Allez, Marchez Braves Citoyennes: A Study of the Popular Origins of, and the Political and Judicial Reactions to, the October Days of the French Revolution

Author: Katie L. Jarvis

Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/523

This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries.

Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2007

Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Undergraduate Honors Program

History Department

Allez, Marchez Braves Citoyennes:
A Study of the Popular Origins of, and the Political and Judicial Reactions to, the
October Days of the French Revolution

by

Katie L. Jarvis

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
the degree of

B.A.

© copyright by Katie L. Jarvis
2007
Allez, Marchez Braves Citoyennes:  
A Study of the Popular Origins of, and the Political and Judicial Reactions to, the October Days of the French Revolution  

Abstract  

On October 5, 1789, several hundred women first converged on the Parisian municipal government, then marched undeterred on Versailles to demand the king’s aid in relieving the dire bread shortage in the city. By the end of the next day however, the women returned triumphantly to the capital not only with bread, but with the entire royal family, the National Guard, and National Assembly’s promise to relocate to Paris as well. This revolutionary journée is referred to as the October Days, and this thesis seeks to address its spontaneous and premeditated origins. I argue that although the journée was not the result of an overarching conspiracy, its themes and actions had precursors in the early months of the Revolution and the years before. Also, by undertaking a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the ensuing judicial investigation of the movement, I have attempted to provide a grounding for the October Day’s most important primary source through which some of the journée’s most controversial aspects can be examined. Finally, I argue that this judicial inquiry significantly contributed to the polarization of the National Assembly as le peuple forced the political elites to take sides over the investigation. Thus, between October 5, 1789 and October 1, 1790 le peuple continued its struggle to reinforce the sovereignty with which it had been endowed.
Allez, Marchez Braves Citoyennes: 
A Study of the Popular Origins of, and the Political and Judicial Reactions to, the October Days of the French Revolution

By
Katie L. Jarvis

Advanced Independent Research Project
April 2007

Thesis Advisor:
Dr. Paul Spagnoli, History Department
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements iii

A Note on Translations iv

Epigraph v

Introduction 1

Section I: The October Days 6

Chapter 1: The Foundations of the *Journée* 9

Chapter 2: The *Journée* Part I, October 5 40

Chapter 3: The *Journée* Part II, October 6 63

Chapter 4: The Spontaneous and Premeditated Nature of the *Journée* 76

Section II: The Châtelet Investigation 92

Chapter 5: The Formation of an Ambiguous Inquest 95

Chapter 6: An Analysis of Testimony For and Against Conspiracy 121

Section III: Chapter 7: Diverging positions: Popular Pressure and the Political Response to the *Procédure criminelle* 147

Conclusion 167

Appendix: 171

Differing Perspectives on the October Days: A Summary of Secondary Source Arguments 171

*Procédure criminelle*: Deposition Number/ Page Number 184

The Comité des Rapports’ Conclusion Concerning the Châtelet Investigation as Delivered by Chabroud in the National Assembly on October 1, 1789 188

Works Consulted 190
Acknowledgements

I must thank several people without whose support this thesis would have proved impossible. I am very much indebted to Professor Paul Spagnoli who advised my work. It was in his class that I received my first detailed introduction to the Revolution and he has continued to extensively offer his valuable insights and knowledge on the subject. During the summer of 2005, Professor Spagnoli agreed to advise my Advanced Study Grant to explore the various controversies surrounding the October Days, in which this project had its unexpected beginnings. I do not think he knew precisely what he was getting himself into at that point, but I thank him for continuing to support this work until its current fruition. I never left his office hours without a new insight, perspective, or the occasional grammatical rule. He graciously read numerous drafts and his suggestions and guidance greatly improved the final product. To Professor Spagnoli, thank you for sharing your passion for the French Revolution with me and encouraging me to do my best work. It has been a pleasure to share my first substantial scholarly endeavor with you.

I am also grateful to Professor Ourida Mostefai for being my second reader and for critiquing the translations in my first section. I appreciate the cultural perspective which you have brought to these arguments and your constant reminder to consider the paradigm in which these events unfolded. Your insights have contributed another dimension to this thesis.

In addition to having initially taught me strong research skills through her Study and Writing of History class, Professor Virginia Reinburg greatly aided me in my graduate school search and application process, thereby allowing me to work on my thesis with much less external stress. Thank you for your generous help and genuine advice.

The interlibrary loan staff at O’Neill deserve a special thank you. Their efforts in obtaining the most obscure sources and rare books have been greatly appreciated.

To Kristen Couture, who has learned more about the October Days than any CSOM student may ever want to know, thank you for tolerating my incessant rambling and indulging my many sentences beginning with “I’m thinking of a word…” Your friendship has been a source of joy throughout this project.

Last, but certainly not least, I must thank my family for their love and support. Your laughter never fails to refresh my perspective and bring me a sense of renewal. Thank you for leading me to believe that nearly anything is attainable through hard work and determination. To Mom and Dad, thank you for encouraging my academic endeavors and for being genuinely interested in all that I do. This undertaking would not have been possible without your heartfelt support, and it is for this reason that this work is your accomplishment as well.
A Note on Translations:

All direct quotes within the main body of this text are in English. All translations from French are my own unless otherwise noted. Some of these quotations have untranslatable gender implications, while the charisma of others cannot be fully captured by their English equivalents. Consequently, the limits of English sometimes compromise the important effect of revolutionary rhetoric. Therefore, although I have tried to maintain the integrity and nuances of the original quotation in my translation, I have always included the original French in my footnotes as well.
“So many great questions, arriving concurrently, on which we must form opinions! So many issues clustered together which have to be studied!”

National Assembly Deputy Jean-Andre Périsse, as quoted by Timothy Tackett in *Becoming a Revolutionary*, p 244.
Introduction

O generous heroines! It’s to you that the French owe this second revolution that is going to decide the glorious fate which has been reserved for their lofty destiny! After having contributed to the salvation of the Nation by your civic offerings, that which we were lacking the most was served by your courage. May you be forever able to gather the fruit of such a noble devotion.¹

Les Révolutions de Versailles et de Paris
(October 1789)

With this opening salvo, Les Révolutions de Versailles et de Paris dedicated its very first issue and entire paper to the “dames françaises.” The women had collectively offered a monetary donation to help the fledgling nation in September, but it was their actions on October 5 and 6, 1789, which the newspaper praised the most. This “second revolution,” the first being the July 14 attack on the Bastille, resulted in the king and ultimately the National Assembly’s relocation from Versailles to Paris. The heart of the national government was moved from its somewhat detached Versailles location to the center of the most politically vocal French city where it was more susceptible to the scrutiny of le peuple. On October 5, 1789, hundreds of tenacious citoyennes marched through the rain to Versailles in order to ask the king for bread and present their grievances to the National Assembly, and on October 6 the women returned to Paris not only with bread, but with the king himself, several military units, and a host of immediate and far reaching consequences.

The most prevalent revolutionary and historiographical debate about the October Days concerns the nature of its origins. The question of whether the October Days was

the result of a conspiracy or spontaneous popular propulsion is central to comprehending its aftermath and significance. Therefore, in order to draw conclusions about this issue, I will trace its thread through three distinct phases, starting in the summer of 1789 and ending in October 1790. These three sections concern the origins of the journée, the judicial response and investigation of this question, and this debate’s political consequences for the National Assembly and the Commune.

In the first section I will argue that nearly every aspect of the October Days had a precursor in the early months of the Revolution and the years before. Therefore, I will give an account of the events of the journée itself in order to point up similarities between this movement and those which took place in the preceding months. This account will be multi-dimensional; not only will it serve as a narration of what occurred, but it will also explore the motivations of the participants of all parties involved. This, of course, lends itself to a discussion of key people, the political climate/agenda, the bread crisis, and the conspiracy rumors that the people and the court commonly believed. Since the October Days began in Paris and ultimately affected it the most, I will examine these issues from the capital’s point of view, rather than from that of the provinces who faced different situations and problems. Most importantly, I will analyze the various motivations of and precursors to the movement in order to address this controversy over the spontaneous or premeditated origins of the journée. I will conclude that the October Days contain both of these dimensions in a paradoxical duality. The movement was premeditated in the sense that the ideas, themes, and actions all appeared earlier in the Revolution or even years before. However, it was also spontaneous in the sense that it was not the result of a conspiracy or one politically planned agenda, but rather it was a sudden manifestation of
popular sentiment and driven by *le peuple*. Finally, I will argue that the October Days is mainly distinguishable from earlier demonstrations because of the sheer number of people involved and the sense of legality added to the movement by the direct participation of the National Guard.

The second section will address the investigation which the National Assembly ordered to discover the “auteurs” behind the “crimes” of October 6. The National Assembly had provisionally charged the Châtelet, an ancient royal court, with the power to try crimes of treason and thus assigned it the task of uncovering this supposed conspiracy. The resulting *Procédure criminelle* recorded the testimony of 395 individuals which the Châtelet heard over the course of seven months. Although frequently cited in various historians’ arguments concerning the conspiracy or spontaneity of the journée, no one has published a detailed overarching study of the investigation, leaving references to individual testimonies weak when taken out of the context of the investigation as a whole. Therefore, I will quantitatively and qualitatively analyze the *Procédure criminelle* in an effort to provide this grounding of individual depositions within the investigation as a whole. By analyzing the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of each witness, I will draw a general picture of the witness pool and conclude that, on a whole, it was conservatively inclined group in comparison to the actual participants of the journée. By evaluating the depositions, I will suggest points of error within the investigation itself, such as the procedure and actions taken by the judges, which shaped its overall conclusions. Additionally, I will explore the content of the testimonies to form conclusions on controversial topics such as if there were men disguised as women and if Mirabeau and Orléans were the “auteurs” of a conspiracy. Moreover, I will argue that the
sketchy evidence which the judges attempted to collect while trying to denounce Mirabeau and Orléans as conspirators actually does more to exonerate them than incriminate them.

In the third section, I will address the political reaction to the Châtelet investigation. Although both the Commune and the National Assembly had originally ordered the investigation, within only a year each had turned its back on the *Procédure criminelle*. In April 1790, after a confrontational meeting between the Parisian Comité des recherches and the Châtelet, word leaked out that the Châtelet was collecting information beyond the events outlined in the denunciation (those concerning the violence of October 6). In fact, it sought to implicate Orléans and Mirabeau, two very popular deputies, in a conspiracy that stretched back to July. Many districts and left leaning newspapers, both representative of *le peuple*, voiced their outrage against this transgression. Therefore, the memory of the October Days produced a highly volatile political issue on which many representatives were ultimately forced to take a side. The pressure of popular opinion deepened the division among the representatives in the National Assembly by forcing the left to renounce the investigation while the right urged for its further consideration. With this polarization of political positions, the left even went beyond rejecting the idea of a conspiracy behind the October Days; it denounced the Châtelet as being part of a counter-revolutionary conspiracy itself! As a result of its relocation, the governing body was directly exposed to the opinions of *le peuple* of Paris, and this immediate effect catalyzed the journée’s long term effect of gradually increasing division among the center political parties. Therefore, the consequences of the October Days come full circle since the deputies were forced to reconcile their positions with
Parisian popular demands, some of which were about the Châtelet investigation and the *journée* itself.

From October 1789 to October 1790, the populace and the political elites frequently revisited the debate over the spontaneous or premeditated origins of the October Days. After detailed analysis and some historical distance, it is reasonable to see the *journée* as a synthesis of both. The actions of *le peuple* were guided by prior knowledge and drew on themes and actions of the past while the *journée* itself was initially a truly popular and rather spontaneous movement. However, the failure of any group to see it as such drove the political and judicial struggle over its contested origins down a track of absolutes at whose beginning and end *le peuple* ultimately held the switch.
Section I: The October Days

Men accomplished the fourteenth of July, women the sixth of October. Men took the royal Bastille and women took the king himself, [and] put him in the hands of Paris, that is to say those of the Revolution.2

Jules Michelet, 1853

With this simple yet powerful comparison, the great nineteenth-century historian Jules Michelet decisively penned his assessment of the October Days. In a single flourish, Michelet reduces the relative importance of the traditional revolutionary hallmark, the fall of the Bastille, in light of the collective achievement of several hundred Parisian women three months later. The glory of the women’s actions, Michelet concludes, lay in their spontaneous, popular, and unguided impulses. In other words, the journée was a movement driven by the women of the popular classes for the greater economic and political good of le peuple. But one is left to wonder if this conclusion stems more from the Romantic inclinations of Michelet than from the historical realities of the October Days themselves. This section seeks to provide a background for the movement, to clarify the events of the journée, to identify the motivations of the various participants, and to examine the defining, though much debated, characteristics of the October Days.

The major historical controversy of the journée concerns its spontaneous or premeditated origins. Consequently, any analysis of the October Days is founded upon the individual historian’s stance in this over-arching debate. Although disagreeing on the origins and scale of a plot, historians such as Henri Leclercq, Georges Lefebvre, and

2 Jules Michelet, Les Femmes de la Révolution (1855 ; Project Gutenberg, 2006). Etext #18738 http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/18738, Chapter V (Les Femmes du 6 Octobre). All translations into English are my own unless otherwise cited. The original French quote is included in the footnote for anything I have translated. (“Les hommes ont fait le 14 juillet, les femmes le 6 octobre. Les hommes ont pris la Bastille royale et les femmes ont pris la royauté elle-même, l’ont mise aux mains de Paris, c’est-à-dire de la Révolution.”).
Marc de Villiers have all asserted that the *journée* was the result of a conspiracy, while other historians such as Louis Gottschalk and Margaret Maddox, Barry Shapiro, and Michelet have argued that the initial propulsion of the movement was spontaneous and popular. However, if one makes a distinction between the themes and specific events of the *journée* on the one hand, and the movement’s initial impetus on the other, a third argument emerges – the movement was both spontaneous and premeditated. This paradoxical argument has been advanced by George Rudé, Albert Mathiez, and David Garrioch, and I will build upon their work along with that of Olwen Hufton to further contribute to this conclusion.\(^3\)

I will argue that the themes of the *journée* were in no way new. In fact, the sources of anxiety which ultimately led to the movement, such as the bread crisis and rumors of aristocratic conspiracy, were clearly present in July 1789, if not before. Moreover, the events which comprise the *journée* as a whole had their origins in previous revolutionary activity and even in the activities of daily life. In this way, the October Days were neither spontaneous nor ground-breaking. Its ideas were already part of a collective consciousness and the events themselves had precedents.

However, I will also argue that the October Days were spontaneous in the sense that they were spurred by popular action without cohesive organization or an agenda imposed by a political group. The consistent actions and demands of the women at the Hôtel de Ville, the château, and the National Assembly on October 5 reveal their motivations to be based upon economic necessity and their concern that counter-revolutionary forces might be influencing their good king and insulting the fledgling

\(^3\) For a brief summary of these historians’ focal points and the nuances which differentiate their arguments, see the Appendix.
nation. The October Days were, at least initially, not motivated by any other factors beyond popular sentiment which manifested itself in spontaneous action.

This section will also examine the October Days in relation to other previous events to conclude that the radical differences between the *journée* and preceding revolutionary activities are the sheer number of participants and the involvement of the National Guard. Thousands of people were immediately affected within the thirty-hour period of the *journée*. These individuals were from a wide variety of backgrounds: from the Flanders troops to the politicians of the National Assembly, and from the nobility of the court to the *poissardes* of the Parisian markets. The participation of the National Guard on the side of *le peuple* legitimized the movement and revealed the Commune’s increasing lack of control in Paris.

Although the numerous factors contributing to the October Days make it difficult to conclude what truly happened, one must sort through the evidence and nuances of various arguments to provide a coherent narrative. Only then can the effects of the October Days be accurately examined.
Chapter 1: The Foundations of the Journée

-Paris at the Beginning of the Revolution-

At the start of the Revolution, the population of Paris was 650,000. Of these inhabitants approximately 10,000 were clergy members, 5,000 belonged to the nobility, and 40,000 were bourgeois. The 595,000 remaining citizens comprised the group of the menu peuple, who were the “shopkeepers, craftsmen, and day laborers” of the city. The menu peuple lived mostly in the northern area of Paris and in the faubourgs of Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marcel. There was also a concentration of wage-earners near Les Halles, the central markets, which was often a hub for revolutionary activity. Due to their participation in popular revolutionary activities such as the October Days, the menu peuple quickly became the Parisian image of le peuple which revolutionary and popular authorities gradually accepted as the legitimizing force or the guardian of “an infallible general will.” However, in the summer and fall of 1789 this relationship was just developing and political leaders were hesitant, to say the least, to completely accept popular actions as originating solely from valid grievances of le peuple.

Nevertheless, the Parisian municipal government which was erected after the fall of the Bastille operated on the principle that sovereign authority must be derived from the districts which represented le peuple. Initially, the Parisian districts had been formed to elect representatives for the Estates General, but they surpassed their initial purpose. By refusing to dissolve, the districts perpetuated the belief that they were able to act as the

---

7 Rudé, The Crowd, 234.
8 Rudé, The Crowd, 17.
legal organ of *le peuple*. Thus, the districts were called by the Comité permanent to elect deputies for the Assemblée des représentants which would become the main body of the Parisian municipal government. Jean Sylvain Bailly, the mayor of Paris, also asked the districts to design a new administration plan for the city. Therefore, the first revolutionary government of Paris was inextricably tied to the will of *le peuple* via the districts who were the “true active force of the Commune” and the “only source of authority.”

*Le peuple* often superseded legal and formal political means to express their needs and opinions in the form of crowds. This means of political persuasion (or intimidation depending on one’s point of view) was already being used in June 1789 to scare the court and nobility of Versailles. Crowds were everywhere in Paris, regardless of whether they had a conscious structure or were the natural result of teeming marketplaces. Minor incidents could easily escalate into major crowd disturbances under such conditions.

There was no stereotypical organized “revolutionary crowd.” Each crowd had its own distinct composition as did any other crowd under the ancient regime. The main difference from old crowds was that revolutionary crowds held longer protests and had more power in persuading the susceptible newly formed government. Thus, historians refer to revolutionary crowd demonstrations as *journées* to stress this increased length of

---

11 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, I: xii. The Comité permanent was organized by the Electeurs of the city on July 13 and consisted of mostly city officials and Electeurs who were charged with reorganizing the administration of the city. At the end of July, it evolved into the Comité provisoire. Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, I: xi.
time and the greater influence that revolutionary crowds held over political and popular opinion. Revolutionary crowds were more than a purely reactive phenomenon; they also showed support for governmental measures. The crowd, acting like the chorus in a Greek tragedy, functioned as the voice of le peuple. For example, at a ceremony in which National Guards took an oath of loyalty, les dames des Halles of Versailles and of Paris “assembled to sing their praise over and over again” and these actions were “celebrated by an immense number of people” and “excited the sweetest emotion.” Another group of citizens submitted to the Commune a “Mémoire” of the Bastille in order to praise the patriotic example of Stanislas-Marie Maillard, who participated in the attack on the fortress.

The Assemblée des représentants recognized the power of these crowds and became increasingly disturbed as their activity grew more frequent and violent throughout the summer. Even children had taken to forming their own crowds, arming themselves and pretending to be revolutionary patrols. The Commune was more than happy, therefore, to receive a decree from the National Assembly ordering the Commune to take judicial action against individuals who disturbed public order and peace. As a result, the Commune took appropriate measures by asking four districts to help police the Palais-Royal which was often the site of revolutionary agitation. As early as August 6,

---

17 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 340-241 (“se sont réunîtés pour chanter à l’envi les louanges” and these actions were “réputés par un peuple immense”; “ont excité la plus douce émotion”).
18 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I:157.
19 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 251.
20 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 67.
21 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 98. According to Siméon-Prosper Hardy, who meticulously recorded his daily observations of the Revolution in his journal, there were 10 instances of unrest or significant demonstrations at the Palais-Royal during July alone. See July 1 (p. 584), July 2 (586), July 3 (589), July 6 (599), July 9 (606), July 10 (615), July 12 (627), July 13 (630), July 19 (670), July 31 (715) in Valérie Goutal-Arnal, “Mes loisirs, ou journal d’événements tells qu’ils parviennent à ma connaissance: les
the Commune even reported that Lafayette had to plead with a crowd to respect the judicial procedures and not unlawfully persecute an accused man.22 The extent and frequency of popular crowd participation nearly paralyzed the municipal government by the end of September.

-Popular Concern for the King and his Actions-

One constant concern of the revolutionary crowds was the political position of the king. Through the October Days, Louis XVI is constantly referred to as “our good king” by a variety of sources. Yet, le peuple were often afraid that the king was being influenced by counter-revolutionary forces such as the aristocracy. Immediately after July 14, Lafayette gave a speech in Paris proclaiming that the king had been “deceived” before the fall of the Bastille, but had since been exposed to the truth.23 Le peuple were further reassured of the king’s good intentions upon his visit to the city on July 17. During this appearance, his Body Guards did not enter with him as a display of respect and trust towards Parisians.24 Although the crowd shouted “Long live the king and the nation” upon the king’s exit,25 Bailly’s speech revealed the suspicion of bad influences that nevertheless prevailed. While presenting the keys of Paris to the king, Bailly proclaimed:

These are the same [keys] that were presented to Henry IV; he had conquered his people, now it is the people who have conquered their king … This is the most beautiful day of the monarchy; it is the occasion of an eternal alliance between monarch and people.26

---

22 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, I: 113. Gilbert du Motier, marquis de Lafayette was the head of the Parisian National Guard and was also an influential deputy in the National Assembly.
24 Gottschalk and Maddox, *Lafayette Through the October Days*, 125.
26 Gottschalk and Maddox, *Lafayette Through the October Days*, 127.
Hardy’s belief in a rumor that the king punched his valet whom he suspected of conspiracy against Paris and the National Assembly illustrates the tendency of le peuple to believe that bad influences surrounded their good king. The king later showed his support of the newly formed Parisian National Guard by pledging to send them 6,000 guns and thereby gained further praise from his Parisian subjects.

These pewter medals were made to commemorate the October Days. The top medal was the first one made and its caption, “La Nation a conquis son Roi, arrivée du Roi à Paris le 6 octobre 1789” (The Nation

27 Goutal-Arnal, “Mes loisirs, ou journal d’événements tells qu’ils parviennent à ma connaissance: les débuts de la révolution Française relates par le libraire Parisien Siméon-Prosper Hardy,” 677 (July 21).
conquered its king, the arrival of the King to Paris on October 6, 1789), clearly refers to Bailly’s July speech with the intent of mirroring the joyous occasion. However, as the origins of the October Days became increasingly controversial, the engraver simplified the description to “Arrivée du Roi à Paris, le 6 octobre 1789” to avoid any negative connotations of the word “conquis.”

These actions did little to quell the popular suspicion that the influences of the court and additional opposition to the Revolution from abroad were corrupting the king. Many politicians requested that the king remove his troops (especially the foreign ones) from Paris, which were the cause of much tension. In July, the National Assembly sent Mirabeau and a deputation of 24 representatives “to address the king on the withdrawal of troops.” However, the actions of the National Assembly did little to reassure Parisians that the king was not being manipulated. In fact, 32 deputies sent a note to the king in reaction to an August 30 attempt to march on Versailles, requesting that the National Assembly be relocated to Soissons or Compiègne. The National Assembly could then be at least 20 leagues away from Paris and beyond the reach of the city’s active crowds. The king, with his “passive courage” refused the request, thereby avoiding an inevitable protest from Paris. These events served to strengthen le peuple’s belief it was their duty to protect the king from counter-revolutionary pressure.

29 A popular fear of the early Revolution was that foreign troops would be manipulated for counter-revolutionary purposes. In 1789, there were 45,000 foreign troops in the royal military forces. Georges Carrot, La Garde Nationale: 1789-1871, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001), 23.
30 Barbara Luttrell, Mirabeau, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), 135. Lafayette, Mounier, and Mirabeau were all strong supporters of this request.
31 Albert Mathiez, “Étude critique sur les journées des 5 & 6 octobre,” Revue Historique, vol. 67 (1898): 273. The August 30 attempted march on Versailles was organized at the Palais Royal in hopes of persuading the king and the National Assembly to reject the veto. I will discuss this event in detail later in this section.
In fact, *le peuple* had valid reasons for concern. A group called the French Regeneration proposed a plan for the king’s flight from Versailles, and Favras was later prosecuted for his involvement in the plot.\textsuperscript{33} Mathiez believes that the king seriously considered fleeing Versailles in September due to increasing political pressure concerning the constitution.\textsuperscript{34} It is at least certain that some of the king’s close advisors strongly urged him to leave Versailles for a more politically favorable location (usually argued to be Metz).

The last major crowd-propelled public disturbance before the October Days occurred on August 30. A group of armed citizens at the Palais-Royal planned to march on Versailles “in order to prevent the royal veto from passing in the National Assembly.”\textsuperscript{35} According to the marchers, “The veto does not belong to a single man, but to twenty million. The citizens gathered at the Palais-Royal think that the ignorant, corrupt, and suspect deputies must be revoked.” Moreover, the same crowd sent a letter directly to the National Assembly, which stated:

> The Patriotic Society of the Palais-Royal has the honor of informing you that, if the aristocratic party, formed by a part of the clergy and a part of the nobility, and one-hundred-twenty members of ignorant or corrupt members of the Commune, continue to cause trouble, and still want the absolute veto, fifteen thousand men are ready to burn their castles and their houses and yours particularly.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{33} Lefebvre, *The Coming*, 194.
\textsuperscript{34} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 69: 61.
\textsuperscript{35} Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, I: 400 (“pour empêcher que le veto royal ne passe dans l’Assemblée nationale”).
\textsuperscript{36} Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, I: 413 (“Le veto n’appartient pas à un seul homme, mais à vingt cinq millions. Les citoyens réunis au Palais-Royal pensent que l’on doit révoquer les députés ignorants, corrompus et suspects.”; “La Société patriotique du Palais-Royal a l’honneur de vous faire part que, si le parti de l’aristocratie, formé par une partie du clergé, par une partie de la noblesse, et cent vingt membres des communes ignorants ou corrompus, continue de troubler l’harmonie, et veut encore la sanction absolue, quinze mille hommes sont prêts à éclairer leurs châteaux et leurs maisons et les vôtres particulièrement.”).
Other reports testified that individuals shouted threats against the queen as well and accused her of participating counter-revolutionary activities.\textsuperscript{37} The leader of the Palais-Royal movement was the Marquis de Saint-Huruge and although his forces were stopped by Lafayette and the National Guard en route to Versailles, the event threw the Commune into such an uproar that the Assemblée des représentants could not adjourn until after 3:00 a.m., once order had finally been restored in the city.\textsuperscript{38} The Commune received a letter later on August 31 which hauntingly informed it that the Palais-Royal movement served “to forestall the fury of the people, it is they who open legal avenues” and that “[the people] want to explain their \textit{cahier} and declare that it did not want to grant the king a veto.”\textsuperscript{39} The Commune had already ordered Lafayette and the National Guard to act “in order to break up all seditious crowds” on August 7,\textsuperscript{40} and the Commune became even more visibly shaken by this new development; the deputies officially denounced the Palais-Royal movement as “seditious,” that it had elements of “subversion,” and “secret and perverse conspiracies” which hurt good citizens. Consequently, the Assemblée authorized Lafayette to take all measures necessary against agitators to restore peace and order.\textsuperscript{41} Despite these new initiatives, members of the Capuchins Saint-Honoré district sent a message to the Commune on September 1 stating that they wished to go to Versailles and stop the National Assembly debates until each deputy consulted the people who elected him on the issue of the veto. The frustrated Commune shortly replied that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{37} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 252.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I:401.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 429-430 (“prévenir la fureur du peuple, c’est de lui ouvrir des voies légales”; “il [le peuple] veut expliquer son cahier, et déclarer qu’il n’a point voulu accorder au roi le veto”).
\item \textsuperscript{40} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 124 (“pour faire cesser tous les attroupements séditieux”).
\item \textsuperscript{41} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 435-437 (“séditieux”; “subversion”; “complots secrets et pervers”).
\end{itemize}
one city did not have the right to force the National Assembly on an issue in which the whole nation had an opinion.42

-The Need for Order and the National Guard-

Not only were there significant demonstrations in late summer, but organized political action in the name of *le peuple* also increased. People moved beyond their districts in an attempt to spread their political opinions across the city.43 The number of groups who requested to address the Assemblée des représentants grew exponentially, and by mid-August the Commune began to make a legal distinction between *députés* from the districts and individual *citoyens* who had diminished legal authority.44 However, this distinction did not deter many groups from arriving at the Hôtel de Ville and the crisis of August 30 compounded the problem. Therefore, the Commune declared on August 31 that it would only receive a “deputation” only if it was “from a legally constituted body.”45 Nevertheless, the Assemblée des représentants continued to be inundated with parties that met this minimum requirement, and this constant interruption paralyzed their efforts to address many of the city’s urgent problems. The Commune consequently decided on September 23 to limit unsolicited communication from the districts to written means alone.46 It is evident that by October 1789, the Commune’s futile efforts could not match pace with the turbulent activities and politically charged atmosphere of the city. Try though they might, the Assemblée could not control Paris alone.

46 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, II: 43.
With tension from various sources threatening to boil over, the Commune entrusted Lafayette and the Parisian National Guard with its own primary goal – to maintain peace and order within the city. The Parisian National Guard, initially called *les milices bourgeoises*, had been originally organized by district but they all became ultimately responsible to General Lafayette in late-July. The National Guard consisted of 3,600 regulars and 30,600 troops, and had 140 canons at its disposal. The first true test of the National Guard occurred early in August when grain convoys were frequently raided en route to Paris, causing much unrest. As a result, the National Assembly passed a decree on August 6 granting the National Guard military power “to reestablish the security of citizens, liberty of commerce, and good universal order,” which virtually encompassed all unrest. The Parisian National Guard was somewhat successful with this mission and the district of Saint-Philippe du Roule specifically praised the actions of the French Guards division. These troops had originally served as protectors of the king until they were replaced at the beginning of the Revolution by the Body Guards. However, the recently alienated French Guards still thought of themselves as special troops and were not always inclined to obey National Guard orders as suggested by the August 19 order that all French Guards must return to their regiments so that Lafayette could better control the militia. In fact, the situation was so bad that by July 14 five of the six French Guard battalions had completely defected from royal command and joined

47 Pierre Dominique, *Paris enlève le roi: octobre 1789* (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1973), 70. The regulars include soldiers who were already members of the various groups of the Royal Army, while the remainder of the troops were composed of citizens without prior military assignments.


the Parisians which they were supposed to policing. Yet, the Commune continued to place its trust in the abilities of the National Guard. In fact, a neighboring town even requested that Paris send some National Guard troops to stop its own “insurrection.”

