.\(^9\)

Phenomenological psychology shifts its study from the mental experiences of actual embodied individuals (empirical psychology)\(^8\) to a description of the a priori forms of all possible experience\(^9\). However, it does not inquire after the ultimate relation of consciousness and world: “Pure psychology…stand[s]…on the ground of positivity; we are or remain explorers simply of the world or of a [particular] world.”\(^8\) By definition, therefore, the transcendental problem cannot be addressed by appeal to this eidetically clarified account of consciousness. The world can only become a problem when its possibility is radically called into question: when “I as a transcendental phenomenologist place the whole world entirely and absolutely within this question.”\(^8\) The transcendental reduction brackets all possible worlds and therewith the individuation of all pure psyches. This further reduction from a psychologically pure subject to a transcendentally pure subjectivity secures access to “that which preforms and posits within itself the apperception of the world and therein the objectivating apperception of a psyche [belonging to] animal realities.”\(^8\) It is only by virtue of this final reduction that we gain access to “transcendental inner experience”

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\(^7\) The general thesis of the natural attitude is that “I find the actuality [of the world]…to be here in advance and also take as it affords itself to be, as being here. …As actuality the world is always here” (Ideas I, §30). It takes the entire natural world as, ‘constantly ‘here for us,’ ‘on hand,’ and that will ever after remain here as an ‘actuality’ in keeping with consciousness; even it is pleases us to bracket it” (Ideas I, §32).


\(^9\) cf. Ideas I, §§78 & 79.

\(^8\) Gesammelte Werke 9, 273 / BH 321

\(^8\) ibid.

\(^8\) “Phenomenology,” BH 324
and therewith the “limitless transcendental field of being.” Hence, for Husserl the transcendental reduction is indispensable for a phenomenology that aspires to be a rigorous science and a formal ontology.

In response to this vision of phenomenology Heidegger poses two questions to Husserl that provide a measure of the difference in their conceptions of phenomenology: “Does the transcendental ego have a world?” and “What is the mode of being of the entity in which ‘world’ is constituted?”

Husserl poses the question of the relation between consciousness and world as a problem of intelligibility: “The notion of a world existing in itself is unintelligible, due to that world’s essential relativity to consciousness” (BH 319). He claims further – and Heidegger agrees with him – that entities within the world cannot be explained in their transcendental constitution by recourse to entities with the same mode of being. For Husserl, the solution is the transcendental ego, which is in an important sense outside and alongside the “world” that it is transcendentally constituting. Heidegger’s solution is different. While agreeing that the transcendental constitution of what Husserl calls “world” cannot be the act of an entity present-at-hand, he notes that this conclusion “does not mean that what makes up the place of the transcendental is not an entity at all” (BH326). It is through a fundamental – rather than a formal – ontology that we come to see

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86 As Moran and Cohen note: “Husserl regards phenomenology as the ‘final form’ (Endform, Crisis § 14) of transcendental philosophy” (THD 332).
that “the mode of being of human Dasein is totally different from that of all other entities and...harbors right within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution” (BH326).

The opposed conceptions of ontology are distinguished by the position they take vis-à-vis the world. For Husserl, entities within the world are “here for us” and “on hand.” The inescapable implication of that account, which Husserl affirms, is that this “on hand” spatio-temporal actuality is something to which “I myself belong” (ID§30). The actuality of the world, including myself as part of it, is here in advance; it gives itself as already being there. As a being on hand in a world simply here for me I am one factum among others. But facta are not explanatory. If philosophy is to be a rigorous science, if we are to have an understanding of the meaning and intelligibility of consciousness and the world we must press past the basic givenness of the natural attitude and its doxic modality. This is what the phenomenological epoché enables us to do. It brackets the contingent and transcendental fact of perceptual life and isolates only the acts of a transcendental ego: In the epoché, “the ego, the human being, along with the entire world as it is naturally supposed, is suspended; then the unadulterated experiences of the act with its own essence still remains” (ID§80). Thus, for Husserl the world is overcome and placed in brackets – “world.” The set of natural objects bracketed includes the empirical ego, and it is for this reason

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88 “Through seeing, touching, hearing, and so forth, in the various manners of sensual perception, corporal things in some sort of spatial distribution are simply here fore me, in the literal or figurative sense of the word they are “on hand [zu Hand],” (ID§27).
that transcendental philosophy must go beyond a phenomenology of pure psychology to a
transcendental phenomenology of pure subjectivity.

Heidegger responds to this account on two fronts asking first what “unintelligibility” means in this context: “in what respect are entities unintelligible? i.e., what higher claim of intelligibility is possible and necessary? By a return to what is this intelligibility achieved?” (BH 327). Can the world ever become truly and completely unintelligible to Dasein? Is the transcendental problematic ever so great that we are without recourse? Or, is it not rather the case that we are always in possession of some basic form of understanding which is the ground of both intelligibility and unintelligibility? For something to be understood as unintelligible requires a minimal preconception of it as some thing that is misunderstood and that implies some sort of partial understanding, otherwise it simply would be unknown, rather than unintelligible. It is because the world is already given to us that we first come to question it in a context of significations and foreconceptions. It is consciousness, therefore, that presupposes being-in-the-world, not the reverse. For example, the experience of something unready-to-hand leads to the breakdown of our basic attitude of concernful engagement with things. This experience suggests that objects in the world, and also the world as such, only become problematic for us on the basis of preexisting functionality.

Second, to frame the problem of philosophy as the problem of intelligibility presupposes that the theoretical relation sense is the basic or privileged relation sense. Heidegger does not
contest the possibility of the theoretical relation sense or the science of essences it makes possible; however, he does call into question the ground of its presumed priority. For Heidegger, Husserl’s treatment of everything as being-at-hand for transcendental consciousness working within the *epoché* is a mistaken understanding of the *relational* sense. The transcendental reduction leaves behind the empirical ego, or at least a consideration of the ineluctable *empiricalness* of any ego, and this results in an impoverishing abstraction rather than an enriching one: It causes us to see less rather than more.\(^8^9\)

If it is true that being-in-the-world is constitutive for consciousness and the transcendental problematic, it is unclear how the reduction to a (supposedly) worldless transcendental ego helps resolve that problem. Thus Heidegger asks: “What is the meaning of the absolute ego as distinct from the pure psychic?”\(^9^0\) And, relatedly, how is its mode of being like and unlike the factual I? Thus, the question of the world returns us to the question of the self because the consequence of a mistaken account of the world is a mistaken account of consciousness. When the basic sense of world is theoretical the corresponding consciousness inquired into is theoretical. Such an account of scientific consciousness is then mistaken for an account of consciousness *simpliciter*. To draw out this implication, Heidegger presses Husserl: “What is the mode of being of the entity in which

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\(^8^9\) Summarizing this critique Van Buren writes that, “Husserl fails to see that ‘the so-called logical comportments of thinking of objective theoretical knowing represent only a particular and narrow sphere within the domain of intentionality.’…Mere being directed toward is a deliving of practical lived experience” (van Buren, John. *The Young Heidegger*, p.213).

\(^9^0\)Kisiel and Sheehan, *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings 1910 - 1927*, 327
‘world’ is constituted"). For Heidegger, Dasein never is as other objects in the world are. He argues that Husserl, in his search for scientificty, is treating the ego as any other object “on hand”. Heidegger is not contesting the possibility of isolating a “pure” ego, but rather that (1) such transcendentally purified ego is worldless, and (2) that such a theoretically reduced ego would be in some sense a privileged position from which to answer the question of the being of beings.

On this account, Heidegger appears to be correct. Husserl privileges the “on hand” and “in person” manner of being in Ideas I. He does so because his conception of phenomenology is based on the model of perception as the original and basic form of intuition. It is intuition that “affords [the objects] in an originary way” (ID§6) and therefore supplies the leading form of consciousness.

Surely, Husserl is correct as far as the order of inquiry is concerned: We enter an animal world of basic needs before entering a fully human world mediated by meaning. In this sense, perceptual consciousness is the leading form of consciousness. But is this also the case according to the order of being? It is not obvious that it should be. What is clear, is that for Husserl, perceptual consciousness with its emphasis on “making-present” as the model of fulfillment serves as a

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91 Ibid, 326
92 Heidegger appends a note to Husserl in this section that reads: “Human Dasein is in such a way that, although it is an entity, it is no simply present-at-hand.”
93 Heidegger writes in his appendix: “Does not a world-as-such belong to the essence of the pure ego?” and then references a previous conversation with Husserl in Totenberg [April 1926] “about ‘being-in-the-world’ (Being and Time, I, §12, §69) and its essential difference from presence-at-hand ‘within’ such a world” (BH498).
94 Ideas I: §136, p.233: The pre-eminent instance of fulfillment is the “intuitive [Intuitiv] manner” where we are we are “conscious of the perceived object with its colors, forms, and so forth (just as they “occur to the perception”) “in person.”” And “We find similarly preeminent instances in every sphere of acts.”
paradigm for other higher founded modes of consciousness such as memory, fantasy, image
consciousness, and signitive intention. There is “perception” operative in these founded modes,
however, in these founded modes their contents admit of a degree of certainty because their objects
are immanent to consciousness that is not applicable to natural objects. For example, Husserl
writes at the start of Ideas I that “the discernment of essence is also precisely an intuition,” and
“in completely the same way” as empirical intuition “‘any subject of possible true predications’
has precisely its ways, prior to all predicative thinking, of coming into view, a view that presents
it, intuits it, at times even encountering it as it is ‘itself in person’” (ID§3). There is an isomorphism
between perception and higher forms of consciousness; even at its highest level such essences are
presented to us “in person.” The ideal of personal presence in higher eidetic acts of consciousness
is modeled on the originary presencing of perceptual objects to the senses.

The presencing of sensible objects, however, is essentially perspectival and therefore
always incomplete (transcendent). Therefore, the only secure base for knowledge will be the
immanent domain of consciousness in its non-spatial, and therefore non-perspectival presencing.
This distinction between consciousness and world, immanence and transcendence, Husserl calls
the “cardinal” difference.

95 as Moran notes, “Husserl begins with direct, immediate perceptual experience which forms the basis of all
consciousness. The bedrock mental act is perception. Perception, moreover, offers a paradigm of the kind of
consciousness where intention finds fulfillment, where the activity of perceiving receives immediate and constant
confirmation and collaboration. Hence perception is a paradigm of evidence, the ‘primordial form’ [urmodus] of
intuitiveiness as Husserl puts it. cf. APS 110, Hua XI 68, Crisis §28, p.105; Hua V 107; quoted in Moran, p.237..”
96 “Comprehension and intuition of essences, however, is a multi-formed act; in particular, the discernment of an
essence is an act that affords [it] in an originary way and, as such, is the analogue of sensory perceiving and not of
imagine” (ID§23-24).
“Thus, the thing itself is said to be itself transcendent and unqualifiedly so. In just this way, the intrinsic differentiation in the manners of being makes itself known, the most cardinal difference there is at all, that between consciousness and reality” (ID§42).

One need not contest the cogency of Husserl’s account of perceptual consciousness, to question the paradigmatic use of it for all forms of consciousness. On the one hand, it allows Husserl to find the certainty he desires within the evidential ream of pure consciousness. On the other hand, however, it is less clear whether such certainty ought to be the ultimate achievement of phenomenology, and whether it can in fact, as but one possibility of Dasein, lay claim to a preeminent response to the question of being.97

Again, correlative to an account of world is an account of consciousness. The consequence of conceiving of the world as a collection of objects on hand, and the empirical ego as one such object is that the ego defined by its consciousness of and in the world is bracketed along with it. Thus, for Husserl, after the reduction, “I myself am not a human ego” (BH 322). In response to this Heidegger returns to his question regarding the mode of being of the entity in which world is constituted. He pursues this question along two lines. First he suggests, that perhaps what phenomenology uncovers is not a non-human ego, but rather human being in its most concrete

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97 Ricoeur makes the interesting observation that “Ideas I does not go beyond the example of sense perception which is, as we have said, the touchstone of the nature attitude (cf.70)” The consequence of this is that in Ideas I the reduction only has a negative sense (A Key to Husserl’s Ideas I. Edited with revised translation by Pol Vandevelde, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,1996), p.115
instantiation: “Or maybe one is precisely that [i.e., a human ego] in its ownmost ‘wondersome’ possibility-of-Existenz.” He then adds, “Why [am I no longer a human ego]? Isn’t this action a possibility of the human being, but one which, precisely because the human being is never present at hand, is a comportment [a way of having oneself]? i.e., a way of being which comes into its own entirely from out of itself and thus never belongs to the positivity of something present at hand.”

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The introduction here of the category of possibility is significant. If, as Heidegger contends, possibility is an existential feature of Dasein, it is the kind of characteristic to which a Husserlian phenomenology based on the model of perception with its interpretive schema of emptiness and fulfillment cannot do justice. As a relation of Dasein to its future, possibility is not grasped in terms of fulfillment – a fulfilled possibility is no longer a possibility – but rather movement. Therefore, Dasein can never be fully present on hand because it is fundamentally determined from out of its future. It is only in death that Dasein as a whole is grasped.

The second riposte presses Husserl on the question of the will. The transcendental reduction is referred to as an “act of will” in response to which Heidegger asks “And this will itself?” (BH322). For Heidegger, the universal willing of a transcendental ego makes no sense. Willing is a relation to objects and the range of possible objects and acts to-be-willed is partially determined by the world we are thrown into and further determined by the possibilities we project

98 BH 498, emphasis mine.
for ourselves within that world. Even at the level of formal analysis, willing presupposes a world as both the context and content of its action. A worldless transcendental ego has nothing to will.

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The debate evident in this second draft of the *Britannica* article can be conceived as a debate over the relationship that obtains between thinking and facticity. Both Husserl and Heidegger agree that the world is present to me through a variety of activities such as experiencing, thinking, valuing and others. This is facticity. For Husserl, the task of philosophy is to “reduce back to my pure life” and, so to speak, rise above the flux of factual life to “absolute self experience.” According to Heidegger, however, the need to do so is premised on a failure to grasp the heterogeneity between Dasein and any other worldly entity: “The factuality of the fact [Tatsache] of one’s own Dasein” is ontologically unique (SZ56/BT82). That factuality, in the case of Dasein, is facticity and *Existenz* is Heidegger’s name for the facticity unique to Dasein, the name of its peculiar being-in-the-world. This human facticity is ek-static, which is to say that Dasein exists as thrown and always “as-having-been”. It is always already a thrown fact. But if the primary meaning of facticity

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99 In *SZ* §41, Heidegger argues that willing is ontologically possible when: (1) A prior disclosedness of the “for-the-sake-of-which” (being-ahead); (2) The disclosedness of something with which one can concern oneself (being-already (in the world)); (3) Dasein’s projection of itself understandingly upon a potentiality-for-being towards a possibility of the entity willed. *Willing*, as opposed to its “tranquilized” derivation, *wishing*, is the realization of possibility. Unlike wishing, it understands actual factical possibility.

100 “Existing is always factical. Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity” (*SZ*, H192).
lies in the character of “having been” it does not come to presence (SZ328/BT376). Moreover, if the fundamental character of factual Dasein is one of predetermined and always yet-to-be-realized possibility, neither can it be studied as something merely present-at-hand, since it is existentially never “on hand.”

Thus, for Heidegger the problem with Husserl’s account is that it privileges a particular conception of being that is itself without evident warrant. It was Husserl’s great triumph to present an argument defending an expansive account of experience that included not only sense data, but also the data of consciousness. However, his emphasis on the scientific character of phenomenology led him to privilege the transparent immanent data of consciousness and conclude that it was the field of absolute being.

§3.2 Historicity and Hermeneutics

Heidegger claims that the phenomenality proper to Dasein is inadequately grasped by the Husserlian model of phenomenology. As a consequence phenomenology has yet to ask the question of being at its proper depth. That point of departure is precisely the question of the being in whom the world is constituted and who is reciprocally constituted by it. That phenomenality is one perforated by absence, and it is not the absence of the unfulfilled intentions of the missing sides of Husserl’s famous cube. The absence essential to the phenomenality of Dasein is twofold.
It is the having-been of Dasein’s thrownness and the not-yet of its futurally directed possibility—that it is always unterwegs. In this sense what is absent for Dasein is the possibility of being its own ground, the source of origin for its own language, and the presuppositionless grasp of its world. Dasein comes to itself from out of its future, and has also always already been given over to itself from out of its past. It lives ahead of itself not only toward future possibility but also because it is unable to get ‘back behind” itself. Heidegger calls this historicality: “the state of Being that is constitutive for Dasein’s ‘historicizing’ as such. On the basis of which something like “world history” is possible” (SZ20/BT41). We are the kind of beings who have history because our being is, as spread out over time, historical. The radical implication of this toward which Being and Time leads us is that,

“Dasein’s being finds its meaning in temporality. But temporality is also the condition which makes historicality possible as a temporal kind of Being which Dasein itself possesses, regardless of whether or how Dasein is an entity ‘in time’” (SZ20/BT41).

Dasein is its past in the way of its own being, which historicizes out of its future on each occasion. The ontic possibilities of historicity or historiology are possible because of the prior ontological condition of historicality. Thus, Dasein grows up and into a tradition and to it are disclosed and regulated the possibilities of its being. Therefore, inquiry into being is essentially characterized by historicality. If this is truly the case, then Husserl’s field of transcendental inner experience must
surrender its claim to “absolute being”. Far from securing for the Seinsfrage a scientific grounding in immanent evidence, the transcendental reduction at best leads us to a radically reduced region of being and at worst it preemptively circumscribes the phenomenon within a borrowed set of parameters. In other words, and this is Heidegger’s accusation, it is bad phenomenology.

What is true of Dasein is true ipso facto of Heidegger himself. His account of temporality here is deeply indebted to his early studies of primitive Christianity, and his account of the self is deeply indebted to his reading of Augustine during those same years, who offers as an alternative to a transparent Cartesian self a self that is always pressed upon by a world within which its possibilities for action are realized, deferred, or rejected. Heidegger’s attempt to grapple with the particularity and historical conditionedness of the lives of early Christian communities leads him to formulate a fuller account of the historical nature of human being – an account that claims a depth that is as yet unplumbed even in his own age of “historical consciousness”. That account is developed in conversation with the dominant trends in “scientific” theology and the emerging field of Religionsphilosophie against which he asserts the account of a deeper historical consciousness, that of the historicity outlined above. Thus, Heidegger’s rethinking of the Husserlian reduction is cognate with his critique of a different kind of reduction, the reduction of religion to the scientific parameters of the critical historians or to a metaphysical lawfulness exemplified by Ernst Troeltsch. Against these positions Heidegger argues that historicity is ingredient to the
phenomenality of the religious phenomenon and therefore it is ill-suited to both the scientific history of the *Religionsgeschichte Schule* or the search for kind of Kantian lawlike regularity.

Heidegger’s philosophical activity in these courses is not merely critical. His engagement with Paul and Augustine help him to rethink what constitutes a phenomenon in light of history and possibility. With Husserl he agrees that phenomenology must be descriptive, but he thinks its descriptions cannot pretend to rest on pure eidetic insight into something present in a pristine form in consciousness. Instead, phenomenology must be hermeneutical. Hermeneutic here means at least four things. In the first place, hermeneutic phenomenology is *dialectic*. Dasein is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse (*logos*) and discourse is always between two. Phenomena *en si* are often only partially given, and Dasein in particular has the phenomenality of a presence perforated by the absence of possibility. Thus, phenomenology as an exercise of clarification is dialectic. Second, and for that same reason, hermeneutic phenomenology is *interpretive*: “The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting” (SZ37 /BT62). Implied here is the claim that Dasein is never simply on hand and since it is the starting point for the question of being its peculiar phenomenality proves methodologically determinative. Thirdly, because it is the interpretive key for all other interpretations of being, hermeneutic phenomenology is *transcendental*: it is a working out of the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends: “This hermeneutic also becomes a ‘hermeneutics’ in the sense of working
out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends” (ibid)\textsuperscript{101}. Finally, hermeneutic phenomenology is \textit{existential}: “Dasein is the entity with the possibility of existence and therefore ontological priority. Its hermeneutic is an analytic of the ‘existentiality of existence’. \textit{This is the philosophically primary sense.}” This last sense supplies the leading sense of interpretation in \textit{Being and Time}. It also makes clear why, for Heidegger, existential hermeneutics and interpretation must be a kind of appropriation. Like Augustine we are “admonished to return to ourselves.”\textsuperscript{102}

Heidegger has eschewed the clarified seeing of eidetic consciousness for the hurly-burly flux and melee of factical life from which we must wrest an authentic interpretation of Dasein. It is precisely this return to the concrete that necessitates a hermeneutic approach that uncovers not only what is self-evident in awareness, but uncovers what lies hidden or buried as well as what is preeminently unapparent: the not-yet. If existence is \textit{ek-static} then to speak about it requires interpretation rather than mere intuition. There is no complete affording intuition; it essentially escapes original givenness. A consequence of this is that there is no Archimedean point; everything is built on traditions, prejudices, and ways of interpreting.

Thus we can see, in a preliminary fashion, the essential differences that develop between Husserl and Heidegger, which result from Heidegger’s dogged insistence (begun in the 1916 supplemental conclusion [\textit{Schlusskapitel}] to his \textit{Habilitation}) that philosophy is grounded in, arises

\textsuperscript{101} Daniel O. Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Transcendentalism” in \textit{Research in Phenomenology}, 2005, pp.29-54
from, and returns to factual life experience. That experience is one in which Dasein is always already a being-in-the-world and ahead-of-itself. Heidegger is concerned to elucidate a more radical absence.

§4. A Brief *Proviso*: Difference and Development

In light of the foregoing, it is important to note, if only in passing, that Husserl and Heidegger are perhaps not as far apart as each thought the other. As we have seen, for Husserl, the *method* of phenomenology includes the phenomenological, eidetic, and transcendental reductions; its *content* is the transcendental field of pure consciousness; and its *goal* is to secure and survey that field in the interest of developing a scientific philosophy and the unification of the sciences through their grounding in phenomenology. This is the account of phenomenology from which Heidegger claims to take leave developing instead a hermeneutics of facticity that eschews the theoretical for new account of concept formation. Yet, we have good reason to question Heidegger’s claim that he retains the Husserlian notion of description, but rejects the reduction. Are we not “led back” repeatedly in *Being and Time*, from the natural attitude of “average everydayness” to the evident but unthematized *existentiell* structures operative therein and by means of those to the ultimate existential structures constitutive of Dasein?
Rudolph Bernet, for example, has made the case that there are unacknowledged reductions operative in *Being and Time*, occasions that serve to lead consciousness back from its pretheoretical and unreflective practical engagement with a world constituted by its projects and projections to a reflective awareness of the manner of its engagement and the being of its tools.

The first of these “reductions” occurs when Dasein encounters a tool that is *unready-to-hand*, either because it is *conspicuous, obtrusive, or obstinate* (SZ73-BT102-105). In the face of this absence Dasein can potentially become aware of its pre-thematic practical engagement with tools and the practical environment [*Umwelt*] they constitute and which gives them their significances.

A second more comprehensive “reduction” occurs in moments of anxiety when not only tools, but also the entire world of Dasein’s circumspective concern loses significance for it. Such a mood befalls Dasein and has the “all-inclusive” character of Husserl’s transcendental problem, only in this case the result of such a reduction is not the transcendental relativity of constituting ego and constituted world – it is not the possible existence of the world that is put into question – but the possible meanings of the world for Dasein.

Thus, for both Husserl and Heidegger the reductions allow us to grasp the world as a whole and distinguish ourselves from it (though in different senses) and thereby envision possibility as a whole. In Husserl’s case, this is because the constituting function of the transcendental ego is the foundation of any possible forms of consciousness. In Heidegger’s case, this is because anxiety is

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what it is for me in the face of my death, which is not an event at the end of my life, but a daily
dying through which my highest and final possibility invests the present and therewith all future
projection. In both cases, a temporality more basic than subject and object is the ultimate
phenomenon disclosed in such a reduction.

Yet, even if Heidegger is closer to Husserl than either realized, it is instructive to note the
distinct registers in which these reductions occur. For Husserl, as Bernet notes, it is difficult to find
a motive for someone to undergo and effect the phenomenological reduction. In the Sixth Cartesian
Meditation it can only be described as a “leap”\textsuperscript{104}. In his posthumous work Experience and
Judgment he has recourse to a “willing” or “striving” to know\textsuperscript{105} that propels the inquirer from
basic doxic forms of consciousness to the shared world and eidetic seeing that make
communication and the collaborative effort of human progress possible. If this is the right place to
turn for a more substantial answer, what remains the case even here is that this is an appeal to a
sort of intellectual curiosity or intellectual wonder.

Heidegger’s “reductions,” by contrast, are attuned or “mooded”. These are reductions we
feel. \textit{Stimmung}, of course, denotes a phenomenon more primordial and more pervasive than a
subjective feeling. Nonetheless, as Dahlstrom notes, there is a sense in which “It is far closer to
the truth to say, ‘I feel, therefore I am’ than to say, ‘I think, therefore I am.’”\textsuperscript{106}. That analysis

\textsuperscript{104} There it is described by Husserl as “a leap of transcendence over one’s natural self” in Eugen Fink, \textit{Sixth Cartesian Meditation}. Translated by Ronald Bruzina. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 32, fn. 84
\textsuperscript{105} Edmund Husserl, \textit{Experience and Judgment}. Edited (German) by Ludwig Landgrebe. Translated by Churchill and Ameriks (Evanston: northwestern University Press, 1997), e.g., 198, 200, 283, 308,
\textsuperscript{106} Dahlstrom. \textit{The Heidegger Dictionary}. (Bloomsbury: 2013), p.133
implies that we do not need to supply a motive for philosophizing because its occasion and necessity befall us\textsuperscript{107}. We do not choose to be frustrated in our practical comings and goings any more than we chose to have anxiety befall us. But this has further implications for the “ego” that is being “lead back”. For Husserl, transcendental subjectivity cannot be mooded. The transcendental reduction secures for us a field of transcendentally pure data – a field of absolute being – and a transcendental ego. Heidegger’s insistence on attunement \textit{[Stimmung]} as a basic existential equiprimordial with understanding suggests that at the appropriately basic level the intellectual register cannot be distinguished from the affective.

But to what are we attuned on Heidegger’s account? It is always to the world in its presence or in its receding absence: “The mood has in each case already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing oneself to something” (SZ137/BT176). Thus, the “reduced” subjectivity to which the Heideggarian reduction secures access is and remains a being-in-the-world.

\textit{Methodologically} then what Heidegger rejects is the presumed priority of the eidetic reduction. At least as it concerns the question of the being of beings and of Dasein, such a reduction affords us only a partial, theoretical phenomenon that is wholly inadequate for a properly phenomenological description. For Husserl consciousness human being is one more entity among the other existing objects until we isolate consciousness and purify its empirical determinateness.

But for Heidegger, that is to resort to a medieval distinction between essence and existence and to prefer the clarity of the former at the expense of the latter. Again, Heidegger’s critique is that this is simply bad phenomenology. Inquiring, rational, mooded, and practically concerned Dasein is not just one more being among others. Moreover, unlike any other object zu hand, its manner of existing is essential to it. That is to say, the manner in which it exists is unique to and coincident with its distinctive form of being. Heidegger can affirm with Kant that existence is not a predicate, but in a different way. Existence is not a predicate because existence is not univocal. What it means for a doorknob to exist, a natural object to exist, and Dasein to exist is not the same in each case. Why is this so? Because the meaning of being can only be a meaning manifest or evident for Dasein and to the extent that Dasein’s existence has implications for its knowing.

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So what are we to make of this failed collaborations – first for phenomenology and then for a philosophy of religion? One can read the Encyclopedia Britannica article either as evidence of different and incompatible approaches – the bifurcation of a transcendental phenomenology and hermeneutic phenomenology – or in a way that sees in Heidegger’s turn to facticity a development of Husserlian phenomenology. Which interpretation we take depends, in part, on our conception
of evidence. Stephen Galt Crowell argues that, in this respect, Heidegger can be read, not as rejecting Husserl’s doctrine of constitution, but of deepening it.\textsuperscript{108}

“What for Husserl, guided by epistemological considerations, must be seen as prior to the naturally posited sense “human subject” is, from Heidegger’s ontological perspective, a possibility of the human subject—not \textit{qua} human (in the anthropological sense) but \textit{qua} subject (in the transcendental sense).”\textsuperscript{109}

That is to say that, for Husserl, transcendental subjectivity is a field of evidence constituting phenomenological science that includes all reason-theoretical problematic. In response to this Heidegger asks (1) what structures of world persist in that field?, and (2) what of the being of the transcendental ego, which is not posited being in the same sense? Thus, Husserl looks to the field as a “\textit{a transcendental clarification of epistemological problems, whereas Heidegger envisions a clarification of the Being of entities}.”\textsuperscript{110} Both, then, agree that the constitution of the being of the present-at-hand must be clarified through the reduction that is reflectively disclosed and not available in the natural attitude; however, they disagree as to the limits of the transcendental reduction. What remains outside of it? For Heidegger, Dasein is not one more example of posited being, but is distinctive in that it is ontological. Husserl has bracketed the question of ontology (it is a branch of formal logic). But for Heidegger, Dasein as ontological has a being that cannot be


\textsuperscript{109} ibid., 507

\textsuperscript{110} ibid, 511
bracketed like *Vorhandensein*. Thus, the ontological dimension of Dasein and therewith “world” come to evidence within the reduction.

Thus, Heidegger uses the tools of phenomenological investigation to rethink its account of the world. In doing so he is also led to rethink the phenomenological account of subjectivity. In this exercise, Sebastian Luft has suggested that “Dasein” is a “counter-concept” to the Husserlian transcendental ego: “[It] stands in stark contrast to Husserl’s teleological concept of subjectivity as an endless field of research accessed by (potentially) endless reflection.”\(^{111}\) It is a critique of the Cartesian elements in a Husserlian account of subjectivity framed in terms of transcendental philosophy. For Heidegger, the Husserlian ego (as a transcendental entity) is far too abstract for the human being in her everyday life. It overlooks daily life in its finitude and neglects to pose the question of the being of that entity which exists and as such understands itself and the world, rather than simply being present-to-hand\(^ {112}\). Hermeneutical phenomenology, by contrast, must first pay attention to this non-thematic mode of existence. Transcendental phenomenology “leaps over” this question of the subject and its mode of meaning and leaves unanswered whether this transcendental ego is the same or different form its factual worldly counterpart. Thus, in some sense, the dialectic is one of competing phenomenologies of the subject. As Luft notes, for Heidegger “because of his theorizing presupposition, Husserl failed to really get ‘to the subject itself.’”\(^ {113}\) However, even

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\(^{112}\) ibid, 147

\(^{113}\) ibid, 149
with a better phenomenology of the subject, one which takes its point of departure from pretheoretical Dasein and its practical involvement in the world, the goal of phenomenology for Heidegger is not subjectivity, but being. Thus, the movement from phenomena to their foundation in facticity, while it entails the rethinking of Dasein and world, is ultimately in the service of an account of being that displaces subjectivity from its presumed position of authority.

From the beginning Heidegger was characterized by an intellectual formation that could not remain within Husserlian phenomenology in a simple and unmodified sense. Phenomenology was the method of seeing through which he came to view the world, but it was the “world” in its unredducible factical and dynamic exuberance that came into view. Husserlian questions about knowledge and validity were superseded by an inquiry into the origin of our very questioning in the experience of factical life. To explicate the structure of a question factically leads one directly to the being that questions. That task is nothing short of phenomenology’s own self-critique, which is why Heidegger claims that, “for Phenomenology, the most original and decisive problem of phenomenology is phenomenology itself.”

§5. Conclusion: Religious Questions and Impulses.

114 GP 10-10-19; GA58 1; See also GA9 36, quoted in Fehér “Phenomenology” in RHFTS
If these are an essential set of principle differences between *transcendental-eidetic* and *hermeneutic* phenomenology, stating and explaining them does not itself explain why Heidegger felt compelled to move in different direction from Husserl: a direction, in important ways, opposed to that of his mentor and *Vaterfreund*. However, to speak of a “break” between Heidegger and Husserl is already to suggest, at least implicitly, the nature of the differences between them. This fits a certain common but inverted narrative that works backwards from Heidegger’s later failures toward Husserl as both a friend and on the more general plane of human decency and moral integrity. But to read Heidegger’s later failings – and they were grave – back into the life of the young *privatdozent*, assistant, and later university professor, more than a decade before his calamitous rectorship is both bad history and bad philosophy. Such an uncritical hermeneutic of suspicion prevents us from asking about the unique set of preoccupations and the unusual intellectual formation that led a young Heidegger through the *Logical Investigations* to Husserl and phenomenology and, ultimately, to a reconceiving of phenomenology.

The impetus and occasion for Heidegger’s radical rethinking of phenomenology is his 1920-21 courses on the phenomenology of religion. It is there that we turn from biography to phenomenology. We have seen in the forgoing first, that religion is the milieu in which Heidegger comes to philosophy and that it supplies the origin of his philosophical questioning. We have also seen what some of the principle differences between he and Husserl are in their mature form. What remains for us in the following chapters is to investigate the nature Heidegger’s early attempt at a
phenomenology of religion and to see how this becomes the occasion for working out a different understanding of phenomenology. There we will discover that the search for the origin of philosophy in factual life – the self-description of true phenomenology – and the Seinsfrage arise from Heidegger’s early religious Lebenswelt and take the particular shape they do on account of that Ursprung.

While we will limit ourselves to these early years of Heidegger’s professional life, it is worth noting that the Religionsfrage is one that accompanies Heidegger throughout his entire life in various forms. Immediately after the period studied in the following pages, he gives up the project of a phenomenology of religious life, fearing it to be an “illogicity.” However, that does not prevent him from pursuing a well-documented relationship with Bultmann, nor his continued personal and scholarly interest in Paul and Luther through the Marburg period. Much of this seems to be abandoned in his 1927 essay “Phenomenology and Theology” in which faith – the form of life that has constituted the origin and horizon of Heidegger’s thought – is opposed to the form of life essential to philosophy. Here again, however, the public and private records do not align. This dialectic between the philosopher and the faith of his birth continues into the final months of his life: On January 14th, four months before his death, Heidegger had a long conversation with the Catholic priest and Messkirch native Bernhard Welte in which he asked him to say a few words at his burial. In the course of their conversation he made it clear that “he had never broken with
the community of believers.” These vignettes are not unlike formal indications of the religious facticity into which Heidegger was born and from which his thought could never fully extricate itself. They caution against our preconceptions that would sort the man and his thought too quickly into the categories of un/believer, a/theistic, philosopher/man of faith.

This is not merely an exercise in intellectual history. Heidegger’s “theological origins” and the persistence of his “struggle” over the course of his life and thought suggest that the religions courses are more than simply the incidental means by which Heidegger came to philosophy or merely occasions to develop his phenomenological method. To interpret them as such would be doubly disingenuous when invoked in the interest of understanding a thinker so uncompromisingly committed to investigating the origin of thought and meaning in factical life: concrete, conditioned, and insuperable.

Ultimately, then, to ask about the religious import of Heidegger’s thought is to investigate the “struggle” that arises from ways 1-4 outlined above. The struggle that moves Heidegger out of confessional Catholicism is certainly motivated by philosophical commitments regarding the historicity of knowledge, but those philosophical commitments are themselves the culmination of a process set in motion by a set of religious preoccupations. Thus, the vectors of influence move

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117 The Benedictine monastery at Beuron was a symbol for this dialectic. Beyond a place to which Heidegger was bound (religio) by aboriginal ties, Beuron represented an antidote for the thoughtlessness of secular and insincerely Christian culture. He returned to the abbey throughout his life to attend services and, on occasion, to lecture. He wrote of it to Blochmann: “The past of human existence as a whole is not a nothing but that to which we always return when we have put down deep roots. But this return is not a passive acceptance [Übernehmen] of what has been, but its transmutation” (quoted in Ott, Biography, 377-78).
118 Of course, Heidegger himself in various ways gives us good reason to think this, but as we shall see his own retrospective interpretation is highly suspect.
in both directions. On one hand, those commitments lead Heidegger from a rigid, reactionary, and epistemologically naïve Catholic climate to a “non-dogmatic” protestant one. However, on the other hand, the methodology developed in the early religion courses is more evidently a response to an uncritical (largely protestant) use of historical method. Heidegger attempts to show that the “meaning” of biblical texts is not only or primarily what can appear within the horizon of their “objective-complex”. Rather we must seek to get a hold of and apprehend the kind of living that the texts purport to disclose. The meaning of Christian eschatology in Paul, for example, and the experience of tentatio in Augustine cannot be understood merely as reducible to their propositional content (Gehaltsinn), as if having defined them we can claim to have mastered the form of life they purport to disclose. Certain phenomena, religious phenomena in particular, have as their focal meaning an enactment sense (Vollzugsinn) absent which, we cannot really claim to understand that of which we are speaking. Thus, Heidegger’s first intimations of an alternative methodology called formal indication arise in the context of biblical interpretation.

But why are these questions important to Heidegger? That answer brings us back to factical life and to biography and so to the first way, but also the fourth way. It is a set of preoccupations arising out of a religious lifeworld that motivate both Heidegger’s lines of research and manner of research. Two things are clear for the early Heidegger. The first is that, Christianity raises the problem of time and history in a particular way. What might this mean? Why is it Christianity that
first confronts time in an explicit way? Perhaps the central doctrine of Christianity, the Incarnation, is paradigmatic for a struggle internal to a Christian intellectual tradition, but also one with wider applications to questions of objective-propositional truth, and non-relativistic, subjective-experiential truth. Within the medieval tradition with which Heidegger was so familiar this tension is conceived as a way of confronting the possibility of the interaction between the two incommensurable orders of time and eternity. This is why for Heidegger up until 1917 medieval mysticism was the counterpart to scholasticism. They were two moments in a single Lebenswelt.

Key for our discussion here, the question of the manner of the investment of eternity in time implies the question of enactment: not only how is that possible, but, more specifically, how are we to be in light of that? How are we to be sub specie aeternitatis? This raises the question of how to have truth, eidei, within time. This ultimately discloses the question of who has truth. This question of how to be in time in light of eternity is ingredient to Heidegger’s understanding of enactment sense and his appropriation of Kierkegaard previous to and in the religion courses. It adds a third “depth” dimension to Heidegger’s understanding of truth. For this reason, the second thing that is clear for the early Heidegger is that a phenomenology of religious experience

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119 It is only after his failed bid for the chair of Christian Philosophy (II) and subsequent conversion to Lutheranism that he adopts Luther’s interpretation of the denaturing affects of scholasticism and begins his appropriation of the latter’s project of Destruktion.

120 This takes two forms in Thomas. First, whether and how God can have knowledge of particulars and, secondly, how we as finite and limited knowers can grasp that eternity exists.

121 For Heidegger ultimately the two (related) tradition accounts of truth, assertion and adequation, are derivative of the prior ontological condition, namely, that Dasein is already “in the truth.” (cf. BT §44). In the traditional scholastic formula adequatio intellectus et rei truth is the adequation between the intellect and the thing, understood as correspondence between a judgment and the thing about which this judgment is made. Heidegger asks how the relation between an ideal being and a real thing be grasped ontologically? What, in other words, is the ontological sense of this distinction.
cannot be had by an inventory of cognitive acts. Such an approach may have its value, and, indeed, at points Heidegger may even be engaged in it, but it operates with an implicit notion of the subject that Heidegger seeks to call into question. The transcendental reduction can never yield the kind of originality after which Heidegger inquires. The world in which Dasein always already exists is a dynamic reality, not a static concept. It is self-modifying over time. But this insight into the “historicity” of knowledge is equally at odds with the reigning religious paradigm of the reactionary Catholic culture embodied in the “Oath against Modernism.”

But if questions concerning truth and meaning lead Heidegger to reconceive Husserlian phenomenology he must still confront another crucial question: How does one access these phenomena correctly so as to describe them accurately? Heidegger’s method of Formale Anzeige is a first attempt to answer precisely this question. First elaborated in his early religion courses and applied to the works of Paul and Augustine, it is an attempt to approach religious phenomena in a manner that does not predetermine the forms their interpretation must take. A central component of this approach is Heidegger’s three-fold understanding of “sense” as content sense (Gehaltsinn), relational sense (Bezugsinn), and enactment sense (Vollzugsinn).

Thus, having shown the major lines of difference between Heidegger and Husserl, having shown the persistent and differentiated ways that Heidegger remains, despite his protests, a religious thinker (or at least a thinker indebted to religion), and having suggested provisionally a set of possible relations between the first two points, we will now turn to the religion courses
themselves to investigate first, the world within which and against which Heidegger proposes his particular account of a phenomenology of religion, and second, the method of *Formale Anzeige* Heidegger constructs for engaging the religious phenomenon in contradistinction from both Husserl and the dominant biblical hermeneutics of his day: that of biblical historical criticism and a Kantian philosophy of religion embodied, for him, by Ernst Troeltsch.
Chapter 2:

Heidegger and Theological Wissenschaft

“Initially, after all, it is necessary to examine religion in its factuality, before one addresses to it a particular philosophical study” – Heidegger

§1. Introduction

In the previous chapter we traced a genealogy that was both historical and conceptual, an analysis that corresponds roughly to Kisiel’s categories biography and doxography\(^1\). We examined the various modalities of Heidegger’s personal relation to religion, in particular, the Christian faith, as both a Catholic and a Lutheran, and as documented primarily in his private correspondence with friends, priests, and theologians. We also examined the less frequent, but crucially important, public statements he makes in his capacity as a philosopher. Significantly, there is internal conflict within both categories of statements as well as external conflict between the personal and professional records, and we cannot explain this conflict with a simple appeal to chronology, Kisiel’s third category. Only by artificially breaking apart that record could we claim, for instance, that there was a simple rectilinear progression from a conservative ultramontane Catholicism that gradually gave way to a liberal and non-dogmatic Protestantism and culminated in the kind of reverent, poetically-inflected agnosticism in the later years. Many of Heidegger’s own statements belie such a reduction. The problem, though, has less to do with the broad categories of

\(^1\) In his introduction Kisiel cites Theophrastus as the original thinker to distinguish the three interwoven strata of biography, chronology, and doxography that constitute any “reliable record of the story of philosophy” (GBT, 4).
classification. It is certainly the case that they are of limited, but real use in describing moments of this story. The problem is that the story is presumed to have a particular arc, a trajectory in which chronological succession implies a supersession of previous viewpoints for new and contrary ones. This is simply not borne out by the evidence we do have. More apt than a narrative line, is Heidegger’s own image from Being and Time of the hermeneutic circle. His own religious history and the differing conceptual formations to which it gave rise are revisited in the sweep of a circular but generative spiral. In attempting to enter into that hermeneutical circle, the goal of the present investigation is not to come to a final pronouncement on “Heidegger’s relation to religion”, even if that were possible. The goal is rather to see what kind of resources and insights Heidegger’s analysis can provide us for our own investigation of religious life.

Having examined the major philosophical differences between Husserl and Heidegger and the persistence of religion, under a variety of relations, over the course of Heidegger’s life, we can now ask, within a context constituted by those insights, what he is attempting to do in these courses that explore the relation between phenomenology and religious life. The first of these is entitled “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” and it was given in the winter semester (WS) of 1920-21. The second course is titled “Augustine and Neo-Platonism” and it was given the following Summer Semester (SS) in 1921. We also have recourse to an earlier set of “Outlines and Sketches for a Lecture, Not Held 1918-1919,” which are sets of notes for a planned course on “The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism” that was eventually canceled by Heidegger due to insufficient time for its preparation.

2 Hereafter “Phenomenology of Religion” and IPR in citations
3 Hereafter “Augustine” and ANP in citations
4 Hereafter “Mysticism” and MM in citations
This chapter and the following one will focus on the first course and, more specifically, its first part. It is there that Heidegger deals explicitly with the question of method. There we find a set of formal, i.e., methodological, investigations into the essential components of a phenomenology of religion. The second part of the lecture courses concerning Paul’s eschatology and the subsequent course on Augustine, by helpful contrast, are more “substantial” in nature. There the new methodology developed in these opening sections is applied to Pauline eschatology and Augustine’s account of facticity. Both of these themes will be examined in subsequent chapters. However, prior to our methodological analysis we must offer a brief _apologia_ for reading these courses at all given the far from unanimous scholarly consensus concerning their merit and significance.

§2. Reading Heidegger’s _Jugendschriften_

Such an _apologia_ must contend with the _Rezeptionsgeschichte_ of these courses. This is a complicated history because it involves Heidegger’s own re-ception of them while overseeing the publication of his _Gesamtausgabe_ as well as their reception by Heidegger scholars already more familiar with his better known and later works. Furthermore, the two courses of 1920 and 1921 are the subject of not a little interest and intrigue. Their scholarly reception generally follows one of two directions. Some scholars find them to be a source of insight into a particular developmental stage of Heidegger’s thought and his emergent hermeneutic phenomenology almost a decade prior to _Being and Time_. Many of these same scholars find expressed here a set of themes that are suppressed or ignored during the rest of Heidegger’s “phenomenological decade” only to reemerge in his later writings. In his 1919 course, for example, course we find the expressions _Es weltet_ and
Es er-eignet sich, and the 1920 course is the first to use Dasein as a technical term. Such themes both complicate and prove indispensable for any understanding of Heidegger’s Kehre. The second tack is to ignore them altogether. This is typified in the otherwise excellent work by Stephen Galt Crowell in his book, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*. Crowell acknowledges that he is giving a selective reading of the early courses, which turns out to mean all but the religion courses, which receive only a single citation of little consequence. Such treatment implies that one can construct an account of Heidegger’s differences from Husserl and his account of meaning independent of these courses. Different as they are, what these two approaches have in common – one genealogical and the other exclusivist – is a more or less explicit presumption that the religious content of these courses is incidental to the philosophical methodology being developed.

There are good reasons for thinking this. First, there can be no doubt that these courses are a window onto a moment in Heidegger’s philosophical development that leads to *Being and Time* and beyond. In that respect, the continuities and discontinuities between the lecture courses and his later texts are illuminative. Second, Heidegger seems to endorse such an interpretation when, for instance, he spends the first half of a course purportedly on Paul, giving a series of lectures that constitute an introduction to phenomenology and only turns to Paul, seemingly regretfully and begrudgingly, when his students complain to the Rector about the lack of theological content. Third, Heidegger attempted to have these courses excluded from his literary legacy while overseeing the publication of his Gesamtausgabe. Van Buren reminds us that his plans for the collected works, “involved handing out the thought paths in his early Marburg courses, but not

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5 Cf. GA 56/57, 73 (*Es weltet*) and 75 (*Es er-eignet sich*). In GA 60, §10 we have the first use of Dasein as a technical term and throughout that course the first full elaboration of formale Anzeige.
7 Recently Ryan Coyne (2015) has suggested that the turn is “improvised”. We will examine this claim in greater detail in chapter 4.
those in his early Freiburg courses (1916-1923)\textsuperscript{8}. He attempted to downplay their importance at times “retrospectively read[ing] his later thought back into his earlier thought, such that in these instances he created a kind of \textit{mython} in the sense of a mythic narrative, a tall tale,” while at other times, suggesting later dates and courses for the origin of key concepts, e.g., “hermeneutic phenomenology”\textsuperscript{9} that in fact appeared much earlier.

These reasons give us grounds on which to contest both trends in interpretation, including Heidegger’s own. Indeed, it is Heidegger himself who reminds us that, “It is a dubious thing to rely on what an author himself has brought the forefront. The important thing is rather to give attention to those things he left shrouded in silence.”\textsuperscript{10} Thus, in what follows we will challenge the self-interpretation of the \textit{Ausgabe letzter Hand}, and, taking our point of departure from the work of Caputo, Dahlstrom, and Westphal, we can challenge it at the levels of (1) interpretation, (2) method, and (3) appropriation.

1. INTERPRETATION. In his \textit{Demythologizing Heidegger}\textsuperscript{11} Caputo has uncovered and deconstructed Heidegger’s tendency after a certain point in his career to identify a \textit{single} Greek origin of his thought and of the history of being. Such a claim implies that there is no essential contribution made by the Judeo-Christian tradition for his own thought or that of being more generally. Such


\textsuperscript{9} Already in the War Emergency Semester of 1919, for example, Heidegger concludes his \textit{The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview} with a section titled “Hermeneutic Intuition” in which he equates the “experience of experiencing” [Erleben des Erlebens] with a kind of understanding that is \textit{hermeneutische Intuition} (Martin Heidegger, \textit{Die Idee der philosophie und das WelstanSHAUNGSproblem}, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999) GA 56/57: 117 / ET: \textit{The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview}. Translated by Ted Sadler. (New York: Continuum, 2000), 99

\textsuperscript{10} From WS 1924-25, quoted in Van Buren, \textit{The Young Heidegger}, p. 10

\textsuperscript{11} Caputo, \textit{Radical Hermeneutics}. 
an omission, or rather, repression, is significant because as the later Heidegger suggests, one’s origin prefigures the shape of one’s destiny. Thus, the discernment of the correct origin redounds to both our understanding of being and also to our interpretation and appropriation of Heidegger’s work. His authorial riposte “ways not works” does little to mitigate this critique. What is at stake here is precisely the way that Heidegger came into his understanding. Caputo’s contention is that what we see in Heidegger is an inverse proportion of emphasis between the Greeks on the one hand and the Judeo-Christian tradition on the other.

This hiding away of a second source of inspiration occurs in two ways. It occurs initially as the failure to acknowledge the sources of inspiration and categories of evaluation. This tendency of Heidegger’s to under-cite his sources, especially his religious ones, has long been noted. This occlusion also occurs as a denial of the relevance of these sources for understanding. This second kind of denial is, in Heidegger’s case, both historically inaccurate and philosophically problematic. That it is historically inaccurate these courses and a growing body of secondary literature and scholarly consensus confirm. That it is philosophically problematic is the main force of Caputo’s polemic. Heidegger’s “mythologizing” is not only untrue, but leads to an overemphasis on Greek values without the countervailing influence of Hebraic and Christian values. Such an overemphasis is also a premature foreclosure of distinct possibilities, which leads to our second mode of critique.

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12 One of Caputo’s central claims is that Heidegger’s notion of Sorge/cura, anticipated by his account of Pauline affliction, is interpreted primarily as a kind of Kampf without the important Pauline notion of Kardia. One consequence of this is that Dasein is implicitly conceived as the magnificent youth of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics rather than the resident alien, widow or orphan of the biblical tradition. Caputo argues that “Kardia and the flesh fell before a new epoché that was driven by a very Greek, phenomenological-aletheiological reduction” (Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, 68). This reduction removes a line of thought that would have mitigated against Heidegger’s later and disastrous appropriation of Nietzsche and Jünger.
2. **Method & Phenomenon.** Daniel Dahlstrom provides us with a different kind of critique aimed at a different level of analysis: that of phenomenological method itself. In a set of articles devoted to the religion courses\(^{13}\) Dahlstrom is particularly attentive to the possible avenues of phenomenological investigation that remain open in this early period, only to be closed by the publication of *Being and Time*. Thus, the repression of these courses concerns not only how we understand and appropriate Heidegger’s work *a la* Caputo, but also how we do phenomenology. Does *angst*, for example, truly retain pride of place as the uniquely disclosive mood of Dasein’s finitude? Are any and all religious frames constituted by hope and the *beata vita* inevitably insincere? These are some the questions that sit uncomfortably in the silence leading up to *Being and Time*.

3. **Appropriation.** Finally, Merold Westphal\(^{14}\) invites us to consider another level of critique: Heidegger’s appropriation of his sources. This critique cuts to the heart of hermeneutics because it asks about the conditions of appropriation and about what is won and lost in that act. Can Heidegger, for example, make use of Kierkegaard’s notions of indirect communication and anxiety while leaving behind the religious context in which they have their original meaning? Heidegger certainly thinks he can. This line of critique has been developed recently by Judith Wolfe’s examination of the uses of “eschatology” in the “early” Heidegger\(^{15}\) and by Ryan Coyne’s exploration of Heidegger’s use of Augustine, beginning with this course, but extending well into

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\(^{14}\) Westphal, ““Heidegger’s “Theologische” Jugendschriften.”’ See also appears as “Chapter 3” in his Westphal, *Overcoming Onto-Theology*.

his later years\textsuperscript{16}. Coyne’s analysis provides us with a helpful term that Heidegger uses, if sparingly, \textit{Enttheologisation}\textsuperscript{17} or “de-theologization”. To rephrase Westphal’s question in light of Coyne, we can ask, does de-theologization constitute a legitimate process of appropriation or is it rather a deformation? Furthermore, if it is legitimate, do the grafted theologemes leave their new philosophical context untouched? Heidegger’s own account of this shifts from claiming that the philosophical use of religious language leaves the religious phenomena untouched to claiming that he is in fact taking back a set of terms for ontological description that were originally “secular” and borrowed by the Christian tradition. “Sin,” for example, is not the ontological ground of the ontic manifestation of guilt [Schuld], but exactly the opposite\textsuperscript{18}. It is the more general and universally human experience of guilt that delimits the semantic (and ontic) field in which the Christian concept of “sin” has meaning.

These three modes of criticism – genealogical, phenomenological, and hermeneutical – which as criticism are also modes of appropriation, will be addressed in later chapters. We mention them here to defend the thesis that these are important courses and to justify our reading and rereading of them in the chapters that follow.

\textbf{§3. The Phenomenology of Religion: A New Project}

\textsuperscript{16} Ryan Coyne. 2015. \textit{Heidegger’s Confessions}. Indeed, Coyne makes the broader claim (cognate with this dissertation) that an original possibility for a phenomenology of religion is prematurely closed down, by \textit{fiat}, shortly after the courses of 1920 and 1921.

\textsuperscript{17} According to Coyne (p. 5), \textit{Enttheologisierung} is used twice in Heidegger’s 1923 course.

\textsuperscript{18} This example is taken from “Section C” of his 1927 “Pänenomenologie und Theologie” in \textit{Wegmarken} GA 9, 64 / “Phenomenology and Theology,” in \textit{Pathmarks}, 51.
Heidegger’s 1920-21 courses on the phenomenology of religious life have rightfully held the interest and occupied the scholarly imaginations of researchers before and after their publication in the Gesamtausgabe in 1995 (the English translation followed in 2004), and for reasons other than their complicated Rezeptionsgeschichte. First, in these courses we find the first substantial elaboration of the methodology of formal indication, which will continue to guide Heidegger’s approach to phenomenology through the 1930’s. Second, here for the first time Heidegger uses Dasein in a technical sense. Third, the emergence of an early analysis of “factual Dasein” suggests that here we have an evident rethinking of Husserlian phenomenology, more so than the previous courses where critiques were added as passing remarks or left implicit. Whereas, for example, he notes Natorp’s critique of Husserl in passing in his 1919 course, here he proposes a new account of concept formation, formal indication, as the phenomenological response.

Finally, the nature of the philosophical engagement with religion being developed here is original on a number of fronts. In the first place, it is new to Heidegger. His engagement with St. Paul and St. Augustine has neither the apologetic character of his earliest writings, nor the confessional character of his private correspondences, nor the neo-Kantian inflected character of his habilitation. Secondly, it is not the eidetic investigation of the essential structures of religious consciousness – a regional ontology – envisioned by Husserl. Finally, as a phenomenology of religion it makes a distinct contribution to the tradition of philosophical reflection with the divine.

§3.1 Heidegger and the Tradition

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19 cf. GA 60 / PRL, §10: The Concern of Factual Dasein
20 Heidegger references Natorp’s critique of Husserl in GA 56/57, 101/ET: Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 78
21 i.e., those published in the conservative Heuberger Volksblatt, Der Akademiker, and Allgemeine Rundschau
This last point is worth pursuing a bit further. Heidegger’s own ambiguity with respect to his profession\textsuperscript{22} and with respect to the exact nature of his project is more readily intelligible when one considers that he is largely without precedents for developing a phenomenology of religion. Indeed, we might push this claim further and suggest that, in a strict sense, he is without predecessors in developing a philosophy of religion. That claim requires some explanation.

Heidegger is certainly heir to a long line of thinkers who reflect philosophically on dimensions of religious belief, practice, and experience. To list only the smallest set: Aristotle, Augustine, Luther, Scotus, Eckhart, Pascal, and Kierkegaard. These are thinkers without whom we would very likely not have Heidegger. However, it is also the case that, while these men are engaged in investigations that have philosophical relevance and to which philosophy may even be essential in one way or another, they are not doing philosophy of religion as it has come to be understood since at least the 19th century. These rational reflections on God or religious belief occur in a variety of modes that are distinct from philosophy, modes such as confession, prayer, polemic, apologetics, or natural theology, as well as the theistic rationalism of Descartes and the theodicy of Leibniz. Even Thomas Aquinas\textsuperscript{23}, who along with Aristotle\textsuperscript{24} perhaps comes closest to warranting the title, is not engaged in a philosophy of religion. This is case for the simple but important reason that the philosophy of religion \textit{in sensu stricto} is only possible as a consequence of the conceptual revolution implied in our modern notions of science and the rise of historical consciousness that followed in their wake.

On the older model one could attain to a natural knowledge of God (\textit{quia}) or to revealed knowledge, but neither was a philosophy of religion. Describing the dominant scholastic

\textsuperscript{22} We have already had occasion to quote his comment to Löwith that he was a “Christian theo-\textit{logian}”.

\textsuperscript{23} cf. ST 1, qq.1-3

\textsuperscript{24} For example, Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics} Z, 1072b1 -20.
understanding. Bernard Lonergan explains that “philosophy” was concerned with the (1) ultimate, (2) naturally known truths (3) about the universe. This implies that its material object, the universe, was unrestricted, that it aimed at ultimate eternal truths that were naturally known and such truths were thought ultimate in relation to proximate truths of the natural sciences. This context, like its Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and pagan predecessors, permitted natural or philosophical theology, but not a philosophy of religion. Lonergan concludes that:

Clearly on scholastic soil a philosophy of religion could not flourish. Either it confined itself to naturally known truths and then it overlooked the one true religion, which is supernatural, or else it vainly attempted philosophical reflection on the supernatural, which it would inevitably distort.25

When Aquinas refers to philosophy as the ancilla theologiae he is hardly countenancing a novel principle in the history of reflection on the divine. To the extent that all scientia, theology included, worked within a “system” defined by basic metaphysical principles, the priority was placed on logical derivation, not experiential data. The scientific revolution is a revolution with respect to origins. Science hereafter begins with experiential data not doctrine whether philosophical, logical, or theological. Bacon and Descartes helpfully delineate the two major categories under which data are now to be grasped: the data of sense and the data of consciousness. From these dual fonts of modern science, we end up, depending on our philosophical persuasions, either as rationalists and later idealists or as empiricists. Pushed along the line rationalism results in a radically unintelligible sensible manifold, while empiricism, in its attempt to account for intellectual activity, gives birth to the reductions of psychologism. It was Husserl’s peculiar genius, much admired by Heidegger, to

unmask the question begging implied in this hasty division of data and to show the inadequacy of a psychologistic account of intentionality and a brute account of sense experience.

If Heidegger did not have recourse to ancient or medieval models, he is also – to state the obvious – in advance of the developments and standard divisions within the contemporary philosophy of religion that has dominated the second half of the 20th century. By its own account, “analytic” or “Anglo-American” philosophy of religion “was gestated in the 1940s, born in the early 1950s, spent its childhood in the 1960s and its adolescence in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since then it has grown into adulthood, and it reached the turn of the millennium in a state of vigorous maturity, with decline and senile degeneration nowhere in sight.”

Thus, standing as he does at the turn of the 20th century, as a philosopher of religion (for a few years, at any rate) he is almost without an interlocutor – a claim to which Troeltsch is the exception that proves the rule27. So-called “continental” philosophy of religion, more of a tradition, than a school, has its 18th and 19th century predecessors beginning, perhaps, with Kant’s Religion or Hegel and the forceful response from Kierkegaard. Yet it is Heidegger who gives this tradition its contemporary shape, namely, its commitment to an exposition of religious factical life that investigates religious phenomena and thinkers who upset the presumed boundaries between certain conceptions of philosophy and religion thereby inviting us to reconsider the basic practices and experiences in reference to which we define these disciplines. Thus, while at a certain level of generality we can situate Heidegger within larger philosophical and theological tradition, when we

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attend to his project with adequate concreteness it is clear that what it shares in language and
themes with his intellectual predecessors and sources, it reappropriates in the service of radically
new theory of method. In short, these early courses attempt something new – whether they succeed
or fail remains to be seen.

