Living witness: Making a confession of faith in a pluralistic world

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INTRODUCTION

I want to thank Erik Ranstrom and the planning committee for inviting me to speak here this evening. It’s a great honor for me. The Engaging Particularities conferences I’ve attended have become like bookends for my doctoral studies. My first paper presentation happened at what I believe was the inaugural Engaging Particularities conference. I couldn’t have picked a better venue for that experience; everyone was very welcoming and the environment of conversation throughout the whole weekend really performed the kind of authentic exchange that many of the papers theorized. I met several wonderful people that year and continued to meet several more in subsequent Engaging Particularities experiences. So having defended my dissertation just 12 short weeks ago, it’s especially nice for me to return here now, and to express my appreciation for the valuable contributions that this conference has made to my journey.

My paper this evening offers something of a synthesis of the ideas I’ve collected on the themes of interreligious dialogue, comparative theology, and missiology. My concerns are mainly methodological, particularly with respect to the relationships among the fields. I will make a few proposals this evening, which will be my contributions to the conversations we’ll have over the course of the weekend; and I
will raise several questions, which I imagine will not evoke unanimous responses but hopefully will help us to think together about some of the themes and topics for which we share a sincere interest.

THEOLOGY AND DIALOGUE

Over the past few years, in my studies and in my teaching, I have become more and more convinced of a close relationship between theology and biography. It seems that theologians who are trying to understand faith are often constructing theologies that help them to make sense of their own faith experiences and journeys, usually in hopes of resonating with the experiences and life stories of others. In that line of reflection, then, I’d like to begin with an experience of my own.

My wife and I attended the first few warrior trainings at the Shambala center in the west end of Toronto during my doctoral studies at Regis College. At the first training, the teacher gave a brief lecture on the experience of “basic goodness.” In the question and answer portion, several of our fellow warriors-in-training engaged in a dialogue with the teacher that went far beyond the concepts introduced in the lecture. They attempted to clarify the nature of “basic goodness” by making sometimes very illuminating and consistently well-informed references to Nagarjuna and even Tson Kha Pha, to sunyata and pratitya-samutpada. Despite their well-intentioned efforts, however, the teacher seemed a bit dissatisfied with the group’s comprehension of his lecture. After a subtly tense moment of silence, a certain young woman sitting to my right (i.e., my wife) politely raised her hand and when called on said, “You know, it reminds me of that little hymn,” and she began to sing, “This little light of mine, I’m gonna let it shine.” Incidentally, the teacher seemed delighted by her comment; he smiled and proceeded to explain how that little hymn expressed exactly what he had been talking about all along.
Now did the young woman in the story have a theology of religions that prepared her for her experience at the Shambala center? Did she subscribe, at least implicitly, to some version of exclusivism, inclusivism, or pluralism? Maybe, but maybe not. In a recent issue of *Horizons*, Peter Feldmeier suggests that different theologies of religions may suit different kinds of dialogical encounters. He recognizes that each of the categories in the common typology of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, has its strengths and weaknesses. Rather than dismissing the framework for its real limitations, Feldmeier wants to embrace the framework more fully for all of its various strengths. He calls for a rejection of the need to fit the religions into a single Christian meta-narrative, a unifying systematization that would define the relationship of Christianity and the religions in fixed and certain terms. In other words, he acknowledges the validity of the project – the project of the theology of religions – but he refutes the approach that would treat the three camps as if they mutually excluded one another. Feldmeier charts the future of the theology of religions in what he calls a “creative postmodern tension,” a tension which has outgrown the fruitless aspiration for absolute systems and, in turn, embraces multiple truths from within multiple paradigms. Sometimes, for example, an exclusivist affirmation of Christ as absolute Savior will resonate most truly for a particular situation, whereas other times a pluralist appeal to perennial religious experience will suit the context more appropriately. Returning to our story, then, the young woman may have had not just one theology of religions prior to her experiences at the Shambala center; she may have had several.