Moreover, when rumors spread that foreign troops might attack the capital, the city entrusted original National Guard troops with protecting the barriers and roads.

Lafayette labored arduously over three short months to discipline and build up the loyalty and reliability of his troops. He standardized the National Guard oath and concentrated on instilling its vows in his officers: “We swear and promise to remain faithful to the Nation, to the King, to the Law, and to the Commune of Paris.” After taking this oath, Lafayette and many of his officers went to Versailles to pay their respects to the king on August 25. Upon arriving at Versailles, the Parisian National Guard troops met Versailles National Guard troops who were:

 Burning with desire to share, with the citizens of Paris, in honoring M. the Mayor and M. the General, who no longer belonged exclusively to the capital since they became their defenders and, by necessary extension, that of the citizens of the entire kingdom...

The Versailles troops invited their military brothers to dine with them instead, but not before Bailly had sworn to Louis “to enforce [the king’s] legitimate authority, to conserve

---

51 Samuel F Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution: The Role and Development of the Line Army, 1787-93* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 53-54, 59, 72-73. Scott attests that 64 French Guards even directly participated in the attack on the royal Bastille. On September 1, the king formally dissolved his French Guard but the troops, many of whom had joined the National Guard, maintained their identifying equipment and popular prestige. By the fall, the majority of the sergeants and lieutenants in the Parisian Nation Guard were former French Guards.


53 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, II: 47.

54 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, I: 283 (“Nous jurons et promettions de demeurer fidèles à la Nation, au Roi, à la Loi et à la Commune de Paris.”).

55 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, I: 340 (“brûlant du désir de partager, avec les citoyens de Paris, l’avantage d’honorer M. le Maire et M. le Commandant général, qui n’appartiennent plus exclusivement à la capitale depuis qu’ils sont devenus les défenseurs et, par suite nécessaire, les citoyens de tout le royaume, cette Garde patriote…”).
the sacred rights of the Commune of Paris and to render justice to all.”

The remainder of the Parisian National Guard took the official oath on August 30 in front of the Hôtel de Ville. Lafayette used the occasion of receiving banners from the king merely a month later on September 27 as an opportunity to reinforce their responsibilities, and the National Guard renewed their oath in the solemn aisles of Notre Dame. Lafayette was an adroit leader and politician who realized that he needed the support of all troops within the Parisian area to control any situations which might arise. As a result, he started to take other troops under his guidance, and even ironically arranged for four battalions of Swiss Guards to take the National Guard oath in front of the Hôtel de Ville on October 5.

-Issues in the National Assembly-

As Lafayette strove to unify his troops, the National Assembly was dividing on the issue of the constitution. More specifically, the representatives seemed to be in a stalemate over the issue of the king’s veto. The group which Lefebvre refers to as “anglomaniacs” or “monarchials” wanted to keep an absolute veto for the king and establish a bicameral system based upon the English model, whereas, the “patriots” (led by Barnave) wanted to grant the king a “suspensive veto over legislations” only if the king would accept the laws already passed by the National Assembly including the August decrees, which abolished the feudal system in France and spelled out the fundamental rights of every citizen. Mirabeau, on the other hand, continued to advocate for one legislative body and an absolute veto for the king only if the constitution guaranteed “an annual assembly, annual army expenses, [and] annual tax laws” to

56 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, 1: 341 (“de faire respecter [the king’s] autorité légitime, de conserver les droits sacrés de la Commune de Paris et de rendre justice à tous.”).
58 Gottschalk and Maddox, *Lafayette Through the October Days*, 305.
60 Lefebvre, *The Coming*, 190.
disperse the power.\textsuperscript{61} Lafayette, always the centrist of the National Assembly, attempted to balance the two sides in order to facilitate a peaceful transition of power to the new governing bodies.\textsuperscript{62} After much debate, the National Assembly approved of the “suspensive veto” on September 11, but the king would not accept the August decrees.\textsuperscript{63} The king had earlier revealed his precarious position concerning his veto in an August 5 letter: “If force obliges me to sanction, then I would give in, but then, there would no longer be a monarch or a monarchy in France…”\textsuperscript{64} Of course, the king’s decision on the veto and constitution was tantamount to his acceptance or rejection of the course of the Revolution so far; consequently, this political issue unfolded at the forefront of the public eye. On September 21 the king finally made a concession, albeit an ambiguous one. Although he had informed the National Assembly on September 18 that he would not accept the August decrees, he sent them a message agreeing to the publication of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the first articles of the constitution, but withheld his promulgation.\textsuperscript{65} This decision worried the patriots since they felt that it was imperative that the king accept the constitution. Moreover, the patriots and le peuple took his hesitance as further “proof” that he was under the influence of bad ministers. Confused and politically stymied, the National Assembly was unsure of how to proceed. Some representatives concluded that the publication meant that the king’s approval of the constitution was not needed while others such as Mirabeau insisted that the National Assembly ask for his “acceptance” of the decrees as late as October 1. The king’s delay

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{61} Luttrell, \textit{Mirabeau}, 124 and 152.
\bibitem{62} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” \textit{67}: 266.
\bibitem{63} Lefebvre, \textit{The Coming}, \textit{190}.
\bibitem{64} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” \textit{67}: 280 (“Si la force m’obligeait à sanctionner, alors je céderais, mais alors, il n’y aurait plus en France ni monarchie ni monarque…”).
\bibitem{65} Henri Leclercq, \textit{Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789}, (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ane, 1924), \textit{19}.
\end{thebibliography}
in ratifying the constitution had the potential to be disastrous in an already anxious setting.

-Food Problems-

Although the majority of le peuple were politically conscious about formal legislation such as the constitution, they were more poignantly aware of legislation concerning their basic means of existence – bread. The 1788 grain harvest had been weak all across Western Europe.66 These crop failures, compounded with the trend of bread price inflation outpacing wage inflation over the past fifty years, had catastrophic consequences. From the period of 1726-1741 to 1785-1789 bread prices increased 65% whereas wages only rose 22%.67 But the price hike of bread in Paris immediately preceding the Revolution was even more distressing. On August 17, 1788, bread cost 2.375 sous per pound, and the price soared to 3.625 sous per pound by February 1789.68 At the time of the French Revolution, the average person consumed 1.5 pounds of bread per day, which constituted the majority of their diet.69 Yet the average wages for a day laborer were 25 sous per day and a skilled worker received 50 sous per day.70 In order to buy daily bread for a Parisian family of four in February 1789, a worker would have to spend 21.75 sous, which was 87% of a day laborer’s wages. Unfortunately, bread prices skyrocketed to 4 sous per pound in Paris, and up to 8 sous per pound in the provinces by July 1789.71 This means that the same family of four would need to expend 24 sous per day, or 96% of a day laborer’s wages on bread alone! Something had to give.

66 Lefebvre, The Coming, 105.
67 Lefebvre, The Coming, 105.
69 Lefebvre, The Coming, 102.
71 Lefebvre, The Coming, 105.
As a result of the deplorable bread prices, much of the summer’s unrest can be attributed to this food crisis. The food riots which broke out in les Halles on August 28 and 29 were so severe that the National Guard was called in to control the uproar.\footnote{Gottschalk and Maddox, \textit{Lafayette Through the October Days}, 231.} Convoys of bread sent in from the provinces were often subject to attack and pillage. On August 31, the unrest in the city began at 2:00 a.m. as convoys approaching Paris were pillaged by looters and even country peasants who were weary of seeing grain leave their land.\footnote{Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, 61.} The participation of some citizens in food crisis events in the name of the city or \textit{le peuple} strengthened their feeling of patriotic duty and confirmed the effectiveness of their own actions. For example, the Commune received a report on August 4 that eleven citizens had defended a convoy against 4,000 “brigands” (undoubtedly exaggerated) out of their feeling of civic duty. The Assemblée des représentants praised their actions and consequently reinforced a positive image of active citizen participation.\footnote{Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, 1: 86.} As the crisis worsened, the blame for the shortage spread from counter-revolutionary conspirators, to the government, to the bakers. Not only were bakers accused of hoarding, but the districts even critiqued the ingredients they used, one asserting that the flour a particular baker used was so bad that “it would be dangerous to use it to make bread.”\footnote{Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, 1: 483 (\textquotedblleft il serait dangereux d’employer à faire du pain.	extquotedblright)}. Therefore, the stores of usable flour were actually lower than whatever small amount of flour was in the city at any given time.

The situation in the countryside did not help the bread problems of Paris. Parisians were already at a disadvantage because unlike the residents of the countryside who purchased grain once a week to make their own bread, most Parisians bought bread
directly from bakers in the city. Although most had direct access to the grain themselves, peasants would cringe at the sight of convoys taking grain from their region to Paris. As early as April 1789, these convoys were frequently stopped by people suspicious of its source and destination. All peasants were aware that decreasing their own grain supply would increase prices and might jeopardize their very existence in the case of a future famine. Local authorities were so concerned with the grain supply that they implemented systems in which peasants had no choice but to sell their grain at local markets to residents and bakers before they could sell any surplus to merchants. However, since royal taxes were not collected in 1789 and peasants no longer had to pay seigneurial dues, immediate income was not necessary, and peasants could hoard grain longer until the market was most favorable to them. The Great Fear spread in the provinces from July 20 to August 6 and peasants lived in constant state of apprehension and paranoia, fearing that brigands would come to steal their grain and property. These circumstances and suspicions greatly hindered the import of grain into Paris.

-The Municipal Reaction to the Bread Crisis-

As a branch of the Parisian municipal government, the Comité des subsistances was entrusted with regulating food within the city. Even though it was established as an independent branch in order to quickly remedy the food crisis, the Comité was completely bogged down during the summer of 1789. The Comité des subsistances moved slowly due to the great number of issues that needed to be addressed. The Comité made sure to post what decisions it did make on placards to inform inhabitants and

---

76 Lefebvre, *The Coming*, 103.
78 Lefebvre, *The Coming*, 103.
80 Lefebvre, *The Coming*, 106.
remind them of its efforts.\textsuperscript{81} The crop of 1789 was not nearly as dismal as that of 1788 and the Comité hoped that this new grain would help to bring down prices.\textsuperscript{82} However, this grain had yet to be threshed and distributed, so the Comité precariously pursued a balancing act to please suppliers and consumers while keeping order in the city. Because of the growing number of disturbances at the food markets and threats directed toward individual bakers, the Comité deployed National Guards at the bakers’ shops from September 1 to 16 in an attempt to quell the unrest.\textsuperscript{83} The Comité also took steps to secure more grain for the capital by sending deputations to neighboring municipal governments encouraging a permanent daily correspondence on the transfer of grain.\textsuperscript{84} These steps proved not to be enough.

In an attempt to free up time to discuss other issues beyond bread, the Commune had deferred most food problems to the authority of the Comité hoping that it would more swiftly solve these problems.\textsuperscript{85} However, the Commune was never able to completely detach itself from food issues and found itself instead working with the Comité on a plethora of issues. Bailly subsidized “a bonus” of 9 livres per sack of flour to help bakers get the raw materials they needed.\textsuperscript{86} Clearly pressured by popular unrest, the Commune declared on September 2:

\begin{quote}
The Assembly, perpetually occupied with means of assuring the subsistence of this city, had invited the representatives of the bakers to confer with them, in the presence of the Comité des subsistances and M. the Mayor, on the most proper
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{82}Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 120.
\textsuperscript{83}Rudé, \textit{The Crowd}, 68.
\textsuperscript{84}Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 313.
\textsuperscript{85}Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 118.
\textsuperscript{86}Dominique, \textit{Paris enlève le roi}, 46 ("une prime").
means to make reign as quickly as possible, an abundance [of food] in the capital.\textsuperscript{87}

The Assemblée des représentants also continued to receive deputations pertaining to food issues. For example, it responded to the demands of the Récollets district in ordering a house to be searched in which it was believed 8,000 sacks of flour were hidden (this turned out to be a false accusation).\textsuperscript{88} Some bakers also approached the Assemblée to complain about the quality of flour they received, so the Commune sent out a team to inspect the quality of flour in the city.\textsuperscript{89} The Commune even addressed food issues beyond the common bread problems and settled a dispute as to when butchers could bring meat to sell at Les Halles.\textsuperscript{90} To make matters worse, since the constitution had not yet been passed, the Commune lacked an updated criminal procedure to follow and thus entered a judicial stalemate concerning the rights of citizens and when arrests or legal action were legitimate. On September 8, Lafayette instructed the Assemblée des représentants to alert the national Assembly that a new criminal procedure was crucial to restore order in the capital.\textsuperscript{91} On September 9, the National Assembly actually formed a committee to review and reform the criminal procedures, but no changes came until October 9, not in time to help the city calm the food crisis before the eruption of the October Days.\textsuperscript{92}

The ever-turbulent Halles (the central markets) were a major source of aggravation for the Commune, since they were the major center of the Parisian food

\textsuperscript{87} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 450 (“L’Assemblée, perpétuellement occupée des moyens d’assurer les subsistances de cette ville, a fait introduire les syndics des boulangeurs pour conférer avec eux, en présence du Comité des subsistances et de M. le Maire, sur les moyens les plus propres à faire régner le plus promptement possible, l’abondance dans la capitale.”).
\textsuperscript{88} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 301.
\textsuperscript{89} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 273 (“farines”).
\textsuperscript{90} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 550.
\textsuperscript{91} Gottschalk and Maddox, \textit{Lafayette Through the October Days}, 248.
\textsuperscript{92} Gottschalk and Maddox, \textit{Lafayette Through the October Days}, 248.
trade. The Commune specifically formed a committee to assess the situation at Les Halles and take any necessary measures to solve the unrest there.\textsuperscript{93} It resorted to establishing a permanent guard for Les Halles that was comprised of 300 troops from different districts.\textsuperscript{94} Yet on September 10, the Assemblée remained troubled by the persistent disorder and warned bakers that if they did not follow regulations they would be prosecuted. In addition they proclaimed:

On what had been presented to the Assembly, that the disorder at Les Halles was again beginning, and that the Guard which was established there did not suffice to repress [the disorder], it had been decreed that the Guard of Les Halles would be increased to 600 men of the national troops, paid and unpaid.\textsuperscript{95}

The Commune was also concerned that the bakers were not bringing enough flour to Les Halles and resolved that this supply should be reported exactly and valued each day.\textsuperscript{96}

The Commune and Comité des subsistances were fighting a losing battle against food-based insecurity and disturbances.

With minimal results to show for their great efforts, the Comité de subsistances came under increasing criticism in the summer and early fall. The district of Saint-Antoine complained that representatives in the Comité de subsistances were not placed there directly by the districts who were “the only true Representatives of the Commune.”\textsuperscript{97} Similarly, the district of Pères de Nazareth called for a surveillance of Les Halles by regulatory commissionaires assigned to the task by district vote.\textsuperscript{98} The Comité was subject to denunciations by the popular press. Marat’s criticism of the Parisian

\textsuperscript{93} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 296.
\textsuperscript{94} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 507.
\textsuperscript{95} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 538 (“Sur ce qui a été représenté à l’Assemblée qu’il se commettait encore des désordres à la Halle, et que la Garde qui y était établie ne suffisait pas pour les réprimer, il a été arrêté que la Garde de la Halle serait portée à 600 hommes de la troupe nationale soldée et non soldée.”).
\textsuperscript{96} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 600.
\textsuperscript{97} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 307 (“les seuls et vrais Représentants de la Commune”).
\textsuperscript{98} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 81.
committees was so biting that the Assemblée des représentants directly questioned him about his seditious works.\textsuperscript{99} The frequency of these attacks increased with time and on September 30, the \textit{Spectateur Patriote} (a popular newspaper) not only blamed the municipal government for failing to safely deliver grain and flour convoys to Paris, but also denounced the actions and failures of the Commune as part of a malicious governmental conspiracy.

\begin{center}
\textit{"Distribution of Ports and Markets, 1789-1812:"} This map shows the dominating central location of Les Halles and the routes which lead from the smaller markets to Les Halles. Since the area of the circle corresponds to the size of the markets, it is easy to see that Les Halles is nearly double the size of the largest of the other markets.
\end{center}

The strain of the food crisis came to a head with the printing of a pamphlet entitled “When will we have bread? You sleep Parisians, and you lack bread!” which was anonymously distributed at the end of September.\textsuperscript{101} It accused Lafayette, Bailly, and the

\textsuperscript{99} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 103.
Commune of profiting from and perpetuating the bread crisis.\textsuperscript{102} It also suggested that the “bad flour” which the government did not distribute was really just a cover-up for its own hoarding.\textsuperscript{103} Referring to measures taken by the Commune in hopes of relieving the situation, the pamphlet declared, “We are beginning to see that these unfulfilled promises are made only with the intention of deceiving us.”\textsuperscript{104} The author argued that the people should pick their own National Guard General while denouncing Lafayette as a “betrayer” and a “vampire.”\textsuperscript{105} The pamphlet did not denounce everyone however. It asserted that the “good king” was being manipulated by others with devious intentions and that the people should not blame the bakers since they could not control the situation.\textsuperscript{106} Finally, the pamphlet issued its final blow. It asserted that the bread crisis was part of a plot to weaken the city so that the newly arrived Flanders troops could attack the city, and that the pretence of their arrival as extra protection for the king was false. Any previously held suspicions and uncertainties were multiplied by this pamphlet which seemed to put two and two together by linking the most prevalent crises of the city, that is, the bread crisis and the recent arrival of the Flanders Regiment.

-The Crisis of the Flanders Regiment-

Serious discussion of calling the Flanders regiment to Versailles started in mid-September. Mathiez offers two explanations for this move. After the Vicomte de Saint-Priest (the Minister of the Interior) had revealed to the Comte d’Estaing (Commander of the Versailles National Guard) that the French Guards had requested to be restored to their old positions as the personal guards to the king, Estaing requested 1000 extra
infantry in case of attack.\textsuperscript{107} The French Guard resented the new Body Guards who were given their most cherished duty. (The French Guards and the Swiss Guards had been the two elite units among the royal household troops.)\textsuperscript{108} Mathiez suggests that the Flanders regiment was also called to protect the king from political pressure to pass the Declaration of the Rights of Man along with the decrees of August 4 to 11.\textsuperscript{109} In any case, the Flanders Regiment arrived peacefully, even in the presence of the Versailles National Guard, on September 23.\textsuperscript{110} Lecointre, head of the Versailles Notre-Dame National Guard battalion, polled the companies to approve of the Flanders regiment on the same day. The results were 23 favorable to their arrival, 7 against.\textsuperscript{111} When the Flanders regiment arrived in Versailles, they respectfully gave the National Guard control of their artillery as a sign of goodwill, further winning over their trust.\textsuperscript{112} However, the reaction to their arrival was much different in Paris; it triggered Parisian protests and added to the general Parisian state of anxiety.\textsuperscript{113} The placards which informed Parisians that the Flanders regiment and other royal troops were 2,610 strong and were spread out within a 60 mile radius around the city did little to reassure the city.\textsuperscript{114}

The news traveled fast and as some Parisians began to panic, the leaders of the Commune tried to keep a level head. As far as Lafayette’s interpretation of the arrival, he could have been insulted that the king did not ask for his advice before acting,\textsuperscript{115} but he suggested that a report of troop movement at Versailles might calm \textit{le peuple}. Ever

\begin{itemize}
  \item Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 280.
  \item Scott, \textit{The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution}, 1.
  \item Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 280.
  \item Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 68: 286.
  \item Leclercq, \textit{Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789}, 18.
  \item Leclercq, \textit{Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789}, 22.
  \item Luttrell, \textit{Mirabeau}, 154.
  \item Gottschalk and Maddox, \textit{Lafayette Through the October Days}, 300.
  \item Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 68: 264.
\end{itemize}
rational but prepared, Lafayette ordered that powder be moved from storage to Parisian military groups as a “way of displaying the power and defense of the City of Paris” in order to reassure Parisians until the troop movement at Versailles was confirmed.\textsuperscript{116} Bailly didn’t believe there was cause for alarm and read correspondence from Versailles “in order to calm the worries of the Assembly.”\textsuperscript{117} A letter from Estaing assured the Commune that it was “indispensable” to call the troops to protect not only the king, but the National Assembly, and Versailles as well and that the troops were loyal to the \textit{commandant-général} of the Versailles National Guard.\textsuperscript{118} Saint-Priest echoed their allegiance and aid to the Versailles National Guard as well\textsuperscript{119} and a memo from La Tour du Pin, a minister of the king, promised the Commune and the National Assembly that no more troops would be called to Versailles.\textsuperscript{120} Finally the Versailles municipal government informed the Commune that the Flanders troops took the actual National Guard oath.\textsuperscript{121} With such reassurances, the Commune moved quickly to settle public anxiety and posted the following facts: the number of royal troops 15 to 20 leagues around Paris was composed of 1,050 Flanders troops at Versailles, 160 Chasseurs des Trois-Evêchès, 100 troops at Chartres, and 350 troops at Rambouillet and Dreux. The grand total of troops including all other groups except for the Swiss was 2,610 men. On the same placard, the Commune pointed out that earlier in the summer, the government had employed 1,450 troops to protect the food supply alone.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{116} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 38 (“moyen de constater la force et la défense de la Ville de Paris”).  
\textsuperscript{117} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 37 (“pour tranquilliser l’Assemblée sur les inquiétudes”).  
\textsuperscript{118} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 51.  
\textsuperscript{119} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 54.  
\textsuperscript{120} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 37.  
\textsuperscript{121} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 52.  
\textsuperscript{122} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 53.
By this time, several rumors and speculation concerning the purpose of the troops had spread through Paris. One was that the Flanders regiment was called up to protect the king in an attempted flight to Metz.\textsuperscript{123} On September 22, one district had asked the Commune point blank if the Flanders troops, who were en route, “have taken the national oath; ... if the troops were coming towards the capital in virtue of the orders of the National Assembly or at least with its agreement.”\textsuperscript{124} Gottschalk and Maddox refer to a letter dated September 16 that said “civil war is much talked of and expected.”\textsuperscript{125} It is hard to overestimate the importance of this single event; Mathiez argues that this troop movement was a “vital event” before the October Days.\textsuperscript{126} Moreover, if the arrival of the Flanders regiment wasn’t enough to exacerbate the agitation of \textit{le peuple}, their welcome banquet certainly was.

-The Infamous October 1 Banquet and the Parisian Reaction-

Military tradition had established that any troops arriving at Versailles were to be given a welcome banquet.\textsuperscript{127} Therefore, an October 1 banquet was held to officially greet the Flanders officers. Besides the Flanders regiment, the royal family, and members of the court, some Versailles National Guards, Chasseurs de Trois-Evêchés, dragons de Lorraine, and Body Guards attended the banquet.\textsuperscript{128} Records reveal that there were 210 place settings at the banquet tables, which gives a rough estimate of the number of attendees.\textsuperscript{129} Due to the limited seating, most of the attendees were officers since all the regiments could not possibly attend the banquet. Members of the Flanders and Trois-

\textsuperscript{123} Dominique, \textit{Paris enlève le roi}, 77.
\textsuperscript{124} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 68: 263 (“avait prêté le serment national; ... si les troupes partaient vers la capitale en vertu des ordres de l’Assemblée nationale ou au moins de son agrément”).
\textsuperscript{125} Gottschalk and Maddox, \textit{Lafayette Through the October Days}, 287.
\textsuperscript{126} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 281 (“l’événement capital”).
\textsuperscript{127} Gottschalk and Maddox, \textit{Lafayette Through the October Days}, 321.
\textsuperscript{128} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 68: 288.
Evêchés regiments composed an orchestra who set the tone for the evening by playing “O Richard, o mon roi” whose lyrics are of great significance\textsuperscript{130}:

\begin{verbatim}
O Richard! O my king!
The Universe has forsaken you!
On earth, it is only I
Who is interested in you!
Alone in the universe
I would break the chains
when all others have forsaken you!\textsuperscript{131}
\end{verbatim}

This strongly royalist song seemed to imply that the troops supported the king alone and looked upon the rest of the nation as deserting the king – not exactly a song in favor of the progress of the Revolution. Additionally, some ladies of the court gave out black cockades in a gesture to Marie Antoinette’s Austrian heritage, and white cockades which was the color of the bourbon dynasty, while neglecting the new tricolor\textsuperscript{132} Some accounts testify that the guests, especially the Body Guards, actually trampled the tricolor cockade instead. Moreover, when toasts were offered, several glasses were raised in praise of the royal family, while no one proposed to drink to the health of the nation.

Whether one believes that the toast to the nation was intentionally left out or accidentally forgotten seems to correlate with whether one thinks that the trampling of the cockade was probable or not. The party seems to have continued after the banquet officially ended. Lecointre, who was not at the banquet itself, testified that the revelry spilled out

\textsuperscript{130} Dominique, \textit{Paris enlève le roi}, 83.
\textsuperscript{132} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 68: 290.
from the Cour de Marbre of the chateau, alarming citizens of the town. Even Leclercq, who is generally conservative in his evaluation of the October Days, argues that some people chanted “Long live the king” and “Down with the [National] Assembly” and that the attendees lingered in plain view to continue drunken singing and debauchery.

If the rumors of the Body Guard banquets were not enough for citizens to conjure up frightening images, the popular illustrations of the event conveniently and dramatically fleshed them out. The sketch above, “Orgy of the Body Guards,” shows a popular representation of the October 1 banquet. The caption reads: The Body Guard’s Orgy in the Salle de l’Opera of the château at which had been given by the Versailles National Guard for the Officers of other different regiments even the Dragons and Soldiers [hired, Flanders] were welcomed there. It was at this Banquet that the excess of joy raised a voice which cried down with the Cockades of the vivid color, the Cockades of the color white, of the color black are the good ones; at the same time the sacred sign of French liberty [the tricolor cockade] was trampled.” The engraving page 35, on the other hand, is a scene from the October 3 banquet and is simply called “Banquet des gardes du corps à Versailles.” Its caption tells another story of distasteful behavior: “Saturday October 3, 1789, at Versailles the Body Guards regaled the Flanders Regiment, Swiss Dragons, and Guards of the Nation etc. etc. This meal was very gay, the Officers changed coats with the Grenadiers and the Soldiers: when at 4:00 a P[ère] Capucin passed near the Salle de l’Opéra, where this meal was being given, two Body Guards took him by his shoulders and brought him in triumph into the Assembly which welcomed him joyously, someone made him sing while making him drink champagne after which the officers took up a good collection for this Father [priest], he was given 200 livres and returned to the monastery with a full purse and stomach.

133 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 32.
134 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 30 (“Vive le roi” and “À bas l’Assemblée [nationale]”).
News of the banquet reached Paris on October 3 and immediately threw the city into an uproar. The majority of the population believed that tricolor was actually trampled at the banquet (as does Mathiez), and that the nation was intentionally insulted in omitting a toast to its health. On this day when news arrived at Paris, the Body Guards made another public relations blunder with a second meal to use up alcohol from the first. Moreover, reports of the Body Guards wearing white cockades agitated the populace, but what *le peuple* did not realize was that the white cockade was actually a mandatory part of the Body Guard uniform.\footnote{Marc de Villiers, *Reine Audu: Les légendes des journées d’octobre*, (Paris: Émile-Paul Frères, 1917), 3.} As a result of this popular uproar, the municipality attempted to legally regulate the wearing of cockades. Danton led the Cordeliers district in ordering “prosecution for the crime of *lèse-nation* of anyone wearing any but the tricolor cockade.”\footnote{Lefebvre, *The Coming*, 198.} The normally meticulously cautious Commune immediately believed the denunciations of what had passed at the banquet and on October 4

---

proclaimed that:

[the Assemblée] is occupied with the outrage made against the nation and the Commune of Paris by several people who permitted themselves to abjure and turn from the cockade that [the nation] adopted as a symbol of union and of liberty... Declares that cockade of the colors the red, blue, and white is the only one which citizens must wear; forbids everyone to wear any others; entrusts M. the Commandant-General to give the necessary orders for the execution of this decree...  

Ironically, Mirabeau had suggested warning the king as far back as July that great “feasting in a royal palace had been the prelude to the massacre of St. Bartholomew.” His predictions had the potential to come true.

Meanwhile, black and white cockades sprang up around the city and the Commune, realizing that “this insurrection was exciting, at this moment, the largest disturbances in the capital,” called Lafayette and the National Guard to restore peace and order within the city. On October 4, Lafayette reviewed 5,000 of his troops and asked for the guards to renew their oath of loyalty which they had taken during the summer. The city’s inhabitants were aware of this great movement and a crowd formed to watch the ceremonies and orders. It was impossible for any Parisian to not be touched by these developments and mounting tensions.

-Other Sources of Agitation in Early-Fall-

The reaction to the banquet was magnified in part because of the formerly discussed agitations of the summer and also because of other individual developments

---

139 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, II: 161 (“[the Assemblée] s’est occupé de l’outrage fait à la nation et à la Commune de Paris par plusieurs personnes qui s’étaient permis d’abjurer et de quitter une cocarde qu’elle a adoptée comme le symbole de l’union et de la liberté… Déclare que la cocarde aux couleurs rouge, bleue, et blanche est la seule que les citoyens doivent porter; fait défenses à tous particuliers d’en porter d’autres; enjoint à M. le Commandant-général de donner les ordres nécessaires pour l’exécution du présent arrêté…”).
140 Luttrell’s words, Luttrell, *Mirabeau*, 137.
141 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, II: 162 (“cette insurrection excitait, dans le moment, la plus grande fermentations dans la capitale”).
143 Gottschalk and Maddox, *Lafayette Through the October Days*, 324.
which had taken place since the arrival of the Flanders regiment. The continued rumors of a possible king’s flight to Metz worried Lafayette that he would not be able to maintain order if such an event did occur. On September 21, he received a report from one of his subordinates, Jean-Philippe Morel, who said that royalist troops would kill Lafayette and Bailly, dissolve the National Assembly, attack both Paris and Versailles, and then bring the king to Metz. However, Morel was probably merely trying to advance his position in the National Guard by trying to represent popular rumors as inside information. Violence against bakers became more frequent in the capital as individuals tried to impose their own “just” regulations on the bread supply with little regard for the regulations of the Commune. This led the exasperated Assemblée des représentants to conclude on September 29 that:

Extreme need seems to be the pretext of this violence, the public order, the surety of properties without which there is absolutely no confidence ... must ban forever these acts of authority which relocate all in the hands of the strongest.