§3.2 Heidegger and Husserlian Phenomenology of Religion

It is Heidegger’s attempt to develop a *phenomenology* of religion that distinguishes his
account from previous ones such as the theological metaphysics of Aristotle, the rationalist
theology of Descartes and the theodicy of Leibniz. The philosophy to which he subscribes seeks
neither an ultimate ground of intelligibility, nor a philosophical ground for doctrinal belief. He
seeks instead to invert the *ordo disciplinae* that traditionally moves from the universal to the
contingent, and to investigate the *Grundstimmung* and basic practices that are characteristic of
religious persons. Yet, as a *phenomenology* of religion Heidegger must be read within the general
context of Husserlian phenomenology. As we have seen, this task is complicated by Heidegger’s
emerging conception of phenomenology that is in important respects divergent from and
antagonistic toward the Husserlian conception. Nonetheless, Heidegger understands this as a
radicalization – and to that extent a development – of Husserlian phenomenology. It is a deeper
return to the things themselves. Therefore, important – even essential – differences in method,

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28 Hints of this appear as early as the 1919 courses and in his letters. These initial indications confirm our earlier thesis
that Heidegger was never merely Husserl’s philosophical protégé, but from the beginning was characterized by a
different intellectual formulation and philosophical orientation. Yet it is also important to note that 1919 courses only
suggest elliptically and in passing what will become points of contention with Husserlian phenomenology. Two
examples are the concluding paragraph on “Hermeneutic Intuition” referenced above and the reference to Natorp’s
critique of Husserl (GA 56/57, 101/ET: *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 78). Yet, we must wait until 1920 for
a fuller elaboration of Dasein as the “counter-concept” to the Husserlian transcendental ego and only in light of that
account can we grasp the reconceiving of history, intuition and world that Heidegger intends.
emphasis, and subject matter should not obscure the indisputable fact that it is only against the screen of Husserlian phenomenology that we can understand Heidegger’s project that is equal parts revolution and development. We have endeavored to suggest the major debts and differences in the previous chapter and we will consider specific differences in subsequent ones, but one consideration should detain us here at the outset. Any close reader of Ideas I will want to ask whether Husserlian phenomenology can give rise to a phenomenology of religion at all. There Husserl famously bracketed the question of the existence of God. Yet, the evidence suggests that Heidegger undertook his 1920-21 course with the encouragement of Husserl and even at his insistence. This in turn suggests that a certain kind of phenomenology of religion is not ruled out by the bracketing of “absolute transcendence” in Ideas I §5829. At first this conclusion seems to conflict with Husserl’s claim that the “absolute transcendence” of God,

“… would transcend not merely the world, but apparently also ‘absolute’ consciousness. It would thus be an ‘absolute’ in a sense totally different from the absolute of consciousness, just as, on the other side, it would be something transcendent in a totally different sense vis-à-vis the transcendent in the sense of the world” (Ideas, §58).

Yet upon closer inspection Husserl’s treatment of religious consciousness is in fact somewhat inconclusive. The transcendental reduction reveals the factical connections between different experiences in consciousness that are “ordered in distinctive rule-governed ways” whose intentional correlate is the “morphologically ordered” world capable of descriptive and classificatory science. In this isomorphism of mind and world Husserl sees a “wonderful teleology since the rationality realized by the fact [Facktum] is not the sort demanded by essence” (Ideas,

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§58). In other words, the fact that our rationality would be directed toward the world and capable of its description is not necessitated by the nature of rationality. This ought to prompt us to question the telos of such a movement, which leads inevitably to the question of its ground. It is here, in his analysis of teleology and ground that Husserl quickly gestures toward a certain parallelism between a phenomenological investigation of teleology and a religious one. He writes,

“The transition into pure consciousness through the method of the transcendental reduction necessarily leads rather to the question of the ground for the facticity, now affording itself, of the respective, constituting consciousness. The factum as the source of endlessly mounting possibilities and actualities of value – i.e., not the factum in general – forces the question of the ‘ground,’ which naturally does not have the sense of a thinglike-causal cause [dinglich-kausal Ursache]. We pass over whatever else, from the side of religious consciousness, is capable of leading to the same principle and, indeed, in the manner of a rationally grounding motive. (Ideas, §58, italics mine)

What is the nature of this “passing over”? Is it the dismissal of an ultimately abortive attempt at grounding or a procedural specification of what transcendental phenomenology is concerned with? That is to say, is it the rejection or the bracketing of an alternative method of investigation? We are not given a clear answer. It is certainly the case that Husserl is placing the question of divine transcendence outside the sphere delimited by the phenomenological-transcendental reduction. But it is equally the case that he conceives of different teleologies (empirical, evolutionary, rational, cultural) as “various groups of such rational grounds” for such a divine being. This possibility is not pursued further by Husserl. Yet, we might ask if the object of religious consciousness is methodologically excluded, does that entail the exclusion of religious consciousness itself? Again, we are not given a clear reply. In part, this is because Husserl’s intention in this section is to illustrate by contrast with theology what he means by the “absolute” nature of consciousness and the “transcendence” of the world. In his commentary on Husserl’s
Ideas Paul Ricoeur makes two helpful observations. He observes first that Husserl is continuing a line of thought he left at §33 regarding the phenomenological reductions. With respect to that earlier investigation, the discussion of absolute transcendence permits him to distinguish two basic levels of reduction: “(1) the reduction of divine transcendence and the psychological ego [which] pertain in a specific manner to the cycle of nature (§56-58), [and] (2) the reduction of eidetics [which] constitutes an ‘enlargement of the first reduction (§59-60).” Thus, the question of or belief in the existence of God is bracketed alongside the empirical ego. This in turn suggests, second, what form a Husserlian phenomenology of religion would have to take. Ricoeur observes,

“The transcendence of God is, like that of the Ego, within the immanence of the Cogito (G: 96:2), but it is not at one with it, as is the ego of the cogitatio. It is announced there ‘mediately’: a) when the teleological problem, posited by the factual order of the world as constituted in consciousness, arises, b) regarding the development of life and human history, and c) through the motives of religious consciousness.”

This signals what will be the essential difference between a Husserlian and a Heideggerian phenomenology of religion. The former will be a “phenomenology of religious consciousness,” which would be one more regional ontology. This is the task Heidegger initially sets out to complete. Yet, as we will see, this proves untenable, and he is forced to reconceive a phenomenology of religious consciousness as a phenomenology of religious life, and therewith phenomenology as such. A basic distinction in disposition is suggested by the preferred theologian

31 Ibid., 114. In Experience and Judgement and the Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie Husserl considers a teleology immanent in consciousness, refers to diversely as “cognitive striving” and a “willing to know” are another indication of the possibility of a different kind of transcendence. See also James Hart’s excellent “A Précis of a Husserlian Philosophical Theology” in Essays in Phenomenological Theology, edited by Laycock & Hart (Albany: SUNY, 1986), in which he presents a wide ranging reading of Husserl’s texts in order to understand “what motivates Husserl to introduce a divine principle at the foundation of the world’s appearing and...how experience discloses an intrinsic ‘piety’” (90). See also his review of the Grenzprobleme in Husserl Studies (2015) 31: 245-260.
32 The German editors of the religion courses note that the original notes involve the title “phenomenology of religious consciousness,” but at a certain point Heidegger crossed out “consciousness” and wrote “life”.

99
of each Freiburg master. We have already seen Husserl’s review of Otto’s *Das Heilige* and his recommendation that Heidegger do what Otto began but failed to complete. Yet, far from developing Otto’s work, Heidegger critiques it for its phenomenological limitations as only an investigation of religious consciousness. As such it takes from religion only that which has the character of consciousness. More problematically “the phenomena of consciousness, which correspond to the entirely particular concept of consciousness of the philosophy used as a foundation, standardize the entire formulation of the problem” (76/53). For Heidegger, Otto’s operative notion of consciousness is Cartesian: a transparently rational ego in relation to the irrational numinous, which it cannot master and so before which cowers in fear and fascination. This erroneous account of consciousness leads to a misapprehension of the religious that in turn generates the inappropriate interpretive categories of the rational and irrational. The root of the religious is not the irrational, but the truly originary, which Otto cannot comprehend because he lacks “true insight yet into living consciousness and its original worlds” (333/251). The elaboration of a distinct account of life [Lebens] grounded in an account of originary worlds is what Heidegger offers us here.

In contrast Husserl’s interest in Otto, Heidegger’s impetus for thinking about a phenomenology of religion is Schleiermacher whom he viewed as a kind of proto-phenomenologist. As Judith Wolfe has suggested convincingly, the latter half of the first course can be read as a reworking of Schleiermacher’s “absolute dependence” into a Pauline-inflected “eschatological affliction”. What Heidegger retains from Schleiermacher is the mooded nature of religious experience that requires a phenomenology that is not just a “phenomenology of religious

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33 Wolfe writes: “Heidegger’s main theological contribution of the years 1916-1921 lies in adapting and revising Schleiermacher’s basic religious experience of absolute dependency in line with Luther’s and St Paul’s emphases on crucicentrist and eschatological anxiety, presenting the basic religious experience (which is determinative of the phenomenological examination of religion) as affliction rather than dependency” (34).
consciousness” but one that can do justice to the “complex of enactment” out of which religious life and reflection on it both arise. We will turn that account now.

§4. The “Introduction” to the “Phenomenology” of “Religion”

Heidegger takes the terms “Introduction,” “Phenomenology,” and “Religion” as three foreconceptions that each indicates a way into their shared problematic. That shared Ursprung, it will turn out, is the historical. He submits each of these terms to a basic principle of his nascent hermeneutics that signals the deconstructive moment entailed by his new method of formal indication: “We will begin with the clarification of the meaning of words, but we will refer immediately to the connections among objects indicated in these meanings such that these connections will be put into question” (5/4). Here Heidegger spells out the implications of his earlier 1919 course on the problem of worldviews where he contended that philosophy must be an Urwissenschaft, and therefore it must be phenomenology. Central to phenomenology as Urwissenschaft is the putting-into-question of our basic assumptions about the meaning of our language and the phenomena it purports to delimit and thereby make manifest. Let us consider how Heidegger delimits each of these three terms.

34 In Heidegger’s handwritten notes to sections 20 and 21 (on Pauline proclamation), for example, he writes: “The ‘mood’ is precisely that which is decisive; everything depends upon—and phenomenological investigation must show precisely this—understanding the peculiar phenomenal complex ‘factical life experience,’ and especially the Christian one” (134 / 95).

35 In the second “Introduction” to Being and Time Heidegger differentiates the ontic activity of historizing from its prior ontological condition, historicality [Geschichtlichkeit]: “‘Historicality’ stands for the state of Being that is constitutive for Dasein’s ‘historizing’ as such; only on the basis of such ‘historizing’ is anything like ‘world history possible...’” (SZ 20/BT 41). PRL lacks the fuller elaboration these terms receive in Being and Time, and yet, Heidegger’s critique of the historical consciousness characteristic of his age is precisely that it lacks a sense for Geschichtlichkeit.
1. **Introduction.** Taking the first term, Heidegger notes that an introduction to a science usually consists of three aspects: (1) the *delimitation* of its domain, (2) the *doctrine* of the method of that domain, and (3) the *history* of scientific attempts in the delimitation and description of that domain. In the case of the sciences, whether the natural or human sciences, “the idea of *science*...motivates, understandably, the sense [*Sinn*] of the schema of an introduction” (4/5). For this reason, there is a formal similarity between the introductions of diverse sciences such as biology, chemistry, the history of literature, or the history of religions, insofar as all claim to be scientific. Philosophy, however, is distinct. Historically, “science” originates as “philosophy” that then undergoes a process of autonomization whose criteria are methodological and correlated to distinct domains of subject matter – biological organisms, elemental compounds and reactions, distinctions of genre, and religious belief and practice. Heidegger does not dispute the claim that the sciences in some sense originate in philosophy. He writes:

> “Only a particular, formative modification of a moment already present in philosophy – a moment, however, found in philosophy in its original, unmodified form – turns the sciences, in their origination from philosophy and according to the specific character of this origination, into sciences” (6/5).

What he disputes is the claim that philosophy, having given rise to the distinct sciences, is then supposed to be a science on the model of its progeny. On this view the sciences are “embryonically present” in philosophy, which is retroactively (and reductively) understood to be the “cognitive dealing with the world”. The implication of such a view, which Heidegger does not spell out for us, is the belief that philosophy finds its highest achievement in the theoretical realm, that is to say, in a scientifically elaborated picture of the world. The task of philosophy, in anticipation of this end, is to provide an epistemology that can account for theoretical conclusions of the natural
sciences. Such reverse engineering, however, will never prove capable of discovering that “original, unmodified form” of philosophy, but can only yield an idea of the “proposition in general” or the “concept in general”. Both these terms intentionally recall Husserl’s “object in general” which Heidegger argues in SS 1919\textsuperscript{36} is not truly primary, but rather derivative of truly “basic phenomenon,” referred to variously as the Ur-etwas, the “anything whatsoever,” or the Lebens-etwas, a pre-worldly and non-theoretical motivation for all theoretical objectivity\textsuperscript{37}.

Thus, in an early example of two recurrent strategies of Heideggerian rhetoric, it turns out that (1) what was supposedly most obvious, the “introduction,” is upon further inspection least clear and that (2) the ambiguity between introduction and origin is in fact a more adequate introduction to the real problematic: Where one begins is not necessarily the beginning. To adequately introduce a science quickly involves one in a discussion of its origin in philosophy and thereby also of philosophy’s origin in factual life. The “connections among objects” signified by the words “introduction” and “philosophy” have been put into question.

2. PHENOMENOLOGY. In this way, Heidegger is led to question the meaning of the second term: “What is called philosophy?” We have seen that this question is implied in the first. An introduction to the subject matter is determined by the nature of the subject matter, in this case the philosophy of religion. Insofar as we have yet to determine the nature of the subject matter we cannot assume an introduction on the model of the sciences will prove adequate. In fact, it is precisely the status of introductory questions that differentiates philosophy from other forms of inquiry. While it tarries alongside basic questions, science has already moved on to the analysis of

\textsuperscript{36} Heidegger, GA 56/57
\textsuperscript{37} Cf. Ibid., especially the penultimate section (88ff.). Here Heidegger delineates three levels of (1) a pre-worldly something of life in itself (his own object of inquiry), (2) a formally objective level that is a “de-vivification” of the first (Husserl), and (3) the “object-like theoretical” (natural sciences).
“concrete problems”. In the latter situation the introduction is merely a statement of technique, i.e., of an accepted approach toward an object domain or regional ontology. We can think – as Heidegger was – of the methodological naturalism of the empirical sciences or the historical and form-critical methods prevalent in the biblical scholarship of Heidegger’s time. Unlike, these methods, that of philosophy is in one sense always at an introductory stage. It is always questioning its method, because unlike other endeavors its essence and method coincide: “a philologist is not interested in the ‘essence’ of philology. But the philosopher occupies himself seriously with the essence of philosophy before he turns to positive work” (7/6). Thus, while Heidegger does not envision us tarrying forever in the antechamber to philosophical investigation, he does nonetheless seem to suggest, within the broader view of the history of philosophy, a recurrent dialectic in which we must return again and again to the basic questions of philosophy. That he considers this a virtue, rather than an imperfection, suggests a further difference from the traditional model of Wissenschaft. Whereas we tend to think of the sciences as progressing in a linear direction toward a fuller portrait of the mechanical laws and statistical probabilities that govern natural phenomenon, philosophy, according to Heidegger, consists in a deepening awareness of the basic motivations of life that give rise to the welter of intellectual and comportmental expressions among which number the sciences. That is to say, if the sciences are thought of in terms of movement along a horizontal plane, Heidegger thinks of philosophy, by contrast, along a vertical plane on which it attempts to move downward rather than forward.

An introduction to philosophy, therefore, must grasp its origin in factical life, and that origin is a question of motivation. This yields a method for distinguishing philosophy from any other form of investigation as well as one for distinguishing between philosophical approaches. The principle question of such a method is: What is the original motive of the philosophy under
question? From this follow four related questions: (1) *What are the conceptual, cognitive means of its realization?* (2) *Are these means original to the motive or adopted from elsewhere (i.e., the sciences)?* (3) *Are there “points of rupture” where philosophy “opens out into scientific channels?* (4) *Is the motive under consideration itself original or adopted from elsewhere?* (7/6).

For Heidegger, philosophy is decidedly not in league with the natural sciences. The language of motivation suggests that the key to grasping the nature of philosophy correctly concerns a mode of engagement other than that of the supposed disinterestedness of the sciences. It will not be had or justified through scientific proofs, nor can it be integrated “into a universal, objectively formed material complex [Sachezusammenhang]” (7/6). To take philosophy as a science in that sense is to impose on it the restrictions of science, which is derivative of it. Phenomenology is not one more field of inquiry among others. It must, in short, must be hermeneutical: “one finds that philosophy arises from factual life experience. And within factual life experience philosophy returns back into factual life experience” (8/6-7)

3. **Religion.** Despite Heidegger’s noting of the “thrice-nuanced” meaning of his course title, we are not given a phenomenological clarification of its third term. Religion remains undefined for the first part of the course. However, a few comments can be made in light of his earlier courses and what is to follow. The first concerns Heidegger’s claim that phenomenology “will have the same meaning as philosophy” (5/4). What Heidegger proposes is a philosophy of religion that is a phenomenology of religion. In the courses immediately preceding this, however, phenomenology has been identified increasingly with a primal science of factual life. Therefore, a phenomenology of religion will mean something like a phenomenology of religious phenomena as they appear in factual life, i.e., at the level of facticity and history. In other words, e.g., there will never be a
phenomenology of the immanent Trinity, but there may be one of people who pray to and live within the horizon of belief in such a thing. Secondly, insofar as the treatment of religion here is a phenomenological one, it will be impossible to consider religion a “worldview”. In other words, Heidegger’s approach cannot constitute a system of meaning in search of existential corroboration. Such an approach, Heidegger had argued since his 1919 KNS course, was inimical to philosophy.

§5. Protestant Theology: Heidegger and the Schools

While much scholarly attention has been devoted to Heidegger’s theological sources relatively little has been applied to the, by no means insignificant, context of 19th and 20th century German theology. A thorough examination of Heidegger’s relation to religion must distinguish between religious sources on the one hand and the contemporary theological situation on the other. To understand how Heidegger incorporates the insights of Paul, Augustine, or Luther into his method, or even those of more recent figures like Kierkegaard or Schleiermacher, is not the same as understanding how his phenomenology of religion was intended as an alternative to contemporary ways of engaging the religious phenomenon. With respect to this second line of inquiry, our goal is to ask how Heidegger stands in relation to the dominant currents of German theological Wissenschaft. What we find in his 1920-21 course is a lengthy reflection on method, which

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39 Much good work has been done on the first of these. To indicate only a fraction of the literature, Van Buren (1995) and McGrath (2006) have noted the importance of Luther and Medieval thinkers for Heidegger; Wolfe (2013, 2014) has shown the importance of Heidegger’s relationship to dialectical theology; and most recently Coyne (2015) has provided us with a comprehensive study of Heidegger’s engagement with Augustine. Cf. Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*; S.J. McGrath, *Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the Godforsaken*, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 2014; Wolfe, *Heidegger’s Eschatology*; Wolfe, *Heidegger and Theology*; Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*. 

106
constitutes the major preoccupation of the German theological world at the end of the 19th century, and a close examination of Paul, in whom that contemporary theology found its most fertile resource and court of appeal. Despite the general and unspecified title to the course, “Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion,” what Heidegger in fact means by “religion” is Christianity and, more specifically, a protestant and largely Lutheran understanding of Christianity. Here contemporary protestant theology rises to the surface as a major influence here alongside Husserl and, in part, as a correction of him, and in both cases Heidegger’s engagement is equal parts appropriation and critique. A close reading of the text shows that he was aware of and well-versed in the Christian theology of his day. In addition to the biographical and historical record, we have Heidegger’s textual references to a range of prominent German theologians in these courses, including Ernst Troeltsch, Adolf von Harnack, Rudolph Otto, Schleiermacher, F. C. Baur, J. Weiss, Bultmann, and others—as well as his extensive appropriation of Paul, Augustine, and Luther.

Heidegger develops his account of a phenomenology of religion in view of the general theological trends in the German academy, especially Liberale Theologie, the proto-phenomenology of Rudolph Otto, and, in particular, the relatively new field of

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40 For example, both Gunkel and Bousset write dissertations on Paul and are part of a larger trend marking the shift of interest from Old Testament scholarship to New Testament scholarship, though Gunkel is an exception to this. Cf. Hermann Gunkel, Die Wirkungen des Heilige Geistes nach der Populären Anshcauung der Apostolischen Zeit und der Lehre des Apostels, (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1888); Wilhelm Bousset, Die Lehre des Apostels Paulus vom Gesetze, (Göttinger Habilitationsschrift, unpublished, 1890).

41 This includes Heidegger’s Catholic upbringing in Messkirch, his studies at religious Gymnasia, a brief period with the Jesuits, and two years of theological studies at the University of Freiburg, as well as his own testimony to this fact in his private correspondence with Löwith, Blochmann, and others.

43 Cf. Ibid., 72-74 and 162-163 / 50-51, 116-117
44 Cf. Ibid., 332-34 / 250-253. See “Das Heilige,” which were Heidegger’s notes for a proposed review of Otto’s Das Heilige.
45 Cf. Ibid., 14-18, 163-64, 168-73, 319, 330 / 10-13, 117-118, 121-125, 241-242, 249-250
46 Cf. Ibid., 81-83 / 56-57
47 Cf. Ibid., Anhang, 132-134 / 93-94
Religionsphilosophie that emerges out of the Religionsgeschichte school. He contradistinguishes his own approach from each of these schools. Therefore, understanding this background is important for evaluating the proposals of these courses on their own terms, rather than merely with respect to their continuities and discontinuities with Being and Time.

However, Heidegger is not only concerned to distinguish his approach from contemporary approaches in theology, he also means to intervene in those debates. The phenomenology of religion is a strictly philosophical endeavor that must defer to theology in articulating the “last understanding” of religious phenomena; nonetheless, through it “is opened up a new way for theology.” What Heidegger proposes is not only a philosophy of religion, but has implications for a religious and scriptural hermeneutics as well.

We can divide the German theological landscape of the late 19th and early 20th centuries according to three dominant schools of thought. We will call the first the liberal-critical school whose leading figure is Adolf von Harnack, though its antecedents go back to Schleiermacher. Roughly contemporaneous, and with some overlap, is the History of Religions School (Religionsgeschichte) also referred to as the Science of Religion School (Religionswissenschaft). Its story of origin is more complicated, but we can take Hermann Gunkel, Wilhelm Bousset, and Ernst Troeltsch as three of its most important figures. Finally and most directly related to Heidegger, is the school of Dialectical Theology including, most famously, Rudolph Bultmann and Karl Barth49.

Heidegger’s relationship to each of these schools is a complicated question. He has been described as converting from a dogmatic Catholicism to a “free Protestantism,” which is certainly true. However, commentators often make the uncritical jump from “free Protestantism” to “liberal

49 Robert Morgan and John Barton suggest a similar breakdown between (1) liberal-critical theology, (2) history of religions, and (3) existential-kerygmatic in their Biblical Interpretation (Oxford: OUP, 1988).
Protestantism” which, while not wholly inaccurate, is misleading. The three strands listed above, while overlapping, are defined by distinct goals that often have them working at cross-purposes to one another. However, this confusion in the scholarship is not surprising, in a 1922 CV Heidegger suggests the importance of the Religionsgeschichte Schule for his intellectual development and engages in these courses with Ernst Troeltsch. He will go on after 1922 to collaborate with Bultmann and so be incorporated, not unproblematically, into the circles of Dialectical Theology, whose approach to a “kerygmatic” theology has little in common with the Religionsgeschichte project and is a direct critique of liberal protestant theology. Finally, Heidegger has a limited engagement with Harnack in these courses and, despite his nod towards the Religionsgeschichte Schule, seems to accord, at least indirectly, a privileged status to Christianity as especially disclosive of the religious phenomenon, which was a major bone of contention between Harnack’s defense of Christian theology and the Religionsgeschichte school’s desire for a broader model of religious studies. At the same time, Heidegger’s work in these courses on a phenomenology of the primitive Christian experience suggests he would find the liberal-critical approach at best anemic and at worst inimical to a hermeneutic phenomenology of the New Testament. He implies as much in his opening sections of the “Augustine” course where he critiques Troeltsch, Harnack,

50 Sylvain Camilleri, for example, suggests that Heidegger was interested in the “liberal” evangelical theology of the 19th century” in “A Historical Note on Heidegger’s Relationship to Ernst Troeltsch” in A Companion to Heidegger’s Philosophy of Religion Life. (Elementa/Rodolpi, 2010), p.116
51 See Judith Wolfe’s Heidegger’s Eschatology, Chapter 5.
52 Heidegger, GA 60, 72-74 and 162-163 / 50-51, 116-118
53 See his 1901 rectorial address “Aufgabe der theologischen Facultäten” (“The Task of the Theological Faculties”), as well as his March 1919 article in the Preussische Jahrbücher (61), Über die Bedeutung der theologischen Fakultäten’ (On the Significance of the Theological Faculty).” It was published in advance of his testimony before the Weimar assembly 1-4 April, 1919 see: Verhandlungen der verfassunggebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung, 336 (Berlin, 1920), 192 ff., and 366 (Berlin, 1920), 216 ff. 1919: 362 –74. For an extensive and informed commentary on these developments see T.A. Howard. 2006. Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University (Oxford: OUP, 2009) pp. 397ff. Much of the present section is indebted to his careful work.
and Dilthey for their interpretations of Augustine which view him “…as an object, in an objective complex of a determinate order” (ANP §5).

§5.1. Theology as Wissenschaft

To suggest that late 19th century German theology was in crisis is surely not to overstate the case, and it was a crisis that was both epistemological and institutional\(^5^4\). Epistemically it was threatened by the continued development of historical consciousness and the historical sciences. The very sciences,

“…that once supported theology’s claim to be a critical, scientific enterprise, in other words, now turn out to threaten theology with wholesale delegitimation, dissolving all religious verities, so some charged, into mere time-bound, human-constructed phenomena unworthy of the assent of faith.”\(^5^5\)

Thomas Howard suggests that the classic confrontation of this can be found in Ernst Troeltsch’s 1922, Der Historismus und seine Probleme. However, this was far from an internal debate within and between theological faculties. Given the place of theology in the new German university defined by its commitment to Wissenschaft the question quickly became one about which of the various models of theology was most rigorously “scientific”. At the time of the founding of the Humboldt university of Berlin, Fichte had argued that theology must assume “a completely different form” if it was to be counted among the faculties. A peace was struck by Schleiermacher, the first chair of theology at Berlin, who successfully defended and implemented a “dual foundation” of theology as “scientific training for church service.”\(^5^6\)

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\(^5^4\) I borrow these categories from Howard, Protestant Theology

\(^5^5\) Ibid., 379

\(^5^6\) cf. ibid., pp. 379-391.
The direct consequence of these factors was the birth of a new academic discipline diversely titled *Religionswissenschaft, Religionsgeschichte*, and *vergleichende Religionsgeschichte* whose basic claim was that “one could not trace the history of biblical religion without studying the history of the traditions contained in this literature.” This comparative approach developed in distinct, but complementary directions such as the form criticism pioneered by Hermann Gunkel and Wilhelm Bousset and the systematic theology pioneered by Troeltsch who, rather than elaborating a history of religions, was in search of the religious *a priori*. This history is significant for interpreting Heidegger, because Troeltsch eventually moves to Berlin to accept a chair in *Religionsphilosophie*. Thus, when Heidegger sets out to develop a philosophy of religion it is in reference to Troeltsch that he must define his own project.

More significant still, is the fact that the debate between the liberal theology of Harnack and the work of the history of religions school was about method. Both claimed to offer a method that was properly scientific, rather than confessional. Therefore, each offered a potential paradigm for developing a methodology in the philosophy of religion. The History of Religions School, however, challenged Harnack and others by contesting the presumed priority of Christianity within theology faculties, claiming that,

“...theology...could never function as a genuine science so long as it kept a traditional tie to ecclesiastical Christianity; the logic of sciences demanded a critical historical investigation of religion in general shorn of all residual attachments to any particular religion and its supporting institutions.”

Such a claim had the further implication that any exclusively Christian theology “did not belong to a modern publicly funded scientific institution.” The central figure of the debates is Adolf von

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59 Ibid.
Harnack (d.1930) the leading figure of the liberal-critical school – *liberal* in continuing the program of Schleiermacher and *critical* in embracing the scientific elevation of theology by its wholesale incorporation of historical method. Harnack believed and successfully defended the position that theology could be wholly *scientific*, and therefore retain its place in the German university, and also specifically *Christian*.

Against Harnack the *Religionsgeschichte Schule* argued that the study of religion could not be properly scientific if it restricted itself to the Christian revelation because in doing so it lacked sufficient generality. Nor could it restrict itself to doctrine. Thus, the study of religion, to be scientific, had to let go of the restrictive modifiers “Christian” and “theological” and embrace a broader engagement with the religious phenomenon across time, place, and culture. In his *Introduction to the Science of Religion* (1873) Friederich Max Müller quipped (paraphrasing Goethe) that, “He knows only one religion, knows none.”60 The *Religionsgeschichte Schule* threatened to up end the division of university theology articulated by Schleiermacher.

Ultimately, Harnack successfully defended the project of liberal protestant theology from the encroachment of the *Religionsgeschichte Schule*; however, he proved to be more vulnerable to attacks from within his own house. To a younger generation of scholars led by Karl Barth, a former student of Harnack’s, the liberal-critical project had resulted in,

…a modernized form of Christendom, Christianity understood as a broad, civilizational project delivered from the husks of older doctrinal or ecclesiastical considerations. …[It was] the redefinition of Protestant theology…not as an apologetic, practical, confessional or ecclesial enterprise, but as a critical, academic, scientific and, indeed, profoundly statist one – the submission of *Heilsgeschichte* to the criteria of *Weltgeschichte*, the submission of theology to the guidance of *Wissenschaft*, the submission of the training of future church leaders to the custody of the state61.

60 Ibid., quoted on p. 390
61 Ibid., 408
The signal figures of Dialectical Theology were Karl Barth, Rudolph Bultmann, Friedrich Gogarten, and Emil Brunner. Its charter, so to speak, was the publication of Barth’s *Römerbrief* in 1919. One need only turn to the influential writings of either Bultmann or Barth to note that they did not reject a critical and historical approach to the bible. What they contested, was the reduction of the theologist to the historian. The liberal-critical theologians had “elevated method over content, observation over engagement, criticism over dogma, and, in biblical exegesis, words over the Word.” They were “quite unaware that there is [after all] a content, a cardinal question, a Word in the words.” The result was a return to the *kerygmatic* core of the Christian gospels, which were the *sine qua non* of Christian theology. This issued in both the “theology of preaching” characteristic of Barth and the Christian existentialism of Bultmann.

The debates in German theology intersect with Heidegger’s work in a few ways. First, they are debates about method. We can already see where Heidegger with his emphasis on factual life experience and despite his own commitment to a certain kind of historical consciousness, would take issue with Harnack’s project. *The wholesale adoption of scientific categories for theological reflection results in a set of theoretical abstractions that reduces religion to a set of propositions to be clarified and defended, rather than an experience to be cultivated.* Second, these are debates about the meaning of biblical texts: what that meaning was and how to access it. One’s position on the nature and role of a “science” of theology depended on whether science governed theology (Harnack, Troeltsch) or theology enlisted the aid of science (Barth, Bultmann). Harnack and Barth had a famous exchange over precisely this issue in a series of journal articles. Between the two

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62 Ibid., 412
63 Barth famously stated that “the task of theology is at one with the task of preaching” “it consists in the reception and transmission of the Word of the Christ” (quoted in Howard, 415)
64 cf. Ch. 4 “The Debate on the Critical Historical Method: Correspondence between Adolf von Harnack and Karl Barth” in James M. Robinson’s *The Beginnings of Dialectical Theology* (KY: John Knox Press, 1968)
there can be no rapprochement. Harnack’s final word is the following: for the “scientific theologian, [there is] only one scientific method [and]…only one scientific task: the pure cognition of the object.”65 This is the precise position that Heidegger rejects in his religion courses.

Heidegger’s own confessionally embroiled search for an academic appointment is taking place in the midst of these nationwide debates over the theoretical and institutional status of theology. Thus, despite only engaging directly with Troeltsch, it is empirically clear from his letters66 that he is aware of them and, more importantly, that, philosophically, he is developing method in these courses that has something to add to them. This is one way of understanding the suggestion that with his new method in the philosophy (phenomenology) of religion a new way for theology is also opened up. Such an approach would be historical, but also, in a sense, kerygmatic, and it would be scientific in the way philosophy is scientific, not in the way physics is scientific.

§5.2 Ernst Troeltsch & Religionsgeschichte

This historical and theological background is essential to the first religion course because there Heidegger’s principal interlocutor is Ernst Troeltsch who was trained as a systematic theologian and was a member of the History of Religions school. Troeltsch’s biography is perhaps not insignificant here as it is strikingly similar to Heidegger’s on a number of points. He too moved from theology to philosophy. He too sought to move from a confessional account of religion to an

65 Howard., Protestant Theology, 417
66 See, for example, Husserl’s letter to Heidegger about Otto’s Das Heilige (Briefwechsel 4:131-36 / BH 359); Heidegger’s 1927(?) letter to Bultmann suggesting Barth was “a mere lightweight,” and dialectical theology “a mere spectre” (quoted in Wolfe, 2014, 154ff); Heidegger gave a lecture titled “The Problem of the Religious in Schleiermacher” on 1 August, 1917 (Wolfe, 2013, p., 47). And we know he spent the better part of a few years reading through the Gospel of John with Bultmann on Saturdays.
intellectually sophisticated one. He too sought to develop a philosophy of religion. Troeltsch was one of a number of young theologians of the so-called “Gottingen Group” or “mini-faculty.”67 He, like many others, came to Gottingen to work with Albrecht Ritschl who was working as a systematician in dialogue with modernity and represented an alternative to the sectarian mentality of much protestant theology (e.g., pietism), which, according to Troeltsch, had “no…consistent conception of the world.”68 Troeltsch studied there from 1886-88. Ultimately, he like many others came to reject many of Ritschl’s tenets which he found to be insufficiently metaphysical, insufficiently historical-critical, and insufficiently scientific69. The result was that the Religionsgeschichte Schule quickly became, by its own admission, “a school without a teacher.”70 Troeltsch later maintained that the diverse and incompatible ends (e.g., skeptical, positivistic, and illusionistic as well as theological) to which the scientific study of the history of religions and religious texts had been put was too diverse to speak of a school. However, he maintained there was a shared method:

“We cannot, then, speak of a religionsgeschichtliche school but only of a religionsgeschichtliche method which is more or less radically employed. The only proper application of the term would be to designate those scholars who have given up the last remnant of the idea of truth supernaturally revealed in the Bible, and who work exclusively with the universally valid instruments of psychology and history.”71

The methodological parameters for this enterprise were spelled out by two teachers at Gottingen. The first was a professor of oriental languages named Paul de Lagarde who, “…divorced the

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67 cf. Morgan & Barton, 125. The group was active during Husserl’s tenure at Gottingen. He arrived in 1901 the year Hermann Gunkel’s commentary on Genesis was published.
69 According to Chapman, “Where Ritschl saw history as functioning merely to confirm the dogmatically fixed conception of Christianity, Troeltsch and his fellow members of the HRS held that the very concept of Christianity itself had to be established on the basis of historical research and could not be dogmatically asserted beforehand” (24).
70 The quote is Gunkel’s from a commemorative speech in honor of Bousset, “Gedachtnisrede an Wilhelm Bousset”, quoted in Chapman, Ernst Troeltsch, 19
evolutionary development of religion from all dogmatic and metaphysical application and called for the impartial dedicated study of the history of religion that would make use of every available means of conscientious research.”72 The second figure was a professor of the Old Testament named Bernhard Duhm who criticized, “The confusion of religion with theology, and the constriction of the former by the latter” preferring instead the “definition of the independent essence of religion, it stages and, if possible, its laws of development.”73

Thus, we see here an early elaboration of a basic methodological rift between the scientific study of religion and any apologetic or catechetical task. This movement away from doctrine had as a correlate a focus on concrete religious practice and expression. Bousset, another early member writes that,

“One grows to realize that to attain a living conception of religion one does not only, and perhaps not even primarily, look at the clear world of ideas and concepts, at biblical injunctions, dogmas, and doctrines, but rather, one looks at the broad stream of the religious life which flows along a different bed form that which we had previously imagined; it flows along the bed of moods and fantasies, of experiences and events of the most primitive kind which are often difficult to control: in ethics, custom, and cultus.”74

The movement was diverse with respect to its evaluation of Christianity. Gunkel and Bousset felt there was a “certain historical necessity” to its emergence and preeminence. Troeltsch was all the way to the other side in rejecting this. For him, it was impossible “to construct a theory of Christianity as the absolute religion on the basis of historical way of thinking or by the use of historical means.”75 This will be of interest in contrasting Troeltsch with Heidegger. It was Troeltsch, moreso than the others, who moved toward a philosophy of religion, ultimately securing a chair at Berlin in philosophy rather than theology. This interest perhaps accounts for his early

72 Chapman, *Ernst Troeltsch*, 26
73 ibid, 28-29.
74 Quoted in Chapman, p. 31
75 ibid., p. 33
and ready acceptance of “the importance of the new social sciences for Christian theology, as well as for biblical studies and church history.”

The central religious figure of this school was St Paul, hailed as “the second founder of Christianity.”

His experience, recounted in his letters, is paradigmatic of early Christian life and that experience was “not to be found in hard and fast doctrines, but rather in the primordial religious experience of the individual.”

Heidegger, citing 2 Cor. 12, claims that Paul’s experience of a “thorn in the flesh” is paradigmatic for the Christian life, rather than his mystical experience “of inexpressible things” in paradise. He refuses to reduce Paul to mysticism or to reduce Christian religious experience to isolated moments of mystic unity. However, to unlock the philosophical relevance of this “originary world” for philosophy and for religion requires a method that is capable of describing the phenomenon without reducing it to something it is not.

§5.3 Heidegger’s Troeltsch

Troeltsch was neither a Kantian the way Ritschl was, nor was he a biblical scholar like many of his fellow Göttinger. With people like Gunkel and Bousset, he sought to resituate Christianity in a broader context and in so doing he is rightfully counted among the members of a single Religionsgeschichte movement; however, that broader context differed in important ways. For

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76 Morgan and Barton, p. 129
77 The quote is taken from Wrede’s Paulus, (103 ff. / ET, 179 ff): “As a rule even liberal theology has shied away from the conclusion that he refounded Christianity. But it is not to be evaded…True, he has not dominated everywhere, especially not in the life of simple, practical piety, but throughout long stretches of Church History—one need only think of the councils and the dogmatic controversies—he has utterly thrust into the background that greater person whom he meant to serve.”
78 Chapman, 36. Even Gunkel, despite devoting the vast majority of his scholarly career to form-critical studies of the Old Testament, wrote a dissertation on the “spirit” in Paul later published as Die Wirkungen des Heilige Geistes nach der Populären Anschauung der Apostolischen Zeit und der Lehre des Apostels. Bousset focused on Paul’s notion of “law” but in relation to spirit in his Die Lehre des Apostels Paulus.
Gunkel and Bousset, and others, it was the near-eastern culture contemporary with the Gospels, Epistles and Old Testament narratives. For Troeltsch it was the broader human context of religious experience. In that endeavor he retained a certain Kantian inflection in his search for das religiöse apriori. For these reasons, the designation of a Religionsphilosophie belongs most appropriately to him. This was recognized by his contemporaries who awarded him the above-mentioned chair in philosophy at Berlin, and Heidegger noticed it as well.

Heidegger’s first indication that he is aware of Troeltsch is in a 1917 letter to Rickert in which he sought to underscore his continued interest in philosophy and religion despite his recent conversion from Catholicism. Far from changing his scholarly pursuits, he now envisioned developing them with “a truly living and free understanding of Christianity in the sense of Troeltsch.”  

79 This notion of a “free Christianity” 80 is taken from Troeltsch, and it recalls Elfride Heidegger’s conversation with Englebert Krebs in which she describes the couple’s commitment to “think in a Protestant way, but with no dogmatic ties, believing in a personal God, praying to him in the spirit of Christ, but outside and Protestant or Catholic orthodoxy.” 81 It also recalls Husserl’s letter to Rudolph Otto in which he describes himself as “a non-dogmatic Protestant and a free Christian.” 82

Shortly after his 1917 letter to Rickert, Heidegger contacted Troeltsch directly. The two exchanged letters and in the summer of 1918 they met in person during Heidegger’s visit to Berlin. 83 That the two should find much in common ought not surprise us. Both men were

79 Denker, Alfred (ed.), Martin Heidegger/Heinrich Rickert: Briefe 1912 bis 1933, (Vittorio Klosterman 2002), 42.
81 Quoted in Ott, Hugo, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie. (Campus, 1988), 108; also quoted in Kisiel, Theodore and Sheehan, Thomas (eds.), Becoming Heidegger, (Northwestern University Press, 2007), 95
82 Kisiel and Sheehan (eds.), 2007, Becoming Heidegger, 25
83 Heidegger was there for his military training as a meteorologist.
influenced by Rickert, though in different ways that anticipate the nature of Heidegger’s disagreement with Troeltsch. Troeltsch was sympathetic to Rickert’s value-philosophy. It was, in a sense, a further broadening of philosophical interest beyond religion to the even-more-general field of value. Just as *Religionsphilosophie* moved beyond the specific exercise of Christianity to religion in general, so too value philosophy moved beyond religious value to value in general. We know from a letter to Rickert dated November 22, 1915 that Troeltsch considered himself a member of that movement referring approvingly to “our group of Heidelberg.” Troeltsch thought that *Religionsphilosophie* must be a *Wertphilosophie*: “The philosophy of religious values, must be the means of attainment of the *Selbständigkeit* of religion.”

Heidegger, by contrast, despite studying with Rickert, rejects the philosophy of value as an insufficiently radical approach to philosophy. It fails to get at the root of the problem because of its “failure to grasp the problem of the subject” whom Rickert regards as the affirmer and denier of representations. According to Heidegger, however, “knowledge cannot be representation, for there is no independent something towards which representations can direct themselves. If all *Being* is content of consciousness, how can there be an original which representations are supposed to copy?” Thus, they disagree over the nature of subjectivity and therefore also the nature of knowledge. This disagreement is in part over what phenomena are determinative for an account of life and how to access them. This problematic emerges again here. Therefore, despite what seems to be Heidegger’s favorable disposition toward Troeltsch and even some of his favorable remarks about him, a careful reading of these courses reveals that what he proposes is not only a different

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84 Quoted in Camilleri, p.124
85 Ibid., 122.
86 GA 56/57, 182 /138
87 Ibid., 184 / 139
model of *Religionsphilosophie*, but one whose basic understanding of meaning is at odds with that implied by Troeltsch’s approach.

In Troeltsch’s account, Heidegger distinguishes four principal and complementary approaches to the philosophy of religion: psychology of religion, epistemology of religion, history of religion, and metaphysics. He argues further that the psychology of religion is really only a “preliminary phenomenology” from which to construct a transcendental religious epistemology that is evidenced in the history of religion, which serves merely as a cultural data set from which to infer an inductive metaphysics of religion. Viewed methodologically, the first three approaches are derivative of the natural sciences and together constitute the “science of religion” that then ushers in a metaphysics of religion, which Troeltsch took to be philosophy of religion in the strict sense. They can also be divided materially:

> “The four regions are not only methodological; [they are] rather also divided according to their material character. The psychic reality is, in its structure and in its character of being, something other than the a priori region of rational lawfulness; and this is again something else than the reality of history, in particular the universal history; and this is something other than the last metaphysical reality, in which God is thought” (28/20).

The critical question that Heidegger proposes at the end of his summary of Troeltsch is central to understanding his reorientation of the direction of inquiry for much of the philosophy of religion that has followed in his wake. He writes,

> “We must now understand in what way this philosophy of religion refers to religion, whether it grows out from the meaning of religion, or whether religion is not as much as grasped in the manner of an object and forced into philosophical disciplines—that is to say, integrated into material complexes that already exist in themselves before religion” (27/19).

In response to the contemporary philosophy of religion that he finds in Troeltsch, Heidegger critiques Troeltsch for adopting a set of categories from the natural sciences and naïvely applying
them to the religious phenomenon. Against this Heidegger argues that when religion is interpreted in this way it is explicated along a number of different lines whose common mistake is to treat the study of religion as any other science and to define it in terms of an uncritically accepted “object,” namely, the “idea of God”. Such “religious-philosophical disciplines,” he writes, do not arise “from religion itself qua religion, [but rather,] from the outside religion is observed and integrated as an object. The philosophy of religion itself is the science of religion.”

By contrast, for Heidegger philosophy (i.e., phenomenology) is a primordial science and therefore cannot begin from an assumed scientific standpoint. A phenomenology of religion, by extension, cannot begin with a predetermined objet, but rather has as its primary task the pre-determined investigation of the religious phenomenon.

The first critique, then, is a critique of method. The four approaches outlined by Troeltsch are four distinct regions and they are regions predetermined and external to the religious phenomenon rather than regions that arise from it. As a result, we cannot explain how the regions link together: “thus, the philosophy of religion is determined here not according to religion itself, but according to a particular concept of philosophy, and indeed a scientific one” (28/20). Here Heidegger signals a very precise parallel with his deconstruction of philosophy in §2. There, philosophy, in being dissipated into various forms of science, in the end is only a general category of “cognitive comportment” whose specific contribution is either already abolished or always in danger of giving way to a further subdivision of scientific method. Here the same occurs, what we have is not a philosophy of religion, but only psychology, epistemology, history (misunderstood), and metaphysics. As such we do not succeed in grasping either religion or philosophy. The philosophy of religion proposed by Troeltsch and is neither philosophy nor religion.

88 Ibid., 27 / 20
The second critique is one of content. Heidegger suggests that for Troeltsch the first three disciplines taken together constitute the *Religionswissenschaft*, an exercise whose legitimacy he does not question, only its claim to be a phenomenology of religion. The fourth, metaphysical, way is what in fact, for Troeltsch, constitutes *Religionsphilosophie*. It is, in Heidegger’s words, “a metaphysics of the idea of God on the basis of all of our experiences of the world” (24/17). For Troeltsch there is an exitus-reditus metaphysical structure to this in which having been given our metaphysical object of inquiry “God”, we leave metaphysics for a “preliminary phenomenology,” that is “a preliminary doctrine of types of historical religions” from which we extract a religious *a priori* which in turn is correlated to the metaphysical notion of God: “Here the religious a priori stands opposite a higher mental world [*Geisteswelt*], the experience of which is the fundamental religious phenomenon” (25/17). From this vantage point we can then anticipate the future course of religious development. This anticipation issues in an ethical directive: to aid religion in its maturation in one of three possible direction: (1) a religion of pure reason, (2) a syncretism (e.g., protestant Catholicism), or (3) a further refined form of one of the already-extant religions.

Such a metaphysics of religion, Heidegger claims, is primarily concerned with the “proof of God” and to that extent is more Greek than Christian. We can hear *in nuce* his future critique of onto-theology. He notes in passing that this is the same reason that Troeltsch does not understand Luther. This seems like a passing confessionally inflected comment, however it is more significant than it appears. For Luther the central religious phenomenon is faith and this is precisely what Troeltsch fails to account for:

“One would like to see something new here offered in Troeltsch’s metaphysics, that here religion is no longer studied as an object, insofar as the primal phenomenon—faith in the existence of God—is treated. After all, the existence of God would then be gained in a non-cognitive manner. But Troeltsch says, despite this, that the “object” of faith must be studied

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as a real object in connection with other real objects, insofar as reason is thought as a unity” (28/20).

Thus, what Heidegger is in fact proposing is that a phenomenology of religion is (a) a phenomenology of religious life and (b) that religious life is the experience of faith\(^{90}\) as it is available in factical life experience.

\section*{§5.3.1 Heidegger’s Critique—Nature, Method, and Goal}

Heidegger deconstructs the epistemological and metaphysical philosophies of religion along the axes of their nature, method and goal. He begins his discussion of Troeltsch with a general remark that, viewed from the end of the chapter, contains the nucleus of his entire polemic. He writes of Troeltsch:

“He is coming from Theology. The presentation of his view is rendered difficult through the frequent change of his basic philosophical standpoint, through which, however, his religious-philosophical positions is maintained quite remarkably” (19/14).

\textit{1. Nature: Philosophies.} This is not, as it might seem at first, the criticism that Troeltsch slides uncritically between philosophy and theology. The “frequent change” pertains to “his basic philosophical position”. In other words, Troeltsch, in part because he comes from theology, has yet to determine what philosophy is. As a result, he vacillates between conceptions of philosophy as scientific and as metaphysical—both of which are erroneous according to Heidegger. The first three approaches in the philosophy of religion (psychology, epistemology, and history) constitute

\footnote{\(^{90}\) Heidegger retains this notion of religion as the believer’s experience of faith even after he has rejected the project of a phenomenology of religion as in his “Phenomenology and Theology.”}
the scientific approach and the last one the metaphysical approach. Thus, for Troeltsch, the philosophy of religion is a science of non-dogmatic or non-confessional theology. In this conception, religion is an external object and as such can be integrated into different material complexes (historical, psychological, epistemological and metaphysical). This “objective” approach to religion accounts for the “the constant transformation” of standpoint. The tendency to view religion simply from one “material complex” and then another, “is the strongest sign that [Troeltsch] posits religion as an object.” Religionsphilosophie succeeds in being other than theology by moving beyond the confessional commitments and beliefs. This is why it must also be a metaphysics. Its raison d’être relies on a metaphysically articulated and rational proof of the existence of God that is, by virtue of that metaphysical character, not reliant on any particular confessional commitment or belief. It is supra-confessional.

2. Method: Scientific Objectivity. The method of this exercise is based on contemporary theological science, and therefore uncritically takes scientific objectivity as its model. This is perhaps the deeper resonance in Heidegger’s critique that Troeltsch is “coming from theology.” He has taken a scientific conception of theology and wedded it to a kind of critical “metaphysics of the idea of God on the basis of all our experiences of the world” (24/17). The epistemology of religion is to identify a religious a priori on the basis of the “phenomenology” (read: descriptive psychology).

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91 Camilleri notes that the scientific and metaphysical character of the study of religion is what Troeltsch retains from his study with Ritschl. This metaphysical register permits theologians working within particular traditions to defend their claim to theological rigor, but at the expense of relocating that exercise from the register of theoretical reason to that of practical reason. They must acknowledge the practical-confessional [praktisch-bekenntnisartik] nature of it (120). Troeltsch describes this phenomenon as practice conforming to feeling [praktisch-gefühlmäßig]. Here, Camilleri continues, Schleiermacher is key in the appropriation of Kant, because it is through him that we can link “the idea of a religious a priori to a historical theology...[He] had separated religion and piety (two synonymous terms) from metaphysics and morality” (121).

92 Heidegger suggests that such a metaphysics is not at odds with the critical epistemological project of Kent in which “one arrives form the teleological context of (transcendental) consciousness to one last meaning, which demands the existence of God” (24/17).
and history of religion. The science of religion, having identified the “rational moment of religion through which religion first becomes possible” turns it over to “religious metaphysics”, which is constituted by an explanatory and a normative role. It must “reunite” (i.e., explain) this \textit{a priori} with its various “psychic modes of appearance” but also become “co-effective” in “the further development of religion”.

On this model, because of its scientific and metaphysical commitments, the “phenomenology” and historical approaches are really subservient to the epistemological and metaphysical ones. For Troeltsch, phenomenology means merely a “preliminary phenomenology” that supplies “types of historical religions”. And as a corollary history is simply the field of data in which we are to locate the religious \textit{a priori} and trace its normative development. This “inductive metaphysics” has God as its object toward which it moves according to its predetermined entelechy.

Heidegger’s criticism that the four approaches he discerns in Troeltsch do not cohere as a single discipline is cognate with this general criticism. It is because the \textit{Religionsphilosophie} of Troeltsch adopts the categories and methods of science generally that it misunderstands its true object. Its project is determined from the beginning by a theoretical-scientific paradigm that distorts its subject matter.

3. \textit{Goal}. The goal of such a \textit{Religionsphilosophie} is “the working out of an academically valid determination of the essence of religion” (GA61: 20). Christianity is thus for Troeltsch the culmination of an arc of religious development from which is distilled the religious \textit{a priori} determinative of future progress and its essence is “…the gradual unfolding of an immanent

\footnote{Heidegger attributes this idea in Troeltsch to Rickert.}
impelling power or fundamental ideal, realizing itself in historical Christianity.” This “essence” could then furnish a “normative principle of dogmatics.”94 Because no single idea could dominate the history of Christianity, “Its essence is rather the productive power of the historical Christian religion to create new interpretations and new adaptations.”95

It turns out that Heidegger’s passing note – that Troeltsch has yet to clarify his basic philosophical standpoint – at the beginning proves quite significant. He has misunderstood the manner of approach to philosophy and so he has also misunderstood religion. He considers religion in terms of its object, which, he believes, remains consistent among shifting manners of engagement. This has led him, in turn, to misunderstand the nature of phenomenology and of the historical. Thus, for Heidegger, a Religionsphilosophie whose point of departure is Religionswissenschaft proves to be quite different from a Religionsphilosophie whose point of departure is phenomenology.

Camilleri suggests that, “Heidegger saw clearly that the Wesenbestimmung (essential determination) thought by Troeltsch was no longer drawn from theology, as it is in Harnack, but instead from the philosophy of religion.”96 This is certainly true, but the cost of moving from theology to philosophy is the adoption of a paradigm that presupposes a general metaphysical form within which to situate religion. That is not only to move beyond theology, but phenomenology also. The metaphysical telos of Troeltsch’s account governs its “phenomenological” moment and structures its inquiries. This is to “return religion to the realm of ideas” in which it cannot apprehend “the insight according to which religion is an act of

95 ibid., 12
96 Camilleri, 128
living.” For him, by contrast, “the religious *a priori* stands opposite a higher mental world [*Geisteswelt*], the experience of which is the fundamental religious phenomenon” (25/17). Thus, even though Troeltsch claims to begin with a “preliminary phenomenology” that would start with the religious as such and in history, his operative account of consciousness predetermines what might “show up” in such an investigation. Thus, Heidegger critiques Troeltsch’s (neo-) Kantianism much the same way he critiqued Otto’s “Cartesianism”. Indeed, the latter is but a derivative formulation of the latter. Against both Heidegger asserts the priority of *Lebens* as the ineluctable starting point for achieving clarity about both understanding (philosophy) and the religious, which ultimately involves him in formulating a new account of each.

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Heidegger’s critical engagement with Troeltsch brings to relief by way of contrast some general components of his own phenomenological approach to the phenomenology of religion. First and foremost, the goal of a phenomenology of religion is an account of *lived* “faith in the existence of God” (28/20), that is its primal phenomenon. Second, because religion, like philosophy, is not an object but a kind of comportment, philosophy cannot simply bracket and evaluate “it” – we are the ‘it’. Phenomenology cannot get out of life, but is rather an attitude towards life from within life – it is a hermeneutics. Therefore, the phenomenologist must wait “to see how religion and philosophy comport themselves, how religion becomes an object for philosophy” (28/20). Third, this requires that the phenomenologist relate to religion in a different way. Philosophy and science employ fundamentally different relational senses with respect to their phenomena and therefore they cannot study religion in the same way.

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97 This is a critique from Troeltsch’s contemporary and critic Wilhelm Hermann in a 1912 exchange of mutually critical articles following Wilhelm’s critical review of Troeltsch’s *Geschichlichkeit Jesu* (quoted in Camilleri, 128).
Thus, there is a parallel between the misunderstanding of philosophy and the misunderstanding of the philosophy of religion. Heidegger claims that when philosophy is understood as metaphysics, rigorous science, or the science of value it fails to grasp its problematic at the proper depth. It reduces the complexity of life out of which questions arise to either an account of the ground of being, an account of theoretical consciousness, or an account of ultimate value. So too in the philosophy of religion, when we think religion under any one of these three categories we reduce the phenomenon under consideration and therefore fail to grasp its full phenomenological sense. The governing relational sense of scientific objectivity is that of subject and object. Heidegger’s point is that this is neither the only nor the most basic relational form. It is a mere cognitive comportment, which is possible, powerful, valuable, but not the fuller compartmental pre-scientific, and also properly philosophical reflection characteristic of both philosophy and religion.

This distinct situation constituted by the irreducibility and inseparability of subject and sense [Sinn], of Dasein and significance as lived relation, is not only the proper starting point of phenomenology (i.e., philosophy), but also of religion. This is a not insignificant point that Heidegger neither elaborates, nor defends, but it is clear in this text that religion is not like other phenomena. Like philosophy, it must be thought at the most basic level of reflection prior to scientific objectivity. Thus, contemporary philosophy of religion is not wrongheaded simply because it misunderstands philosophy. Troeltsch need not be simply less of a Kantian and more of a phenomenologist. Heidegger’s claim is stronger. It is not that he got religion right, but philosophy wrong, but rather that in getting philosophy wrong he has also gotten religion wrong. This is a further corroboration that the religious content of these courses is not incidental. It is because of how phenomena are in their givenness that both phenomenology and religion must be understood
in a certain way. The kind of reflection characteristic of phenomenology and of religion is at the very least paradigmatic (if not unique) because its theoretical deformations fundamentally misinterpret them. This is different from, for example, the theoretical attitude of the natural sciences. A theoretical account of entities, while transcendentally naïve, is a real possibility of human consciousness and discloses real dimensions of the entities it describes. So too in the human sciences. The critical-historical work done on ancient texts, sacred and other, is of real and lasting value as a certain kind of history, but it too is transcendentally naïve and “existentially” naïve to the extent that it does not advert to the underlying ontological conditions that make historical consciousness a possibility for human being. In contrast to these examples, when philosophy and religious life are conceived in theoretical terms their essential characteristics are hidden from view. Therefore, what results is not one possibility among others, but a false account of what the phenomena are. This is due to the fact that philosophy and religious life are ineluctably tied to the lived experience from which one cannot abstract without changing the phenomenon under investigation. Phenomenology – both simpliciter and as a phenomenology of religion – is proposed by Heidegger as a via media between a de-naturing conceptualism and unreflective description. This is the thrust of Heidegger’s remark that, “It is necessary to examine religion in its factuality, before one addresses to it a particular philosophical study” (30/21).

Thus, in the end despite his personal relationship with Troeltsch, his likely sympathy for a shared professional trajectory from theology to philosophy, and legitimate and worthwhile elements of his Religionswissenschaft, Heidegger proposes an approach that is quite distinct. That the differences are more than incidental can be grasped from the fact that Heidegger is at his most
generous when suggesting that Troeltsch perhaps no longer holds his former positions (e.g., 26/18) or when he remarks in a letter to Rickert that Troeltsch, “is a formidable adversary!”

It is, of course, not enough to critique Troeltsch. Heidegger must propose an alternative Religionsphilosophie. He calls this die Phänomenologie der Religion, where Religion is understood as religiöse lebens – religious life. This movement from consciousness to life distinguishes Heidegger from both the wissenschaftliche pretensions of Troeltsch and the regional ontology of Husserl and Otto. Its starting point is “to see how religion and philosophy comport themselves, how religion becomes an object for philosophy” (28/19). Yet, the pressing question is, how? For Heidegger, like Husserl, phenomenology is fundamentally a clarification of experience, where experience is understood as the experienced and the experiencing. Such a clarification, whether it is theoretical or hermeneutical, requires a distinct kind of seeing. Therefore, to move from critical to constructive work Heidegger must redirect the phenomenological gaze. In what follows, he proposes a radicalized form of phenomenological seeing that requires rethinking both the meaning experienced and the experience of meaning. Thus, he first reconfigures the Husserlian account of meaning in terms of three meaning-strata, and then he proposes a new method for “seeing,” which he calls formale Anzeige,

§6. How Meaning Means

At work in Heidegger’s engagement with Troeltsch and through him with the History of Religions school and the liberal-critical project as well, is a debate about meaning: how best to access it and how best to explicate it. The sine qua non of phenomenological investigation is that our

experiences are significant. We do not overlay a veneer of meaning on brute sense experience or materiality; rather, our experiences are meaningful in se. This is the thrust of Heidegger’s repeated insistence on experience as both content and activity: the experienced what and the experiencing of that what. Experience is not a detached speculative surveying, but rather “a confrontation-with, the self-assertion of the forms of what is experienced” (9/7). Just as seeing does not create the object, but rather becomes aware of itself in relation to an object, so too, consciousness does not create its world, but comes to itself precisely as a being-related-to the world of which it is conscious.

The proposition “experiences are originally meaningful” does not contradict the readily verifiable proposition “we are often mistaken about the meaning of our experiences.” However, it does imply that the court of appeal for such mistaken judgments will be a return to those experiences themselves. This leading back of philosophy to its original experience, characteristic of this “early” Heidegger, is presented as an alternative to Husserl’s transcendental reduction in which we are led back to transcendental consciousness. Here, instead, we are led back to the interrogative experience of being in the world. This is not simply a retreat to immediacy. Heidegger defends the possibility of a philosophical reflection on factual life experience, which, far from impoverishing or denuding it, allows its temporal and contingent fullness to be thought. Crucial for Heidegger, however, is the fact that this leading back is not only a reevaluation of the experienced content, but equally of the experiencing activity.