But isn’t it also possible that she didn’t bring a theology of religions with her at all, neither one nor many? Couldn’t she have walked into that warrior training without even an implicit Christian understanding of her Buddhist neighbors? Of course, James Fredericks seems not only to affirm such a possibility, but also to prescribe it. He and Francis Clooney, having called for a moratorium on the theologies of religions, are well known for their sharp criticism of the project as a whole. For Fredericks,
the various theologies of religions display their hopeless inadequacy by their own oversights and repetitive dead-ends. Essentially, they all theologize about the religious other without ever listening to the other. They are all based strictly on Christian belief and discourse without reflecting any real or serious engagement with the teachings and practices of other religious traditions.

On their individual merits, inclusivism, for Fredericks, supersedes exclusivism and pluralism by its affirmations of the uniqueness of Christ and the universality of grace. But the adequacy of inclusivism for meeting the demands of the Christian tradition does not translate into genuine motivation for Christians to dialogue interreligiously. Despite any emphasis it may place on dialogue, the inclusivist model, argues Fredericks, does little more than promote tolerance. Its self-referential assessment of other religions excuses Christians from real encounters and leaves them pastorally unprepared for the needs of their complex, religiously diverse situations. Even the best of candidates for a theology of religions falls short of the mark. “The time has come,” Fredericks says, “to move on to doing theology comparatively as an alternative to the quest for a theology of religions.” So, perhaps the comparativist would recommend simply showing up for Buddhist meditation, listening to a lecture on “basic goodness,” and seeing what happens. What do I learn? How does it change me?

Now as far as I can tell it seems that major voices in the debate between comparative theology and theologies of religions have grown closer together in their perspectives through the years. Clooney, for example, now recognizes that theologizing on religions should continue as the questions that inspire such reflections also continue to emerge and demand our attention. Similarly, Paul Knitter grants to Fredericks the absolute necessity of dialogue for understanding the religious other, but maintains that theologies of religions play an important part in our dialogical encounters. Knitter uses the image of a circle to draw the relationship between dialogue and theology: theology disposes us for dialogue and
dialogue, in turn, influences our theology. On this score, Knitter perfectly echoes Stephen Duffy’s editorial essay written ten years ago now in response to a disagreement between Knitter and Clooney over the comparativist’s call for a moratorium. Again, voices that once seemed discordant are sounding more and more resonant. It seems possible now to discern a shared desire in the various approaches – a desire to articulate the religious horizons of confessional commitments while engaging wholeheartedly in genuine dialogue with the religions. The theological meanings of the confessions and their implications may differ as strongly as the commitments, but these are no longer juxtaposed in principle to comparative encounters.

I tend to think that Duffy’s rather brief essay makes an important contribution to current and future work in the theology of religions and comparative theology. He appeals to basic and sound hermeneutical principles to explain how the two modes of inquiry are inseparably related. The historicity of understanding makes it impossible for an interpreter to enter dialogue without bringing his or her history to bear on the encounter. Only by his or her religious horizon does the Christian first encounter the teachings and practices of another religious believer. Only by the play of my theological pre-understandings with the meanings of a religious counterpart in dialogue do I come to a genuine understanding of what he or she desires to communicate to me. So to suggest a comparative encounter without theological pre-understanding, without an inchoate form of a theology of religions, betrays a problematic view of the dynamics of human interpretation. But the achievement of understanding always to some greater or lesser degree changes the person who understands. Comparative encounters may offer renewed and life-giving self-knowledge in light of genuine discovery; they may lead to a revision of theological self-understanding. Duffy thus contends that theologies of religions form the a priori part of a circle that necessarily includes comparative theology as the a posteriori counterpart. Both parts are mutually interrelated.
For Duffy, then, even the fact of a practicing Christian’s arrival at a Shambala center potentially says something about her Christian convictions and commitments. Of course, spelling out exactly what it says probably would require accumulating a good deal of further data. But her experience of understanding suggests that she encounters Buddhist practice and teaching from within rather than against her distinctly Christian horizon or worldview.