In the same vein, the National Assembly committee had finally reported its decisions about revising the criminal code on September 29, but these revisions were not immediately put into action, leaving the city without a definitive system for controlling the unrest. By October 3, the Commune was so convinced an uprising would take place in the near future that it thought le peuple would soon attack the Ecole Militaire in search of arms. Likewise, the bourgeoisie was frightened by the sudden popular revolutionary

---

144 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 249.
146 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 110 (“l’extrême besoin semble d’être le prétex de cette violence, l’ordre public, la sûreté des propriétés sans laquelle il n’est point de confiance... doivent interdire à jamais ces actes d’autorité qui remettraient tout dans les mains du plus fort.”).
147 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 320.
148 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 323.
movement, while the “patriot deputies” encouraged the involvement of _le peuple_ in the making of “the new order.”\textsuperscript{149}

The press played a substantial role in influencing public opinion with its strong tirades and vocal demands. Marat wrote one of the most popular papers, _l’Ami du peuple_, in which he pungently criticized anyone he felt was inhibiting revolutionary progress, and his volatile columns did much to excite _le peuple_. For example, he criticized the outcome of the Bensenvaal case saying that “The People has stupidly missed its chance to get rid of enemies of the State…. who have now resumed their machinations.”\textsuperscript{150} Marat, along with Rutledge, was a leading accuser of Necker as an aid to hoarders who caused the bread crisis.\textsuperscript{151} The Commune had had enough of Marat’s tirades by late September and looked to shut down his paper for slandering government officials.\textsuperscript{152} Yet other editors were also critical of officials; Desmoulins denounced Lafayette and the regulation of the Palais-Royal in his pamphlets such as “The Discourse of _la lanterne_ to Parisians.”\textsuperscript{153} The simple publishing of rumors seemed to validate their truth. The September 12-20 issue of _Révolutions de Paris_ articulated the suspicion that émigrés were about to attack France with foreign troops to restore the Old Regime.\textsuperscript{154}

The heightened anxiety of _le peuple_, along with denunciations and rumors spread by the press, the Versailles banquet, and the cockade issue led to a great state of disorder and alarm on October 4. Even in the morning session of the Assemblée des représentants,

\textsuperscript{149} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 265 (“députés patriotes”; “l’ordre nouveau”).

\textsuperscript{150} Shapiro, _Revolutionary Justice in Paris_, 82. Bensenvaal was in charge of the royal troops in and surrounding Paris until early July. On July 12, he was forced to withdraw his troops because the Parisians became paranoid that the court would use the troops to attack the city. At this point, Bensenvaal attempted to flee (upon orders of the king) but was soon captured and tried for treason.

\textsuperscript{151} Lefebvre, _The Coming_, 197.

\textsuperscript{152} Shapiro, _Revolutionary Justice in Paris_, 99.

\textsuperscript{153} Lefebvre, _The Coming_, 192-193 (“Le Discours de la lanterne aux Parisiens.”).

\textsuperscript{154} Gottschalk and Maddox, _Lafayette Through the October Days_, 290.
some deputies reported that they heard rumors which “were proving an increasing agitation, one ready to produce an explosion.” Although the Commune ordered all troops to assemble, it acted out of character by extending this command “to reassemble in their troops the largest number of citizens that zeal and patriotism would unite beside them.”  

155 It is generally accepted that in addition to the usual agitation at the Palais-Royale about the economic crisis and the awful intentions of counter-revolutionaries, a woman gave a speech that foreshadowed the events of the next day. In her speech, she voiced her desire to go to Versailles to get bread herself and said that she would depart the next day. 156 Although the truth of this incident is sometimes debated, Gottschalk and Maddox, and Michelet, both include this event in their accounts of the October Days. 157

---

155 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, II: 161 (“prouvait une fermentation croissante et prête à produire une explosion”; “de rassembler dans leurs corps de garde le plus grand nombre de citoyens que le zèle et le patriotisme réuniraient auprès d’eux”).

156 Gottschalk and Maddox, *Lafayette Through the October Days*, 325-326. and Michelet, *Les femmes de la révolution*, chapter V.

157 Gottschalk and Maddox are known for their meticulously close work with sources in carefully recording events. Michelet’s analysis of events is sometimes dismissed by historians, but he is generally regarded as very accurate with factual information. Hufton insists that “at the level of fact – rather than interpretation – [Michelet] is almost invariably reliable.” Hufton, *Women and Citizenship*, 157.
Chapter 2: The Journée Part I, October 5

-From les Halles to the Hôtel de Ville-

One of the major historical disputes about the October Days concerns the initial significant motivations of the marchers who gathered on October 5 at the Hôtel de Ville. The most widely accepted argument is that the women initially gathered in response to the dire conditions related to the bread shortage. Batiffol names this as the leading cause of the October Days while others such as Michelet believe the fear that the newly arrived foreign troops might start a war greatly motivated the marchers along with their hunger. Mathiez also stresses the patriotic sense of duty in protecting the nation from disgrace as he explains, “the women of Paris [went] to Versailles to ask for some bread, the discharge of the [foreign] troops, the punishment of all those who outraged the tricolor cockade.” Garrioch attributes the sudden reaction of the women to what had been a lingering problem as being triggered by the October banquet as well. There are also historians who view the journée as a popular event that was partially manipulated by agents (generally of the Orléanist inclination). For example, de Villiers believes that although the vast majority of participants were women seeking bread, they were manipulated by disguised agents who, using Orléanist money for bribes, agitated the crowd in order to pressure the king into approving the constitution. Other historians point to testimonies of men disguised as women to argue that an Orléanist conspiracy directed the entire movement.

159 Michelet, Les femmes de la révolution, chapter V.
160 Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 243 (“les femmes de Paris se rendent à Versailles pour demander du pain, le renvoi des troupes, le châtiment de tous ceux qui ont outragé la cocarde tricolore”).
162 Villiers, Reine Audu, 2.
In order to comprehend the great participation of women in the October Days, it is necessary to fully understand the gendered mentality that guided their actions. Unlike men whose occupation formed the basis of their identity, society defined women by their familial responsibilities rather than by job.\textsuperscript{163} Therefore, men mainly controlled the politics of \textit{la nation}, while women directed the private sphere.\textsuperscript{164} Seen as leaders in the domestic realm, women had two main issues on which society respected their authority – bread and religion.\textsuperscript{165} Therefore, men did not begin an uprising in response to the deplorable food conditions because this was part of “women’s domain,” making it the “primary responsibility” of women to air their grievances.\textsuperscript{166} Therefore “all the weight [of the food shortage] falls on her” since a woman was responsible for the survival of her family.\textsuperscript{167} Moreover, since women were closely tied to their local community for identity, it was not unusual for them to stand up to outside forces, including government authorities, to protect the interests of their neighborhood in which they had a stake.\textsuperscript{168} For those women who did work outside the home and in the markets, “the whole question of prices, supply, and quality of food” was even more relevant.\textsuperscript{169} Louis-Sébastien Mercier observed that “the fishwives make the law” in Les Halles where females managed many of the stalls.\textsuperscript{170} These women, \textit{les dames des Halles}, even had an official “corporate status” which had been bestowed upon them by Louis XV who allowed them to visit Versailles on special occasions and associate themselves with the royal family during

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Garrioch, “Parisian Women and the October Days,” 236.
\item Hufton, \textit{Women and Citizenship}, 4.
\item Hufton, \textit{Women and Citizenship}, preface xix.
\item Garrioch, “Parisian Women and the October Days,” 234.
\item Michelet, \textit{Les femmes de la révolution}, chapter V (“tout le poids [of the food shortage] porte sur elle”).
\item Garrioch, “Parisian Women and the October Days,” 239 and 242.
\item Garrioch, “Parisian Women and the October Days,” 242.
\item Garrioch, “Parisian Women and the October Days,” 241 (“les poissardes font la loi”).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The part the women of Paris played in the October Days was psychologically consistent with their traditional gendered sphere, and *les dames des Halles* were well prepared to play a leading role in propelling the movement.

The initial movement of October 5 started in Les Halles around 7:00 a.m. Many historians pinpoint Saint-Eustache as the first center of commotion. Batiffol suggests that women started yelling about bread problems while everyone was in line for food and that someone suggested going to the Hôtel de Ville to collectively voice their complaints. De Villiers however attributes the initial commotion to the pillaging of a bakery whose owner was accused of cheating customers, which resulted in a march of women to the Hôtel de Ville to have him judged. De Villiers attributes this movement to the work of agents of the duc d’Orléans who took advantage of the commotion to suggest this pretext for directing the crowd to the Hôtel de Ville. Moreover, since people from different districts soon joined the crowd from Les Halles, de Villiers concludes that this was the work of Palais-Royal agents who distributed bribes in nearby neighborhoods. However, Garrioch offers a more plausible explanation for the great number of women in the crowd from different districts. The central markets of Les Halles involved a great daily exchange of people, as it was the main source of supplies in the city. Thus, there were heavily traveled roads near Les Halles that led to the North and East. With this continual “coming and going,” Garrioch concludes:

> It is hardly surprising that the news of the events in the heart of the city should have spread quickly to the northern and eastern faubourgs. Against this

---

171 Garrioch, “Parisian Women and the October Days,” 238.
172 Michelet, *Les femmes de la révolution*, chapter V.
background, the geography of recruitment for the march to Versailles becomes
easily explicable.\textsuperscript{176}

Thus, the number of women in the crowd swelled on the way to the Hôtel de Ville as the
marchers encouraged, in some cases even threatened, other women to join them amidst
the gathering cry of a drum.\textsuperscript{177} The ad hoc formation of the crowd lent itself to a diverse
socio-economic composition as well and by the time it reached the Hôtel de Ville, the
crowd included women of all market occupations and even some bourgeois wives.\textsuperscript{178}

Les Halles can be seen above the center of the map, southeast of the Palais-Royal. In the top left hand
corner of the map the Champs Elysées, Place Louis XV, and the Tuileries gardens progress from west to
east. The Hôtel de Ville and the Place de Grève lie just north of Cité (the islands in the middle of the

\textsuperscript{176} Garrioch, “Parisian Women and the October Days,” 247.
\textsuperscript{177} Michelet, \textit{Les femmes de la révolution}, chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{178} Rudé, \textit{The Crowd}, 181.
Seine). The faubourgs of Paris are also shown, most notably the Faubourg St. Antoine lies to the extreme east near the Bastille.

The women arrived at the Place de Grève (the square in front of the Hôtel de Ville) at 8:00 a.m. Estimates of the number of people in the crowd at this point range from 800 to 2,000 people. The women demanded to address Bailly and Lafayette to order that some immediate action be taken to alleviate the bread crisis, but the Assemblée had yet to convene. Bailly and Lafayette had not even arrived at the Hôtel de Ville to conduct the day’s business and thus the women waited for three hours in hopes that they would arrive. Irritated that no one was addressing their concerns, some of the women threw rocks at the National Guard posted outside of the doors, while others became increasingly impatient and cried that Bailly and Lafayette should get la lanterne. Michelet reports that some of the women cried "some bread and some arms!" Some of the women had brought “arms” including “broom handles, spears, pitchforks, swords, pistols and rifles, although none of them was able to procure ammunition.” The ability of the women to use these arms aside, this choice illustrates that they were ready to act if the municipal government did not.

The women hoped that by entering the Hôtel de Ville before 10:00 a.m., they would be able to take control and force the hand of the municipal government, provided any of the representatives showed up. The women wanted a nonviolent demonstration

180 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 329.
181 Hufton, Women and Citizenship, 7.
182 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 165.
184 Dominique, Paris enlève le roi, 104. La lanterne is a reference to hanging a person in the street from a lamp post.
185 Michelet, Les femmes de la révolution, chapter V (“du pain et des armes”).
186 Villiers, Reine Audu, 40 (“manches à balais, de lances, de fourches, d’épées, de pistolets et de fusils, sans cependant qu’aucune d’elles ait pu se procurer de munitions”).
187 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 165.
and, clearly aware of gender roles concerning both the issue at hand and violence, actively prevented men gathering outside from entering the Hôtel de Ville which would disrupt this peace and division.\footnote{Hufton, \textit{Women and Citizenship}, 14.}

The peace was disturbed however, when someone rang the tocsin of the Hôtel de Ville, the traditional signal of emergency and distress, at 11:00 a.m. About the same time, some men attacked the door on the Saint-Jean side of the Hôtel de Ville and successfully entered the building. As to whether or not the men were acting as a result of some sort of conspiracy, Mathiez adds “One looks in vain to discover the hand of the Duke of Orléans and his friends in the beginning of this uprising.”\footnote{Albert Mathiez, “Étude critique sur les journées des 5 & 6 octobre,”\textit{Revue Historique}, vol. 69 (1899) : 48 (“On chercherait en vain à découvrir la main du duc d’Orléans et de ses amis dans le début [de ce] soulèvement.”).}

Hufton blames the "uglier" and chaotic scene which followed on the entrance of the men.\footnote{Hufton, \textit{Women and Citizenship}, 11.}

In what the Commune recorded as an “extraordinary agitation,” the people spread out inside the building.\footnote{Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 165 (“agitation extraordinaire”).}

Some women tried to free prisoners during the disorder, some people broke into the arms room to take arms, and “some bad-intentioned people” tried to steal money from “the savings and the treasury of the city.”\footnote{Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 166 (“quelque gens mal intentionnés”; “la caisse et la trésor de la ville”).}

Multiple accounts speak of men wielding torches who tried to set rooms and documents ablaze.\footnote{Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 167.}

It is important to note that the Commune, in its records that they wrote later in the afternoon, makes the distinction between good citizens and trouble-making figures: “The honest citizens heard with lively indignation the names which were the most respectable and dear to all the citizens uttered with the most atrocious insults and menaces.”\footnote{Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 166 (“Les citoyens honnêtes ont entendu avec la plus vive indignation les noms les plus respectables et les plus chers à tous les citoyens proférés avec les injures et les menaces les plus atroces”).}
the noble actions of good citizens during the October Days and the unfavorable actions of bandits or other people continued to be an important characteristic in most ensuing accounts of the October Days.

-The Departure of the Women and Maillard for Versailles-

When Maillard arrived at the Hôtel de Ville he quickly worked with other National Guards called by the tocsin to settle the disorder. The women told Maillard that they wanted to force the Assemblée des représentants to address their demands before any other matters. Frustrated that the Assemblée had yet to convene, they informed Maillard that they wanted to see the king himself and asked Maillard if he would lead them. This seems to be a practical request since Maillard was popular due to his role in the attack on the Bastille and was considered to be the leader of the volontaires de la Bastille. Overall, he was a man of the people – a patriotic and logical choice to lead the women to Versailles to see the king. Historians still dispute why Maillard actually agreed to do so. Batiffol argues that the chevalier d’Hermigny, the head of the National Guard at the Hôtel de Ville in the absence of Lafayette, suggested that he take the people to Versailles as a way of relieving the demonstration of the Hôtel de Ville and restoring order. Maillard testified in the ensuing Châtelet investigation that “it was the only way to free the Hôtel de Ville and the capital” and that the National Guard would then have

195 Batiffol, Les journées, 14.
196 Carrot, La Garde Nationale: 1789-1871, 76-77. The title “volontaires de la Bastille” was awarded to the military division which broke up workers’ unions in Montmartre on August 29, 1789. The “volontaires de la Bastille” should not be confused with the “vainqueurs de la Bastille” which Maillard was also a part of. [The “vainqueurs” originally referred to anyone who fought in the battle of July 14, but in June 1790 the government drew up an official and somewhat inaccurate list of “vainqueurs” which omitted some individuals while falsely including others. J.-R. Suratteau, “Bastille (Imaginaire de la).” In Albert Soboul ed, Dictionnaire Historique de la Révolution Français (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), 91.]
197 Batiffol, Les journées, 15.
time to gather and react to the march. In any case, the crowd of women departed for Versailles before Lafayette arrived, with Maillard as their leader. By now, the women had somehow procured two canons and the size of the crowd along with the arms they already carried made for an intimidating sight. It did not take long for the women to encounter a second challenge, a Swiss guard and hussard who were patrolling the Tuileries gardens. The guards would not let Maillard pass through the gardens with the crowd of women. A brief scuttle ensued, and the issue was quickly resolved when the women intimidated and disarmed them by smacking them with their brooms. The rest of the journey to Versailles was quiet, although challenging. As the women marched, it began to rain, slowing their progress and adding to their misery. At Sèvres, the halfway point between Paris and Versailles, the women tried to procure some food, but there was only 32 pounds of bread available for several hundred women. Maillard managed to buy an additional 12 pitchers of wine for the women to drink as well. Once the crowd left Sevres, they followed the Saint-Cloud road the rest of the way to Versailles. When the town was in sight, Maillard instructed the crowd to sing “Henry IV” to show that their aims were not malicious. Upon its arrival at Versailles, the crowd had swelled to 6,000 people, the majority of which were women.

199 Hufton, Women and Citizenship, 8.
200 Batiffol, Les journées, 15-16. and Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 47. Michelet asserts that Maillard actually fought the guards himself (Les femmes de la révolution chapter V), but all other accounts attribute this action to the women.
201 Michelet, Les femmes de la révolution, chapter V.
202 Batiffol, Les journées, 17.
203 Dominique, Paris enlève le roi.
204 Michelet, Les femmes de la révolution, chapter V, Henry IV was a traditional military chant glorifying France and the king. The following verse is greatly significant in showing the loyalty of the crowd: Au diable guerres, The hell with wars, Rancunes et partis! Rancor and division!
This is an anonymous drawing of the march on Versailles. Notice that the artist has excluded all men from the picture, and that the woman to the far left appears to be a bourgeois. The women carry a variety of arms and drag a canon from Paris. Two of the women dragging the canon and the woman at the head of the crowd all wear the national cockade on their vestments.

-The Response of the Lafayette, the National Guard, and the Commune-

Meanwhile, several thousand National Guards had gathered at the Hôtel de Ville upon the sounding of the tocsin. Rudé estimates that there were 20,000 troops assembled at the Place de Grève by the time the building was secured. Lafayette had finally managed to make his way through the confusion of the streets to reach the Hôtel de Ville, but not in time to see Maillard leave with the crowd of women. As the Commune debated what should been done, six grenadier companies led by Mercier approached Lafayette to inform him that the Comité des subsistances was not helping the situation, and that they intended to go to Versailles to support the women and take the king away from the

Comme nos pères
Chantons en vrais amis
Au choc des verres
Les roses et les lys.
Like our fathers
Let us sing in true friendship
To the collision of glasses
The roses and the lilies.
206 Sketch from Sylvie Mesere, “Début de la Tormente,” Site dédié à Axel de Fersen. http://axelvonfersen.free.fr/debut.php. (The cover picture is a variation on this sketch which I have cropped and shaded red.)
207 Rudé, The Crowd, 76 and 181.
counter-revolutionary forces which were present at the October 1 banquet. Some of the troops added that if the king fled, the dauphin could take the throne. Lafayette went outside and attempted to address his troops and reason with them, but insistent cries of “À Versailles! À Versailles!” drowned out his words. Lafayette returned to the Assemblée des représentants informing them that “it was not possible to resist” the demands of his troops. Consequently the Commune:

Authorized M. the Commandant-General, and even ordered him to go to Versailles; recommends to him at the same time to take the necessary precautions for the security of the city; and, to take any other subsequent measures according to his discretion.

In addition, the Commune sent deputies Delagrey, Lefèvre, Desmousseau, and Maillot with Lafayette to bring news back from Versailles to Paris. Lafayette and the Parisian National Guard did not actually depart for Versailles until around 5:00 in the evening. Luttrell maintains that Lafayette delayed the departure because he thought that the initial march might have been part of an Orléanist conspiracy to draw the National Guard out of Paris so that it would leave the city vulnerable to attack. As Loustalot watched the 20,000 troops file through the city gates he was inspired to write “March on good citizens, you carry with you the destiny of France…. Save our deputies, uphold the

\[\text{References}\]

208 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 332-333.
210 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 336 (“À Versailles! À Versailles!”).
211 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 171 (“il n’était pas possible de résister”; “a autorisé M. le Commandant-général, et même lui a ordonné de se transporter à Versailles; lui recommande en même temps de prendre les précautions nécessaires pour la sûreté de la ville; et, sur le surplus des mesures ultérieures à prendre, s’en rapporte à sa prudence”).
213 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 340.
national majesty.” Everyone was aware of the potentially grave implications of the demonstration in Versailles.

Upon finally convening around mid-day, the Commune had several other issues to deal with besides the demands of the National Guard. It sent M. Fissour to warn the king and the National Assembly of the movement. The message, in part, informed them:

[the Assembly] declared in nearly all the neighborhoods of Paris, gathered, since nine o’clock in the morning on the place of the Hôtel de Ville, and, that in the middle of disorder some particular individuals indulged themselves in pillage, which was happily stopped. MM. the Representatives do not know of any other pretext for this movement than the sustained fermentation excited by the cockades of different colors than those of the Hôtel de Ville; fermentation that the fear of lacking bread made more dangerous. The people exiting the Hôtel de Ville began to arm themselves in part, [and] appeared to direct their steps towards Versailles.215

The immediate bread crisis in Paris had not ended, and the Commune received reports that bread convoys from Nantes and other areas of the provinces had slowed down, so they ordered Lafayette to appropriate National Guards to escort the convoys the remainder of the way to Paris.216 In addition, deputies from the Oratoire district urged the Commune to order bakers to quickly make as much bread as they possibly could to maintain order in the city.217

---

214 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 340. The title of this thesis is a variation on this observation. The original quote is “Allez, marchez, braves citoyens, vous portez avec vous le destin de la France: nos coeurs vous suivent, secourez notre roi, sauvrez nos députés, soutenez la majesté nationale.” It can be found in Louis-Marie Prud’homme, Révolutions de Paris Dédiees À la Nation, Issue N° 7, October 3-10, 1789, p. 14, Bibliothèque Nationale Française, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148 /bpt6k49617b.

215 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 169 (“[the Assemblée] s’est déclarée dans presque tous les quartiers de Paris, a rassemblé, depuis neuf heures du matin sur la place de l’Hôtel de Ville, et, qu’au milieu du désordre, des particuliers se sont livrés au pillage, qui heureusement a été arrêté. MM. Les Représentants ne connaissent d’autre prétexte à cette émeute que la fermentation subite excitée par des cocardes de couleurs différents de celles de l’Hôtel de Ville ; fermentation que la crainte de manquer de pain a rendue plus dangereuse. Le peuple sortant de l’Hôtel de Ville, où il commençait à s’armer en partie, paraît porter ses pas à Versailles.”).

216 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 169.

217 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 172.
-The Reaction at Versailles and the Actions of the Women before the Arrival of the Parisian National Guard-

When news of the march reached Versailles, Marie Antoinette ordered Saint-Priest (the Secretary of State and one of the king’s closest advisors) to send cavaliers to find the king, who was out hunting.²¹⁸ Messengers did not find the king until 3:00 at which point the hunting party quickly returned to Versailles.²¹⁹ Batiffol contends that some of the nobles who were returning to the château passed the crowd en route, which threw rocks at them.²²⁰ Upon sight of the marchers, the Marquis de Favras tried to organize several military officers to turn away the crowd from the château and convinced Saint-Priest to send his carriage to escort the royal family out of Versailles. (Neither of these measures was carried out successfully).²²¹ Saint-Priest ordered Estaing to lead the defense of the château and he took precautions to ensure the availability of troops if the crowd was hostile.²²²

Also at 3:00, Target announced to the National Assembly the impending arrival of the crowd via the Avenue de Paris.²²³ When Mirabeau passed this information on to Mounier, the president of the National Assembly, Mounier assumed that Mirabeau was part of the conspiracy that arranged it since he knew they were coming. Moreover, Mounier also thought that the women and National Guard were coming to Versailles to pressure the king into passing the August Decrees and the Declaration of the Rights of Man.²²⁴

²¹⁸ Batiffol, Les journées, 10.
²¹⁹ Batiffol, Les journées, 18.
²²⁰ Batiffol, Les journées, 19.
²²¹ Shapiro, Revolutionary Justice in Paris, 126.
²²² Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 344.
²²³ Michelet, Les femmes de la révolution, chapter V.
²²⁴ Luttrell, 164. Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 346.
Maillard and the women arrived at Versailles at 3:30. Upon their arrival, the crowd broke into two groups. Some women stopped at the Hôtel des Menus Plaisirs where the National Assembly held its meetings, while others went to the Place d’Armes, the central square in front of the gates to the château itself. Outside of the Hôtel des Menus Plaisirs, the women turned over their three canons to dragoons outside of the National Assembly after the dragoons took an oath of loyalty to the nation, which the women demanded. Some of the women entered the National Assembly and Maillard gave a brief speech to the representatives present. Michelet maintains that a man in the crowd informed some deputies that the crowd came for bread and to punish the Body Guard for their degradation of the tricolor cockade. Some women hurled insults against the clergy, who had opposed some of the August decrees. A noble of the court in a letter written on October 6 told his wife that some women had used threats in the National Assembly and talked of killing the queen. Mirabeau was a popular deputy, and the women insisted on seeing him. But for those who believed that Mirabeau was part of a conspiracy who organized the crowd from the beginning, the women’s devotion to Mirabeau only served to further incriminate him. Leclercq, a believer in an Orléans/Mirabeau conspiracy, actually believes one accusation that “the vicomte de Mirabeau caress[ed] the bosoms of the prettiest women.”

225 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 344.
226 Villiers, Reine Audu, 44.
227 Villiers, Reine Audu, 109.
228 Batiffol, Les journées, 23.
229 Michelet, Les femmes de la révolution, chapter V.
231 Michelet, Les femmes de la révolution, chapter V.
232 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 73 (“le vicomte de Mirabeau caresse la gorge des plus jolies”).
Map: Paul Fevier, “Plan de la Ville de Versailles en 1789,” 1890. in Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789. The Hôtel des Menus-Plaisirs where the National Assembly held its sessions is #28 on the Avenue de Paris near the bottom of the map. The Place d’Armes is clearly labeled in front of the
As for the contingent of the crowd that continued to the Place d’Armes, Swiss troops and the Chasseurs des Trois-Evêchés met them at the gate. The women asked the men to take an oath of loyalty to the nation like the dragoons at the National Assembly and asked to see the king. The troops promised them eventual entry of a small group of women so the crowd sent news back to the National Assembly to form a deputation of women to go and address the king. Louis sent orders that no one was to be hurt in the crowd. As the women waited, some verbally abused the guards and there is even one report that a woman threatened a guard with a knife. Around 4:00, one man in the crowd scared a horse as he attempted to run behind the troops and through the gate, so the Body Guards chased the man. The crowd assumed the troops would kill him, so someone shot and injured a Body Guard named M. de Savonieres. Luckily, Mounier and the deputation of women arrived shortly after to see the king, which restored order as the crowd nervously waited for word back from the king.

Although Saint-Priest had tried to reassure the deputation that the king was doing everything possible to supply Paris with bread and that they must be patient, the women still demanded to see the king. The guards finally admitted the deputation of women to see the king at 7:00. Louison Chabry, one of the speakers, fell on her knees to ask the king for some bread, at which point he raised her to her feet to embrace her. Louis continued to articulate his love for his Parisian subjects and reassured them that he was

---

outer-most front gates of the château. (The château is the building which contains the Cour Royale). The Hôtel de Noailles, where Lafayette set up headquarters, is on the Rue de la Pompe which is the next main street to the right of the Place d’Armes. The Hôtel des Gardes du Corps (Body Guards) is #23 and is located near the bottom of the Avenue de Sceaux. The Caserne des Gardes Françaises lies at the top left of the Place d’Armes and played an important role in the action in the Place d’Armes.

---

trying to resolve the bread crisis for them. The king gave each of the women 7 louis to show his generosity and he explained it was the only immediate gift which he could offer them. The small deputation of women ran back to the crowd outside the gate in the Place d’Armes shouting “Long live the king! Long live the good king and his house! Tomorrow we will have bread.” It took the group a few minutes to reassure the crowd that they had not been bribed and that their report was true. Although the king gave the women some money, this was not a bribe, but was more a sign of his goodwill and of his promise to provision Paris. However, after hearing the order for the king’s servants to gather grain for Paris, Maillard departed for Paris with about 60 percent of the women to bring the capital their triumphant news.

Thus, before the Parisian National Guard even arrived, Louis and his staff knew the severity of the bread problem in Paris and started the process to find solutions. Lecointre (an officer of the Versailles National Guard) worried, however, that the women would become agitated again if they did not eat and worked with the Versailles municipal government to procure 2 tons of rice. Although the marchers had no way of cooking it, the officials hoped that this would satisfy their demands for food until the bakers had made enough to give them the next morning.

During the evening, Saint-Priest and some of the king’s other advisors encouraged him to flee to Rambouillet for his safety. Mounier agreed that the royal family should

---

239 Hufton, *Women and Citizenship*, 10 or Michelet, *Les femmes de la révolution*, chapter V.
leave Versailles but also told the king that if he approved the constitutional decrees and Declaration, the people would be less inclined to see his actions as part of a counter-revolutionary movement. At 10:00 p.m., the king sent Mounier to the National Assembly to finally announce his full acceptance of the National Assembly’s constitutional decrees. Louis could not reconcile himself to the idea of such a cowardly act as running away, and he merely repeated in a stupor “A fugitive king! A fugitive king!”

In the meantime, the National Assembly was trying to continue with their scheduled agenda while dealing with interruptions caused by the new movement. When Mounier announced the king’s acceptance of the constitution, many of the women replied that they did not come for politics but for bread. The presence of the women greatly slowed the work of the Assembly. The deputies did not even begin to discuss the criminal procedure revisions, which Paris was in dire need of, until 1:30 a.m. on October 6.