The meaningfulness of our experience is thus a function of its content and its activity. Therefore, a primordial account of the significance of factual life and, within that, of religious experience, will have to proceed along both these lines, which are in reality two irreducible moments of a single complex phenomenon. Heidegger’s distinction between content and activity
is rendered here in terms of content and relational senses [Sinn]. These correspond to the “what” and the “how” dimensions of an experience, respectively. This distinction has been operative in Heidegger since his first 1919 course in which he defined experience as “a living toward something” in which the “relating to” is not a thing-like part to which some other thing, the “something” is attached. The living and the lived of experience are not joined together in the manner of existing objects” but together constitute a single unity. This is facticity; this original unity is what remains unthought in a hasty move to the theoretical where subject- and object-pole are already distinguished.

To illustrate the point that different relational senses reveal different dimensions of one and the same content Heidegger compares the experience of a sunrise from the perspective of an astrophysicist and from the perspective of the chorus of Theban elders in Antigone. The astrophysicist, sees the sunrise “simply as a process in nature before which he is basically indifferent.” This indifferece is a characteristic mark of the theoretical relation-sense. His theoretical relation to the object of investigation requires a bracketing of other possible relational senses, e.g., the aesthetic or existential, and the meanings tied to them. By contrast, the chorus of Theban elders, witnessing it “on the first friendly morning after a successful defensive battle” sees: “That most beautiful glance of the sun / That upon seven-gated Thebes / So long shine”.

One can think of the difference between these two relational senses in terms of distinct relations of the “I”. The theoretical “I” of the astrophysicist stands apart from his object of investigation in a theoretical relation. It sees the object. It is a scientific witness to the unfolding order of the natural world. The Theban elders being in the throes of lived experience do not take a position with respect

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100 Ibid., 74/59
101 Ibid.
to the sunrise—do not witness to it—but are the witnessing, so to speak. That is to say, they are
“an event of appropriation [Ereignis]” in which the relational sense is not that theoretical distance
of observing “I” and observed object, but something else. That “something else” is the relational
sense appropriate to appropriation, which at this point is a heuristic denomination of what
Heidegger is seeking.

Heidegger’s distinction between the content- and relation-strata of meaning is a reframing
and a relocating of the Husserlian distinction between an object of perception and its mode of
givenness that is essential to Ideas\textsuperscript{102}. On that account the theoretical attitude is correlate to a mode
of givenness that in turn is constitutive of a kind of scientific objectivity. Heidegger’s question
here is, who has grasped the meaning of the sun, the astrophysicist or the Theban elders? In his
scientific indifference, the astrophysicist has circumscribed his selbstwelt from its organic
concourse with the umwelt and mitwelt, whereas for the Theban chorus these three are interrelated
in a single motivated grasping of significance. There are, of course, in a sense, two meanings here.
That they can both be true is not Heidegger’s point. His point is rather that, our relation-sense
determines the content-sense of an object. Once we acknowledge this, we must then ask the second
question, by what criteria is the scientific account taken to be more basic than the “existential” or
“worldly” account of the chorus? In other words, Heidegger’s contestation does not concern the
theoretical attitude and its construction of a region of objectivities, but with its claim to
primordiality. The very reasons for which it is proposed as such—its affective and worldly
indifference—are precisely those on account of which it cannot be properly basic\textsuperscript{103}.

\textsuperscript{102} See for example, Ideas 1, §§35 & 37.
\textsuperscript{103} Heidegger is simultaneously confronting the same problem in Rickert in his course on value philosophy. There he
critiques Rickert for wanting to classify meaning within a particular region of being, a classification that “decides the
total character of philosophy” and which “is to be grounded in a scientific-methodological manner and absolutely
grounded” (GA 56/57, 201-202 / 151). Against this position, Heidegger argues that meaning is not among the sphere
of “existing entities”, but must be grasped prior to the regionalization of the world indicative of scientific
consciousness.
If the 1919 courses articulate a clear distinction between content and relational sense, the relational sense remained a generic and undifferentiated term. It is only in the 1920-21 course that it receives its technical sense by a further subdivision into relational sense (Bezugsinn) and enactment sense (Vollzugsinn). Both senses were part of Heidegger’s undifferentiated account of relational sense prior to 1920, however it is here that they first acquire their distinct technical specifications in light of their contradistinction from one another. He describes the full account as follows,

“What is phenomenology? What is phenomenon? Here this can be itself indicated only formally. Each experience—as experiencing, and what is experienced—can “be taken in the phenomenon,” that is to say, one can ask:

1. After the original “what,” that is experienced therein (content) [Gehalt].
2. After the original “how,” in which it is experienced (relation) [Bezug].
3. After the original “how,” in which the relational meaning is enacted (enactment) [Vollzug]” (63/43)

Heidegger describes these components of sense as three “directions of sense” [Sinnrichtungen] and argues that while they are distinguishable, they are also inseparable. A phenomenon, “is the totality of sense in these three directions. ‘Phenomenology’ is the explication of this totality of sense” (63/43). Thus, primordial phenomenology is to be the account that describes how the experienced arises out of the experiencing that allows it to be seen.

Heidegger presents his account of meaning as a competitor to Husserl’s “formal-ontological” account. The formal-ontological takes as its object the “object-in-general” and as such says nothing about the content-sense or its possible fulfillments. Therefore, it is not “prejudiced” [präjudizieren] as are more regional investigations: it does not start out by considering only biological or chemical or historical phenomena, but considers any object whatsoever. It is radically
indeterminate with respect to content, which enables it to determine the essential elements of the basic modes of givenness and constitution in consciousness. Heidegger does not disagree with Husserl on this point; however, he does not think we have gone far enough. In focusing on *experiencing consciousness* Husserl has not asked in what way or ways we are related to our own conscious performance. Is the theoretical elaboration of consciousness truly primordial, as Husserl claims it must be? What is the justification for this methodological privileging of a theoretical relational sense? Precisely in its indifference to content – not just particular content, but content as such – formal ontology overlooks the basic givenness of experience from out of the factical. Moreover, even if Husserl can elaborate a theoretical account of consciousness, what guarantees that this is an adequate phenomenological account of the meaning of philosophy, being, and religion? Is not its purported neutrality its greatest liability.

“[It is] exactly because the formal determination is entirely indifferent as to content, [that] it is fatal for the relational- and enactment-aspect of the phenomenon – because it prescribes, or at least contributes to prescribing, a theoretical relational meaning. It hides the enactment-character – which is possibly still more fatal – and turns one-sidedly to the content” (63/43).

For Heidegger, if as Husserl claims, it is essential that phenomenology be a primordial science, this requires in its first moment attending to meaning in its concrete occurrence in, from out of, and in reference to factical life. If that is true, phenomenology in its fullest sense cannot be “formal-ontological” because this account preemptively selects the theoretical attitude as the leading relational sense – precisely what is not original to the natural attitude – and in doing so it ignores or occludes the role of enactment-sense in the constitution of phenomena because it is always caught up in concrete possibilities.

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104 In what follows we will see the extent to which this focus on enactment is essential to a phenomenology of religion, in particular. We have already seen that Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion takes the human experience of faith, rather than the metaphysical or doctrinal object “God” to be its grounding phenomenon. As we will see below, faith
Heidegger’s distinction between content and relational senses recalls Husserl’s distinction between the content of an intention and the mode of intentional relation toward it. However, in distinguishing a third level of sense that points toward the motivational source of the relating, Heidegger calls into question the presumed theoretical attitude under which the relational sense (whether it is perception, memory, or imagination), have been examined. Merold Westphal notes that Vollzugsinn suggests the Husserlian distinction between filled and empty intentions. Yet here the question Heidegger asks is not about the state of fulfillment: a synthesis that has or has not occurred as made clear by its presence or absence. Rather, he asks about the fulfilling—an ongoing, temporal process in which motivation from out of factical life is constituent for the other sense of meaning. He will ultimately relate this to a fourth Zeitigungssinn—a temporalizing sense that helps to underscore the extent to which any kind of experiencing, including the experience of knowing is tied to factical life which as historical is always in a state of “here becoming.”

But at this point we can ask Heidegger why we ought to privilege a temporal model of meaning or over a theoretical one. If Heidegger has succeeded in showing the unwarranted claim of the theoretical attitude to define philosophy as such; and if he has done this by showing the alternative possibility of a different kind of engagement with factical life experience, it remains

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105 Westphal, “Jugendschriften,” 251
106 See his 1921–22 *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle*, 52 / *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*, GA 61, 37
107 This accords with Westphal’s suggestion that Heidegger’s three-fold understanding of sense is both a redistribution and an augmentation of the Husserlian account: “But in keeping with the challenge to the primacy of the theoretical posture, perception is not the model, so fulfillment is not the presence of the content to an observer but an execution, actualization, or enactment by an agent. Perception or intuition would be a particular, somewhat thin mode of enactment. But because it is not a privileged mode, enactment has a temporal sense as a process rather than as a present moment. Whereas fulfillment is an achievement word for Husserl, it is a task word for Heidegger” (op. cit, 251-52).
108 A fuller answer to this question requires an exploration of the way in which Heidegger reinterprets Husserlian “reflection” in response to Natorp’s dual critique. This is taken up in the next chapter.
to be shown why phenomenology *als Urwissenschaft* has a greater claim to our fidelity than phenomenology *als strenge Wissenschaft*. And should he succeed in convincing us of this first point, it still remains for him to demonstrate exactly how such an engagement is possible. This second task is undertaken in his account of formal indication to which the next chapter is dedicated. Let us prepare for this by examining Heidegger’s reasons for radicalizing the phenomenological account of meaning and thereby deconstructing its claim to *Wissenschaft*.

§7. Conclusion: Motivating Phenomenology

To answer this first question requires us to break out of the structure of the course. Both Husserl and Heidegger are concerned with how we know things. For Husserl this is framed by the question, how is scientific knowledge possible? Whereas for Heidegger, it is, how can one come to know the meaning of being? This moves us past an account of the fact of intentionality – that we come to ourselves already and always conscious of something – to a certain kind of directedness or “teleology” in consciousness that desires to know. For both, the key to answering this question is motivation: What motivates the philosophical attitude, whether that is understood as a shift in attitude or a basic comportment? In *Ideas 1* Husserl explains that motivation is a “phenomenologically basic concept” that “resulted for [him] right away with the specification of the purely phenomenological sphere, carried out in the *Logical Investigations* (and as a contrast to the concept of causality).”

He is likely referring to a passage like the following one from the first investigation:

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109 *Ideas 1*, §47, p.73, fn.
“[C]ertain objects or states of affairs of whose reality someone has actual knowledge indicate to him the reality of certain other objects or states of affairs, in the sense that his belief in the reality of the one is experienced (though not at all evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other. This relation of ‘motivation’ represents a descriptive unity among our acts of judgment in which indicating and indicated states of affairs become constituted for the thinker.”

Thus, for Husserl motivation is a basic principle and a key methodological concept which secures for phenomenology the rigor it requires in its investigations: “For here, as everywhere in the phenomenological sphere, there are no contingencies, no facticities; everything is motivated in an essentially determinate way.” However, as we noted above, it is less clear what motivates the “radical alteration” that inaugurates the phenomenological attitude. He maintains that the suspension of the thesis of the world is always a possibility for consciousness. The closest we come to a motive for such a suspension is in response to the provocation of skepticism. In this respect, then, perhaps the frequent and rarely accurate charge of Husserl’s “Cartesianism” hits home. It is not merely that he distills from Descartes’ radical doubt the more circumspect possibility of the epoché. He also adopts the entire conceit within which philosophy is taken as a response to skepticism, which is to say, to the denial of knowledge of the world. From such a standpoint philosophy is always in some sense epistemology and reactive. This accounts for its aversion to contingency and therefore history, since these are the traditional courts of appeal for the skeptic.

Heidegger seeks a different motivation for philosophy. He, too, is concerned with the question of motivation: “[F]or every phenomenological investigation it is of decisive importance to understand the genuine and meaningful motives of a problem.” However, he flips this

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110 LI 2.1 §2
111 Ideas I, §138, p.237
112 Ibid., §63.
113 GA 56/57, 128/98
problematic on its head: It is contingency, the temporal flux of life that elicits the question from us. Philosophy, then, is a questioning comportment, and “questioning comportment is motivated by a ‘desire to know’ or a ‘drive for knowledge’”\(^{114}\) that is itself a response to life. Philosophy’s problematic is not to defend the reality of the world – to contest that is an “absurdity” not a “problem”. The real question, is whether “the motivation of the sense of reality (as theoretical moment) [is] from life and first of all from environmental experience.”\(^{115}\) But the umwelt, precisely because it is shot through with contingency, is the first thing to fall afoul of the de-vivification of the theoretical disposition. Thus, on Heidegger’s account, philosophy as a primal science takes the questionability of factual life to be the basic phenomenon of the philosophical attitude, rather than the problem to which it addresses itself. “The philosophical problematic is motivated on principle from the historical, so is this possible only insofar as the concept of the historical is polysemous” (31/22). That is to say, the historical must mean something more and other than what it is commonly taken to mean.

However, if he is attempting to save phenomenology from a new kind of retreat into ideality, on the one hand, Heidegger’s insights into the historical nature of questioning (not just of objects) makes him equally critical of the dominant trends in “historical” Theology, at least insofar as these purport to be either theology or philosophy of religion. Those trends all operate with the “object-conception” of the historical which has a strange circularity in so far as it begins with concepts that are then treated like objects that are in turn the “empirical” basis for a further set of concepts describing them. Against this Heidegger delineates a second sense of the historical that is defined as “here becoming, emergence, proceeding in time, a characterization that befits reality” that is not determined, “by the foreconception of the object” (31/22). It is the historical “as we

\(^{114}\) Ibid., 66-67 / 53

\(^{115}\) Ibid., 92 / 72
encounter it in life” not “in the science of history.” He maintains, moreover, that both “philosophy [and religion] subsist in factical life experience.” Therefore, neither can be correctly understood absent a proper understanding of the historical, i.e., the factical.

We have in fact grasped in a pre-thematic sense the deeper meaning of our own historical being to the extent that the rise of historical consciousness has placed a “burden” on us and, in withdrawing our view from the present, it has ruined “and paralyze[d] the naïveté of creating.” Yet, instead of being led to an ontological clarification of this historical-being, it has provoked two problematic responses. One the one hand some (Troeltsch) renegotiate an older deductive metaphysics of eternal truths, no longer possible, for a new “inductive” metaphysics in which we induce those truths from the witness of history rather than from contemplative reason. Thus we are prevented from accessing the true ground of our understanding and the world within which it is already caught up. Second, we have contented ourselves with a superficial account of history that has no feeling for historicality, its true source. This we have yet to grasp it at its proper depth and in light of its deepest implications.

Thus, Heidegger’s final pronouncements on the contemporary theologico-scientific approach are rather critical. Despite what he will write later the same year concerning the influence of the Religionsgeschichte in his 1922 CV, his argument here is that

“So long as it is not certain that the religious-historical and the genuine religious-philosophical understanding, that is, phenomenological understanding, coincide, it is still not at all said that history of religion can deliver material for the philosophy (phenomenology) of religion” (77/53).

The history of religion “accomplishes much for phenomenology,” but only once it has been subjected to “phenomenological destruction [Destruktion].” It is worth noting, that this suggestion that the results of historical research in religion can furnish resources for the phenomenology of
religion is something of an ironic inversion of Troeltsch’s suggestion that Religionsphilosophie required a “preliminary phenomenology”. Heidegger’s critique of scientific theology extends beyond the Religionsgeschichte school to the other strands of theological Wissenschaft we considered above. Regarding form-critical analysis, he suggests that in their consideration of the history of style and literary forms, “the point of departure is misguided as much according to the science of history as phenomenologically. One approaches the matter entirely externally” (81/54). He also claims that Harnack and the liberal-critical school, because they misunderstand history, misunderstand the true problematic of the origin and development of dogma. “[E]xplication is not a technical problem separate from religious experience, rather the explication goes along with, and drives, the religious experience” (72/51). The problematic of religious “explication” (dogmas), “lies in primordial Christianity,” and requires that one advert to the ineluctable factical circularity between expression and experience.

Heidegger, thus, rejects any suggestion that historical-critical and form-critical studies of religion, in their non-theological character, might suggest a model for an adequate philosophy of religion. In contrast to both historical-critical scholarship and Religionsphilosophie, Heidegger proposes the model of St Paul who he claims “rejects the understanding of Christianity from pre-given forms of religion.” Heidegger’s Paul desires, instead, “a complete break with the past: Paul wants to say that he has not come to Christianity through a historical tradition, but through an original experience” (69/49). That way forward involves a particular kind of understanding. That understanding is a hermeneutic understanding that contends with the dynamic, motivated,

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116 In particular, Heidegger critiques Harnack’s magnum opus, History of Dogma, for only starting in the 3rd century when the “Hellenization” of Christianity has purportedly taken place.
117 Heidegger cites Galatians 1:12 in defense of this claim, where Paul claim to have received the Gospel “not from a human source…but…through a revelation of Jesus Christ.” The wording and brevity of Heidegger’s remark is challenging because it also appears to reflect the then-dominant tendency in the German biblical scholarship to downplay or deny the Jewish elements of the Gospel and the early church.
and temporal conditions of factual life experience. As hermeneutic it must secure a proper foreconception of that which it is desires to interpret without importing foreign categories of interpretation. This is the lofty claim made for his practice of *formale Anzeige* to which we turn now.
“[The phenomenologist must wait] to see how religion and philosophy comport themselves, how religion becomes an object for philosophy”

–Heidegger

In the last chapter we saw that in the first half of his “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” Heidegger deliberately contradistinguishes his own approach from the dominant currents of “scientific” theology. The challenge that faces him now is to show how philosophy as phenomenology can be more than the mere and haphazard description of life, while also being something other than a theoretical description that prescinds from facticity. In response to this he proposes a method he calls *formal indication*. We will attend to this in detail below. At the outset, however, and in view of the larger problematic of a phenomenology of religion we ought to note that Heidegger develops this approach first in the context of his project of a phenomenology of religion which was of more than incidental importance to him. In his letter to Fr. Englebert Krebs, he remarks,

“My investigations in the phenomenology of religion…should show beyond a doubt that in transforming my basic philosophical position I have not been driven to replacing objective
appreciative judgment of and deep respect for the life-world of Catholicism with the angry and coarse polemics of an apostate.”

Here Heidegger offers his work in the phenomenology of religion as a promissory note. These researches are to be a kind of evidence of good faith, of a sincere and consistent interest in the religious life within the purview of a philosophy that he goes on to describe as an “inner calling” undertaken “for the sake of the eternal vocation of the inner man.” It remains to be seen, then, whether these courses in fact testify to that religious life-world, and how formal indication achieves this.

§1. Introduction

One of the difficulties in reading Heidegger even at this early stage and independent of the “lecture notes” style of these courses is his preference for Aristotelian argumentative rhetorical structures, and two of these in particular. The first is his commitment to an aporetic approach. From his earliest writings Heidegger conceived of philosophy as a kind of questioning. Not simply a reflection on the commonplace that we question, but rather the pursuit of how to question phenomenologically. Precisely to the extent that he agrees with Husserl that it is our questions that initially and heuristically delineate the form of our answers—precisely to that extent learning to ask the right question in the right way is essential for philosophy. For Heidegger, what we can “see” phenomenologically depends on the kinds of questions we ask and how we ask them. For that reason, in the same way that Aristotle – and Socrates before him – often led his interlocutors to a state of aporia before articulating the correct line of inquiry or argument, so too Heidegger,

1 Kisiel and Sheehan, Becoming Heidegger, 367
without announcing it, often begins a line of questioning that he knows will lead to conflict with either the topic at hand or between it and a conclusion reached earlier in the course. For example, though his rhetoric is largely favorable towards Troeltsch, ultimately what he shows his students is that this scientific approach to the philosophy of religion is based on an understanding of philosophy and science that has already been shown to be at odds with phenomenology. For Heidegger these aporetic moments serve the same purpose as Husserl’s destruction of sedimentation. They shake us out of the “traditionalization” which is the enemy of authentic tradition and authentic thinking. In being led to an aporetic state we are forced to ask again and, in some sense, for the first time, *Was ist?*

This aporetic strategy results in a second structural one: repeated beginnings. Many of Aristotle’s works\(^2\), the *Metaphysics* and *De Anima* most famously, have multiple ἔξ ὑπαρξῆς or “new beginnings” — here Heidegger does something similar. His engagement with Troeltsch is, for all intents and purposes, an instructive dead end. It has rehearsed the major trends in the field, but also their inevitable inability to handle the religious phenomenon with adequate attention and rigor. We might have been alerted to this after §2 in which he discussed the title of the course. There, though his statements about “Introduction” and “phenomenology” are not dead ends, we never arrive at the promised discussion of the third, and most important term, “religion”. In fact, his opening remarks on “philosophical concepts,” (§1) which open with the intent to discuss the class’s title that is then delayed until §2, constitute a kind of platonic excursus in which the seemingly irrelevant digression is in fact the unannounced introduction to the problematic that will be examined. Finally, his extensive treatment of the “historical” serves much the same purpose as his

\(^2\) *Metaphysics, De Anima, Book 3, and Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7*
examination of Troeltsch. It is only in the final sections of Part 1 that we are finally introduced to the center of his methodological considerations, his account of *formale Anzeige*.

The need for formal indication as motivated in two ways. First, it is originally motivated by the need for philosophy to be a properly basic science, an *Urwissenschaft*. For it to be such requires a privileged but unprejudiced mode of access to factual life experience. Second, it is a remedy to the “formal determination of the objective” that dominates the history of philosophy. It will remedy this malady in two ways: by providing the phenomenologist with an alternative way of reflecting on experience in the present, and by providing a way of rereading philosophical history. Thus, formal indication will prove central to – and indeed another name for – Heidegger’s project of *Destruktion*. It breaks apart the objective-metaphysical relational senses of the history of philosophy to uncover the vital indications that have been hidden by a preference for the theoretical.

§1. The How of Meaning

The manner of phenomenologically accessing the significance of life in all three of its dimensions of meaning (content, relation, and enactment senses) is what Heidegger calls *formale Anzeige*. The term as a name for Heidegger’s method is first proposed in the “Introduction” course and it has a long life in his work. It is further elaborated the following semester in his “Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle” and it is used at about the same time in his review of Jasper’s *Psychology of Worldviews*. Neither is it limited to this “earliest” Heidegger. Gadamer has

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4 Heidegger sent the review to Jaspers in 1921 and we know from a letter to Löwith that Heidegger was reading Jasper’s 1919 text as early as March 23, 1920 (cf. *Becoming Heidegger*, p., 97), therefore it must be roughly contemporaneous with the “Introduction” course.
suggested that when Heidegger spoke of formal indication, “he already formulated something that holds for the whole of his thought”⁵ and the material and thematic records support this⁶. This implies two initial conclusions at the start of our own investigation. First, formal indication originates in Heidegger’s work as part of the method of a phenomenology of religion. Second, as a method, formal indication is clearly not restricted to the phenomenology of religion⁷. The fact that Heidegger turns away from explicitly engaging religious themes after 1921 does not entail the illegitimacy of a formally indicative phenomenology of religious life, though it may cause us to wonder. Nor does his insistence in 1922 on the methodological “a-theism” of phenomenology, which does not take a position on the existence or non-existence of God, but rather articulates a form of interrogative asceticism that does not presume to possess God⁸. Far from a rejection of the previous year’s project, this account of atheism is in fact anticipated his account of “renunciation” in this course. Moreover, recent scholarship has suggested, that, despite the turn away from religion as an explicit topic, Heidegger returns at crucial intervals to his religious sources – in particular Augustine – as a source of insight⁹.

⁶ It is references in SZ at 114, 115, 117, and 313. In his 1930 Basic Concepts of Metaphysics course he states that, It is necessary to reflect on the general character of philosophical concepts, that they are all formally indicating or signaling [formal anzeigend]” (GA 29/30: 422, 430). And, while the term as such does not appear in his posthumous Contributions, there is nevertheless an important sense in which this “new beginning” is premised on an attentiveness to “indications” both new and old, and its mode of enactment is described as indicative” rather than “declarative.”
⁷ From neither of these conclusions follows the third conclusion that the religious content of these courses is incidental to the method that is developed. This may be the case or it may not be the case. But either way it is not necessitated by the first two statements.
⁸ In GA 61 Heidegger writes, “Philosophy, in its radical self-posing questionability, must be a-theistic as a matter of principle. Precisely on account of its basic intention, philosophy must not presume to possess or determine God. The more radical philosophy is, the more determinately is it on a path away from God; yet, precisely in the radical actualization of the “away,” it has its own difficult proximity to God” (197-198/148). He goes on to specify later in the text, “…here, ‘atheistic’ means: keeping itself free from the temptations of that kind of concern and apprehension that only talks glibly about religiosity”(363/ translated by John Van Buren in Supplements, (New York: SUNY, 2002), 194.
⁹ Coyne’s Heidegger’s Confessions is the most recent example of this kind of research in English. See also Gerhard Thonhauser’s German monograph on Heidegger and Kierkegaard, Ein rätselhaftes Zeichen: zum Verhältnis von Martin Heidegger und Søren Kierkegaard. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016).
Philosophically, our way into these considerations can only be to attend carefully to the method outlined here, to engage in it, to examine its fruitfulness, and to consider what possibilities it may open up for our own appropriation. In that respect, it is worth recalling that Heidegger himself and his own – notoriously shifting – self-interpretation, is not the final arbiter of the significance of his work, but “only its first reader.”

Defining formal indication positively, however, can prove difficult. In part, this is because Heidegger often defines its negatively, i.e., in opposition to other models of philosophical investigation. The term itself is a compound of two distinct Husserlian concepts taken by Heidegger from separate analyses. The “formal” character of formal indication is taken from Husserl’s account of the distinction between formalization and generalization in Ideas I and the “indicative” character of formal indication relies on a distinction in the Logical Investigations between significant expressions and non-signifying indications. Once again, we cannot understand Heidegger except against the screen of Husserlian phenomenology. Once again, in resituating Husserl’s investigations Heidegger radicalizes them. In this case he reverses the priority of these pairs.

In reversing the order of priority in each of these investigations, Heidegger attempts to respond to a challenge leveled by Natorp against phenomenology. The question at issue is, How can a science of life be truly primordial? Natorp contends that phenomenology either arrests a moment of experience for analysis, in which case it cannot claim to have penetrated to experience as such, or it is merely unreflective description and therefore not philosophy at all. Heidegger noted the seriousness of this critique in his 1919 course where it hangs uncomfortably and unanswered in its final hours. In that context, it is unclear whether he thinks Natorp has indeed identified a flaw.

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10 Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 11
in the Husserlian model or whether he thinks Natorp’s frame of reference prevents him from understanding how a phenomenology of life could be self-reflective without being theoretically abstractive, i.e., how there could be a productive and truly primal circularity rather than simply a vicious one. His account of formal indication suggests that Husserl has the resources for it, but it requires a rethinking of phenomenology. The stakes are clear for Heidegger, *formale Anzeige* is the means by which we achieve a methodological approach to existence.

Heidegger first defines formal indication as “the methodical use of a sense [Sinn] that becomes a guiding one for phenomenological explication” (55/38). This initial definition is less transparent than one would hope. We have just learned that “sense” is understood in at least three ways – *Gehaltsinn*, *Bezugsinn*, and *Vollzugsinn*. Which of these is to be the formally indicative sense? Is it all three? Moreover, how is it that the formal indication can guide the investigation without bringing any “preconceived opinion,” i.e., as Heidegger goes on to specify, either (1) an attitudinal consideration or (2) a regional demarcations taken as absolute? To answer these challenges and to provide a more comprehensive account of what Heidegger means by this term we will look first at his account and its Husserlian antecedents and then at the different resonances various commentators have detected within its somewhat flexible parameters.

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12 It also determines how one interprets the purported “failure” of the project of *Being and Time*. Is formal indication truly a philosophically or phenomenologically significant development? Is the Daseinanalytic of *Being and Time* its greatest achievement? Does it outlive the purportedly failed project of *Being and Time*?
§2. Husserl

§2.1 Formale Anzeige

As noted above, the predecessor to Heidegger’s understanding of *formale* is Husserl’s discussion of formalization in his *Logical Investigations* and also in *Ideas I*. In both, he is keen to distinguish formalization from other kinds of abstraction. He first discusses the topic in his third logical investigation “On the Theory of Parts and Wholes”\(^\text{13}\) where in §12 he argues that,

“We may define *analytically necessary propositions* as propositions whose truth is completely independent of the peculiar content of their objects…and of any possible existential assertions. They are propositions that permit of a complete ‘formalization’ and can be regarded as special cases or empirical applications of the formal, analytic laws whose validity appears in such formalization” (LI.2.1, §12).

Here formalization refers to propositions and, more specifically, to propositions concerning materially independent truths, such as the logical truths of identity (“A = A”) or non-contradiction (“A v –A”). He continues,

“In an analytic proposition it must be possible, without altering the proposition’s logical form, to replace all material which has content, with an empty formal *Something*, and to eliminate every assertion of existence by giving all one’s judgments the form of universal, unconditional laws” (LI.2.1, §12).

Husserl distinguishes two functions of formalization. It is, first, formalization is a process of evacuating logical forms of their material content. In doing so we also refrain from making existential assertions. Formalized propositions are, in the terminology of *Ideas I*, under the *epoché*. The process of formalization allows us to distinguish analytic propositions from synthetic ones because the former require no specific content for their formal-logical coherence. The “something”

\(^{13}\) Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations* (LI), Part 2, Investigation 1, §12. It is worth noting that Husserl felt this investigation was his most important contribution and the most overlooked.
that instantiates this formal proposition is left wholly undetermined. Ultimately, this line of reasoning permits Husserl to arrive at the most materially undetermined of possible objects, his “something-in-general”. The identification and clarification of synthetic propositions, by contrast, lead to “laws grounded in the specific nature of the contents to which non-independent factors belong.” They retain an essential link to materiality because they are laws about thinking about certain things, whereas formalized propositions are laws about thinking anything at all. These latter lead to “analytic and formal laws, which, being founded purely on formal ‘categories’, are unaffected by all ‘material of knowledge’” (LI.2.1, 173).14

Formalization is essential to Husserl’s project of “constituting the idea of a pure logic as mathesis universalis” (§24). In the Logical Investigations it is not yet contrasted with generalization; however, it is distinguished from “abstraction.” By abstraction Husserl means “a non-independent ‘moment’ of content, or the corresponding ideation under the title of ‘ideating abstraction’, but not formalization” (ibid). Abstraction is a process of clarifying empirically-dependent forms, whereas formalization makes the move to ideality. This process of abstracting a materially dependent form is called generalization in Ideas 1.15

Thus, in the Logical Investigations Husserl used formalization to distinguish analytic from synthetic propositions. In doing so he noted its distinction from a kind of “material” abstraction. In Ideas 1, §13 it is this distinction that takes center stage reformulated as the distinction between formalization and generalization. Husserl demonstrates the fundamentally different ways of

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14 This in turn determines the language we use to describe them: “In formalization we replace the names standing for the sort of content in question by indefinite expressions such as a certain sort of content, a certain other sort of content etc. At the same time, on the semantic side, corresponding substitutions of purely categorial for material thoughts take place” (LI.2.1, §24).

15 Already in LI we find that CH. 8 §59: “To the pure theory of the forms of meanings [i.e., formal apophantics] we here have a corresponding pure theory of the forms of intuitions, in which the possibility of the primitive types of simple and complex intuitions must be established by intuitive generalization, and the laws of their successive complication into ever new and more complex intuitions must be laid down.”

151
dealing with phenomena by describing how each process has two directions and contrasting their results: he contrasts formalizing and de-formalizing with generalizing and specifying. Key to the distinction is the observation that when we generalize or specify our point of departure is always some material object. So when I specify the genus “animal” I can point to a class or species within that, say “human being,” and then further specify this human being here. By contrast, however, when I de-formalize I am not specifying the material determinations contained within a concept, but filling in an empty logical-mathematical form or a formal truth. This is ultimately a distinction between an empirical intuition, which can be generalized to yield empirical universals and the intuition of essences,

“Logical essences of forms (e.g., the categories) do not lie in the substantive individual essence in the way that the universal red lies in the various nuances of red or “color” lies in ‘red’ or ‘blue’” (ID 1, §13).

In the 1920-21 course Heidegger credits Husserl with being the first to carefully explicate the process of generalization and distinguish it from formalization. The basic distinction, as Heidegger summarizes it, is between the process of generalization which moves from “red” to “color” to “sensuous quality” and the process by which one moves from “sensuous quality” to “essence.” Generalizations are (1) bound to a material domain, (2) proceed in ordered stages, and (3) proceed according to the matter at issue. Formalizations, by contrast, (1) are not bound to the materiality of the thing, nor (2) are they bound by stages. Generalization because it is tied to material determinateness is alternatively a specification or abstraction of the content/content-sense

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16 “Husserl first differentiated ‘formalization’ from ‘generalization’ … Husserl first carried out its logical explication. He sees the meaning of the difference, above all, in terms of formal ontology and in the grounding of a pure logic of objects (mathesis universalis). We want to attempt to further this differentiation and, in the furtherance, explain the meaning of the formal indication” (GA 60: 57/39).
of an object. Formalization because it is materially indeterminate concerns the relational sense that obtains between an unspecified content and intentional consciousness.

Here Heidegger asks the crucial question: If formalization is not bound by its material content, how is it motivated? In other words, if the content-sense does not motivate the act of formalization, what does? Heidegger suggests that for Husserl,

“It arises from the sense of attitudinal relation itself [Einstellungbezug]… I must see away [wegsehen] from the what-content [Wasgehalt] and attend only to the fact that the object is a given, attitudinally grasped one. Thus the formalization arises out of the relation meaning of the pure attitudinal relation itself, not out of the ‘what-content as such’” (58/40).

In other words, the theoretical relation sense requires that one “see away” from the content. This is the process by which we suspend the material content and its existential thesis in order to “retract our gaze” to see the manners and modes of intentional life. In doing so, for Husserl, we first become intentionally self-aware.

If it is clear that Heidegger relies on formalization rather than generalization, it is also clear that his appropriation of Husserl’s notion of formalization does not take place without altering its meaning, or, more accurately, its manner of application. He suggests we can think of “formal” in three ways. In the first sense formalization is a “forming-out” [Ausformung] which yields the formal-logical and the formal-ontological. The formal logical yields a set of formal categories that “make possible the performance of mathematical operations” (62/43). In the second sense, the formal-ontological is the clue to a mathesis universalis in which being is viewed through a fixed theoretical relation and thus yields, according to Heidegger, a separate “theoretical region”. Finally, there is the “phenomenology of the formal” which is Heidegger sense. Distinct from the formal ontological investigation of Husserl (second sense), this is an “original consideration of the formal itself and explication of the relational meaning within its enactment” (62/43).
words, Heidegger is proposing a further retraction of the gaze not only from content to intentional form, but to the activity of that forming itself. In doing so he retains (1) the materially-indeterminate nature of formality, and (2) the non-ordered nature of formalization. Regarding the second retention, however, he contends that although Husserl’s account of formalization is not ordered at the level of content (that would be generalization), in fixing a theoretical relational sense it has privileged a particular ordering at the level of relation sense. Thus, while it does not order directly like generalization, it does still order indirectly. Formal indication attempts to eradicate this indirect imposition and get at the Sache selbst in a more originary way.

Heidegger agrees with the Husserlian analysis as far as it goes, but wants to broaden it and to deepen it. He broadens it by asking not about the “object-in-general,” but about the “anything whatsoever”, the Lebensetwas. He deepens it by asking about the attitudinal enactment [Einstellungvollzug] that gives rise to the attitudinal relation [Einstellungbezug]. He claims that his sense of “formal” (the third one he identifies) is “more original” than those used in Husserl’s account of formalization. In showing that there is a distinction within the relational sense between relation simpliciter [Bezug] and its enactment [Vollzug] he moves beyond Husserl’s analysis without rejecting it. Given that there are a variety of possible relations, we must move to the level of enactment to ask after the motivation of a particular privileged Bezugsinn. The de facto positing of the theoretical relation-sense is problematic for Heidegger because it prevents one from asking about formalization at the properly basic level of factical life experience – it occludes the extent to which the relating consciousness is itself always factical. Thus, while the move from empirical generalities to formalized idealities is crucial to phenomenology, it does not succeed in supplying the properly basic motive or the properly basic level at which to answer the question of philosophy and meaning. For that, as we will see, the relational sense must be altered in order that the
enactment sense can, for the first time, come into view. This, in turn, will allow us to ask about the origin and the original motivation for the theoretical.

§2.2 Formale Anzeige

Such is the sense of formale, but what of Anzeige? Here too the Husserlian antecedents are key for grasping Heidegger’s account. In the first of his six logical investigations Husserl discusses the nature of signs. There he argues that the term “sign” is used ambiguously. Some signs – those with which Husserl is primarily concerned – are expressions, i.e., they express or have a meaning. However, some signs do not. For Husserl, signs that do not express a meaning they “possess” merely indicate or point to a meaning external to themselves: “Every sign is a sign for something, but not every sign has a meaning, a sense that the sign expresses. [...] Indications (notes, marks, etc.) do not express [signify] anything” (LI.2.1 §1). In other words, both expressions and indications are signs, both put us in relation to meaning, but they do so differently: expressions do so directly and indications do so indirectly. Because an indication is an indirect communication it is situational, i.e., it requires that the inquiring consciousness be able to grasp the meaning the sign is “standing in for”. They are tied to factical life: to concrete and contingent contexts. Therefore, for a phenomenology under the epoché it is expressions, not indications that are essential because only they survive the reduction to immanence.


17 “The pure attitudinal relation must itself still be viewed as an enactment, in order to understand the origin of the theoretical” (59/40).
18 “Expressions function meaningfully even in isolated mental life, where they no longer serve to indicate anything” (LI.2.1, §1). This claim along with the distinction between indication and objective expression are famously taken up by Derrida in his *La voix et le phenomene*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1967)
Both indication and expression are kinds of relation. The marks of an indication, say, the colors, arrangement, and shape of a national flag or of a stop sign are “characteristic qualities of the objects to which they attach” (§2). In a second and wider sense, however, indications need not be intentional, as when, to use Husserl’s example, fossils indicate to us the existence of predeluvian animals. Events too can be “signs” in this sense. These indications “stand for” that which they signify indirectly.

This distinction between expression and indication maps onto a second distinction made by Husserl between “essentially subjective and occasional expressions” and “objective expressions”19. An objective expression,

“…pins down (or can pin down) its meaning merely by its manifest, auditory pattern, and can be understood without necessarily directing one’s attention to the person uttering it, or to the circumstance of the utterance” (LI.2.1, §26).

Whereas an essentially occasional expression,

“…belongs to a conceptually unified group of possible meanings in whose case it is essential to orient actual meaning to the occasion, the speaker, and the situation. Only by looking to the actual circumstances of utterance can one definite meaning out of all this mutually connected class be constituted for the hearer. …[This] involves the presence of generally graspable, sufficiently reliable clues to guide the hearer to the meaning intended in the case in question” (LI.2.1, §26 – emphasis mine).

Indications are essentially occasional and as such can never be objective expressions. This distinction between situationally dependent and independent signs is essential to Husserl’s account of mental phenomena, because only the latter (objective expressions) retain their meaning within the immanent realm of intentional consciousness. The signal examples of such objective expressions are theoretical statements. The meaning of the quadratic equation (\(ax^2 + bx + c = 0\)) or the Pythagorean theorem (\(a^2 + b^2 = c^2\)) “is not in the least affected by the circumstances of our

19 Husserl elaborates this in §26 of his first logical investigation.
actual use of it.” We can read and understand it without any essential reference to the speaker or author of our mathematics textbook.

Occasional expressions, by contrast, serve the practical needs of daily life that vary from one moment or day to the next. Unlike objective expressions, they are indexical, requiring the personal pronoun “I”. In fact, “I” itself is an interesting case – an observation not lost on Husserl and one that will prove essential to Heidegger. On the one hand, “I” is an *indication* that relates to “the immediate idea of one’s own personality.” On the other hand, it is a personal pronoun that we all use. For this reason, Husserl defines it as “a *universally* operative indication.” It is a particularly clear example of the difference between indication and expression. When someone says “I…” to me, I grasp that the speaker intends herself. However, that is not really to grasp what *she* means when she says “I,” but only the general form that concrete meaning is taking. It is unlike (to use Husserl’s example) the expression “lion,” which can arouse an idea of a lion. To grasp the concrete meaning of an uttered “I” I must follow the indication and see and hear the speaker to grasp the content of the particular, concrete, contextualized “I”.

There is an evident ambiguity between the shared *functional* use of “I” by a multiplicity of persons – by all people, in fact. On the one hand, for all it has a shared sense of “self-reference”. On the other hand, there is the singular self thus referenced in each case. Husserl calls these the indicating and indicated sense of the term. It is important to note, however, that in a special way with “I” the indicating function *presupposes* the indicated content to such an extent that the indicating function can only be exercised when I am actually present (in some form). This is also the case with demonstrative pronouns such as this/these, that/those as well as here/there, now/later, yesterday/today/tomorrow, above/below, left/right. These words are tied to the spatial
environment or temporal moment of the speaker, and they presuppose her intuition of it\textsuperscript{20}. It is key for Husserl, and for the possibility of theoretical science, “that it is always possible to substitute non-indexical expressions for indexical ones without changing the information.”\textsuperscript{21} Heidegger will object that while it is possible, there is a significant change in the information. We cannot escape the fact that the categories of our interpretation of life originate in a given \textit{hic et nunc} whether or not they also come to have a theoretical destiny. Ultimately, the hermeneutical destruction of the privileged categories of interpretation is a leading back of those same concepts from the indifferent world of theory to the \textit{hic et nunc} of the particular philosopher in an effort either to reappropriate them or to discard them.

Unlike his appropriation of formalization, Heidegger adopts Husserl’s account of indication without significant amendment. Yet, he shifts his phenomenological orientation from objective expressions which are the gateway to scientific discourse, to their prior ground in indicative speech: every scientific discovery entails experimentation that takes place for an “I” here and now. Taking Husserl’s analysis into account suggests that formal indications as \textit{indications} are occasional expressions in which the concrete situation is essential for determining their meaning and whose explication possessed a semantic stability, but a denotative plurality. Yet, in modifying “indication” with the term “formal” Heidegger proposes something new. In fact, “formal indication” would no doubt suggest a contradiction to a Husserlian insofar as formalization yields logical forms that are materially independent – analytic propositions completely independent of particular content – whereas, indications occur in situations in which formalization is impossible, because the meaning is dependent on the context.

\textsuperscript{20} NB: This entire class of expressions is called deictic expressions in contemporary linguistics. A deictic expression is one in which has a fixed semantic meaning, but whose denotative meaning varies with time and place.

§3. Heidegger’s *Formale Anzeige*

Heidegger’s account of formal indication involves a double reversal. He has reversed the order of priority from generalization to formalization and form objective expressions to indications. For Husserl, generalization is a means of mapping the essential orderedness of material ontologies to which their logical forms in consciousness (formal apophantics) corresponded. Heidegger claims that the “lawfulness” that regulates this isomorphism of consciousness and content unwarrantedly imports the regulated structure of material ontology into the realm of consciousness. It is in fact formalization, rather than generalization that provides the more basic form of access to both material (ontological) and intentional life. Similarly, in Husserl’s account of meaning objective expressions are more important than occasional indications because they retain their meaning in immanence, whereas the interpretation of occasional indications is ineluctably tethered to life. Yet, Heidegger prioritizes indicative, merely occasional, expressions because they supply the factical ground for any higher-order discourse and are therefore indispensable to a properly basic phenomenological account of factical life. Such are the Husserlian antecedents of Heidegger’s methodological innovation, but what of his own elaboration?

Returning to the definition we cited earlier Heidegger writes: “[Formal indication is] the methodical use of a sense [Sinn] that becomes a guiding one for phenomenological explication” (55/38). At the outset, we can identify a set of four *features* of formal indication. We will go on to investigation these with respect to three functions it serves in Heidegger’s analysis.

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22 Heidegger writes: “In Husserl’s phenomenology, consciousness itself becomes a region, and is subordinate to a regional consideration; its lawfulness is not only in principle original but also the most general. It expresses itself generally and originally in transcendental phenomenology” (57/39).
First, formal indication is a methodical moment in phenomenological explication not the whole of it. That formale Anzeige is not the whole of phenomenology is key to understanding the place that the Husserlian account still occupies within Heidegger’s radicalized phenomenology — though not without having suffered some violence. Second, formal indication is a “preliminary securing” of the phenomenon so that its content-sense is left undetermined (as in Husserl), but also its relation-sense. This is done to enable the enactment character of significance — its motivation from out of factical life — to come into view. Third, because this “preliminary securing” leaves the content and relation sense undetermined, formal indication prevents the pre-judgment or prejudice that the theoretical relation is the original or privileged Bezugsinn. Yet, despite calling into question the theoretical Bezugsinn it still aims at identifying a relation-sense, the enactment sense. It is not a coincidence that Heidegger’s first elaboration of formal indication occurs in the same course where he first fully distinguishes between the Bezug and Vollzug senses of the relation sense. Fourth, this prevention of a theoretical prejudice is also a protection against the “falling tendency” of factical life which is always threatening to “slip into the objective” (64/44). In this regard, Heidegger’s disagreement with Husserl over the theoretical relational-sense is not specific to phenomenology. Quite to the contrary, Heidegger sees in Husserl a recurrent tendency in Western philosophy (metaphysics) that, moving forward from these courses, he will make it is aim to deconstruct.

These four characteristics are operative in each of the three functions assigned to formal indication, namely, that it is (1) a principle of the phenomenological method that (2) requires the reinterpretation of the Husserlian notions of reflection and intuition and (3) is taken by Heidegger to be the essential activity of philosophy.

23 “One must prevent oneself from taking it for granted that its relational meaning is original theoretical” (64/44).
§4. Formal Indication as Phenomenological Method

Heidegger has defined formal indication as a “methodical moment” in phenomenological investigation. It is also the basic or original moment because it is only when the enactment sense has been recognized that we can ask about the distinct motivations of possible relation-senses. If the Gehaltsinn corresponds to the question, “What is it?” and the Bezugsinn corresponds to the question, “How is it for me?”, we might say that the Vollzugsinn corresponds to the question, “How am I for it?” This acknowledges that Dasein is not in its first instance master over its relation to the world, but rather is the concourse between consciousness and world. Heidegger’s account of Vollzugsinn attempts to isolate that dynamic tendency at the heart of life and to show that its motivations do not arise from an abyss (a radical voluntarism), but rather are a response of life. Thus, while we have suspended the specific content-sense of the discreet phenomena under investigation, through a consideration of the Vollzugsinn there enters in again a pre-theoretical tie to facticity or Weltlichkeit because enactment presupposes a “from which” and “within which.” Roughly, then, we might suggest that parallel to the structure of Gehaltsinn, Bezugsinn, Vollzugsinn stands the structure of object, consciousness, world. It is thus a phenomenological sensitivity to the worldly or worlded character of thinking that supplies the ground of enactment and which determines the nature of intentional relations (theoretical or other) and objectivity. Put another way, we might say that if formal indication brackets the specific material (Gehaltsinn) it does so in the interest of showing the more basic phenomenon that conscious activity is always motivated from out of a world and therefore its philosophical explication cannot prescind from a consideration of facticity. Therefore, the meaning of consciousness (and therewith
phenomenology) cannot be only the theoretical clarification of the ideal forms of consciousness. This is at best one possibility and a later modification of a more primordial form of understanding – what Heidegger has referred to in passing as “hermeneutic intuition.”\(^{24}\) The distinction between the specific content of an intuition and the facticity of consciousness in general clarifies an otherwise strange remark by Heidegger:

“[E]xactly because [Husserl’s] formal determination is entirely indifferent as to content, it is fatal for the relational- and enactment-aspect of the phenomenon—because it prescribes, or at least contributes to prescribing, a theoretical relational meaning. It hides the enactment-character [das Vollzugmäßige] which is possibly still more fatal, and turns one-sidedly to the content” (63/43).

Yet, formal indication too employs a kind of formalization that is indifferent to content at the level of Gehaltsinn. Heidegger’s point appears to be that the indifference toward content (and self) characteristic of the theoretical attitude determines in advance, by defining the content it excludes, what the content sense will be\(^{25}\). There is a further clarifying that must be done not of the possibility of scientific thinking and discourse, but rather of their origins in factual life. Phenomenology must begin as formal indication because only as such can it properly access the factual origins of conscious life.

Yet, if formal indication is the means of letting the enactment-character of experience show forth, we can still ask how exactly it achieves this. To answer that question we can read Heidegger’s religion courses alongside his 1921-22 WS course, “Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle”\(^{26}\) where he describes formal indication without significant amendment or development, but in occasionally clearer terms. There, as in the religion courses, his first account

\(^{24}\) GA 56/57, 112 / 94

\(^{25}\) He is suspending the facticity of the content in order to highlight the facticity of consciousness itself.

is negative – a philosophical definition cannot purport to define a principle, but must indicate what first principles are. Therefore, the original philosophical account must be “indicative”, provisional with respect to content in such a way that is “does give in advance the principle of the content” (PIA 32/26).

“A philosophical definition is one of principle, so that philosophy is indeed not a ‘matter of fact’ [‘Sache’]; ‘possessing in principle.’ Therefore, this definition must be one that ‘indicates’ what is at issue; that is only a more precise explication of the specific character of a principle. The philosophical definition occasions a pre-‘turning’ to the object, such that I do indeed not ‘turn’ to the content. The definition is ‘formally’ indicative, the ‘way,’ the ‘approach.’ What is pre-given is a bond that is indeterminate as to content, but determinate as to the way of actualization” (PIA 18-19/16-17).

Here Heidegger reaffirms the directional character of “indication,” which is a sign that points beyond itself, but to this he adds the observation that “formal” too has a dimension of directionality. It is a manner of approach: “‘formal’ means ‘approach toward the determination,’ approach-character” (PIA 33-34/27). Precisely as specifying the directional sense of philosophical definition, formal is a kind of enactment and therefore neither the opposite of material, nor a synonym for eidetic. Thus, the formal indication of a Sache has yet to take a position on the specific relational-sense that ought to disclose its content-sense. Instead it is concerned with the principle (Prinzip = arche = source), i.e., the source of its manifestation that ought, in turn, to indicate the mode of fulfillment most appropriate to it.

There are two topoi lying behind the difficult language of this section. The first is Aristotle’s distinction in Book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics between episteme and nous. Episteme is a rational comportment that proceeds by dialectic and admits of demonstration by which it

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27 “The opposite [of formal] is not the ‘material,’ the accidental content. Nor is formal the same as the eidetic, and the use of that term, in the sense of ‘universal generality,’ is altogether problematic in phenomenology. ‘Formal’ refers to a way of ‘approach’ toward actualizing the maturation of an original fulfillment of what was indicated” (PIA 33-34/27).
produces scientific definitions. *Nous* is the rational comportment by which we “grasp” first principles such as the laws of identity, excluded middle, and non-contradiction. These, Aristotle reminds us, cannot be “demonstrated” because all demonstration takes them for granted. These principles, like the ethical principles outlined in the rest of the work, admit of a distinct degree and type of “proof” from the investigations done, for example, in the *Posterior Analytics*.

We might say that what Heidegger proposes here is a phenomenology of Nous, or at least a phenomenological method on the model of “noetic” comportment rather than epistemic comportment. He interprets Husserl’s research a contributing legitimately, but somewhat short-sightedly to the latter. Yet, for Aristotle we cannot give a theoretical (i.e., demonstrative) account of the noetically grasped first principles. Our argumentative options are merely recursive, a *reductio ad absurdum*. He suggests, for example, that the only response to a skeptic who denies the principle of non-contradiction, is to make him speak because language presupposes that principle for its success. Similarly, the basic principles of reflection on life (phenomenology) will not be theoretically demonstrable, nor rigorously scientific; they will always be “questionable” *from the theoretical perspective*. Thus Heidegger argues that,

“The authentic foundation of philosophy is a radical, *existentiell* grasp of and maturation of questionableness; to pose in questionableness oneself and life and the decisive actualizations is the basic stance of all—including the most radical—clarification” (PIA 35/28).

If this first *topos* is “ontological”, the second is “linguistic.” We began the section by speaking about philosophical definitions. How are we in fact to write and to speak philosophically according to formal indication? The problem Heidegger faces is not just the destruction of a theoretical attitude, whether in its naïve (Troeltsch) or sophisticated (Husserl) form. It is deeper than the
decision to value theoretical categories and the theoretical comportment as primordially explanatory and philosophical. The preference for the theoretical is a consequence of the more intransigent problem of the objectifying tendencies of language. Thus, as Dahlstrom articulates it, the challenge Heidegger faces is the “inherent challenge of language, which, as soon as it begins its work of articulation, takes its subjects to be things present-at-hand.”

While this problem is given its full elaboration in light of the ontological categories of *Being and Time*, it was an animating one from the very beginning of Heidegger’s work. As early as 1919 he suggests that a “crude” but “sufficiently threatening” objection to phenomenological description pertained to language: “all description is ‘grasping-in-word’ – ‘verbal expression’ is generalizing. This objection rests on the opinion that all language is itself already objectifying, i.e., the living in meaning implies a theoretical grasping of what is meant, that the fulfilment of meaning is without further ado only object-giving [gegenstandgebend].”

Moreover, forms of language are correlative to certain forms of comportment. Heidegger’s target here is the scientific language of philosophy whose basic terms find their modern expression in Descartes: subject, object, ego.

Correlative to that account of subjectivity (as *ego cogito* and *res cogitans*) is the characteristic way of sizing up the “furniture of the world” as so many things present-at-hand. Heidegger’s lifelong wager is that within such a paradigm we cannot meaningfully ask about the nature of philosophy because we cannot meaningfully ask about the nature of being.

The deconstruction of scientific philosophy’s claims to both primordiality and pride of place, however, is not the rejection of conceptual language. The distinction between formal indications

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29 GA 56/57, 111 / 85
30 For an in depth survey and interpretation of Heidegger’s lengthy, but often implicit, engagement with Descartes see Coyne’s *Heidegger’s Confessions*, esp. Ch. 4. We will have a chance to examine later Coyne’s these that in Augustine Heidegger discovers a “reversed [Cartesian] cogito”.

165
and scientific concepts does not map the distinction between non-conceptual and conceptual language. Quite to the contrary, formal indications are philosophical concepts and the process of formally indicating something can be thought of as the generation of appropriate concepts. Heidegger has not forsaken categorial intuition and expression. He does contend, however, that the uncritical adoption of a universal set of categories borrowed from another science will inevitably deform our apprehension of certain Sache. Thus, formal indication is a “specific step of the method of phenomenological explication”\(^\text{31}\) precisely insofar as it uncovers the enactmental sense and shows it to be, “a methodical...fundamental sense of all philosophical concepts and connections among concepts is to be seen”\(^\text{32}\). But if this is an account of what formal indication claims to do, how, exactly, does Heidegger propose to do it?

The generation and formation of philosophical concepts by formal indication takes place according to two primary and overlapping functions. Dahlstrom helpfully characterizes these—condensing Heidegger’s own account at the end of his 1922 Aristotle course—as the “Referring-Prohibitive Function” and the “Reversing-Transforming Function.”\(^\text{33}\)

According to its Referring-Prohibitive function, a formal indication signals a phenomenon while preventing “preemptive” or “external characterization of it.”\(^\text{34}\) It prevents “dogmatic fixations” divorced from the presupposition, preconception, context, and time of interpretation.\(^\text{35}\) With respect to this function we can understand Anzeige as the kind of indicating that is, on the one hand, “binding for the investigation, supplying direction and principles,” and, on the other hand, which does not “specify in any adequate or authentic sense the object of investigation.”\(^\text{36}\)

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\(^{31}\) Martin Heidegger, “Karl Jasper’s Psychology of Worldviews” in Wegmarken/Pathmarks GA 9, 9-11, (translation modified by Dahlstrom 780)  
\(^{32}\) Ibid., 29 (Dahlstrom 780)  
\(^{33}\) Dahlstrom, “Formal Indications,” 780ff.  
\(^{34}\) Ibid., 782  
\(^{35}\) As a formal corrective to theology cf. GA9, 66  
\(^{36}\) Dahlstrom, “Formal Indications,” 783
is *formale* in the sense that it is “not predetermined; at least not arbitrarily or in a customary way.”

It signals the hermeneutic nature of factical understanding which arises from factical experience and purports to describe that experience in language indebted to it. Something is given in factical life and therefore formal indication as a response to that cannot be completely random; yet to presume unwarrantedly that scientific categories are the privileged discourse of a true account of being is to proceed arbitrarily and by custom according to Heidegger.

The second and overlapping function is the Reversing-Transforming function. Because Heidegger has dispensed with both the Cartesian “view from nowhere” as well as the Husserlian transcendental ego, we must ask “who” it is that formally indicates something. This is always Dasein. And the Dasein that would be interested in formally indicating phenomena, i.e., the phenomenologist, is nonetheless a Dasein already situated in a scientific *Umwelt* with customary ways of objectifying whatever is entertained. Thus, formal indication is not only a method for phenomena, but it is equally a methodological transformation of the dative of manifestation, viz., Dasein. It is “a reversal that transforms the individual who philosophizes.” It is a reversal from subject to object that moves beyond that dichotomy by acknowledging the priority and ineluctability of the worldly significance of whatever shows up for a subject.

In addition to our two initial *definitional* characterizations of formal indication – that it is a moment in the phenomenological explication that is focused on the enactmental sense of a phenomenon – we can now add two *functional* characterizations, viz., that in order to do this it prohibits the adoption of a theoretical framework of interpretation that would foreclose pursuit of the genuine sense of the phenomenon and adopts “a revisable way of pointing at some

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37 Ibid., 783, fn. 31 PIA 33.
38 Ibid., 783
39 Ibid., 783
40 This implies that at the level of factical life the interpreter can never be merely indifferent.
phenomenon” that fixes a preliminary sense (vorgriff), and “the corresponding manner of unpacking it.”

The further pertinent question, however, is how formal indication can at one and the same time not predetermine the sense of its Sache, but also not become totally arbitrary. Formal indication has provisionally bracketed or left undetermined both the content-sense and relation-sense of the phenomena so as to bring into view the enactment-sense. The enactment-sense we will recall is the way in which facticity, as the ground of content-sense and relational-sense, is, so to speak, brought back into play. It is not, to be sure, the specific factual content of the Gehaltsinn. But the engaged resonance of “enactment” is Heidegger’s way of signaling to us that at the properly basic level there is a kind of fore-having or pre-possessing (vorhaben) always already operative in our concourse with the world. We can recall his description in his 1919 course of a “hermeneutical intuition” as a kind of “understanding intuition.” This is the proper position from which to begin asking philosophically about the world, not the theoretical distinctions of Descartes, which are both arbitrary and have become customary.

“These characters are formal-indicational; i.e., they receive their concrete, factual, categorial determinateness from the respective direction of experience and of interpretation. At the same time, they factically ‘say’ nothing with regard to the concrete movedness of factual life, but, instead, merely give direction to the regard, insofar as a categorial interpretation of the ontological sense of life resides in the pre-possession” (PIA 141/105).

It is, in Husserl’s happy phrase, the Sache selbst that provide the initial orientation to inquiring intelligence. But precisely because experience of these Sache is always both experienced and experiencing, the philosopher must be in the right way. It is in this final sense that formal indications signal some original comportment. This last component incorporates the previous ones.

41 See Dahlstrom 780, also Heidegger, GA 9, 11
In Heidegger’s review of Jaspers he suggests that this comportment “is based on the phenomenological insight that the object of an interpretation must be so articulated that the determination of the object (in what sense it is) must emerge from the manner in which one originally ‘has’ it, that is to say, the manner in which it originally becomes accessible.”

We might ask at this point if the investigative restraints and personal transformation that constitute formal indication do not have analogues in other scientific endeavors? To answer this question it will be helpful to proceed by way of contrast: What does Heidegger, near as we can tell, not mean by formal indication? In his course “Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle” he contrasts formal indication with what is “formally logical” and “formally thematic”. Formal logic, so important to Husserl and to Heidegger’s own early work, aims to clarify the basic structures underlying all regions of beings, i.e., the most formal structures or categories of consciousness true of any “object-in-general.” Heidegger contends that this approach takes as its subject matter a predetermined region of being (even if it is one that purportedly underlies all other regions of being). The privileged position of formal logic derives from the primordiality of the sphere it claims to clarify for us, yet that claim to primordiality is not itself phenomenologically evident, but rather determined by other non-phenomenological considerations. Finally, something what is “formally logical” is usually tied to a system of generalizations rather than formalizations, and while generalizations may be formally empty, they are logically ordered structures of genera. Heidegger’s critique of the philosophy of religion on the model of Husserl and Otto is that its formality is tied to a particular account of consciousness that results in the reduction of the religious

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42 Dahlstrom, 781.
phenomena to consciousness. The justification for that approach is the primordiality of consciousness. Heidegger’s account of world is intended to upset these neat divisions.