So what does Duffy’s proposal imply for the future of the theology of religions? His argument for the hermeneutical inseparability of the latter with comparative theology may partly explain a trajectory of development in the proliferation of the theology of religions over the past few decades. Consider Knitter’s explanations of the strengths and weaknesses of the various theologies of religions in his latest book. Knitter often uses the principles of (1) genuine openness to the religious other and (2) fidelity to Christian tradition as standards for measurement and criticism in his analyses of the various theologies. The tendency to evaluate proposals according to the principles of fidelity and openness seems to suggest that theologians are attempting to accomplish what Duffy formally anticipates, namely, a theology of religions suitable for genuine comparative study. And yet, none of the proposals expounded and analyzed in Knitter’s book seems to win the day. After dissecting the pros and cons of the various models, Knitter ends with an “inconclusive conclusion.” He suggests that theologians need to dialogue about their Christian theologies of religions, just as the religions need to dialogue with one another. But his interlocutors, in a review symposium devoted to his book, push him to acknowledge that not all of the positions he outlines are “equal.” On matters of central importance to Christian self-understanding, such as Christology, “the inner logic of faith,” writes Roger Haight, “demands a judgment.”

Of course, Knitter agrees and argues that theologians should strive toward a consensus. He anticipates the future of the theology of religions in a coherent hybrid theology that sublates the best
insights in each of the basic models and offers something new to interreligious encounters. He finds the most promise in the pluralist or mutuality model, but that’s what makes Feldmeier’s recent proposal so interesting: he refuses to choose. He suggests that we need not so definitively decide on one model or paradigm over another. It’s not entirely clear how Feldmeier would respond to Haight’s query on the inner logic of faith. Feldmeier recognizes the need for a priori theological principles to express central Christian convictions and commitments in dialogue, but he also recommends appropriating these principles skillfully (i.e., differently) for different encounters. His view that each of the camps in the common typology represents a partially true yet incomplete paradigm results in his proposal for holding all of the models in a creative postmodern tension. Would Haight’s suggestion that faith demands a judgment sound to Feldmeier like a modernist plea for an Absolute system? I’m not sure, but the question is significant. Does the inner logic of faith demand a judgment with respect to the theology of religions? If so, what kind? For the remainder of my remarks, I will suggest a few Christian presuppositions and principles that may help us think about the logic of faith in hopes of contributing a few pieces to the circle of theology and dialogue.

CULTIVATING AN “EXPECTATION OF THE UNEXPECTABLE”

The research for my dissertation focused on the works of Bernard Lonergan and his theology of grace. I tend to think that Lonergan offers a largely untapped resource for thinking about interreligious questions. One of his most well-known and respected interpreters, Frederick Crowe, has consolidated and developed a good deal of Lonergan’s scattered writings on the subject. Remarkably, Crowe approaches the question of Christianity’s relationship to other religions by limiting two issues that receive a lot of air time in many theologies of religions. He suggests that focus has turned away from the possibility of salvation for all, for that possibility is now simply “taken for granted.” He also does not
see the universalist claim of Christianity or of any other religion as the focal point for determining Christianity’s relationship to the religions. Rather, he sees the issue put more squarely by reflection on the divine economy: What is God doing in the twofold mission throughout human history? What was God doing in past ages and places? What is God doing now? What can we discern about the possibilities of the future? Neither salvation for non-Christians, nor the apparent conflict in a plurality of salvations or of absolute claims, preoccupies the inquiry. Crowe’s emphasis on the divine economy translates into attentiveness to the patterns of grace and redemption occurring in history. His reflections do not completely determine or define the whole of salvation history, but they attempt to anticipate how we go about discerning it. His position aims at defining a performance.

On the twofold mission, then, Lonergan linked the gift of the Spirit in the divine economy with the gift of God’s love. He described this gift as a dynamic state of unrestricted being-in-love and identified it as the foundational element in all religion. He suggested that it has a determinate content without an intellectually apprehended object, implying that religious experience “does not of itself include knowledge of God.” On this basis, then, the gift itself constitutes a prior, inner word that grounds and complements its external expression in the outer word of religious language and tradition. Not only do we need to communicate for ourselves what we inwardly and deeply experience, but we also have the need to share, encourage, and correct one another in the form of religious community. The community allows its members “to come to understand the gift that has been given them, to think out what it implies and involves, to support one another...” in living out its meaning. Lonergan’s universalist view of religion does not specify Christian tradition. It describes the dynamics of human interiority in basic categories that at least potentially apply to all religions. Unlike the post-liberal proposals of Knitter’s acceptance model, Lonergan’s methodological emphasis on religious experience does not supplant
ontological reference. His view of interiorly differentiated consciousness helps to explain how interreligious dialogue and transformation may occur.