Many of the women tried to spend the night in the chambers of the National Assembly, much to the dismay of many deputies who clearly feared their presence. One of Lafayette’s aides witnessed the women curling up on the benches for beds and described their plight: “The miserable creatures were... sleeping pell-mell in horrible

---

246 Batiffol, Les journées, 42.
248 Leclercq, Les journées d'octobre et de la fin de l'année 1789, 90 (“Un roi fugitive! Un roi fugitive!”).
249 Villiers, Reine Audu, 15-16.
250 Villiers, Reine Audu, 75-76.
251 Villiers, Reine Audu, 148.
252 Villiers, Reine Audu, 62.
253 Hufton, Women and Citizenship, 10.
disorder."254 Others tried to find shelter throughout the town, while some resigned themselves to the wet fields.

“The Parisian Women seating in the National Assembly among the Deputies:” Note the four women between the two desks. All four are standing while most of the deputies are seated. This stance reinforces the action in which the women are clearly and unabashedly articulating their opinions to the deputies.

Saint-Priest had not given up with his escape plan and he summoned the royal carriages. They tried to enter through a gate but some Versailles National Guard and Swiss Guards stopped them.256 They had received orders to let no one pass through the gate except for the carriage of one minor National Assembly deputy who regularly traveled to and from the National Assembly. Parts of the crowd who were near the gate realized that the king might try to leave and they protested the passage of the royal

254 Villiers, Reine Audu, 150 (“les misérables creatures étaient… couchées pêle-mêle dans un désordre horrible”).
256 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 82.
carriages. Fortunately, some of the Versailles National Guardsmen turned around the carriages and escorted them back to the stables, which calmed the crowd.257

-The Arrival of Lafayette and the Parisian National Guard at Versailles-

Meanwhile, Lafayette and the Parisian National Guard made their way slowly from the capital to Versailles, partly because of Lafayette’s caution and partially because of the weather. Lafayette, still not convinced that a conspiracy was not the cause of the uprising, feared an attack from the Flanders Regiment and even the Versailles National Guard.258 At the Avenue de Saint-Cloud outside of Versailles, Lafayette made his National Guard troops once again renew their oath to protect the king and his property.259 The National Guard arrived at the Avenue de Paris in Versailles a little before midnight.260 Lafayette and his troops had taken between 6 and 7 hours to complete a trip that usually took 3 to 4 hours by foot.261

Once the head of the troops reached the Place d’Armes, the Parisian National Guard column still stretched all the way back to the Hôtel des Menus-Plaisirs.262 The guards at the grille informed Lafayette that he could only enter the château alone to see the king. Fearing a trap, his grenadiers were very concerned and it took several minutes for Lafayette to convince his men that he would not be in danger without them.263 As Lafayette stepped into the Oeil de Boeuf where the king held court, “everyone was watching the general with a sentiment of curiosity, mixed with fear and with anger.” 264

258 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 349.
259 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 347.
260 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 349.
261 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 343.
262 Batiffol, Les journées, 51.
263 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 354.
264 Batiffol, Les journées, 49 (“tout le monde regardait le général avec un sentiment de curiosité, mêlé de crainte et de colère”).

58
One of the aristocrats muttered “Voila Cromwell,” to which Lafayette answered,
“Monsieur, Cromwell would not have entered alone.”265 Guy le Gentil, the marquis de
Paroy, also revealed the court’s general mistrust of Lafayette in his October 6 letter: “At
eleven-thirty, the great General La Fayette appeared, covered with mud from head to
foot; his soul was covered still more so in the eyes of the spectators.”266 Lafayette
informed the king that about 20,000 armed troops had wanted to come to Versailles, and
despite Lafayette’s own loyalty to the king, he could not dissuade them from marching.
Thus, the march was in no way his choice.267 Then Lafayette provided the king with a list
of requests. He asked the king to publicly announce his support of the national cockade
and to distance the Flanders regiment from Versailles, and suggested that the king move
to Paris.268 The last request was not only that of Lafayette. One of the messengers from
the Commune carried a note to the king, which read:

The king would give a great proof of his love for the French nation if he wanted
to live in the most beautiful palace in Europe in the middle of the largest city of
his empire and among the most numerous part of his subjects.269

By this time, the king had received requests from three distinct groups of Parisians, the
women of the crowd deputation, Lafayette, and official messengers from the municipal
government itself. The king did not give a clear answer to the last point. There was no
immediate threat to the château since most of the crowd had settled down for the night, so
the king retired for the evening, leavingEstaing and Lafayette to discuss plans for the
security of Versailles for the night.

265 Michelet, Les femmes de la révolution, chapter V (“Monsieur, Cromwell ne serait pas entré seul.”).
268 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 103. Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette
Through the October Days, 359.
269 Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 69: 45 (“Le roi donnerait une grande preuve de son amour pour la nation
française s’il voulait habiter dans le plus beau palais de l’Europe au milieu de la plus grande ville de son
empire et parmi la plus nombreuse partie de ses sujets.”).
Estaing allowed Lafayette’s Parisian National Guards to take responsibility for the outer-posts of the château’s courts while the Body Guard and other Versailles troops retained the inner-posts.270 After the officers gave these orders, Estaing retired to his home while Lafayette left for his command site at the Hôtel de Noailles on the rue de la Pompe.271 This seems to be Lafayette’s biggest blunder during the October Days. The Hôtel de Noailles was some distance from the château itself, and thus some historians believe that he should have stayed closer to the king that night since his position did not enable him to respond quickly to any change in situation.272 However, it was natural for Lafayette to stay at the Hôtel de Noailles which was owned by his father-in-law.273 Despite historical and contemporary criticism of Lafayette’s distance from the château on the night of October 5/6, it is crucial to note that the Hôtel de Noailles was not far from the château at all compared to the location of the Body Guard barracks.

-The October 5/6 Session of the Commune of Paris-

Back in Paris, the Commune still had no news at 1:00 a.m. on October 6 of what had taken place at Versailles. Thus, the Assemblée des représentants sent another deputation to find Lafayette or a messenger and to ask for the latest developments.274 The districts were also concerned about what had happened and the Cordeliers district argued that Paris should send bread to feed the National Guard in Versailles, but the Commune did not dare to spark an uprising by removing food from the city.275 At 3:00 a.m., Deschamps finally returned with the news that the king had received Lafayette and the

270 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 360.
271 Villiers, Reine Audu, 167 and Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 364.
274 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 173.
275 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 173.
National Guard well. An hour later, some *dames des Halles* returned from Versailles to report that the king had embraced Louison Chabry and had promised the women bread. Maillard provided the Commune with a more official “Extrait du procès-verbal de l’Assemblée national le 19 août et le 18 septembre.” He also brought back the National Assembly’s October 5 orders that it:

Authorize all individuals and notably those who are charged by commissions from their municipalities to buy grain and flour to claim the executive power and the military power, to provide liberty and safety in the markets, and to facilitate the transport of bought wheat and flour…

In addition, Maillard gave the Commune the king’s orders for the immediate provisioning of Paris and Louis’ letter to the NA which states:

I am deeply touched by the insufficient provisioning of Paris; I will continue to second the zeal and the effort of the Municipality by all means and all resources within my power; and I have given the most positive orders for the free circulation of grain, on all the routes, and the transport of those [convoys] which are destined for my good City of Paris.

After 4:00 a.m., Desmousseaux returned to the Commune to report somewhat incorrectly that the king would send the Flanders Regiment away and that the National Guard had both interior and exterior posts at Versailles; but he correctly reported that the king had accepted the constitutional decrees. He was followed by Lefevre and La Grey who announced that the National Guard had arrived at the château at 11:30 p.m. and that

---

277 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, II: 176 (“Autorise toutes personnes et notamment celles qui sont chargées de commissions de leurs municipalités pour acheter des graines et farines, à réclamer le pouvoir exécutive et la force militaire, pour procurer liberté et sûreté dans les marchés, et pour faciliter le transport des blés et farines achetés…”).
278 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, II: 177 (“Je suis sensiblement touché de l’insuffisance de l’approvisionnement de Paris ; je continuerai à seconder le zèle et les efforts de la Municipalité par tous les moyens et toutes les ressources qui sont en mon pouvoir ; et j’ai donné les ordres les plus positifs pour la circulation libre des grains, sur toutes les routes, et le transport de ceux qui sont destinés pour ma bonne Ville de Paris.”).
Lafayette had informed the king that his troops were under oath and he had no choice in coming. They also reported that Lafayette had requested four things from the king:

1. That the National Guard be the only guard for the king.
2. That the king help the Commune in procuring food for Paris.
3. That the people wanted the constitution, and judges for the trials of prisoners waiting in prison.
4. That the king demonstrate his love for Paris by moving to the capital.

To these demands the king had replied:

1. That Lafayette should confer with Estaing about the guarding of Versailles.
2. That he had already given orders to relieve the Commune before the arrival of the Parisian National Guard.
3. That he already sanctioned the August constitutional decrees and the Declaration of the Rights of Man that evening.
4. That although he loved his Parisian subjects, he had not yet made a decision about leaving Versailles.\(^{280}\)

Finally satisfied with the information that it received, the Assemblée des représentants adjourned and the exhausted deputies agreed to meet again later in the morning.\(^{281}\)

---

\(^{280}\) Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 182-183.

\(^{281}\) Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 178.
Chapter 3: The Journée Part II, October 6

-The Morning Chaos-

The events which took place in Versailles on the morning of October 6 are still a source of historical controversy. However, one thing is certain – a great portion of the crowd managed to enter into the interior and exterior courts of the château and even parts of the building itself during an interval of less than two hours filled with much confusion and some violence. The infiltration of the courts began sometime before 8:00 a.m. on October 6. Gottschalk and Maddox conclude that the crowd initially wandered into the Cour des Ministres because the Body Guard habitually opened the gate at 5:30 a.m. and they did so on October 6.²⁸² De Villiers also says that the old French Guards also opened the gate in the Cour des Princes, as was tradition when they used to guard the king directly.²⁸³ According to Leclercq, the women were rallied by a drum and split up upon entering the Cour des Ministres under the influence of conspirators, and some were diverted away from the Cour des Princes to the open Grille de Chapelle.²⁸⁴ In their narrative, Gottschalk and Maddox contend that the crowd and “at least one National Guard” moved into the inner courts through the open and unguarded gate of the Cour des Princes.²⁸⁵ At the first sign of infiltration of the courts, the king sent orders to his troops that no one fire upon the people, and the subsequent actions of the Body Guard showed that they were willing to obey.²⁸⁶

²⁸² Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 368.
²⁸³ Villiers, Reine Audu, 171.
²⁸⁵ Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 369.
²⁸⁶ Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 116. Louis XVI was known to abhor violence, especially violence against his own subjects. Shapiro, Revolutionary Justice in Paris, 37.
This is a floor plan for the second floor of the château with the names of the rooms and courtyards. Of special concern are the queen’s apartments which lie to the right of the Terasse et Parterre du Midi. The stairs which lead to these apartments are visible to the right of the Salle des Gardes. At the top of the Cour de Marbre is the Chambre de Louis XIV where the king stood on the balcony to address the people. Directly to the left of the room is the Oeil de Boeuf.287

According to the “brigand” or “bandit” theory of entry, a group of ambiguous wrongdoers eventually made their way into the Cour des Ministres and were prepared to fight royal troops with the intention of general pillaging.288 Leclercq argues that the bandits encountered and mixed in with some women and Fournier l’Américain in the Cour des Ministres. Then, by way of the Cour Royal this group moved into the Cour de Marbre where the real fighting began.289 Michelet, like Hufton, blames the men for starting the violence.290

The defining moment which seemed to lead to the outbreak of general violence was the death of a 17-year-old boy. Jérôme L’héritier was in the Cour de Marbre when he died. Historians usually offer one of two causes to explain his death: the first is that he slipped and cracked open his skull on the marble floor and the other is that he was shot by a royal guard through a window of the château. The crowd at least assumed that the latter was true, which aroused their anger.291 Mathiez supports this interpretation of L’héritier’s death as well.292 Batiffol also agrees that the boy was shot and even argues that this led directly to the storming of the queen’s apartments.293 After searching through official records, Rudé discovered that the burial of two Body Guards and L’héritier are described very differently in the “Registre des actes de sepulture de la Paroisse Royal de Notre

---

288 Villiers, Reine Audu, 132.
290 Michelet, Les femmes de la révolution, chapter V (“Il y avait là des hommes decides à agir sans elle; plusieurs étaient de furieux fanatiques qui auraient voulu tuer la reine.”).
293 Batiffol, Les journées, 59.
Dame de Versailles” (fol. 82). L’héritier received an honorable, almost military-like burial, while no honors were extended upon the deceased Body Guards who were buried at the same time. Therefore, Rudé concludes that some Body Guard must have shot the boy and that the crowd was aware of this event. It is important to note that Charles Doussan, a Parisian who died during the attack on the Bastille, was also buried in a ceremonious manner and “one took great care to insert an honorable mention on his death certificate” as well. The populace clearly accepted both men as innocent individuals who died a patriotic death. Regardless, the record of L’héritier’s burial disproves de Villier’s argument that witnesses invented the story about the death of a 17-year-old boy as an excuse to justify the violent actions of the crowd. L’héritier did exist, did die on the morning of October 6, and the crowd did think that he deserved special recognition, suggesting that the shooting of L’héritier is a plausible argument. In any case, the gunshots that rang out did anything but calm the crowd as tensions flared and chaos broke out. Rudé asserts that the crowd cried “Look for the baker, the baker’s wife and the baker’s little boy” (referring to the royal family) as it spread through the courtyards.

De Villiers gives a very detailed account of the invasion of the château itself and the resulting attack on the queen’s apartments, although he attributes the direction of the movement to “rioters” who were “incontestably [occupied with]… searching to

294 Rudé, The Crowd, 76.
295 Goutal-Arnal, “Mes loisirs, ou journal d’événements tells qu’ils parviennent à ma connaissance: les débuts de la révolution Française relates par le libraire Parisien Siméon-Proper Hardy,” 663-664 (July 18) (“on a grand soin de faire insérer dans son extrait mortuaire une mention honorable”).
296 Villiers, Reine Audu, 212.
297 Villiers, Reine Audu, 173.
298 Rudé, The Crowd, 203 (“Cherchons le boulanger, la boulangère, et le petit mitron”).
assassinate the Queen.” The crowd first encountered the Body Guards at the foot of the Marble Staircase, and forced the Body Guards to retreat to the vestibule, while some of the Swiss guards fled since they had orders not to harm the people but wanted to save themselves. At the top of the staircase, 20 guards remained to block the path and the people demanded that the guards give them bread and drop their weapons. The Body Guards refused and ordered Auguié, Marie Antoinette’s chambermaid, to save the queen from the approaching crowd. After some members of the crowd killed two Body Guards on the way to the queen’s chamber, they severed the heads from the corpses and immediately marched them back on pikes to Paris. This suggests that at least some of the marchers only really wanted revenge on the Body Guards for their disreputable behavior at the October 1 banquet. Eventually, the Body Guards locked themselves in the nearby salles for the king and queen’s guards. Next, the quick-thinking guards retreated from the Salle des Gardes de la Reine into an antechamber whose door they cleverly disguised with a folding screen. The crowd, seeing only the door at the opposite end of the room broke down that door which led to the Salle du Sacre, in the complete opposite direction of the queen’s bedroom.

---

299 Villiers, *Reine Audu*, 170. Villiers firmly believes that Fournier was one of the leading “émeutiers” who played the “bon citoyens” card to save himself from prosecution. Villiers, *Reine Audu*, 178 (“émeutiers”; were “incontestablement [occupied with]…chercher à assassiner la Reine”).

300 Villiers, *Reine Audu*, 177.

301 Villiers, *Reine Audu*, 179.

302 Villiers, *Reine Audu*, 123.


305 Villiers, *Reine Audu*, 189.
The heads of the two decapitated Body Guards are triumphantly carried on pikes.

After the king heard that violence had broken out, he hurried down the passage du roi on the first floor, which led to an interior staircase behind Marie Antoinette’s bedroom. However, while Louis was running to save his queen, Marie Antoinette had passed him overhead by a secret second level passage, which led to the king’s apartments. He realized what had happened and followed her path back to the Oeil de

---


307 Villiers, Reine Audu, 186-187.
By 8:00 a.m. on October 6, all of the royal family had reunited in the king’s apartments. The Body Guards immediately barricaded the doors of the Oeil de Boeuf, but none of the crowd ever succeeded in reaching it.

Once Lafayette arrived at the château, he ordered his troops to prevent people from pillaging. He was disappointed to see that his troops did not eagerly help some Body Guards who were being cornered by some members of the crowd, so he urged them to save them from their deaths. The Parisian National Guard did succeed in saving the Body Guards de la Mother and d’Aubiac in the Place d’Armes and the crowd did not succeed in killing any more Body Guards after Lafayette’s command. This command, along with the actions of Jean-Etienne Gondron who pushed his troops into the Cour de Marbe to defend the Body Guards and the château from the crowd, gradually restored order. The number of people who died in fighting varies by account. In 1827, Montegaillard estimated that ten to twelve Body Guards died, whereas Michelet concluded that seven Body Guards died along with five National Guards/crowd members. The fact that less than twenty people died in an incident in which thousands of people were involved is revealing. This suggests that the primary intention of the crowd was not violence and destruction since it could have killed many more people. The final death toll is also a testimony to the noble restraint and discipline of the king’s troops.

---

313 Villiers, *Reine Audu*, 221.
After calming the crowd at 8:00 a.m., some of the National Guards proceeded to the Oeil de Boeuf where they asked the Body Guards to open the doors so that they too could defend the king and give the Body Guards their tricolor cockades.\(^{317}\) Lafayette entered at this time to address the king for the first time on that morning.\(^{318}\) It is certain that complete order had been restored by 9:00 a.m. since Lecointre asked Lafayette what his troops should do at the Place d’Armes, to which Lafayette replied that everything seemed secure so no immediate action was necessary.\(^{319}\)

Lafayette first appeared to the crowd on the king’s balcony and eloquently informed them, “Messieurs, I gave my word of honor to the king that there would not be any harm done to all that belongs to His Majesty. These Messieurs are his Body Guards, if anything would happen to them you would make me break my word of honor that I gave, I would no longer be worthy to be your leader.”\(^{320}\) Thus, he made the people and his troops alike renew their oath of loyalty to the king when he presented him on the balcony.\(^{321}\) The crowd cheered as Necker and the Keeper of the Seals stood alongside Lafayette and the king on the balcony. After this first appearance on the balcony, the king asked Lafayette to show the crowd his approval of the Body Guards. Consequently, Lafayette brought a Body Guard out on the balcony with him, took off his own tricolor, and presented it to the Body Guard. Lafayette then cemented this final union with an


\(^{318}\) Gottschalk and Maddox, *Lafayette Through the October Days*, 373.

\(^{319}\) Gottschalk and Maddox, *Lafayette Through the October Days*, 373-374.

\(^{320}\) Leclercq, *Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789*, 133 (“Messieurs, j’ai donné ma parole d’honneur au roi qu’il ne serait fait aucun tort à tout ce qui appartient à Sa Majesté. Ces Messieurs sont des gardes du roi, s’il en arrivait autrement vous me feriez manquer à la parole d’honneur que j’ai donnée, je ne serais plus digne d’être votre chef.”).

The crowd showed their approval as other Body Guards threw off their sashes and National Guards offered them their tricolors, and shouts of “Long live the Body Guards!” filled the court.

The entire royal family was soon on the balcony, but the crowd reacted by demanding that the queen appear alone. She withdrew into the apartment and, in one of the most dramatic moments of the day, Lafayette asked the queen, “Madame what is the personal intention of the queen?” To which she replied, “I know the fate which awaits me, but my duty is to die at the feet of the king and in the arms of my children.” “Well then, Madame, come with me,” urged Lafayette. “What! alone on the balcony? Haven’t you heard and seen the threats that have been made against me?” exclaimed the queen. Yet, the ever-collected Lafayette calmly repeated, “Yes, Madame, go ahead.” Once on the balcony, Lafayette took the queen’s hand and kissed it with the reverence of a gentleman. Whether it was due to this action, or to the queen’s stately calmness and acceptance of the crowd’s demand, le peuple began to chant “Long live the queen!” At some point during the king’s numerous appearances on the balcony, the crowd started to shout “The king to Paris!” Once this idea, which had been on the minds of all Parisians for months, was verbalized, the king could no longer ignore this demand. It appears that the women sincerely believed that the bread shortage would...
end if the king lived in Paris. The king and Lafayette reappeared on the balcony for the last time to announce to the crowd that the royal family would move to Paris that very day.

The parade back to Paris with the royal family finally left the gates of Versailles at 1:00 p.m. Gottschalk estimates that 60,000 people participated in the procession while Estaing and Lafayette personally rode alongside of the royal carriages. In the general state of emergency on the night before, the National Assembly had declared that it was “inseparable” from the king. Thus, it decided to move to Paris, but sent 36 deputies to accompany the king directly for the time being. Impressively, 60 carts of grain accompanied the group which the Versailles municipal government and the king’s ministers had been collecting throughout the night. Some of the women raised bread on pikes, like National Guards carrying their flags. The procession moved just as slowly as Lafayette had moved the night before, and it took seven hours for the entourage to reach Paris on the evening of October 6.

-The Commune Prepares to Receive the King-

Earlier that day, the Assemblée des représentants reconvened at the Hôtel de Ville and quickly received news from Rousseau about the morning’s events. He informed the Commune that the king had addressed the crowd from his balcony saying, “My friends, I will go to Paris with my wife, with my children, it’s to the love of my good and faithful

---

331 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 141.
332 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 379-381.
333 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 143.
334 Villiers, Reine Audu, 241.
335 Hufton, Women and Citizenship, 12.
subjects that I consign that which I hold most precious.”337 In response to the news, the Commune immediately issued a proclamation and ordered printers to post it throughout Paris. It read:

The citizens are informed that the King, the Queen, and the royal family are en route to move to Paris. The Body Guards of His Majesty, who, this morning, took the national commands, fraternally joined themselves under the flag of the Parisian National Guard.338

The Assemblée continued its regular business and received reports on the continuing food shortage, which led to a discussion of how to preserve the present food supply and maintain its quality.339 The representatives then tried to reward Charles Monnoyer for preventing fires in the Hôtel de Ville on the previous day, but Monnoyer only asked that he be admitted to the National Guard as his reward.340

At 1:00 p.m. a deputation led by Bailly and followed by some National Guard units left to meet the king outside of the barrière de la Conférence. The king and the parade met Bailly’s group at 5:00 p.m., whereupon Bailly, for the second time in three months, gave the keys of the city to Louis. After Bailly assured him that “under the reign of Louis XVI, the King was made powerful by his people and the people happy by their King,” the king proclaimed, “I will always find myself with pleasure and confidence among the citizens of my good City of Paris.”341

337 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 184 (“Mes amis, j’irai à Paris avec ma femme, avec mes enfants; c’est à l’amour de mes bons et fidelles sujets que je confie ce que j’ai de plus précieux.”).
338 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 185 (“Les citoyens sont informés que le Roi, la Reine et la famille royale sont en marche pour se rendre à Paris. Les gardes-du-corps de Sa Majesté, qui, ce matin, ont prêté les troupes nationales, se sont fraternellement confondues sous les drapeaux de la Garde nationale parisienne.”).
339 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 186.
340 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 189.
341 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 189-190 (“sous le règne de Louis XVI, le Roi sera puissant par son peuple, et le peuple heureux par son Roi”; “Je me trouverai toujours avec plaisir et confiance au milieu des citoyens de ma bonne Ville de Paris.”).
Le peuple of Paris greeted the procession with great enthusiasm, and thousands of individuals gathered in the Place de Grève to see Bailly present the king from a balcony in the Hôtel de Ville. Bailly announced the king’s confidence in his Parisian subjects, and the duc de Liancourt proclaimed that the National Assembly would soon relocate to Paris since it had made itself inseparable from the king.\textsuperscript{342} The crowd shouted “Long live the King, long live the Queen, long live his lordship the heir...” and “Long live the National Assembly!”\textsuperscript{343} For the time being, the king once again earned the trust and goodwill of \textit{le peuple} by coming to Paris and assisting the city in its time of crisis. The National Guard troops, especially those who used to be French Guards, were pleased to hear that the king’s inner guards would be National Guards instead of the Body Guards.\textsuperscript{344} As the celebration continued for days, a Dame des Halles composed a song which summed up popular sentiment:

\begin{center}
We sing of Louis’ mercy  
We celebrate his presence as well,  
He comes to stay here,  
And in Paris he holds his court.  
Yes, everyone goes to see it sparkle  
He’s a good father of the family.  
All French, big and small.  
Poor, rich, are his children.

The days of the king so debonair  
Interest all of Europe  
To see his days more happy from a far  
Here is the object of all the good wishes  
For his happiness, his dear company  
His dear child, it’s necessary,
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{342} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 191.  
\textsuperscript{343} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 191 (“Vive le Roi, vive la Reine, vive Monseigneur le Dauphin...” and “Vive l’Assemblée nationale!”).  
\textsuperscript{344} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 191.
O Heaven, conserve therefore without end
The King, the Queen, and the Dauphin. 345


De Louis chantons la clémence
Célébrons aussi sa présence,
Il vient faire ici son séjour,
Et dans Paris il tient sa cour.
Oui, chacun de la voir pétille
C’est un bon père de famille.
Tous Français, petits comme grands.
Pauvres, riches, sont ses enfants.

Les jours du roi si débonnaire
Intéressent l’Europe entière
Les voir longs et des plus heureux
Voilà l’objet de tous les vœux
Pour son bonheur, campagne chère
Enfant chéri, c’est nécessaire,
O ciel, conservez donc sans fin
Le Roi, la Reine et le Dauphin.
Chapter 4: The Spontaneous and Premeditated Nature of the Journée
- An October Days Conspiracy Plot?

One of the many mysteries surrounding the October Days is whether it was the result of, or influenced by, a political conspiracy. Most historians and contemporaries who share this view blame Lafayette, Mirabeau, or Orléans for leading such a conspiracy. However, most historians find it unlikely that Lafayette had malicious intentions or purposely organized any part of the journée. Lafayette’s accusers point out that “général Morphée” had urged the king to relocate to Paris several times during the summer, and had renewed this advice at the end of September. However, not only was this a rather common demand, but Mounier even visited Lafayette at the end of September to procure his promise that he would never use force to bring the king to Paris. Mathiez thinks that while Lafayette certainly had the greatest influence of all the people involved in the October Days, he was a “man of honor” who did not betray his oaths of loyalty. It is important to recall that Lafayette tried to dissuade his troops from marching to Versailles in the first place. Gottschalk hypothesizes that he gave in to their demands as a way of staying in control, keeping order, and not destroying the discipline of his new militia which he had been building up for the past three months. Moreover, it is evident that Lafayette took great caution in approaching Versailles, and emphasized the duties of his troops by reinforcing their oaths. On the charge that Lafayette did not sleep closer to the king on the night of October 5/6, this is merely a mistake on his part and not a sign of

346 Villiers, Reine Audu, 149. Lafayette’s critics sometimes refer to Lafayette as “General Morpheus,” alluding to his irresponsibility in being asleep at the start of the crisis on October 6.
347 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 317.
348 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 318.
deliberate scheming. Gottschalk and Maddox’s assessment of Lafayette appears to be the most accurate:

[He was] a competent, well-meaning, patriotic soldier and statesman who, at this stage at least, generally managed to control events, even if they sometimes got out of hand, and in doing so was thrust into a position of leadership, a position he neither diligently conspired to achieve nor earnestly shunned.350

Lafayette was not a conspirator looking to increase his power over the king, but merely a man of his word who was constantly concerned with maintaining peace.

The most popular target of the instigator theory is the duc d’Orléans. Leclercq brilliantly describes him as “First prince of the blood, privileged, the richest landowner in the kingdom, his financial means were nearly without limits, his intellectual means did not exist.” Dominique accuses Orléans of speculating on blés and of having had a hand in controlling the bread supply to suit his financial interests.352 Like many historians and Orléans’ contemporaries, Dominique also articulates the suspicion that Orléans was after his cousin’s throne, and believed that the Revolution offered him the opportunity to become king. Lafayette, himself suspicious of Orléans’ intentions, recorded a peculiar meeting with him in his memoirs, which Dominique interprets as Orléans insinuating that he wanted Lafayette’s cooperation in a plot.353 The fact that Orléans owned the Palais-Royal, the political center of agitation that Lafayette’s National Guard was always addressing, did not help his case. Mathiez even cites the king for blaming Orléans “for having transformed the Palais-Royal in a bad way and for enriching himself with the

350 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, viii.
351 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 37 (“Premier prince du sang, apanagé, le plus riche propriétaire du royaume, ses moyens financiers étaient presque sans limites, ses moyens intellectuels n’existent pas.”).
352 Dominique, Paris enlève le roi, 47.
353 Dominique, Paris enlève le roi, 20.
vices that he lodged there.” This was because Orléans allowed many politically active groups to rent his arcades at the Palais-Royal including influential cafes and political clubs, in hopes of becoming a man of the people. Leclercq personally asserts that “money was, literally, thrown from the windows of the Palais-Royal.” Thomas Jefferson, although certainly a heavily biased source at this time, includes in his analysis of Orléans the assumption that he was receiving money from England which wanted to upset the French government. To this accusation, Mathiez argues that this is very uncertain since he believes that Pitt wanted to keep England neutral in French affairs for the time being, and thus would not interact with Orléans. Orléans’ post-October Days flight to England, upon Lafayette’s request that he leave, did much to contribute to the theory of English aid.