A formally “thematic” interpretation makes use of “‘neighboring’ schemata and ‘settled’ notions, instead of itself retrieving the original access to the objects.”43 By contrast, Dahlstrom explains, something formally indicated or “formally signaled” “is not given as something already complete and understandable through comparison, contrast, and classification; instead what is ‘formally indicated’ is understandable only insofar as the philosopher reforms or carries out some activity himself.” 44 We note here again the enacted or comportmental dimension of formal indication. It is not merely the taking-on of the scientific attitude, but the interrogative disposition that asks what sort of Bezugsinn the phenomenon calls for. It is a basic apprehending rather than the mere reception of meaning. This will become important when Heidegger turns to Paul and Augustine. He leverages his reading of Paul from out of a distinct “enactmental complex” he names the “situation” and claims that this offers us insights that are passed over by traditional historical models of interpretation that fail to grasp the enactmental nature of meaning.

The method of formal indication is an alternative to formal ontology that attempts to think intentionality in the context of factual life before its theoretical distinction into formal ontology and formal apophantics. It is a way of keeping philosophical concepts from falling into the category of scientific objectifications – the tendency of “falling into signification” characteristic of life. To that extent, as Dahlstrom notes perceptively, it is an indication of the ontological difference at a moment when Heidegger is still working out this distinction.

§5. Formal Indication: Radicalizing Husserl in response to Natorp

43 PIA 80 / 174
44 ibid., 784
The second function of formal indication is as a response to the charge leveled by Natorp against Husserl. We noted earlier that formal indication is Heidegger’s response to the question, *How can a science of life be truly primordial?* This question is in fact a reformulation of Natorp’s critique of phenomenology cited by Heidegger in his 1919 course “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview.”45 Heidegger’s account of phenomenology as formal indication is intended as a response to Natorp’s critique, a response that entails a transformation of the Husserlian account of intentionality and intuition.

To set up the conflict Heidegger first cites Husserl’s account of phenomenological reflection:

“‘Only through reflectively experiencing [*erfahrende*] acts do we know something of the stream of living experience’ (*Ideen*, 144). Through reflection every living experience can be turned into something looked at. ‘The phenomenological method operates entirely in acts of reflection’ (*Ideen*, 145). Reflections are themselves in turn lived experience and as such can in turn be reflectively considered, ‘and so on *ad infinitum*, as a universal principle’ (*Ideen*, 139)” (TDP 77).

Heidegger glosses Husserl’s account here by suggesting that reflection is not a “second ray of consciousness” directed at the describing consciousness, but rather “reflection itself belongs to the sphere of life-experience as one of its ‘fundamental peculiarities’” (TDP 78). For Husserl in reflection an object becomes “looked at” and in being looked it becomes “an object of reflection”. Thus, in this account of reflection “we are theoretically oriented” (TDP 79).

Though Heidegger is ultimately highly critical of Natorp’s “objectification” of the subject, he presents him here as advancing a substantial, fair, and as-yet unanswered critique of...

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phenomenology. “Until now,” he writes, “Natorp is the only person to bring scientifically noteworthy objections against phenomenology. Husserl himself has not yet commented on these” (TDF 78). That objection is simple enough: phenomenology purports to be a descriptive science of consciousness, which is immediate because immanent; however, to properly describe consciousness one must use concepts and thereby “still the stream”\textsuperscript{46} of immediacy. Therefore, either phenomenology is conceptual description and therefore the mediation of immediacy, or it is non-conceptual in which case it is not a science. Summarizing Natorp’s position, Heidegger writes: “If one wishes to make experience into an object of science, it is impossible to avoid theoretization. This means, however, that there is no immediate apprehension of experience” (TDP, 78). In short, there can only be a “mediated apprehension of experiences” (TDP 79).

What Heidegger does in responses to this challenge in these final paragraphs of the course is a matter of some debate and hinges largely on the “tone” in which one hears his comments and how one interprets the ellipses in his presentation. However, the following general observations are clear enough. First, Heidegger does not refute Natorp’s claim on the basis of Husserlian phenomenology. If anything, in using Husserl’s Ideas to provide a definition of phenomenological description that is then unproblematically inserted into Natorp’s claim that all description is conceptual theoretization, Heidegger seems to suggest that Natorp’s objections find a place to land in Husserlian phenomenology. He writes, for example, that

“Phenomenology’s claim to be purely descriptive in its intent changes nothing in regard to its theoretical character. For description also already proceeds via concepts: it is a \textit{circumscription} of something into generalities, it is ‘subsumption’ (Natorp); it already presupposes a certain kind of concept-formation and therefore ‘abstraction’ (Natorp) and theory, i.e., mediation” (TDP 78).

\textsuperscript{46} Natorp, \textit{Allgemeine Psycholgie}, 140 quoted in TDP, 85.
The conclusion, therefore, is that description is nothing “immediate and unmediated”, but is concept-formation according to laws and therefore “already objectifying”.

Second, Heidegger points out a problem in Natorp’s general account in general without responding directly to his critique of phenomenology. He argues that for Natorp, the “subject” who is so important to the process of conceptually mediating the immediacy of life is on that account merely a “reconstructed” subject on the basis of the “objectification” she is supposed to provide. According to Natorp, the subject accomplishes in consciousness the absolute objectification of possible experience by which she then mediates immediate experiences: “objectification is determination, the subjective is what determines” (TDP, 79). But, Heidegger argues, it is precisely the determining activity of the subject that distinguishes it from that which is merely determined. Thus, he asks, “how can that which is itself essentially determining be in turn determinable?” (79). While Natorp seems to grant priority to the determining subject, in reality the implicit and operative notion of determining subjectivity is merely subjectivity as a determined object: “This method of ‘subjectification’…is not prior to the method of objectification but subsequent to it” (104/80). Natorp begins, in other words, not from an examination of inquiring intelligence, but from that of objective knowledge. It is only by “reverse argumentation” that he constructs a corresponding notion of subjectivity, which has already been cut to the dimensions of scientific knowledge. On this account, the possibility of a non-theoretical understanding of immediate life experience cannot even be raised, and therefore important dimensions of consciousness (subjectivity) are left out of play from the beginning47. That sort of question-begging is bad philosophy in general, not merely bad phenomenology.

47 He adds that on Natorp’s account philosophy achieves the “highest degree of consciousness” by achieving “the most complete analysis of the steps of objectification” (TDP 79).
Third, Heidegger’s phenomenological “response”, which is at best a tentative gesture of possibility, is based on a reading of Husserl’s “principle of all principles” (ID, §24). Natorp has done us the favor of making clear that the “scientific disclosure of the sphere of lived experience” is the “fundamental methodological problem of phenomenology” (TDP 83). However, Heidegger notes, this “scientific disclosure” stands under the “principles of principles,” which states, in Heidegger’s elliptical citation: “Everything that presents itself…originally in ‘intuition’ is to be taken simply…as it gives itself” (83-84, italics in original)\(^48\). As a principle, this methodological strategy is not theoretical, but precedes all theory. It merely acknowledges what must be the case for us to have something about which we theorize. One implication of this is that, “If description itself is always necessarily theoretization, that does not exclude the possibility that the founding intuition – I must first see before I describe – would not be of a theoretical nature” (85). In other words, the very possibility of theory presupposes a prior moment in which consciousness is not yet theoretical consciousness. If intuition is already a seeing to which is opposed the “thing” then intuition is already theory. Thus, the heart of phenomenology’s response is to reassert the non-primordiality of theoretical consciousness, which he cannot see on account of his “exclusively theoretical” and “pan-logical” orientation. Because Natorp is focused on the possibility of scientific knowledge “his dispute with phenomenology does not get at its authentic sphere of problems at all” (83). That is, a fuller account of conscious subjectivity that accounts for why it is always in relation to a world and yet distinct from any entity within that world.

Part of the disagreement is over the nature of language. For Natorp language is always objectifying: “all verbal meaning consists in nothing but [the theoretical universality of a genus]”\(^48\) It is worth noting the implicit claim that Natorp misunderstand the principle of principles is of a piece with Heidegger’s earlier contention that he overlooks “the fundamental demand of phenomenology to bracket all standpoints” (TDP 83).
(TDP 85). Therefore, phenomenological description must be theory. Heidegger, in turn, distinguishes “formally objective” from “object-specific” language:

“The formally objective is qualitatively different from the object-specific, and... refers back to a fundamental level of life in and for itself. Signification therefore, linguistic expression, does not need to be theoretical or even object-specific, but is primordially living and experiential, whether pre-worldly or worldly” (TDP 89).

In other words, Heidegger emphasizes both the possibility of a non-objectifying language and its essential priority. He suggests that such a language makes use not of concepts [Be-griff], but of “re-cepts” [Rück-griff] and “pre-cepts” [Vorgriff]. These backward- and forward-moving tendencies of language – motivated tendency and tending motivation, respectively – are meant to suggest that the world is available to us as already significant and even when it admits of scientific description this is always derivative of a prior and perhaps fuller disclosure. The world of immediacy, moreso than that of science, is the truly necessary world the sine qua non of all other discourses.

This defense of a properly phenomenological kind of enactment and signification helps us understand Heidegger’s emphasis on the enactment-dimension of formal indication and its relation to a particular understanding of phenomenology. In the final moments of the course, he suggests that this alternative signifying expresses “the characters of the appropriating event.” This “empowering experiencing of living expressions” is precisely “understanding intuition, the hermeneutical intuition” (117/89). Therefore, and though he does not make it explicit, formal indication is presented as a manner of reflection that is not external to intuition, but integral to it. This ruptures both Natorp’s false dichotomy between intuition and understanding as well as Husserl’s between (theoretical) consciousness and world. This “unoriented and vague
preunderstanding” is at one and the same time the ground of and subject of formal indication. It is ground because this basic Vorhaben of factical life is the condition of Dasein in media res that allows for the comportment of formal indication. It is its subject because Verstehen is the given and underdetermined content that we signal in the exercise of formal indication. The price we pay for such access is its claim to theoretical universality and phenomenological “stability”. A small price to pay, Heidegger would contend, for the only sufficient means of securing the initial sense of our experiences, i.e., of our lives, within which various other forms of scientific and aesthetic consciousness may take shape. Yet, this account entails a rethinking of the Husserlian notions of reflection and intuition, since these are what come under fire in Natorp’s two-part critique.

a. Reflection

For Husserl, of course, reflection is not a univocal term. However, the relevant sense for our discussion here is that in which reflection designates the “shift of focus” within the cogito that creates a new cogitatio that is the apprehending of the manner of apprehending (ID §38). This reflection is always a possibility for us because “experience has the kind of being that in principle can be perceived in the manner of reflection” (§45). This reflection is integral to the shift from the

49 Kisiel, Genesis, 376
50 On the relation between formal indication and the Husserlian account of intuition and reelection the commentary is far from unanimous. Among those who favor a thesis of continuity are Crowell (2001), Luft (2005), and Westphal who does not see in these early courses an attempt to break away from Husserl, but a radical development of the basic Husserlian impulse. On the other hand, Theodore Kisiel in his magisterial The Genesis of Being and Time (GBT) claims that a definitive break with Husserl is achieved in SS1925 with the first fully systematic treatment of Verstehen (GBT 376). (Theodore Kisiel. The Genesis of Being and Time. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). Against, this Crowell argues that, “Exclusive emphasis on the sense in which formal indication might be said to replace the Husserlian notions of intuition and reflection, however, obscures the fact that Heidegger’s account of it becomes philosophically compelling only by tacit appeal to a version of those very notions”. See: “Heidegger’s Phenomenological Decade” in Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning. 2001. (Evanston: Northwestern Publishing, 124)
natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude, in the phenomenological attitude “we carry out acts of reflection, directed at [the cognitive acts of the natural attitude]” (§50). Robert Sokolowski describes this kind of reflection as a “perch” from which to view the natural attitude. This is a helpful image for grasping the sense in which, for Husserl, the phenomenological reduction yields reflection from a higher theoretical viewpoint than any of those constituent of the natural attitude.

In reaction to this preference for the theoretical, one common interpretation of Heidegger argues that from at least 1925 onward, and indebted to his rereading of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, philosophy becomes phronesis in a deliberate contrast to theoreia. While it is surely that case that Heidegger recovers the comportmental nature of philosophical reflection and contrasts it with a de-worlded and problematic notion of the theoretical, two further considerations ought to mitigate the emphasis we place on this thesis. In the first place, the “kinesthetic” or enactment dimension of meaning as we have shown was not suddenly discovered *in toto* when Heidegger turned to Aristotle in 1925. Rather the “dynamized facticity of life” had been present in his earlier courses, the 1920-21 course in particular, but the earlier ones as well. In the second place, as Crowell argues, to say that philosophy is phronesis is to make the analogous but opposite error of saying philosophy is theoreia.

Heidegger is aware of the need in arguing that phenomenology is not theory, to say positively how it is something other than unreflective immediacy. In response to Natorp he claims that philosophy is a *repetition* of life, not a re-living adding that “it is categorial research.” Thus, philosophy involves a “special sort of turning back” that is a kind of non-theoretical reflection on

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52 Westphal makes a similar claim, “Formal indication is not an attempt to render the What intelligible by moving to higher and higher levels of abstraction; it rather shifts attention entirely away from the what to the how.” (Westphal, “Jugendschriften,” p. 252)
53 Crowell adds, quoting Heidegger, that in this categorial research “life’s re-collectability (*Wieder-holdbarkeit*) ‘simultaneously brings its evidence to fruition’” (GA61: 88)/ SM 125.
immediacy. The burden of proof is now on Heidegger to differentiate his proposal from the kind of haphazard and unrigorous description of life he (unfairly, perhaps) attributes to certain of the Lebensphilosophen.

The wager of formal indication is that it is a mode of reflection that rises above the mere flux of life without claiming to grasp it in a theoretical viewpoint. It is the generation of revisable concepts that spring from the phenomena themselves. In their original givenness – or affording intuition – those phenomena are given here and now, and are meaningful in that moment, not only after a first reduction or abstraction. This pluriform givenness thus requires interpretation. Thus, a developed understanding of reflection implies for Heidegger a new understanding of method. In Being and Time, for example, key terms are “formalized”, which is to say, they are emptied of their everyday reference (their concrete “what”) yet, they retain reference to their attitudinal motivation in life (their “how”) such that they can indicate the immediate life situations out of which they arise and toward which the philosophy is directed. Thus, for example, the analysis of tentatio in Augustine’s Confessions Book X is not an analysis of this or that specific temptation, but of a constant relating that the tempted subject is underdoing. The analysis of this relation tells us something new about the experience of life that would otherwise have remained hidden.

This “how” of the factical self is the point from which Heidegger leverages his distinct understanding of reflection as repetition (Wiederholung) rather than a mediated re-living. The claim is that we already have ourselves in a certain way in factical life and this way admits of a

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54 See Crowell: “[For Heidegger,] even if the Gehaltsinn of life and philosophy is in some sense the “same,” their Bezugs Sinn and Vollzugsinn must differ” (SM 125).
55 Those (unlike Nietzsche, Bergson, and Dilthey) “who would rather gush with enthusiasm than think” (GA 61: 80).
56 According to Crowell, “‘formal-indicating’ concepts…neither objectify nor describe, but interpret” (SM 123).
57 The analysis of Guilt is a clear example of this.
58 Cf. Crowell, Space of Meaning, 125. To the extent that enactment remains tied to facticity it would appear formal indications can’t be completely evacuated of their Gehaltsinn. We will examine this possibility in the following chapters.
self-reflective or self-referential moment where we, without abstracting from the immediacy of life, attend to its manners of enactment. Such an exercise for Heidegger, argues Crowell, ought to be continuous with life’s immediate self-interpretation and therefore must indicate how the pretheoretical situation is itself “categorically” structured\(^59\). Thus, we see that what Heidegger was first drawn to in his reading of the *Logical Investigations* remains central to his emerging hermeneutic phenomenology: life in its immediacy is categorically structured.

\(b. \text{Intuition}\)

Reflection is defined by its relation to immediacy, which is that upon which it reflects. We are in relation to our own immediacy through intuition. Therefore, Heidegger’s modified understanding of phenomenological reflection entails a new account of phenomenological intuition. In *Ideas I* the original and affording intuition is a matter of “natural experience” and “perception” which occur in the natural attitude. The natural attitude is defined by Husserl principally as a theoretical attitude\(^60\) whose primary means of investigation are the natural sciences in which “true being” is always equivalent to “actual being” (or “real being”). As a result of this quick association of the natural and theoretical-scientific attitudes, intuition is already regionally circumscribed:

“To each science there corresponds a region of objects as the domain of the science’s research and to all the knowledge gained in them, i.e., to all the correct assertions here, certain intuitions correspond as original sources of the justification that demonstrates their correctness, intuitions in which objects of the region are themselves given and are given, at least partially, in an originary way” (*ID*, §1).

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 140
\(^{60}\) Cf. *Ideas I*, §1: “…the theoretical attitude that we call the natural attitude.”
Intuitions are first described here as the originary sources of the confirmation of scientific research. This results from the relation obtaining between the originary affording intuition of “natural experience” and “perception”. All this is to say that our experience of the world is the perception of objects that are given as belonging to distinct regions of objects.

For Heidegger, this is an account of the transition from factual life experience to knowledge; however, it is neither the only account, nor the original account, and therefore ought not to be considered the leading account. The immediacy or givenness of factual life admits of more and different manners of engagement than the leap to the theoretical. For that reason his account of formal indication must reconfront the Husserlian question of access to the pre-theoretical, which requires him to revisit the Husserlian account of intuition. The result is an account of hermeneutical intuition that is structured by re-cepts and pre-cepts, i.e., by traditions of meaning and anticipations of it, “…the originary back-and-forth formation of the recept and precepts…Universality of word meanings primarily indicates something originary: worldliness [Welthaftigkeit] of experienced experiencing” (TDP 89).

Heidegger here suggests that phenomenological activity has access to a “lower level of worldly experience” that is prior to regional demarcations and a matter of the interpretation of phenomena prior to their regional allocation. Factual life is “a determination” of phenomena “prior to all theoretical description” that is “brought along” into the theoretical and for which, because it has no theoretical use, “the convenient title of the irrational has been invented” (TDP 89). Thus,

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61 Van Buren: Formal Indication, which is used as a tool of a provisional search for the historical Sache of being that is nothing short of a rethinking of the “universal intuition” of Husserl as “Hermeneutic Intuition” Hermeneutical intuition, “interpretively explicates the factual preconception of being that belongs to factual life.” (Van Buren’s “Ethics of Formal Indication”). To make this transition requires the rejection of “transtemporal essences of being, to which an exact phenomenological terminology would ideally correspond” (ibid).
we see that for Heidegger a misunderstanding of understanding intuition leads not only to a skewed picture of the phenomena, but also to a false account of reason.

Is this account a decisive break with Husserlian phenomenology? István Fehér notes correctly that “hermeneutical intuition” is already a response not only to the inadequacy of Neo-Kantians, but also to Husserl. Nor, as we have seen, was this lost on Heidegger’s students, though neither Husserl nor Heidegger’s students perceived it as a problem. In other words, Heidegger is not (yet) breaking away from Husserl, but to his mind radicalizing the analyses of his mentor by moving past the neo-Kantian analysis of validity and the Husserlian critique of psychologism, in order to articulate the Ur-etwas. This is an attempt to think the “etwas-gaben” of Husserl at a deeper level of analysis certainly than the sensible manifold of the neo-Kantians, but also than that of constituting subjectivity-objectivity. This is an incipient critique, advanced gently, of the theoretical attitude. Heidegger asks, according to Fehér, if there is not a deviation in turning “life experience” into “something given”? Does that already imply a hidden theoretical commitment? Heidegger’s analysis here, particularly his attention to the critiques of Natorp, identify the field proper to a Urwissenschaft and identify both the inadequacy of neo-Kantian attempts to circumvent it and the insufficiently radical development of phenomenology to apprehend it. The result of this investigation is the need for the method of formal indication toward which its concluding sections gesture. It is precisely the method proper to a primordial science that would seize life at its pretheoretical and “operational” level. The proposed philosophical contention with facticity is rightly called ontology, because in the self-interpretation of facticity is disclosed the world in its entirety.

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Does Heidegger’s amended account of reflection and intuition add anything to our account of formal indication? Crowell suggests, not unproblematically, that we define formal indication as “definitional discourse”. However, much hinges on what we take the nature of “definitions” to be. If they are the conceptual articulation of relations formed according to rules and criteria borrowed from the theoretical sphere, then this cannot be what Heidegger means. However, if we take the idea of definition back to its etymological sense of de-limiting (de-finis) appropriately basic distinctions, then we are perhaps closer to Heidegger’s sense. But this requires us to acknowledge with Heidegger that the most basic distinctions do not admit of the conceptual clarity of higher and founded theoretical distinctions. Formal indications are not rounded-off concepts, but rather indicate “a way of access” to experience that grounds all high-order conceptualization.

Keeping in mind that this “way of access” is an enactment we can say that formal indication suggests that phenomenological seeing (relation-sense) only happens properly when we are able to be in a certain way (enactment sense). Reading this in light the prohibitive and transformative functions of formal indication we can suggest that “formally indicative defining” has two moments. It is first characterized by a kind of interpretive askesis that has the “negative” function of holding at bay the common theoretical assumptions regarding phenomena. This first moment makes possible a second “positive” function of providing directional sense. In this it captures the “positive sense of Husserl’s re-duction,”63 namely, that we are led back from a “ruinous flight into the world” to an originary field of experience. The claim that phenomena themselves have “motivating tendencies” that suggest the appropriate manner of their investigation, is merely the reverse side of the claim that our questions already dictate to some degree the form of their answers.

63 GA61, 39/31
Thus, in response to Natorp’s objection Heidegger does not reject the reflective character of phenomenology, but rather recasts reflection in terms of formal indication. He rehabilitates Husserlian reflection as *Wieder-holung*, a repetition of life that attends to its manners of enactment and motivating tendencies. This, in turn, leads to a rethinking of Husserlian intuition as a kind of pre-theoretical understanding that he calls *hermeneutic intuition*. This can be read as a rethinking and a deepening rather than a rejection of Husserl’s insight into the originary givenness and significance of experience. As he argues in his 1919 course, before the “*es gibt etwas*” there is the “*es gibt*” *simpliciter*. Formal indication is an “indirect interpretive strategy” that seeks that original “*es gibt,*” and in doing so it returns us to the most basic level of factical life where the questionability of existence is thickest. It is for that reason that Heidegger suggests formal indication is not merely essential to phenomenological method and its response to Natorp, but enable the kind of questioning that is the essential form of philosophy.

§6. Formal indication as the kind of questioning that is the activity of philosophy

The foregoing analysis has attempted to show that Heidegger proposes formal indication as a method of philosophical investigation. It has become clear, however, that it is not one method among others. We do not select the method of formal indication the way one might choose to pursue a linguistic analysis of a problem in lieu of metaphysical, political, or ethical analysis. We do not select it as one among many argumentative strategies the way one might chose a *reductio ad absurdum* rather than a straightforward demonstration. It is not even reducible to the choice between direct and indirect forms of communication.
This observation stands in tension with Heidegger’s statement, quoted above, that formal indication is a “moment” in phenomenological explication. A moment is a technical term from Husserl’s mereological account in the *Logical Investigations* that designates a non-independent part. The description of formal indication as a moment suggests that it is one of a set of activities that *in sum* constitute phenomenology. How can formal indication be determinative for the whole of philosophy and at the same time only a part of its elaboration of the world?

To answer this, we must recall that formal indication holds at bay the content- and relation-senses of a phenomenon to allow that enactment-sense to be brought to evidence. It is a radicalization of Husserl’s “annihilation” of the thesis of the world insofar as it *re-duces*, or leads back, inquiring consciousness from the presupposed theoretical attitude of that act to its more primordial manners of enactment. According to this account, formal indication is first and foremost a comportment, a way of being toward and with phenomena. Only within this comportment can we then derive an initial and provisional set of categories that do not succumb to the charge leveled by Natorp. These categories – e.g., life, world, Dasein – interpret a phenomenon according to their (the categories’) meaning such that they bring the phenomenon as *interpretandum* to understanding.

However, the enactment-sense uncovered by formal indication is that of the fundamental questionability of facticity. It is for this reason that Heidegger suggests formal indications are always *inauthentic*. Authenticity [*Eigenlichkeit*] denotes a kind of self-sameness that would be inappropriate for formal indications standing, as they do, at the start of philosophical reflection. Thus, these “principle definitions,” as Crowell calls them, “are therefore what are eminently

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64 Again, it is worth noting here that the theoretical inventory of consciousness proposed by Husserl remains a permanent possibility of Dasein, though it must, for Heidegger, rescind its claims to primordiality.

65 Westphal suggests that Formal indication “keeps open” fundamental questions, “especially about the temporality of life which is falsified by objectivity” (252).
He is in agreement with Westphal in suggesting that formal indications are not “forms of objects” but rather “indicators of tasks.” They do not settle the matter for us, but rather invite us into its correct exploration. Shortly after his Augustine course, perhaps as a result of his elaboration of tentatio, Heidegger would write: “The authentic foundation of philosophy is a radical, existentiell grasp of and maturation of questionableness; to pose in questionableness oneself and life and to be decisive actualizations is the basic stance of all—including the most radical—clarification” (GA 61, 35/28).

The freedom to confront philosophical questions as questions is a recurrent theme in the early Heidegger. According to Oudemans’ reading, we can attribute Heidegger’s strong emphasis on enactment to a belief that the subject of philosophical questioning only becomes such when it is questioned philosophically. In other words, the topic (topos) in question is only available from a certain place (topos) of questioning: “The subject of philosophical asking is not only to be discussed, but ‘becomes’ only in and through the asking.” Questioning is the Vollzugsinn of philosophy, which is to say that it is the particular how of philosophical consciousness, or, more to the preferences of Being and Time, it is an event that occurs when we are able to be in the world in a certain way that allows for its authentic disclosure: “Only by…allowing the formal emptiness of asking to be directional for asking, can there be asking at all. The formal emptiness is directional,

Crowell, Space of Meaning, 141

In a way it anticipates his later discussions of the nothing, and the abgrund or abyss. If the ground of philosophy is facticity and facticity is subject to a perennial questionableness then there is a sense in which the ground of philosophy is an afgrund, a nothingness when viewed from the theoretical perspective. It also clarifies certain later statements about philosophy and religion. At certain moments he claims that adherence to Christian belief prevents one from even being able to ask the essential philosophical questions and to encounter them as genuine problems. For Heidegger the theoretical bracketing of one’s faith commitment (its relation-sense) is insufficient because on his “thicker” account to philosophize is not just to ask questions, but to ask them out of a particular way or style of being-in-the-world, i.e., an enactment. The authenticity that requires is conceived, from 1927 forward, as the primary alternative or competitor to the way of faith. Cf. Heidegger’s “Phenomenology and Theology” cited above.

Th. C. W. Oudemans, “Heidegger: Reading against the Grain” in Reading Heidegger Form the Start, Kisiel and Van Buren (eds.), 39-40
Phenomenological questioning is formally undetermined because it is not previously committed to a specific set of theoretical categories. Nor is it a questioning about a particular region of worldly experience that proves immune to such categories, as if we could then set it next the fields of biology, aesthetics, or geology. Quite to the contrary, the formal indeterminacy of phenomenological questioning is precisely such as directed to every possible experience. Its way of having the object is what distinguishes it, not the object itself.

However, precisely because we are not bound by the theoretical division of subject and object such questioning is not haphazard or random it is always a response to a world that we are already engaged with. Therefore, we question what is in one sense already available to us. We might consider this Heidegger’s response to Meno’s paradox. If we do not know that which we seek, we do in some sense already understand it, though pre-thematically. Questions for Heidegger are not the idle thoughts of a cranially circumscribed ego in potential but never definitive relationship with the world beyond its representations. If questioning is formally empty, it does not thereby abstract from factual life; while it holds all worldly object at bay, it does not hold at bay the wordliness that is the essential context of enactment. Thus, “the formal emptiness is empty, yet it binds, because it allows for a movement to be experienced...”

How can this be the whole of philosophy? To answer this question we must situate this close phenomenology of the comportment of originary questioning in the larger and diverse arc of human inquiry. It is not that all questioning must take this form. Heidegger’s need to delineate a truly primal Ur-Wissenschaft that has the tools to grapple with a truly originary Ur-etwas requires

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69 ibid
70 The extent to which Heidegger’s early work is a sustained, if unacknowledged, engagement with Descartes has been recently brought to light by Ryan Coyne (2015) in his Heidegger’s Confessions.
71 In this sense enactment is the counter-concept to the transcendental ego.
72 Oudemans, Ibid., 41
him to draw sharp lines between primordial and theoretical science, between *Verstehen* and *episteme*. While Husserl is the undeniable force behind Heidegger’s analyses, he nonetheless falls afoul of this distinction in his quest for philosophy *als strenge Wissenschaft*. However, this should not lead us to underestimate the value Heidegger accords to the legitimate, though founded, kinds of questioning appropriate to various fields of human inquiry. Nor ought it occlude the ineluctable “representational” or “discursive” nature of human rationality. As Oudemans notes, “Formal emptiness cannot stop re-presentation. It can only show that re-presentation’s being un-bound is in fact a keeping away of bounds. …Human life…is fixed…to the formal emptiness that binds in staying away.”

It is in this sense, perhaps, that Oudemans makes the potentially confusing claim that the “*gehalt* is not a content; rather it is being gripped by the asking itself, i.e., a hold. It consists of getting involved in the asking as a having-to-do-with (Bezug).” The point here, as I take it, is that the formally empty *Gegenstand* of philosophical questioning has for its content a holding at bay of that content that makes possible a focus on the alternative ways something is for (*Bezugsinn*) and towards us (*Vollzugsinn*) and how we are for it and towards it.

This phenomenological questioning permits a provisional and primordial interpretation of the mutual disclosure of consciousness and world that would be the ground of all other truthful interpretations. However, in keeping with the peculiar *askesis* of philosophical questioning such interpreting is not the imposition of consciousness on the world or the construction of the intelligibility of that which stands against (*gegen-stand*) it. It is rather a letting be.

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73 ibid., 42
74 ibid., 38
75 What is less clear is whether this is a characteristic of all questioning, or of phenomenological/philosophical questioning in particular.
Ultimately, it is the world, according to Oudemans, that is, “the formal emptiness by which life as re-presentation ‘is held fast, to which it holds itself.’” Comportment as the concourse between Dasein and world, does not distinguish subject and object, but rather names an activity that has Dasein and world for its constitutive moments. Within that movement are reciprocal vectors: the world is the condition of possibility of Dasein and Dasein is also the condition possibility of the understanding of world. “The world is called “Gehaltsinn” the very sense of gehalt…because the world is the possibility of understanding, the openness in which representation is bound.”

Phenomenological questioning requires the holding at bay of representation because facticity, as Natorp noted, is always itself being held back from our theoretical gaze. No sooner do we name it and seek it than it recedes from view. In the final analysis, it is the basic givenness of the world that is the ground of meaning to which our questioning, when adequately directed, becomes the occasion of understanding and expression. As Heidegger will say later in Being and Time, “words grow towards meanings,” and the goal of formal indication is to find the right words, provisional, searching, and arising in the space of restraint.

§7. Conclusion.

Heidegger’s account can sound fantastic in its suggestion of an attentive listening to or seeing of experience from which we would draw the directions of its provisional interpretation. However, this feeling of strangeness is itself an index of how deep-seated the theoretical (natural scientific)

76 ibid., 44
77 ibid., 44
78 GA 2, 214/161 (Oudemans’s amended translation)
mindset is. Heidegger’s proposals are not mysticism. They are a leading-back of our reflection to the moment that stands at the beginning of all experiential engagement, scientific engagement included. The distinctions within the natural sciences, for example, arise because chemical reactions, living organisms, and objects of mass admit of being studied and described in distinct matters. So too do ethics, aesthetics, and religion. Thinking can be many things within this set of practices: it can study logic as the world of ideal validity irreducible to contingent psychic events. It can study ethics as the study of (possible) behavioral normativity irreducible to the complex of evolutionary motivations of pain and pleasure. It can study physics in its attempt to discern, predict, and exploit the law-like regularities of the material universe. But as phenomenology, thinking is interested in the question of how it is that we should understand in at all. By what right do we construct our worlds through the selection of various forms of the theoretical attitudes that themselves exist by the grace of an ‘if’. Phenomenology, returning to Aristotle, is interested in the noetic leap according to which we transparently leave the realm of epistemic proof to ask about the conditions that found it, but that are themselves unfounded. This requires that we study attentively the facticity from which they originate. We do this, however, with the added insight that to meaningfully ask this question we must also be in a certain way.

The world both is and is not there apart from our descriptions of it. It is there insofar as it remains a possibility to which we may return. It is not there insofar as our universes of discourse about being, certainly, but also about the Dasein, social life, the natural environment and ethics occlude from view possibilities of being. Formal indication in its permanently provisional nature is always an “introduction” and therefore also always an invitation to the further work of meaning. To return to Gadamer, with whom we began this chapter, “Formal indication points us in the way
we are to look – we must learn to say in our own words what shows up there.”79 This exercise in saying, which is equally an exercise in seeing and listening, is what Heidegger attempts in his investigation of Paul and Augustine.

79 Gadamer, “Heidegger’s One Path,” 34
Chapter 4

Formally Indicating St. Paul

“Perhaps in philosophy the ‘introduction’ has such an important meaning that it has to be considered alongside every step into philosophy.” (PRL §2)

“We must ask, rather, what is temporality originally in factical experience? What do past, present, and future mean in factical experience? Our way takes its point of departure from factical life, from which the meaning of time is won.” (PRL §13).

§1. The Pauline Kehre

Of the many new beginnings in Heidegger’s “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” the most significant is his turn to the Pauline epistles. How to interpret this new beginning is a matter of some debate for which the material record is inconclusive. Most recently, Ryan Coyne¹, echoing Kisiel’s² appraisal, has suggested that the turn to Paul is “improvised”. In other words, that Heidegger did not intend to turn to the Pauline epistles, or at least to Galatians, and was forced to do so because of student dissatisfaction. The plausibility of this position derives from Heidegger’s apparently abrupt decision to “break off” [abbrachen] the lectures on method in “Part I” in order to avoid the “calamity” entailed in “abstract considerations.” This decision was related to the

¹ Coyne, Heidegger’s Confessions, 27. Coyne does suggest that despite the improvised turn the explication of Paul is in fundamental continuity with the first part of the course.
² Kisiel, Genesis, 173. In defense of this Kisiel cites the “seemingly unprepared state of the interpretation of Galatians.” Yet, this claim is advanced tentatively (“seemingly”) and only with respect to Galatians, not Thessalonians which dominates the latter portion of the course.
dissatisfaction of some of his students who had complained to the Rector. This “improvisation thesis” gains further support from the observation made by many commentators that the opening sections of the second half of the course appear to be arranged somewhat haphazardly. This interpretation, however, is potentially misleading for a few reasons.

To take the last observation first, these are lecture notes. They were not prepared for publication. In the case of the first course, they are reconstructed from a set of student transcripts in conjunction with Heidegger’s own notes on the original course manuscript, which has since been lost. While there is no gainsaying that fact that the opening sections of the second half of course are not as cogently presented or systematically framed as those that precede them, it is not clear what we are entitled to conclude from this state of affairs. It is possible, though I think very unlikely, that Heidegger’s turn to Paul was completely unplanned. Moreover, we cannot conclude this based on the appearance, for example, of a list of textual references to key terms in Galatians as occurs in §15. Similar informal forms of notation occur, for example, in the 1919 and 1920 courses alongside incomplete sentences and parenthetical “notes to self”. Secondly, and more importantly, it becomes clear in later sections that the identification of a diverse set of possible

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3 At the end of part one, Oskar Becker noted that the “breaking off” was “Owing to uncalled-for objections [Einwänden Unberufener], broken off on the 30th of November.” While it is possible and even likely that this may have been on account of the notable lack of theological content in part one, nonetheless, the editors of GA60 note that when queried, “the archive of the University of Freiburg could find no explanation of the sort of objections” (GA 60, 324-343).

4 Here it is worth addressing the concerns of some scholars about the reliability of this first course in particular. The original text of the lecture is lost and what remains are student notes and a set of Heidegger’s own notes that he seems to have compiled while delivering the lectures. There can be no denying that what we have today is not as reliable a record as the original document. However, to suggest that this provides a reason for ignoring the course is untenable. The text itself is the reproduction of 5 distinct student transcripts of the course. Thus, in favor of using this transcript we can note that (1) If scholars had the degree of material evidence involved in the reconstruction of this course for say, some of the Pauline epistles themselves, they would be very happy indeed. (2) Furthermore, the course stands in thematic and structure continuity with the Augustine course that follows it, for which we possess the original record. (3) Finally, as any student knows, for many professors, the written record prepared ahead of the lecture course is a content-poor account of what was in fact said and done over the course of a semester in the classroom. In this respect, the transcripts of Oskar Becker, Helene Weiß, Franz-Josef Brect and others provide us not only with a set of missing pieces to the original manuscript, but the elaboration and expansion of those themes undertaken by Heidegger who was by all accounts wont to depart from his prepared notes in the interest of elaboration and further explication.

5 E.g., GA 56/57 117 / TDP 90; 167/130; 182-84 / 138-39; 202/151-2; GA 58, 10 / BPP 8; 47 / 38, 80 / 64
essential phenomena is part and parcel of the method Heidegger is proposing. He repeats the same procedure when he shifts from *Galatians* to *1 Thessalonians* (§25) and again when shifting to *2 Thessalonians* (§27). Both of these considerations suggest the style of a lecturer who tended to speak extemporaneously as often as he read a prepared lecture. Finally, even if one grants that there is a less obvious thematic coherence to the treatment of *Galatians*, this is not the case for the treatment *1 & 2 Thessalonians*. This suggests that, while Heidegger is forced to amend his course plan mid-semester, it is more likely that he always intended to turn to Paul and merely does so sooner than expected. This more moderate proposal – that the turn to Paul was always intended but is made prematurely – has the added advantage of accounting for Heidegger’s treatment of *1 & 2 Thessalonians* which is more systematic in its thematic presentation than his treatment of *Galatians*.

There are a number of other reasons for suggesting that Heidegger does not proceed *ad hoc* in his engagement with Paul. In the first place, he is engaged not only with a set of Pauline texts, but also with a wide range of secondary literature with which he is in fruitful and informed conversation. That secondary literature, moreover, is varied. Heidegger has a sense for how to situate Paul in the history of theology and the history of biblical interpretation (especially with respect to Luther) as well as contemporary debates in historical-critical schools and the History of Religions school. Second, the choice of *Thessalonians* and *Galatians* as the starting points for a phenomenology of the Christian life seems far from arbitrary. These are not only two of the five Pauline texts whose authenticity is beyond dispute, but they are also the earliest of the authentic Pauline Epistles: *First Thessalonians* dates from (at the latest) 49-51 CE and *Galatians* from the

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6 See, e.g., the similarities between PRL §15 and §27.
early 50’s CE\(^7\). This means that they are prior to the Gospels and very likely the earliest canonical writings of the New Testament, a point noted by Heidegger\(^8\).

The third reason for thinking the turn to Paul is more than an accidental concession is that, in addition the textual and thematic continuities outlined in the previous paragraphs, there is a basic *phenomenological continuity* between the first and second parts of the course. The analysis in part two is a natural continuation and concrete application of the method outlined in part one. The basic point around which Heidegger organizes his phenomenological approach to religion is a return to factical life. How are religious phenomena for religious persons? This question must be further concretized to accommodate Heidegger’s emphasis on the correct understanding of the historical. Thus, in turning to Paul Heidegger undertakes a methodological procedure that is characteristic of his thought and approach to phenomenology, namely, to “take a concrete phenomenon as the point of departure” (PRL 65/45). This movement from an introductory discussion of method to the analysis of the concrete phenomena of factical life to the further investigation of their underlying structures is also the basic structure of *Being and Time*, and it is an approach that will hold true for Heidegger’s phenomenology – religious and other – for the duration of his philosophical activity. Thus, the turn to Paul is the way in which Heidegger makes good on his promise from the earlier portion of the course to provide an analysis of the *Ürphänomen* of Christian life.

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\(^8\) GA 60, 83 (§21). NB: the third text to which Heidegger has occasional recourse in his notes in 1 *Corinthians* which is also thought to be a relatively early texts from the 50’s CE.
The phenomenological continuity of the course is central to its interpretation because it reminds us that what Heidegger is pursuing here is not a history of religious experience, but a phenomenological explication of its structure. There is a distinction here between two kinds of description: historical description and phenomenological explication. While Heidegger acknowledges the important role of historical research and its results for phenomenology and while he regularly indicates his awareness of the dating, compositional nature, and controversies surrounding the texts under examination, the chronological record is not particularly significant for phenomenological explication. An important example of this is his election to begin his investigation of Paul with *Galatians* rather than *Thessalonians*, which is the earlier text. This reordering is methodologically motivated rather than circumstantially necessitated. The methodological motivation is not historical, but rather phenomenological. The goal of the phenomenology of religion is to grasp the religious phenomena and experience in the world, and, according to Heidegger, it is in *Galatians* that we grasp Paul’s “exposed position” (133/94), his own self-understanding of his posture before God, before his young religious communities and before the world at large. It is “the original document for his religious development and, historically, reports the passionate excitation of Paul himself” (68/47). This further confirms our

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9 This account implies a further, third differentiation in the concept of time from the two outlined in “The Concept of Time in the Science of History” (1915). In that early lecture Heidegger distinguishes time as “quantitative determination” in the natural sciences from time as qualitative difference in the science of history. Historical times differ qualitatively and so cannot be submitted to the quantitative homogeneous differentiations of natural-scientific time. The point here is not that chronology is qualitative, though that is assumed; it is rather that the kind of historical description that “overcomes” time in the sense of the temporal distance between the reader and the original text is itself founded on a still more basic temporality constitutive of human being and human meaning, and it is at that level of analysis that we must interpret Paul and the Christian life. See, “The Concept of Time in the Science of History” in *Supplements*, edited by John Van Buren, 49-60.

10 Heidegger’s defense here is successful as far as it goes. However, recent scholarship, especially McGrath (2006), has called into question the confessional neutrality of Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion. It is perhaps the case that Lutheran theological positions pertaining to the (non-)relationship between nature and grace enter in subtler ways at the deeper levels of this analysis.
thesis that the work of religious historians, in this case biblical historians, is important but not methodologically determinative for a phenomenology of religion.

In the final analysis, whether or not or to what extent the Pauline Kehre is improvised, its legitimacy as a moment in Heidegger’s fledgling phenomenology of religion is indisputable. Even though Heidegger breaks off abruptly from his abstract considerations, it seems that Paul was always the terminus ad quem those considerations were heading and the terminus a quo a deeper phenomenological analysis of Christian facticity was to take its point of departure.

§2. Originary Explication

The goal of Heidegger’s new approach to the philosophy of religion is an originary [ursprüngliche] explication. This is made possible by his reformulated account of meaning which uncovers the original what [die ursprüngliche “Was”] and the original how [die ursprüngliche “Wie”] of both relation and enactment through formal indication. For Heidegger, “‘Phenomenology’ is explication of this totality of sense” (63/43). This account is originary because it begins from the incontestable starting point of any investigation into the religious: religious experience. It asks how religion is for people in life, and it takes Paul as its privileged interlocutor. To do this first with Paul and then with Augustine Heidegger uses his tripartite schema from earlier courses of the surrounding world [Umwelt], the communal world [Mitwelt], and the self-world [Selbstwelt].

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11 Benjamin Crowe (2008) has suggested along similar lines that the initial analysis of concrete phenomena is one of three core features of Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion: ‘Heidegger’s theory of religion is phenomenological in the sense that he grounds his case upon the careful exposition of the structures of certain characteristically religious attitudes and activities. [...] His expositions begin with exemplary phenomena, which provide what he sometimes calls a ‘fore-having’ [Vorhaben], an initial grip, on the subject matter under investigation” (60-61). We can think here of his example of the lectern in his 1919 course or the famous example of the door knob in Sein und Zeit (H67-68).

12 These three spheres of facticity first appear in Heidegger’s 1919 “Basic Problems in Phenomenology” course where they are used to show the various stages of “de-vivification” that occur when scientific categories are uncritically applied to the study of life. (See GA 58, 43-45, 59-64/34-36, 46-50
These three overlapping spheres are compounded in any consideration of facticity. We can think of them as three “depth dimensions” of life and therefore also of each of Heidegger’s three strata of sense. A content-sense, for example, already contains relations to the surrounding, communal and self-world’s I inhabit in various ways. I can disentangle these relations – indeed that is the goal of formal indication – but I cannot extricate myself from them.

This implies an insuperable commitment to facticity. For Heidegger, Paul’s experience and articulation of the Christian life is tied ineluctably to the world in which he seeks to proclaim the Gospel. His affliction [Kampf] is indescribable apart from his relationship to the Jewish, Jewish-Christian, and Gentile communities among which he lives and works. Such a phenomenology of religious life, rather than merely religious consciousness, attempts to catch consciousness in the act of its concurrence with the world. Heidegger’s critique of Otto and Husserl is not a denial that something corresponding to religious consciousness can be delineated – something conforming to the constraints of an “object-in-general” – it is rather that this is not preeminently the religious in its leading-sense. When we take it to be such we set down a path of inquiry that cannot do justice to the phenomena or their phenomenality as such.

This is the phenomenological sense in which Heidegger’s exposition is original; there is also a disciplinary sense. Because a phenomenology of religious life examines religious motivation and meaning at the level of facticity it is distinct from other forms of religious investigation. It

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13 One might press Heidegger here on his condensation of the various ways Paul speaks about affliction – distress, affliction, necessity, etc. – into a single phenomenon. There are distinctions – perhaps theologically significant ones – between, thlipsis and anagke. Thlipsis is the general and more common term for “distress”. It is used 43 times in the New Testament, 24 of those times occur in Paul’s letters. However, in other places, most notably 1 & 2 Corinthians, he uses anagke, which carries a similar sense of distress, but one that is “imposed” by or results from law or duty. Might there be an important distinction here between forms of affliction and distress that are and are not necessitated by Christian factical life? (Ref. The NAS New Testament Greek Lexicon). For example, Heidegger passes over 1 Thess. 3:7 where both terms are used side-by-side, “For this reason, brothers and sisters, during all our distress [anagke] and persecution [thlipsei] we have been encouraged about you through your faith” (The New Oxford Annotated Bible). It would take a good deal more work than Heidegger undertakes to determine whether Paul is using synonyms to intensify his account or in fact distinguishing between two distinct forms of suffering.
begins “from the sense [Sinn] of the religious life itself” (72/50). Heidegger begins his exposition of Paul’s *Letter to the Galatians* with a second “Introduction” to the course that offers a more specified set of disciplinary distinctions. Here he is particularly clear about what a phenomenology of religion will *not* do. This opening paragraph is a compact piece of writing in which each sentence is a distinct claim. When taken together these constitute at one and the same time a *finale* that recapitulates the essential themes from part one and an *overture* for the phenomenological analysis of Paul to follow. Let us examine the paragraph in its entirety:

“In the following, we do not intend to give a dogmatic or theological-exegetical interpretation, nor a historical study or a religious meditation, but only guidance for phenomenological understanding. Characteristic of the phenomenological-religious understanding is gaining an advance understanding for an original way of access. One must work the religious-historical method into it, and indeed in such a way that one examines it critically. The theological method falls out of the framework of our study. Only with the phenomenological understanding, a new way for theology is opened up. The formal indication renounces the last understanding that can only be given in genuine religious experience; it intends only to open up an access to the New Testament” (67/47).

Heidegger’s first “Introduction” to the course distinguished between scientific and philosophical introductions. Unlike scientific introductions which delimit a subject area, articulate a method, and summarize a history, philosophical introductions seek an “original motive” [*ursprüngliche Motiv*], the authentic conceptual means of its realization, and points of rupture [*Bruchstellen*] (7/6). Thus, we can see that this second introduction proceeds according to that second model rather than the first. While there is a certain delimitation of the subject matter, namely, primitive Christian life, this is a heuristic designation for what will appear when looked at correctly rather than the delimitation of a field of inquiry. Rather than stating what a phenomenology of religion is, i.e., its *doctrine*, Heidegger states what it is not. His methodological proposals proceed by a *via negativa*: the phenomenological interpretation of religious life is distinguished from other approaches to the
biblical text. He lists four in his opening sentence. Let us consider a few of those distinctions more closely.

Heidegger claims that a phenomenological reading is not dogmatic, which is to say that a phenomenology of religion is not an attempt to find either the articulation of the mysteries of the Christian faith, nor evidence for them. It is received (δέχεσθαι) from within that tradition, but without the authority of its Revelation and thus not as dogma (δογματ- δόγμα). Although the phenomenon is taken as that which seems (δοκεῖν) true to the believer. Neither, he continues, is such a reading theological-exegetical. It is not an attempt to interpret the signs and symbols and potentialities of a sacred text in service of the exposition of dogma or in its defense. Nor is such a reading historical study. In other words, a phenomenology of religion is not a detailed analysis of sources and textual forms (Biblical criticism), nor a comparative analysis with contemporaneous cultures or religions (Religionsgeschichte). The pretentions to comprehensiveness of such a religious-historical method will be called into question by a phenomenology of religion for their insufficient grasp of historicity. Finally, a phenomenology of religious is not religious meditation.

While Heidegger is focused on the enactmental sense of the Pauline texts, this remains an exercise in understanding not in pious devotion or religious discipline. Rather, it is “guidance for phenomenological understanding.” Heidegger claims here that phenomenology can provide a structure to religious inquiry that is neither borrowed from the natural sciences nor reduced to the personal intuitions of popular piety and, conversely, that the early Christian attentiveness to and

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14 The term “dogma” derives from the Greek δογματ- δόγμα, and is related to δοκεῖν, meaning “to seem”, which is itself related, suggestively, to δέχεσθαι, meaning “to receive”.
15 Heidegger is critical of Christian “apologetics” throughout the religion courses. He takes the “negative” character of apologetics (i.e., its defensive posture) to be indicative of Greek philosophy not New Testament religious disposition. It is originally a desire to defend itself against science (ancient and then modern) that leads religious thinkers to search for aids outside external to religious phenomena themselves, such as the metaphysics of Aristotle or Plotinus (159/115) or modern scientific method (29/20).
articulation of the experience of faith in its radical comprehensiveness and historical contingency is a guide to a phenomenological understanding of facticity and also its point of departure.

This, then, is the place to ask in what sense the interpretation of the Pauline epistles might be a “guide [Anleitung] for phenomenological understanding.” Heidegger locates the distinction between philosophy and theology, i.e., between a philosophy of religion and any other approach to the religious phenomenon (theological, historical, devotional etc.) at the level of motivation. It is not the case that the Sachgebiet gives itself in only one way. On the contrary, it can give itself in a number of different ways in response to different manners of engagement. Heidegger, as we have seen, is interested in the basic substratum of factual life that is constituted by the historical particularities and contingencies from which traditional philosophical concepts abstract. His proposal for phenomenology pursues these in the overlapping spheres of the Selbstwelt, Mitwelt, and Umwelt which, he claims, are particularly evident in Paul’s self-accounting in Galatians. While he is not contesting the possibility of other distinct forms of engagement, Heidegger does argue, adamantly, for the legitimacy – and, indeed the priority – of this more primordial description as a kind of philosophical activity and its ultimate ground. His distinction between scientific knowledge (or scientific philosophy) and understanding [Verstehen], and later thinking, often marks this difference\(^\text{16}\). The chief characteristic of the distinctly phenomenological way of access (i.e., formal indication) is what Heidegger calls here “renunciation” [Verzicht].

\(^{16}\) In preparation for his course on medieval mysticism (1918-1919) Heidegger had already noted that, “Above all, understandability does not mean ‘rationalization,’ dissolution of experience into its ‘logical components’” (GA 60, 304/232). Decades later (1951-52) in “What is Called Thinking” he noted that, “what has been presented here [i.e., “thinking”] has nothing to do with scientific knowledge. […] Science does not think” (What is Called Thinking, GA 8: 7, 8). This distinction developed into that of “calculative thinking” and “meditative thinking” in his 1955 “Memorial Address”: “Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning in everything that is” (Martin Heidegger, Philosophical and Political Writings. Edited by Manfred Stassen. (New York: Continuum, 2003), 89).
§3. Renunciation

Renunciation is what makes originary explication possible and distinct. If this explication is to be phenomenological rather than theological it must do so in a particular way. Heidegger confronts this question in his opening sections on St. Paul where he argues that phenomenology must renounce the ultimate religious interpretation in order to stay faithful to its own prerogatives: “The formal indication renounces the last understanding that can only be given in genuine religious experience; it intends only to open up an access to the New Testament” (67/47). It is important to note here the extent to which Heidegger’s account of the phenomenological renunciation is a reconfiguration account of Husserl’s bracketing: the phenomenologist of Christian factical life remains under the epoché in an important sense. We are more preoccupied with the activity of proclamation and the experience of belief than with the ultimate truthfulness of the claims that inspire these activities. The legitimacy of the kerygma is not being questioned, but rather, what it means for one to proclaim it and how. In this sense, the ultimate truth or falsity of the claims of Christianity are bracketed in order to first grasp the truthfulness of the experience of a Christian way of being in the world. It is significant in this regard that Heidegger’s phenomenology is concerned with Paul’s Umwelt, Mitwelt, and Selbstwelt, but not the reported speech concerning the resurrected Christ17 or his religious authority as an apostle untimely born. Thus, while his account seeks to extend phenomenology’s reach to the factical world within which we live and move and have our being, in taking that account as it appears it is not totally unmodified18. The

17 There cannot be a phenomenology of the resurrection via the interpretation of reported speech – inspired or not. This is not to say that there cannot be other ways of examining, phenomenologically, what the resurrection understood as a rebirth might entail through the analysis of the immediately available phenomenon of birth. Such is the procedure of Emmanuel Falque, for example, in his Metamorphose de la Finitude, (Cerf: September 2004)

18 In this, we can see that he still has Natorp’s objection in mind. While phenomenology (philosophy) cannot impose foreign categories on factical life, neither can it be content with a wholly unmodified account of life that would simply describe in haphazard fashion the speed, color, and shape of the flux.
phenomenologist brackets the truth claims of specific revelations, and in this sense a 
phenomenology of religion is not, nor can it ever be, theology.

Yet it is also clear that the phenomenologist’s renunciation does not suspend the 
particularity of religious revelation. Renunciation implies neither denying revelation nor ignoring it. Both of those routes lead to the search for a religious a priori and the syncretism in which it often results. In the first case, this occurs by disregarding the specific religious differences grounded in distinct revelations. In the second case, it occurs through the reduction of religion to an aid in the pursuit of a universal moral existence. Heidegger suspects Otto of the first tendency and Troeltsch of the second. Thus, even while she brackets the truth-status of the specific claims of a particular revelation – e.g., whether Jesus of Nazareth was in fact the Christ or whether he did appear to Saul of Tarsus – a phenomenologist of religion still understands that those claims are essential to the phenomena under investigation.

Renunciation is thus best understood as a kind of bracketing that can accommodate the persistent reality of lived existence (as opposed to the view from nowhere), and it is central to a formally indicative phenomenology of religion. Part of its explanatory power lies in its ability to integrate historical knowledge and into an originary investigation. This is the sense of Heidegger’s claim above that,

“Characteristic of the phenomenological-religious understanding is gaining an advance understanding for an original way of access. One must work the religious-historical method into it, and indeed in such a way that one examines it critically. The theological method falls out of the framework of our study” (67/47, emphasis mine).

That original way of access is Heidegger’s identification of the enactmental sense. The fact that, in its original manifestation, meaning is always motivated from out of factical life and therefore requires a hermeneutic kind of understanding to catch it “in the act”. When we advert to the
necessary contingency of experience we can critically examine the “scientific” accounts of that experience in order to identify their erroneous presuppositions, but also in order make use of their conclusions. Thus, the tremendous labor of German biblical scholarship is fruitful for Heidegger’s phenomenological understanding of Paul. An explication of the Pauline surrounding, communal, and self-worlds presupposes knowledge of the historical world within which Paul exercises his office. Thus, phenomenology makes use of the results of the critical-historical method even as it circumscribes its pretensions to ultimacy.

This is the sense of Heidegger’s remark that historical research is helpful to phenomenology, if not to theology. The greater the degree to which one grasps Paul’s Umwelt, the greater the degree to which she is prepared to grasp what is distinctive in his enactment within it. The meaning of the latter half of this remark – that such historical knowledge is of dubious value for Theology – is made clearer in his 1927 address, “Phenomenology and Theology” where he suggests that biblical criticism is unhelpful to theology if it seeks to reduce theology to itself, which is in effect to reduce theology to history – and to a naïve concept of history at that. Criticism is unconcerned with faith; yet, as the 1927 essay makes clear, faith in the cross is the positum that defines theology, which is the study of “Christianness.” Theology arises from and returns to faith as its source and goal; therefore, any approach that remained disinterested toward faith could not claim to be theology. The phenomenology of religion, by contrast, makes use of the results of historical critical scholarship to better grasp a context of enactment and, at the same time, examines

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19 “In this respect the historical research of theologians has been of service, as questionable as it may be for theology itself” (69/48).
20 This outmost level of situatedness appears to encompasses the greatest degrees of variability including at times the more immediate and local social, religious, and political contexts within which Paul operates, but it also seems to extend to the kind of cross-cultural and intertextual knowledge generated by historical and form-critical scholars.
it critically, defining the limits of its investigation (and therefore also of its application) by considering its conditions of possibility.

This makes clear the sense in which Heidegger considers his phenomenology of religion to open up a new way for theology. Formal indication, despite renouncing the “last understanding,” nonetheless opens up a new way of access to the New Testament. The last understanding that phenomenology renounces is the lived appropriation of a religious horizon for one’s own life. The ultimate understanding is expressed in religious decision. The last understanding is not a matter of how the religious phenomenon is for people in general, but of why I have chosen it as an individual\textsuperscript{21}. Decision, Heidegger suggests, is the fullest form of understanding because it is “not theoretical, but enactmental, because each enacts on its own” (148/105). Paul, on the road to Damascus, the Thessalonians when faced with the proclamation of the eschaton, and Augustine when facing his own temptations are faced with a decision, and that decision is original in each historical moment\textsuperscript{22}. It can only be decided for in light of the situation and under the conditions of a particular moment and, once chosen for, it is not a permanent attainment, as if one were choosing whether to believe in the mathematical properties of a triangle. Yet, the phenomenologist is neither the apologist nor the evangelist: “Our goal can never be to awaken religious life. That only [occurs] through such life itself.” Yet, if it is clear that phenomenology is not evangelical proclamation, in what sense does it open up a new way for theology? To understand how this is the case we need to parse Heidegger’s final claim that phenomenology opens up access to the New Testament.

\textsuperscript{21} A “positive” decision in Heidegger’s sense, is always an individual’s choice for a particular truth in time: “…we have to seek a decision positively, in the sense of historical experiencing and determining, a decision which itself can only be a historical one” (166/119).

\textsuperscript{22} Authentic decision is made in the concrete historical situation, not for abstract propositions regardless of context. We must be motivated by concern, something must be at stake for us or it is not a positive decision (cf. 221/164). This position bears upon Heidegger’s scattered references to “apologetics,” which he defines as the ‘reformulation of Christian life experience into objective form’ (114/81). It its defensive posture toward science – ancient or modern – Christian apologetics makes itself into a metaphysical exercise.
Philosophically, a phenomenology of religion opens up access to the New Testament for philosophers. It provides another and very interesting form of life to investigate. This new way of access is defined principally by eschewing preconceived theoretical and scientific categories and by granting the legitimacy of revelation as a structuring principle of a person’s existence. But it does not issue in religious decision, i.e., faith, nor does it generate the theological categories according to which the phenomena experienced and reported are interpreted by a person who has made such a decision. Heidegger has described how Paul’s worlds were upset and reconfigured as a result of his experience on the road to Damascus. Building on this analysis the theologian is then in a position to ask why this happened and what it means for the Christian community that “has become” through his testimony and missionary zeal. Theologically, this new way of access is both lectio and actio. It ushers in a theological hermeneutics of testimony distinct from that of historical criticism that, because it presupposes faith, is properly theological in Heidegger’s sense. However, this lectio as testimony is also an actio that Heidegger calls proclamation. Through his proclamation Paul not only communicates the kerygmatic content, but also enacts a form of Christian life. This is the central contribution of Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics: it

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23 In his “L’hermenetique du temoignage,” Ricoeur defines testimony as “words, works, actions, and lives which attest to an intention, an inspiration, an idea at the heart of experience and history which nonetheless transcend experience and history.” It can communicate an “original affirmation” for the absolute that exceeds both the moral exemplar and the symbol because it is a “concrete singularity” that “confers the sanction of reality on ideas, ideals, and modes of being that the symbol depicts and discovers for us only as our most personal possibilities.” (Archivio di Filosofia (La Testimonianza) 42 (1972): 35-61.1).