Besides the outer word of religious language and tradition, Lonergan also suggested that God speaks an outer word of revelation to the religious community. Human persons live and act in a meaningful world, and we define ourselves by the meanings we construct and affirm. “So it is,” Lonergan wrote, “that a divine revelation is God’s entry and his taking part in man’s making of man.”xv Lonergan used the analogy of a man and woman falling in love in order to help us understand why God enters the world to participate in the human drama. He explained that love does not come to fruition unless lovers avow their love to each other. Love fails to mature into itself if lovers never speak it, if mutual self-donation does not bring about the radically new interpersonal relation and situation, the presence and the opportunity for growth. Spoken love allows for sustained development and deeper mutual knowledge, mutual gifts and companionship through sufferings and pain, which “make love fully aware of its reality, its strength, its durability….”xvi God’s spoken word in history complements the inner word of the gift of divine love. For Lonergan, God not only falls in love with the human family but also avows that love in revelation events and divine disclosures.

When Lonergan turned to history, he named Judaism and Christianity as recipients of God’s spoken advent into the world of religious expression. Notice the inclusion of Judaism here, and how it precludes an exclusive identification of God’s spoken word in history with the divine mission of the Son. Lonergan acknowledged more than one such avowal of love in the larger human story. His understanding of why God would want to enter the world of meaning in the history of religion does not translate into an exclusively Christian discourse. In fact, Crowe asks if this aspect of God speaking an outer word of revelation to a particular community may likewise apply to all religions. On his reading of Lonergan, he
concludes that this line of reflection may allow for various divine words uttered in history, “one for Judaism, another for Islam, another for Hinduism, and so on.” He does not go into much further detail on this point, but the recognition of the possibility of various revelation events complements his overarching emphasis on a divine economy that becomes fully transparent only in the eschaton.

Of course, for Christians, the mediation of God’s gift of love occurs as love in Christ Jesus. Crowe’s suggestion that Lonergan may have recognized the possibility of several spoken words of God in history does not divorce the universality of the inner word and the living Word of Jesus the Christ. He distinguished the Christian community in its social, historical, and doctrinal aspects according to the interdependency of God’s gift of love and the Incarnation event. Lonergan never doubted the central affirmations of Nicea, but he instructively shifted attention away from Christ himself as mediator while considering the question of the divinity of Christ. Crowe shows that what Lonergan ultimately considered pivotal for differentiating Christianity consists in the Father’s sending of the Son and in the revealing of God’s love for us “in the most heart-rending way,” in the way of the Only-begotten’s crucifixion and death. By framing the question of the divinity of Christ in terms of the revelation of God as Love in and through the Paschal Mystery rather than in terms of Christ’s metaphysical make-up, Lonergan invited us to consider the uniqueness of Christ as participants in the apostolic witness of the resurrection event.

The approach that Lonergan took to Christology here parallels that of James Alison’s, whose powerfully creative insights into the Christian Mysteries begin with the apostolic witness to the crucified and risen Lord. In that witness, God reveals God’s self as Love by revealing God’s self as human victim. The resurrection event simultaneously offers new perspectives onto human beings as constituted by patterns of rivalry and violence, and onto God as absolutely forgiving and opposed to the
murderous logic of those patterns. Only by being forgiven, by being in solidarity with the self-giving and forgiving victim, and by adopting the perspective or intelligence of the victim, does our complicity in rivalry become known and our understanding of what God revealed to us about God’s self in the Paschal Mystery become a living truth. Robert Doran’s recent work has helped me to see that Lonergan’s idea of being-in-love with God unrestrictedly reconstitutes human living in the pattern of what Girard calls the “non-naive form of pacific mimesis,” a pattern of relationality defined by forgiveness, self-donation, and peace. Only by the vantage point of that new life and ecclesial reality does one enter into the vision and truth of Christian dogma.

Now Crowe recognizes that Lonergan always insisted on the mission of the church to preach the gospel to all peoples. He hedged neither on the divinity of Christ nor on the universal significance of Christianity. But he understood the modus operandi of preaching the gospel in terms of dialectic, encounter, and dialogue. The beliefs of others demand our attention. By the authenticity of their religious experiences, other religious believers are positively related to the gospel message; and by the authenticity of their own religious expressions, their beliefs are positively related to the gospel and to every other inner word.