Yet, in the context of the political environment of the October Days, it does not make sense that Orléans would have supported a plot to move the king to Paris. Rumors raged all summer long about the possibility that the king might flee; it would have been completely against Orléans’ interests to trap him in Paris where it would be harder for him to escape. If Orléans truly wanted to take the crown, it would have been to his best advantage to wait for the king to leave the country on his own, at which time he might receive enough popular support to take the throne. Orléans seemed to enjoy his political popularity but not be too eager for any tangible leadership positions. After the

deputies elected him as president of the National Assembly on July 4, 1789, Orléans
turned down this powerful position protesting:

But Messieurs, I would betray your good will and if I were to accept this position
[of president], knowing how little I am qualified for it. Find it good Messieurs,
that I refuse it, and only see in this refusal the indubitable proof that I will always
sacrifice my personal interest for the good of the State. 359

As for his actions during the journée itself, some witnesses of the October Days testified
that they saw Orléans himself at the château on the morning of October 6. However, very
few sources note his presence and Mathiez went so far as to calculate that Orléans could
not have possibly arrived at Versailles before 8:00 a.m. on October 6, based on the
testimony of other witnesses who had seen him before the violence. The witnesses who
place Orléans at the château before 8:00 are even contradictory among themselves. All
things accounted for, Orléans would have missed the outburst of violence and could have
arrived only as order was being restored.360

After Orléans, the second person most frequently blamed for organizing the
October Days is Mirabeau. At the start of the revolution, Mirabeau was a member of the
“moderate left.”361 Despite his noble heritage, he was popular with le peuple in Provence
and Paris.362 As a member of the National Assembly, he backed the movement to abolish
the tithe but was an advocate that parish priests should receive a salary from the state as
the Church would give them nothing to live on.363 The nobility felt deserted by his
moderate position, detested “his conscious intellectual superiority,” and abhorred his

359 Goutal-Arnal, “Mes loisirs, ou journal d’évènements tells qu’ils parviennent à ma connaissance: les
débuts de la révolution Française relates par le libraire Parisien Siméon-Prosper Hardy,” 595-596 (Mais
Messieurs, je serais indigne de vos bontés et si je la [la place de président] acceptais, sachant combien j’y
suis peu propre. Trouvez donc bon, Messieurs, que je la refuse, et ne voyez dans ce refus que la preuve
indubitable que je sacrifierai toujours mon intérêt personnel au bien de l’Etat.).
361 Luttrell, Mirabeau, 143.
362 Luttrell, Mirabeau, 109.
363 Luttrell, Mirabeau, 144.
position as a journalist. His criticism of Necker in the press, however, also made him some “patriot” enemies as well, such as Lafayette. Mirabeau’s biographer, Barbara Luttrell, argues that liberal deputies in the National Assembly misconstrued Mirabeau’s support of the veto as a return to despotism, whereas, in reality, he favored a system of checks and balances. Mirabeau was very ambitious, and most people thought of him as outright “venal.” Shapiro argues that Mirabeau actually had hoped to replace Bailly as the Mayor of Paris at the end of July. The public and politicians alike knew that Mirabeau wanted a position as a minister to the king; via the press, he urged the king to choose a minister from the National Assembly on September 14 and October 15. What no one knew until October 1790, however, was that the court started secretly corresponding with Mirabeau in October 1789 during which Mirabeau gave political advice to LaMarck who brought back this information to the court. The court eventually paid him regularly for his advice. Essentially, the court employed him without making him a minister.

Some people believed that Mirabeau was secretly working for Orléans or was at least manipulating him and his resources for his own plots. Lefebvre explains that Mirabeau might have believed that the constitutional “crisis would easily resolve itself if

---

364 Luttrell, Mirabeau, 110, 112.
365 Luttrell, Mirabeau, 115.
366 Luttrell, Mirabeau, 151-152.
367 Luttrell, Mirabeau, 110.
368 Shapiro, Revolutionary Justice in Paris, 71.
369 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 41.
370 Luttrell, Mirabeau, 171.
the king abdicated his throne and the duc d’Orléans became regent.”\(^{374}\) In any case, if he supported an Orléans attempt to become king, Mirabeau would have the opportunity to be a minister. In reality, Mirabeau did not like Orléans.\(^{375}\) Luttrell cites Mirabeau’s conversations with LaMarck to show that Mirabeau was not interested in the political activities of Orléans or Lafayette for that matter.\(^{376}\) She argues that Mirabeau did not want Orléans to overthrow the throne because then the monarchy would become “the prize in a political game,” which would completely negate his system of checks and balances. Nor, would he favor the disorder such actions might cause, including the threat of civil war.\(^{377}\) Moreover, Luttrell argues, “Palais-Royal propagandists denounced Mirabeau as a counter-revolutionary.”\(^{378}\) If Mirabeau was in fact conspiring with Orléans, the Orléanist supporters of the Palais-Royal would not have reacted violently against him.

Considering the relationship and aims of Orléans and Mirabeau, the most plausible assessment of their responsibility in the October Days comes from Mathiez. Mathiez points to the lack of proper accounts of any specific actions undertaken by Orléans’ agents and says that witnesses who speak of agitators are vague and inconsistent.\(^{379}\) Rather, Mathiez categorizes the participants as people whose political ideas happened to run close to those of Orléans: “The \textit{journées} of October were not done by and for the Duke of Orléans, they were done by people who liked the Duke of Orléans.”\(^{380}\) Before Mathiez, Pierre-Victor Malouet, a National Assembly deputy, had concluded that if no one associated with the Orléans party had participated in the \textit{journée},

\(^{374}\) Lefebvre, \textit{The Coming}, 195.
\(^{375}\) Shapiro, \textit{Revolutionary Justice in Paris}, 98.
\(^{376}\) Luttrell, \textit{Mirabeau}, 162-163.
\(^{377}\) Luttrell, \textit{Mirabeau}, 168.
\(^{378}\) Luttrell, \textit{Mirabeau}, 162.
\(^{380}\) Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 68: 279 (“Les \textit{journées} d’octobre ne furent pas faites par et pour le duc d’Orléans, elles furent faites par des gens qui aimait le duc d’Orléans.”).
“the course of things would not have been changed.”\textsuperscript{381} The influence of any Orléanist members who happened to be in the crowd was not even enough to control the events of the October Days, let alone direct the journée as a premeditated plot. Mathiez concludes that one must not exaggerate their power over the October Days and realize that although Orléans “tried to profit from these events, he did not create them.”\textsuperscript{382} As for Mirabeau, Mathiez concedes that he did take part in the journée as a vocal member of the National Assembly, but his role was ultimately a minor one.\textsuperscript{383}

Since the October Days were not the result of an overarching plot, the group of \textit{le peuple} who marched on Versailles are classifiable as a “crowd” rather than a “mob” based on Rudé’s standard, since “mobs” are “hired band[s] operating on behalf of external interests.”\textsuperscript{384} However, Rudé also explains that “the venality of the masses was taken for granted [by the government] and the remedy for popular insurrection was sought in the tracking down of presumed conspirators rather than in the amelioration of social grievances.”\textsuperscript{385} Thus, when the municipal government demanded that the Châtelet conduct an investigation to find the conspirators behind the “crimes of October 6,” they were acting on the long established assumption that such a large and influential crowd must be a mob. (In fact, the Commune initially believed that Saint-Huruge, in starting his August 30 movement, had received bribes as well.)\textsuperscript{386} The motivations of the marchers were clearly beyond bribes. If the women had merely wanted money, they could have

\textsuperscript{381} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 68: 279 (“le cours de choses n’en aurait pas été changé”). This is especially notable because Malout was a relatively conservative member of the Third Estate. Timothy Tackett, \textit{Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790)}, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 37.
\textsuperscript{382} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 263 (“tâche de profiter des événements, il ne les crée pas”).
\textsuperscript{384} Rudé, \textit{The Crowd}, 239.
\textsuperscript{385} Rudé, \textit{The Crowd}, 193.
\textsuperscript{386} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 263.
taken the money from the Hôtel de Ville and avoided a four-hour march in the rain. Moreover, if for some reason these women wanted to pillage Versailles instead, the majority of them would not have left peacefully after hearing the results of the deputation to the king on the night of October 5. It is evident that the women had their own deeper motivations.

Nevertheless, Lefebvre and de Villiers both argue that there was a significant plot behind the October Days. Lefebvre actually turns the Orléanist conspiracy theory on its head by claiming that although Orléans gave his own money to the movement, the main aim of the supposed plot was popular political benefit and not personal gain, that is, to force the king to accept the constitution:

Could Louis XVI have been replaced with someone willing to accept an accomplished fact unreservedly, the basic constitutional issue could have been covered up; but since this was impossible there was no way open except to coerce him by a new mass uprising and such was the origin of the October Days.387

By bringing the king to Paris, Lefebvre postulates, fear of le peuple could render him hostage to “perpetual intimidation” which would benefit the designs of patriot deputies.388 In arguing for the premeditated origins of the journée, de Villiers cites a document from the Cordeliers district that proclaimed: “Commissioners will be sent to the Hôtel de Ville who will press the Commune to enjoin M. le Commandant général to meet with the King at Versailles tomorrow, Monday, October 5.”389 However, any hint of a delegation from the Cordeliers district with such a document is completely absent from the Commune’s records on October 4. Moreover, the historian must note that the district

387 Lefebvre, The Coming, 187.
388 Lefebvre, The Coming, 191.
389 Villiers, Reine Audu, 8 (“Il sera député à l’Hôtel de Ville des commissaries qui presseront la Commune d’enjoindre à M. le Commandant général de se rendre dans le jour de demain lundi 5 à Versailles auprès de la personne du roi.”).
wanted only Lafayette to go see the king, rather than a crowd of several thousand people. Lefebvre and de Villiers’ reasoning concerning a master premeditated plot is weak.

-The October Days as a Fusion of Premeditated of Ideas with a Spontaneous, Popular Impulse-

Therefore, the journée was spontaneous in the sense that it was “natural and legitimate, if any ever was, entirely spontaneous, unanticipated, [and] truly popular.” It was not the result of a higher orchestrated plot, but of popular motivation. The October Days were truly spontaneous (even if a woman did make a speech about going to Versailles on the evening of October 4) in the sense that there was no great plan or strong driving forces outside of le peuple. However, the themes (the bread crisis, etc.) and actions of the October Days had precedents, some even before the early months of the Revolution. Thus, Mathiez’s conclusion remains the most accurate: “If it is true to say that the insurrection was premeditated in the sense that it had a precise objective, fixed in advance, one sees also that it was, for a large part, a popular and spontaneous movement.”

There had been talk of bringing the king to Paris since the convening of the Estates General. The Third Estate spring cahier, or list of grievances, included the demand that the king move from Versailles to the capital. In fact, four of the Parisian cahiers specifically included this request. Lafayette had told the king during July that the National Guard would be able to protect him better in Paris. Dussaulx, a

---

390 Michelet, Les femmes de la révolution, chapter 5: (“naturelle et légitime, s’il fut jamais, toute spontanée, imprévue, [et] vraiment populaire”).
391 Mathiez, “Etude critique,” 69: 49 (“S’il est vrai de dire que l’insurrection fut préméditée en ce sens qu’elle avait un objet précis, fixé d’avance, on voit aussi qu’elle fut, pour une large part, une émeute populaire et spontanée.”).
392 Rudé, The Crowd, 70.
representative in the Commune, had predicted on August 26 that something would eventually force the king to come to Paris.\textsuperscript{394} On September 25, the \textit{Chronique de Paris} invited “the king and the queen to spend the winter in Paris.”\textsuperscript{395} By the time of the march, the popular idea that the king should move to Paris had become deeply engrained into the consciousness of \textit{le peuple}.

There were also many instances during the summer in which different groups considered marching to Versailles for variety of reasons. In his July 3 journal entry, Siméon-Prospér Hardy wrote that a “seditious orator” at the Palais-Royal called for an armed crowd to go to Versailles and protect the Third Estate deputies from being murdered by the nobles. The Commune quickly responded by placing canons on the route to Versailles to prevent any potential crowds from marching.\textsuperscript{396} Of course, another major example of the intent to go to Versailles is the August 30 march attempt from the Palais-Royal, which triggered relentless demonstrations thereafter.\textsuperscript{397} The goal of this march would have been to convince the king to give up the veto, but nonetheless, the important precedent here is that a popular group considered a march that they almost executed.\textsuperscript{398}

On September 17, Lafayette warned Estaing that 1,800 old French Guards who had become National Guards wanted to go to Versailles to resume their posts near the king and keep any counter-revolutionary influence away from him.\textsuperscript{399} Less than a week later, rumor had it that workers in the École militaire were even considering going to

\textsuperscript{394} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 249.
\textsuperscript{395} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 68: 265 (“le roi et la reine à venir passer l’hiver à Paris”).
\textsuperscript{396} Goutal-Arnal, “Mes loisirs, ou journal d’événements tells qu’ils parviennent à ma connaissance: les débuts de la révolution Française relates par le libraire Parisien Siméon-Prospér Hardy,” 589-590 (“orateur séditieux”).
\textsuperscript{397} Shapiro, \textit{Revolutionary Justice in Paris}, 88.
\textsuperscript{398} Gottschalk and Maddox, \textit{Lafayette Through the October Days}, 231.
\textsuperscript{399} Gottschalk and Maddox, \textit{Lafayette Through the October Days}, 292-295.
Versailles.\textsuperscript{400} The \textit{Rérumbutions de Paris} reported in its September 22 issue that there were rumors that \textit{le peuple} might go to Versailles.\textsuperscript{401} Even though people did not immediately act upon these rumors, they illustrate that \textit{le peuple} had already begun to contemplate going directly to Versailles to see the king. Yet these rumors only prove that the idea of going to Versailles had been considered, not that it was part of a premeditated plot or conspiracy.

During the eighteenth century, common belief held that the presence of the king had effective calming capabilities. The letter of thanks that the Commune wrote to the king for visiting Paris on July 17 illustrates this point. It included the line: “It’s his presence which reestablished peace in Paris….”\textsuperscript{402} The National Guard of Versailles also employed this idea. On September 13, a bread riot broke out in Versailles so severe that the crowd was attempting to hang a baker. The National Guard quickly brought the king to the scene “in order to calm the minds [and spirit].”\textsuperscript{403} This tactic was successful.

The precedent of appealing directly to the king and looking to him to establish order also goes further back in French history. Thus, movements such as the October Days “mark not a radical break with previous patterns of behaviour, but [use] such behaviour to assert new versions of old claims.”\textsuperscript{404} For example, in 1740 people appealed to the king over price increases and a crowd of women even surrounded one prominent cardinal who was known to have governmental influence.\textsuperscript{405} In 1775, crowds around the country seized supplies or controlled merchants in the “Flour Wars” which resulted in “popular price control.” Although the king resorted to using troops to stop the rioting, \textit{le}

\textsuperscript{400} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 68: 267.
\textsuperscript{401} Villiers, \textit{Reine Audu}, 4.
\textsuperscript{402} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 65 (“C’est sa presence qui a rétabli la paix dans Paris….”).
\textsuperscript{403} Rudé, \textit{The Crowd}, 69 (“pour calmer les esprits”).
\textsuperscript{404} Andress, “Revolutionary Crowd,” 3.
\textsuperscript{405} Rudé, \textit{The Crowd}, 23.
peuple had “solicit[ed] the intercession of the king as the protector of his people.”

More recently, the Parisian quarry-workers appealed to the king in their 1786 strike. Le peuple expected the king to fulfill his paternal role and protect the interests of his subjects.

The suspicion that the aristocracy was behind the bread crisis was not a new theme either. In eighteenth-century France, le peuple sometimes believed in times of crisis in a “pacte de famine” in which the aristocracy and the Old Regime conspired to create an “artificial bread scarcity.” This complaint reappeared whenever there were major food shortages that produced high bread prices. By the time of the October Days, some individuals who felt that the Comité des subsistances was not actually improving the food situation extended this accusation even to the Parisian municipal government and its leaders (see “Quand aurons-nous du pain?”).

It is evident that les dames des Halles felt that their previous special position at court might have encouraged them to actually undertake the march to Versailles in the first place. They had played an important role in the procession that escorted the king into Paris on July 17. Maria Leczinska, the mistress of Louis XV had indulged the whims of the poissardes of Paris on special occasions before the Revolution. In fact, many of les dames des Halles made the trek to Versailles several times before the journée. This, no doubt, increased their confidence that they could make the journey to Versailles and that the court would receive them well.

---

408 Rudé, The Crowd, 22.
409 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 127.
410 Hufton, Women and Citizenship, 15.
It is important to remember that, despite Lafayette’s efforts to discipline them, the National Guard still shared the general consciousness of le peuple. Of the 800 to 900 volontaires de la Bastille, 6/7 became National Guards.⁴¹¹ Le peuple greatly respected these members as protectors of the Revolution, and these troops formed a very popular-minded core of the National Guard, which found that it could not completely separate itself from the grievances of the people on October 5.

Besides the precedent of ideas, there were also precedents of specific actions that took place during the October Days. The bread problem severely worsened over the course of the year before the Revolution and during the early months of the Revolution itself, as has already been discussed. Yet, it is important to stress this trend since Rudé cites food problems as the cause of most “outbreaks of independent activity by the menu peuple.”⁴¹² Bread prices almost always went down after popular demonstrations, thus le peuple increasingly turned to crowd expression as a means of controlling the food problem. The efficacy of these popular demonstrations is illustrated by the July 22 movement that resulted in a price drop from 3.625 sous per pound of bread to 3.375 sous per pound, and again after August 8 demonstrations at the Hôtel de Ville reduced the price to 3 sous per pound.⁴¹³ The rallying cry for crowd formations during many revolutionary events was the ringing of a tocsin (the tocsin of the Hôtel de Ville did ring on October 5), but the women of the October Days also took their cue from military traditions to rally the crowd with a drum. The National Guards used this instrument

---

⁴¹¹ Andress, “Revolutionary Crowd.”
⁴¹² Rudé, The Crowd, 209.
⁴¹³ Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67:
occasionally,\textsuperscript{414} and Versailles troops also used it to announce the arrival of the Flanders Regiment.\textsuperscript{415}

The measures which the October Days crowd took to legalize their actions reflect the increasing feeling among \textit{le peuple} that they should seek governmental permission for what they assumed was extraordinary patriotic behavior. During the August 30 movement, the Palais-Royal sent a deputation to the Hôtel de Ville as a way of trying to achieve “un caractère de légalité.”\textsuperscript{416} Via their actions, women showed that they understood the power and importance of the Commune in their lives, and they expected the Commune to address their issues. On September 7, one woman was confident enough to enter the Assemblée des représentants alone in an attempt to procure a \textit{letter de cachet} that her husband had written against her.\textsuperscript{417} Just a week before the march, a delegation of \textit{les domestiques} approached the Commune to declare that they would each give 6 livres to Paris and asked the Assemblée that it start a \textit{Caisse nationale} so that others could follow their example.\textsuperscript{418} The women had experience in not only forming processions, but also in asking the Commune for permission. Commune records indicate that a deputation of women from the district Saint-Leu appeared in September to request clearance for a religious procession which they were planning to Saint-Geneviève. Women clearly had practice in seeking legal permission from the Commune and realized the political importance of the Hôtel de Ville.\textsuperscript{419}

Many actions involving the king already had models from earlier in the Revolution. By directly addressing crowds from balconies, Louis was able to discern the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{414} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 150.
\item \textsuperscript{415} Leclercq, \textit{Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789}, 21.
\item \textsuperscript{416} Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 252 (“un caractère de légalité”).
\item \textsuperscript{417} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 498.
\item \textsuperscript{418} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, II: 92.
\item \textsuperscript{419} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, I: 499.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
approval or disapproval of the public regarding his actions. On July 15, Louis spoke to
National Assembly deputies from his balcony at Versailles where they cheered his
request for “help in restoring order in Paris.”420 After dinner with the Commune
deputation and National Guard officers at Versailles on August 25, the king again stood
on his balcony, pleased to hear cries of “Vive le roi! Vive Louis XVI! Vive la famille
royale!”421 The difference in the king’s appearance on the October Days was that the
crowd was not completely satisfied with his initial speech.

Events from earlier in the Revolution also dictated expressions of patriotic
approval. As Bailly had presented the king with the new national cockade in July, so too
did Lafayette extend his tricolor to the Body Guards to show the crowd his sign of
approval.422 In addition, Bailly humbly offered the king keys to the city in July and he
repeated this action of respect and honor at the end of the journée. Even the king’s parade
into Paris on July 17, complete with carriages filled with National Assembly deputies
with guards riding along side of them,423 foreshadowed his next return to Paris on
October 6.

Therefore, although the October Days was a popularly propelled movement
whose immediate ignition was not premeditated, its themes and actions were not
innovative. In this light, the October Days appears to be “the climax of… popular
interventions” in 1789.424 If, in fact, the October Days had so much in common with
events that came before them, what made them so different from the previous events of
the revolution? Although demonstrations had taken place throughout the city, only

420 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 109.
421 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 342 (“Vive le roi! Vive Louis XVI! Vive la famille royale!”).
422 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 128.
423 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 126.
424 Andress, “Revolutionary Crowd,” 2.
relatively small areas had been involved before the October Days. However, the marchers
who spontaneously gathered on October 5 were from many different districts within the
city. This was also the first major movement conducted by women during the Revolution.
The sheer number of people who were quickly involved in the journée, either in Paris or
in Versailles, was unprecedented during the Revolution itself. The intervening of the
National Guard on the side of the people at the Hôtel de Ville added a legitimizing factor
that had been lacking from previous demonstrations.425 Furthermore, the immediate
consequences of the march had a far-reaching effect on the population of Paris, as well as
the entire national government.

425 Rudé, The Crowd, 221.
Section II: The Châtelet Investigation

[Jean Pelletier] testifies that everything he knows about the facts contained in the [denunciation] pieces which we just read to him, he learned of only by public rumors in the societies, promenades, clubs or cafes, without being able to recall from which people, about the different circumstances and anecdotes relative to the disastrous scenes of last October 5& 6...  

First Deposition (December 11, 1789)

As the Châtelet judges began their criminal investigation of the October Days, their very first witness, Jean Pelletier, graced them with his knowledge, or lack thereof. The only information which Pelletier had to offer them was based solely on rumor and hearsay. Unfortunately, Pelletier’s sources were not unique and his deposition would come to characterize the tone of the investigation as a whole. Much of the testimony which the Châtelet judges recorded over the course of seven months was based upon rumor or indirect sources rather than the individual’s own experience during the October Days. However, the Châtelet investigation remains one of the most extensive and varied primary sources about the journée. Despite its questionable reliability, the Procédure criminelle has been hard for historians to dismiss, yet it has proven equally as difficult to embrace.

Although the Procédure criminelle is often cited by those who write about the October Days, no one has published a detailed, overarching study of the investigation. Moreover, when the investigation is cited, it is usually only in reference to a handful of

---

426 Procédure criminelle instruite au Châtelet de Paris, sur la dénunciation des faits arrivés à Versailles dans la journée du 6 Octobre 1789, 3 vols. (Paris: Chez Baudouin, 1790), I: 11. Deposition 1 “[Jean Pelletier] dépose que tout ce qu’il sait des faits contenus ès pièces [de dénonciation] dont nous venons de lui faire lecture, c’est qu’il appris seulement, par les bruits publics dans les sociétés, promenades, clubs ou cafés, sans pouvoir se rappeler par quelles personnes, différentes circonstances et anecdotes relatives aux scènes désastreuses des 5 & 6 octobre dernier...” For the remainder of this section, I will refer to the testimony in all three volumes of the Procédure criminelle only by deposition number in the footnotes. A list of the corresponding page numbers for each deposition is included in the appendix.

427 Despite his lack of direct knowledge, Pelletier continued to testify and speculate for seven pages.
testimonies at any given time. Since the testimonies greatly vary, this isolation of
individual testimonies becomes greatly subjective and renders them insufficient pieces of
historical evidence in many cases. For example, when the main Body Guard unit retired
from its post at the Place d’Armes on October 5 shots were fired. One could argue with
the support of Alexis Grincourt’s testimony that some Body Guards fired on the crowd
which was heckling them. On the other hand, Antoine-François Leclerc’s deposition
allows one to argue that although the crowd was booing the retiring Body Guards, the
Versailles National Guards solely took the offensive by firing at Body Guards. Each of
these two opposing testimonies could be misleading on its own; only when they are
rooted within the entire context of the investigation and are compared with other
testimonies can they become truly effective pieces of evidence.

Thus while conflicting viewpoints and multiple exaggerations are present in the
Procédure criminelle, its deficiencies are still of historical value. Although the frequency
of a contested fact within the many testimonies does not directly translate into complete
reliability, it does offer keen insights into popularly accepted points of view. The use of
these testimonies to separate absolute fact from fiction, however, remains a moot point
without a thorough grounding of individual testimonies within the investigation as a
whole to begin with.

In this section, I will attempt to provide this grounding for the Procédure


428 LXXIII.
429 CCXCV.
will also study how the witnesses interpreted the constraints of the denunciation in order to approach what the witnesses identified as linked to the “crime.”\[^{430}\] Since the entire investigation took place over the course of seven months, the areas of concentration within the witnesses’ offered testimony were by no means stagnant. Therefore, I will explore the perceptible shifts in the *Procédure criminelle* over time in order to characterize these changes. Using the information provided by the witnesses, I will attempt to see what light the Châtelet investigation can shed on key areas of historical dispute such as if there were men disguised as women in the October Days crowd and if someone bribed members of the crowd. Finally, I will examine what the investigation itself sought to examine, that is, the evidence which could link Orléans and Mirabeau with a conspiracy directing the *journée*.

Chapter 5: The Formation of an Ambiguous Inquest

The official name under which the National Assembly published the Châtelet inquiry is *Procédure criminelle Instruite au Châtelet de Paris sur la Dénunciation des faits arrivés à Versailles dans la journée du 6 Octobre 1789* (Criminal Procedure Conducted by the Châtelet of Paris on the Denunciation of doings which took place at Versailles during the *journée* of October 6, 1789). The investigation consists of the testimonies of 395 witnesses, all but six of which were taken by the Châtelet judges in Paris.431 The *Procédure criminelle* is 570 pages long and was printed over a three volume span.

The published investigation is prefaced by five related documents. The first is an “extrait du procès-verbal de l’Assemblée Nationale du 31 Août 1790” (extract from the National Assembly records of August 31, 1790). This piece orders the Comité des rapports to print the entire Châtelet investigation and in a gesture to the sensitivity of the issue ordered its “printer to take appropriate precautions to prevent counterfeiting.”432 The second is entitled “Extrait des registres des délibérations de la compagnie de MM. Les Officiers du Châtelet” (Extract from the deliberation records of the Châtelet Officials) which details what was contained in the packets which the Châtelet investigation submitted to the Comité des rapports on August 9 (which is essentially everything printed thereafter in the *Procédure criminelle*).433

---

431 Some historians discount the six testimonies which the Châtelet ordered satellite judges to record in their final numbers. Most historians report that there are 394 testimonies, yet this is incorrect due to the fact that Didier Vinconot was accidentally not assigned a deposition number. His testimony can be found between depositions CCLXIX and CCLXX. So as not to reassign the official numbers, I will refer to Vinconot’s testimony as “CCLXIX b.”


The remaining three documents deal with establishing the purpose of the investigation and what evidence should be solicited from the witnesses. The “Dénonciation Municipalité de Paris” (November 23, 1790) was written by the Parisian Comité des recherches whose job it was to pinpoint possible crimes of treason or conspiracy and then pass on the information to another group, in this case the Châtelet, for the actual investigation. In this document, the Comité des recherches qualified the event of the investigation as the crime

which sullied the château of Versailles during the morning of Tuesday October 6, [and] only had as its instruments some bandits, who driven by clandestine maneuvers, mingled with and confused the citizens…. between five and 6:00 am on Tuesday morning, a group of armed bandits, accompanied by some women and men disguised as women, made, by way of the interior passages of the garden, suddenly burst into the château, forced the Body Guards on watch to the interior, forced in the doors, went towards the queen’s apartments, massacred some of the guards who were up keeping watch for her safety, and penetrated this apartment which her majesty barely had time to leave and flee to the king.

The Comité praises the Parisian National Guard for arriving in good order at Versailles to protect the king and the National Assembly, and for stopping the violence of bandits on October 6. They attribute the reestablishment of order to the “wise provisions of their commander.” Finally the Comité directly denounced “the attempts herein mentioned, as well as the authors, troublemakers and accomplices, and all those who by promises of

435 “Dénonciation Municipalité de Paris,” as reprinted in Procédure criminelle, I:6 (“qui a souillé le château de Versailles dans la matinée du mardi six octobre, n’a eu pour instrument que des bandits, qui poussés par des manœuvres clandestines, se sont mêles et confondus parmi les citoyens…. entre cinq à six heures de la matinée du mardi, une groupe des bandits armés, accompagnée de quelques femmes et d’hommes déguisés en femmes, fit, par des passages intérieurs du jardin, une irruption soudaine dans le château, força les gardes-du-corps en sentinelle dans l’intérieur, enforça les portes, se précipita vers les appartemens de la reine, massacra quelques-uns des gardes qui veilloient à sa sûreté, et pénétra dans cet appartement que sa majesté avoit à peine eu le temps de quitter pour se retirer auprès du roi.”; “dispositions sages de leur commandant”).
money or by other maneuvers excited and provoked them [the attempts]."436 The king’s prosecutor of the Châtelet also signed his approval on this denunciation. The fourth document is a brief letter from the Châtelet to the Commune reiterating the denunciation which it received from the Comité des recherches and informing the municipality that Michel-Eustache Ollivier and Antoine-Louis Olive de la Gastine were the judges nominated to oversee the investigation.437 The last document “Information, Conclusions et Décret” reiterates the denunciation, reiterates the National Assembly orders which the Châtelet was acting upon, and notes the additional presence of François-Gilles Boucher-Durmont (a parliamentary lawyer and honorary counselor of the king), Jean-Baptiste Brion (the clerk of the Parlement of Paris), and unnamed Châtelet clerks. 438

From the first testimony given on December 11, 1789, to the last testimony given on July 29, 1790, the court procedure at the beginning of each deposition at least remained the same. The judges recorded the name, age, occupation, and place of residence at the beginning of each deposition. This was followed by an oath “to say and present truth,” after which the witness would hand over his/her summons which the court bailiff Fayel had served him/her. The judges then read the witness “the decrees and indictment enunciated above, and the ordinance [of December 1].” Finally before the witness testified, the clerk noted that he/she “declared to not be a relative, ally, servant nor domestic servant of the parties.”439

436 “Dénunciation Municipalité de Paris” as reprinted in Procédure criminelle, I:6-7 (“les attentats ci-dessous mentionnées, ainsi que les auteurs, fauteurs et complices, et tous ceux qui par des promesses d’argent, ou par d’autres manœuvres les ont excités et provoqués.”).
439 “de dire et déposer vérité”; “des arrête (sic) et requisitoire susénoncés, et l’ordannance [of December 1]”; “a déclaré n’être parent, allié, serviteur ni domestique des parties”.