24 From Ricoeur again: “Testimony is the action itself as it attests outside of himself, to the interior man, to his conviction, to his faith” (ibid., 10).

25 A different project would examine how Heidegger’s reading of Paul stands in relation to contemporary ones. We can only note in passing that the tradition of the HRS focused on the “hellenized” roots of the New Testament. It examined how theologically, structurally, and rhetorically New Testament authors – especially Paul – were indebted to the Greek world in which they strove for articulation. This trend in interpretation de-emphasized the Jewish origins of the New Testament. The so-called “new perspective” on Paul originates in the 1950’s with W. D. Davies’ Paul and Rabbinic Judaism (London: SPCK, 1948) as well as E. P. Sanders studies such as Paul and Palestinian Judaism (London: SCM, 1977). It sought to correct the neglect of the Jewish origins of Paul’s thought. N. T. Wright is perhaps the best know contemporary author doing this sort of work. What Heidegger proposes here is something distinct from both these approaches and yet again from the existential-kerygmatic approach of the “dialectical” theology of Barth and Bultmann. He is, on the one hand, more sympathetic than the dialecticians to the kind of historical work being done by the HRS and “new perspective” historians. (Bultmann famously distinguished between the “historical Jesus” and the “Christ of faith” and seemed little interested in the former.) Yet, for Heidegger the end of this sort of historical
attempts to describe the reconfiguration of Paul’s present world(s) in light of his experience of faith, rather than trace particular features of those worlds back to their possible Jewish, Greek, or other near-eastern sources. This helps us see how the theologian relates to that proclamation differently from the phenomenologist. While the phenomenologist reads the Pauline epistles to understand how Christian persons are, the theologian, on Heidegger’s understanding, reads it to understand how to be a Christian and why she is one. Such an ultimate understanding is had in or is itself the content of authentic religious experience. This suggests intriguingly that if such phenomenological description is properly basic, it is not therefore necessarily ultimate.

§4. Vorgriff

The originary nature of phenomenological explication lies in its renunciation that allows for the authentic (and enactmental) “leading sense” of religious existence to first be seen and then to be thought. Heidegger calls this original leading sense a pre-conceiving [Vorgriff] or pre-having [Vorhaben]. It is this distinct kind of phenomenological understanding that secures the fore-concept of religious life prior to any theoretical considerations. As noted above, work is not to understand what Paul meant, so much as how Paul meant. This tells us something about how humans mean and how in a more particular way Christians mean, and thus, phenomenology is made useful both for philosophy and theology. This can help clarify the structure of meaning and decision involved in, for example, Paul’s conversion and also prompt the theologian to consider how and why one might choose to adopt this story as her own. For a more detailed topology of contemporary Pauline scholarship see James D. G. Dunn’s “Introduction” to the Cambridge Companion to Saint Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). The term “new perspective” is coined by Dunn in his “The New Perspective on Paul” in the Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Vol. 65, 1983, 95-122.

26 The stakes are clearest, perhaps, in asking what the foreconception of human being ought to be. Alasdair MacIntyre lays out the varied and regionally-appropriate answers in the following way: “From the standpoint of physics human beings are composed of fundamental particles interacting in accordance with the probabilistic generalizations of quantum mechanics. From that of chemistry we are the sites of chemical interactions, assemblages of elements and compounds. From that of biology we are multicellular organisms belonging to species each of which has its own evolutionary past. From that of historians we are intelligible only as emerging from long histories of social and economic transformations. From that of economists we are rational profit-maximizing makers of decisions. From that of psychology and sociology we shape and are shaped by our perceptions, our emotions, and our social roles and institutions. And from that of students of literature and the arts it is in the exercise of our various imaginative powers
phenomenology’s renunciation of the last understanding is determinative for a distinctly philosophical fore-having of the phenomena in question as distinct from a theological one. But the peculiar way that phenomenology secures its phenomena not only distinguishes it from theology, but also distinguishes it from other non-theological (object-historical) approaches: “All objectivity of the science of history and the object-historical understanding offer no guarantee so long as the guiding foreconception is not clarified” (77/53). In other words, Heidegger suggests that the various results of different forms of inquiry may be internally consistent or valid by the standards of inquiry and accuracy that constitute a given approach. Yet, this begs the further pertinent question, *What is the warrant for a particular foreconception?* By what right is it proposed and methodologically incorporated as the end of a particular methodology? Each of the forms of scriptural interpretation outlined above – dogmatic, exegetical, historical, devotional – employs a distinct foreconception. Within a philosophy of religion, more specifically, we have also explored a few of the principal alternatives for determining its foreconception. The guiding sense of religion for Troeltsch is reason as “a case or an example of an extra-temporal lawfulness” (76/52). That of Husserl and Otto is one in which the leading sense of religion is “only that which has the character of consciousness” (76/52). Harnack and the liberal-critical school take religion to be that which is clarified in theological *Wissenschaft*. Finally, the biblical historians, conceiving their methods as a close approximation of the natural sciences, have misunderstood the true nature of the historical by imposing a set foreign set of categories which de-vivify and thereby deform the phenomena under investigation. The supposed disinterestedness of such investigations obscures the fact that

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that we exhibit much that is distinctive about human beings. But how do all these relate to each other? In what does the unity of a human being consist? And how should the findings of each of these disciplines contribute to our understanding of ourselves and of our place in nature?” (*God, Philosophy, and Universities*. Rowen & Littlefield. May, 2009), 175.
(1) the historical is always motivated and (2) that the uncritically assumed foreconceptions are themselves motivated even if the scientist does not advert to them.

Each approach and its guiding foreconception fails to recognize the fact that, “Motives for historical understanding are always awakened through factical life experience” (76/53). By contrast, the phenomenologist of religion must recognize the motivational character of her own desire for knowledge and its origin in factical life\(^{27}\) to better grasp the correct manner of interpreting Paul. This claim grants a certain priority to the world in its concurrence with Dasein – facticity itself already has tending motivations [\textit{tendierenden Motivation}] and motivated tendencies [\textit{motivierten Tendenz}] that suggest their forms of articulation. The natural sciences are a particularly clear example of this – their very possibility is predicated on the fact that certain phenomena lend themselves to certain forms of description. This originary phenomenological “back and forth” [\textit{originäre phänomenologische Rück- und Vorgriffs-bildung}] is prior to all theoretical consideration and is the hallmark of hermeneutic intuition\(^{28}\).

Here we have Heidegger’s response to Husserl on the one hand and to Natorp on the other. The desire to know leads us not only to higher forms of scientific consciousness (Husserl), but also back into the world the was the original site of its wondrous provocation. Yet, while Heidegger guards against a too-hasty abstraction from life, he is equally clear that the phenomenological description of facticity implies a certain degree of formalization and, therefore, is not the mere description of its flux. It is an “empirical formalism”. This degree of formalism secures for the philosophy of religion a “methodological security.” Primitive Christianity is peculiarly suited to this enterprise because “It [Primordial Christian religiosity] is factical life experience itself” (82/57). It is a historical, factical, religion that has a “start date.”

\(^{27}\) Husserl agrees with the first half of this statement, but not the second.

\(^{28}\) See, GA 56/57, 117/99.
The way Heidegger describes it in these courses, the formal investigation of religious life has a “hypothetical” character to it that is distinct from the evidential character of empirical verification, or, better, the kinds of evidence that may be brought forward are understood more broadly. Concretely, with reference to Paul, this means that if *proclamation* is an appropriately basic phenomenon “from out of it must be won a relation to the total religious basic phenomenon” (83/57). Its enactment will explicate the phenomenon and therefore find its justification. Such a formally indicative philosophy of religion presupposes an organic motivated unity to phenomena. *Original explication* is the identification and description of that unity. It is noteworthy that this phenomenal determination of a motivated unity carries through to *Being and Time*.

§5. The Problem of Religious Experience

Here is the place to note two potentially problematic assertions. The first concern *who* can be a phenomenologist of religion, and the second concerns *how* one is to do so. Heidegger claims that to have the right *foreconception* requires a “familiarity” with the subject matter: “It cannot be had by every observer for every phenomenon” (82/57). This is specified in relation to a phenomenology of religious life:

“Only a religious person can understand religious life, for if it were otherwise, he would have no genuine reality. Certainly, but does this have any systematic or methodological disadvantages? It means only: ‘hands off’ for those who do not ‘feel’ genuinely at home here. That holds everywhere” (304/232)

He concludes by suggesting that the distinction of inclination and exposure are already operative in other (scientific) disciplines. The claim that one must be or have been a Christian (or at least

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29 What are Heidegger’s equiprimordials – understanding, discourse, attunement – if not a basic and irreducible set of tendencies at the heart of Dasein?
closely acquainted with Christian life and practice) to become a philosopher of (the Christian) religion is similar to the suggestion that one must have the inclination and training in physics to be a physicist.

This is an interesting problem for a phenomenology of religion that would be a phenomenology of religious life. Traditional phenomenology – whether in Ideas I or, in a different way, in Being and Time – is dealing, generally, with states of consciousness that everyone experiences even if they rarely advert to them. They at least are ones that everyone is capable of experiencing. Husserl, for example, begins with the paradigmatic instance of doubt famously articulated by Descartes from which he distills the more limited methodological principle of the époché. The claim is that anyone is theoretically capable of switching from the natural to the phenomenological attitude by bracketing the thesis of the world, however much the many and varied manners of our engagement with the world mitigated against that possibility. For all that, it remains essentially a possibility open to all. Is the case of a phenomenology of religion different? It seems that Heidegger is in a bit of a bind.

Yet, on the other hand, Heidegger’s claim appears to be implied by the nature of formal indication, which requires that the categories of interpretation be drawn from the experience itself, not imposed uncritically from without as in the case of both the contemporary biblical and comparative strategies of the liberal critical and Religionsgeschichte schools. In rejecting these approaches Heidegger has rejected both (1) a universal scientific method that would encompass also the study of religion and (2) the search for a (universal) religious a priori. This requires him

30 The traditional Husserlian response would be that any object for consciousness is similar in its dimension of “for consciousness” (formal ontology). However, Heidegger seems to be suggesting that if we are to take facticity as the starting point of phenomenology and as it gives itself, then we cannot predetermine what consciousness is prior to its various intentional relations. This suggests that consciousness can only be discovered in its relating to any and all phenomena, which, in turn, requires that we retain a partially open (or at least revisable) account of what consciousness is capable of or might include. In other words, nothing can be settled about consciousness in advance, but only in and by the concrete investigation of its relation to diverse phenomena.
to reject Husserl’s account of the universal accessibility of religious experience implied by a “regional ontology” of religious consciousness\textsuperscript{31}. By contrast, the (Heideggerian) phenomenologist of religious life must have some direct acquaintance with religious life in order to interpret (formally indicate) its basic structures and categories of interpretation. Yet, while this experience of religion (of faith) is required of her, it is also precisely what she must renounce at the right moment returning from a “last understanding” to what is penultimate. This is the second problematic assertion.

The phenomenologist of religion investigates religious life “as if” the mysteries that motivate its performance and articulation were true. This peculiar bracketing is designed in such a way that the life of Christianity is not “nullified” (\textit{ID} §49), but, just the opposite, it is always retained in view. Yet the proposed position of the phenomenologist \textit{vis-à-vis} religious revelation and practice leads at least to a tension if not a contradiction. On the one hand, the very language of renouncing seems to presuppose someone who is already acquainted with a particular tradition and only then in a second move suspends its truth claims to investigate how they structure personal or communal religious existence. The German word \textit{Verzicht} seems to carry this sense. The inseparable prefix “ver-” has a range of meanings\textsuperscript{32} that includes “to reverse a process”. For example, \textit{kaufen} means “to buy,” while \textit{verkaufen} means to sell, and similarly \textit{spielen} means “to play,” while \textit{verspielen} means “to gamble” or, we might say, “to play away.”

\textsuperscript{31} The division of experience into various regional ontologies – materiality, nature, consciousness, culture – allows for the transcendental phenomenologist to claim to be engaged in a more primordial activity of delineating what each (and all) of those regional ontological presuppose, viz., a universal formal ontology. Such an account presupposes that the basic forms of experience articulated in a given regional ontology conform to the conditions of the underlying formal ontology.

\textsuperscript{32} E.g., to reverse a process, e.g., \textit{verkaufen, vermeiten}; to make things worse, e.g., \textit{verstauchen, verhunger, verkomplizieren}; to bring about change, e.g., \textit{verbessern}; to do something the wrong way, e.g., \textit{sich verrechnet}; and it is also used to verbalize a noun to indicate process, e.g., \textit{verkorken, vergiften}. 
So too, the one who renounces has reversed a process already undertaken. This would follow from the preceding discussion of the necessity of a certain kind of “acquaintance” with religion. In this case, she has begun as a participant in a religious tradition and now is assuming a distinct perspective with respect to it. Heidegger suggests that one must be religious to have the kind of religious experience that admits of phenomenological description and clarification. The Christian experience and its *positum*, the crucified savior, is what it is for and in reference to Christian life and practice. On the other hand, that same phenomenologist of religion must renounce the ultimate interpretations that give rise to the practices and language that constitute the factical Christian life and world within which religious experience takes place and from which the theologian would presumably take her point of departure.

In response to this suggestion we might ask two questions. First, given what religious decision entails, can someone simply “renounce” or “bracket” it? Does it only have one motivational complex of enactment? Second, the foregoing suggests that the phenomenologist of Christian factical life can only be someone who is (or was) Christian, but has undertaken a kind of bracketing. *But how is the person who has undergone this renunciation different from someone who has simply never been part of the tradition under investigation?*

We can put the question another way: is the phenomenologist of religion necessarily a Christian phenomenologist of religion? (Or a Buddhist, Muslim, or Jewish phenomenologist of religion?) If it is the case that the phenomenologist of religion must be someone in contact with the religious life she investigates, this is a demand she shares with the theologian. The distinction between a philosopher and a theologian, then, would be less one of primary and subaltern sciences, and something closer to Husserl’s account of a shift in attitude only in this case it would not be
from a non-reflective natural attitude to a phenomenological one, but between a phenomenological and theological.

This emphasis on the lived experience of religion is central to and distinctive of Heidegger’s account. We might characterize his phenomenology of religion as a shift from the analysis of God to the analysis of faith in which the “object” of phenomenological investigation is not the absolute or transcendent, but rather the human disposition according to which the divine is received and by which it is believed, viz., faith. Here, faith is understood along Kierkegaardian lines as an individual’s full attunement to a being-before-God. It is a form of enactment, the “fundamental comportment of Christian consciousness” (69/48). If faith, understood as Vollzugsinn and Grundstimmung, is the object of the phenomenology of religion, then its Sachgebeit or Sachezusammenhang is neither doctrinal definition or defense, exegetical genealogies or even historical contextualization, though the phenomenologist may make use of any and all of these as they pertain to the “context of Christian consciousness”. Neither is it an empty state “yielding final bliss.” It is rather, as Heidegger describes it in his own commentary on the course, “[the] enactmental relation of the concerned entry to the future…Christianity [is] something with an entirely new principle of existence: Christian salvation!!! Explicated in struggle and through struggle” (128/90). That struggle, we shall see momentarily, is the meaning of faith, a faith that is also “dying with Christ,” and “hope for the completion of the beginning” (128/90).

§6. Pauline Exposure: Proclamation and Affliction

33 This is in some sense prepared for by Husserl’s bracketing of absolute transcendence in Ideas §58. This leaves open (only) the possibility of a description of faith for a phenomenology interested in religious experience. Yet it is significant, I think, that in his own later reflections on religion (e.g., in the Grenzprobleme) and in those of his best interpreters on this topic (e.g., Jim Hart) this is not the direction of inquiry that is pursued. Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity because of its distinct point of departure is in a position to provide a richer account of faith and one that leaves open the possibility of asking to what it directs itself or what might be constituted in prayer.
Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion takes Paul’s account of his conversion (selbstwelt) and relation to the Jewish and Greek communities (umwelt) and the new Christian communities at Galatia and Thessalonica (mitwelt) among whom he finds himself as paradigmatic for the explication of Christian religious experience. This is brought to evidence through the particular mode of proclamation [Verkündigung] in which the letters are written. In the phenomenon of proclamation “the immediate life-relation of the world of self or Paul to the surrounding world and the communal world…is able to be comprehended” (80/55-56). In his analysis of Pauline proclamation Heidegger is searching for the basic attunement (Grundstimmung) according to which Paul experiences the world in light of the Christian revelation. He is keen to emphasize the way in which Paul’s relationship to time and history is altered as a result of his experience on the road to Damascus (Acts 9:1-19; Galatians 1:11-17).

This tells us something about the possibilities of human consciousness, attunement, and being-in-the-world that we did not know before. How such a radical reorientation of one’s life is possible and the various ways that it can take shape are philosophically significant regardless of the true/false claims of the revelation under which these events are interpreted and given meaning. Thus, Heidegger, in an instructive contrast to Otto, is interested in the particularity of Paul’s experience rather than the general features it might share with other non-Christian accounts of conversion. There is a phenomenological integrity to Paul’s experience that is rent asunder if it is reduced to preconceived interpretive categories like the rational and irrational. Heidegger rejects the search for a religious a priori either by way of an appeal to ideal structures of consciousness or by a sort of comparative empirical investigation of forms of religious experience, yet he simultaneously renounces a fuller theological understanding that might be given these events by
individuals and the tradition they constitute, and which issues in religious decision and an entire way of life.

Paul writes in his letter to the church in Galatia, “For I want you to know, brothers and sisters, that the gospel that was proclaimed by me is not of human origin; for I did not receive it from a human source, nor was I taught it, but I received it through a revelation of Jesus Christ” (Gal. 1:11-12). This account of the reception of revelation and its particular form of expression, proclamation, raise two phenomenological questions for Heidegger.

1. The first question pertains to the relationship obtaining between expression and manifestation – how to say what one experiences. Heidegger finds this tension in Paul in his struggle to express the Christian life to the surrounding world (Umwelt), and the struggle is both that which is proclaimed and in the proclaiming itself. For Heidegger, it becomes the primary phenomenality of Christian life. It has many layers. The most immediate of these is Paul’s relation to both the Jewish community and his Jewish-Christian predecessors. Paul struggles with how to proclaim the Christian life to both communities. However, the struggle conceived here at the social level is more deeply felt at the more basic linguistic level where understanding and expression are intertwined. The language according to which the good news is proclaimed, i.e., according to which experience is expressed, is itself indebted to one or more traditions. The pressing question is how a tradition and its language condition experience, and it presses upon Paul no less than the Pharisees or Peter, James, and John. Noting this tension, Heidegger writes,

“[Paul] uses the insufficient means of rabbinical teaching available to him. From this his explication of Christian life experience has its peculiar structure. Still, it is an original

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34 E.g., Paul’s struggles with the Church in Jerusalem (Gal. 2: 1-10 and with Peter at Antioch (Gal. 2:11-14); his “labor and toil” in forming early Christian communities (e.g., 1 Thess. 2: 9-12); the more general struggles of those Christian communities themselves who are undergoing “distress and persecution” (1 Thess. 3:7). Paul also gives a more general account of his sufferings as an Apostle in 2 Cor. 11: 16-33.
explication from the sense of the religious life itself. It can be further formed out in the primary religious experience” (72/50).

This passage is helpful in clarifying what Heidegger means by original sense and his criticisms of the historical critical method. For Heidegger, what is original in Paul is his present religious experience, the experience which he proclaims. That it can only be expressed in the language and conceptualities available to him is equally true. For that reason, a historical sensitivity to linguistic use and literary form is beneficial for phenomenology because it helps us grasp the prevailing forms of thought within which Paul sought to articulate something new. It is limited because what is phenomenologically relevant is this news struggling for articulation. Critical, historical, and comparative treatments bring us to the threshold from which we can move either in a phenomenological or a theological direction.

What follows from this? First, the important, but perhaps uncontroversial claim that semantic indebtedness structures articulation: Paul must use Jewish and Greek (and in reality already Jew-Greek) words. However, Heidegger claims more than this. He claims further that the explication pertains to “the sense of the religious life itself” by which he appears to mean at least two things. First, we do not have experience, religious or other, apart from or prior to our expression of it. Religious experience is not something prior that is then expressed35. Such expression need not be verbal or oral and it need not be directed toward another person, but an experience which cannot be expressed – not even as an unutterable experience – is one that has not occurred36. There can be no distinction between form and content in this respect. Yet it also

35 We ought here, of course, to distinguish between various forms and levels of expression. That our most rudimentary experiences are already sense-laden need not preclude us from acknowledging that we can communicate those already expressed-experiences in a variety of ways and in a variety of mediums.

36 We should not forget that silence is a form of expression for Heidegger: “Keeping silent is another essential possibility of discourse, and it has the same existential foundation” (GA 2, 165 / 208)
follows (second) that experience is not univocal and its expressions are not equally well-suited. That all experiences are also expressed does not necessitate that there are not still better and worse expressions.

In this second sense, expression structures meaning because, in Paul’s case the active expressing is dynamically part of the religious experience. Proclamation is the activity of a religious person, especially an apostle. The motivation for such an enactment is ultimately what distinguishes it as something new. Heidegger’s goal is to describe, “how the direction of proclamation is motivated enactmentally” (133/94), and as a discrete kind of experience despite its inevitable conditioning by the forms of thought and language particular to any historical situation. Thus, Paul’s experience is that of a particular religious lifeworld that may or may not be continuous with the forms of language used to render it public. Here we see an important and productive tension between original experience and explication, between a pre-understanding or fore-having and its expression. This is one way of understanding how an enactment-sense can determine the character of its content-sense. Saying “I love you” can mean very different things when my motivations originate in my identity as a spouse, a parent, or a football fan.

This emphasis on the equiprimordial nature of experience and expression is Heidegger’s response to Natorp and to Harnack. For the latter, problem of “dogma” is a matter of de-hellenizing Christian history and language.

Yet for Heidegger, this approach misses the real dilemma because it misunderstands the equiprimordial nature of experience and expression. Dogma, understood as religious explication (expression) is already constituent to and problematized with primordial Christian experience: “It is not a technical problem, separate from religious experience; rather the explication goes along with, and drives, the religious experience” (72/51). Religious

37 Heidegger critiques Harnack’s prodigious Lerbuch der Dogmengeschichte for not beginning until the 3rd century at which point the dogmatization of Christianity by Greek philosophy was fully evident.
experience already contains a sense that seeks expression and from which it can only be logically, not really, distinguished. An expression can be true or false and better or worse, but it is never independent of that experience or simply a later over-laying of foreign conceptualities. The challenge of dogma – of the formulation of religious experience – is part and parcel of religious experience, something Heidegger’s studies of mysticism no doubt taught him well. Similarly, in response to Natorp, Heidegger is suggesting that phenomenology is *reflective* in its attentiveness to the motivated tendencies of phenomena and their explication, but in a way that is not yet *theoretical*.

2. Heidegger’s second question concerns this distinct kind of formality which is reflective without being theoretical. The germ of this principle was formulated earlier in preparations for his course on medieval mysticism where he writes,

> “The phenomenological primordial understanding is so little prejudiced…that it carries within itself the possibilities of entering into the different worlds and forms of experience. It may not be thrown together with the specifically or regionally theoretical” (305/232).

In Heidegger’s formulation, to the extent that phenomenology has given up its pretension to rigorous science, and so to a borrowed standard of the theoretical, it can enter into a variety of forms of experience, the scientific, certainly, but also the aesthetic, ethical, and religious. Precisely because hermeneutic phenomenology does not begin from a privileged standpoint, e.g., that of theoretical science or historical criticism, it must allow the commonsense language of experience to provide a point of departure. For him, this follows from Husserl’s principle of all principles. An

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38 Heidegger gives the rejection of the authenticity of 1 Thessalonian by the Tubingen school as an example of the problems that occur when one begins with an incorrect foreconception. (§21).
immanent reading of experience cannot begin from outside it. Yet neither is it merely simple or florid description; it must be anchored in some part of original experience and justify its primordiality by providing a fuller account than that of other explanatory paradigms. For Heidegger that anchor, the layer of experience to which phenomenological hermeneutics is particular attentive is enactment \([\textit{Vollzugsinn}]\): “Phenomenological understanding is determined by the enactment of the observer” (81/56). Original explication is a new theory of concept formation, one which is enactmental-historical. Heidegger writes:

“The discovery of the phenomenal complexes changes from the ground up the problematic and the formation of concepts and offers authentic measures for the destruction of Christian theology and western philosophy” (136/96).

The more wide-reaching rethinking of concept formation also yields to new insights at the particular level of the philosophy of religion. What Heidegger, following Luther\(^39\) calls – a bit dramatically – \textit{destruction} is what Husserl will later call the breaking apart of sedimentation, and it is exemplified in his fruitful re-reading of Paul. This fuller account of how we experience, have, and discern meaning opens up new possibilities for grasping that of the Pauline situation. For example, Heidegger interprets the Pauline distinction between faith and the law as a distinction between two kinds of \textit{Vollzugsinn}, two manners of fulfillment. That of faith is an original historical understanding resulting for Paul from a “break in his existence” (74/51)\(^40\).

Thus, an original understanding of Paul involves grasping the basic role of human comportment in the having and enacting of meaning. This in turn helps clarify the extent to which

\(^{39}\) Van Buren helpfully traces Paul’s use of destroy (\textit{apolo}) in in 1 Cor. 1:19 to Luther’s \textit{destruere} used in his Theses 19 and 20 with the sense of dismantling or deconstructing which Heidegger picks up with the intent “to rethink not only theology, but also ontology.” \textit{The Young Heidegger}, 165.

\(^{40}\) Paul writes in his “Letter to the Philippians” 3:13: “This one thing I do, forgetting what lies behind and straining forward to what lies ahead.”
the original meaning of law and faith are not definitional or propositional, but in fact enactmental. This process is one of interpretation insofar as we are confronted with a factual multitude of phenomena whose order must be discerned rather than imposed. The Letter to the Galatians admits of many formal indications. This is one way of reading the list of references and clarification Heidegger provides in §15. From among these “vague and vacillating” conceptions such as world and parousia and affliction he selects proclamation as the foreconception of his reading because it is Paul’s own response to his experience of the risen Christ and also the factual point of origin for the response of his churches. They cannot believe what has not been proclaimed. We cannot get around this if we want to get clear on Paul himself.

Proclamation is a performance of this straining toward what lies ahead and a testimony to the afflicted nature of Paul’s new relation to the Selbstwelt (outer/inner man), the Umwelt (former pharisaic community) and the Mitwelt (the new ecclesial communities he is founding). The disclosive power of this phenomenon will be justified if can provide the motivational ground to which the other and diverse indications can be traced. It ought to supply the interpretive “center of gravity” to the “phenomenal complex” under investigation. Then we can identify the right interrelatedness between the various elements we have come to “experience the object itself in its originality” (76/53). When we fail to do so our investigation “understands away from its object.” This is a recurrent if also an odd phrase by which Heidegger means that when the wrong foreconception is taken up the object under investigation our manner of inquiry leads us away from it, rather than towards it. With respect to formally indicating Paul, there are two forms of this: cataloguing and systematizing. To catalogue is to draw out certain concepts (faith, righteousness, flesh) and construe their propositional meanings from out of a heap of singular passages of the Pauline writings.” To systematize is to “discover” a theological system in Paul. Heidegger instead
assumes the integrity of the fundamental experience as a heuristic and seeks a way of access that shows “its connection to all original religious phenomena” (73/51). To understand “toward” an object is to ask, “What is the object at all, according to its fundamental determination?” (130/92). In the case of Paul and of Christianity, that fundamental determination is historical, and it is only out of the “original historical understanding” Paul has of himself that we can grasp the content of his proclamation.

Ultimately for Heidegger, while the historical context of Paul’s experience and the historical traditions, rhetorical and conceptual, that structure its expression are valuable, he is interested in the experience that led him to take up a new stance within that historical situation and redeploy its conceptualities in the service of articulating something new. The Pauline proclamation tells us something new about Dasein’s own possibilities: “Which new articulation of life is raked up, and whereto and how? …it demands con-frontation [aus-einander-setzung] from all those who run into it.” “The explication uncovers something new that ‘lies in the sense’” (94/133; 95/135)

Proclamation, as a form of religious enactment, is a central phenomenon in Heidegger’s reading of Paul. It is clear that for Paul the religious life of Christianity is not merely that of having received a revelation, but rather the constitution of a life in accord with and as the fundamental articulation of that revelation. “Paul’s own religious position is to be constituted” (69/48) and only in and through the life of his communities. For Paul, as Heidegger reads him, proclamation is not merely a secondary religious activity that follows upon religious experience, but it is ingredient to Paul’s religious experience and makes possible the experience of the “spirit” for others: “Did you receive the spirit by doing the works of the law or by believing what you heard” (Gal. 3:2). Just as Paul has heard and believed the self-proclamation of Christ on the road to Damascus, now he proclaims that same Christ to the churches in Galatia.
Heidegger is interested in what Paul undergoes in this lived-experience of faith. By faith we must understand something like what Kierkegaard means by faith, which is to say a passion: something we undergo and it is in this sense that proclamation for both Paul and his hearers leads to affliction or distress. As a result of hearing what is proclaimed we adopt a form of comportment toward the world that involves a distinct way of seeing and a kind of basic attunement. Paul’s experience is not interpreted as privileged mysticism, but rather as paradigmatic for the Christian, “Friends, I beg you, become as I am, for I also have become as you are” (Gal. 4:12). When we advert to the enactmental level of meaning we discover that both the Pauline Epistles and the Gospels are proclamations: Jesus proclaims the Kingdom of God and Paul proclaims Jesus. This form of enactment is the how of early Christian religiosity. It is the unifying phenomenon because it is an enactmental phenomena, by which we can bring an otherwise diverse set of phenomena into a coherent motivated unity: Christ’s revelation to Paul is a proclamation on the basis of which Paul proclaims Christ to the various churches he founds whose members in turn are called to do likewise: “The factual life experience of the Christians is historically determined insofar as it always begins with the proclamation” (115/83). Thus, originally for Paul Christianity is a matter of the spoken word more so than the written word. Proclamation, as a speech act, involves a more radical degree of contingency than that of a written text, though both return us forcefully to facticity. This is crucial for Heidegger: What is proclaimed can only be known in the proclamation itself. What is proclaimed is historically contingent; it is factual. It cannot be known by discursive reason or a noetic grasp of basic principles. Christian factual life experience originates in the proclamations enacted first by Jesus of Nazareth and then by Paul of Tarsus. Despite the tortuous nature of Heidegger’s various Denkwege in the course, his basic logic is rather straightforward:

41 This an example of Heidegger’s method of a preparatory “taking-cognizance of” a set of phenomena for further explication among which we must seek the enactmental ground.
The origin of Christianity is in proclamation and proclamation is factical, i.e., historical and occasional, and as historical it is also temporal.

It is on the basis of this line of reasoning that Heidegger concludes: “Christian religiosity lives temporality as such” (104/73; 116/83). And later, “Christian religiosity is in factical life experience, it actually is this itself” (131/93). It is not clear whether the scope of this claim (taken from Heidegger’s handwritten notes) extends to only Christianity, the religious as such, or beyond. However, it at least extends as far as Christianity. But what does it mean to claim that Christianity is facticity? This is the theme of Heidegger’s exploration of 1 & 2 Thessalonians which concludes his “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion”. Paul concludes Galatians with the following exhortation: “For you were called to freedom, brothers and sisters; only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for self-indulgence, but through love become slaves to one another” (Gal. 5:13). The loving entanglement suggested by these lines is a description of Christian factical life. Paul’s identity and the fruitfulness of his freedom is dependent upon the Thessalonians and they, in turn, have enacted a new identity and way of life that is dependent on their “having-become” through and in the Pauline proclamation.

§7: Temporality as Such: Eschatology as Past, Present and Future in Paul’s Epistle to the Thessalonians.

§7.1 The Situation

Heidegger’s transition from Galatians to Thessalonians is also a movement from considering the existential position of Paul to considering the peculiar facticity and temporality constituent of the
Christian factical life that originates in his proclamation and the Thessalonian’s response. Having grasped the motivational or enactmental complex out of which these occasional letters are written, he sets out to read them in light of this in a way that leads to a deeper understanding of the Christian experience of time in its past (having-become), present (obstinate waiting) and future (parousia) moments. In order to do this, he must clarify the difference between two perspectives and the account of time that underlies them. He calls these the objective-historical context and the situation.

The objective-historical context is constituted by questions such as, where did Paul go on his missionary journeys? How long he was there? Who was he with and whom did he meet along the way? What is the likely place and date of composition of a given letter? Is it written by Paul or a member of his community? Heidegger writes: “If we present the situation object-historically, Paul appears as a missionary who talks as a usual wandering preacher, without attracting too much attention” (88/61). Such an historical account – however legitimate – has no sense for historicality. It is focused exclusively on what is shared by Paul with his surroundings and the broader cultural and historical contexts in which he ineluctably participates. Heidegger desires to move beyond (or better, beneath) this context to the properly phenomenological level of motivated experiencing.

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42 Temporality and facticity are the central example of complex phenomena: Heidegger desires to show both that we cannot determine temporality except from out of facticity and that facticity is the defining characteristic of facticity: “every happening in time and space has the quality of standing in a temporal context, a context of becoming” (35/24); “The problem of time must be grasped in the way we originally experience temporality in factical experience. […] We must ask rather what is temporality originally in factical existence” (65/44-45). In Christian factical life, “the sense of facticity determines itself in this direction as temporality” (119/85).

43 Occasional is a designation employed by scholars of Paul to denote letters that are occasioned by particular needs in particular communities. While this is true of all the letters in a broad sense, it is used in a narrower sense to separate letters like Galatians and Thessalonians from Romans, which is more “programmatic” or “epistolary” in nature and, as Bart Ehrman notes, written to a community Paul did not found located in a city that he had never visited. Romans is not written the deal with particular problem she is aware of, but rather to articulate Paul’s own understanding of the Gospel (299). See his The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
But this requires that we again grasp an account of temporality that is more basic than either the scientific time of quantitative determination or the historical the time of qualitative difference.

The situation is this new manner of engagement in which, “we write the letter along with Paul” (88/61). It is a context constituted by questions like, How does Paul as letter writer stand in relation to the Thessalonians? How are they experienced by him? These questions imply an investigation of not only the Umwelt of Paul’s relation to the world around him and the discourse that structure their expression, but also the Mitwelt or communal world which is manifested in Paul’s relation to it. Thus, the Pauline epistles are statements of a relation between Paul and his communities that also reveal the motivations of their belonging-together. The interrogation characteristic of the situation asks, “How are the givenness of the surrounding world, the communal world and the self-world, which flow into each other in factual life, emphasized?” (89/62). Thus, the enactmental-historical situation is Heidegger’s term for the factual, motivated and complex relationship of surrounding, communal, and self-worlds, which constitute the closest reality of every human undertaking. This situation is the “ground floor” of phenomenological engagement with the world: “[It is] a phenomenological term (literally!)” (147/104). Where the object-historical approach reduces diversity by selecting what elements fall within a set of predetermined parameters, Heidegger’s approach seeks the unification of diverse elements though motivation:

“For the question of the unity or the diversity of the situation, it is important that we can gain them only in the formal indication. The unity is not formally logical, but merely formally indicated. The formal indication is in the “neither-nor”; it is neither something in the manner of an order, nor explication of a phenomenological determination” (91/63).

That is to say, first, that the situation is not an ordering of elements such as time, space, color, weight, quantifiable and perceptible qualities, but neither is it phenomenological explication according to a region of being, even one as expansive as consciousness. A situation is always for
an “I”; that which is had by an “I”. Thus, there is no “situation of point A between B and C” (91/63) because a point is nothing like an “I.” “Being like an I belongs to each situation, though this need not be what unified the diversity” (91/63). Embedded within this line of explication is a double challenge to Husserl whose flowing or streaming account of phenomena still has the manner of an order and implies homogeneity (cf. 92/64). The situational complex, by contrast, is neither ordered nor phenomenologically determined – it is beyond (or before) the either-or of the static-dynamic.

It is also to say (second) that the situation is not a region. It is what the I “has”, but it is not an ordered unity that would admit of isolatable independent elements. To view it as such falsifies it by reducing the actual “relational” phenomenality of the “having” Heidegger is describing to the “dwelling indifferently” of the theoretical. Phenomena are not “spread out” like “independent pieces on the stage of consciousness” (137/96), but are, rather, related to one another and to us. In short, a situation is not a region in Husserl’s sense. There is no regional a priori for the situational structure, but instead “a historical originality and a decision against it and for it – not theoretical, but enactmental because each enacts on its own” (148/105).

The tendency to fall from the factual to the theoretical is a perennial danger for phenomenology: “Because the enactmental understanding is also in danger of falling, compressed into an attitude or interspersed with attitudinal moments, it is difficult at times to grasp what is authentic in the situation” (148/105). Only an account focused on enactment and the nature of Paul’s exhortations can grasp the relations of meaning between the elements of love, hope, affliction and the parousia. We misunderstand early Christian eschatology if we do not grasp that as a lived experience the parousia is “not encompassing, not common, but reigning throughout

44 Here again, as before, Heidegger’s claim is that phenomenology can uncover a richer account of life than that proposed by Husserl: “Already the starting point of a phenomenological study as having the manner of an order and the attempt of a material description fails because of the phenomenon itself. One must return ever again to the point of departure. The departure is to be taken from the having-relation of that which is “like an I”” (93/64).
enactmentally” (148/105). Paul’s exhortation to “keep awake and be sober” (1 Thess. 5:6) and await the parousia “like a thief in the night” (1 Thess. 5:2) do not describe propositional content, but a posture toward the world. They may speak indirectly to a religious doctrine, but they speak directly to a daily discipline.

Such a situation is for an “I”. The enactmental strata of meaning is the fundamental and distinct relatedness of Dasein to its world. Against someone like Descartes, Heidegger insists that the I is a kind of having – a being that is always already a possessing; that is already caught up in the having of life. That having is understood variously as being-with, having projects, and above all as having been and projecting forward – but in all cases having is motivated and this motivated having is the self’s relation to the not-self whether in the form of other people or its own unrealized possibilities. This negativity is the act of differentiation that in constituting two first constitutes the (one) self.

Paul’s situation with respect to the Thessalonians is therefore that relating that is lived by an I and in its world, an I, moreover, that lives either “away from” or “towards” its situation. Such an I cannot be “formal” in Husserl’s sense, but instead must be, “posited in the manner of formal indication, as unity-forming” (147/104). We cannot abstract the concrete I out of her factical situation, but we can formally indicate her motivation and relational tendencies to yield a formally indicated relational complex: “I is and as such ‘has’ already a closer determination of the relational complex, not formal, rather formal indication” (147/104). In other words, the I indicates formally...
but is never itself (merely) formal. Her “is” is an “enactmentally radical self-ness (existence)” (147/104).

What then is Paul’s situation in Thessalonians? What is the factual, motivated, and overlapping context of his surrounding, communal, and self-worlds? Our point of access, according to Heidegger, is the manner of his relating to the community in Thessalonica. From the outset of the course Heidegger has argued that the phenomenologist of religion must grasp a deeper temporality and historicality than that implied by historical consciousness. The features of such an account are discernable in the concluding section of the course where Paul’s situation is explicated temporally-existentially in light of a having-become, an obstinate waiting, and the parousia, which collectively constitute the phenomenological account of Christian facticity and its eschatology.

§7.2 Having-Become

Heidegger interprets Paul’s Letter to the Galatians as a description of Paul’s exposed position—an elaboration of the content of his proclamation and its factual origin in his conversion experience of the risen Christ (Gal 1:11-12) and a new understanding of justification by “faith in Jesus Christ and not by doing the works of the law” (Gal. 1:16). There Paul reinterprets justification enactmently as faith in Christ: the originary relating to God enacted in the promise made to Abraham “four hundred thirty years” (Gal. 3:17) prior to the giving of the Law. The Law, though in a certain sense enacted, involves one in a different relation to God, a relationship that involves a “mediator” (Gal. 3:20) and “disciplinarian” (Gal. 3:25). Now for Paul the Law is no longer the means through which he is related to God, but rather “Christ who lives in [him]” (Gal. 2:20) is the very relating. The marks of this relatedness are a new cruciform circumcision of the flesh: “I carry
the marks of Jesus branded on my body” (Gal. 6:17), yet they are not the means by which one is related to God, but rather a consequence of a life lived by those “who do not grow weary in doing what is right” (Gal. 6:9).

Paul’s proclamation here – as rich as it is controversial – is primarily directed at persuading the church in Galatia of his apostolic authority, which has come under threat from other teachers in his absence. As such it is focused on what the true Gospel is and why Paul is its faithful expositor. Yet, how to live this faithful enactment is taken up only very generally in the exhortation “through love become slaves to one another” (Gal. 5:13). It is to the Letter to the Thessalonians that we must turn for a fuller account of the facticity entailed in Paul’s proclamation, its acceptance by the community at Thessalonica, and the identity of both before the parousia.

The Christian lifeworld is originary because it is brought into being through proclamation – that of Jesus of Nazareth and that of Paul of Tarsus. In the first case we have the constituting activity of the euangelion – the “good news” that is doctrinal, prescriptive, but also expressed publicly in and by the person of Jesus of Nazareth. In the second case, Paul’s proclamation is differentiated by a distinct claim to authority and form of enactment. In having “dwelt among us” the word enters the world of human facticity by entering a particular environment (Umwelt), however within that environment another world is constituted on the basis of proclamation that constitutes a new communal world (Mitwelt). According to Heidegger this communal world, “is the ‘receiving’ world into which the gospel strikes; in which it is ‘re-act[ed]’” (143/101). This fundamental situation determines its particular character, i.e., its given phenomenality. This communal world is equally and irreducibly determined by both Paul and the community that hears

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46 We limit ourselves to the analysis of Paul’s proclamation, since that is what Heidegger does. However, the it is important to note in passing, that the proclamation, while analogous, is different. Paul does not speak with the authority of Christ, but on the authority of Christ. The nature of his enactment of “vocational” and “elective” – that of someone called and chosen, whereas that of Christ is of someone sent.
and accepts his proclamation. He is not merely an itinerant preacher who may or may not find or found a community, rather his identity is only revealed after the fact of the having-become of a community on the basis of its response to his proclamation. Thus, he says of the Thessalonians, “you are my real being” (140/99). Heidegger writes, that, “Paul is co-included [mitenthalten] in the state of the congregation” (93/65). Yet the Thessalonians, too, are now those who fell to Paul, in whom, “he necessarily co-experiences himself” (93/65). Thus, the communal world is the relation between Paul and his community and the relation is equally in each.

Here the “communal world [is] each individual” (142/102). It is both Paul’s relationship to the Thessalonians, but also how they experience their existence for Paul, and through his preaching and their hearing, the Spirit of Christ (1 Thess. 1:6)\textsuperscript{47}. Thus, they stand not only in relation to Paul, but also each stands beside him in relation to Christ through the same Spirit. Thus, the factical enactment of faith is— to modify Kierkegaard – the \textit{relating of the relation} and that is the ground of this existence. The distinct form of this relation is determined by its characterization as a promise that involves moral and spiritual action now, but more fundamentally awaits its fulfillment. In that space and time of expectation Paul and the Thessalonians remain “in their being” on the one hand, but their awakening “urgently imposes itself” on them “eschatologically.” They remain entangled in the relations of factical life – surrounding worldly, communal worldly, self-worldly relations – yet these are “determined from the enactment of the end-of-time facticity” (143/98). The world does not cease to press upon them in its basic, finite integrity. Yet, those same spheres are had enactmentally according to a “disrupted” temporality in which a future still-to-come has disrupted the present and redistributed its centers of gravity and value.

\textsuperscript{47} See also, PRL 141/100.
This communal world “exists through call, faith: eschatology is the phenomenally basic sense of what is communally-worldly experienced” (143/101). The faithful relating that is characteristic of Christian factual life is at one and the same time the enactment of something given and also a call (vocatio) whose calling is a call for response. Paul has undertaken his vocation in response to a call and the Thessalonians have done so in response to Paul. We can see that vocation is key here. Paul has been called and he in turn has called to the Thessalonians and now both, having been called, are characterized by a being called from the future. This calling – of Paul by Christ, of Paul to anyone who would listen, of the consequent community toward the parousia –grounds the communal world and determines its nature as an active response. In the present of the call – and in its presence – meet not only the past and the future but also the Selbstwelt and the Mitwelt 48.

It is worth noting that in contrast to the hegemony that the solus ipse exerts in Being and Time, here Heidegger claims that it is a “unique encounter with others” that provides an entrance into factual life, and that this “can be an occasion for the eruption of new enactments; but never so much as here [i.e., in Paul] where existence grounds itself in this encounter” (143/101). The relation that obtains between Paul and the Thessalonians is “co-determining” and indicates “an existential fundamental determination” (149/105). This accounts for the distress he faces on account of the young churches. If his community falls away from the Gospel, who is he?

If it is eschatology 49 that distinguishes the particular facticity of the Christian life, it is that same facticity that causes its peculiar distress. Summarizing Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of 1 & 2 Thessalonians we can say that here eschatology is living in the present toward

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48 In Paul’s case, for example, Heidegger notes that “There is for him only proclamation” (142/98).
49 We should note here that Heidegger does distinguish between philosophical and theological treatments of eschatology: “The title ‘eschatology’ is just as oblique, because it is taken out of Christian dogma and designates the doctrine of final things. Here we do not understand it in this theoretical-disciplinary sense (115/82).
the future in response to the past. The facticity of the early Christian community is secured first in its peculiar status of having-become who they are through the historical proclaiming of the historical act of the Incarnation: “The factual life experience of the Christians is historically determined insofar as it always begins with the proclamation” (115/83). What is proclaimed is historically contingent. It can only be known in proclamation. It cannot be known by discursive reason or a noetic grasp of basic principles, and it is therefore “historically determined by its emergence with the proclamation that hits the people in a moment, and then is unceasingly also alive in the enactment of life” (115/83). Thus, the communal world is not necessitated, but is rather characterized by a fragility. Moreover, the knowledge of the contingency of this having-become is a feature of its phenomenality that must itself be made present. In this regard, Heidegger notes an emphasis on memory, history, election (e.g., 141/100). Thus, the “knowledge” pertinent to faith is entirely different from any other knowledge. It arises only out of the situational context of Christian life experience: “Knowledge about one’s own having-become poses a very special task for explication. From out of this the meaning of a facticity is determined, one which is accompanied by a particular knowledge” (94/66). The facticity is co-experienced with the knowledge. The understanding that it need not have been and could have been otherwise is ingredient to the apprehension of the situation, and characterizes the act that submits to this knowledge.

This acknowledgement is “an absolute turning-around” that is also a “turning-toward God,” and the acceptance of the having-become is the reception of an un-necessitated past that

50 And later in the concrete factical nature of its response to that historical call—salvation history refers not only to God’s actions but to the believing community’s as well.
51 Heidegger further claims that the recurrent terms for becoming, knowing, and remembering viewed enactmental-historically are a “surfacing tendency, a motif”; performative calling to mind and thereby making present again the situation of decision within which the Thessalonians act.
proves decisive for the present and future. Further, it proves determinative for all consequent reflection on that world (i.e., theology)\textsuperscript{52}. Thus, Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity comes full circle, the sense of the terms and claims that Paul makes can only be gained from the "the basic context of the life of Paul himself," which must be grasped relationally and enactmentally, but such a phenomenological explication will change the conceptual structure of the Pauline account of Christian life.

\textit{§7.3 The Future}

The factical having-become of the Thessalonian community is a "transcendental" feature of the communal world because it is co-given at each moment of that originary world. This means that, "the having become of the Thessalonians is at the same time a new beginning" (69/99), which breaks with the previous historical time of their lives. We must distinguish here between two facticities. There is the facticity of an originary Christian lifeworld and this is other than the facticity of the world \textit{simpliciter} within which and "after" which it arises. The tension between these worlds causes the affliction that Paul experiences. One that occurs at the various strata which constitute both worlds: socio-political, communal, and personal. This interrupted time forces the Thessalonians to reconfront questions of resurrection. If, as Kierkegaard noted, the paradox and offense of the Christian faith is the notion that my eternal happiness could be dependent on a single point of time\textsuperscript{53}, then what of those who came before? Does the facticity of the world as such constrain the facticity of the communal world and, conversely, can the untimely born facticity of

\textsuperscript{52} "Knowledge of one’s having becomes the starting point and the origin of theology" (95/66).

\textsuperscript{53} “Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure be of more than historical interest; can eternal happiness be built on historical knowledge?” (\textit{Concluding Unscientific Postscript}, 15).
the believing community reconfigure the facticity of former times? Such is the animating concern of the Thessalonians that motivates Paul’s response.

That response is a new account of life now conceived as an “end-of-time facticity [\textit{endzeitlichen Faktizität}]”. The event of the proclamation of the gospel has drawn the past and the future into the present rendering the present moment decisive for what preceded it and also for what follows from it, yet this in such a way that in the present are always already compacted (i.e., co-given, co-experienced) the having-become and the towards-which, the already and the not-yet. This reconfiguration of temporality in its \textit{linear}, and therefore irreducibly \textit{historical} character raises concrete concerns for the Thessalonians. They desire to know \textit{how} it is for their deceased brethren and \textit{when} the parousia will take place.

Yet Paul, “does not answer with worldly reasoning” (99/69) because the question itself originates from the previous experience of time and world that, without being annulled, has been superseded by the Christian proclamation. The eschatological “when” of this second facticity is no longer circumscribed within merely qualitative or quantitative time. Now, for the Christian \textit{when} is caught up in the \textit{how}. She has not left behind the first facticity of finitude and death, yet she simultaneously has superimposed a second facticity that enacts a distinct mode of life whose points of orientation exceed the first. This is a distinction that cannot be “explained,” but rather one that must be entered into. Paul does not answer by offering an account of the future, but by distinguishing two ways of life. What is decisive is how I comport myself to it in actual life. From that results the meaning of “when” – of time and the moment.

For Heidegger “the eschatological problem [is] the center of Christianity” (104/73). How is one to live in imitation of a God in time who came to proclaim a kingdom that is at once already and not yet? Yet, how we express and explicate this eschatology is caught up in and indicative of
whether or not we have understood it. “The expression [of the parousia] changes its entire conceptual structure, not only its sense in the process of history” (102/71, emphasis mine) because it entails the return of the Messiah, a meaning that is not contained in either its Greek or Old Testament uses. This suggests a logic of fulfillment rather than theophany. God has already broken into [aufbrechen] the structures of mundane existence. The problematic of Christian facticity is to discern how to be in light of that revelation while also awaiting its fulfillment. That strange displacement of Christian identity is what distinguishes the particular sense of her expectation. For that reason,

“We never get to the relational sense of the parousia by merely analyzing the consciousness of a future event. The structure of Christian hope, which in truth is the relational sense of parousia, is radically different from all expectation” (102/71-72).

The eschatological experience of the Christian is that of hope amidst affliction54. Hope is a form of enactment grounded in facticity – it must be renewed daily. Therefore, it cannot be primarily an idea, but it is rather a manner of life in the interim. Heidegger highlights two manners of enactment that are characteristic of different forms of life: those who “stand firm” in their belief and those who would use it to “win fame”55. The distinction between them is first signaled in the how of their communication. Unlike those who speak with eloquence and “puffed up” knowledge, Paul claims to be “untrained in speech” (2Cor. 11:6) and cruciform in his posture toward the world56. The cruciform manner of Paul’s proclamation and the resultant form of the Christian life – “Be

54 Rom. 5:3-5: “…we also boast in our sufferings, knowing that suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope, and hope does not disappoint us, because God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us.” Rom 12:11: “Rejoice in hope, be patient in suffering, persevere in prayer…”

55 This latter form of enactment is meant to distinguish from other “Greek preachers” (97/67), but also from other Christian and Jewish-Christian preachers such as those referred to in Gal 5: 7-12, and the ironically named “super Apostles” in 2 Cor. 11:5.

56 “May I never boast of anything except the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by which the world has been crucified to me, and I to the world” (Gal 6:14).
imitators of me as I am of Christ” (1Cor. 11:1)—is the enactment of that motive. That how is a further agitation of the distress of the Thessalonians, rather than a calming or allaying of their fears. Christian eschatology, Heidegger writes — perhaps with Nietzsche in mind — is not passivity, it is distress: “The experience [of awaiting the parousia] is an absolute distress which belongs to the life of the Christian himself. This distress is a fundamental characteristic, it is an absolute concern in the horizon of the parousia, of the second coming at the end of time” (98/67). Because faith is an active believing in God, rather than a passive believing about God, it is a relation that must be constantly maintained until its promised fulfillment. Thus, any delay of that fulfillment is a source of anxiety.

Thus, Paul’s answer to when the parousia will occur and how it will be for others, is an exhortation to how one should be today. This can be shown in 1 Thess. which already supplies general moral and spiritual instructions (e.g., 1Thess. 3:1-4:12; 2Thess. 3:6-16). This suggests that for Paul the parousia is a future that already invests the present and in doing so restructures it decisively. The undergoing of this produces distress on account of the non-coincidence between two facticities: we go about restructuring our relation to the world and yet the world does not restructure its relation to us. In this sense the parousia is already and not-yet. However, this distress is a form of being-before-God, and therefore it is already a participation in the parousia.

“The one who accepts [the having-become] treads upon an effective connection with God. [They have] accepted the how of the Christian standard of living. Acceptance concerns the how of self-conduct in factical life” (95/66).

This is the sense in which Heidegger speaks about distress but also about joy, “the joy that we feel before God ([Gal.] 3:9)” (143/101). Paul experiences hope, joy, love, but “in this way, as they

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57 Cf. “The phenomenon of proclamation – center of motivation of the enactment” (142-3/101), i.e., by which lived experience is communicated with urgency and for an occasion.
themselves, living obstinately, waiting towards” (145/103). Here eschatology is described as the modality of Christian factical life, it is waiting towards as a manner of having factical life. Heidegger comments further on this section:

“This meaning is something which decides their factical life, their hope, the having-of-hope, and the How of this having. That is, the authentic How of their being” (149/106).

The meaning of the parousia is in a manner of having that enables it to be already for us and yet also not yet fully for us. The answer to when is therefore now, the Christian must decide to live temporality now. Yet, Heidegger cautions us that the time of this decision, “is a time without its own order and demarcations…the when is in no way objectively grasable” (104/73). The decision to hear and to respond in faith is heard and accepted in the moment (kairos). Kairos designates the moment that is qualitatively distinct in that it is the moment of crisis or election or action – the fullness of time or the time of “harvest” (Gal. 6:9). Such a moment is contingent; it requires the presence of the right set of factors and the recognition of those factors. For Paul and his young churches this is the fullness of time in Christ and their response to this defines their very being: “this relation of enactment is grounded in a being chosen! Because you are called, the basic sense of your Being is” (150/107).

Yet, having-become through the proclamation of the Gospel does not guarantee one salvation. In answering the question, when is the eschaton? with an exhortation “to awaken and to be sober,” Paul distinguishes not only between Christianity and other forms of life, but also between authentic and inauthentic forms of enactment within the Christian community. They must be on guard against brooding [Grübelei] speculation about the future that remains “stuck in the

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58 Heidegger has already tied salvation to his enactmental understanding of Pauline faith: “Faith in the son of God as Lord is the basic condition of salvation” (116/83).
worldly” (105/74). The return of Christ will come like a thief in the night for Christian and non-Christian alike. Thus, hope in that return is not a matter of advanced knowledge, but rather one of living as if the return were already here. Thus, the asking when the parousia will be fulfilled leads back to asking how I ought to comport myself toward the world today. This, in turn, leads to the Christian understanding of the present.

§7.4 The Present – Obstinate Waiting

The present, as we have suggested, is the meeting place of past and future, of facticity and parousia, and eschatology indicates the enacted way of life in which these relations come together. It is a set of enacted relations that structure a present form of life. Heidegger summarizes this authentic form of this life as “obstinate waiting” [das Erharren], which is “an essential determination of the How of their factical life. …[Paul] gives them knowledge precisely by the way of the How” (106/75). The two forms of life introduced earlier are now further concretized as two forms of hope. Heidegger describes the first kind of hope as “the broodings of hopeful, falling speculation” (150/106), whereas the second form of hope is that of obstinate perseverance. Each species of hope relates itself to the advent of the parousia. For those with a brooding hope it will occur “suddenly.” It will be like a thief in the night. Those who wait with authentic hope already live in view of it and so experience it as that for which they have obstinately waited. Yet such perseverance, Heidegger is quick to add, is neither excess nor deficiency, neither “erroneous enthusiasm” nor “sleeping,” which are the excess and deficiency of true hope.
Hope, then, is the behavior by which one relates herself to the future. This is done in a particular and perhaps unique way in early Christianity. In *I Thessalonians* Christian hope is distinguished from other accounts through the contrast of “hope as boasting” and “hope as coping”. Heidegger writes:

“The hope that the Christians have is not simply faith in immortality, but a faithful resilience grounded in Christian factual life. Hope: it is experienced not as boasting (and thus no concern for one’s self) but rather precisely hope in coping, endurance of the oppression” (152/107).

For those who boast, hope is a “mere attitudinal expectation” of immortality that provides them a warrant for a certain way of life that need not consider that future precisely because it is already secured. Yet, for Heidegger’s Paul, the Christian knows no such security. Each moment of her existence is won from such a “falling tendency”. Thus, authentic Christian hope is exactly the opposite of a forgetting-of-self on account of a naïve eschatological security; rather, hope is the joyful affliction of a soul oriented *coram Deo* in the interim between the promise and its fulfillment. Such a hope is active, engaged, and not at all other-worldly.

The distinction between authentic and inauthentic forms of Christian hope is the central preoccupation of *2 Thessalonians* according to Heidegger. Against trends in German biblical scholarship (e.g., Schmidt) he posits continuity and development rather than opposition between Paul’s first and second letters. This requires him to reconcile the figure of “the lawless one” (59). 

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59 One possible valence of Heidegger’s repeated claim that Christianity “lives” temporality may be that in (Judeo-) Christianity we encounter (1) an original (factual-historical) world of experience whose (2) horizon is a future both already and not-yet. In contradistinction from the eternal and recurring world of ancient Greece, that of the Christian is an *ek-static* present defined by its history of election, incarnation, and proclamation and also living towards a future that, though absent, also structures her present form of life. This is the already and not yet quality of the kingdom of God as it is represented in the words and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth.

60 He refers to the German theologian P. Schmidt and his, *Der erste thessalonicherbreif neu erklärt, nebst einem Excurs über den zweiten gleichnamigen Brief*, (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1885), p. 111f.

61 The contemporary scholarly consensus is not unanimous, but generally supports the thesis that *2 Thessalonians* is a later letter written by a disciple of Paul. However, this consensus is not necessarily an obstacle for the phenomenological continuity Heidegger is concerned to underscore. Horrell’s introduction to the epistle in the *Oxford*
2Thess. 2:3) commonly referred to as the Antichrist as well as “the one who restrains” (the *katechon*) this lawlessness with the account of 1 Thessalonians. What Schmidt had proposed as the play of opposite “ideational views” between the letters makes sense if we think Paul is primarily concerned with the *when* of the parousia as a far off event whose approach is discernable by world events. According to Heidegger, however, this is a mistaken account of eschatology based on a mistaken understanding of the temporality of Christian factical life. The parousia is not primarily a future event circumscribed within the mundane temporal order of past, present and future. Such an account misapprehends the deeper ontological temporal structure of Dasein as well as the ontic reconfiguration that occurs in an original life world such as that of early Christianity. He writes,

“Paul is not concerned at all about answering the question of the When of the parousia. The When is determined through the How of the self-compartment, which is determined through the enactment of factical life experience in each of its moments” (106/75).

The eschaton is not, or at least not primarily, a future event, but the manner in which that future event – whose character and reliability rely on a past promise – invests and reconfigures the present in light of a future still to come. Paul frames his eschatological exhortation in 1 Thessalonians (4:13-18), between two exhortations to present moral living (4:1-12; 5:12-22). In 2 Thessalonians, too, the emphasis is displaced from a concern for the precise shape of future events, to the authentic shape of daily Christian life. Paul appeals to this apocalyptic *agon* in order to arouse form complacency those who are idle and his concluding admonition is to “keep away from believers who are living in idleness and not according to the tradition that they received from us,” a tradition

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*Bible* notes the division among commentators, while Richard’s *First and Second Thessalonians* presents “solid reasons … to view 1 Thessalonians as being Pauline and 2 Thessalonians as deriving from a Paulinist writer…” (*Sacra Pagina* Series, ed., Daniel Harrington SJ, (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1995), ix).
that states that “anyone unwilling to work should not eat” (2Thess. 3:6, 10). It is by work that one earns her living (3:12). Yet here that living is taken up not merely in terms of physical sustenance, but spiritual as well. One cannot live towards Christ idly, but must undertake to work out her salvation in fear and trembling (Phil. 2:12). Thus, the early Christian community is a people living under the promise of a future completion that exercises a decisive influence on the present. It is for this reason that Paul is not interested in responding to questions that would specify the when of the parousia in a historical sense, but instead exhorts them to live today: “Paul does not help them; rather he makes their anguish still greater” (106/75).