Lonergan considers the questions of mission and dialogue in relation to divine providence and grace and in the context of a total view of history. There follow two practical implications. (1) The whole matter of mission and dialogue rests more in God’s hands than in ours; the primacy of the divine initiative in history “checks a tendency to attribute excessive importance to our own responsibility,” and allows us to embrace a more humble manner of cooperating with God’s desire for human history. Such humility acknowledges God as the agent of a religious conversion that in the divine economy of the twofold mission begins well before the preacher’s arrival with the gospel. (2) Such humility, then,
translates into a directive for seeking out authentic dialogue as the mode of witnessing to the gospel that best suits our secondary role in the wide compass of God’s purpose and intention for all peoples. The witness works two ways: it involves careful listening to the religious other, witnessing the authentic movements of the divine economy already occurring in history, and it involves preaching the good news of the Only-begotten within a positive relation of attentiveness and shared discernment.

So, then, what is the final relationship of Christianity to the other religions? Crowe’s response to this question offers an extremely helpful key to weighing the value of our reflections to this point. In giving his answer, he begins by posing the theological problem of divine omniscience and human freedom, and argues that how a theologian explains the limits of our secondary responsibility in the divine plan has implications for personal living and interreligious encounter. Please allow me to quote him at length; he writes:

If God’s ‘plan’ is already in place for us, that is, in the ‘already’ of our ‘now,’ then to that extent we are no longer free. And if God has a determinate ‘plan’ in place for Christianity and the world religions, then we will let be what must be. But suppose God has no such plan, suppose that God loves a slow-learning people enough to allow them long ages to learn what they have to learn, suppose that the destiny of the world religions is contingent on what we all learn and do – say, on Christians being authentically Christian, Hindus being authentically Hindu, and so on. Then responsibility returns to us with a vengeance, and the answer to the question of the final relationship of Christianity and the world religions is that there is no answer – yet. xx

Crowe outlines less a position than a performance of discernment. He articulates the Christian responsibility to discern the twofold mission of the divine economy in history. Such discernment makes dialogue with other religions necessary, and strives to meet the religions on their own terms. Neither Crowe nor Lonergan seem to harbor any desire to make other religious believers into crypto-Christians, for they caution a slow-learning people against hasty judgments and facile pretensions to unity or uniformity. Their affirmations of the divinity of Christ displace them from the mutuality or pluralist model, but their patient refusal to leap to an answer on the final relationship of Christianity to other
religions also does not seem to fit perfectly alongside many versions of the inclusivist or fulfillment model. But if their perspective meets the basic demands of the Christian tradition, still does it prepare Christians pastorally for the new forms of solidarity that, as Fredericks rightly says, our religiously diverse contexts currently demand?

Once again, I think Alison offers useful insights. He speaks of the universality of grace as a chistoform imitation of the self-giving victim.\textsuperscript{xxi} For Alison, grace always involves a turning towards the victim, and its universality attests to the fact that explicit religious identities do not matter more than concrete performances of people living out the chistoformity of grace, turning towards victims in real solidarity. In other words, the actual construction of a new humanity, not its explicitation, matters most to our religious living. Still, Alison sees belief in the resurrection as inseparably linked with the historical founding of the Eucharist-based Church, which marks the creative sign of a new humanity par excellence, and with the universality of grace in the contours of salvation history. Grace brings the historical body into being and constantly pushes its borders and limits by creating what Alison calls “anonymous proto-signs” of humanity’s reconciliation with God wherever humans are separated and alienated from one another.\textsuperscript{xxii} Our participation in the Eucharist-based Church prepares us to witness the life-giving patterns of the Paschal Mystery wherever people are in solidarity with victims. Grace creates a new humanity that does not manufacture its identity out of violence, or justify itself over against another group.\textsuperscript{xxiii} The new unity of the Eucharist-based Church receives its existence from the self-giving victim, and, in turn, gives itself as bread for others to consume.