97
From this point on, the testimony of the witness was recorded as a summary of the facts rendered. The clerks rarely quoted the witnesses and often only used quotation marks when the witness quoted something which someone else had said. Generally, the witnesses gave their accounts in chronological order and addressed different periods of time depending on their interpretation of the denunciation. Therefore, it appears that the judges did not ask the witnesses a list of predetermined questions. However, as the investigation progresses, some anachronisms and patterns appear in the testimonies which suggests that the Châtelet judges may have started asking questions or leading the depositions of some of the witnesses. This issue will be addressed later in this section. At the end of each testimony the witness affirmed that he/she gave all the information which he/she knew and the clerk read back his/her deposition. The witness then once again confirmed the truth of his/her testimony. Finally, the judges asked the witness if he/she “required compensation” and paid the witness for his/her time if he/she said yes. Then the judges, and clerks present signed the deposition along with the witness.

This approach to recording the depositions introduces many opportunities for error. For example, since the denunciation does not name any suspects the witnesses could worry that their being at the scene of the crime could actually make themselves suspect. When people did give detailed depositions they often removed themselves from the action and assumed the position of a neutral onlooker or even an unwilling participant. This seems to be the case with the testimony of the few women who were interviewed who admit to even being part of the march from Paris. Out of the mere 31

---

440 “requis salaire”.

98
women who were interviewed during the investigation, only eleven claim to have joined the marchers. Moreover, every one of these eleven women testified that they were forced to join the marchers against their will or better judgment. However, the testimony of some of these women contradicts the idea that they were coerced into joining the march. Jean Martin testifies that she was threatened into joining the women at the Louvre but later in the march became part of the twenty main women at the head of the entire column en route to Versailles. Similarly, Françoise Rolin says that she was forced to go to the Hôtel de Ville and then to Versailles by other women, yet she somehow wished to and managed to see the king with the other women on October 5.

Louise-Marguerite-Pierette Chabry (alias Louison), perhaps the most famous of the women who had “the honor of bringing the grievances about bread and subsistence” also claims that she did not go to Versailles of her own free will but by force. Marie-Rose Baré also testified that she was one of four women admitted to see the king. However, it does not make sense that individuals who were forced against their will by hundreds of people would be chosen as the primary representatives of their very captors.

On the other hand, some women claimed to intervene on behalf of the “non-criminals” in the investigation. Anne-Margueritte Andelle testifies that she tried to tell some women that killing the Body Guards and making threats against the queen were awful actions. While this is not hard to imagine, the rest of the testimony is. Andelle says

---

441 Depositions given by women: XXI, LIII, LIV, LVI, LXXXII, LXXXV, LXXXVI, XC, XCV, XV, CII, CIII, CVII, CXXI, CXXXII, CLI, CLXXIII, CCCXLIV, CCCXLV, CCLXXIV, CCLXXXIII, CCCLXXIII, and CCCLXXXIV.

442 Women who participated in the march: LXXII, LXXXV, XC, CII, CIII, CVII, CLXXXIII, CCCXLVII, CCCLXXII, CCLXXXIII, CCCXLIV, CCCXLIII, CCCXLV, CCCLXXIV, and CCCLXXXIV.

443 LXXXII.

444 CLXXXVII.

445 CLXXXIII (“l’honneur de porter les doléances du pain & des subsistances”).

446 CCCXLIII.
that at this point some women broke off from the group and guarded her as a threat until the king left for Paris, which would be the equivalent of four hours. By making herself one of the victims of the “crime,” Andelle clearly hoped to clear any suspicions which the Châtelet might have about her participation in the march.\textsuperscript{447} More drastically, Jeanne-Antoine Beffous, a resident of Versailles, testifies that she went to the château on the morning of October 6 and literally saved the life of a Body Guard by throwing herself on him to protect him and that she helped the French Guards save others as well. Beffous’ testimony seems slightly too eager to please since she also manages to hit all the right targets which the Châtelet was looking for in her short deposition.\textsuperscript{448} Due to the ambiguous denunciation, there was certainly a factor of self preservation in many of the depositions which resulted in skewed and questionable testimony. Thus, the testimony which could have easily proven most valuable to open-minded judges was instead tainted by the methods of these judges.

The quality of the remaining women’s testimonies is varied, but lacking. Besides the eleven marchers, four participated in the \textit{journée} in some way other than marching (i.e. royal household employees),\textsuperscript{449} ten did not directly participate in the events but offered testimony based on observation, conversation, or rumors,\textsuperscript{450} and six claimed to have absolutely no knowledge.\textsuperscript{451} This reveals another problem in the investigation. There are an extremely small number of women who were questioned in comparison to number of people interviewed by the Châtelet and to the number of women who marched on Versailles. Even excluding the testimonies of the marchers, the quality of information

\textsuperscript{447} CCXXXVI. The rest of Andelle’s testimony (which goes on for nine pages) is even more incredulous.
\textsuperscript{448} CCCLXV.
\textsuperscript{449} LVI, LXXXVI, XCIV, and CCCLXV.
\textsuperscript{450} XXI, LIV, CXXI, CXXV, CCXXXV, CCXLV, CCLXXIII, CCLXXXII, and CCCXLIV.
\textsuperscript{451} LIII, XCVI, CLIX, CCLXXXIII, CCCLXVI, and CCCLXXXIV.
of at least ten of the remaining women is less than favorable as much of the information
is second hand knowledge or based on observation from a distance while six women had
no knowledge of the events to begin with. In short, the *Procédure criminelle* is severely
deficient in quality and quantity of testimony provided by women.

**Role of Women Witnesses in the *Journée***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Testified Role in the <em>Journée</em></th>
<th>Number of Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marchers</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation by a means other than marching</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No direct participation but offered testimony based on observation, conversation, or rumors</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolutely No Knowledge</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The entire witness pool of the inquest was not overly knowledgeable. Although
one can surmise that each individual was summoned by the Châtelet because the judges
believed that he/she could contribute valuable testimony, this is not consistently the case.
Overall, the clerks recorded “he/she had no particular knowledge of the facts declared in
the statements [read to him/her]” (or some variation of this phrase) for 137 of the
witnesses. Of these witnesses, 57 only offered this statement or this phrase in
conjunction to where they were during the *journée*. The remaining 80 witnesses
included this statement in their testimony but did proceed to provide the Châtelet with
additional testimony which he/she often felt was not directly related to the denunciation

---

452 “il/elle n’a aucune connaissance particulière des faits énoncés aux pièces”.
453 Depositions with no information beyond location of witness: III, XLI, XLII, LI, LIII, LXV, LXVI,
LXVIII, LXX, LXXVIII, LXXXIV, XCVI, CXII, CXIII, CXVI, CXXIII, CXXXV, CL, CLI, CLIX, CLX, CLXII,
CLXIX, CLXX, CLXXV, CLXXXVIII, CCXVI, CXXV, CXXIX, CXXXII, CCCCII, CCCCIII, CCCCX, CCCCXII,
C CCCXXIX, CCCCXXX, CCCCXXXI, CCCCXXXII, CCCCXXXIII, CCCCXXXIV, and CCCCXXXV.
or was based on indirect information such as rumors. Whatever their reason, 34.7 percent of the witnesses felt obliged to include “aucune connoissance” somewhere in their deposition. This statistic alone attests to the failure of the Châtelet to gather sufficient information.

The Châtelet seems to have recorded everything each witness said, even if it came from a source other than the witness. This poses a problem because it reveals a major source of error in the court proceedings and greatly dilutes the potency of much of the evidence which the Châtelet gathered. Overall, 83 of the witnesses (21 percent) in the investigation based at least part of their testimony on information from secondary sources in the sense of information beyond their personal observation. That is not to say that all of these testimonies should be dismissed as completely false; however, there are different degrees of plausible credibility based upon the secondary source itself and the extent to which it is relied upon in the deposition.

The largest group (32) of these secondary source testimonies relies on rumor for part of the deposition and specifies the divide between “hearsay,” “heard,” or “rumors”

---

454 Depositions with “aucune connoissance” which provide additional information: V, VI, VIII, XIII, XIV, XVII, XLIII, XLV, XLVI, XLVII, XLIX, LIV, LV, LXIII, LXIV, LXVII, LXIX, LXI, LXXIV, LXXXV, LXXVI, LXXIX, XCV, CVII, CXLVII, CCLII, CCLIV, CCLVII, CCLVIII, CCLXXII, CCLXXVI, CCLXXX, and CCLXXXX.

455 “no knowledge”

456 Testimony qualifies as resulting from a secondary source if the individual did not witness the events themselves and is merely repeating a description which someone else told them. For example, if a witness says that a woman told him that she saw men break into the queen’s apartment and he is relaying this story in his deposition, it is considered a secondary source. However, if a witness presents what a person told him as only a statement and does not strongly rely on this to portray the events which he witnessed, I did not count this as testimony based upon a secondary source. The testimony of 83 witness is founded in part upon secondary sources.
and their own observations. There are fourteen testimonies which rely solely on rumor for the entirety of the deposition. A significant number of the secondary source testimonies attempt to provide the name or description of the specific individual who initially gave them their information. The Châtelet successfully subpoenaed several of these individuals later on to confirm this information. These specified secondary source testimonies are generally somewhat more credible than those based solely on rumor. Only five witnesses based their entire account on specified secondhand information, while 28 witnesses used this information as part of the deposition in addition to their own experiences. Four individuals testified using a mixture of rumor and specific second hand accounts. Despite the separation of these 83 secondary source testimonies into varying categories of credibility, the fact remains that the significant percentage of the witness pool which offered this kind of indirect testimony greatly increased the potential for error in conclusions incautiously drawn from the investigation. In this respect, Omer-Gratien Zéphirin’s friend on the Comité des recherches appears justified in telling him that:

the Châtelet tribunal was never able to judge this affair; that a tribunal vested with a higher authority was essential, and that if one was to render an exact justice in this affaire, it would have to take more than 10,000 people.

457 I have qualified any secondary information without a specific source as rumor. V, XI, XV, XVII, XVIII, XXVII, XXXI, XLVI, XLVII, CLII, CLV, CLXI, CLXVII, CLXVIII, CLXXI, CLXXXVI, CV, CVI, CLXVIII, CCLXXIX, CCLXXX, CCCVII, CCCIX, CCCXVI, CCLXXIX, CCLXXX, and CCCLXXIX. (“oui-dire”; “a entendu”; or “bruits publiques”).
458 I, X, XI, XXI, XLVI, LV, LXXI, XCIV, XCV, CLXXXI, CXCIV, CCCXLIV, and CCCLVIII.
459 XXXVI, CXLIV, CCXC, CCLXXVI, and CCLXXXX.
460 XX, XXII, XXIII, CLII, CLV, CLXI, CLXVII, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVII, CCCXXI, CCCXXVIII, CCCXLVII, CCLXXXI, and CCCLXXIII.
461 LXI, CLIII, CLVII, CLXI, CLXVI, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVII, CCCCXXI, CCCCXXVIII, CCCCXXX, and CCCCXXXI.
462 CCXI (“le tribunal du Châtelet ne pouvoit jamais juger cette affaire-là; qu’il falloit un tribunal appuyé d’une plus grande autorité, & que si on rendoit une justice exacte dans cette affaire, il faudroit prendre plus de dix mille personnes.”).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Testimony</th>
<th>Number of Witnesses Using Each Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part rumor, part own observations</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solely based on rumor</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solely based on information from a specified secondary source</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part specified secondary source, part own observations</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part specified secondary source, part rumor</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The compensation which the Châtelet paid some witnesses also leaves room for error in the testimonies. The Châtelet does not specify anywhere in the investigation its method for calculating the stipend offered to each witness. We do know that the judges asked almost every single witness if they wished to receive any recompense and that it was up to the witness to accept or decline payment. It seems that it was common for investigation committees to pay individuals for their testimony. Anne-Marguerite Andelle told the Châtelet judges that the Comité des recherches de Paris gave her 6 francs “to indemnify her for the time that she had lost” while testifying and that a Cordelier District committee did the same.\(^{463}\) It is reasonable to assume that the Châtelet paid their witnesses for the same reason, and it is equally reasonable that the witnesses would expect to be offered this compensation.

\(^{463}\) CCXXXVI ("pour l’indemnifier du temps qu’elle avoit perdu").
Slightly more than 38 percent of the Châtelet witnesses received some compensation for their deposition, but the range in compensation greatly varies. If the compensation was provided on the basis of what information the individual offered or if the witnesses even thought that their compensation was based on the value of their information, the effect on the content of the 151 compensated depositions would be detrimental. Other surmisable bases for the amount of recompense could include the amount of time the witness spent giving their deposition (which would be proportional to the length of their testimony), or the normal occupational salary of the witness (which would allow for a large variety of compensation amounts).

It is clear that witness compensation was not calculated based on the time spent at the Châtelet. Although the judges needed three days of Maillard’s time to record his lengthy 15 page disposition, he was only paid 12 livres. On the other hand, François Basset’s deposition was only a page long and he also received 12 livres for his testimony. The length of the testimony or the amount of material in the testimony does not seem to make a difference for any of the paid depositions. Fortunately, the same is true for the content of the depositions. Sister Marie-Anne Favier saved the lives of 14

---

464 XV, XIX, XX, X XI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXIX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, XXXIV, LI, LII, LVI, LVII, LVIII, LIX, LXII, LXIII, LXIV, LXV, LXVI, LXVII, LXVIII, LXXI, LXXIII, LXXIV, LXXV, LXXVI, LXXVII, LXXVIII, LXXXI, LXXXII, LXXXIII, LXXXIV, LXXXV, LXXXVI, LXXXVII, C, CII, CIII, CIV, CV, CVI, CVII, CVIII, CIX, CX, CXI, CXII, CXIII, CXIV, CXV, CXVI, CXVII, CXVIII, CXXIV, CXXV, CXXVI, CXXVII, CXXVIII, CXXIX, CXXX, CXXXI, CXXXII, CXXXIII, CXXXIV, CXXXV, CXXXVI, CXXXVII, CXXXVIII, CXXXIX, CXL, CXLII, CXLIII, CXLIV, CXLI, CXLV, CXLVI, CXLVII, CXLVIII, CCL, CCLII, CCLIII, CCLIV, CCLI, CCLV, CCLVI, CCLVII, CCLVIII, CCLIX, CCLX, CCLXI, CCLXII, CCLXIII, CCLXIV, CCLXV, CCLXVI, CCLXVII, CCLXVIII, CCLXIX, CCLXX, CCLXXI, CCLXXII, CCLXXIII, CCLXXIV, CCLXXV, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVII, CCLXXVIII, CCLXXIX, CCLXXX, CCLXXXI, CCLXXXII, CCLXXXIII, CCLXXXIV, CCLXXXV, CCLXXXVI, CCLXXXVII, CCLXXXVIII, CCLXXXIX, CC, CCII, CCIII, CCIV, CCV, CCVI, CCVII, CCVIII, CCIX, CCX, CCXI, CCXII, CCXIII, CCXIV, CCXV, CCXVI, CCXVII, CCXVIII, CCXIX, CCXX, CCXXI, CCXXII, CCXXIII, CCXXIV, CCXXV, CCXXVI, CCXXVII, CCXXVIII, CCXXIX, CCXXX, CCXXXI, CCXXXII, CCXXXIII, CCXXXIV, CCXXXV, CCXXXVI, CCXXXVII, CCXXXVIII, CCXXXIX, CCXL, CCXLI, CCXLII, CCXLIII, CCXLIV, CCXLV, CCXLVI, CCXLVII, CCXLVIII, CCXLIX, CCL, CCLI, CCLII, CCLIII, CCLIV, CCLV, CCLVI, CCLVII, CCLVIII, CCLIX, CCLX, CCLXI, CCLXII, CCLXIII, CCLXIV, CCLXV, CCLXVI, CCLXVII, CCLXVIII, CCLXIX, CCLXX, CCLXXI, CCLXXII, CCLXXIII, CCLXXIV, CCLXXV, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVII, CCLXXVIII, CCLXXIX, CCLXXX, CCLXXXI, CCLXXXII, CCLXXXIII, CCLXXXIV, and CCLXXXV.
Body Guards by sneaking them out of the royal infirmary on the morning of October 6 and lying to the people who came to search for them.\textsuperscript{467} Yet, the heroic nun received 12 livres, the same amount as Louis Gamain whose only line of testimony was “il n’a absolument aucune connoissance des faits.”\textsuperscript{468} Moreover, Benjamin Dardignac also “n’a absolument aucune connoissance des faits,” but the Châtelet only offered him 30 sols for the same exact line.\textsuperscript{469}

The guiding principal of the Châtelet’s compensation system appears to be based on occupational income, although it is handled haphazardly at times. The witnesses with the lowest incomes such as Jean-Baptiste Gaillard, a locksmith’s assistant, received the lowest compensation of 30 sols.\textsuperscript{470} The Châtelet provided the equivalent of Gaillard’s salary to several domestiques as well.\textsuperscript{471} A court messenger and a hunting assistant to the king each received 6 livres,\textsuperscript{472} whereas a lawyer/municipal officer received 9 livres.\textsuperscript{473} Even military troops were generally paid by rank. For example, the Châtelet paid most Flanders Regiment captains 12 livres,\textsuperscript{474} and offered military engineers from the same regiment only half that amount.\textsuperscript{475} Yet there are discrepancies in this system. Two valet de pieds de la reine offered testimony but one was paid 9 livres and the other was paid 3 livres.\textsuperscript{476} Also, two Swiss guards had very similar testimonies but one earned 6 livres while the other only gained 3 livres.\textsuperscript{477} Among the rest of the witnesses however, the

\textsuperscript{467} LVI. \\
\textsuperscript{468} CXVI. \\
\textsuperscript{469} CLI. At the start of the Revolution, one livre equaled twenty sols. Colin Jones, \textit{The Longman Companion to the French Revolution} (New York, NY: Longman, 1990), 236. \\
\textsuperscript{470} LXXVIII (“compagnon serrurier”). \\
\textsuperscript{471} For example: CXVIII, CXXXIII, and CXXXIV. \\
\textsuperscript{472} CCXLIX and CCXXXI. \\
\textsuperscript{473} CCCXXXIII. \\
\textsuperscript{474} LIX, LXXXVIII, and LXXXIX. \\
\textsuperscript{475} CCCXXIV and CCCXXV (“sapeurs”). \\
\textsuperscript{476} XCIX and C. \\
\textsuperscript{477} XXXII, and XXXIII.
differences in compensation among people of similar economic status are relatively small.

Interestingly enough, the Châtelet seemed to financially favor different branches of the military as a whole in their compensation. The average remuneration for the 18 Flanders troops was 10.2 livres, and the average remuneration for the 10 Versailles National Guard troops was 9.8 livres. However, the average compensation for the four Parisian National Guards was 3.5 livres despite the fact that both a captain and a corporal testified. Even the average compensation for the 25 women paid (excluding the one with a travel allowance) was higher that the Parisian National Guard average at 5.86 livres. The Body Guards seem to be the winners of the groups with an average of 14.4 livres for six individuals (even excluding the traveling troop and three mysterious anomalies [see below]). Perhaps this is because the Body Guards were not militia volunteers, but then again, neither were the Swiss whose average salary of 3.8 livres barely passes that of the Parisian National Guards. There seems to be some clear favoritism of Versailles based troops (with the exception of the Swiss troops), and one cannot help but wonder if this propensity extended to an easier acceptance of their testimony on the part of the Châtelet judges as well.

478 LIX, LXIII, LXIV, LXV, LXVI, LXVII, LXVIII, LXXI, LXXXVII, LXXXVIII, LXXXIX, XCVII, XCVIII, CCXCI, CCXCIX, CCCXXIII, CCCXXXIV, and CCCXXV.
479 XV, XIX, CLXXXVIII, CCXXVIII, CCXXVIII, CCXXIV, CCCXXXIX, and CCCLXV.
480 CCCXII, CCCXXVIII, CCCLXXV, and CCCLXXXIV.
481 XX, XXV, LVI, LXXII, LXXXIII, LXXXV, XC, CII, CVI, CVIII, CLXXIII, CLXXXVII, CCXXVII, CCXXXVI, CCXLV, CCLXXIII, CCCLXXIV, CCCLXXIV, CCCLXV, CCCLXXXIV, and CCCLXXV.
482 XXIII, LVII, CCL, CCCXXVII, CCCLXXV, and CCCLXXXI.
483 XXXII, XXXIII, XXXIV, CXXXI, and CCLXXVI.
Not all of the stipends seem to clearly follow the occupational salary system. The judges justified the high compensation of five witnesses as compensation for “for the expense of travel, stay in Paris, and return.”484 While this seems reasonable for the two Body Guards who were paid 20 livres and 24 livres for this purpose,485 the price seems a bit more exorbitant for the three witnesses who received 300 livres, 230 livres, and 360 livres for their travel.486 Once again, there was not anything special in length or content about these depositions. In fact, the Châtelet paid Jeanne-Louise-Constance d’Aumont (one of the travelers) 230 livres for her to vaguely tell them that she saw armed men and women enter the courts on the morning of Oct 6 and that beyond this information she “n’a aucune connoissance particulière des faits.”487 There are only three testimonies whose unjustified compensation causes great alarm. Three Body Guards were each paid

---

484 “pour frais de voyage, séjour à Paris & retour”.
485 CCCLXXV and CCCLXXXXIII.
486 CCLXXVII (maréchal-des-logis des Body Gurads), CCLXXXII (a duchess), and CCCLXXXI (Ancien officier au Régiment du Maréchal de Turenne) respectively.
487 CCLXXXII.
150 livres for their ordinary depositions. One might guess that such an anomaly was the result of a typo at the press, but the printer spelled out the words “one-hundred-fifty livres” in one deposition and used the numbers “150” in the next. These Body Guards did not do anything more courageous than their other comrades, nor were they greatly injured as the result of the October Days. The Châtelet’s motivation for paying them such high amounts seems completely irrational, unless there was any foul play and some of their testimony was purposefully left unrecorded.

The only other anomalies in witness compensation appear to be caused by accidental omission. The investigation lists two witnesses as receiving a stipend while failing to specify the amount. These testimonies are not unordinary and neither are the two other testimonies in which no mention of a compensation offer, acceptance, or decline is mentioned. Additionally three other testimonies fit this same pattern but these discrepancies are likely due the interviewing of these witnesses by satellite judges and not the Châtelet. Also, Mounier was one of these witnesses and it may have appeared impolite to ask him if he would need compensation for his testimony.

Compared to the entire group of 151 witnesses which the Châtelet paid, these few divergent examples are minor in the overall scheme of witness compensation. It still stands that occupation was the principle determining factor for compensation in most depositions. If the witnesses were aware of this approach, it would deprive them of motivation for giving false testimony in hopes of financial gain, thereby reducing the amount of falsehoods in the depositions.

---

488 CXXVIII, CXXIX, and CXXX.
489 CXXIX and CXXX (“cent cinquante livres”).
490 CCCLXXXII and CCCXXX.
491 CCLXVI and CCCXXVII.
492 CCCLXXXIX, CCCLXXXX, and CCCXXVII.
Besides the allure of financial compensation and the witnesses’ biases, another wild card factor played an important role in shaping each individual testimony – the witness’ personal interpretation of the denunciation. Since most witnesses had little guidance after being read the denunciation which officially investigated the activities of October 6, they were responsible for choosing the boundaries of the information which they offered the Châtelet. Therefore, the time span of each witness’ account varies according to personal interpretation. The extreme endpoints of the collective testimony time span stretch from the winter of 1788/1789 to April 19, 1790. Only 58 individuals actually held fast to recounting only what they had witnessed on October 6. In fact, more depositions (71) only describe events on October 5 than only October 6. But the most popular response, given by 107 witnesses, provided the Châtelet only with information about both October 5 and October 6. Some witnesses offered information

493 CLXXX (winter 88/89), and CXCI (April 19, 1790).
494 V, XIII, XIV, XVI, XXXIII, XXXIV, XLVII, LVI, LVII, LXIV, LXXII, LXXXVIII, XCIX, C, CVII, CXXVIII, CXXXIII, CXXXV, CXLII, CLXXII, CLXXXII, CLXXXIV, CCLII, CCLIII, CCLVII, CCLXII, CCLXXVII, CCLXXVIII, CCLXXIX, CCLXXXIII, CCLXXXV, CCLXXXVII, CCLXXXIX, CCLXXXX.
495 II, XVII, XXI, XXII, XXVI, XXX, XXXVII, XXXVIII, XXXIX, XL, XLII, LXVII, LXXVII, LXXXIV, CXXXI, CXXXII, CXXXIII, CXXXIV, CCXIV, CCXLV, CCXLVI, CCXLVII, CCXLVIII, CCLXXII, CCLXXVI, CCLXXX, and CCXLXXX.
496 VII, IX, XI, XII, XXI, XXII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXX, XXXII, XXXIV, XXXV, XXXVI, XXXVII, XXXVIII, LXXII, LXXXVIII, CXXXII, CXXXIII, CXXXIV, CCXIV, CCXLV, CCXLVI, CCXLVII, CCXLVIII, CCLXXII, CCLXXVII, CCLXXVIII, CCLXXXI, CCLXXXIII, CCLXXXIV, CCLXXXVII, CCLXXXVIII, CCLXXXIX, CCLXXXX.
about these days in addition to venturing beyond the time span of the journée. Exactly 101 witnesses testified, at least in part, about events which took place before or after October 5 and 6. The time span which the depositions cover was crucial to those who believed that the journée was the result of a conspiracy. Politicians and judges who supported the conspiracy theory wanted to allow testimony about the summer which they hoped would link Orléans and/or Mirabeau to a long established plot. However, more liberal individuals sought to limit the testimony and any additional evidence strictly to the denunciations’ confines of October 6. This became a major point of contention between left-leaning and right-leaning political groups during the course of the investigation and this issue will be more thoroughly addressed in the next chapter.

Regardless of political implications, these figures reveal the most prevalent time periods touched upon by the witnesses and give a picture of the chronological breadth of the investigation.

497 CXX, CLXXVII, CV, I, XX, XCIII, CXIX, CLXXXII, CXCIII, CCCXXV, CCCXVI, CCCXXII, CCCXXVI, CCCXXVIII, CCCXXX, CCCXXXI, CCCXXXII, CCCXXXVIII, CCCLX, CCCLXII, CCCLXIII, CCCLXV, CCCLXVII, CCCLXVIII, CCCLXX, CCCLXXI, CCCLXXII, CCCLXXIII, CCCLXXXI, CCCCLXXIII, and CCCCLXXXIII. In addition, 19 other witnesses testified about both October 5 and 6 as well as events beyond this time period. They are: XV, XXIII, XXV, XXVII, LXXXV, CIV, CXI, CXLIX, CLV, CLXXVII, CLXXXV, CCXII, CCXX, CCXXXVI, CCXC, CCCXI, CCCXXVI, CCCXXVIII, CCCXLIX, and CCCCLXXX.

498 For more details on this point of contention, see section 3.

499 These numbers do not include witnesses whose only response was “aucune connaissance” or those whose testimony was so vague that it cannot be associated with a definite time period.
Due to the variety of time spans covered, the great breadth of information offered, and the array of sources cited by the witnesses, it appears that most witnesses were given free reign to interpret the boundaries of the denunciation on their own. Yet, about two/thirds of the way through the depositions some anomalies begin to appear in the testimonies. Some of the depositions are unusually ordered, as if the witnesses were

---

500 These numbers do not include the above witnesses covered by the previous note. Also, this percentage is not based upon length of content; rather, it is indicative that the content was addressed in some fashion. For example, an individual who testified about events which occurred in September and on October 6 counts once in each category (making the divisor of the percentage > 395). Therefore, this chart most closely represents the percentage of deposition content relating to each time period.

501 On the other hand, this chart reflects the percentage of witnesses who addressed each time span. Simply stated, number of witnesses/395 x 100 = percentage.
interrupted during their narratives. For example, up until deposition CCXLVII, all witnesses who responded with some form of “aucune connoissance” did so at the very beginning of their testimony; however, at this point in the investigation, some of the “aucune connoissance” responses occur at the middle or the end of the testimony, after the witnesses gave other information. This phrase is recorded at the end of nine depositions,502 in the middle of three depositions,503 and more than once in the testimony of two individuals504 as if a judge interrupted the witness to reiterate or more clearly specify the denunciation.

It appears that the Châtelet judges began to grow a little impatient after six months of interviewing witnesses with a lot of ambiguous testimony and little evidence to offer regarding the “auteurs” of October 6.505 The anachronism of the “aucune connoissance” in the sixteen depositions suggests that the judges infringed upon these narrations. By interrupting the witnesses and redirecting their narratives, the judges may have pressured the witnesses to give more pertinent or specific information. Yet, twelve of these witnesses actually testified about events on October 5 or October 6 before “aucune connoissance” appeared in the testimony.506 So it appears that the latter explanation is correct, that the Châtelet judges became increasingly concerned with finding concrete evidence about a conspiracy as the investigation dragged on with little to show for their efforts. In fact, there is a perceptible shift in the all-encompassing secretaries’ recording of “aucune connoissance particulière des faits” to a very specific

502 CCXLVII, CCL, CCLII, CCLXX, CCXLVII, CCLXXXV, CCCXI, CCLXXX, and CCLXXXX(interviewed at Langres).
503 CCLXXXIV, CCCXI, and CCCXVII.
504 CCLXIII and CCLXXVIII.
505 Louis-Alexandre Bertheir, witness CCXLVII, testified on May 15, 1790.
506 CCL, CCLII, CCLXX, CCXLVII, CCLXXXV, CCCXI, CCCXII, CCLXXX, CCXLVII, CCCXVII, and CCLXXXIV.
“can not give us any information on the authors or accomplices [of the conspiracy]” (or something to that effect) in seven of the testimonies.\textsuperscript{507} Frustrated with the Comité des recherches’ refusal to release potential evidence from earlier in the summer, the Châtelet may have taken this matter into its own hands since these testimonies all occur after their mid April quarrel.\textsuperscript{508}

Additionally, the double affirmation of no knowledge in the depositions of Alexandre-Charles Beffôn and Pierre-Rapheael Paillot raises the question of just how inquisitive the judges were.\textsuperscript{509} Paillot not only asserted that he had “aucune connoissance” but also that he did not know the authors of the insurrection, did not see any men disguised as women, and did not see anyone handing out money. It is rather suspicious that an individual who gave absolutely no testimony would name what exactly he did not know anything about.\textsuperscript{510} Jean-Nicolas Motte actually testified about several events before his deposition ended with “aucune connoissance particulière” and similarly iterated that he did not know the authors of a plot, did not see men disguised as women, and did not see anyone hand out money.\textsuperscript{511} It is highly unlikely that these two witnesses could name exactly what they had no knowledge of by chance and this seems to be another clue that the Châtelet began to ask the witnesses more specific questions rather than allowing them to interpret the denunciation alone. This, in conjunction with the other anachronisms involving “aucune connoissance,” makes it reasonable to conclude that the judges attempted to lead or pressure at least fourteen witnesses to some degree.