2 Thessalonians addresses the different ways members of that community interpreted Paul’s first letter62. It is therefore concerned with distinctions internal to the Christian community where the falling tendency can be seen in the disposition of some toward “speculative talk.” There are those who obstinately wait, but also those who “make an idling out of unconcern for the contingencies of life.” (108/76). These Christians are concerned in a “worldly manner” that is characterized by “bustling activity” that is a hindrance to, rather than an expression of, Christian factical life. Inauthentic Christian eschatology shares the same basic features with non-Christian eschatology into which it has again fallen, but retains the language and trappings of the Christian lifeworld.

Against the common reading that Paul softens his eschatological claims in 2 Thessalonians, Heidegger argues instead that he intensifies their urgency63. Their increase in the complex of enactment is the proof of genuine Christian consciousness. This is the reason for Paul’s overburdened expression which is intended to rouse the community to a vigilant faith. “Truth stands in relational connection to faith” (108/77), i.e., the necessary knowledge can only be had

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62 E.g., “They have understood the first letter otherwise” (107/76).
63 “[There is] no taking-back, [but] rather an enlarged tension” (108/76).
from out of the right form of enactment. The two factions at Thessalonica represent two modes of factual life, two *hows* of eschatological living. The denial of faith that the inauthentic eschatological vision implies is neither a privation (withholding assent) nor a negation (denial of truth), but rather an “enactmental not” (108/77). It is a performative contradiction. Without denying the proclamation of Paul, some Thessalonians have returned to an old way of life, but with new (Christian) justifications for it. They no longer see with the eyes of faith and therefore they interpret the world differently. The advent of the antichrist will make this division clear to authentic Christians because only they can “see” the “lawless one” (*Anomos*). This implies, for Heidegger, a facticity to knowledge, i.e., the knowledge of the Antichrist is only knowledge for a particular community founded in and from a particular factual situation. Thus, it is the ability to recognize the antichrist that determines whether or not one is a true Christian.

The Antichrist is presented as a “sign of the time” which is “adversity to God.” He is misinterpreted by some to be a definitive sign that will demarcate a “before” and “after” in the form of Christian hope. Against this interpretation, Heidegger contends that only those who have grasped that hope is what it is in and for the Christian life *now*, i.e., that there is no before and after, can understand what is adverse towards God – what is anti-Christ – as such. Paul suggests something similar when he notes that “the mystery of lawlessness is already at work” (2 Thess. 2:7). The ultimate revelation of the lawless one is simultaneous with his annihilation: “…the lawless one will be revealed, whom the Lord Jesus will destroy with the breath of his mouth, annihilating him by the manifestation of his coming” (2Thess. 2: 8). It is not *in the future*, but now *in the interim* that he is to be feared.

The danger for the young Christian community addressed in 2 Thessalonians is not that they would forsake the way of life proclaimed to them by Paul, but rather that they would
misunderstand it. The struggle at the heart of Christian facticity is not only the struggle to hold firm in the face of rejection, but also a struggle against the “falling tendency of life” which seeks to domesticate the Gospel through a theoretical interpretation that makes it but another instance of what one already knows in different terms. To live this way is to be anomos, without the lawful living that is the love of Christ which fulfills the old law as it institutes a new one. This daily lawlessness is finally made clear in the Antichrist who represents this falling tendency. He is the thief in the night – unknown except to authentic Christians. The ability to recognize lawlessness and the lawless one is what distinguishes the true believers who “possess the possibility of distinguishing.” (114/80). Those who are deceived by him (and only “Christians” can be deceived) are not indifferent. In fact, their idleness is highly industrious; yet, they are deceived and so “fall prey to the Antichrist” (114/80). This industriousness is conceived by Heidegger as a “recoiling and increasing reformulation of Christian life experience into object form [and it] was effected through the apologetic reaction of defense against paganism and its science” (115/81). To break through this inauthentic interpretation requires the “destruction” of its dominant forms of interpretation, and return to the lived character of belief and love. This is the lofty goal of Heidegger’s phenomenology of religious life.

§8. Conclusion: A Broken Temporality of Remainders

What then of the authentic Christian community? Heidegger has distinguished two accounts of facticity. We might call the first the “facticity of Dasein” as such and he calls the second the “salvation-historical [Heilsgeschichtliche]” (e.g., 152/108). Both facticities are compounded in the

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64 Gal. 5:14: “The whole law is summed up in a single commandment: “love your neighbor as yourself.”
Dasein who has become a Christian as a result of Paul’s proclamation. How are we to understand the relation of these two facticities each of which is constituted by the complex of Umwelt, Mitwelt, and Selbstwelt? Put another way, what remains of the various worlds of Dasein? How do they nonetheless remain in the new world of Christian commitment and belief? We will conclude with three observations.

First, there is both change and continuity before and after the proclamation: “The relation and the sense of lived significance are determined out of the original enactment. Put schematically: something remains unchanged, and yet it is radically changed” (119/85). But what, more precisely, is changed and what unchanged? Heidegger claims that it is the relation and content senses that remain unchanged: “The relational sense is not changed, and still less the content. This: The Christian does not step out of this world” (119/85). The relational directions of sense (e.g., slave, free, man, woman, rich, poor), “determine in no way the facticity of the Christian. […] The significances of the surrounding world become, through having-been, temporal possessions. The sense of facticity determines itself in this direction as temporality” (119/85).

Second, Christian facticity makes the first human facticity a possession of time thereby determining its facticity a temporality: “The surrounding-worldly and communal-worldly connection co-constitute facticity; but they are temporal possessions, insofar as they are lived in temporality” (119/85). In other words, the Christian, without stepping out of the world, is able to “get a hold of it” in a certain sense. On the one hand, finitude (the facticity of Dasein) is the condition for the later Christian facticity. Yet, on the other hand, it is in this later facticity that finitude is taken up and “compressed” [zusammengedrängte] making it at once more pressing and less ultimate: “The compressed temporality is constitutive for Christian religiosity: an ‘only-yet’
there is no time for postponement” (119/85). Far from securing the future and thereby extending time indefinitely, for the Christian “There remains only yet a little time” (1Cor. 7:29-32).

Third, “the (Christian) self is still to be distinguished from the self-world…these relations “are hit the hardest” (117/84). Thus, the self is itself not perfectly congruent with the selbstwelt. That would be the Cartesian error. Against the transparent and self-identical ego, Heidegger promotes the concept of a heterogeneous self whose non-self-identity permits her to occupy simultaneously two worlds. Such a stratification of the self yields a set of interpretive categories for describing that experience of enactment: “remaining,” “not-yet,” and “as if not.”

The “not-yet” and “as if not” articulate the way that the Christian relates to the remainders of her facticity in light of a new, Christian complex of enactment that, “is not straightforward, but is rather broken up: all surrounding-world relations must pass through the complex of enactment of having-become” (120/86). Christian life experience is “broken up” [gebrochen] precisely and to the extent that it does not annul the ontological facticity that is Dasein, but brings this to light in a uniquely clear way and radically reconfigures it. It is the factical origin of the Christian revelation, its proclamation and that the proclamation would be determinative – what Kierkegaard calls the paradox and offense of Christianity\(^{65} \) – that draws the world’s attention to its own facticity.

The experience of affliction that arises from the experiential tension between these two facticities is, for Heidegger, the criterion of authentic Christian experience. Inauthentic Christianity would attempt to annul the first facticity, human finitude, through the second facticity originated by the gospel. And finitude, as Heidegger surely learned from the Greek tragedians, is not only a physical vulnerability, but an affective and intellectual vulnerability as well. Thus, to

\(^{65}\) In Concluding Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard explains, “The basis of the paradox in Christianity is that it continually uses time and the historical in relation to the eternal” (95).
the extent that a religious lifeworld or practice would seek to annul the lived, affective, and intellectual tensions between these facticities it would be inauthentic because to annul them is ultimately always an attempt to make them easier. The nature of this response (also intended I think as a response to Nietzsche) places Heidegger in a line of thinkers of stretching from Socrates through Luther and Pascal to Kierkegaard, who seek to make life harder, not easier.

The “hardness” of the Christian community comes from living “as-if” the worldly powers were not and “as-if” the Basileia proclaimed by Jesus and the parousia proclaimed by Paul were already fulfilled knowing that they are both already and “not-yet.” This knowledge is decisive for their way of life: to live “as-if” the self-world, communal world, and surrounding world were already, yet knowing that they are “not-yet”. This is their peculiar complex of enactment: a present broken between an insurmountable past and a not-yet-attained future. Yet at precisely this point Heidegger suggests that despite the essentially broken experience of Christian factical life there is nonetheless, “In Christian life… an unbroken life-context on the level of spirituality [Geistigkeit] – which has nothing to do with the harmony of life […] The Christian life should, on the side of the surrounding world, receive a character of self-evidence (I Cor: 4:11-13)” (121/86). This rather elliptical statement seems to suggest a deeper continuity between self and life and world that is possible when the worlds of self, community, and society are understood as expressions of divine providence and care. Yet even this only serves the heighten the affliction, for what does it mean that a God who became such in time was also such from eternity?

The inauthentic approach to religion by factions in Thessalonica is an attempt to “gain a foothold” on the future and thereby on the present. Yet, there is no gaining a foothold with respect to Christian factical life experience or to God as its purported object of inquiry: “God has already given the foothold, but it is only there for those who can see. […] In Christian life experience it
arises from the sense of the surrounding world, that the world does not just happen to be there. Its givenness and the experience of its significance is experienced of authentic enactment” (122/87). The only foothold is faith which, by its nature, is that to which we are bound, but which is itself unbound.

* * *

In conclusion then, Heidegger has attempted to discern the basic features and orientation of a phenomenological explication of religious life that is at one and the same time a hermeneutics of St. Paul and a hermeneutics of the originary motivations and forms of the Christian life. The latter set of considerations transcend the text to the extent that as interpreters who are also working within such a originary world we labor under the possibility of participating in those same motivations and thereby grasping their directions of sense and explication in a fully phenomenological way. In returning to the sense-complexes of original Christian life Heidegger purports to move beyond the one-sided approaches of both “empiricists” and “spiritualists” by proposing an account of experience that is both sensible (perception) and sense-filled (meaningful). To read off the relations of this content requires a rejection of the “internal hermeneutics of bare science” in favor of the formally indicative approach suggested in these pages. This is an attempt to grasp not “isolated contents” but relations and enactments. The goal of discerning such relations and enactments is not to acquire a new set of eternal and immutable truths, but rather to enable one to “grasp the sense from the appropriation of one’s own factical existence!” (137/96). That is both a philosophical and a religious exhortation.

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66 Paul Claudel depicts this richly in his *The Satin Slipper*. Here the character Rodrigue floats lashed to a mast of a ship floating on the ocean: “But now I could not be bound to thee more closely than I am, and however violently my limbs move they cannot get one inch away from thee. So I really am fastened to the cross, but the cross on which I hang is not fastened to anything else. It drifts on the sea” (London: Sheed and Ward, 1945), act 1, scene 1.
Ultimately, Heidegger is less concerned with the question of the *novelty* of Christian life experience than its *originality*. That originality consists in the disclosure of facticity as the ground of Christian religious experience. The Christian God is a god in time and history and therefore the Christian living before such a God is peculiarly and perhaps uniquely attuned to and structured by temporality – past, present, and future. This is the prior and all-encompassing situation within which derivative questions of Christianity’s relationship to what preceded it in paganism and Judaism. Only in light of this context can the basic *phenomenological* determinations of “opposition” and “development” be understood. Heidegger rejects a reductive tendency to see in Christianity simply a determination according to which different things meld together and dominate something. A principal example of this is Christian eschatology. The Christian eschaton is not simply an over-taking of Greek thinking on immortality and overlaying it with Christian symbolism. The eschaton invests the present for the Christian in a way it does not for the Greek. The result of this is a displacement in the self-world of the believer. For a fuller accounting of that Heidegger turns his attentions the following semester to Saint Augustine.
Chapter 5

From the Selbstwelt to the Self: Augustine and the Heterogeneous Self

“Oneri mihi sum” – Augustine  
(Confessions X, 28, 39)

“Je pense, donc je suis” – Descartes  
(Discourse on Method, 19)

§1. Introduction: Augustine and Neo-Platonism

At the conclusion of his treatment of Paul, Heidegger suggested that the self is not identical to the self-world (Selbstwelt). He suggests that even at the deepest or most intimate level of interiority there is not perfect congruence, not perfect transparency. The self is not opaque or incongruous (ek-static) merely because it is always already extended into the shared worlds of Mitsein and Umsein, but even within its own enclosure it is not self-identical. The heterogeneity at the heart of the self is what occupies him in his subsequent investigation of Augustine. This is part and parcel of the larger project we have been charting of articulating a phenomenology of religion that takes facticity as its point of departure. Factual life is constituted by the dynamic relating of the self to the surrounding, communal, and self-worlds. This basic situation therefore determines the particular character of whatever knowledge that self later acquires. Yet, it is not merely facticity
that is constituted relationally, but also the self as such. It is not surprising, then, that in his search to articulate a self that is fundamentally a form of relating Heidegger would turn to Augustine and read him alongside Kierkegaard.

In his 1921 lecture course “Augustine and Neo-Platonism”, Heidegger returns to the heterogeneous temporality of Paul, whose history has been “broken” by a past event that has called into being a new and originary world in which the future (eschaton) is both already and not yet. He examines that peculiar complex of Christian factical life through the lens of Augustine’s search for the self in Confessions, Book X. In his earlier reading of Galatians and 1&2 Thessalonians, Heidegger drew out the implications of the Christian believer’s commitment to an account of the religious life that is essentially historical. In that account the past events of revelation and proclamation definitively inform our experience of the present and are themselves directed toward a future still to come. The account of a self who experiences the world in this way is one in which the present moment is already structured by its past and its future. Such a self is present in the interim, yet it is never a full presence – there is always a remainder. Both past and future remain outside of the present, yet the self in the present is defined by its active relating to those. The authentic believer of Galatia and Thessalonica is one who adheres in faith to an historical proclamation of prior events and simultaneously lives toward a future possibility – the kingdom of God – as if it were already present. Yet, if the peculiar experience of temporality for the Christian believer is one structured by past and future, it is nonetheless in the present that the battle is fought and won or lost.

1 The most important consequence of this claim for a philosophy of religion is articulated well by Kierkegaard in his “summary” of Lessing: “Contingent historical truths can never become a demonstration of eternal truths of reason, also that the transition whereby one will build an eternal truth on historical reports is a leap,” Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Howard and Edna Hong. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 93. A philosophy of religion that would proceed on the basis of a historical revelation would therefore have to approach the matter in a manner other than rational demonstration.
Augustine’s account of himself in Book X provides Heidegger with the opportunity to explore such an embattled self and to extend his phenomenological analyses of religious life from earlier in the year. He applies his method of formal indication to Augustine’s rich description of conscious life as a means of deepening his analyses, particularly that of the self-world. The opening hours are a survey of three recent interpretations of Augustine each of which misunderstands him by failing to question its own motivational basis. As with Paul, Heidegger proposes to read Augustine by taking the enactmental level of meaning as his point of access. The result is a detailed reading of *Confessions* X in which he attempts to formally indicate the manner of a self’s being-before-God in both its *inquietas* and tendency toward falling. He takes as the motto for his second religion course a line from *Confessions* X: “The human race is inquisitive about other people’s lives, but negligent to correct their own.” In doing so, he signals from the start a distinct preoccupation with the contours and behaviors of the self-world rather than the overlapping enactmental contexts of the self-world, communal world, and surrounding world.

Heidegger begins, as he did with Paul, by contradistinguishing his own analysis of Augustine from a set of contemporary ones, specifically, those of Troeltsch, Harnack and Dilthey. Each author has a particular “direction of access” [Zugangsrichtungen] from which he approaches Augustine and along which he intends to situate him. For Troeltsch it is a broad and universal philosophy of culture in which Augustine is the seminal and concluding figure of “Christian antiquity,” while for Harnack it is the history of Christian dogma within which Augustine is read as anticipating important theological developments in later reformers. Similarly, for Dilthey...
Augustine inaugurates a historical process of developing rational self-consciousness, “a change in the life of the soul” (PRL 164/118), that is part of a larger account of the history of the formation of historical consciousness. Amusingly for Heidegger, Dilthey claims that what Augustine set out to accomplish is finally achieved first in Kant and then Schleiermacher, which suggests to him that “Dilthey entirely misunderstands the inner problem of Augustine” (164/118).

Yet, if their directions of access are distinct, Heidegger is keen to demonstrate that for all three authors the sense of access [Zugangsinn] is identical and in each case it covers over the motivational basis for that access point [Zugangsansatz] as well as its enactment [Zugangsvollzug]. Put simply, all three approaches view Augustine as an object within an objective complex with a pre-determined order. Within that shared sense of access they merely view him from different “per-spectives” [Hin-sicht], “with regard to different ‘sides’” (166/120). Interpreting a bit, we might suggest that those perspectives are a kind of Religionswissenschaft (Troeltsch), Theologische Wissenschaft (Harnack), and Bewusstseinwissenschaft (Dilthey). Here, more directly than in the lectures on Paul, Heidegger ties this object-historical Zugangssinn to the particular conception of historical time. He writes:

“‘Time’ functions in objective history: (1) as a methodologically regional means of determining material. As such, it is enacted in the attitude in the manner of such regional means; according to its origin; however, it is already a specific kind of ‘orientation’; (2) as itself an objective material object, a determinate time: an age” (168/121).

For Troeltsch, Augustine concludes an age and for Harnack and Dilthey he anticipates one. In all three cases, what is essential to understanding Augustine is predetermined by what is essential to the history of ideas. This leads to a second conclusion, namely, that the objective framework of order is co-founded with the understanding of historical time as chronological. Thirdly, the unquestioned starting points cover over the underlying and unquestioned motivational basis. Thus,
Troeltsch’s point of departure, a philosophy of culture, is grounded in “the ‘conviction’ to assist the resurrection of contemporary mental life, and religious life in particular, through a system of cultural value which is historically oriented” (168/121). Harnack’s theological Ansatz originates from, “the ‘conviction’ that a critical historiography of dogmas shows how an ecclesiastical theology which originally does not agree with Protestant Christian theology came about” (168/121). Finally, for Dilthey, the search for the foundation of the human sciences is based “in the ‘conviction’ that in the mental-historical penetration of what is past (what is objective), a concrete mental task of life in the present is given” (169/122).

Heidegger draws out these unquestioned assumptions for three reasons. First, it is a way of signaling that all investigations, critical or not, are motivated. The goal is not to get beyond such motivations to a dispassionate view from nowhere, but rather to ask what the right animating motivation might be. Second, he wants to suggest that these motivations themselves are in need of philosophical and theological criticism, “that would judge their motivational basis with regard to originality and then the meaningfulness of ‘objective’ study” (168/121). Finally, he wants to distinguish his own approach which attempts to break through the binary of object-historical/scientific and subjective/non-scientific. He will do so most appropriately with Augustine by showing that these constructs rely on an account of time that is itself founded in a more original account of subjectivity. The deconstruction of the presumed originality of historical time will grant a new place and sense of access to those “sense-complexes” covered up by the uncritical and preemptive framing of the problem of inner experience and enable one to grasp the factical as a more radical problem – not how do science and factual life interpenetrate, but how does science arise out of factual life.
This rediscovery of an original – and non-Cartesian – account of the self in Augustine is equally a rediscovery of authentic historicity. Augustine’s historicity will be seen “as something in whose peculiar dimension of effect [Wirkungsdimension] we are standing today. “History hits us [trifft uns], and we are history itself” (173/124), Heidegger writes. With respect to the philosophy of religion, he claims that this investigation does not blur the boundaries between the disciplines, but rather goes back behind these two “exemplary formations of factical life” in order to indicate what lies behind both – not extra-temporally, but historical-enactmentally.

§2. Augustine and the Heterogeneous Self.

Having contradistinguished his own approach from three contemporary approaches, Heidegger proceeds, as he did with Paul, to a preliminary “taking-cognizance-of” the various phenomena that surface in Confessions X without yet indicating what will be the motivational central of an enactmental-historical interpretation. In laying out the various phenomena he does not follow Augustine’s own schema exactly since that is arranged for a variety of purposes. Heidegger’s “exposition” [Refarat] surrenders the original text to a genuine explication without claiming to improve upon it.

He begins, somewhat oddly, with Augustine’s Retractiones which he wrote in 417-426 CE close to the end of his life (d. 430). There are a few possible reasons for this. First, retraction like proclamation (and we will see, confession) is a particularly clear example of enactmental communication: part of understanding what is being said is understanding what is being done. Therefore, like the Confessions, it is a text whose content will be misunderstood if we overlook

³ “With Augustine himself, the ‘disorder’ has a certain sense of expression: the always new unlocking of ‘content’ and enigmas of enactment” (182/133).
that enactmental context. Second, in Augustine’s “preface” to the portion of the Retractiones discussing the Confessions – the part which Heidegger quotes – he makes it clear that the book deals with his good and bad actions, which Heidegger interprets as Augustine’s “being, life, having-been” and he notes that “the first ten books deal with me; the other three books deal with the Holy Scripture.”\(^4\) Thus, Heidegger is calling on Augustine’s own self-interpretation to justify his reading of the Confessions as a presentation of Augustine’s self in its having-been, but not only that. He goes on to explain how “Book X can easily be demarcated from the other books, as Augustine here no longer relates his past, but rather tells what he is now: ‘what I am in the very time of the making of my confessions.’”\(^5\) Thus, Confessions X provides both an account of the self and self-world of Augustine, but also of how his past self is had in and by his present self.

But what, exactly, does it mean to confess? If it is a particular mode of enactment, it is nonetheless a different mode than proclaiming. Like proclamation, it is a manifesting and not just of content, but of content in a particular way. Like proclamation it must be undertaken by an “I”. You cannot confess for me; the internal logic of confessing entails a relation to oneself. It is a kind of self-revelation. Unlike Pauline proclamation, however, Augustinian confession is to speak on one’s own authority and to confess that one is without authority, i.e., it is a confession of sinfulness. More precisely, lest we be perverse, a sinfulness overcome: “[a] showing that grace assists even the weakest one” (178/129). Confessing also entails a to whom the confession is made. In Augustine’s case, his confession is made first and foremost “in the face of God,” but it is also made “to one’s fellow human beings.” In that respect, confession, like proclamation, is the response of one to another that is simultaneously a call to a third that intends to draw forth a response. Heidegger summarizes up Augustine’s claim, intentionally or not, by “mis-remembering” Kant:

\(^4\) Retractiones II 6, 1; PL 32, p.632 quoted in PRL 176/128
\(^5\) Confessions X, 3, 4, quoted in PRL 176/128.
confiteri aude! Dare to confess! Such confession is no less a daring to know (sapere aude), but it is of a different order. Augustine can only confess what he “knows” about himself, yet this is simultaneously a Socratic confession that he knows he does not know all: Quaestio mihi factus sum.

To confess, then, is to tell a strange sort of secret – I do not know myself. I do not have myself. Indeed, perhaps I cannot be had in a manner analogous to any other thing. What am I if I cannot know myself in the manner I know anything else? What would constitute knowledge of myself? Yet, the telling of this secret is ingredient to knowing oneself. It is by confessing one’s contingency to God and to others that Augustine gains a fuller account of himself.

It is at precisely this juncture, at the split between the known and unknown self, that Heidegger turns to Kierkegaard for the first time: “To comprehend [Begreifen] is the range of man’s relation to the human, but to believe [Glauben] is man’s relation to the divine”\(^6\). He interprets this passage as an elliptical explication of Augustine’s claim that “there is something in the human being which is unknown even to the spirit of man […] I do not know which temptations I can resist and which I cannot.”\(^7\) The phenomena of temptation is taken up until later in the course where it provides the enactmental center of Heidegger’s investigation of the (Augustinian) self\(^8\). Together the two quotes function as an opening salvo suggesting that the self under investigation is one capable of both comprehension and belief – two distinct relational senses. What is believed beyond what is comprehended is precisely one’s self in the face of future temptation, i.e., in the

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\(^7\) Confessions X 5, 7 quoted on PRL 178/130.
\(^8\) “All this belongs to me and I myself do not grasp it. The mind is too narrow to contain itself. Where should that be which the mind cannot gasp of itself” Heidegger paraphrasing Augustine,” (PRL 182/133).
face of life in its relentless advent and permanent tendency toward falling. We will return to these themes shortly.

Heidegger provides a close and rich reading of Augustine’s interior ascent, which is a movement upward by a movement inward. In turning from the created and external world to the memoria Augustine already signals an approach that, while still expressed in the categories of a faculty psychology, nonetheless begins to push past them: “What phenomena Augustine brings forth, regarding the content only, and, above all, how he explicates the phenomena and in what basic contexts and determinations – e.g., beata vita – shatters the framework and structure of the usual concept [i.e., of memoria]” (182/133). It is significant in this regard that Heidegger leaves memoria untranslated. It is clear in Augustine’s own analysis that at times he is referring to what we would call memory, the “storehouse” of past images and experiences, and yet even more often he means the much broader and diverse set of activities that constitute mind or consciousness. This leads Heidegger to conclude that for Augustine, “memoria is nothing outside of consciousness, but is consciousness itself” (186/136). The turn inward is itself a proto-phenomenological shift in attitude.

Significantly, it is an attentiveness to the phenomena themselves that motivates the shift in attention: “Here we already have a displacement of the question…under pressure from the phenomena: the question is no longer whether this or that is God, but whether I can find God “therein” = “thereby” = “living therein” (181/132). For Heidegger’s Augustine, God is no longer sought as a (metaphysical) object out there in the world – whether the Manichean God of light or the substance which permeates material creation like water and a sponge. Rather, God is to be sought in the interiority of one’s self. This is a transition from questioning objects to questioning

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9 Heidegger refers to the “narrow sense” as meminisce (to remember) (cf. 136/186).
10 Augustine uses this image to characterize his own insufficient understanding of God in Conf. VII.7.
oneself as the proximate condition for consciousness of those objects: an attentiveness to the beauty of the world leads to an attentiveness to oneself. Beauty functions here as a kind of repelling force – creation drives the dispersed gaze backward and inward, consolidating it and directing it.

Thereupon follows an examination of the modes of givenness of *memoria* and their corresponding objectivities: sensuous objects (e.g., any sensible object), non-sensuous objects (e.g., numbers, rules, propositions), scientific objects (e.g., objects corresponding to theoretical acts, essences), one’s recollection of affective experience (e.g., past fear or delight), and finally the recollection in consciousness of myself. Heidegger concludes that consciousness is given to itself as *discernere* (differentiating), *colligere* (gathering), and *cogitare* (thinking), as well as in affectivity whose fundamental genera are *timere* (fear) and *delectatio* (delight). All of these modes are given “noematically”, i.e., as containing content. Consciousness for Augustine as for Heidegger is always “consciousness of”. It is precisely as and in differentiating, gathering, thinking, and feeling consciousness that *ipse mihi occurro*: it is in the midst of this activity, not before it or apart from it, that I “occur” to and before myself. Yet this happening of the self is not exclusively the present-having of past activity. I do not merely remember myself and so have myself. My presence to myself in the present is equally constituted by the future-directed intentions of action: “…on the basis of this [recollection], I meditate upon future actions and events and hope as if they were present now.” (Conf. X 8, 14)\(^\text{11}\). Thus, the Augustinian self is not only gathered but also projected. Its past, but also and especially its future are “*quasi praesentia,*” – as if present. This yields the strange result that “that in which I live is not itself – in the flesh – present; and yet

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\(^{11}\) All citations from the *Confessions* will be from the version Heidegger uses in his notes, unless noted otherwise. That edition is *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, Series Latina, accurante J.-P. Migne (Paris: 1861/1862), vol. 32. We will cite the directly from *Confessions* using the English translation preferred by English translators of GA 60.
it is not nothing” (187/137). Thus, in response to the question, How does the self have itself?, Heidegger reading Augustine concludes that it has itself diversely, incompletely, and before God.

This leads to the important thesis that memoria “has” both the self and God incompletely and yet is never wholly without then. They are had according to one of three basic modes of conscious intentionality: recollecting (colligere), forgetting (oblivio), and searching (quaerere). All three modes are concerned with absence, yet presuppose in their possibility a form of absence that is itself incomplete. In this regard, Augustine’s account of the aporia concerning forgetting – How is it that I can remember that I have forgotten? – is due largely to the failure to distinguish between the having-forgotten-something (intentional relation)\textsuperscript{12} and the thing forgotten (intentional object). When we further differentiate between contents of consciousness and modes of givenness we can grasp better how I represent the relation of having-forgotten in which I remember forgetting, without necessarily also recalling the forgotten content. Even so, the phenomenon of forgetfulness helps us understand a peculiar kind of absence – an absence that is self-aware without being annulled. It is in specifying the problem of forgetfulness that Augustine is able to grasp how it is that the self and God are both had in some sense and yet still sought after through memoria.

This absence of myself to myself is what inaugurates my searching. Therefore, searching is itself a form of relating to absence. It is the key for Augustine for two reasons. First, searching is that by which I transcend the memoria since it alone can ask beyond it about its conditions and its possible limits\textsuperscript{13}. Such an infinite questioning – a questioning that is both unending and also

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. “oblivio is relational” (PRL 188/138).

\textsuperscript{13} This includes the limit according to which human memoria is distinct from its analogue in other forms of animal consciousness. That habit that other animals share (139) is not what Augustine means here by memoria. This distinction is further evidence for Heidegger’s implied but unstated assumption that there are in fact two understandings of memoria in Augustine, memoria simpliciter which is more or less what we mean by the term memory, and memoria in a thick or pregnant sense, which is consciousness.
which asks about infinity – is a form of *transcendence*, a “climbing over” (trans-scendere) knowledge (*episteme*) toward possibility. Thus, *memoria* is given to itself as constituted in part by a “knowledge” that it exceeds itself: “All this belongs to me and I myself do not grasp it. The mind is too narrow to contain itself. Where should that be which the mind cannot gasp of itself” (182/133). That limit, expressed as both ignorance and infinity and intended by desire, is the enactmental core of inquiring intelligence. The paradoxical outcome of Augustine’s turn inward to discover the self is that by turning inward he is turned outward. *Memoria* is a being that is a *having* and that having has shown itself to be, paradoxically, a having and a not having. It is *essentially* incomplete.

Second, questioning – in particular, questioning about God – implies a minimal fore-having (*vorhaben*). This is the opposite side of the same coin: if *memoria* involves recollecting or searching for what has been forgotten, it must be in some possession of, to some degree, that which it seeks: “[But] what does searching mean? I must have it in some sense before I find it or how will I know I’ve found it?” (190/139). Thus, the being who is a questioning is a being whose being is a (fore-)having. The peculiar having implied by questioning is a having that has-not-yet lost that which it seeks but also which lives in the anxiety of possibility losing. Such an anxious relation to possibility – one that both has but does not yet have completely – accords with Heidegger’s understanding of the intentionality of being-there (*Dasein*):

> “Being = having, but what kind of having/ having never lost or having in relation to possibly losing? In anxiety – possibility – intentionality! – being-there [*Dasein]*” (190/140).

Here a second shift occurs. The first shift was from questioning objects to questioning oneself. The second shift is from questioning oneself as such to a questioning of *questioning*. This entails an oblique reconsideration of the self as an always-being-constituted in and by such questioning.
Augustine shifts from surveying the contents of the highest part of me to the motivation of the surveying, i.e., to the searching itself. Three implications follow from this. First, consciousness is not merely the seat of certain activities (substantia) nor the merely the place from which those activities receive or recollect content (memory simpliciter), but rather (or also) an activity itself: “This memoria is a great force of life and I am myself memoria” (189/139). This new understanding of consciousness as searching-intentionality implies a reconceiving of the object and the mode of its givenness that correspond to such searching. Second, what is searched for is in the memoria – it has “dropped out” – yet there is “a remainder in our consciousness […] even what had been forgotten surfaces from and in consciousness. So it cannot have dropped entirely from consciousness” (191/140). Oblivio, though it only grasps its object as having-been-forgotten, is nonetheless an intentional relation, a particular type of Bezugsinn. Finally, it follows from this that the manner of my searching for that which is absent, or myself as a searching, must be different:

“What, while searching, is still at my disposal? (what do I have and how do I have it?)” (191/140)

“In my search of God something in me does not only reach ‘expression’ but makes up my facticity and my concern for it. […] That means in searching for this something as God, I myself assume a completely different role. […] the enactment of the search itself is something of the self. [I.e.,] the self gains an idea of itself in is search for the transcendent-absolute. ‘Kierkegaard.’” (192/141).

The nature of our searching, by which we transcend the memoria (at least the part of it we share with animals) reveals a certain transcendence and immanence. I search for something that is given as exceeding my consciousness and yet I could not search for it were it not in some manner or to some degree present to consciousness. What is that remainder? What is still at my disposal in the
search for God? What in the givenness of consciousness has incited me to search in the first place? Heidegger suggests that Augustine’s answer to this is the *beata vita* – the happy life.

Augustine’s original question has undergone a series of permutations: What do I love when I love you? Where do I find you? How do I search for you? And now, how do I search for the happy life? This is both a negative and a positive development according to Heidegger. It is negative because the proposed answer (the happy life) does not follow from what preceded it; therefore, Heidegger suspects Augustine of smuggling in dogmatic or metaphysical assumptions. It is a positive development because it finalizes the discussion’s reorientation from asking what to asking how.

§3. *Beata Vita et Veritas*

Heidegger senses two distinct, but undifferentiated currents in Augustine’s thinking about God. They are condensed into the description of God as *vita vera* (true life) where God is grasped as life (*vita*) and/or truth (*vera*). As *vita* both God and the self are grasped enactmentally, but understood as *vera* they are in danger of being interpreted as “veritas in the direction of falling” (199/146). Is the primary sense of one’s self before God to be thought from out of life (*vita*) or as a matter of truth (*veritas*)?

Pursuing the first line of inquiry, Augustine describes consciousness (*memoria*) as a great force of life (*tanta vitae vis*), which I myself am. As such, consciousness is always consciousness of life and from out of life. God, therefore, as somehow present to consciousness must be present to it from out of life. Therefore, the self’s directedness in life is its desire for God as the true life (*vita vera*). That desire is conceived in very general terms by Augustine as that which “all desire, and
which no one fails to desire (*omnes volunt, et omnino qui nolit nemo est*)” (Conf. X, 20, 29). What the desire aims at is happiness, the *beata vita*. Yet, this is merely a formal indication for Augustine: the *desiring* of happiness is what is universal, the content itself must be left indeterminate. In other words, *beata vita* is a heuristic notion. The sheer diversity of accounts of what constitutes the content of the happy life drives Augustine to an enactmental consideration of the underlying desire. At that level, the happy life is sought for in terms of the various *hows* according to one might have it. A consequence of this account is that “true” happiness is happiness *in life*. It is not enough to know what happiness is; what we in fact desire is to be happy: “The happy life we have in our knowledge, and so we love it, and yet we desire to attain it so that we may be happy” (Conf. X, 21, 30).

This is significant because the matter for which we search in part determines how we search and therefore what we find. If what we desire is happiness (and God and truth) *in life*, then what we desire is not merely knowledge of those things, but the experience of them: “What all agree upon...is that they want to experience joy and would call that joy the happy life” (x.21). There is here an implicit account of truth as what we might call a “faithful having” rather than a propositional knowing. The former account suggests that truth is most fully a matter of having experience correctly, i.e., relating to it in the right way. The search for happiness thereby becomes also the search for truth understood as “the explication of the How of having. The primacy of the relational sense, or of the sense of enactment” (195/143). As a result, the search for the happy life becomes the search for the *situation* of enactment within which one can have it in the right way. In other words, we must appropriate the “having” such that the having becomes a “being” (195/143).

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14 He writes, “Even if one person pursue it in one way, and another in a different way, yet there is one goal which all are striving to attain, namely to experience joy” (Conf. X, 31).
On this first interpretation then, God is present *im Vorgriff* in consciousness as the great force of life. This pre-having is left indeterminate as to content, “[it] does not have to have the formed-out, concrete, traditional sense, but really has an existential sense of movement” (192/141). Yet – and this is crucial for Augustine and for Heidegger – this great force of life is also the self. Amidst the search, Heidegger asks, “as whom do I experience myself” (192/141). The search for God, or for something as God, also tells us about the self. The search displaces the self and in doing so reveals a further dimension of that self: “the enactment of the search itself is something of the self” (192/141)\(^\text{15}\). To know myself as desiring something and as searching for something is to know more about myself. Both the self and God are had partially and with volatility in the having, but also always escape complete determination because that having is an occurring that is unending and therefore in some sense a burden (*moles, -is*).

There is, however, a countervailing interpretation in Augustine’s account: God as vita *vera* (*true life*). Here the “true” account of God is not thought from out of life, but rather on the basis of a predetermined account of truth as *veritas*. According to Heidegger, Augustine’s account of *veritas* is an appropriation of the Greek metaphysical account of truth as precisely that which abstracts from life (facticity). He therefore critiques Augustine for not searching radically enough. He does not gain access to the root of the problem, but instead, “remains within the classifying consideration of frameworks and in a correspondingly dominant relation sense – Greek” (194/142). That dominant relational sense is an “attitudinal orientation” governed by a metaphysical understanding of objectivity and God as the metaphysical object of our search and that towards which the *beata vita* tends. More problematically still, the motivation for such an endeavor in

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\(^{15}\) Heidegger comments on this passage that it is in searching that the self wins existence and what existence is: “in searching it places itself in the absolute distance, and tries to win the distance.” He finds further corroboration for this in Kierkegaard’s *Sickness Unto Death* from which he quotes: “The criterion for the self is always: that directly before which it is a self; but that in turn is the definition of ‘criterion’” (SUD 79 in PRL 248/186).
objectivity is the joy and delight (gaudium and delectatio) of truth, which is a delight in the having-attained rather than either the undertaking or the being-in-the-truth.

God as vita vera presupposes an account of truth as universality\textsuperscript{16} “whose meaning has been contorted [umgebogen] through Greek philosophy” (198/146). Yet this stands in tension with Augustine’s account of the beata vita as a how of existence whose relational sense is an enactment sense. In those passages, “the primacy of the relational sense, or of the sense of enactment is remarkable. […] Appropriate the ‘having’ such that the having becomes a ‘being’” (195/143). This second emphasis opens the possibility for an alternative account of truth that contends with the inevitable remainder [Residuum] in the first account. If there is a kind of understanding that can grasp life in its factual movement, then that would be the first site of our “knowledge” of God, not the later abstractions founded upon it\textsuperscript{17}.

Heidegger finds the possibility of this second account of truth signaled in Augustine’s account of lumen\textsuperscript{18} which he distinguishes from lux. Lux is the light of objectivity, whereas lumen is “Light, the voice of the inner human being” (180/131). It is this inner voice that undertakes the “relentless and understanding questioning” and so “brings to light from the darkness of the soul” that which its daily performance presupposes: “those elements of the background” (209/154-55). Thus, even amidst the “bustling activity” characteristic of falling, “there is still a modicum of light”\textsuperscript{16} Heidegger also calls this “catholic”, presumably playing with the more general sense in which what is catholic is also universal. He critiques this approach for its reliance on “widespread occurrence”. But it is unclear what the problem with this approach is. Does not Aristotle equally presume “widespread concurrence” for the analogous claim of that all men desire to know, or Husserl for the claim that consciousness always intends an object!\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, such an account would be defined the self’s ineluctable relatedness to the factual situation in which such an understanding experience of God occurred. Therefore, it would be a “personal” account in the strictest sense, i.e., an account in which the experience as given for a self is always included. The God revealed in such an experience would be always a God for a self. This may be the reasoning that lies behind Heidegger’s much latter claim that the opposite account – that of the onto-theo-logical God – because it is a theoretical account can only supply “the god of philosophy” before whom “man can neither pray nor sacrifice…neither fall to his knew sin awe…nor play music and dance” (Identity and Difference, translated by Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1969), 72

\textsuperscript{18} “Lux and lumen are to be distinguished. Lux: in an objective sense, what is present as the object of seeing (regina colorum [the queen of colors]). Lumen: brightness, always of the soul” (287/217).
Lumen, as signaling an alternative to the falling tendency (lux) is thus an alternate how, a distinct way of seeing: “Lumen has here a very determinate, existential sense of enactment in self-worldly, factual experience, and is not to be understood in a thingly-metaphysical way” (199/147, translation slightly altered). Heidegger notes in a footnote to this section, “veritas and beata vita: existential truth” (200/147 fn.). It is clear that while there are two strands of the vita vera in Augustine’s analysis, and while he seems to privilege the Greek-metaphysical paradigm at certain points, this is constantly tempered by his searching existential analysis.

Heidegger takes the two understandings of God, as vita and as veritas, as ultimately – thought not essentially – conflicting. He interprets Augustine’s argument as beginning with the search for the sense of beata vita, proceeding to a search for the vera beata vita to, and culminating in, the search for veritas. This veritas is then understood in the falling sense of Greek philosophy and so “presto!” we arrive at an implicit syllogism: God is truth; truth is in and for consciousness; therefore, God is in and for consciousness. The delight we take in discovering that we do in fact have a conception of God is thus “the real motive” for our searching. In response to this Heidegger asks probingly: “is the desire to take delight the motive for one’s effort and for one’s bustling activity?” (196/144). Bustling activity [Geschäftigkeit] is a characteristic of the falling tendency. Thus, Heidegger suggests that when the desire to have God is motivated by the desire to experience the delight in having God as truth in the mind, it is a falling away from the more original kind of having that is being. In these sections Heidegger is fond of his statement of the commutative property that: being = having, having = how, and (therefore) being = how. But if veritas is the leading term in our understanding of the religious it presupposes the entire conceptual apparatus in which it can be discerned and judged.
Yet this *how* of attaining truth is set against the *how* of searching previously described. For Heidegger that is the *beata vita*:

“Formally indicated, the *beata vita* as such, and in relation to the *How* of its existence, is one. It really concerns the individual, how she appropriates it. There is one true one, and especially this, in turn, is for the individual” (197/145).

The delight one experiences in the attainment of truth – the “*delectatio veritatis*” (199/146) – cannot be this relation, because *delectatio finis cura*: delight is the end of concern. Far from signaling the end of concern, the authentic *beata vita*,

“…becomes an object in its genuine manner only in such concern. (Thus it is something which is only present in an authentic complex of enactment. It has to be broken into – existentially – not in the attitudinal handling of content, but in the determinately articulated, factical historical complex of enactment” (198/146).

Such a falling tendency fails to grasp the existential (i.e., disclosive) conditions of truthfulness as such that allow the possibility of such a syllogism to be. This deeper existential understanding of truth is born witness to by the fact that even if we desire to deceive others, we never desire to be deceived ourselves. Such a love of truth – of being in the truth – is still a minimal testament to the authentic sense of *beata vita*: “even in this closing-himself-off against the truth, he loves the truth more than error, and thus makes an effort at the *beata vita*” (201/148). From authentic *veritas* follows authentic *gaudium*: “Beata vita is *gaudium*, more closely, *gaudium de veritate* [joy of truth], understood as existentially related to the *vita beata*. (By way of *veritas*, however, we have at the same time, the invasion of Greek philosophy)” (201/148)\(^{19}\). Nevertheless, this somewhat

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\(^{19}\) It is important to note that in “Augustine and Neo-Platonism,” Heidegger is more hospitable to the “Hellenization” thesis dominant in much German religious-historical thought than he had been in his exposition of Paul. There he was critical of attempts to explain Paul’s thought merely in terms of its Greek antecedents. Paul, while indebted to the prevailing discourses, nonetheless struggles to articulate something new. Here he seems less generous with Augustine, assuming that Greek discourse dominates everywhere and absolutely Augustine’s account of *veritas*. Yet, could we not, for example, argue that the account of *veritas* is itself more of an indicating toward God than a naïve claim about having knowledge of God? Cyril O’Regan notes a similar lack of hermeneutic generosity in his “Answering Back.” Heidegger’s treatment of Augustine is different from that of figures like Paul, Luther, and Eckhart, “[it is] from the
hasty equation of God and truth does not prevent Augustine from exploring further the enduring sense in which vita in its movement toward or questioning search for the beata vita is experienced as tentatio and therefore a burden (molestia) – conditions that render being in the truth and the gaudium de veritate it founds impermanent because in need to being won again in each moment.

§4. Tentatio

Heidegger interprets Augustine’s conclusion that God is not extra memoriam as implying, first, that our possible relations to God (i.e., searching and finding) are internal rather than external and, second, that the beata vita is not an object in the traditional sense: Even if one has a partial or initial intimation of God as veritas in memoria, God is only there tenuiter (tenuously). Thus, described phenomenologically, Augustine’s inventory of consciousness was a review of the different modes of givenness and the different objectivities correlative to those modes. That God is not among such things implies that God is not an object. Heidegger thus reads Augustine as having, “renounced the regional characterization of the meaning of Dominus” (203/149). Yet, as constituent to veritas, God is constituent to experience – to being as such – and therefore to everyone everywhere, but only insofar as experience is grasped correctly, i.e., only insofar as it is “had” correctly. The kind of understanding this requires is not a function of seeing better, but rather a cultivation of one’s ability to hear (audire). Hearing is thus a privileged mode of religious enactment: “Audire: ‘to understand,’ that is, mode of enactment. […] everything depends upon the

very beginning marked by reservation, even ambivalence.” “While he continues to underwrite Augustine’s articulation of an erotic self of interminable questioning and open-ended quest, there is considerably more concern as to where Augustine falls short” (137, 139). “Answering Back” in Human Destinies: Philosophical Essays in Memory of Gerald Hanratty, edited by Fran O'Rourke. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012).
authentic hearing, upon the How of the questioning posture, of the wanting-to-hear [Hörenwollen](203/150).

Thus, to the first sense of remainder – that of God in our consciousness and the light in our searching – is added a second, that of “remaining open” [offenhalten]. Hörenwollen and offenhalten are the dispositional conditions in which proper concern [bekümmerung] is first disclosed. Remaining-open is a capacity to hear and to transform what is heard into a matter of proper concern. In other words, by hearing correctly we become concerned in the right way. Authentic searching is characterized by a kind of hearing that enables us to have ourselves with appropriate concern. In contrast to this there is an inauthentic searching characterize by a different kind of hearing: curiositas, which seeks only what “suits” paßt it. Authentic hearing (remaining open) is distinguished from inauthentic hearing (curiositas) by its ability to attend to what does not suit it, to what does not “fit” its preconceptions. It is a refusal to reduce one’s experience of the world to a set of categories at hand. In a suggestive remark that he does not elaborate, Heidegger claims that this account of “keeping oneself open for” is Augustine’s definition of sperandi (hope). We can see in this provisional account of hope the way that Heidegger is using Augustine to deepen his analysis of the Christian life experience begun in his course on Paul. There obstinate waiting was the leading sense of the present life. Here that is further explored in light of a keeping-oneself-open-for which is the particular quality of the searching that is Christian belief. It is the porosity of the Augustinian self, of a consciousness that cannot contain itself and plagued

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20 Heidegger’s account of Bekümmerung anticipates aspects of both Sorge and Besorgen in later works, especially Being and Time. It is interesting to note that the initial insights that will propel that development are already present there. He notes in a footnote a few pages later that. “Phenomenological connection between curare as concern [Bekümmerung] (vox media) and uti as dealing-with (in concern)” (206/153).

21 In German the verb passen is often used in reference to clothes, and it carries the sense of “to fit,” “to suit,” or “to match.” Inauthentic hearing hears only what “fits” it, only what can already appear in a predetermined form of concern. It “matches” factual life to a predetermined worldview.
by a perpetual remainder, that secures the ground of hope, of a remaining-open-for the in-breaking of that which is both already and not yet.

Yet here we might ask, why are we a being that must keep itself open and, further, why it is the case that keeping oneself open – i.e., learning to be concerned in the right way – is experienced as a trial? That authentic searching would be a struggle (Kampf) for Heidegger and a re-collecting (colligere) for Augustine suggests that such an authentic self must be won back from the self in media res. Heidegger cites approvingly Augustine’s account of the experience of subjectivity as “oneri mihi sum” (Conf. X, 27, 38). In contrast to the Cartesian conclusion, “I think therefore I am,” we have the Augustinian description, “I am a burden to myself”. Both purport to describe consciousness, however, for Augustine (read by Heidegger) the burdensome nature of the self is precisely an index of its inevitable and ineluctable involvement in the world: The self is always already a displaced self.

The thesis of a Heideggerian opposition between the Cartesian and Augustinian models of the self has been developed in a careful and detailed manner by Coyne: “On multiple occasions from 1920-1931 Heidegger suggested that a critical retrieval of Augustine of Hippo’s anthropology could provide the resources for undoing Descartes’s alleged perversion of the cogito.” In these early courses Heidegger proposes to recover a “reversed cogito” or, as Coyne terms it, a cogito out-of-reach. Like Pascal – the fellow countryman, contemporary, and first great critic of Descartes – Heidegger contests the parameters of Cartesian intuition. For Pascal it is the failure of moral intuition that he finds unforgivable. Descartes has cut the statement short: I think

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23 ibid., 54
24 “The infinitely little is the least obvious. Philosophers have much oftener claimed to have reached it, and it is here they have all stumbled. This has given rise to such common titles as First Principles, Principles of Philosophy, and the like, as ostentatious in fact, though not in appearance, as that one which blinds us, De omni scibili.” Blaise Pascal. Pensées. translated by A. J. Krailsheimer. (London: Penguin, 1995), §72
therefore I am *wretched*. An original awareness of our moral failure, which is simultaneously an awareness of moral possibility, is co-given in consciousness. For Heidegger, it is not moral possibility, but possibility as such that contravenes the Cartesian account because it presupposes a world against which possibility can be seen. He, like Pascal, wants to contest the implicit and presumed transparency of the Cartesian *sum*. However, his, as Coyne suggests, is an interrogative reformulation: Not “I think therefore I am” but “Am I?” In contrast to Descartes, the *ego cogito* must be taken “in the sense of a formal indication, in such a way that it is not taken directly, but is related to the respective concrete instance of what it means.”

There are two models of such a displaced self in *Confessions*. The first is the dispersed self. In contrast to the beautiful things (*formosa*) Augustine questioned initially, he questions himself and discovers he is *deformis* and in his search has become *defluxus*, dispersed among many things (*in multa defluximus*). The dispersed self is thus the self *in media res* from which the authentic self is or is not won. Dispersion is not only the cumulative weight of the past in the present, but also determines our projection of the future and thereby the kind of concern by which we relate to it:

“In the *defluxus*, factical life forms out of itself, and for itself, a very determinate direction of its possible situations, which are themselves awaited in the *defluxus: delectatio finis curae*. Now this *curare* has a relation sense which changes in the historical-factical complex of life. It is enacted as *timere* and *desiderare*, as fearing (retreating from) and desiring (taking into oneself, giving oneself over to)” (207/153).

The dispersed self experiences its world as an awaiting of delight that will be the end of its concern (*curare*). Even in its present volatility the world is experienced as *delectatio*: “the life of the world in its manifold significance…appeals to us (206/152). The enactmental quality of this form of concern is that of fear and desire which are co-given with the world and always co-present in each

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25 Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*, 61
26 cf. 127, “The law of sin is the violence of habit” (141) “Ingrained evil had more hold over me than unaccustomed good” (150) Augustine freely chose the chains by which I am now bound.
experience. When I experience the *multum* of factual life as *prospera* I nonetheless *fear* losing it, and when I experience the *multum as adversa*, I desire *prospera*. This having of concern is not a state in a stream of consciousness, but is itself “had in the experiencing—this having-had is [its] being” (208/154).

Two consequences follow from this. First, we can only get at the nature of concern via its enactment: its “having had” is its being. Secondly, the enactment of concern is irreducibly complex, i.e., (to borrow language from *Being and Time*) its elemental components are *equiprimordial* and non-convertible. For that reason, it is always volatile:

“Thus, the enactment of experience is always insecure about itself in the complex of experience, there is no *medius locus* where there are not also counter-possibilities. …[thus] *continentia* is, by itself, a hopelessness, and that it must be given, if it is to be had somehow” (209/154).

*Continentia* describes the second mode of the displaced self. Yet, we should note immediately that this “gathered” self is no less a burden and no less displaced. However, its manner of having itself as burdensome and as displaced is what distinguishes the continent or “collected” self from the dispersed self. Because *continentia* is an enactment no less than *defluxus* it is subject to the same law of counter-possibility. It is a securing of the self from the past and in the present, but always vulnerable before the future. It is the recognition of this “hopelessness” – that of the resolute self beneath the relentless pressing-down-upon-it of the future – that constitutes authentic hope, which can only be had in the face of it. In other words, to be in despair in the right way is to have authentic concern and therefore hope.²⁷

²⁷ It is hard to miss the indirect references and indebtedness to Kierkegaard’s *Sickness Unto Death*, cited directly elsewhere in the lectures.
The two modes of the dispossessed self—defluxus and continentia—are two possible forms of concern, and each is a relational modification of the more basic experience of tentatio. For Heidegger, Augustine’s account of tentatio, “is no event, but an existential sense of enactment, a How of experiencing” (249/186). Thus, it stands to defluxus and continentia as an enactment-sense to two distinct relation-senses. It is not in its primordial sense a being-tempted-by this or that object, but rather the experience of future possibility which perpetually de-stabilizes the attempted securing of the self, whether that securing is authentic or inauthentic. Commenting on Augustine’s, “I am a burden to myself,” Heidegger notes that “possibility is the true burden” (249/186). The experiencing of this burden of possibility is a learning (dicere) about life, that same vita in which is found the remainder of God and before which the self is discerned in relief. Heidegger quotes Kierkegaard claiming that “The criterion for the self is always: that directly before which it is a self, but that in turn is the definition of criterion. …The greater the conception of God, the more of the self there is; the more the self, the greater the conception of God” (SUD 79, 80). Thus, in discovering life to be burdensome and discerning the way in which it is had correctly as burdensome we learn of God and conversely more about the self. Life is burdensome because we are given over to ourselves. The distinction between authentic and inauthentic appropriations of this situation (manifest in authentic an inauthentic forms of concern) is our attitude toward the self whose criterion is possibility. For the inauthentic self,

“In the defluxus, I give myself, and create for myself a situation that is, in a determinate sense, closed, a situation that carries a possibility in itself but its tendency is directed toward delectatio, bustling activity” (250-51/188).

28 It is worth noting this is hardly a formulation of phenomenological description and investigation to which religion is incidental!
Whereas the authentic self, “[finds itself] between these possibilities that impose themselves, and over which one does not reign – the comfortable ones do not see this” (250/187). Thus, tentatio is ingredient to both the authentic and the inauthentic life. It is the condition for the choice between them. Heidegger spends the remainder of the course describing its three forms: concupiscentia carnis (desire of the flesh), concupiscentia oculorum (desire of the eyes), and ambitio saeculi (secular ambition). All three forms are ways of loving the world and its objects, i.e., they are ways of having the world, and since, as we have seen repeatedly, having is the manner of being, all three forms of tentatio are ways of being in the world.

At stake for Augustine as for Heidegger is not the overcoming of temptation in any permanent sense, but rather a right relation to temptation as the basic movement of life. It is for that reason that understanding confiteri as a mode of enactment is key for accessing the correct interpretation of Augustine’s account. In confessing he recalls and relives the phenomenon of temptation and how he relates or tries to relate to it. The choice to confess is itself an interpretation: “Augustine does not merely characterize these phenomena objectively, as somehow existing, but his presentation is always in the fundamental posture of the confessio… (Confiteri: interpretation, here in a very determinate How!)” (212/157). Moreover, the I who confesses is a sum, an existence where “existence is pulled into being and a chance of being, so that precisely with this difference it could modify itself and yet does not have to” (213/157). This possibility of self-modification or of allowing oneself to be modified by what is external constitutes the heart of Heidegger’s reading of Augustine. He focuses on Augustine’s understanding of the transeo – the transition from waking to sleeping and sleeping to waking, from hunger or thirst to satisfaction or satiety, from ignorance to knowledge, from alienation to intimacy with God. This account of “passing” is the hermeneutic key to Augustine’s at times tortuous account of temptation because it is an enactmental category.
It is only in attending to the quality of the passing from need to satisfaction that we can identify whether an object is appropriated according to *uti* or *frui*: whether we desire it as something useful or as something desirable in itself. Confusing these distinct Augustinian orders of love is the consequence of fallenness and the source of sinfulness.

§4.1 *Concupiscencia Carnis*

The first form of *tentatio* is *concupiscencia carnis*, the desire for various forms of physical pleasure. Here Augustine is not merely articulating the difference between desiring good things and bad things, but also distinct ways of desiring good things. Do I desire to eat because it is necessary and therefore good for my body or because the food is delicious? Experiences which are otherwise necessary (e.g., eating and drinking) become pleasurable in the wrong way when we desire them not for sustaining our life, but for the pleasure they give us. What is necessary becomes (also) delightful: “So something is turned upside down, *molestia* and *malitie* are *deliciae*. Food and drink are supposed to be only *medicamenta* to sustain me,” however, “in the very passing lies an insidious trap of desire” (215/159). The *transeo* from hunger to satisfaction becomes pleasurable for me such that I can desire food for its pleasurableness rather than its goodness.

Before we charge Augustine with a preening scrupulosity, we should notice – as Heidegger does – that the relevant aspect of this investigation is that often *I cannot know from which motive I act*. Moreover, the uncertainty of whether I am involved in necessary concern for my body or the pursuit of a pleasurable meal is something I hide behind: “I turn the ‘necessity’…into a pleasure” (214/159). Thus, factical need and desire contain this “possibility of movement within themselves, such that this possibility pushes itself in between and in the first place as the proper *telos*” (ibid).
This uncertainty of the self to the self precludes self-transparency. “I cannot just look at myself and see myself lying open before me. I am concealed to myself...I can never appeal to a moment that is shut down, as it were, in which I supposedly penetrate myself. Already the next moment can make me fall, and expose me as someone entirely different” (216-17/161). Thus, tentatio, even as I learn to desire, taste, smell, touch, feel and hear correctly is always accompanied by the possibility of falling. The possible movement from indigentia (need) to iucunditas (delight) (and vice versa) is part of the structure of desire. Future possibility, therefore, is already ingredient to our experience and perception of the present. Temptation, therefore, is a formal indication of facticity: “[It] lurks precisely in what belongs to my facticity, what is with me and in which I am” (252/189). As such it is “historically present”, i.e., that the having that is the form of my being contains within itself the possibility of a future not-having or having-differently. This possibility of counter-movement – of a movement away from authenticity – equally characterizes the Augustinian self. It implies both obscurity and instability (inquietas). Whether my undertaking is motivated by need or the desire for pleasure it not always evident to me in the moment, and even when I have relative clarity that I am “moving towards” more authentic forms of life that attainment is always provisional in the light of future possibility.

These considerations supply a second valence of the Augustinian defluxus. Even when I am not dissipated amidst worldly goods in the present, I remain spread out in time. Thus, defluxus, while contrasted with continentia, is also the condition of its possibility. It is only as a being whose having has the form of temporality that the possibility for dissipation and integrity are available to me. (We can see here an anticipation of the account of resoluteness in Being and Time.) This dispersed self is the self in media res, as thrown. The awareness of oneself as such is one’s

29 In this Heideggerian reading of Augustinian defluxus we see also Geworfenheit: “in the defluere – the unrest – being thrown” (251/188).
qualification as spirit – to borrow from Kierkegaard – as capable of and defined by moral action.

The basic character of *defluxus* is *curare*, which Becker describes as, “a middle voice between the good and the bad parts” (271/203). This concern for one’s self admits of both genuine and non-genuine forms (bustling activity). Thus, *curare* is constituent of both *continentia* and *defluxus* (in the first sense). We can therefore describe *continentia* as the correct having of *curare*, which distinguishes it from being merely another form of *delectatio*.

Concern for oneself in the future therefore motivates both the dispersed self and the recollected self. The problem is not to transcend concern for oneself, but to understand how to be concerned in the correct manner. Augustine’s distinction between use (*uti*) and enjoyment (*frui*) is a distinction between two forms of concern. *Uti* is to be concerned with things as instrumental goods. It takes the form of a “coping” or “dealing with”. *Frui* is to be concern with things as ultimate goods. In the limit, this form of concern is the attunement of the soul directed towards God as the final “that for the sake of which” everything else is desired. Human *concupiscentia* is always in one form or another to use what should be enjoyed or to enjoy what should be used. It is, quite literally, a *dis-ordering* that results in a wrong relating. We can grasp the nature of *tentatio* as precisely this perennial possibility of mistaking the wrong relational sense. The different alignments of *uti* and *frui* are what distinguish the self as *defluxus*, in which they are mis-aligned, from the self as *continentia*, in which their correct alignment allows for that gathering together of the self from its enjoyment of the beautiful things to an ordered enjoyment of the beautiful *en si*.