Christian living may wholeheartedly embrace new forms of solidarity with other religious believers as Christians live out the Eucharistic performance that makes the body of Christ visible in the present. William Cavanaugh’s work beautifully describes how the Eucharist assimilates us into Christ and makes
us gift and sustenance for others. He describes how the Eucharist anticipates the future Kingdom by bringing all places and times into the body of Christ, and how it simultaneously disallows a complete identification of the heavenly church with the church in time. The eschatological imagination of the Eucharist thus cultivates in us an “expectation of the unexpectable.” Our hope for the repentance of sins always opens towards the surprise of ever new forms of reconciliation; we do not know who the heavenly church will include or exclude; but in the Eucharistic foretaste of the kingdom, we become the body of Christ and must offer ourselves in sacrifice as to offer what Christ offered. The Eucharist opens us to the authentic meanings that religious others embody in the patterns of the divine economy. The self that a Christian receives in the Mystery of the Body lives out the truth of its “Amen” by entering into life-giving relationships with all others in the eschatological hope of an unexpectable communion.

“Eucharist,” Cavanaugh writes, “reveals the true meaning of solidarity.”

**CONCLUSION: CONFESSIONING THE FAITH**

I should probably say a few words about the title of this paper before my time runs out. The confession of faith intensifies the question of religious living that we considered in the broadest scope with Lonergan’s reflections on divine providence. But the intensification does not displace the divine economy: Only the logic or rigor of love inspires the authentic confession, for only love does not accede to temptations to mastery and assurance. Jean-Luc Marion carefully examines how such temptations lead to the aberrations of confessional performances that are marked by militant persuasion, or a spiral of violence, or indifference, or ecstasy, or opportunism. The potential for some form of Pelagianism to occupy the confession seems almost endless. Marion suggests that an absolutely valid confession that says “Jesus is Lord” requires two conditions: (1) the Lordship of Jesus, which only the Father can manifest, and (2) the confessor as re-created in perfect imitation of Christ, which only
Jesus can recognize. Thus, the Christian who confesses can supply neither of these conditions, the implicit relations of which span the reach of the divine economy. The confession of faith passes through the speaker only by the speaker’s withdrawal from every form of mastery and assurance. For Marion, the confession of faith finds its true completion in the privileged instance of martyrdom, for martyrs abandon themselves to Jesus, sharing in his passion, by the logic of love.

Even the confession of faith hangs in the balance. Between mastery and martyrdom, the earthly church strives to live faithfully in the incompleteness of its eschatological imagination. The Eucharistic performance of the body of Christ aims at forming us into witnesses or martyrs who imitate Christ’s self-offering in perfect love and obedience to the Father. Returning now to the question that Haight poses to Knitter, I suggest, in agreement with Haight, that the logic of faith demands a judgment, but I would also suggest that it demands a judgment not our own, a judgment that merely passes through us. The logic of faith belongs to love, and it seems to me that love suffices for a true confession and an authentic dialogue and solidarity with other religious believers. Our future theologies may continue to strive to traverse the terrain between principles for understanding the broad horizon of religious encounter and intensified insights into what it means to confess the faith, to be incorporated into the ecclesial body, and to say “Amen,” in the eschatological time of a cultivated expectation of the unexpectable.

Feldmeier seems to acknowledge the possibility of a logical contradiction between theologies of religions, but Feldmeier wants us to move beyond a theory of reason that would lead us to view a violation to the principles of identity and non-contradiction as a stumbling block (“Theology of Religions,” 266-67).

Ibid. 268.


Fredericks, “Review Symposium,” 118.

Clooney writes: “Neither can there be a moratorium on reflection on pluralism, since people inevitably raise these questions and need to reflect on them. Theologizing on religions, and theologizing in an interreligious conversation, can and should continue, even according to tradition-specific approaches, provided the price for balance and integration is paid” (“Theology, Dialogue, and Religious Others: Some Recent Books in the Theology of Religions and Related Fields,” *Religious Studies Review* 29 [2003] 319-27, at 324).

See Knitter’s reply to Peter Phan et al. in the review symposium cited above.


Ibid. 137.

Ibid. 128.


xx Ibid. 141.


xxii Ibid. 92.

xxiii Ibid. 93.


xxv Ibid. 250.

xxvi There is a reference here to Augustine: “It is to what you are that you reply Amen, and by so replying you express your assent. What you hear, you see, is *The body of Christ*, and you answer, Amen. So be a member of the body of Christ, in order to make that Amen true” (cited in Cavanaugh, *Torture and Eucharist*, 233).

xxvii Ibid. 268.


xxix Ibid. 196-97.