\textsuperscript{507} CCL, CCXLVII, CCCLXXX, CCXLVII, CCLXXXIV, CCLXIII, and CCCLXXVIII (“ne peut nous donner aucune renseignement sur les auteurs ou complices”).
\textsuperscript{508} A more detailed discussion of this confrontation and division between the Comité des recherches and the Châtelet is given in the next section. Deposition CCXLVII was recorded on May 15, 1790.
\textsuperscript{509} CCLXIII and CCCLXXVIII.
\textsuperscript{510} CCCLXXVIII.
\textsuperscript{511} CCCLXXX.
This is problematic especially if this kind of pressure was used to shape and perhaps taint the testimony of other witnesses as well.

The demographic information about the witnesses is also an important factor when evaluating the investigation as a whole since it greatly influences what testimony the Châtelet was able to record. The vast majority of the witnesses lived in Paris or Versailles. At the time of their questioning, 108 individuals named Versailles as their place of residence.\textsuperscript{512} 37 additional individuals clarified that Paris was now their place of residence, most implying that they had moved from Versailles.\textsuperscript{513} Therefore, it would not be surprising if some of the 225 witnesses who listed Paris or the faubourgs as their place of residence also recently moved with the National Assembly and the king from Versailles.\textsuperscript{514} Since the collection of testimony took place up until 9 months after the

\textsuperscript{512} XIV, XV, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXXI, XXXII, LVII, LVIII, LIX, LXI, LXIII, LXIV, LXV, LXVI, LXVII, LXVIII, LXIX, LXI, LXXI, LXXII, LXXIII, LXXIV, LXXV, LXXVI, LXXXI, LXXXII, XC, XCI, CC, CCC, CCCII, CCCIII, CCCIV, CCCV, CCCVI, CCCVII, CCCVIII, CCL, CCLI, CCLII, CCLIII, CCLIV, CCLV, CCLVI, CCLVII, CCLVIII, CCLX, CCLXI, CCLXII, CCLXIII, CCLXIV, CCLXV, CCLXVI, CCLXVII, CCLXVIII, CCLXIX, CCLXX, CCLXXI, CCLXXII, CCLXXIII, CCLXXIV, CCLXXV, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVII, CCLXXVIII, CCLXXIX, CCLXXX, CCLXXXI, CCLXXXII, CCLXXXIII, CCLXXXIV, CCLXXXV, CCLXXXVI, CCLXXXVII, CCLXXXVIII, CCLXXXIX, CXC, CXCII, CXCIII, CXCIV, CXCV, CXCVI, CXCVII, CXCVIII, CXCVII, CXCVIII, CXL, CXLI, CXLII, CXLIII, CXLIV, CXLV, CXLVI, CXLVII, CXLVIII, CXLIX, CL, CLI, CLII, CLIII, CLIV, CLV, CLVI, CLVII, CLVIII, CLIX, CLX, CLXI, CLXII, CLXIII, CLXIV, CLXV, CLXVI, CLXVII, CLXVIII, CLXIX, CLXX, CLXXI, CLXXII, CLXXIII, CLXXIV, CLXXV, CLXXVI, CLXXVII, CLXXVIII, CLXXIX, CLXXX, CLXXXI, CLXXXII, CLXXXIII, CLXXXIV, CLXXXV, CLXXXVI, CLXXXVII, CLXXXVIII, CLXXXIX, CXC, CXCI, CXCII, CXCIII, CXCIV, CXCV, CXCVI, CXCVII, CXCVIII, CC, CCII, CCIII, CCIV, CCV, CCVI, CCVII, CCVIII, CCX, CCXI, CCXII, CCXIII, CCXIV, CCXV, CCXVI, CCXVII, CCXVIII, CCXIX, CCXX, CCXXI, CCXXII, CCXXIII, CCXXIV, CCXXV, CCXXVI, CCXXVII, CCXXVIII, CCXXIX, CCXXX, CCXXXI, CCXXXII, CCXXXIII, CCXXXIV, CCXXXV, CCXXXVI, CCXXXVII, CCXXXVIII, CCXXXIX, CCXL, CCXLII, CCXLIII, CCXLIV, CCXLV, CCXLVI, CCXLVII, CCXLVIII, CCXLIX, CCL, CCLI, CCLII, CCLIII, CCLIV, CCLV, CCLVI, CCLVII, CCLVIII, CCLIX, CCLX, CCLXI, CCLXII, CCLXIII, CCLXIV, CCLXV, CCLXVI, CCLXVII, CCLXVIII, CCLXIX, CCLXX, CCLXXI, CCLXXII, CCLXXIII, CCLXXIV, CCLXXV, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVII, CCLXXVIII, CCLXXIX, CCLXXX, CCLXXXI, CCLXXXII, CCLXXXIII, CCLXXXIV, CCLXXXV, CCLXXXVI, CCLXXXVII, CCLXXXVIII, CCLXXXIX, CCC, CCCII, CCCIII, CCCIV, CCCV, CCCVI, CCCVII, CCCVIII, CCCIX, CCCX, CCCXI, CCCXII, CCCXIII, CCCXIV, CCCXV, CCCXVI, CCCXVII, CCCXVIII, CCCXIX, CCCXX, CCCXXI, CCCXXII, CCCXXIII, CCCXXIV, CCCXXV, CCCXXVI, CCCXXVII, CCCXXVIII, CCCXXIX, CCCXXX, CCCXXXI, CCCXXXII, CCCXXXIII, CCCXXXIV, CCCXXXV, CCCXXXVI, CCCXXXVII, CCCXXXVIII, CCCXXXIX, CCCXL, CCCXLI, CCCXLII, CCCXLIII, CCCXLIV, CCCXLV, CCCXLVI, CCCXLVII, CCCXLVIII, CCCXLIX, CCL, CCLI, CCLII, CCLIII, CCLIV, CCLV, CCLVI, CCLVII, CCLVIII, CCLIX, CCLX, CCLXI, CCLXII, CCLXIII, CCLXIV, CCLXV, CCLXVI, CCLXVII, CCLXVIII, CCLXIX, CCLXX, CCLXXI, CCLXXII, CCLXXIII, CCLXXIV, CCLXXV, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVII, CCLXXVIII, CCLXXIX, CCLXXX, CCLXXXI, CCLXXXII, CCLXXXIII, CCLXXXIV, CCLXXXV, CCLXXXVI, CCLXXXVII, CCLXXXVIII, CCLXXXIX, CCC, CCCII, CCCIII, CCCIV, CCCV, CCCVI, CCCVII, CCCVIII, CCCIX, CCCX, CCCXI, CCCXII, CCCXIII, CCCXIV, CCCXV, CCCXVI, CCCXVII, CCCXVIII, CCCXIX, CCCXX, CCCXXI, CCCXXII, CCCXXIII, CCCXXIV, CCCXXV, CCCXXVI, CCCXXVII, CCCXXVIII, CCCXXIX, CCCXXX, CCCXXXI, CCCXXXII, CCCXXXIII, CCCXXXIV, CCCXXXV, CCCXXXVI, CCCXXXVII, CCCXXXVIII, CCCXXXIX, CCCXL, CCCXLI, CCCXLII, CCCXLIII, CCCXLIV
journée, some individuals probably felt reestablished enough not to have to specify that they moved. Of course, the residency of the witnesses plays a crucial part in the testimony as it may reveal prejudices. For example, Versailles inhabitants probably regretted that their town was invaded by masses of Parisians and deprived of its pride and livelihood (the king and royal government), whereas Parisians most likely looked favorably on the events as a way of removing the king from potentially bad influences and protecting him in the capital. Only fourteen other towns and cities are cited as places of residence in the entire investigation. Since almost all the witnesses lived in Versailles or Paris, all had something at stake and were affected by the journée in some manner. Not to mention, the political ramifications of the journée greatly contributed to personal biases. In the Châtelet investigation, there were no objective witnesses.

The occupations of the witnesses also provide valuable background information which often affected their various points of view and directed the role which they played in the October Days. A large portion of the witnesses were part of some military group. 124 of the witnesses were connected to royal military troops. 31 of these witnesses were Body Guards or worked with these troops, 22 were members of the Flanders

---

515 Limousin: CCCLXXXI; Langres: CCCLXXXX; Pont-Audemer: CCCLXXXX; Chartres: CCCLXXXI; Montreuil: CCCLXXXX; Genève: CCCLXXXX; Passy: CCCLXXXII; Sèvres: CCCLXXXIII; Nanterre: CCCLXXXIV; Paris and Rouen: CCCLXXXV; Grenoble and Paris: CCCLXXXVI; Clermont and Paris: CCCLXXXVII.

516 Some witnesses listed more than one occupation and are therefore counted in more than one group. X, XVI, XVIII, CXXIV, CXXVII, CXXVIII, CXXIX, CXXX, CXXXV, CXXXVI, CCCCIII, CCCCXXV, CCCCXXVII.
Regiment, and 7 were members of the Swiss Guard. The remaining 64 individuals were from a variety of royal military positions including the dragoons, chevaliers, chasseurs, troops from other regions, and those who were given the honorary title of chevalier de Saint Louis. Including the 26 members Parisian National Guard and 16 members of the Versailles National Guard who testified, 166 witnesses or 42 percent of the witness pool had some kind of military affiliation.

Distribution of Military Witnesses Interviewed:

The Châtelet interviewed several governmental officials about the journée. Sixty National Assembly deputies offered depositions and several not only testified not only about the events which took place at the National Assembly, but also portrayed a variety of deputy concerns, personal experiences, and atmospheres making the depositions a...
valuable resource for fleshing out the account left behind in the National Assembly records.\textsuperscript{522} The Châtelet did not ignore governmental employees on a municipal level and summoned five Versailles Municipal Employees\textsuperscript{523} and 34 individuals connected with the Commune and Parlement de Paris.\textsuperscript{524} These testimonies afford the reader insights as to how the respective municipalities dealt with the \textit{journée}.

Several individuals of royal nonmilitary positions also testified to the Châtelet. Of the king’s employees, 26 of his counselors or employees with professional positions gave their version of the October Days to the judges.\textsuperscript{525} Valets, pages, and other nonprofessional employees of the royal household and family accounted for 41 additional depositions.\textsuperscript{526} Squires without specified employment and courtiers present at Versailles contributed seven depositions.\textsuperscript{527}

These numbers do not leave much room for nonaffiliated groups of people – that is general members of the populace; only 112 of the witnesses held positions outside of the above groups. The Châtelet interviewed 26 bourgeois with jobs outside of the

\textsuperscript{522} IV, XIII, XCI, CX, CXIII, CXIX, CXXI, CXXVI, CXXXVII, CXXXIX, CXL, CXLII, CXLIII, CXLV, CXLVI, CXLVII, CXLVIII, CXLIX, CLII, CLIII, CLIV, CLV, CLX, CLXI, CLXII, CLXIII, CLXIV, CLXV, CLXVI, CLXVII, CLXVIII, CLXIX, CLXX, CLXXI, CLXXII, CLXXIII, CLXXIV, CLXXV, CLXXVI, CLXXVII, CLXXVIII, CLXXIX, CCII, CCIII, CCIV, CCV, CCVI, CCVII, CCVIII, CCIX, CCX, CCXI, CCXII, CCXIII, CCXIV, CCXV, CCXVI, CCXVII, CCXVIII, CCXIX, CCXX, CCXXI, CCXXII, CCXXIII, CCXXIV, CCXXV, CCXXVI, CCXXVII, CCXXVIII, CCXXIX, CCXXX, CCXXXI, CCXXXII, CCXXXIII, CCXXXIV, CCXXXV, CCXXXVI, CCXXXVII, CCXXXVIII, CCXXXIX, CCXXXX, CCXXXXI, CCXXXXII, CCXXXXIII, CCXXXXIV, CCXXXXV, CCXXXXVI, CCXXXXVII, CCXXXXVIII, CCXXXXIX, CCXXXXX, CCXXXXXI, CCXXXXXII, CCXXXXXIII, and CCXXXXXIV.

\textsuperscript{523} CCXXXVII, CCCXXIX, CCCXXXII, CCCXXXIII, and CCCLXXX.

\textsuperscript{524} II, XI, XII, XIII, XXX, XXXX, XXIX, XL, LX, LXXIX, CLI, CLII, CLIII, CLIV, CLV, CLVI, CLVII, CLVIII, CLIX, CLX, CLXI, CLXII, CLXIII, CLXIV, CLXV, CLXVI, CLXVII, CLXVIII, CLXIX, CLXX, CLXXI, CLXXII, CLXXIII, CLXXIV, CLXXV, CLXXVI, CLXXVII, CLXXVIII, CLXXIX, CCII, CCIII, CCIV, CCV, CCVI, CCVII, CCVIII, CCIX, CCX, CCXI, CCXII, CCXIII, CCXIV, CCXV, CCXVI, CCXVII, CCXVIII, CCXIX, CCXX, CCXXI, CCXXII, CCXXIII, CCXXIV, CCXXV, CCXXVI, CCXXVII, CCXXVIII, CCXXIX, CCXXX, CCXXXI, CCXXXII, CCXXXIII, CCXXXIV, CCXXXV, CCXXXVI, CCXXXVII, CCXXXVIII, CCXXXIX, CCXXXX, CCXXXXI, CCXXXXII, CCXXXXIII, CCXXXXIV, CCXXXXV, CCXXXXVI, CCXXXXVII, CCXXXXVIII, CCXXXXIX, CCXXXXX, CCXXXXXI, and CCXXXXXII.

\textsuperscript{525} III, VIII, XV, XXII, XXIV, XXVI, XLII, L, LII, LV, LVII, LXX, LXXXVI, XCIV, XCV, XCVI, CXX, CLX, CXV, CCII, CXXII, CXXIII, CXXIV, CXXV, CXXVI, CXXVII, CXXVIII, CXXX, CXXXI, CXXXII, CXXXIII, CXXXIV, CXXXV, CXXXVI, CXXXVII, CXXXVIII, CXXXIX, CXL, CXLII, CXLIII, CXLIV, CXLV, CXLVI, CXLVII, CXLVIII, CXLIX, CLI, CLII, CLIII, CLIV, CLV, CLVI, CLVII, CLVIII, CLIX, CLX, CLXI, CLXII, CLXIII, CLXIV, CLXV, CLXVI, CLXVII, CLXVIII, CLXIX, CLXX, CLXXI, CLXXII, CLXXIII, CLXXIV, CLXXV, CLXXVI, CLXXVII, CLXXVIII, CLXXIX, CLXXX, CLXXXI, CLXXXII, CLXXXIII, CLXXXIV, CLXXXV, CLXXXVI, CLXXXVII, CLXXXVIII, CCII, CCIII, CCIV, CCV, CCVI, CCVII, CCVIII, CCIX, CCX, CCXI, CCXII, CCXIII, CCXIV, CCXV, CCXVI, CCXVII, CCXVIII, CCXIX, CCXX, CCXXI, CCXXII, CCXXIII, CCXXIV, CCXXV, CCXXVI, CCXXVII, CCXXVIII, CCXXIX, CCXXX, CCXXXI, CCXXXII, CCXXXIII, CCXXXIV, CCXXXV, CCXXXVI, CCXXXVII, CCXXXVIII, CCXXXIX, CCXXXX, CCXXXXI, CCXXXXII, CCXXXXIII, CCXXXXIV, CCXXXXV, CCXXXXVI, CCXXXXVII, CCXXXXVIII, CCXXXXIX, CCXXXXX, CCXXXXXI, and CCXXXXXII.

\textsuperscript{526} IX, LXX, CCXI, CCXII, CCCII, CCCVII, CCCX, and CCCXII.
government and employment by the royal household. \footnote{Academia: II, VI, XXXI, XLII, LV, XCI, XCIi, CCLI, CCLI, CCXC, CCCXV, CCCXIV; Lawyer (Avocat): CCVIII, CCCXXXIII; Doctor of Law: CLXXXIV; Doctor: XXVIII, CCXC; Bourgeois: V, XLV, XCV; Big merchant (Négociant): I, CXLII, CCCXXIX, CLXXXIV, CCCXXXV, Clerk: CXLIII; Master Glazier (Maître vitrier): CCLXXV; Master Scribe (Maître d’écriture): CCCII; (Master of Arts in Ironworks) Maître-és-arts en fonte de fer: CC; Master of the Horse Post at Versailles (Maitre des Postes aux chevaux à Versailles): CCCXXXI; Master Apothecary (Maître en pharmacie): CCCXLIV; Master Joiner (Maître Menuisier): CCLII; Master Locksmith (Maître Serrurier): CLXXXV; Master Carpenter (Maître Charpentier): CCLXXXVI; Master Harpiste (Maître de Harpe): CCLXXX; Master Wigmaker (Maître Perruquier): CCLXXX; Master Fonder (Maître Fondeur): CLXXX; Master Baker (Maître Boulanger): CCLXXX; Master Cobbler (Maître Cordonier): CLI; Master Seamstress: LXXXV; (Merchant) Marchand: XIV, XIX, XX, XXI, LVII, LXXXI, LXXXVI, CII, CLI, CXXXV, CLXXXI, CCXCVI, CCCXXIX, CLCL; Domestic Servant (Domestique): CXVIII, CXXIV, CXXXII, CXLII, CLXXV; Worker: CCXXXVI, CCCXLIII; Housekeeper (Gouvernante): CCCXLIV; Unemployed Wife: CCLX; House Cleaner: LXXXII; Widow: LIV, CCLXXXIV, CCLXXXIV; Unemployed Wife: CXXV, CXL, CLXXIX, CCXLIV, CCCCXXXIV, CCCXLIV, CCLXXXII, CCLXXV, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVII, CCLXXVIII; Artist: XCV, CLXXXI, CCCXXXIII; Day Laborer (Journalier): CCLX; Pastry Chef (Pâtissier): CCLX; Doorman (Portier): CCLXI; Gardener (Jardinier): CCLVII; Landlord of Furnished Rooms (Loceur en chambres garnies): CXXVIII.} Approximately 83 individuals had a social standing below that of bourgeois and no connection to the government and royal household (several also served in the militia). \footnote{Clergy: XXXVI, XLVI, XLVII, XCI, XCIi, XCI, CX, CXI, CXXI, CCX, CCLI, CCLIX, CCCIII, CCLX, CCLXXVII, Acolyte: CCLXXX; Nun: XCVI.}

In total, 198 witnesses owed their employment to the royal military or the royal household, and therefore had at least some reason to view the invasion of royal grounds and the manipulation of the king with contempt. Additionally, the 21 clergy members interviewed, including the acolyte and the nun, were probably aware of and averse to the anticlerical attitude espoused by several individuals of the crowd inside the National Assembly on the evening of October 5 (many of these clergy members were in fact deputies as well). \footnote{In total, 198 witnesses owed their employment to the royal military or the royal household, and therefore had at least some reason to view the invasion of royal grounds and the manipulation of the king with contempt. Additionally, the 21 clergy members interviewed, including the acolyte and the nun, were probably aware of and averse to the anticlerical attitude espoused by several individuals of the crowd inside the National Assembly on the evening of October 5 (many of these clergy members were in fact deputies as well). With these statistics in mind, the witness pool takes on a politically conservative inclination solely on the basis of occupational statistics. Moreover, this occupational evaluation reveals a discrepancy in the background of the witness pool in comparison to the background of the actual participant pool of the journée. In reality, the...} With these statistics in mind, the witness pool takes on a politically conservative inclination solely on the basis of occupational statistics. Moreover, this occupational evaluation reveals a discrepancy in the background of the witness pool in comparison to the background of the actual participant pool of the journée. In reality, the...
thousands of Parisian women, men, and National Guards far outnumbered the royal troops present in Versailles, but their testimonial voice is lacking in comparison. The most striking example of this is the deficiency of women marchers interviewed. These proportional flaws in the number and kinds of people summoned taint the overall picture of the journée given by the Châtelet as more unfavorable than it may have been actually viewed by many of the participants. In short, the combination of a conservatively inclined witness pool and a conservative court predictably resulted in conservative conclusions which cast suspicion on the susceptibility of the populace to be driven by conspiracy or other devious intentions.
Chapter 6: An Analysis of Testimony For and Against Conspiracy

Indeed over 20 percent of the witnesses not only understood that the Châtelet was looking for information about the “auteurs” of the crime in regards to a potential conspiracy, but they also successfully took the hint to mention Orléans and Mirabeau in their testimony.\footnote{531 It is important to recall that Shapiro argues that although the “auteurs” were not named in the October Days denunciation, it was common knowledge that the officials had Orléans and Mirabeau specifically in mind.} Although 61 individuals testified about Orléans\footnote{532 I, IV, VI, XVII, XXXI, XXXVI, XLVI, XLVIII, XLIX, XLVII, XLVIII, LX, LXXIX, LXXXII, LXXVII, XCV, CIV, CVI, CXI, CXIX, CXXIV, CXXVI, CXXXII, CXXXIII, CXXXV, CXL, CXLIX, CLV, CLXII, CXLVII, CLXV, CLXVII, CLXVIII, CLXXI, CLXXVII, CLXXXV, CCLIV, CCLVII, CCLXXII, CCLXXXII, CCLXXIV, CCLXXVII, CCLXXXIII.} and 33 witnesses gave information concerning Mirabeau,\footnote{533 I, IV, XVIII, XXII, XXIV, XXXVII, LIV, LV, LXI, XC, CXI, CXL, CXLV, CLX, CLIV, CLVII, CLXIV, CLXVIII, CLXX, CLXXI, CCL, CCCCXVII, and CCCXLIV.} not all of the information actually links them to a conspiracy. In this respect, some individuals seem to have taken the denunciation read to them as a request to give the judges all their knowledge of the October Days along with any type of knowledge that they had of Orléans and Mirabeau whatsoever. When the content of these 84 depositions is broken down, the result is a much weaker case against Orléans and Mirabeau than the Châtelet and many conservative National Assembly deputies had hoped for.\footnote{534 In an effort to thoroughly analyze the portrayal of Orléans and Mirabeau in the \textit{Procédure Criminelle}, I have counted every deposition in which either is specifically mentioned, regardless of the context of the testimony. This will give the most conclusive picture of the kind of evidence offered for and against them.}

Even though the denunciation asked for information about October 6, some individuals volunteered information about Orléans before the October Days. Most of the testimony of these witnesses centered around two issues: the popular parading of
Orléans’ and Necker’s busts on July 12\textsuperscript{535} and the manufacture of lead plaques which read “Vive Orléans” during the winter of 1788-1789.\textsuperscript{536} One individual offered the observation that he saw some men talking to the police commissaire on July 13 and 14 and that he saw these men lead 2,000 armed men across the Pont Royal. He loosely linked this vague event to Orléans by saying that he believed the leaders of the armed men to be Orléans’ \textit{jockeys}.\textsuperscript{537} François-Henri de Virieu observed that the people wanted to make Orléans the lieutenant-général du royaume (the dauphin’s regent) which reveals the duke’s popularity in mid July.\textsuperscript{538} An additional witness said that he had worked to make 600 pikes during July in the facilities of Faure, who was Orléans’ locksmith.\textsuperscript{539} The witnesses merely shared this information because it encompassed questionable behavior linked in some way to Orléans. The events which the individuals described are not linked to a conspiracy behind the October Days.

Four witnesses came slightly closer to the denunciation by testifying about events immediately preceding the \textit{journée}. One witness saw one of Orléans' servants in the Palais Royal shouting angrily about the Body Guard banquet, but this kind of speech was not unique due to the great public agitation over the event.\textsuperscript{540} Two witnesses expressed their suspicion that Orléans had supported the placards encouraging people to take an oath to defend the National Assembly and calling them to arms.\textsuperscript{541} One of these witnesses also heard a rumor that Orléans dropped off 16,000 livres at the hotel de la reine on Oct 4 and told someone “that in less than a few hours one would see some things

\textsuperscript{535} XCV, CXXIV, and CCXIV.
\textsuperscript{536} CLXXX, and CCVII.
\textsuperscript{537} LXXIX. Although the primary definition of \textit{jockey} is a coachman, nearly all the witnesses who use the term use it to describe a messenger, often on horseback.
\textsuperscript{538} CXL.
\textsuperscript{539} CIV.
\textsuperscript{540} XLIX.
\textsuperscript{541} XLVIII and CXXVI.
clearly.” Interestingly, no one else makes this claim. The most curious of the pre-October Days testimony comes from an old officer of the royal military whose rationality and level-headedness shines throughout most of his deposition. He said that after the October 1 banquet he encountered a distressed chasseur de Trois-Evêchés who tried to kill himself after vaguely telling him “Our good king, this king’s brave household, I am a big rogue! What do these monsters want from me?” When the witness asked him who the monsters were, the chasseur replied “these scoundrels of Commandant and of Orléans” and then fell on his sword. This portion of his testimony seems absurd but is plausible. However, the testimony of these four witnesses provides no conclusive evidence of Orléans’ direct involvement in a conspiracy.

The October 5 sightings of Orléans are equally as weak as evidence of Orléans’ involvement in a conspiracy. One Body Guard testified that he saw Orléans leave the National Assembly and head off in the direction of Paris around 1:00 pm. The same witness is the only one to testify that he saw Orléans among the armed people that night and that the people were making threats against the king and voicing their opinion that Orléans should be king instead. One witness testified that he saw Orléans dressed without distinction and alone in Paris, while another witness “heard it said, without being able to certify it,” that La Clos was at Saint-Denis waiting to leave for Versailles.

---

542 XLVIII (“que sous peu d’heures on verroit bien des choses”).
543 CCCLXXXI (“Notre bon Roi, cette brave Maison du Roi, je suis un grand gueux! Les monsters qu’exigent-ils de moi?”; “ces jean-foutres de Commandant & d’Orléans”) The chasseur is refering to Lafayette as “Commandant.” This appears to be a true incident since the witness then gives a detailed account of the rescue attempt and efforts to stop the bleeding. While doing so he specifically names some of the individuals who were involved in the incident. He also says that they wanted to keep the chasseur alive so that they could gain more details about his confession.
544 CCXIV.
545 CXIX.
with Orléans. Just as much attention was focused on Orléans’ employees on October 5 as on Orléans himself. One witness described how he had seen Orléans talk to his jockeys (who had sabers) in the Bois de Boulogne, and that after this conversation, the jockeys galloped off in the direction of Paris. Another witness said that he had heard from a specific individual that one of Orléans’ jockeys had passed through the barrière on October 5, while the queen’s gardener testified that he saw several couriers in front of the château, including one who worked for Orléans. However, Orléans’ interaction with his employees who were doing their jobs as messengers can hardly be anything out of the ordinary.

Many witnesses thought that it was appropriate to comment on the people’s general attachment to Orléans in their deposition. Two witnesses referred to Orléans’ paternal position among the people who told them Orléans was their “père” while another witness referred to the crowd metaphorically as Orléans’ “enfants.” One witness spoke of the people’s devotion to Orléans when describing a speech given in the Palais Royal on October 4 during which the speaker said the people would make Orléans the lieutenant-général instead of Lafayette. Yet, popularity does not imply guilt (take Lafayette’s position for example).

More relevant to a conspiracy are the sources which attempt to implicate Orléans in bribery of the Flanders Regiment. Yet, only two witnesses testify that Orléans directly interacted with the Flanders Regiment. One witness said he heard someone encouraging

546 VI (“a entendu dire, sans pouvoir le certifier”).
547 CCXXVI.
548 CCXC.
549 LXXXII.
550 CCCLXXVII and CCXXVI.
551 CCII.
552 CCXLIII.
the Regiment against the Body Guards, but wasn’t sure if the man was Ganache or Orléans. In addition, the other witness testified that someone else told him about the bribery and he did not directly see it.

The depositions which most strongly seem to implicate Orléans in a scheme are those concerning the activities on the morning of October 6. A total of 25 witnesses discussed Orléans’ actions on October 6. Orléans was accused of directing the conspiracy by many of his contemporaries. However, only 5 witnesses testified that they saw Orléans in the courts of the château before 8:00 am. Of these five, only two individuals testified that they saw Orléans in the middle of the people who were flooding the courtyards and directing their actions. The remaining three witnesses based their information on secondary sources. Two other sources do not give times for their observation, but the events they describe also took place during the chaos. A royal brigadier said that he heard a rumor that a man was pointing the way up the stairs to the queen’s apartments and that the man was Orléans. Another witness testified that a rumor was spreading that Orléans had encouraged his “children” from a terrace during the violence saying “allez, allez, continuez votre chemin.” It important to note the division between the testimony which refers to events before and after 8:00 a.m. since this was the time at which calm was reestablished in the château and the courtyards. Therefore, if Orléans did have hand in directing the violence, this would have to have occurred before 8:00 a.m.