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30 For example, Heidegger describes the “temptation of uti” (i.e., its misuse) as the “lust of entertainment”: “taking-delight-in, comfort, calculation of significance, pretending-to-oneself, more precisely: pretending one significance before the other one and, in this, wriggling oneself out of the noose” (258/193).

31 According to Heidegger, Frui is the basic characteristic of the Augustine basic posture toward life itself. Its correlate is the beautiful and therefore also the good therefore God: “*Fruitio dei* is a decisive concept in medieval theology” (272/205).
Yet, the recursive nature of facticity, always thrown back on itself by possibility, reminds us that while continentia is a direction in life it is never a permanent achievement in life. It provides the correct interpretation of inquietas by enabling us to follow our restlessness in the direction of authenticity, but even so, life remains one of movement towards or away from this elusive goal.

§4.2 Concupiscentia Oculorum

The second form of temptation, the concupiscentia oculorum, concerns the intellect rather than the appetite and affects. It is not related to the basic dealing-with of perceptive life, but rather to the looking-about-oneself [Sich-Umsehen]. Its basic dispersed form is curiosity, curiositas. Heidegger contrasts curiositas as the “lust of experience” with voluptas as the “lust of entertainment”. Curiositas is a kind of anesthetized mode of consciousness which can consider both the good and the bad because “the intention is such that it renders the content of the What accessible in such a way that it cannot trouble it, and keeps it at bay” (224/167). Heidegger links this intellectual seeing with the particular “taking-cognizance-of” that aims at objectivity. It grasps things as present-at-hand and renders them accessible. He writes:

“In curiosity in this relational direction, everything is in principle accessible, without restraints. … [It is] one principle way and one ‘existing’ opportunity for dispersion” (226/169).

Heidegger’s account clearly intends to sound certain similarities between curiositas and the theoretical attitude. It is called the lust of the eyes because when the senses are used to designate different orders of knowing, “to see means first to give an object as object” (226/168). Seeing thus exercises a kind of descriptive hegemony over other acts of cognizing that share analogs with the

32 rf. Vorhanden (225/168)
basic forms of sensual perception. We may say, “See how that sounds?” or “See how that tastes!”, but never “Hear how that looks?” or “Taste how that looks!” When we take cognizance of something present-at-hand we privilege the vocabulary of visibility. Thus, the determinations of knowledge (as taking-cognizance-of) are referred to *lux* as the condition of visibility and *lux* is restricted to “what is objective *qua* what is merely objective” (226/168). For both Heidegger and Augustine, the circumscription of the conditions of visibility to the merely objective sphere pertains to discourse about and our intercourse with God as well:

“God has to endure becoming a factor in human experiments. He has to respond to an inquisitive, pompous, and pseudo-prophetic curiosity, that is, a curious looking-about-oneself in regard to Him, which does not submit [fügt] to His sense of objecthood, that is, which is non-sense [Un-fügt]” (224/167). The quote above suggests an early anticipation of his critique of ontotheology, which is precisely to take God as an object, misapprehending the correct enactment- and relation-sense of religious inquiry. Yet just as we cannot always anticipate or prevent the delight that we take in the satisfaction of our basic needs, so too in an analogous way, having identified *curiositas*, we cannot hope to eliminate it completely, though we must endeavor in this. It is a perennial possibility of human existence: “Interjections of curiosity are interspersed throughout factical experience” (227/169).

33 In *Identity and Difference* Heidegger suggests that traditional metaphysics is, “about beings as such and as a whole” (54). The “wholeness” or unity of beings is in turn dependent on an ultimate ground to being (onto-logic) and a highest being (theo-logic): “The essential constitution of metaphysics is based on the unity of beings as such in the universal and that which is highest” (61). For that reason, metaphysics is onto-theo-logical. As such, metaphysics is unable to ask its own properly basic question concerning the original difference between Being and beings (*IDD*). Heidegger’s goal there is to extricate thinking from the onto-theo-logical tradition. His goal here is to show the inadequacy of theoretical language for a phenomenology of religion. However, these are the obverse and reverse sides of the same coin.

34 “The other relational senses are not functionalized for the achievement of access, but, inversely, seeing has the meaning of rendering accessible (what is objective), in the emphasized sense of the mere taking-cognizance-of” (226/168). On this interpretation to be *curious* about God is to employ a concept of “God” for one’s independent inquiry.
§4.3 Ambitio Seaculi

The third and final form of temptation, ambitio seaculi, is distinct from the first two because it cuts right to the heart of the Selbstwelt. The temptations of the flesh and the eyes are both essentially related to the Umwelt and the Mitwelt. Dealing-with and the curious looking-about-oneself “remain in an essential surrounding–worldly character of the object (significance): that is precisely what is characteristic of their corresponding experiential relations (and this so ‘objectively,’ that they precisely accomplish and enable the absorption)” (227/170). In the first form the self is “absorbed” in its dealing-with. In the second form its peculiar character is precisely that it is not mere absorption, but neither a having oneself. In both cases, as in the third, the self is no less a self in temptation. In all moments it is “lived by the world” and this “being-lived is a special How of facticity and can only be explicated on the basis of the authentic sense of existence” (228/170). In the first two forms of tentatio the self does not advert to itself as a self. It does not “articulate itself enactmentally in the experiential enactment” (228/170).

Only with the third form of tentatio have we driven our investigation to the heart of the self-world. Here the self “articulates itself enactmentally” and “its self-significance becomes finis delectationis. At issue is the self-validation in factical experiencing, that is, in the communal-worldly context of life, but finally also in the self-worldly contexts” (228/170). Here the timere and desideare co-given in previous experience are modified as the desire of the self to be loved and the desire of the self to be feared in its relation to the communal world, certainly, but as it pertains to the self: It concerns the self directly, but in its relation to the communal world in which it attempts to articulate itself: “the selfworld puts on airs in a communal-worldly situation it views
in a special way. It is about the being-in-communal-worldly-validity” (229/171). Heidegger suggests that here language, specifically as spoken self-communication, is ingredient to the enactment of the communal worldly performance of the self: “our daily furnace is the human language” (Conf. X, 37, 60). This desire to be esteemed in one form or another by one’s peers is, “a new mode of the sense-motivation of the molestia in facticity. […] A direction of concern, and indeed a direction co-given with the experience of ‘world’” (230/172). This molestia is not perceptual as with the first and, in a different way, the second forms of temptation, but an interpersonal-affective experience. In his later gloss on this section, Heidegger describes this activity of the self in the communal world as “leveling” which disfigures authentic concern for the self into a “concealed calculation”

Thus, ambitio seaculi consists in amor laudis, the love of praise in which we take delight in the experience of being praised rather than the givenness of that for which we are praised (and thereby in God). It is not only the experience that is being valued, but, “a certain declaration of value before other or for oneself…a bringing-into-validity in the communal world” (232/173). This communal-worldly validity then becomes the (inauthentic) course of motivation, and, as a consequence, we surrender [deponamos] the authentic veritas gaudium and shift our concern elsewhere, viz., to the delight of being praised. The challenge for Augustine, as Heidegger reads him, is to take true delight and therefore genuine pleasure (placere) in the donum, the givenness of things. Praise may be rightly deserved. It is right to praise the goodness of creation and therein the human action and achievement. The leading sense of praise is therefore that of the doer, not the recipient. One who esteems another “has the genuine direction of the placere, the genuine

35 cf. PRL 262/197
36 Heidegger renders Augustine’s deponere as “shifting the direction of cura, or the esteem and the positing of the finis, and ponere: moving it toward the opinions of human beings, asking an effort in read to ‘how they think of us,’…settling oneself there with one’s aspiration of factical life” (234/174).
mode of preferring; he performs the praising in view of the *donum* as the *donum Dei*…” (234/175). Yet, what is the right and just act of one person becomes an occasion of *tentatio* for another. The falling reaction to praise is a taking-onself-to-be-important, whereas the authentic reason is “to rejoice in one’s genuine ability to praise; then, that he is so far along as to see value and thus validate the genuine *donum* (Dei).” (236/176)\(^\text{37}\).

However, if *tentatio* is the permanent condition of inauthenticity, it is equally the permanent condition of its own overcoming. “It is a *certamen* (competition) between two direction of loving” (237/177). Moreover, it is only here in the self-world that we can overcome the *dispersio* and attain *continentia*. Such *continentia* has two distinct moments. On the one hand it is “refraining from the love of things” that is a “halting of the fall”. On the other hand, it is “*iustitia*, the bringing-together, position of love toward, love bringing-together, leading-toward, and genuine direction of concern. *Iustitia* is the authentically and originally sense-like directedness…in its entirety, of the factual experience of significance” (237/177). Heidegger’s account of Augustine’s *iustitia* gestures toward a richer account of *Mit(da)sein* than that of *solicitude* in *Being and Time*\(^\text{38}\). It involves, “a genuine giving-onself-over to the communal world, but a giving enacted from the clear position of one’s own in the facticity of one’s own life; such giving can never be proven in

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\(^{37}\) Heidegger’s account of *ambitio saeculi* anticipates his account of “solicitude” in *Being and Time* (GA 2, 121-123/157-159). Both are concerned with authentic and inauthentic forms of relating to other human beings. Both suggest that to attempt to ground oneself in relation to the other is a form of inauthenticity – though in 1920-21 this is thought in terms of one grounding one’s own identity in praise received from the other, whereas in 1927 it is thought in terms of one’s tendency to “leap in” to secure the identity of the other in a way that prevents her from doing this for herself. In the first we alleviate our own authentic concern inauthentically, in the second we alleviate the other’s authentic concern inauthentically.

\(^{38}\) It is highly significant that here the phenomenological analysis of *continentia* in relation to oneself entails the desire for *iustitia* for the other; that authentic self-possession implies a just relation to the other. Yet, as Dahlstrom notes, it is also suggestive that ‘this ‘context of loving’ that conditions the discussion of authenticity is absent from *Being and Time*.” “Truth and Temptation: Confessions and Existential Analysis” in *A Companion to Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religious Life*, edited by S.J. McGrath andAndrezej Wiercinski (Rodopi: Elementa Press, 2010), 278.
mere giving-over to the object in every sense” (236/177). Such a “giving-oneself-over” is an authentic acknowledgment of facticity and its overlapping worlds.

Ultimately, the condition for temptation is also the condition for its overcoming, the *donum*: “Finding joy in the *donum* is the highest duty and by no means convenient” (235/176). Yet the given is equally our historicity which we cannot get back behind (thrownness) as well as a present and perpetual process of giving with which we must contend. Or better, within which we live and move and have our being.

There is, however, a second form of *tentatio* that pertains directly to the *selbstwelt*, self-importance. The desires to be *loved*, *feared*, and (for either reason) *praised* constitute the first form of *ambitio saeculi*. Its second form, self-importance, unlike the first form, does not concern the intersection of the selfworld and the communal-world. Self-importance – pride – is a *tentatio* that presses on the selbstwelt alone.

Self-importance is the self’s relation to its own self-world. The *delectatio* is directed toward the self-world, rather than the standing-in-validity of the *Mitwelt*. In making an effort at *beata vita*, the self-world is taken to be important. “One’s own self-world...is presented to oneself...in order to explicitly take oneself to be important in one’s presented self-world” (238/178). From this result four possibilities: (1) We delight in not-good things as if they were good, (2) we take actual good things as if they were our own, (3) or we attribute the good we receive to our own merits, or finally (4) we find joy in not sharing our good with others. In all four instances,

“the direction of the *placer* and the *gaudium* is moved into the self, but precisely in such a way that self-world here becomes the still dominant communal world. Precisely in this worldly positioning the self is lost. The meaning of the authentic fall from the self: this losing or never gaining...” (240/179).
Pride presupposes a certain self-understanding, a grasping of oneself as a source of freedom and self-determinacy. This means that we can “dissipate” ourselves in worldly concern. Yet, here Heidegger senses a second “solution” to or overcoming of tentatio:

“In the last and most decisive and purest concern for oneself lurks the possibility of the most groundless dive [abgrundigsten Stuzes] and of authentically losing oneself. […] Augustine clearly sees the difficulty and the ultimately anxiety-producing character of Dasein in such having-of-one’self in full facticity” (241/181).

Thus, a pure concern for oneself, a recognition of freedom grounded by the abgrund of the nescio and the quaerero, leads to the disinterestedness characteristic of the authentic self. The paradox, which Heidegger credits Augustine with sensing is that one must, “tak[e] oneself to be less and less important by engaging oneself all the more” (241/180). Such an “anxiety-producing” attunement is precisely “full facticity.”

Heidegger reads the three forms of tentatio as so many stages of an interiore modo that moves from the attraction of perceptual objects to the lure of spiritual and intellectual desire, to the desire for interpersonal acclaim, and ultimately, to a deep concern for oneself that we find lodged, quite literally, if the route is true, at the heart of oneself. Each of the stages of tentatio is increasingly less ‘solid’ and one’s freedom comes increasingly into play.

§5. Conclusion: Molestia

The Augustinian nescio can be seen as a contradiction of the Cartesian dubito. For the Bishop of Thagaste, doubt is not methodological, but factual; it is written into the heart of the self, preventing both complete transparency – clarity and distinctness – in the present and security in the future. As Heidegger interprets it, the nescio signals a constituent “being-hidden-from-one’self” that forms
the existential basis of the destruction of, the “Nescio in qua parte stet victoria” – I do not know on which side is the victory. But this ignorance, while it contests the character of truth in certain domains, simultaneously opens up possibilities as it closes others. It is the source of the burdensome nature of life (molestia). That burden is an opportunity for seriousness [Ernstes], “an opportunity with oneself rendering facticity experienceable (opportunity is a character of enactment)” (254/190). Thus, molestia is ultimately the enactmental center of Heidegger’s interpretation of Confessions X.

“The molestia is not a piece of object…but designates a How of experiencing. And precisely as such a How, it characterizes the How of factual experiencing, insofar as we now consider it in aligning it to our special task…” (231/172).

In the same way that proclamation became the enactmental-center of Heidegger’s interpretation of Paul, so molestia becomes the enactmental center of his reading of Augustine. Molestia is “something which pulls life down and what is peculiar to it is that it can pull down” (243/182). The various tentationes are the differentiated experience of molestia according to the relations of one’s being (ambitio saeculi), knowing (concupiscentia oculum), and loving (concupiscentia carnis)39. However, these relations of the self-communal- and surrounding worlds in the aggregate constitute the world as such in which I live in this or that way. Thus, molestia tells us something of the kind of being we are by telling us something of the kind of life by and in which we are constituted: "The life in which something like molestia can be experienced at all…is a life whose being is grounded in a radical having-of-oneself” (242/181).

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39 Heidegger refers to the complex belonging-together of esse, nosse, amare as “the real pre-structuring [Prästruktur]” (242/181).
Heidegger summarizes this in the compact formula, “the more life lives, the more life comes to itself” (241/181). The developmental living of life is life, as Dasein, coming to self-consciousness of its various worlds. Thus, the surrounding world is better understood by our reflective consciousness of the communal world, and both are further and for the first time essentially understood in their constituting relations to the selfworld of conscious interiority. Only by acceding to the Selbstwelt are we able to grasp the full enactmental sense of facticity, “the happening of enactment…which is only in the enactmental self-formation” (243/182). When life is understood to be lived this way, “the more life comes to itself”, which is to say, the more we grasp that life, of which we are an instance, is (an enactmental) having: “the being of life somehow also consists in the fact that it is had” (243/182). Such a life is experienced by the self as a burden which is why molestia is the enactmental center of gravity about which the various phenomena detailed by Augustine and Heidegger orbit in equal parts attracted and repelled by the center: “It is a having of oneself that takes effect only in enactment, and fully only in its historical facticity” (243/182). This signals the fuller account of historicity lacking from the earlier discussion of historical consciousness and historical criticism in interpreters of both Paul and Augustine.

Yet, the discovery of the Selbstwelt and the differentiation of its various implications of being, knowing, and loving\(^{41}\) in no way resolves or lessens the molestia. On the contrary, it

\(^{40}\) Though space does not permit us to pursue it further, we should note here that Heidegger’s interpretation of the communal world is an occasion for the self to reflect on its manner of relatedness to others and so come to greater self-possession. Esposito observes that this one-sidedness stands in tension with the broader account of the Confessions in which “having received oneself coincides with the discovery that this is self is for another, and it is precisely in the tension of this relation that the unique sense of the historicity of being is to be found” (293). Thus, the Augustinian conversion to God is perhaps reduced to an “endogenous” shift of the self towards itself in its relational manners of engagement. While, Esposito seems to overestimate the degree to which Heidegger thinks a kind of “pure self-possession” is possible, he is no doubt correct to note the lack of consideration of the degree to which the other – and perhaps the Other – is essential to Augustine’s account. (Constantino Esposito, “Memory and Temptation” in A Companion to Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life, edited by S.J. McGrath and Andrezej Wiercinski (Rodopi: Elementa Press, 2010), 285-307)

\(^{41}\) With respect to the account of loving in this course, Dahlstrom offers an interesting counterpoint to Esposito’s suggestion that Heidegger is largely interested in a pure self-possessing. He suggests that Heidegger is “shifting the basic locus of [phenomenological] investigation from a perceptual intentionality to a loving existence,” which is part
intensifies it. *Molestia* is “a How of experiencing, a burden to, and an endangering of having-of-one'self – in full facticity” (244/183). The reference to endangerment is intriguing, if also a bit ominous. How does molestia endanger the self? Perhaps this is case because the self, as given over to itself (*donum*) gives to itself in the concrete and genuine enactment of itself that possibility of its own falling as an expression of its ownmost radical self-concern. Yet, doing so it simultaneously gives itself “the full, concrete, factual ‘opportunity; to arrive at the being of its ownmost life” (244/183). Augustine’s *confessio* enacts a kind of *colligere* – a gathering or re-collecting of the self in its historical facticity past and present as a way of having-himself authentically. Yet, the phenomenological description of *tentatio* undermines an overly-simplified interpretation of the meaning of this act since its conclusion is precisely that this present having of oneself even in its authenticity is invested by a future which is the perpetual possibility of the authenticity slipping away, falling back into old forms of being, knowing and loving, or new ones diversely but equally inauthentic. This is the true threat of the *ambitio seaculi*, under the sway of which a person could be externally perfect in her actions and speech and yet harbor a pride that destroys her from within. Thus, a concern for being a self is made possible by grasping that being is a having-of-the-self and yet this self-concern “forms the radical possibility of falling, but at the same time the opportunity to win itself” (245/183).

At the communal-worldly level this self-having interacts necessarily with the *Selbstwelten* of other *Dasein* in a way that constitutes a co-experiencing of standing-in-validity, which is a form of validation peculiar to the intersubjective world of meaning. This too is experienced as a burden. It is clear that Heidegger considers its average and everyday form to be that of an inauthentic “bustling activity”, yet the same law of counter-possibility would apply here as it did with the

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of his rethinking of (Husserlian) phenomenology. “Temptation, Self-Possession, and Resoluteness: Heidegger’s Reading of *Confessions* X and What is the Good of *Being and Time*” in *Research in Phenomenology*, (39), 250.
selbstwelt, implying that there is equally an authentic form of communal-worldly participation, and perhaps something more robust than the various forms of solicitude sketched hastily in Being and Time.

Finally, the having at the surrounding-worldly level is the condensation of self- and communal-worldly relations in their widest theater: “factual experiencing, dealing-with, use, enjoyment, care for daily life, reficere ruinam [restoring the decayed], procreation, preservation” (245/184). Yet this is hardly a secondary matter. On the contrary, our individual and communal possibilities are hemmed in from all sides by the surrounding world within which we come to ourselves in media res. The self and its community are those who ask,

“which ‘can’ …is present for us factically and historically[?] The ‘can’ comprises in itself the objectity [Objektität] (an objectity rooted in something altogether different) of the existential in the direction of its ownmost sense!)” (246/184).

Facticity ultimately reveals the essential questionability of life as its fundamental enactment, and we would be right to hear here Being and Time’s persistent refrain: Dasein is the being for whom its being is a question. That facticity is “questionability and [the] enactment of questionability” (265/199) reveals the inappropriateness of what Heidegger calls “axiologization”, by which he seems to mean that an axiology will require the “right” external actions to the detriment of the interiority that is the real and deeper goal of Christianity and authentic existence.

"What is precisely crucial is to constantly have a radical confrontation with the factical, and not to flee. In order to attain existence, I precisely must have it, this having precisely means living in it, but not giving in not even overcoming it comfortably and axiologically” (265/199).

Molestia is thus an opportunity for “seriousness” in the investigation of life, i.e., in philosophy. Philosophy as exploratio is a new kind of seeing, an antidote to curiositas: “[the] possibility of seeing the being free, the overcoming and the having overcome, the understanding of who I ‘am’
and what I ‘can’” (267/201). Such an exploratio engenders angst because it is the letting-be-encountered of various possibilities. This play of possibility is not only in the present but also with respect to the past as it pertains to the present, and that insight is the origin of Heidegger’s account of deconstruction [Destruktion]:

“Since, in the end, factical existence is crucial, and in it, destruction is lived and has meaning, everything to be destructed is, in the end, to be explicated as to its How. That is, the task is: precisely to see the unspoken lead [Duktus] that one does not gain as long as one lives only in the matter itself, for example by discussing it” (269/202).

The return to factical life de-constructs the self precisely by leading it back to its insuperable origin in the dynamism of factical life. Such a leading-through of consciousness back to life is the purpose of formal indication, which allows us to grasp the way in which all thinking is ultimately generated from out of the dynamic contingencies of the world. To shoulder the burden of facticity amidst tentatio leads to insight, self-revelation, and the possibility of a kind of self-possession. Yet, precisely because the self so-possessed is such before a ground that is itself unground (abgrund), such a self remains, for all that, a heterogeneous self, displaced by the very conditions that constitute its freedom. That “I am” is an “I can” means that I can lose myself, but also “forms the possibility of loving and of winning oneself” (246/184).

This generates a radical set of possibilities. As the Augustinian self comes to understand its worlds and ultimately itself as gift (grace) a novel enactment of concern becomes possible. All worldly goods become “void” (inanescit) before the gratuity of God that generates the “purest concern for oneself,” (214/180), a concern for oneself as radically given over to oneself. Here the self does not stand before worldly powers, intellectual pretensions, or private ambition, but merely before grace, interpreted by Heidegger as the radical givenness of things. This self is capable of what Heidegger calls a groundless dive [abgrün digsten Sturzes], “‘groundless’ because
the dive has no longer any hold, and it cannot be enacted before anything, so that one could finally turn it into a secular importance after all. Here lies what is really satanic in temptation!” (214/181).

The “satanic” temptation when faced with the radical freedom of oneself is to choose “egoism” as the mode of self concern, “a dangerous individualism.” The other alternative is to choose what amounts to an early formulation of Gelassenheit: “Self-concern is precisely the most difficult: taking oneself to be less and less important by engaging oneself all the more” (ibid). Such is the “‘anxiety-producing character’ of Dasein in such having of oneself (in full facticity)” (ibid).

Here we might ask, is this still a phenomenology of religious life? Heidegger set out to save religion from a reduction to science by showing that it can only be authentically understood with respect to its originary motivations in factical life. However, his own emphasis on enactment pushed to a radical degree appears to have reduced grace (gift) – the Augustinian self as for God, because given over to itself (created) by God – to facticity (givenness). If it is true that “Christian religiosity lives temporality as such” (80/55, 104/73, 116/83), does it live it in a distinct way? Or, is the content of religious life incidental to its enactment? There are many moments in both courses the tell against such an interpretation, yet Heidegger’s concluding note is less constructive than one might hope. Life as molestia and tentatio is the perennial possibility of losing and winning oneself, but should one undertake to win herself from out of (Christian) life towards what or before what does she do so? It appears it is before the pure movement of life – but what of the “originary world” of Christianity? At what point does such a radical apophasis become simply non-religious?
Chapter 6

A Formal Problem and a Climacean Response

“There is an old proverb: *oratio, tentatio, meditatio facunt theologum*. Similarly, for a subjective thinker, imagination, feeling and dialectic in impassioned existence-inwardness are required.” —Søren Kierkegaard (CUP, 350)

“How little depends on the What of the content; everything depends on the How.” —Heidegger PRL §10, 148

§1. Introduction

Heidegger reads Paul and Augustine in a formally indicative way and also as forerunners of his own formally indicative approach. Paul and Augustine, despite their inevitable indebtedness to prevailing discourses (Jewish and Greek), nonetheless struggle to allow the categories for an interpretation of (religious) life to rise to the surface. Proclamation, affliction, obstinate waiting, *parousia*; confession, *beata vita, tentatio, molestia* – these are not the language of theory, but that of daily life. It would be difficult to gainsay the claim that Heidegger’s enactmental reading of both authors enriches our understanding of not only their *thought* – for that is too easily disembodied – but also their *approach*, which is to say, the motivated and motivating intentions of their work.
Heidegger claims, to recall earlier chapters, that formal indication can engender a new kind of philosophy of religion, which would be a properly phenomenological one because it will consider religion as it appears and is experienced in factical life. In returning to factical life it provides a distinct way of access [Weg des Zugangs] to religious phenomena that entails the rejection of predetermined theoretical frameworks that preemptively and uncritically privilege certain phenomena over others. Formal indication secures this new way of access by bracketing our consideration of the content-sense (Gehaltsinn) and relation sense (Bezugsinn) in order to grasp the sense in which the religious is enacted from out of our factical life (Vollzugsinn). In plain terms, Heidegger is suggesting that before we can determine that the religious is a phenomenon with a universal, law-like structure or belonging to a particular state or region of consciousness we must undertake the more difficult task of asking how people are religious.

In his chosen example of Christian religious life, for example, Heidegger suggests that it is only once we have grasped Paul’s experience of proclaiming the Gospel or the peculiar way that he as configured his existence in light of an eschatological horizon both already and not-yet here, or when we have considered carefully all that is entailed in Augustine’s confession of tentatio that we are prepared to grasp the larger web of relations by which other aspects of their analysis are gathered together in a complex whole. Thus, the way that these people have the religious (Vollzugsinn) will aid in determining the most appropriate relational sense, rather than presupposing it to be one theoretical framework or another. Together these two senses constitute the “how” of having a particular “what” of experience.

It is important to Heidegger’s account that we are able to bracket the content sense; that it is possible to determine a particular how (a having) independent of the what that is had by it in that manner. In other words, that we can consider the same content from various relations and motivations. Yet, precisely here, in this relation of how to what – of having to being – we
must ask a question: is it really the case that the content of the Pauline proclamation or of the Augustinian confession is unaltered or unaffected by the \textit{how}? That understanding how either author has his message is separable from that message itself? Or, more to the point, is it the case that we can grasp the \textit{how} of enactment independent of the content so enacted? Might it not rather be true that what the message is – its \textit{Gehaltsinn} – can in some cases structure its particular enactment? Indeed, could it be the case that certain contents require specific forms of enactment and the relational forms consequent upon them? And might this not be true, above all, for religious contents?

\textbf{§2. A Formal Problem}

\textbf{§2.1 Religious Testimony the limits of Formal Indication}

We had occasion in chapter 4 to consider Paul Ricoeur’s account of \textit{testimony}, which provides us, perhaps, with a way into this problematic. Ricoeur presupposes the distinction between \textit{how} and \textit{what} greatly emphasized by Heidegger. Testimony is a particular act on the part of the one who testifies. It stands in relation to, what we might call, the \textit{testament}, that about which or to which one testifies. Testimony is a particular enactment of the testament, although testifying is not the only possible relation one may have towards a testament. The fractious Thessalonian community is an example of this. There are those who continue to testify to the Pauline proclamation of the \textit{kerygma} and those who have “fallen” away, i.e., interpreted their relation to that same proclamation differently. While Ricoeur’s account distinguishes between act and meaning it does not separate them. Testimony as an act is meaningful because it is a response to a given meaning. Its meaningfulness is in an important sense derivate of that original meaningful event. Whether it is in fact testimony at all, whether as testimony it succeeds or
fails, whether it is better or worse – any of these qualifications presuppose a relation to the original meaning or content (\textit{Gehaltsinn}) to which it bears indelible reference in its very existence. Therefore, while the internal logic of that activity may be logically separable and discernable, its existence is not\textsuperscript{1}.

We have here a kind of existential-hermeneutic circle: for we never have isolated contents, they are always being enacted in one way or another, and yet, to speak about better and worse or more and less authentic enactments is to presuppose the content by which those very enactments are to be measured: that \textit{of which} they are authentic or inauthentic enactments. The circle is \textit{existential} because it concerns the \textit{in media res} nature of content and enactment (i.e., facticity). It is \textit{hermeneutic} because the enactment, as a form of expression, is itself always also an interpretation. This is a problem for the Heidegger of the religion courses.

On the one hand, he attempts to get at the motivational ground of the testifier or enactor, and yet the nature of motivation is such that it presupposes a \textit{donum} – a prior meaningful event to which my motivated-enactmental eventuation is responsive. Therefore, we have good reason to question Heidegger’s account of formalization: the proposed bracketing of the \textit{Gehaltsinn}.

On the other hand, Heidegger’s tri-partite account of meaning does not question whether the \textit{what} and \textit{how} moments of intentionality are always distributed (or related) in the same way. There are certainly examples where the same content can be viewed under a variety of enactmental and relational paradigms: I can, as we have seen, examine a sunset as an astronomer, an astrologer, a painter, or the Theban chorus after a long war. But this variety in our possible enactmental relations toward natural phenomenon, for example, does not decide

\textsuperscript{1}Heidegger insists throughout the course that (1) factual life experience “designates: (1) the experiencing activity, (2) that which is experienced through this activity, ... [and that] it is precisely the fact that the experiencing self and what is experienced are not torn apart like things that expresses what is essential in factual life experience” (9/7). Thus, (2) factual life already contains “directions of sense...factual meaning...[in which a] new basic articulation of life is raked up” (132/93). The claim of formal indication is that (3) it is the manner (\textit{Vollzugsinn}) of one’s basic con-frontation with “the self-assertion of the forms of what is experienced” that articulates their primary significance: “seeing and hearing lend the content, the experienced significance [lends] its basic articulation” (223/166).
whether there are specific phenomena whose Gehalt-, Bezug-, and Vollzugsinn mutually entail one another to a greater degree. This would be a situation in which the content can only be grasped as part of or as entailing a particular form of enactment. Heidegger, perhaps because of his reading of Kierkegaard, has already noted the distinct nature of the esthetic, ethical, and religious spheres in order to critique neo-Kantianism and the philosophy of worldviews for beginning with scientific objectifications and only then deriving their “subjective foundation” through “reverse argumentation”. This method presuppose a particular how that determines the content in such a way that it, “blocks…any free access to the sphere of lived experience, to consciousness.”

Thus, we must press Heidegger, first, on what the sense is in which the Gehaltsinn can truly be “bracketed” in order to isolate the Vollzugsinn. Has not the enactment sense always already taken a particular form on account of the meaning to which it is a response – even when that form has been covered over? Indeed, does not this link constitute the very possibility of the recovery of meaning? Second, we must ask whether the religious (to keep to our present thematic) is not an instance of a phenomenon whose Gehaltsinn cannot be in any way bracketed from its Vollzugsinn. Finally, there is a third hermeneutic challenge to Heidegger. The tripartite account of meaning is not only a reconfiguration of phenomenological description, but also – and inevitably – the grafting of hermeneutics onto that tradition. Yet the logic of supplanting that characterizes grafting is perhaps a less apt analogy than that of cultivation. For Heidegger, the hermeneutic development of phenomenology was not about breathing new life into a method that had exhausted itself (hardly!), but rather about having been led by that very method (“Husserl gave me my eyes”) to see the historical individual at the origin of every

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2 GA 57/58, 108/83
reduction and shift in attitude. Therefore, the graft of hermeneutics on phenomenology can equally be described as the development of phenomenology from within on account of the (Kierkegaardian) insight that the phenomenologist, no less than the phenomena she describes, is factical in her deepest reality. By this logic, hermeneutics is cognate to phenomenology and therefore need not limit itself to accommodate phenomenological method. The hermeneutic challenge to Heidegger claims that in exaggerating the enactmental quality of Christian factical life at the expense of its Gehaltsinn, he misapprehends certain important dimensions of both the Pauline proclamation and the Augustinian confession with the result that his phenomenological explication of Pauline eschatology and his critique of Augustinian desire do not land quite where he intends them to.

§2.2 A Pauline Problem

Heidegger’s over-formalized account of the eschatological enactment of the Thessalonians—the enactmental expression of their having-become—leads to a one-sided characterization of Christian hope as suffering or affliction (Kampf) before an unknown content. Yet, if Christian hope—as the basic attunement of Christian factical life—were truly content-less how could its enactment be meaningful?

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4 We need only return to Heidegger’s comments to Husserl from Chapter 1 to see that they are an invitation to his mentor to see the implications of his own method: “[First note:] Does not a world-as-such belong to the essence of the pure ego?”; “[Second note:] See our conversation in Todtnauberg [April, 1926] about ‘being-in-the-world’ (Being and Time, I, § 12, § 69) and its essential difference from presence-at-hand ‘within’ such a world.” (BH 325. And later in the same draft: “Isn’t this action [i.e., the transcendental reduction] a possibility of the human being, but one which, precisely because the human being is never present-at-hand, is a comportment [a way of ‘having oneself’], i.e., a way of being which comes into its own entirely from out of itself and thus never belongs to the positivity of something present-at-hand?” (BH 326). See also Sebastian Luft: “Heidegger’s fundamental ontology was an immanent development, rather than a scathing criticism, of his own phenomenology” in “Husserl’s Concept of the ‘Transcendental Person’: Another Look at the Husserl–Heidegger Relationship” in International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 13(2), 141
The crux of Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of early Christian eschatology is his claim that, “the expression [of parousia] changes its entire conceptual structure, not only its sense in the process of history. […] …we never get to the relational sense of the parousia by merely analyzing the consciousness of a future event. The structure of Christian hope, which in truth is the relational sense of parousia, is radically different from all expectation” (102/71). On the part of the apostle Paul, the motivational center is the act of proclamation and the subsequent affliction it engenders. However, on the part of those who hear the word, the response takes one of two possible forms of life: obstinate waiting or brooding speculation. The first faces an indeterminate future before which it remains “awake and sober”. The second remains “stuck in the worldly” and attempts to discern the advent of the eschaton by deciphering signs. The first accepts the uncertainty as the permanent feature of Christian eschatology, while the second speaks of “peace and security”. These two modes of life lead to two opposed formulations of hope. The brooding speculation narrowly centered on the self’s immortality is a “boasting” hope, whereas for the one who waits obstinately, hope is a form of “working” the world, which awaits the parousia like “a thief in the night” – vigilant and prepared. In response to this account we can make three responses.

1. First, Heidegger draws a false dichotomy between a naïve inauthentic religiosity and a radical eschatological agnosticism. In his characterization of the false hope grounded in speculation he perhaps has Nietzsche in mind. In his Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche launched a particularly forceful formulation of the critique that Christian eschatology is born of a ressentiment that constructs an ideal future in which the will to power of the weak is finally able to reverse the worldly order of oppressor and oppressed. On such an account, eschatology

5 For example, “And what do [the Christians] call that which serves them as comfort against all the sufferings of life? […] —they call that ‘the last judgment,’ the coming of their kingdom, the kingdom of God—meanwhile, however, they live ‘in faith,’ ‘in love,’ ‘in hope,’” Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 28.
is nothing but escapism or wish-fulfillment. In response to something like this critique, Heidegger makes two claims. First, he is keen to maintain that Christian eschatology does not lessen existential anxiety, but rather intensifies it. Second, the kind of vengeful wish fulfillment described by Nietzsche presupposes a fairly detailed picture of what the *parousia* will look like. Against this, Heidegger offers a *parousia* that has been evacuated of content. Yet, here we have every right to ask if we must choose for our account of authentic Christian eschatology either the naïve escapism characterized by Nietzsche or the merely heuristic account of the *parousia* offered by Heidegger? The warrant for a new investigation is provided in the text itself. The occasion for Paul’s first letter to the Thessalonians is their very concrete concern for those who have died and will die before the *parousia*. Paul’s answer is neither escapism nor agnosticism:

> “But we do not want you to be uninformed, brothers and sisters, about those who have died, so that you may not grieve as others do who have no hope. For since we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so, through Jesus, God will bring with him those who have died.” (1 Thess. 4:13-15)

This is an eschatological account that must pass through the Caudine forks of finitude and death—surely a strange escape route. The Thessalonians are exhorted to grieve otherwise, but not to cease grieving. Moreover, while Heidegger is right to suggest that Paul’s response is ultimately an enactmental exhortation to “stay awake and sober”, it nonetheless involves an indispensable claim about the resurrection that is essential to the mimetic logic of the early Christian community: as the Thessalonians imitate Paul imitating Christ in life, so too in death and resurrection. In other words, the essentially enactmental character of Christian religious life is tied to the kerygmatic meaning of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.
2. Second, as a consequence of Heidegger’s formalized account of the parousia he has reduced hope to affliction. The meaning of hope is the Christian’s afflicted existence in the present lived before or within the horizon of an indeterminate future. From here it is not difficult to anticipate the move Heidegger will gradually make over the next few years from an indeterminate future to what Judith Wolfe has called the “eschatology without eschaton” of Being and Time. Here, this conflation leads to a one-sided interpretation of the text and through it of Christian factual life experience. Along these lines Wolfe argues that this reduction “misidentifies Paul’s basic eschatological mood, which is not affliction but hope. This virtue alone is absent from his writings on religion.”

3. Third, there is a shift from considering the priority of the Vollzugsinn as a corrective emphasis to considering it as an essential basis. Initially, Heidegger describes the three strata of meaning as interdependent and equiprimordial moments in a single act. His prioritization of the enactmental level of meaning is intended as a corrective to a dominant and largely theoretical discourse that privileges the theoretical relation (Bezugsinn) which presupposes the distinction of subject and object and therefore conditions our account of the world without ever adverting to the prior level of worldly experience in which any and all directions of inquiry are motivated and, as motivated, presupposes a basic concurrence between Dasein and the world of which the relative abstractions of subject and object are a derivation. However, as the religion courses progress (and this will hold true for the next few decades of Heidegger career) his account of that pre-predicative field of meaning – itself the prior condition for subsequent differentiations of meanings – increasingly privileges the enactmental (i.e., strictly formal)

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6 Heidegger does reference, briefly, a type of joy concomitant with the “great despair” of the believing Christian. It is a joy that “comes from the holy spirit” and so is “not motivated from out of one’s own experience” (PRL 94/66). Such a joy is not proportionate to one’s experience (that would be optimism), but rather is grounded in the Christian virtue of hope, which does not enable an escape from the demands of finitude, but rather harbors the possibility of living them otherwise.

7 Wolfe, Eschatology, 65
level of meaning to such a degree that what began as a corrective emphasis increasingly becomes an essential starting point for any and all inquiries, and this to such a degree that the significance of the content becomes increasingly non-determinative for the authentic enactment: Gradually a logical distinction becomes a real distinction. This culminates in the ethically problematic account of authenticity in *Being and Time* in which the resolute projection and election of possibility, grasped against the screen of finitude, is described independent of the actual contents (i.e., concrete courses of action) of Dasein. So too here, Heidegger attempts to render certain religious structures with a degree of formality that empties them of certain essential relations to contents that co-determine them.

Here, in a sense, we are turning Heidegger’s successful critique against him. Heidegger critiqued the various theoretical approaches to religion for failing to acknowledge the particularities of the traditions they conflated under the concepts of a theoretical vocabulary. Yet, Heidegger in his fidelity to the facticity particular to Christianity, nonetheless succumbs to an analogous formalism that threatens to undermine his rich interpretations.

On the one hand, Heidegger is characteristic of the dominant (protestant) theological approach of his age in searching primitive Christianity for a kerygmatic and charismatic *Urpunkt* from which to leverage a critique of the subsequent (Hellenized) Christian tradition. We should not forget that alongside the three great *solas* of Luther’s reformation was the humanist battle cry, *ad fontes*, which bears an undeniable, if very general, kinship with Husserl’s *zu den Sachen selbst*. The re-formation was in its first instance intended as a re-turn, a more authentic repetition of early Christian commitment and community. On the other hand, Heidegger’s appropriation of this orientation is itself a distinct repetition mediated as it is by

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8 However, we must also note that he is often critical of this impossibly broad critique as one which displaces the real concern regarding religious experience and expression. It also has the tendency to make of primitive Christianity an easily identifiable object-historical situation able to be incorporated into any number of world-historical accounts.
the categories of his nascent hermeneutic phenomenology. What the lecture courses are ultimately in search of is a Befindlichkeit—a primordial attunement of the believing soul coram Deo. The tension in his analysis arises because it is an analysis which purports at one and the same time to take the believer as belonging to a particular tradition, and therefor to interpret her religious activity within the horizon of a particular revelation, and yet it simultaneously seeks to bracket the content of that revelation in order to isolate her enactmental activity. Yet, as we have seen, to interpret Christian hope merely in terms of its enactment is to make it indistinguishable from a similar set of phenomena. Thus, it becomes (merely) eschatological affliction. As Wolfe notes, anticipating the more fully “secularized” analyses of Being and Time, “Interpreting [eschatological affliction] as a function of human situatedness resists the inclusion of the traditional Christian objet of this disposition. Its object is only the world in its transience.”

Wolfe’s larger argument is that Heidegger’s eschatology runs into problems that are consequences of attempting to eradicate the religious foundations of an irreducibly religious concept. The account here is a distinct but consonant critique. We have gone back to Heidegger’s consideration of those concepts as religious concepts and noted the problematic articulation of formal indication that might lead one to question his articulation of these concepts even as religious concepts. The emphasis on enactment is not problematic, but its potential one-sidedness is. Beyond this hermeneutical-phenomenological critique, a second problematic consequence arises. Formalization leads to a failure to acknowledge the concrete contents that are the concerns of daily life as exemplified in his reading of 1st Thessalonians.

A similar problem occurs in Heidegger’s reading of Augustine because his approach requires that the ultimate goal of our striving be content-less or effervescently heuristic in order

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9 Wolfe, Eschatology, 50
to avoid predetermining the proper relational and enactmental forms of its fulfillment in factual life.

§2.3 An Augustinian Problem

a. *Beata Vita & Veritate*

It is worth noting at the outset that Heidegger’s appraisal and interpretation of Augustine is more ambiguous than that of Paul, even if at the same time his phenomenological explication is richer and finds greater material to work with in *Confessions X*. While he is at times critical of the “Hellenization thesis” of Harnack and Troeltsch, he nonetheless remains suspicious of the Greek form and expression Augustine’s thought often takes. He shifts, not always consistently, between a critical line of inquiry and what amounts to a textually and interpretively driven argument for Augustine as proto-phenomenologist of the religious self. This ambiguity in Heidegger’s attitude towards the Bishop from Thagaste is signaled by the course title, “Augustine and Neo-Platonism”, despite which we do not turn to an explicit consideration of Neo-Platonism until the final sections. Even there, the elliptical concluding lines suggest that it is perhaps Augustine who is enacting a deconstruction of Plotinus, rather than Heidegger deconstructing the metaphysical elements in Augustine.

Nevertheless, Heidegger does claim to offer an important critique of the metaphysical elements in the Augustinian account of the *beata vita* and its relation to *veritas*. “*Beata vita* is *gaudium*, more closely, *gaudium de veritate* understood as existentially related to the *vita beata* (by way of *veritas*, however we have, at the same time, the invasion of Greek philosophy)

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10 The name Plotinus, in fact, only appears three times in the entire text: once to suggest his influence on Bergson (159/115), once to attribute a claim of Augustine regarding beauty to him (220/163), and finally as the heading of a final marginal note to the last section of the course (the note itself does not mention Plotinus by name) (269/202).
11 “Tradition – not or not entirely destructed [*destruiert!*]” (193/141).
He critiques this account as being (1) unnecessitated, (2) as desiring certainty and (3) therefore as bringing an end to the restlessness characteristic of authentic searching, i.e., as proposing an answer to the questionability of the self.

In response to these characteristically “metaphysical” dimensions of the text, Heidegger proposes to use formal indication to bracket the “Greek” content of Augustine’s account in an effort to uncover the enactmental heart of the Confessions in which veritas and beata vita are grasped as existential truth. The proposal, whatever its efficacy, is important for two reasons. First, this is an early account of what Heidegger means by destruktion. Second, it is not clear in light of the more generous moments of Heidegger’s reading of Augustine that this is not what Augustine is in some sense already doing.

Heidegger’s first critique is that Augustine simply introduces the equation of the search for God and the search for a happy life. This implies that the suggested relation between these two things is not motivated by a consideration of factical life as such, but introduced by some other (dogmatic) consideration. In response to this charge we need to note that this is not the first time the term beata vita appears in Confessions. It does not appear often, which suggests that it is used deliberately and as something of a technical term for Augustine. But it does appear once prior to Book X and that is in Book VI, which occupies an important place in the chiastic structure of the first nine books of the Confessions.

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12 E.g., “veritas and beata vita: existential truth” (200/147).
13 “…everything to be destructed is, in the end, to be explicated as to its How. That is, the task is: precisely to see the unspoken lead that one does not gain as long as one lives only in the matter itself, for example by discussing it” (269/202).
14 “For when I seek you, my God, I seek the happy life. […] Tradition—not, or not entirely, destructed! Then, the question “how do I search for God” becomes the question “how do I search for the happy life.” (Augustine immediately gives an answer to the question: “But what do I love when I love you?”: beata vita. This answer does not follow from what preceded it” (193/131).
15 Book X accounts for 16 of the 17 times the phrase appears in Confessions.
16 The chiastic structure of the first nine books draws the reader attention to book 5 as the middle book and “low point” of Augustine’s dissipation in the world. Thereafter the death of his friend (Book IV) and his disillusionment with the Manicheans (Book V) he sets sail for Rome and eventually finds himself in Milan. Thus, Book VI continues an upward ascent from Thagaste to Rome to Milan (geographically) and from Faustus to Ambrose (religiously). The second trajectory will culminate in the mystical vision at Ostia shortly before Monica’s death in Book IX. However, that path passes through Augustine’s encounter with a beggar in the streets of Milan that serves to make clear to him the vanity of his own ambitio seaculi. It is in the wake of that encounter that Augustine
Augustine’s later discussion in Book X must be read in light of the extensive narrative presentation that has preceded it. Heidegger, we will recall, opened his course on Augustine by citing the Retractiones, in order to distinguish the first ten book, which deal directly with Augustine’s self-world from the final three books. He then made the further claim that in books I – IX Augustine relates his past, whereas in Book X he speaks “in the present”\(^1\).

In the first place, this is a rather poor reading of the Confessions. Throughout the text Augustine is both relating his past and relating to that past from the present. However, Heidegger is right that a distinct form of relating happens in Book X where Augustine reflects on his own motivations for the confessing that he has already done in his heart and with his pen which in turn prepares the way for a related by distinct form of confessing, that of the inner self “[in] my heart where I am whatever I am” (Conf. X.iii). Yet this (proto-) phenomenology of the inner re-collected self is dependent on, for both exemplification and contrast, the previous account of the dispersed self that has been gathered together to the point that such self-reflection is possible. Therefore, Book X must be read in light of the nine books that proceeded it. While the “abyss of human consciousness” lies naked before God, to us it is only available via the more circuitous route of temporal self-revelation and reflection.

Therefore, Augustine’s discussion of the beata vita in Book X is foregrounded by his lengthy and ineffectual search for it that has led to the possibility of his asking this question anew. That possibility first arises in Book VI where Augustine writes: “I longed for the happy life, but was afraid of the place where it has its seat, and fled from it at the same time as I was seeking for it” (VI.xi). It is in failing to find the happy life outside of God that Augustine is led to seek it with God. Yet here, beata vita is, like “God”, a heuristic concept. It indicates a direction of inquiry and of desire but does not thereby determine its specific nature. Thus, for

\(^1\) “What I am in the very time of the making of my confessions” (Confessions X, 3, 4).
Augustine, the identification of his search for God with his search for the happy life is the beginning of inquiry, not the end. The restlessness that determines the quality of his search is not stilled by his encounter with the Platonists or even his conversion in the Garden. The Augustine of Book X faced with tentatio can, in a slightly different way, offer the same prayer from Book VIII: “My desire was not to be more certain of you, but to be more stable in you. But in my temporal life everything was in a state of uncertainty…” (Conf. VIII.i). As Heidegger’s own careful reading of tentatio demonstrates, even when Augustine has reached a degree of moral health and stability this cannot yet be the attainment of the perfectly happy life because it is threatened – and to that degree incomplete – by the future which presses down upon it at every moment.

To further defend Augustine against the charge that he expects certainty from this life and an end to its restlessness, we can appeal to his discussion of happiness in Book XIX of his De Civitate Dei, one of the five Augustinian texts cited by Heidegger. There we are provided an account of happiness as a kind of peace. Augustine distinguishes between two kinds of peace, the first, relevant for our discussion here, is an earthly peace experienced as solace. This is the “peace of Babylon” and it is quite distinct from the fuller peace of perfect beatitude which is experienced as gaudium (joy). Far from a mere and uncritical reappropriation of Greek philosophy, De Civitate Dei is a formidable critique of the Greek tradition; a Christian deconstruction that asks after precisely the “how” of its 288 variant philosophical definitions of happiness. In examining the actual enactment of earthly happiness, Augustine asks: “What flow of eloquence is sufficient to set forth the miseries of human life?” To the Platonic and Stoic philosophers – to whom he is indebted in myriad ways – Augustine poses his own
rhetorical question: “Why pretend that evils are not evils?” What we have here is the original speech to one’s cultured despisers: the Greek and Roman educated elite of the empire fleeing to northern Africa as the *Pax Romana*, and with it the entire empire, comes apart at the seams. Keeping this account in mind (finished the same year as his *Retractationes*) we can suggest that for Augustine, like Paul, the *beata vita* has the eschatological character of the already and not-yet. It is a particular how of being in the world that is at best anticipated in hope now. Paradoxically, the desire for the happy life and the hope of attaining it frees Augustine to acknowledge the often unhappy conditions of the world he (and we) live in. Augustine’s figure for the Christian is not the self-sufficient contemplative philosopher or Stoic sage, but rather the wayfarer and pilgrim: “As long as the two cities are mingled together, we can make use of the peace of Babylon. …our pilgrim status...makes us neighbors.”

This is important because Heidegger’s critique of the purported metaphysical “certainty” implied in the Augustinian *beata vita* rises and falls with our interpretation of its supposed content. In concert with his discussion in *De Civitate Dei* XIX, it seems more reasonable to read the account of *beata vita* in *Confessions* X as a heuristic account, or even a formal indication. It is a term that suggests a basic orientation and direction of inquiry, but is not yet so concrete as to make the inquiry superfluous. This interpretation is further corroborated by the fact that Augustine introduces the idea of the *beata vita* according to the modality of desire and therefore of a possibility and at best only partial fulfillment. Thus, in answering Heidegger’s first critique we have anticipated an answer to his second. If to desire the *beata vita* is to desire certainty or to desire a ground, then it is a very unusual ground. Heidegger says that “one thing is certain for [Augustine], that he loves God” (178/130). To which Augustine replies: “But what do I love when I love you?” Central to Augustine’s entire

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21 Ibid., 199
22 Ibid., 245
logic of searching is the fact that knowing is a kind of loving, or at least presupposes it, and therefore cannot be couched exclusively in the categories of Greek metaphysics. It is precisely this that bursts those very categories. Augustine says famously that “my weight is my love, by it I am borne wherever I am borne”\textsuperscript{23}. The density of facticity is loving desire.

Heidegger claims Augustine’s account of veritate presupposes an account of metaphysical certainty. Augustine draws an analogy between how people desire the truth and how they desire happiness. While many desire to deceive others no one desires to be deceived, so too no one desires to be unhappy, therefore we can claim that all desire happiness. Yet, a promised or proposed content does not preclude authentic questionability. Quite to the contrary, it is the promise of the beata vita that stands in conflict with the present reality – as exemplified in De Civitate Dei – and therefore necessitates the theological virtue of hope.

Thus, Heidegger’s claim that in Augustine’s analysis of veritate, “this search has become problematic and “turns into a general theory of access, and not into a really strictly existential one” seems misguided (193/142). Even if the hasty set of equivalences Heidegger proposes holds true – “Happy life = the true happy life = truth = God” – it remains the case that I still only “have” the beata vita and therefore also truth and God in the modality of desire. Therefore, there remains an ineluctable ontological difference not only between God and God’s creation, but also between truth and happiness as it pertains to one or the other. If we may be permitted a felicitous anachronism, it is another close student of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, who reminds us repeatedly that, quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur: What is received is received according to the mode of the knower\textsuperscript{24}. That condition, in our case, is the molestia of facticity that conditions the particular human manner of nosce, esse, and amare, and constitutes our historically conditioned situation.

\textsuperscript{23} Augustine, Confessions, XIII.ix
\textsuperscript{24} Cf. Summa Theologiae, e.g., Ia, q. 75, a. 5
b. The reduction of *tentatio*

This is why Heidegger rightly senses that Augustine’s account of *tentatio* is in some sense the hermeneutic key to his account of the self: “*Tentatio* is no event, but an existential sense of enactment, a How of experiencing” (248/186). Temptation is concrete, particular, factual: “[It] lurks precisely in what belongs to my facticity, what is with me and in which I am. Temptation is historically present” (252/189). For that reason, it signals the possibility of “enactmental renewal". Indeed, it requires it for those who would live authentically, i.e., “those who radically become questions to themselves” (248/186); because it is temptation that makes it clear that, “Possibility is the true ‘burden’” (248/186).

Heidegger is reliant on Kierkegaard here to establish the link between particular temptations of the various physical and spiritual senses and the deeper condition of sinfulness and the anxiety it produces over the possibility of sin. Thus, temptation, much like *angst* later in *Being and Time*, partially discloses the temporal structure of human experience to the extent that it presupposes a concrete self with a history and particular preferences (which are the prior conditions of temptation) and a future-directedness according to which the possibility of future temptation is the heaviest burden. Thus, the account of temptation with which Augustine concludes Book X clearly anticipates (and also presupposes) the account of human temporality that follows in Book XI. As Heidegger reads him, for Augustine, *tentatio*, in disclosing the anxiety over future possibility, reveals the fundamental heterogeneity of the self. Such a self can only be recollected in the *memoria* and always escapes total (re)collectedness. Even when the self is grasped truthfully it is never grasped completely. This in turn suggests that the self at any given moment is not certain, but uncertain, above all of itself:

“The knowledge of the uncertainty lies in darkness. I cannot just look at myself and see myself lying open before me. I am concealed to myself […] I can never appeal to a
moment that is shut down, as it were, in which I supposedly penetrate myself. Already the next moment can make me fall, and expose me as someone entirely different” (217/161).

What is less clear, however, is whether Heidegger is right to think that it is tentatio alone that secures the perpetual remainder of the self. Is it the only way to the self? It is clear from Book XI that temporality is co-implicated in this account of the self: because the self can never have time, she can never, as herself temporal, have herself completely. She never overcomes Augustine’s opening salvo in Confessions XI: “What then is time? Provided no one asks me, I know. If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know” (XI. Xiii). The interplay of ignorance and knowledge, of error and truth, permeates Book X’s account of the self, much as it does Book XI’s account of temporality. Yet, what of desire? For Augustine tentatio is but one possible modality of desire, what we are tempted by must be that which we desire. Desire (concupiscentia) is presupposed by the logic of temptation. But, unlike Heidegger’s bleaker reading, for Augustine desire admits of differentiation. Heidegger in his methodologically driven search for a principal form of enactment privileges tentatio – a form, or at least an indication, of disordered desire at the expense of other candidates, specifically, love.

Love is the desire for unity as a future possibility. Precisely as a desire, however, this is not yet unity. The self is not transparent, much less a ground or metaphysical ballast. The beata vita does represent in a heuristic sense the unity of the self, a state of joy and truth and light. Yet, even this eschatological vision presupposes a porosity to the self. It is only the self as united in some sense with God, with what is fundamentally other than itself that it ceases to be a mystery to itself. The self is only at peace with itself as the meeting place of the incommensurable orders to time and eternity25. This is hardly an account in which one escapes

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25 Given the constraints of the present chapter we cannot take up Heidegger’s reading of Confessions XI. However, in that regard, Cyril O’Regan has proposed an Augustinian response to Heidegger’s critique of Augustine’s account of time. Among his insightful observations he notes, to my mind correctly, that for Augustine eternity is not a substitute for the human experience of temporality, but makes it possible: “treating the relation of time and eternity only after temporality has been phenomenologically exposted enables one to see that eternity, and finally
the demands of human temporality or reconfigures their perimeters. Yet the reduction of the enactmental sense from a thicker understanding of desire as encompassing both the search for the beata vita and anxiety of tentatio, leads to a one-sided account of the distensio of existence.

Wolfe argues that Heidegger and Augustine have divergent understandings of the diastasis (distensio) of existence. For both it is a function of temporality, but for Augustine it is our striving for eternity within time that gives rise to it, and as such it is an existential dislocation that admits of a possible unification. For Heidegger, by contrast, this diastasis is inevitably a diathesis: a permanent condition circumscribed by the horizons of world and time. Thus, death, not eternal life, is the authentic object of eschatology. Cyril O’Regan takes a different tack, suggesting that death is not as far from Augustine’s considerations as Heidegger seems to suggest. The Confessions is punctuated at regular intervals by the deaths of Patricius, Nebridius, Monica, and Adeodatus. De Civitate Dei, too takes up the theme, particularly in Book XIII where, “passingness means that death is an operation intrinsic to the self, its hollowing out from within.” It is “the outside coming in, preventing the self from being a work of the self.”

“plangent evocations of evanescence? …If Augustine does not make the point explicit, death confirms the scattering, the lack of integrity and transparence, that defines a temporal self. […] In Confessions, then, time provides a protocol for death in the ‘not’ that constitutes it.”

What is clear is that the enactmental center of Heidegger’s reading of Augustine is tentatio occasioned by molestia, the burdensome nature of life. This leads Wolfe to conclude that Heidegger’s description of Christian “restlessness” is at fundamental odds with its original

the eternal, not only represent the therapy for time, but actually allow time to be time, to be what it is” in “Answering Back” in Human Destinies: Philosophical Essays in Memory of Gerald Hanratty. Ed. Fran O’Rourke. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 154.
26 Wolfe, Eschatology, 73
28 Ibid., 161
29 Ibid., 160
Christian context because it lacks and must lack an analysis of theological hope. Wolfe, like O’Regan, has in mind primarily the Heidegger of Being and Time and his remarks on and against Augustine in that text. Nonetheless, the suggestion is interesting, because while “hope” is a word that does appear with a certain degree of frequency in both these courses, we must still ask if, on account of the drive for formality, the minimal content of the beata vita – its heuristic parameters – in being bracketed by Heidegger leads to an enactmental account of the religious self that is unable to distinguish between tentatio and spes, between despair over temptation and hope for reconciliation? Would a greater attention to the thicker and polyvalent meaning of desire have led us in richer and equally fruitful directions of explication?

This last suggestion brings us back to our three modes of critique discussed above in Chapter 2. The first of these was the critique of interpretation, specifically of the relative unimportance or incidental nature of the religious sources of Heidegger’s thought. These courses are themselves key evidence in overturning that position. However, even here we can see analogously a privileging of certain religious phenomenon over others in a way not necessitated by the philosophical constraints of the investigation. The way, for example, that affliction is prioritized over hope as the basic attunement of primitive Christian life. Caputo is at his best when showing the way in which a preference in interpretation leads to concrete consequences for our ethical lives. In that respect, it is suggestive that Heidegger, interested in characterizing the affliction experienced by the Christian community as an essential and enduring element of temporality overlooks the very real, immediate, and concrete concern about the meaning of the resurrection for the relatives of believers who have already died. Similarly, in his reading of Augustine a concern with the permanence of tentatio as an index of the futurity of the Augustinian self, causes him to rush past a more developed account of the positive desire for possibility as beata vita and veritate. At times Heidegger seems to valorize

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30 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics.
the account of *tentatio* provided by Augustine to an extent to which the penitential nature of the exercise is overlooked.

Along similar lines, Heidegger tends to flee any scent of the axiological. Facticity, the subject matter of phenomenology is essentially “questionability” not normativity:

“In understanding facticity, its questionability and the enactment of questionability, what surfaces is the fatefulness, and inappropriateness for existence, of the axiologization” (265/199).

"What is precisely crucial is to constantly have a radical confrontation with the factual, and not to flee. In order to attain existence, I precisely must have it, this having precisely means living in it, but not giving in not even overcoming it comfortably and axiologically” (266/199).

