Identity crisis: Examining interorganizational cooperation within the peacekeeping regime complex

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This thesis seeks to explain variation in coordination, competition, and cooperation between international and regional organizations during peacekeeping operations. In the post-Cold War era, a number of factors—including the proliferation of increasingly capable organizational actors, expansion of mandated tasks, and increasing complexity of conflict—have led to the development of an international peacekeeping “regime complex.” This complex is characterized by multiple international institutions that exhibit overlapping membership, are actively involved in matters of peace and security, and are connected by normative and operative interaction, both official and ad hoc. By examining materialist, dependency, and organizational factors, this thesis explores institutional interaction and the drivers of both rivalry and collaboration in the context of four cases: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Mali, and Somalia.

It hypothesizes that organizations will cooperate when they hold complementary understandings of their roles within the peacekeeping regime complex, but will compete when these identities clash and overlap. Understanding these dynamics will not only lead to recommendations for more effective and efficient peacekeeping operations, but also contribute more generally to the growing theoretical field of regime complexity in international relations.

**ABSTRACT**

This thesis seeks to explain variation in coordination, competition, and cooperation between international and regional organizations during peacekeeping operations. In the post-Cold War era, a number of factors—including the proliferation of increasingly capable organizational actors, expansion of mandated tasks, and increasing complexity of conflict—have led to the development of an international peacekeeping “regime complex.” This complex is characterized by multiple international institutions that exhibit overlapping membership, are actively involved in matters of peace and security, and are connected by normative and operative interaction, both official and ad hoc. By examining materialist, dependency, and organizational factors, this thesis explores institutional interaction and the drivers of both rivalry and collaboration in the context of four cases: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Mali, and Somalia.

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**TYPES OF COORDINATION**

- **Sequential Operations**: One organization deploys an initial mission with the intent of stabilizing the volatile situation on the ground, followed by another organization taking on a long-term mission
  - Examples: Burundi, Bosnia, Kosovo
- **Parallel Operations**: Multiple organizations operate in the same country autonomously, but toward the same broad goals
  - Examples: Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo
- **Integrated Operations**: Two organizations share command or one organization subordinates command to another
  - Example: Darfur

**ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS**

**Materialist Explanations**
- Cooperation: Organizations will combine resources to achieve a shared goal
- Competition: Organizations will compete over scarce resources

**Dependency Explanations**
- Cooperation: Organizations will coordinate comparative advantages to carry out a mission
- Competition: Organizations will compete over command and control

**Organizational Identity Explanations**
- Cooperation: Organizations share complementary understandings of roles and responsibilities
- Competition: Organizations hold conflicting identities, leading to disputes and clashes

**CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS**

- Organizational identity plays a key role in determining how institutions act toward resources, capabilities, and each other
- Autonomy is important—organizations act more efficiently when working individually toward specific goals
- An interlocking security system based on comparative advantages must take organizational roles into consideration
- Organizations should be treated as unified, autonomous actors
- Conceptions of organizational identities can be applied to other problems of collective action