While the Socratic sentiment is understandable, admirable even, in its efforts to fend off a naïve or reductive axiology, does it endanger ethics more generally? The implicit claim appears to be that an axiology will require the “right” external actions to the detriment of the interiority that is the real and deeper goal of Christianity and authentic existence. Yet, this can also slip into an unnecessary capitulation to ontic dimensions of facticity that commit us implicitly or explicitly to structures of evil and violence. There is something ominous in light of Heidegger’s own failures as rector, when he quotes 1 Corinthians “Remain in the condition in which you were called” (1Cor. 7:20). The text of course continues, “Were you a slave when called, do not be concerned about it.” (1Cor. 7:21). It is clear enough how Heidegger understands its relation to the ontological level of life. However, the failure to advert to its problematic application at the ontic level, which is the level of justice, is something of a sin of omission.

Moreover, can one truly purport to provide an account of primitive Christian life that ignores the beatitudes (Matt. 5: 1-11)? Or the radicalization and internalization of the Decalogue that takes place in the antimonies (Matt. 5: 21-48) whereby Christians are called not merely to discern and regulate their external actions, but their intentions as well? Can one provide an account of eschatological affliction that does not include willingly taking on the
affliction of others in an effort to alleviate it? The emergent accounts of Christian *kenosis* and *agape* are not less eschatological than that of Pauline affliction.

This ethico-religious line critique anticipates the second phenomenological one, exemplified in the work of Daniel Dahlstrom. As a properly phenomenological critique it asks whether the overemphasis on the *Vollzugsinn* and the misleading characterization and bracketing of the *Gehaltsinn* have closed off certain avenues of phenomenological investigation. For example, does Christian temporality as *Kampf* and *tentatio* truly exhaust the complex of phenomena? Is the self’s relationship toward the future merely one of anxiety? Dahlstrom is concerned primarily with the *non-apparent* [unscheinbarkeit] sources of Heidegger’s analyses in *Being and Time* that are brought into view when we read that text against these early courses. He sees three major discontinuities between the Augustine course and Heidegger’s 1927 opus. Of the first he writes,

“Heidegger is careful to convey to his students just how fundamental notions of desire and the good are to Augustine’s confessional self-analysis. Yet, although Heidegger appropriates significant elements of that self-analysis into his own existential analysis, for the most part in *Being and Time* he avoids, as noted, overt references to desires and goods (SZ 345). This omission, coupled with the otherwise patent convergences that we have been noting, raises the obvious question of whether they play a significant tacit role in the analysis. The question raised here is one version of the question: What is the good of *Being and Time*?”

In other words, is there a tacit conception of the good operative in *Being and Time*? Why, to tie Dahlstrom’s suggestions to Wolfe’s analysis, do we desire the existential integrity and wholeness aimed at by *Entschlossenheit*? Why is death experienced as a threat? What “good” does it endanger? In light of our own reading of the Augustinian *bonum* as a heuristic notion rather than a metaphysical commitment, might we pursue a more rigorous phenomenology of,

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for example, the other-directedness of justice (iustitia) that Heidegger suggests is ingredient to correct concern for the self?

The second avenue of foreshortened (if not foreclosed) investigation concerns that of desire: “Heidegger’s account of Stimmung and Befindlichkeit [in Being and Time] does provide a structural analysis that, at least in some respects, may seem as suitable for lust and love as it is for fear and anguish.”32 Do the same categories of indeterminacy, disclosure, and all-encompassing affect help us grasp the nature of desire in a way analogous to angst? This possibility is important to a phenomenology of religious life that discerns love as the founding motivation for Christian practice and belief. Ultimately, for Paul and Augustine it is love not anxiety that discloses the world33.

Circling back to Caputo, we noted Heidegger’s bracketing of the concept of justice (iustitia) in Augustine34. For Augustine continencia and iustitia go hand in hand. They are co-commanded by God: “iubere is iubere continentiam et iustitiam [commanding continence and justice]” (201/156) and he cannot cultivate one without the other35. Moreover, Augustine defines justice not merely as a refraining from evil, but also as a “position of love toward [another]” (237/177). Such a “context of loving” has important implications a the phenomenological analysis of Dasein’s concern, which suggests a possible rethinking of the ek-stasis of Dasein in a manner that includes an attunement toward the other that is more than the analyses of Mitdasein or solicitude because it is not only a condition of the world or possibility, but a motivational structure as well.

32 ibid., 263
33 A similar point holds for the more general phenomenological analysis of life. Dahlstrom argues that “Yet, even given…the privileged position of Angst…much more needs be said here before concluding that his analysis of Angst as a Grundbefindlichkeit rules out a similar account of love or motivation generally.” (ibid., 264)
34 Heidegger writes: “The concept of iustitia and its genuine conception is to be left aside…” (210/156).
35 “In the continencia [continence]…we do not only find the [refraining from love of things]. Rather, what is also demanded is the iustitia [justice], the [bringing-together, positioning of love toward], love’s bringing-toward, leading-toward, and genuine direction of concern” (237/177).
36 Dahlstrom suggests this has implications for a possible critique of the account of Being and Time: “This ‘context of loving’ that conditions the discussion of authenticity is absent from Being and Time which is suggestive” (“Temptation,” 278).
Finally, in addition to the genealogical and ethical critiques of Caputo as well as the phenomenological critique of Dahlstrom, we have the hermeneutical critique of Westphal, and more recently, Wolfe and Coyne. What are Heidegger’s hermeneutical debts and how are they to be collected? This question must be differentiated at the outset into two distinct questions. One question concerns the later more radically de-contextualized use of religious terms and structural relations for which *Being and Time* is a helpful, if imprecise, touchstone. Can these be “lifted” from their original contexts (enactmental contexts!) and submitted to the process of *Enttheologisierung*: reappropriated for non-religious or pre-religious explication? The other question, more relevant for our own investigation, is in appropriating Christian sources for a philosophy of religion (read: Christianity), does Heidegger read them well? Does he adequately map the various constellations of signs and meanings in their various relations?

Related to this second line of questioning, we must also ask how his interpretive method, formal indication, in being focused on the how enables a productive “destruction” of a tradition of sedimented meanings. As we have seen, for Heidegger, “factual existence is crucial, and in it, *destruktion* is lived and has meaning, everything to be destructed is, in the end, to be explicated as to its How” (269/202). The basic claim and warrant of *destruktion* is to return thought to life, to its origins in human motivation. But is not human motivation, like interpretation, always also a matter of decision? And is not decision ultimately an ethical as well as a religious category? More importantly, does not decision always presupposed, essentially, some content that is decided for or against?

We can see here in an important and central sense how our second and third lines of critique begin to overlap: for the early Heidegger engaged in developing phenomenology *als strenge Wissenschaft* into a hermeneutics of facticity, texts become a form of testimony and phenomenology becomes the practice of probing that testimony and, in the limit, a means of testifying for oneself. While this conception of phenomenology retains the basic Husserlian
orientation of an exercise in clarification of a given content, it bursts the bounds of the Husserlian reduction in its attempt to clarify, not (merely) consciousness, but factical life as such.

The goal of enumerating and providing an initial exploration of these various lines of critique is not to build a case for the rejection of formal indication or even the main lines of Heidegger’s reading of Paul or Augustine. It is, rather, to show the tendency toward formalization in its application by him and suggest that need for amendment. Heidegger, in fact, provides the means for his own de-construction. Westphal notes suggestively that

“Perhaps if Heidegger had taken his own emerging understanding of the hermeneutical circle more seriously he would have been less optimistic about the possibility of a content neutral formal indication.”

§3. Johannes Climacus and the Ladder of Factical Descent

§3.1 The Historical Record

It is not clear that the tendency toward over-formalization – to the emphasis of the Vollzugsinn at the expense of the Gehaltsinn – is necessitated, and help may come from a corner both expected and not: the thought of Søren Kierkegaard. Historically, Westphal has already signaled that in this period we see “the emergence of Kierkegaard over Husserl and Dilthey as Heidegger’s philosophical mentor.” Thematically, Wolfe has recently suggested that the analyses of being-guilty and being-onto-death in Being and Time presuppose an unstated desire for wholeness despite our factical thrownness, and that his “eschatological reformulation” against the screen of death is “a reformulation of Kierkegaard’s notion of faith as relating

38 Ibid., 253. See also Russell (2011) and Van Buren (1995).
oneself absolutely to the absolute, precisely by relating relatively to all relative things.”

Additionally, there are Heidegger’s own references to Kierkegaard’s analysis on the themes of death, despair, sin, and anxiety. Finally, pivoting back to Westphal, we can note a further set of methodological continuities between Heidegger and Kierkegaard specifically regarding the how and what distinction and, relatedly, the necessity of an indirect form of communication.

We will conclude this chapter by pursing this comparison along these historical, thematic, and methodological lines, and ultimately using Kierkegaard as a means of amending Heidegger’s problematic formalism.

That Kierkegaard’s thinking might interface with Heidegger on the question of the nature and structure of meaning might be unexpected because of Heidegger’s claims that Kierkegaard is a theologian who, while insightful, has failed to penetrate to the ontological and therefore properly philosophical-phenomenological level of analysis, even if he anticipates it to a greater degree than most other thinkers. However, those familiar with Heidegger’s biography and attentive to his footnotes and elliptical references might be less surprised that a thinker whose name appears more than a few times – even if in occasionally odd places – might be already at work as an influence on the thought of the young privatdozent.

The traditional locus for Heidegger’s engagement with Kierkegaard are the three references in Sein und Zeit. However, Heidegger’s most frequent engagement with the Dane actually occurs in the two Freiburg periods on either side of his time at Marburg and the publication of his great work. The question of his early exposure to Kierkegaard is a matter of some debate, which recent German-language scholarship has done much to correct and clarify. Gerhard Thonhauser has done the overlapping worlds of Heidegger and Kierkegaard scholarship a great service with his recent monograph, Ein rätselhaftes Zeichen: zum

Wolfe, Eschatology, 132.

The locus classicus for Heidegger’s critical engagement with Kierkegaard on this point is Being and Time, GA2: 190/234, 235/278, 338/387.
Verhältnis von Martin Heidegger und Søren Kierkegaard\textsuperscript{41}, which chronicles the piecemeal and complicated Übersetzungs- and Rezeptionsgeschichte of Kierkegaard in Germany as well as (and in light of that) Heidegger’s engagement with the Danish philosopher. Thonhauser defends the need for a careful retracing of this early history by noting two current examples of errors in contemporary scholarship.

The first belongs to Gadamer, who recalls being at Heidegger’s home in Marburg and watching him read Kierkegaard’s “religious discourses”, specifically “the lilies of the field” („Sehet die Lilie auf dem Felde”). Heidegger moved to Marburg in the spring of 1923 and Gadamer is likely reporting from 1924. At this point in time both of Kierkegaard’s discourses on the lilies of the field where available in German: \textit{Die Lilien auf dem Felde und den Vögeln unter dem Himmel}. \textit{Drie fromme Reden} was translated in 1877 and \textit{Was wir lernen von den Lilien auf dem Felde und den Vögeln unter dem Himmel} was translated in 1891. The problem is that Gadamer also says that the essay (whichever one it was) was from Kierkegaard’s \textit{Religious Discourses} (religiösen Reden). This was a text translated by Haecker and published in 1922 that contained neither of the lily discourses. Therefore, while it is possible that Heidegger read either or both of the discourses prior to 1924 he did not read them in the \textit{Religious Discourses}. This has implications for English-speaking research since Van Buren, for example, draws from Gadamer’s recollection the conclusion that unequivocally Heidegger had read the “Lily of the Field” discourse by 1924.

The second example pertains to Van Buren himself who claims that Heidegger subscribed to the periodical \textit{Der Brenner} beginning in 1911 and that it was there that he encountered the work of Kierkegaard, came to admire the poetry of Trakl and became a friend of Ludwig von Ficker. Thonhauser shows the ultimate inclusiveness of all three claims\textsuperscript{42}. There

\textsuperscript{41} Gerhard Thonhauser. \textit{Ein rätselhaftes Zeichen: zum Verhältnis von Martin Heidegger und Sören Kierkegaard.} (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016). The text is not available in English.

is no actual documentary evidence that demonstrates conclusively that Heidegger subscribed to *Der Brenner*. Van Buren cites Kisiel as a secondary source who in turn cites a certain Janik who gives no evidence for his claim. Janik is affiliated with the Brenner-Archive and likely has in mind the dissertation research done at those same archives by Walter Methlagl, who makes a similar claim, again without any primary source evidence. In the interests of complicating this assumed narrative Thonhauser notes that (1) the name “Heidegger” does not occur anywhere in the *Brenner* archives and (2) at the very least, Heidegger could not have read Kierkegaard from 1911 because Haecker’s translation was only available from 1914. Thus, while it is not impossible – and perhaps not even improbable – that Heidegger read Kierkegaard in *Der Brenner*, it is important to acknowledge that this cannot be confirmed by any documentary evidence, and therefore any interpretive claims should be adjusted accordingly.

Having shown the need for it, Thonhauser proposes to return to Heidegger’s *opera* and trace the various citations of Kierkegaard. To that end, he proposes three categories of writings: (1) the published works, (2) the lecture courses (including seminar notes), and (3) other writings, including correspondences, and he limits himself to explicit references, given the challenge raised by implicit ones. The importance of Kierkegaard for Heidegger over the course of his thinking becomes immediately clear: Thonhauser counts roughly 140 direct references in more than 50 texts over a period of almost 40 years.

Thonhauser divides this era of Heidegger’s Kierkegaard reading into four phases, (1) Freiburg I, (2) Marburg, and (2) Freiburg II up to the resignation of the Rectorate, and (4) from 1934 onward. In the first phase, Kierkegaard is cited 5 times over 9 semesters and 4 texts. The

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43 Ibid., 144.
44 Ibid., 145.
45 Ibid., 145.
46 Heidegger’s last explicit reference to Kierkegaard is in 1958, though he participates in a conference titled “Kierkegaard Vivant” organized by Jean Beaufret where he gives his celebrated “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” – which does not mention Kierkegaard a single time.
first citation occurred in Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/1920)\textsuperscript{47}. The Augustine course a year later is crucial because it contains direct citations from both Sickness Unto Death\textsuperscript{48} and Concept of Anxiety\textsuperscript{49}. The following semester Heidegger cites two other Kierkegaard texts (Practice in Christianity\textsuperscript{50} and Either/Or\textsuperscript{51}). The Marburg period, traditionally thought to ground the engagement with Kierkegaard in Being and Time, has, by contrast, only seven citations over ten semesters. Yet, when Heidegger returns to Freiburg in 1928, Kierkegaard is cited in almost every lecture course. The final period from 1934 onwards is characterized by a general decline in interest in Kierkegaard; however, there is the notable exception of SS 1941 where, in a course on Schiller, Heidegger engages in the lengthiest consideration of Kierkegaard of his entire oeuvre.

The material record, clarified by Thonhauser, is important for our investigation for a few reasons. First, it shows that, were we to limit ourselves to Heidegger’s published works, Kierkegaard’s influence would be thought marginal at best. Yet, when we consider his lecture courses and correspondences, the presence of the religious thinker is significantly more palpable. Second, Thonhauser’s work allows us to determine better what Heidegger read and within that, which texts were particularly influential for him. We know that Heidegger read the four texts cited above; there is also evidence in the early courses that he read The Point of View for My Work as an Author\textsuperscript{52} as well as the journals published by Haecker. There is also a likely

\textsuperscript{47} GA 58, 204: “Diese alchristliche Errungenschaft wurde durch das Eindrin-gen der antiken Wissenschaft in das Christentum verbildet und verschüttet. Von Zeit zu Zeit setzt sie sich in gewaltigen Eruptionen wieder durch (wie in Augustinus, in Luther, in Kierkegaard).”


reference to *Works of Love*\(^{53}\). Later on he will reference and also cite directly from Johannes Climacus. All this means that over the course of his life Heidegger cited from every volume of Kierkegaard’s *Gesammelten Werke* with the exception of Volume 4 (*Stages on Life’s Way*).

Beyond the record of textual citation, it is also worth noting that Heidegger’s early work in Freiburg and Marburg occurred in the midst of a “Kierkegaard-Renaissance” in Germany leading to an explosion of Kierkegaard research in the mid-1920’s. Thonhauser argues there were three different and concurrent images of Kierkegaard [*Kierkegaard-Bilder*]:

1. Kierkegaard as the upbuilding author [*Erbauungsschriftsteller*] working within the church
2. Kierkegaard as a literary and biographical-psychological phenomenon [*Literat und biographisch-psychologisches Phänomen*]
3. Kierkegaard as a philosopher and critic of the church [*Kirchenkritiker und Philosoph*]

The first of these is particularly relevant for our investigation of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kierkegaard. It was promoted most successfully by Haecker, one of the best early translators of Kierkegaard into German, who worked for a brief but intense period from 1914-1923. While he did translate some of the major works, the center of Haecker’s interest was the *Upbuilding Discourses* and the journals from which he concludes that Kierkegaard is not only a Christian thinker, but also a critic of modernity. Haecker’s interpretation of Kierkegaard is important for the influence it exercised on Karl Jaspers\(^ {54}\) who was in turn “without a doubt the most important mediator of Kierkegaard [for Heidegger]”\(^ {55}\). It can hardly be a coincidence that Heidegger’s first reference to Kierkegaard occurs in WS 1919/1920, the same time period in which he is


\(^{54}\) As well as Hirsch, Thurst, and Adorno.

\(^{55}\) Thonhauser, 137: “Der für Heidegger wichtigste Kierkegaard-Vermittler war ohne Zweiel Jaspers”
reading Jasper’s 1919 *Psychology of Worldviews*. That reference is to Kierkegaard as a thinker who, alongside Augustine and Luther, “erupts” amidst the sedimentation of a Hellenized Christian tradition to put us back in touch with the early Christian achievement [*altchristliche Errungenschaft*]. This suggests that Kierkegaard provides Heidegger with a model for the kind of work he undertakes a year later in his religion courses. Therefore, we do not need to wait until *Being and Time* to examine Heidegger’s reading of Kierkegaard. It is here in his earliest Freiburg period that the first references to the Danish philosopher, “theologian,” and poet occur.

It is intriguing that the discrepancy of references to Kierkegaard between the published and unpublished records is mirrored in the religion courses in the discrepancies between the lecture notes and Heidegger’s own notes and appendices. Were we to limit ourselves to the lectures and *Nachschriften*, we might be misled also as to the importance of Kierkegaard for these courses. He does not appear in the Paul course at all and he is cited only twice in the Augustine course. The first quote provides a gloss on the questionability of the Augustinian self. Heidegger writes:

> “Augustine admits not knowing everything about himself. He wants to confess that too. (*Quaestio mihi factus sum*). ‘To comprehend is the range of man’s relation to the human, but to believe is man’s relation to the divine.’ *Terra difficultatis*. Observe the different relation sense [*Bezugsinn!*]!” (130/187, SUD, 95).

Kierkegaard’s first appearance in Heidegger’s *opera* is as a thinker sensitive to the what/how distinction, particularly as it pertains to knowledge, and religious knowledge more specifically. The second and final citation in the body of the text pertains to the conception of the self. Heidegger writes,

> “What does it mean that I ‘am’? (The self gains an ‘idea’ of itself, what kind of idea I have of myself. Kierkegaard)” (141/192).

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56 GA 58, 205/155: “This early Christian achievement was deformed and submerged by the infiltration of ancient science into Christianity. From time to time it asserts itself yet again in powerful eruptions (as in Augustine, in Luther, in Kierkegaard).”

57 GA 58, 205
The elliptical reference is presumably a reminder to extemporaneously relate the Augustinian account of the self to Kierkegaard’s account, which itself suggests a certain comfort and fluency with the Dane’s thought. Heidegger may very well have had in mind the famous opening lines of the *Sickness Unto Death* in which the self is defined as “the relation’s relating itself to itself in the relation.”\(^{58}\) This is an account of the self that grasps the essential dynamism and possibility that lie at the heart of Heidegger’s burgeoning conception of the self.

While these are the only two citations in the original transcript of the course, when we consult Heidegger’s additional notes on the Augustine course – which, it bears repeating, are his own handwritten notes – we find another five references to Kierkegaard, a third citation from *Sickness Unto Death*\(^ {59}\), and four citations from *Concept of Anxiety*\(^ {60}\). In fact, Kierkegaard is the only author other than Augustine cited in the sections that deal with Heidegger’s interpretation of *Confessions X*. If we bracket the opening sections that survey the three dominant Augustine interpretations (Troeltsch, Harnack, and Dilthey), Kierkegaard is the most cited source in the course other than Augustine himself. Heidegger will continue to appeal to Kierkegaard throughout the remainder of his philosophical career\(^ {61}\).

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58 *SUD*, 13
59 On p. 186/248 Heidegger quotes: “The criterion for the self is always: that directly before which it is a self; but that in turn is the definition of ‘criterion’” from SUD, 79.
60 *The Concept of Anxiety* is quoted twice on 192/257: “Guilt is a more concrete conception, which becomes more and more possible in the relation of possibility to freedom” (CA, 21) and “But whoever becomes guilty also becomes guilty of that which occasioned the guilt. For guilt never has an external occasion, and whoever yields to temptation is himself guilty of the temptation” (CA, 109). It is quoted a third time on 199/264 with respect to sin: “Therefore, interpreted Christianly, sin has its roots in willing, not in knowing, and this corruption of willing embraces the individual’s consciousness” (CA, 95). It is quoted for the last time 202/268 with respect to anxiety: ‘to open — possibilities — itself historically. ‘Anxiety discovers fate’” (CA, 159).
61 The following list of references does not purport to be comprehensive, however, the quantity of references over the majority of the Gesamtausgabe is nonetheless suggestive. Nor do I intend to suggest the citations of equal merit. Some are passing comparisons, while others are more in depth engagements. Generally, the references to Kierkegaard concern (1) his account of *Angst*, (2) his notion of paradox, (3) his notion of existentialism and critique of systematic thinking, and (4), his account of the moment (*Augenblick*): GA 2: 190, 235, 338; GA 5: 230; GA 6: 472-480 *passim*; GA 8: 216, GA9: 41; GA 14: 103-104; GA 17 126; GA 20: 405; GA 24: 408; GA 26: 178, 245-46; GA 28 205, 260, 311-313; GA 29-30: 225-26; GA 31: 201; GA 32 19, 197; GA 35: 82 ff.; GA 36-37: 10-15 *passim*, 147 – 280 *passim*; GA 42: 38 – 43 *passim*; GA 45: 216; GA 49: 26 – 37; GA 54: 44, 53; GA 55: 126; GA 60: FILL IN; GA 61: 24, 182; GA 63: 5, 17, 31, 42, 111; GA 65: 204, 233, 237.
Heidegger presented at a conference organized by Jean Beaufret and François Fedier entitled, “Kierkegaard Vivant”.

These quantitative considerations help describe an atmosphere in which Heidegger’s thought takes shape, and even if that atmospheric density varies from one season to the next, that it extends to the twilight of Heidegger’s career and life is justification enough for us to take it under serious consideration. From this it is clear that Kierkegaard is more than illustrative – more than a helpful example of a particular claim made by Augustine or Heidegger himself. To borrow a term used later by Heidegger, there is a kind of Mitdenken taking place here. Heidegger uses Kierkegaard both to interpret and develop Augustine’s account of the self in Confessions X, as well as to develop his own interpretation of that account. Thus, he both reads Augustine through Kierkegaard and employs the Kierkegaardian analyses to develop his own categories of interpretation for Augustine and, through him, for facticity.

This Mitdenken occurs along distinct thematic axes. Generally, the references to Kierkegaard concern (1) his account of angst, (2) guilt and sin, (3) the notion of paradox, (4) the moment and (5) pseudonymity. Yet through them all run Kierkegaard’s central distinction between the what and how senses. The first uses to which Heidegger puts Kierkegaard signal that he is sensitive to this distinction. By means of it, Kierkegaard seeks to disrupt the settled Christianity of his native Denmark, by turns speculative and romantic. He came to see this social and religious de-construction as a kind of vocation:

“…since with your limited capabilities it will be impossible to make anything easier than it has become, you must, with the same humanitarian enthusiasm as the others have, take it upon yourself to make something more difficult” (CUP, 186).

62 E.g., GA 60: 202, GA 2: 190/234, 235/278, 338/387
63 E.g., Guilt: GA 60: 192; Sin: GA60: 199
64 E.g., GA 34: 135
It is this reformulation of (some might say return to) Christianity as a question of how that allows Kierkegaard to take his place beside Augustine and Luther as a great reformer. In an age beset by “systematic thinking,” it is by distinguishing the how component of our knowing and living that Kierkegaard distinguishes between “comprehending God” and “believing in God.” That account requires a new set of distinctions in how we speak about subjectivity and truth. It is this account of subjectivity as defined by unique dynamism that likely attracted Heidegger to Kierkegaard, whom he enlists alongside Augustine to describe a distinct, thoroughly anti-Cartesian account of living subjectivity.⁶⁵

§3.2 The Philosophical Record (Themes and Method)

Yet, our primary concern with Kierkegaard and Heidegger is not historical, but philosophical. How can Kierkegaard, who offers a similar account of the enactmental nature of meaning and the account of subjectivity consequent upon that, help us curtail the overly formal tendencies of Heidegger’s approach?

To aid us in our investigation we will turn to Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous text, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*⁶⁶ which proves to be a rich source for a few reasons. First, it is a pivotal text for Kierkegaard himself, who writes that, “This book constitutes the turning point in my entire work as an author, inasmuch as it poses the issue: becoming a Christian. Thereafter the transition to the second part is made, the series

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⁶⁵ It is striking in this regard to consider one of Heidegger’s earliest accounts of the problem of theory from *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*: “Further, preference for the theoretical is grounded in the conviction that this is the basic level that grounds all other spheres in a specific way and that is manifested when one speaks, for example, of moral, artistic, or religious ‘truth’. The theoretical, one says, colours all other domains of value, and it does this all the more obviously in so far as it is itself conceived as a value. This primacy of the theoretical must be broken, but not in order to proclaim the primacy of the practical, and not in order to introduce something that shows the problems from a new side, but because the theoretical itself and as such refers back to something pre-theoretical.” (GA 59: 46-47). The account could be a gloss on any number of passages from any number of works by Kierkegaard.

of exclusively religious books.” Kierkegaard sees Postscript as a thematic climax to his pseudonymous authorship. That authorship is philosophical in nature and deals with questions pertaining to religion. It is not until Postscript that we find the crucial distinction between two forms of religiousness: Religiousness A and (Christian-paradoxical) Religiousness B. This distinction is important to any consideration of his thought as a philosophy of religion or Christianity, and it will will be of direct use to our present discussion.

Heidegger does not refer to Postscript directly in the religion courses; however, many scholars have noted the strong thematic and methodological similarities – we might even say a certain isomorphism – between Heidegger and the specifically Climacean account of Christianity. Westphal, for example, notes that, in Heidegger’s distinction and shift in attention from the Gehaltsinn to the Bezugsinn and Vollzugsinn, “it is impossible not the hear echoes of Johannes Climacus’s distinction of objectivity from subjectivity in just those terms.” He goes a step further, claiming that in the Paul course (which has no reference Kierkegaard, let alone Postscript), in Heidegger’s reading of “the strenuousness of existence before God, the echoes are even louder.” Heidegger first references Climacus briefly in a 1931/32 text on the concept of “pseudonymity”, though it is not until 1941 that he makes a direct reference to a work by Climacus. It a reference to the third chapter of Concluding Unscientific Postscript on the “subjective thinker”. In terms of emphasis and influence, Thonhauser argues – largely on the basis of the number of citations – that Heidegger’s Kierkegaard is above all the Kierkegaard of Concept of Anxiety, the two writings of Anti-Climacus (Sickness unto Death and Practice in Christianity), as well as Point of View and the journals. While the documentary record is important for establishing certain broad parameters of interpretation, our intent here is, again,

68 Merold Westphal, Heidegger’s Judgmentschriften, 253.
69 Ibid., 253.
70 GA 34, 135-136
philosophical rather than historical. We need not show that Heidegger is directly reliant on Climacus – though I suspect he is for the reasons cited above – in order to show that Climacus offers a cognate account that is nonetheless distinct in important ways and therefore offers us different possibilities for conceiving the relations between Gehaltsinn, Bezugsinn, and Vollzugsinn.

For Climacus, ultimately, and in the religious sphere above all, there are specific contents that mark a radical (i.e., rooted in radix) difference in enactment absent which enactment would not be what it is. While the what/how distinction runs through Kierkegaard’s entire corpus, its lengthiest and arguably most mature expression occurs in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript.

§3.3 Concluding Unscientific Postscript

The text is intended, a bit ironically, as a “postscript” to its predecessor, Philosophical Fragments, and at more than 600 pages (compared to Fragments’ roughly 200 pages) it is quite an addendum indeed! Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author, Johannes Climacus presents himself as a dialectician who, in contrast to the orator or rhetorician, is sensitive to the question that goes unanswered: “Dialectical intrepidity is holding onto one’s ‘scrap’” (CUP 14). As a good dialectician that scrap is a question, in this case the question is:

“Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure be of more than historical interest; can eternal happiness be built on historical knowledge?” (CUP 15)

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72 Johannes Climacus was a 6th century monk and abbot of a monastery at Mt. Sinai who wrote the Ladder of Divine Ascent. Westphal notes that in attributing both Fragments and Postscript to the pseudonym Climacus, Kierkegaard is situating his two works within a tradition of spiritual instruction. They instruct us, respectively, in epistemology (PF) and existential reflection (CUP). Fragments remains a fairly circumscribed epistemological study, while Postscript “deserves to be considered the founding text of existentialism by making ‘existence’ a technical term designating human life as a very individual task that goes beyond the biological, sociological and especially the epistemic dimensions of our being-in-the-world” (Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Conception of Faith, (Grand Rapids: Eerdman’s, 2014), 124).
The presumption of the importance of particularity, history, and individuality seems audacious. But, Climacus contends that, “it is not I who of my own accord have become so audacious; it is Christianity itself that compels me. It attaches an entirely different sort of importance to my own little self and to every ever-so-little self, since it wants to make him eternally happy, if he is fortunate enough to enter into it” (CUP 16). This same scandal of particularity is what leads Heidegger to claim that Christian life experience constitutes an “original” life world. He is interested in investigating the way that the historical particularity of the proclamation of the Gospel structures the experience of Christian factual life. In a related but distinct manner, Kierkegaard is interested in investigating the way in which an individual grasping the historical particularity of the Gospel (and therefore its non-necessitated character) can nonetheless decide to found her eternal happiness on it.

Heidegger proposes formal indication as the way to reflect philosophically on the historical. It requires a new form of understanding and how we understand that understanding. For Kierkegaard, dialectic serves a similar purpose by calling into question our presumed frames of analysis and by inviting us to an appropriation of historical knowing. In a structural nod to the compounding complications that often accompany the specifications entailed in dialectic the text itself gets longer as it divides and subdivides: Part I is roughly one tenth the size of Part II, which subdivided into Section I which is about one tenth the size of Section II, which is further subdivided into 4 chapters the last of which is 4 times larger than any of the first three. Chapter 4 is further divided into “Division 1” and “Division 2,” with the latter being 8 times longer than the former – making the last chapter the longest of the work.

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73 “The independence of religious experience and its world is to be seen as an entirely originary intentionality with an entirely originary character of demands. Likewise originary are its specific worldliness and valuableness” (322/244).

74 The prohibitive function of formal indication requires an initial hermeneutics of factual life that prevents us from rushing to conceptualization and this transformation in the manner of inquiry entails a transformation in the inquirer who comes to understand that she understands in this way.
and its last section longer than any other chapter by a factor of 2. The inverted proportions between *Fragments* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* as well as those internal to the *Postscript* are structural indications of the nature of dialectic, which in its attempt to distinguish and thereby simplify, often leads to increasingly complex accounts of the topic under investigation. The motivating distinctions at the heart of *Postscript* are those between the historical individual and her purported eternal happiness, between objective and subjective accounts of truth, and underlying both these, the distinction between the what and how of subjectivity. It is these distinctions that motivate the dialectical structure of *Postscript*. Such an existential reflection, “is always dialectical. It is the need for ‘appropriation’ that makes everything dialectical (CUP 34-35).

At first it might appear that Kierkegaard proposes an account of the religious very close, identical even, to Heidegger’s. If anything, he is more emphatic than his German counterpart on the absolute priority of the enactmental dimension of meaning. The distinction between what and how underlies his entire account of subjectivity: “Objectively the emphasis is on what is said; subjectively the emphasis is on how it is said” (CUP 202, emphasis in original). This, in turn, determines the related question of how such a subject can be a Christian: “Being a Christian is defined not by the ‘what’ of Christianity but by the ‘how’ of the Christian” (CUP 610). This distinction, as in Heidegger, is motivated by the desire to distinguish philosophy and religion from a reigning theoretical-scientific paradigm: “Science and scholarship want to teach that becoming objective is the way, whereas Christianity teaches that the way is to become subjective, that is, truly to become a subject” (CUP 131). According to Kierkegaard, however, Christianity is an “existence-communication” rather than a “doctrine”75. He explains:

“[Today,] the word ‘doctrine’ is immediately understood as a philosophical theory that is to be and ought to be comprehended. To avoid this mistake, I have chosen to call

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75 E.g., “Christianity is an existence-communication. The task is to become a Christian or to continue to be a Christian” (CUP, 608).
Christianity an existence-communication in order to designate very definitely how it is different from speculative thought” (CUP 380).

The way in which Christianity as existence-communication is different from a doctrine is precisely as a how rather than a what. The upshot of all this is that faith, the basic pathos of the Christian existence, is understood in its leading sense as an enactment rather than a cognitive assent to revealed content. To highlight the non-theoretical nature of faith Kierkegaard defines it as “an objective uncertainty held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness. [This is] the highest truth there is for an existing person” (CUP 203)⁷⁶. In this sense Kierkegaard proposes his famous account of subjective truth: “Subjectivity is truth, subjectivity is actuality” (CUP 343). Truth, any truth, even “objective truth,” must be subjectively held, i.e., appropriated by an individual. That appropriation is essentially conditioned by the contingent, historical, communal, and personal circumstances within which any given individual finds herself. Moreover, what is true of any truth is true a fortiori of certain truths that are only known by becoming true for individuals such as the truth of which faith is the primus inter pares. In its most general articulation, such faith is a passionate concern for our eternal happiness. This animating concern makes us subjectively “heavy”: it supplies our factual density, recalling Augustine’s notion that our love is our weight. It is also offers an explanation as to why the existential analysis of faith is a privileged route to authentic subjectivity,

“Christianity cannot be observed objectively, precisely because it wants to lead the subject to the ultimate point of his subjectivity, and when the subject is thus proper positioned, he cannot tie his eternal happiness to speculative thought” (CUP 57).

Yet there are important considerations that mitigate what can seem like an exclusive emphasis on enactmental meaning in Kierkegaard. He does claim that, “Being a Christian is

⁷⁶ Similar accounts occur at CUP 491, 611.
defined not by the ‘what’ of Christianity but by the ‘how’ of the Christian,” (CUP 610). Yet, he goes on to add that “this ‘how’ can fit only one thing, the absolute paradox” (CUP 611), adding later that, “with regard to having faith…it holds true that this how fits only one object” (CUP 613, fn.). Kierkegaard is not describing a radical or an absolute bracketing of contents, he is, instead, trying to draw our attention to how the contents must be grasped. The relevant distinction is not between enactment and content in Heidegger’s sense, but rather between objective and subjective appropriations of Christianity. In other words, since the “content” of Christianity is a paradox it must be grasped in a particular way if it is to be “understood.” There is an analogous sense in which the paradoxical quality of Christianity brings about a bracketing. It is not that the contents are per se suspended, but rather that they are suspended when viewed from the theoretical-objective standpoint: What is self-contradictory takes itself out of play. It is the paradox, for example, that prevents Christianity (the “paradoxical-religious”) from being subsumed by the theoretical system for precisely this reason.

The nature and role of paradox has a number of valences. One important caveat comes early in the text, “The eternal essential truth is by no means in itself a paradox; but it becomes paradoxical by virtue of its relationship to an existing individual” (CUP 205). This seems to suggest that (1) there are contents, (2) those contents are not per se paradoxical, but (3) are paradoxical in relation to us. I take (2) to mean that we can imagine conditions under which the “by-definition eternal” would enter time77, but simultaneously grasp that were this the case it could never be known objectively given the parameters of theoretical knowledge. Therefore, it is not (objectively) known, but believed. Faith is an enacted passion coram Deo and beneath an incarnational horizon that distinguishes itself from imagination precisely by its pathetic-dialectical task. Moreover, the very “logic” of the paradox presuppose a content that is in direct

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77 This is the key distinction between the Socratic paradox – that the eternal is not the temporal—and the Christian paradox – that the eternal has become temporal (while remaining eternal).
and exhaustive contradiction with a second content (eternal/temporal), or perhaps for Kierkegaard, a manner of appropriation (God/human). We may even be able to think of Kierkegaard’s account as a refining of the what by means of a shift in attention to the how. He argues about halfway through the work that we must come to “a preliminary agreement about what Christianity is before one explains it, lest instead of explaining Christianity one hits upon something oneself and explains it as Christianity—the preliminary agreement is of utmost and decisive important” (CUP 370). We see here a distinction between “what Christianity is” and an (objective) explanation of Christianity. Part I has already shown that the “objective truth” of Christianity cannot be decided by appeal to scientific or speculative categories. This suggests a distinction between two kinds of contents, theoretical contents and subjective contents, and consequently two kinds of understanding. “True understanding” would be “to understand in such a way that one can begin with the difficulty”—that is to say, to become and to be a Christian (CUP 379).

In the same way that Kierkegaard’s account of paradox suggests a distinction between different kinds of content, rather than a simple dismissal of objective content, so too does his account of decision: “The issue is the decision and all decision…is rooted in subjectivity” (CUP 129). Objective thinking, particularly as it pertains to the religious, is merely some attempt to “evade the pain and crisis of decision.” Yet, decision must presuppose some content that is decided for. Of course, once decided for, the issue is not settled – that would be a route to objectivity through the back door. Subjectivity, by contrast, is the possibility of appropriation, i.e., of undertaking and so receiving the good. Yet, this subjectivity is also always still on the way. Both Christian concern and Socratic jesting contest the assumed priority of the objective “subject”. Yet, it remains the case that the paradoxical-religious must presuppose content had
and “understood” in the right way in order to be paradoxical and in order to be decided for. Such a decision is a “religious action”, namely, “to have faith in God” (CUP 340).

Lastly, the need for a content, however rethought, is signaled by the essentially historical nature of the Christian revelation with which Climacus is so concerned. It is precisely this historicality that gives rise to the paradox which in turn necessitates decision. In Kierkegaard’s words: “The individual’s eternal happiness is decided in time through a relation to something historical that furthermore is historical in such a way that its composition includes that which according to its nature cannot become historical and consequently must become that by virtue of the absurd” (CUP 385). These three interrelated arguments are compounded in the final sections of Postscript in Climacus’ much-celebrated distinction between Religiousness A and Religiousness B, or Socratic Religiousness and Paradoxical-Religiousness. We will conclude by providing a brief account of each position and endeavor to demonstrate how the distinct Gehaltsinn in light of which one is authentic is the differentiating factor between them.

In terms of their “how”, Socratic religiousness and Christian religiousness share a number of features in common. First, both relate to the eternal. For the Socratic person truth is eternal and this is grasped in such a way as to intensify existence which, under the light of eternity, becomes the theater of gradual conformity to – and therefore participation in – the eternal truths. Here it is the individual who shoulders the responsibility to relate herself to the eternal: “The ‘how’ of the individual’s existence is the result of the relation to the eternal, not the converse, and that is why infinitely more comes out than was put in” (CUP 574). For the Christian, God is the eternal, the absolute, and existence is what it is as a kind of existing-before-God. Here, however, it is the eternal that relates itself to her.

Second, for both accounts the relation to the eternal entails paradox. For Socrates, even as a being capable of recollection I do not cease being an existing human being: “[Socrates] was aware that he was a thinking being, but also that existence was a medium that prevents
him from thinking in continuity because it was a process of becoming” (CUP 309). Thus, the **Socratic paradox** is that the eternal truth is related to an existing person (CUP 209). For Christian religiousness (paradoxical religiousness), by contrast, the paradox, “is the actuality of the god in existence...that the god has existed as an individual human being” (CUP 326)79.

Third, on account of the paradox, both modes of life are modes of suffering. Kierkegaard remarks, speaking of a general religiousness that applies to both A and B, that “…from the religious point of view all human beings are suffering, and the point is to enter into the suffering (not by plunging into it but by discovering that one is in it) and not to escape the misfortune” (CUP 436). He adds that, “viewed religiously, the point, as mentioned above, is to comprehend the suffering and remain in it in such a way that reflection is on the suffering and not away from the suffering” (CUP 443). In both accounts, then, to be human is to undergo existence in some sense. For Socrates, this is the sense in which philosophy is a therapeutics80.

In contrast to this, for the Christian the “deep suffering” of true religiousness is,

“to relate oneself to God absolutely decisively and to be unable to have any decisive outward expression for it...because the most decisive outward expression is only relative, is both too much and too little, too much because it implies arrogance with regard to others, and too little because it still is a worldly expression” (CUP 492).

This distinction in the nature and purpose of suffering is related to different accounts of the eternal (or the god). For the pagan, the eternal is “everywhere and nowhere but hidden by the actuality of existence” (CUP 571). The eternal is diffuse, a plenitude that fills space and time. Paganism is thus visibility for Kierkegaard. It is commensurability: “Direct recognizability is paganism” (CUP 600). By contrast, “In the paradoxical religious the eternal is present at a specific point and this is the break with immanence” (CUP 571). Kierkegaard refers to this

79 Cf. Also, “The paradox is primarily that God, the eternal, has entered into time as an individual human being” (CUP 597?)

80 Pierre Hadot has done much to signal that precisely as a “spiritual exercise” ancient philosophy, beginning with Socrates, was conceived of as a therapeutics. See, his Philosophy as a Way of Life. Translated by Michael Chase and edited by Arnold Davidson. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), in particular “Spiritual Exercises” (Ch.3), pp. 81-125.
“break” with immanence as the “crucifixion of the understanding.” It is that the god, the eternal, entered a specific moment of time. The paradox before which the understanding stands is absolute and absurd, it does not admit of half-measures or partial steps. It is that, “Religiousness A accentuates existing as actuality, and eternity...vanishes in such a way that the positive becomes distinguishable by the negative. [...] The paradoxical-religious establishes absolutely the contradiction between existence and the eternal, because this, that the eternal is present at a specific moment of time, expresses that existence is abandoned by the hidden immanence of the eternal” (CUP 571).

Thus, in summary, both Religiousness A and B are dialectical. Socratic religiousness is the dialectic of inward deepening. It is the Socratic elenchus at work gradually bringing to evidence our biases and moral failures and thereby creating the possibility for moral formation which is the possibility of gradual conformity to or participation in the eternal. Paradoxical religiousness requires a break with this merely immanent conception of the self. This break is not a denial of the inward deepening: it is its fullest realization. For Kierkegaard, authentic Christian belief presupposes that inward deepening – both religiousness A and B employ forms of indirect communication to facilitate it. We must undergo the dialectic of inward deepening, the dialectic of immanence, in order to be able to confront the external dialectic between immanence and transcendence. Yet, this developmental account presupposes the recognition of a particular content that can lead to the paradox which engenders the break with immanence. This is not merely the “incomprehensible” but in fact the “absurd” and “the absurd, is the expression for the passion of faith” (CUP 611). The absurdity of the Christian paradox creates an aperture in the immanently constructed self that is its opening onto transcendence. That aperture is the

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81 The specifically Christian-Religious category of the absurd is that, “the eternal truth has come into existence in time, that God has come into existence, has been born, has grown up, etc., has come into existence exactly as an individual human being, indistinguishable from any other human being inasmuch as all immediate recognizability is pre-Socratic paganism and from the Jewish point of view is idolatry” (CUP 210).

82 This is a logical distinction and not necessarily a temporal one. It is also a very large (and disputed) interpretive claim. I do not mean to suggest that one must deliberately pass from Religiousness A to Religiousness B, much less that one must be a philosopher in order to be an authentic Christian. However, what Kierkegaard seems to suggest here is that Religiousness B requires the revocation of the configuration of temporal and eternal in Religiousness A, but for this revocation to occur one must have – implicitly or explicitly – that which is to be revoked.
possibility of a higher actuality (and therefore truth) that could exceed the very real and discernable bounds of immanently generated knowledge and its equally immanent conditions of fulfillment. Only religiousness B has the paradoxical-dialectical quality according to which, “The existing person must have lost continuity with himself, must have become someone else…and now, by receiving the condition from the god, becomes a new creation” (CUP 576).

§4. Conclusion: A Truth Indirectly Communicated

Both Socrates and the authentic Christian are aware of the “dialectic of communication.” Both require indirect communication rather than direct because “what is communicated can never be mastered completely and calls for appropriation” (CUP 73, fn.). This observation returns us to the question of the how. For Kierkegaard, Christianity is essentially indirect communication\(^{83}\), and this is so not only, and not even primarily, on account of who the Christian is, but primarily on account of who God is: “In Christianity everyone knows that God cannot indeed manifest himself [directly]” (CUP 246). Yet, every Christian also believes that “the Word become flesh and dwelt among us” (Jn. 1:14). Thus, God (the eternal) has chosen to communicate in time and therefore through the Son who did so by “emptying himself and taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness” (Phil. 2:7)\(^{84}\). Indirect communication is thus the form of divine condescension. However, Climacus (and Kierkegaard) do not merely imitate this form of communication because it is the religious form, but rather grasp that this is the only means of communicating a certain kind of truthfulness. Here “the direct relation is idolatry” because “with regard to the essential truth, a direct relation between spirit and spirit it unthinkable” (CUP 246, 247). It is in Religiousness B, where we grasp that the truth to be

\(^{83}\) “The direct relationship with God is simply paganism” (CUP 243). NB: Socrates grasps that there is no direct relation between teacher and learner even if paganism in general does not (cf. CUP 247).

\(^{84}\) Climacus: “…the spiritual relation in truth specifically requires that there be nothing at all remarkable about his form…” (CUP 246).
appropriated is paradoxical in such a way that it cannot conform to the parameters of theory or science, there the need for indirect communication becomes clear. It is attempt to raise a question and manifest a paradox in order to provoke a decision rather than complacent intellectual apprehension because such apprehension is always either illusion or idolatry.

This is no one sense of Kierkegaard’s remark at the end of Postscript that: “My pseudonymity or polynimity has not had an accidental basis in my person...but an essential basis in the production itself” (CUP 625). It is also the sense of Climacus’ claim to be a humorist because a humorist is one who rejects appeals to authority – one cannot command another to find something funny, but must evoke laughter as a, perhaps involuntary, acknowledgement that humor has found its mark. So too with spiritual sight – one can invite another to see what she sees, but she cannot see for another. The provocation to decision also lies behind Climacus final subversive act in his postscript to the Concluding Postscript: “An Understanding with the Reader”. There he issues a revocation, a sort of contradictory imprimatur for a work of indirect communication: “What I write contains the notice that everything is to be understood in such a way that it is revoked, that the book has not only an end but has a revocation to boot” (CUP 619). We have here a fourth example of an enactmental authorship alongside proclamation, retraction, and confession – revocation. Of course, we must note – and Climacus does – that “to write a book and to revoke it is not the same as refraining from writing it” (CUP 621).

This last observation highlights the central dynamic of belatedness that characterizes hermeneutic reflection, or which makes all reflection in some sense hermeneutic. The ironic revocation allows us to acknowledge the priority of the donum before which we always arrive belatedly. For this reason, philosophy, and in particular phenomenology, is an exercise in

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85 NB: This is Kierkegaard speaking, not Climacus.
86 “To be an authority is much too burdensome an existence for a humorist...” (CUP 618).
clarification. Heidegger’s account of formal indication loses sight of its own belatedness insofar as it attempts (non-ironically) to bracket the content sense which has always already structured – authentically or inauthentically – the Bezugsinn and Gehaltsinn. Kierkegaard’s similar emphasis on the how of meaning is sincere, yet it recognizes a certain irony in attempting to distinguish what and how. This does not subvert that distinction completely, but calls for a degree of self-knowledge. Irony, Westphal reminds us, is “not the abolishing of all claims, but the very means of making them (indirectly).”

No doubt, Kierkegaard would find in a phenomenological or existential account of the religious that privileged the enactmental account to the occlusion of the paradoxical Gehaltsinn the same reduction for which he faults the theoretical dogmatists of his own age.

Indirect communication recognizes the ineluctability of concrete meaning in the structuring of human life while also acknowledging that when certain contents are not appropriated subjectively, they are not in fact understood at all. Thus, he too draws our attention to the essentially enactmental dimension of meaning and, within that, to a particular class of truths that can only be grasped enactmentally. This, I submit, is a helpful, and indeed essential, amendment to Heidegger’s attempt at a “content neutral” model of formal indication. That account is neither necessitated by the problematic that interests Heidegger nor does it have greater explanatory power. Quite to the contrary, as we have endeavored to illustrate, there is a certain anemia that characterizes Heidegger’s in many ways rich readings of both Paul and Augustine. He is not wrong that a peculiar form of affliction characterizes the Christian experience of life lived within the horizon of the second coming of Christ. Elsewhere, however, that experienced is characterized by the enactments of faith, hope, and love in light of which Heidegger’s description, even on its own enactmental terms, seems unnecessarily one-dimensional. Similarly, in his reading of Confessions Heidegger does not consider the way in

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87 Westphal, Kierkegaard, 135
which Augustine’s search for God, the happy life, and truth is characterized by the nature of what is sought (i.e., the “content”), but not thereby characterized by the possession of what is sought either intellectually or existentially. In both cases this leads Heidegger to undervalue the concrete ethical and interpersonal concerns that motivate the early Pauline communities and Augustine. Therefore, he appears to fall afoul of Climacus’ observation that abstract thinking “results in the ignoring of the ethical and a misunderstanding of the religious” (CUP 307). On the one hand, Heidegger is equally on guard against the theoretical mindset on which Kierkegaard and his pseudonymous interlocutors have set their sights. Though they have different targets, for both, the theoretical mindset fixes in advance a privileged way of relating to experience determined by an (often implicit) account of reason without acknowledging that the account is itself but one possibility of factical human being. On the other hand, however, the rarefied degree of Heidegger’s own formalism, while it does not privilege a theoretical relation does attempt an analogous kind of indifference toward the content of factical life that leads to the analogous problems we have suggested.

Our own proposal is not revocation, but amendment. In curtailing the more extreme tendencies in Heidegger’s account of formal indication we can provide a better and more adequate – because more concrete – phenomenology of religious life. That proposal illumines a real deficiency, namely, that the content cannot be methodologically bracketed in any permanent sense. At the same time, in reintroducing the content as a structuring principle of enactment, it enables us to formally indicate the way in which meaning occurs at both the levels of content and enactment. This resolution is thus a both-and: we retain Heidegger’s insights into the dynamic nature of facticity and how meaning is constituted in and by our confrontation with a world of significances and at the same time we allow those significances to speak to the particular forms of life they structure.
A Concluding Postscript

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
Through the unknown, unremembered gate
When the last of earth left to discover
Is that which was the beginning;
At the source of the longest river
The voice of the hidden waterfall
And the children in the apple-tree

Not known, because not looked for
But heard, half-heard, in the stillness
Between two waves of the sea.
Quick now, here, now, always--
A condition of complete simplicity
(Costing not less than everything)
And all shall be well and
All manner of thing shall be well
When the tongues of flames are in-folded
Into the crowned knot of fire
And the fire and the rose are one.

—T. S. Eliot, “Little Gidding”

“Finding joy in the donum is the highest
duty and by no means convenient.” —Heidegger

We began our investigation by asking what role religion played in Heidegger’s reformulation of phenomenology as a hermeneutics of factual life. Heidegger’s way to philosophy was through his early religious education and vocational aspirations. His further path from philosophy to phenomenology was the discovery of the latter as a method internally akin to religious experience: “one of the inmost tendencies of phenomenology.”¹ These paths ultimately led him from preparations for the priesthood to the professoriate and from medieval

¹ Heidegger, GA 58, 61
scholasticism through neo-Kantianism to phenomenology. Developing a phenomenology of religion became an occasion for contending with the factual world in a new way. How can phenomenology do justice to the manifold forms of givenness by which life makes itself available to philosophy without either reducing it to categories that de-form it or merely describing its transience? The articulation of religious life proves particularly susceptible to such deformations, and so Heidegger sets out to articulate a new account by stepping back from theory and consciousness by stepping into life.

Heidegger sets out to articulate a phenomenology of religion that can address the religious in an appropriate manner and at the same time address the insufficiencies of other forms of engagement with the religious. We have seen the scope of his engagement with the dominant schools of thought about religion in his own day – philosophical, theological, and historical. Somewhere in the midst of his preparations for his 1920-21 course he came to see that a phenomenology of religion could not be a phenomenology of religious consciousness, but must be instead a phenomenology of religious life. Husserl claimed that to start from consciousness was to build from the ground up – to return to the things themselves by articulating their constitution in and for and by consciousness. Yet for Heidegger, to begin from an account of consciousness prior to an account of its dynamic concourse with life – to begin with its formal structures rather than its enactmental performance – was to allow one’s investigation to be guided by an account the very thing one sought to investigate (i.e., consciousness). Instead, one had to begin “further down” if she wanted to construct a truly primordial account. This movement from consciousness to life defines his early attempt studied in detail here and it came to dominate his thought moving forward: the priority of life as the wherein of consciousness became the basic position from which to ask the question of being.

In this account, formal indication replaces the transcendental reduction as the “step back” by which we can observe consciousness in its most authentic performance – not confined
to immanence but in ek-static confrontation-with facticity. This is Heidegger’s answer to Natorp’s critique that phenomenology is either theoretical reflection or it is not philosophy. It is also his proposal for a phenomenology of religious life that would address the deficiencies he saw in the methods of his contemporaries. It is a way of staring facticity in the face and articulating its peculiar shape and movement. The basic thrust of this vision of phenomenology was summed up best by Merleau-Ponty decades later:

“[Phenomenological] reflection does not withdraw from the world toward the unity of consciousness as the foundation of the world; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice; it alone is consciousness of the world because it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical.”

Such a vision is premised on the idea that the world gives itself to us laden with significance; that we are already in an understanding relation to the world that is not yet theoretical, though it harbors that possibility as one of its great achievements. Such an original understanding Heidegger had suggested since the year prior was a “hermeneutic” understanding. That is, an understanding that grasped in the movement of life the plurality of possible relations and – this is the key – that there was no given priority of one over the other. To prioritize is to interpret: to desire to see one thing rather than another. It is not merely we who mean in different ways, but the world as well.

Formal indication is a manner of reflecting on life without privileging a scientific or epistemic paradigm. It grants to life, rather than consciousness or science, a basic priority in the dialogue of human living and knowing. Heidegger’s wager in these courses is that there is a space between life and the conceptualization of the neo-Kantians or the transcendental reduction of Husserl for a philosophical reflection on the conditions that make these activities possible. What is the value in this?

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In the case of religion, the value is in knowing how to be religious. The key, Heidegger claimed, was to discern not what the meaning was, but how it was brought about in oneself. Until one understood how Paul was a Christian, one could not grasp what the term meant. Until we understand how Augustine experiences life we cannot grasp the meaning of his search for God in life. Formal indication allows us to uncover in the articulation of life by these figures how life meant and that suggests how one ought to be in relation to life if it is to mean in a similar way. Such proposals, even if they are not taken up by us, nonetheless tell us something about our own possibility. Insight into religion as a living world has value for both philosophical and theological reflection on religion.

Heidegger’s defining insight is that our basic form of understanding is operative at the level of factual life and it is therefore a hermeneutic understanding. That hermeneutic understanding, therefore, conditions all further modifications of human knowledge founded upon it: it is the “ground” of all other forms of understanding. This is an insight he shares with Kierkegaard for whom any knower – the religious believer, Hegel, or, God forbid, the assistant professor – is also a single individual and therefore someone who must come to understand truth not merely objectively, but subjectively as well: “The subjective thinker’s task is to understand himself in existence” (CUP 351). For both thinkers, our first truth, the truth of existence, determines the manner in which it is grasped. For both that form is interpretation understood as appropriation: Kierkegaard defines subjective truth as the “truth of appropriation” and Heidegger defines interpretation as the “appropriation of understanding in the being that understands.”

Heidegger’s religion courses make a lasting contribution to our discourse on meaning and interpretation, and therefore to our discourse on knowledge. However, he like his Danish predecessor, is a reactionary thinker, and in his attempt to underscore the factual and enacted

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3 GA 2, 150/142, trans. Stambaugh.
origin of meaning and understanding he draws too sharp as division between the content and relation senses on the one hand and the enactmental sense on the other. The result, we have tried to suggest, is an increasingly formalized account of enactment that, when it becomes completely untethered from its motivating content, misrepresents the always embedded and content-laden nature of any undertaking. Thus, the eschaton in light of which Paul and the Thessalonians live becomes so indeterminate that one begins to wonder why it required a revelation to articulate it, and the Augustinian experience of the molestia of life occasioned by tentatio can no longer account for the good in distinction from which tentatio has its meaning.

There is an ethical critique here as well: Heidegger’s attention to the performance of an action threatens to eclipse the moral quality of the action itself (that of or for which it is a performance (Gehaltsinn)). In amending his proposals, we do not want to deny the extent to which the enactment-meaning of our experience is crucial to understanding it. Yet, the exclusivity and priority that he accords it fall afoul of his own critique of Husserl’s emphasis on consciousness: they take from life only what has the character of enactment. His formalism reaches such a degree of abstraction that it cannot accommodate the concrete situations and circumstances in light of which good and evil are decided. It can only consider the most general forms of being and action which would be constituent to a truly virtuous action. Yet the good is always concrete, and precisely because he has suspended the content-sense (Gehaltsinn) of such actions we cannot see to what ends they are directed⁴.

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⁴ His initial involvement with National Socialism is a tragic example of this. Heidegger had a hopelessly—and culpably— naïve vision of a German Volksgeist that was heir to the romantic nationalism of Fichte, Hegel, and Hölderlin. As Wolfe notes, “To Heidegger, as to many other intellectuals at the time (e.g., Bultmann), it seemed less an innovation than a return to the great nationalist tradition of the 19th century.” (“Caught in the Trap of his Own Metaphysics” in Standpoint (online), June 2014). This is gradually distinguished from what Heidegger eventually sees as the “vulgar Nazism” of the Party and its “dull biologism” of blood and soil rather than spirit. The problem, as Wolfe points out, is that Heidegger substitutes a poetic justice for a practical (concrete) one. That is to say, he is spiritually and intellectually opposed to Nazism, but in a way that leaves him practically complicit with it: “Perhaps his own call to a poetic appreciation of the world, for all its rejection of a forceful “enframing” of the world, is simply another version of the human tendency to remake the world in the image of our own fantasies” (Wolfe, “Caught in the Trap”).
The over-emphasis on enactment is a philosophical problem in two ways. First, it mischaracterizes the meaningful experience of the world that is the heart of phenomenology by over-emphasizing one moment (enactment) at the expense of others. Second, it is not a faithful reading of the experiences articulated in Paul’s letters and Augustine’s *Confessions*. Kierkegaard helps us to recover a sense of the way the content of experience structures its enactment and articulation by taking the Christian account of the paradox as paradigmatic – in religiousness B, Christ teaches us something we could never know from introspection and recollection. This is a content whose peculiar form of enactment for the authentic believer cannot be separated from what she believes. Yet, it is still an account particularly attuned to authentic and inauthentic ways of having that content: how one believes in the Incarnation makes a difference, indeed it makes the difference.

Kierkegaard thus helps us recalibrate the Heideggerian account of meaning and puts us in a position to ask a more properly hermeneutic question: how do content and enactment mutually structure one another? If Heidegger’s “deconstruction” is the walking back of our interpretation to its how, then Kierkegaard helps us see that such an activity is always in service of the further re-appropriation of the what. It is a form of a repetition – another and a further spiraling inwards of the hermeneutic circle.

This opens to us a rich way of engaging in a philosophy of religious life. First, we can re-read Heidegger’s own texts for some of the marginalized dimensions of Christian factual life. Augustine’s suggestion that there is a relation between self-possession and justice towards the other is a particularly fertile one. Second, the focus on enactment provides a helpful hermeneutic for thinking about other dimensions of Christian practice outside of what Heidegger discusses. We have examples of a phenomenology of liturgy⁵ and prayer⁶, but what

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might a phenomenology of mercy look like? Third, a phenomenological articulation of the lived experience of religious life offers possibilities for religious dialogue. What might a phenomenology of pilgrimage in Christianity and Islam have to offer us in terms of mutual understanding? Finally, formal indication is a hermeneutics of life that originates as a hermeneutics of a set of Christian texts. How might one apply Heidegger’s enactmental account of meaning to other texts, religious and non-religious alike, to understand them better?
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347


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70.