553 XVLIII.
554 CXLVII.
555 CCCLXXXIII, CCCLXXVI, CCLVI, CCCLXV, and LXXXVII.
556 CCLVI and CCCLXV.
557 CCCLXXXIII, CCCLXXVI, and LXXXVII.
558 CCXXVI.
559 CCCXLIV ("enfants").
560 See Chapter 3.
Witnesses and reliable sources for spotting Orléans before 8:00 a.m. are clearly lacking in the *Procédure criminelle* and cannot be used to reasonably prove Orléans’ involvement in a conspiracy. Moreover, Mathiez argues that “it is beyond doubt that he did not arrive at Versailles before 8:00 in the morning.” Mathiez reached this conclusion after studying a letter written by Orléans and using a deposition given to the police of Gros-Callin in which “the national guards at the Point-du-Jour post affirm the have seen the duke of Orléans pass, October 6, 1789, at 7:30 in the morning, going in the direction of Versailles.”561 This evidence combined with the lack of convincing testimony makes it nearly impossible to directly link Orléans with the “crimes” of October 6.

Skeptics would point out that eleven other testimonies report that Orléans was among the people on the morning of October 6. However, four of these testimonies specify that their sighting occurred at sometime after 8:00 a.m.562 In addition, four of the remaining witnesses testified that they saw Orléans surrounded by people crying “Vive le duc d’Orléans” or something to that effect563 which is exactly what three of the four post-8:00 a.m. witnesses reported seeing as well which allows these sightings to be classified in the same post-8:00 am time frame.564 One of the witnesses specifically testified that he saw the crowd of people following Orléans when the chaos was calming down and the king appeared on the balcony.565 Another witness heard of Orléans’ presence in the courts

561 Albert Mathiez, “Étude critique sur les journées des 5 & 6 octobre,” *Revue Historique*, vol. 68 (1898): 276. This letter was published in the collection “Correspondance de Philippe d’Orléans” and the deposition was recorded in *Archives parlementaire*, vol 19, p. 392 (“il est hors de doute qu’il n’arriva pas à Versailles avant 8 heures de matin”; “les gardes nationaux de poste du Point-du-Jour affirment avoir vu passer le duc d’Orléans, le 6 octobre 1789, à sept heures et demi du matin, se rendant à Versailles”).
562 CXXXIII, CCLIV, CXCV, and CCCLXXIV.
563 CLXXVIII, CCXVII, CXXVII, and CXXXII.
564 CXXXIII, CCLIV, and CXCV.
565 CCV.
but this deposition is too ambiguous to classify chronologically. The final witness in this group of eleven merely recounted what one of the other eleven witnesses had told him.

The remaining seven testimonies describe events which happened after order had been established on October 6. Most note Orléans’ presence in the king’s apartments and National Assembly, and others list people with whom Orléans was talking. Two depositions describe Orléans’ mood when the king left for Paris, but one claimed that he appeared content while the other testified that he looked unhappy.

Orléans’ relationship with politically influential people and the National Assembly as a whole were also scrutinized by the witnesses. Some witnesses reported rumors that Orléans was trying to corrupt members of the National Assembly and that he had been working with other deputies to get the king to flee from Versailles so that Orléans could become regent. They also discussed the relationship between Orléans and Mirabeau. One witness suggested that Orléans was fed up with Mirabeau who oscillated between correspondence with and denunciations against him. Two other witnesses reported that a deputy had told them that Orléans and La Touche were lamenting about failing to win over Estaing and their misfortune that he was appointed the leader of the Versailles National Guard. Two others cast suspicion on Orléans by testifying that he was tied to England, the contemporary and counter-revolutionary rival of France. Edme-Thomas Garnier Dwall, a secretary of Prince Edward (son of George III), testified that a

566 CXLIX.
567 CXXXV.
568 CXI, CVII, CCXLVI, CCLXXII, and CLXVIII.
569 CCXI and XLVII.
570 I and LV.
571 XXXVI and XLVI.
friend had told him that Orléans was loaning Prince Edward money. In addition, a former member of the Comité des recherches of Paris said that the Comité had come into possession of a letter from London in the summer with Orléans’ seal on it, but that they were not permitted to open it and examine its contents.

Two witnesses responded to the insinuating “auteurs” referred to in the denunciation by actually giving their own rationale to exonerate Orléans. Nicholas Bergasse, a National Assembly deputy, postulated that “[Orléans] n’a été que le prête-nom de beaucoup de gens qui vouloient se servir de son crédit pour assurer le succès de leurs intrigues.” A professor and doctor of medicine also testified that he heard supporters of Orléans say that they could make him regent but that he also believed that if the king took flight to Metz, it would help Orléans with his plan. In his *Etude Critique*, Mathiez skillfully uses both of these points to argue that Orléans was not directly involved in a conspiracy. Even with 395 witnesses, the *Procédure criminelle* failed to

---

572 CCCXVII.
573 CLV. It is not clear who forbade them from opening the letter, but it was probably the Commune or the National Assembly.
574 IV.
575 XXXI.
gather any substantial evidence linking Orléans to a conspiracy behind the journée. The investigation appears to implicate Orléans through the 61 testimonies, but in reality, the investigation merely succeeded in getting the witnesses to realize that Orléans was a suspected “auteur” and to mention any first or second-hand knowledge they had of him in their depositions.

The 33 depositions which mentioned Mirabeau are equally laced with suspicion but are full of ambiguity. Only six depositions refer to Mirabeau before the October Days. Two of these accounts refer to Mirabeau’s opinion on the monarchy. One National Assembly deputy testified that Mirabeau had said that he was in favor of a king, but he didn’t care if it was Louis XVI or Louis XVII. Malouet, another deputy, said that he discussed the Spanish Bourbons’ rights to the French throne with Mirabeau, and Mirabeau seemed to favor that if the French line became extinct the crown should move to Orléans and that it could happen in a blink of an eye. Given Mirabeau’s outspoken personality and knack for ominous rhetoric, it would not be out of character for Mirabeau to say either of these things. However, two other depositions which mention Mirabeau before the journée do not provide any strong links to a plot. One refers to a speech given by Desmoulins in the Café de Foy in which he urged the people to protect Mirabeau, and the other vaguely mentions a July letter from Mirabeau to Mounier which the witness believed might have contained information about a conspiracy. The remaining two witnesses testified that, at least 12 days before the journée, Mirabeau had warned three secretaries that something was going to happen at Versailles but that good citizens should

576 IV.
577 CXL.
578 CCCXVII and CXLVII. It is obvious that Mounier was not involved in a conspiracy in any way since he abhorred the consequences of the journée. Therefore, it is not logical that Mirabeau would reveal a plot of this nature to the individual who would be most opposed to it.
not be afraid. Yet, no other witnesses mention Mirabeau’s actions in connection to a plot before the October Days.

Only 14 witnesses mentioned Mirabeau’s actions on October 5. Half of these individuals merely reported Mirabeau’s actions in the National Assembly such as that he approached Mounier to report that the Parisians were coming, denounced the Body Guard banquet, convinced Mounier to suspend the assembly to go see the king, and complained about the endless disruptions the women caused in the session. One individual added that after Mirabeau said that the king should be the only person untouchable to denunciations, rumor had it that he muttered the queen and the duc de Guiche should be denounced. The other witnesses testified that Mirabeau was armed with a saber (some said near the Flanders Regiment), and one said that he had heard by rumor that Mirabeau talked to Valfond (the head of the regiment) who later gave a woman who asked him for bread some money instead. Only one individual said that he had heard from two other people that Mirabeau was among the ranks of the Flanders Regiment encouraging their defection and exciting the people. The remaining witnesses who recount the events of October 5 only mention the people’s association with Mirabeau and that some of the women in the National Assembly had said “Where is our Count Mirabeau; we want to see our Count Mirabeau.”

579 XXII and XXIV. The first witness said that his friend overheard this alleged conversation but the second witness said he directly heard the conversation.  
580 CCCLXXXXIV, XC, CXI, CLXVIII, CLXXVII, CCIV, CCXX, and CCXXIV.  
581 CLXVIII.  
582 XXXVII and CLXIV.  
583 LXXI.  
584 CXLIX.  
585 CCCXLV and CLIV (“Où est notre comte de Mirabeau; nous voulons voir notre comte de Mirabeau.”).
Only eight witnesses make any mention of Mirabeau on October 6. Four of the testimonies say that Mirabeau was among the Flanders Regiment or the people,\textsuperscript{586} but only one of these individuals said he directly witnessed these actions, and testified that Orléans was telling people “courage, my children, liberty” on the Place d’Armes.\textsuperscript{587} The other half of the witnesses correctly recounted the opinions of Mirabeau in the National Assembly that afternoon regarding the convening of the National Assembly, the deputation to be sent with the king, and the message sent to the provinces about the recent developments.\textsuperscript{588}

As for any mention of Mirabeau after the \textit{journée}, there is the witness who asserted that Mirabeau alternated correspondence with and denunciation of Orléans.\textsuperscript{589} Anne Pottevin gave a rather round about account insinuating Mirabeau’s connection in a plot. Pottevin testified that she had known Mirabeau for 19 years and that he had not yet paid her back for his wedding garments despite her reminders, but when she recently mentioned the debt he said he would be a minister and paid her back a few days after the king came to Paris.\textsuperscript{590}

Testimonies Mentioning Mirabeau

\textsuperscript{586} XVIII, CCXXVI, and CCXXX.
\textsuperscript{587} CLVII (“courage, mes enfans, la libertê”).
\textsuperscript{588} CLXXI, XCI, CLXX, and CCXI. The testimony of these witnesses is confirmed by the Procès-verbal as recorded in the \textit{Archives Parlementaires}.
\textsuperscript{589} LV.
\textsuperscript{590} LIV.
At first glance, the fact that over 20 percent of the witnesses mentioned Orléans or Mirabeau seems to imply that the Châtelet was able to gather much evidence linking them to a conspiracy. However, upon a detailed analysis, one can conclude that the majority of individuals who mentioned Orléans and Mirabeau did just that – merely mentioned them. Most of the witnesses only cited Orléans and Mirabeau in reference to any observations they had of them whatsoever. The majority of these observations which are even applicable to the conspiracy theory are not highly incriminating, and no exceptionally solid evidence arose out of these 84 testimonies. Moreover, if one takes into account the fact that the Châtelet interviewed an over-represented portion of governmental and military officials in comparison to the total number of people involved in the journée, and that if a conspiracy really was organized from above the individuals in these positions would have been the most likely to hear about it, the Procédure criminelle actually weakens the argument that the journée was a result of a grand plot. In addition, the Châtelet had the power to summon individuals whom witnesses cited as their source of information. Yet, little concrete evidence or even a great number of similarly incriminating observations against Mirabeau and Orléans surfaces in the testimonies. The Châtelet investigation miserably fails as a foundation for any argument maintaining that Orléans and Mirabeau planned and directed a conspiracy during the October Days.
Proponents of the conspiracy theory would be quick to argue that just because Orléans and Mirabeau did not direct a plot that does not mean that one did not exist since some witnesses talk about bribes which the people received. However, these testimonies are even less numerous than those implicating Mirabeau and Orléans. Only 14 depositions concern a potential or stated exchange of money during the October Days. Five of the witnesses said that they talked to people who were given money or who had been offered money during the journée. One of these witnesses specified that the troops were offered money to bring the king and the National Assembly to Paris. Two witnesses said that they witnessed people directly handing out money, and only one witness said she was offered 6 to 12 livres by a person from the Palais Royal to go to Versailles. Four other witnesses said they heard only by rumor that someone paid the Flanders Regiment and the people for their actions. Two women specifically testified that they had not received money. Louise-Marguerite-Pierette Chabry was part of the deputation to see the king and she swore to the crowd that she did not receive any money from him. The second individual was aware of the bribery rumors and she actually attempted to dismiss them by testifying that a little girl had seen a man give a woman some money in the National Assembly and so the little girl ran off shouting that the women were paid, thereby beginning the rumor.

591 Only 26 witnesses mention the exchange of money or people with money. They are: XX, LXXXVII, CCCXXX, CCCLXXXIV, CXX, CCCLXXXIII, CLXXXII, XLV, CCXXXVI, CLXXXIII, XXXV, LXXXXVIII, CX, CXLIV, LVI, LXXXII, CCXCV, CCCLXXVII, CCXXXV, CCLI, CCLXI, CCCXVII, XCIII, and CCCLXVII.
592 XX, LXXXVII, CCCXXX, CCCLXXXIV, and CXX.
593 CCCLXXXIII and CLXXXII.
594 XLV.
595 XXXV, LXXXVIII, CX, and CXLIV.
596 CLXXXIII.
597 CCXXXVI.
Similar to the tendency with Orléans and Mirabeau, some witnesses divulged knowledge of suspicious payment which actually occurred before or after the October Days, while others spoke of people who seemed to have a lot of money during the journée. Six witnesses refer to people gesturing to their pockets, showing them money, or being in possession of more money than is usual for their socio-economic station, but made no mention of why they had money.\(^{598}\) Five other witnesses spoke of money being handed out in the months and weeks before the October Days, three at the Palais-Royal,\(^ {599}\) one at Passy,\(^ {600}\) and one at an undisclosed location.\(^ {601}\) One witness even took the opportunity to say that someone had told her that the queen gave the Body Guards three louis each after the journée “to prevent the Millers from grinding, and the Bakers from cooking.”\(^ {602}\)

The deficiency of testimony describing bribery or exchange of money among the people also weakens the conspiracy argument. It appears that at least the majority of people were not paid for their actions, or there would have been more testimony to that effect. Once again we return to the conclusion that the march was spontaneous and popularly motivated. Many more witnesses actually discussed the intentions of le peuple rather than the payment of them. The testimony provided by 41 witnesses directly states the intentions of the people in some way, as opposed to merely implying their motivations. These 41 observations further support the conclusion that the journée was a popularly based movement.

\(^{598}\) LVI, LXXXII, CCXCI, CCLXXX, CLXXVIII, and CLXXIX.
\(^{599}\) CCLI, CCLXI, and CCCXVII.
\(^{600}\) XCIII.
\(^{601}\) CCCCCV.
\(^{602}\) CCCLXVIII (“pour empêcher les Moulins de moudre, & les Boulanders (sic) de cuire”).
Of these 41 witnesses, 28 cited bread alone as the driving force behind the women’s actions. These witnesses determined what the women wanted through a variety of means: some directly asked the women, some heard the women voicing their demands to others, some referred to slogans which the women shouted as a group, and others wove the demand into their narrative as the motivation for the women’s actions (i.e. the women came into the National Assembly or went to see the king to ask for bread). A lieutenant in the Flanders Regiment emphasized this one dimensional focus when he recounted the women telling him “it’s not money which you must give us, it’s bread.” Similarly, a Parisian woman said the other women in the crowd told two Body Guards who inquired about their intentions that “they came to ask for some bread, because one can hardly get any for two livres, while spending half the day at the door of the bakers.” These observations concerning subsistence as motivation span the entire timeline of October 5 from the initial shouting at Les Halles to the Hôtel de Ville, and from the march to the deputation formed to see the king. Only three of these testimonies mention any intention of using violence, and it is mentioned as a last resort only if the women could not get bread.

Eight additional witnesses testified that the women intended to procure bread through their actions, but that they had other motivations as well. Three of the witnesses also stated that one of the women’s goals was to bring the king back to Paris.

---

603 XXXVII, XLIII, XLIX, LXXXII, XC, XCIII, CV, CVI, CXI, CXIV, CXVI, CXXXVI, CLXV, CLXXXIII, CCXI, CCXX, CCCCXVII, CCXVI, CCLXIX, CCLXXII, CCLXXIV, CCCXII, CCCXX, CCCXLIII, CCCCXXXVI, CCCCCXI, CCVCI, and CCCCXXXII.
604 XXXVII (“ce n’est pas de l’argent qu’il nous faut, c’est du pain”).
605 CV (“elles voient demander du pain, parce qu’a peine pouvoit-on en avoir deux livres, en passant une demi-journée à la porte des boulanger”).
606 CCVCI, CCCCCXXII, and CCCCCXXVII.
607 CXL, CLIV, CCXI, CLV, CCLXXVII, CCCCCXXIV, XXX, and LXXXI.
608 CCXXI, CLV, and CCCCCXXXIV.
Two witnesses told the Châtelet that the women came to the National Assembly to complain about the behavior of the Body Guards, and Mounier also noted that this was one of the issues taken up by the women. Two other witnesses said that the women wanted to punish “the authors of the famine” and “to ask for justice” in addition to asking for bread. One deposition asserts that the women demanded the pure and simple acceptance of the constitution along with the bread.

Only five of the 41 witnesses who directly stated the motivations of the women did not mention bread at all. Each of the five depositions which do not mention bread as a motivation state that the women arrived with the intention of harming the Body Guards and the royal family. A Body Guard named Charles-François Bernardy made the most scathing assessment of the women’s goals. He testified that a woman told him on the evening of October 5: “It’s certainly not bread that we demand; it’s blood that you must give us, you are all rogues; your queen is a coquin, and we want her skin so that we can make district ribbons with it.”

Nonetheless, these figures attest that the primary motivation for the women’s march was to procure bread. When the 41 testimonies which directly state the women’s motivations are sifted from those others which only insinuate their intentions, 28 mention bread as the sole goal, 8 mention bread in addition to another motivation, and only 5 state that the women had purely malicious and violent intentions. This evidence, in conjunction with the lack of reliable testimony concerning bribery, confirms that the

---

609 CXL and CLIV.
610 CCCLXXXXIV.
611 XXX and LXXXI (“les auteurs de la famine”; “demander justice”).
612 CLXXVII.
613 CCXXV (“Ce n’est point du pain que nous demandons; c’est du sang qu’il nous faut; vous êtes tous des gueux; votre reine est une coquine, & nous voulons sa peau pour en faire des rubans de districts.”).
march to Versailles was a popularly driven movement principally motivated by the Parisian bread crisis.

Another historical dispute which the Châtelet investigation sheds light on is the issue of men disguised as women. Some historians dismiss this idea altogether as exaggeration, while others refer to it as part of a conspiracy which shaped the October Days. Certainly the Châtelet judges viewed this testimony in the latter light. Yet another option must be considered. Could there have been men disguised as women even if there was no conspiracy? Although this situation may seem counterintuitive, the investigation reveals some startling numbers. Of the 395 witnesses who testified before the Châtelet, 47 assert that there were men disguised as women.614 Three of these claims were made by women, none of whom actually participated in the march.615 Even with the conservatively skewed demographic of people interviewed, a claim which is made by 11.9 percent of the witnesses cannot easily be dismissed.

In order to effectively analyze these claims, one must look again at the role gender played in the events of the journée. As has already been noted, the issue which catalyzed the October Days involved general subsistence, or more specifically bread. This is why so many accounts detail the separation of women and men in the initial action at the Hôtel de Ville. The women clearly felt that this issue was within their domain and actively turned away men who sought to interfere or even help their cause. This of course did not stop men from participating in the journée. From Maillard’s account, we know that some men marched with the women to Versailles, but they

---

614 The following testimonies purport the idea of men disguised as women: I, V, VII, XI, XVII, XXXIII, XLIV, XLIX, LI, LXXI, XCVII, XCVIII, CX, CXX, CXXV, CXXXVII, CCCLVI, CCCLXXIII, and CCCLXXXVI.

615 CXXV, CLXXIX, and CCCLXV.
remained segregated from the women at the end of the column. Therefore, men could and did participate without a disguise. Moreover, those men in the National Guard were able to play a highly active role in the journée as well.

So why would men dress as women, disregarding the conspiracy argument? Primarily it could be an issue of safety. The National Guards at the Hôtel de Ville were hesitant to fight and control the crowd in part because the crowd was composed of women. If a man wished to secure the safety of his being and was wise enough to consider the implications of his gender, he would realize that he would be exposed to less brutal resistance as a woman than as a man. (There are other close examples in French history of men disguising themselves as women while confronting higher powers. In 1774, 1765, and 1783 men in the Beaujolais, Vivarais, and Franche-Comté respectively dressed as women while revolting against figures of authority. The War of the Demoiselles, which began in 1829, used this device extensively for three years.) Active men would not only come into conflict with the National Guards but would also come into conflict with the women who wanted to maintain the division of the sexes. So men who dressed as women could also be disguised from the very women they joined in order to be accepted into the group.

The next question which must be addressed is the capability of men to find a disguise during the rather spontaneous start of the journée. All accounts within the investigation which mention men disguised as women only testify their presence at the Hôtel de Ville or later events. There is absolutely no mention of men disguised as women

---

616 LXXXI.
during the initial commotion at Les Halles. The previous chapters have illustrated that although the demonstration was popular and spontaneous, the women did not leave for Versailles immediately. In fact, they were stalled for several hours at the Hôtel de Ville while waiting for Bailly, Lafayette, and the Commune deputies to appear and address their grievances. The women who did enter the Hôtel de Ville were inside for a considerable length of time before some men forced their way inside. Even by a conservative estimate, at least three hours passed between the initial disturbance at Les Halles and the entrance of the men into the Hôtel de Ville. Logistically, this would have given the men enough time to first be rejected by the women’s movement, and then find an impromptu disguise of women’s clothing.

The weight of the 47 testimonies becomes more serious when viewed in light of the contemporary cultural perception of clothing. The way one dressed during both the Old Regime and the Revolution revealed key elements about his/her social and even political identity. The average French citizen was strongly aware of these demarcations and the entirety of the *Procédure criminelle* emphasizes this consciousness. The vast majority of the testimonies within the investigation refer to the color and types of clothes different people were wearing. In this visual society, these descriptions provide strong clues about the intent of a person. Many witnesses suspected that people who were dressed outside of their social station had dubious intentions. For example, many individuals who claim to have seen Orléans during the October Days describe his “grey frock coat without any distinguishing marks” and note the “large cockade on his hat.” In other words, they make this distinction of dress to illustrate that they believe

---

618 CXIX (“redingote grise, sans aucune marque distinctive”).
619 CXXVII and CXXXII (“une grosse cocarde à son chapeau”).
Orléans was up to something devious since he was not properly clothed according to his role as an aristocrat and a National Assembly deputy. The importance of clothing as denoting a political station or intent becomes all the more obvious if one considers the entire upheaval over the Body Guards wearing the white cockade rather than the national cockade. French society did not take a person’s manner of dress lightly and it was therefore reasonable for witnesses to conclude that men who disguised themselves as women and transgressed their gendered appearance must be part of dubious plot.

In order to access the reliability of these testimonies, one must also consider the justifications which the witnesses provide to distinguish the men disguised as women from the actual women. Of the 47 witnesses who claimed to have seen men disguised as women, only 20 actually give one or more reasons for this identification. Nine of the witnesses say that they were tipped off by the “women’s” beards.620 The next leading clue was sound of voice which five individuals cited.621 Three individuals claim to have heard about the presence of men disguised as women through rumor or a secondary source.622 Two witnesses said that they became suspicious because of the unnatural way the “women” carried themselves and their clothing623 while two other witnesses said they saw men’s garments underneath the disguises of some men.624 One witness insisted on knowing the true male identities of some individuals because he recognized them as deputies and National Guards.625 Another witness referred to the amazing strength of an individual who was pulling a canon as the way in which he identified the individual as

620 The following testimonies mention men disguised as women who had beards: XCVII, CXXXVI, CLXXVIII, CLXXIX, CLXXXII, CCXXXIII, CCXXXVII, CCLXXII, and CCCLVI.
621 XXXIII, LXXXI, XCVII, CX, and CCXXXIII.
622 XI, XVII, and CXLV.
623 XXXIII and CCCXVI.
624 CCI and CCXXIII.
625 CCXXVI.
truly a man. One witness believed a “woman” to be a man since he had a National Guard sword at his side. Finally, another witness attributed his conviction to the sight of an indiscreet hairy chest which was not fully covered by the man’s dress. While some of these indicators are more subjective than others, they do show that these twenty witnesses felt inclined to offer support for their argument. Many of their assumptions that they saw men disguised as women are based on sound logic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Claim of Men Disguised as Women</th>
<th>Number of Witnesses Using Each Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beard</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound of Voice</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumor or Secondary Source</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body Carriage/Clothing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s Garments Underneath</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew True Identities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard Sword</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairy Chest</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However in such a politically charged investigation, the issue of witness bias challenges the actual validity of the testimonies. Of course each account is ultra subjective due to the very nature of the investigation. It is, after all, an attempt to reveal a devious conspiracy. Since the authors of this conspiracy remain officially unnamed in the denunciation read to the witnesses, everyone is fair game for suspicion including the witnesses themselves. This no doubt led some witnesses to testify what they thought the conservative judges would like to hear, in order to clear themselves of suspicion.

---

626 CXXXVI.
627 CCCLXV.
Evidence of men disguised as women, especially if it insinuated conspiracy would be well received by those hoping to find the “auteurs” behind the “crimes” of October 6. In an effort to sort through the layers of these biases and contemplate what effect they may have had on witnesses testifying to seeing men disguised as women, I have created a system of ranking these biases. I read the 47 accounts while paying attention to the strength of descriptive language of the witness, their attitude towards the crowd, and the extremity of their accusations in comparison with all the other witnesses in the *Procédure*. I then proceeded to rank each deposition on a scale of one to seven. A one constitutes a strongly unfavorable attitude towards the events which the witness described, two an unfavorable attitude, three a somewhat unfavorable attitude, four a neutral attitude, five a somewhat favorable attitude, six a favorable attitude, and seven a very favorable attitude. Yet this assessment also poses a problem. Witnesses clearly could not act in favor of things the government called “crimes.” Even proactive participants like Maillard end up appearing neutral (4) at best with a just-the-facts rendition void of much qualitative description. No more than perhaps a half dozen witnesses in the entire investigation could actually exceed the rank of 4.

Nevertheless, the nuances in attitude from 1-4 still give an informative picture. These rankings are distributed as follows: 14 ranked “1”, 12 ranked “2”, 14 ranked

---


629 Ranked 1: XLIV, XLIX, CX, CXXXIX, CLXX, CLXXXII, CCI, CCXXV, CCXXVI, CCCVII, CCCXVI, CCCLVI, CCCLXXIII, and CCCLXXXVI.

630 Ranked 2: I, XCVIII, CXXXVI, CXXXVIII, CLXIII, CCXXXIII, CCXXXVII, CCXL, CCLXXII, CCXCIV, CCXLVII, and CCCLVI.
“3”, 631 and 7 ranked “4.” 632 Although these rankings fall somewhat lopsidedly in the lower end of the ranking spectrum, they are not overwhelmingly “strongly unfavorable.” Moreover within the context of the range of biases people displayed in the Procédure criminelle, these biases are not strikingly polarized. The majority of the witnesses who testified seeing men disguised as women did not portray the actions of the crowd or supposed members of a conspiracy in a violently hostile manner. Therefore we can be reasonably assured that over half of the 47 witnesses did not make up a story of men disguised as women out of the malicious intent of creating fake evidence to support the conspiracy theory.

Attitude of Witnesses who testified that Men were disguised as Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank of Attitude</th>
<th>Number of Witnesses Receiving Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All biases considered it is possible to assume that around 30 individuals (or about 7.6 percent of the witnesses) probably were honestly convinced that they saw men disguised as women. These figures compounded with the strong societal emphasis on attention to clothing and the testimony of the witnesses who logically indicated their reasoning for gender indication reveal that it is plausible that some men were disguised as women during the journée. Not only is this cross-dressing plausible, but it is also logistically possible as has been illustrated by the timeline of the events on the morning of October 5. Moreover, it is important to note that men could have disguised themselves

---

631 Ranked 3: V, XI, X Vi, XXXIII, XCVII, CXX, CXXX, CXLV, CXLVIII, CLXI, CLXII, CLXXVIII, CLXXIX, and CCXLVI.
632 Ranked 4: VII, LIX, LXXXI, CXXV, CLXXXV, CCIII, and CCLXX.
as women without being part of a conspiracy because of the aforementioned other plausible motives for this action.

One could argue that some of the witnesses from Versailles were perhaps not accustomed to seeing some of the rougher *poissardes* of Les Halles and mistook their gritty appearance for men disguised as women. However, the extensive traditional rights and recent trips of *les dames des Halles* out to Versailles provided its inhabitants and the court with several occasions to come in contact with these women. Moreover, many of *les dames des Halles*, even the *poissardes*, made a substantial profit which allowed some of them to buy jewelry.⁶³³ These were not unrecognizable women dressed in rags. Their importance in the public and political sphere made them a visible and recognizable group. The multiple sightings of men disguised as women could not all be mistaken observations based on some naivety of the Versailles witnesses.

Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that there were men disguised as women during the *journée*. However, the evidence at hand suggests that this was a small minority of the men and that such a small number of men were not part of an all encompassing conspiracy. In fact, four witnesses testified point blank that they did not see any men disguised as women⁶³⁴ while the remaining 344 witnesses did not make any mention of men disguised as women at all. This myth-like issue on which many historians and contemporaries of the Revolution are divided appears to be true on a small scale. The problem in reconciling these accounts of cross-dressers is that the presence or lack of a conspiracy is often hinged on the acceptance or rejection of the presence of men disguised as women. It is imperative that in revisiting the history of the October Days,

---

⁶³⁴ LXXXIII, CCVIII, CCLXXVIII, and CCCLXXX.
one realizes that the existence of men disguised as women and the existence of a
conspiracy are not necessarily contingent upon each other.

It is essential that historians only consider the testimony of individual witnesses in
the _Procédure criminelle_ within the context of the investigation as a whole. To make
generalizations about the _journée_ based on the depositions of two or three of 395
witnesses is misleading since the testimony of each individual is highly subjective given
the loose structure of the Châtelet’s court methods. The testimony of each witness is
affected by individual biases of varying degrees, along with other collective factors such
as their occupation, place of residency, sex, and interpretation of the denunciation. The
substantial presence of information obtained by second hand knowledge adds to the
uncertainty of the evidence contained in the testimonies. Moreover, the groups of people
represented within the witness pool are not proportional to those who participated in the
_journée_. This witness pool puts the investigation’s picture of the October Days in a
disproportionately conservative light. The denunciation itself acts upon the presumption
that the _journée_ was the result of a conspiracy and searches for the authors of a plot,
rather than first questioning if a plot actually existed. However, it is possible to draw
meaningful conclusions from several testimonies if they are viewed against the
background of the investigation as a whole. By evaluating all of the pertinent testimony
without losing awareness of the others not represented, one can use the investigation to
conclude that there was a small minority of men disguised as women during the _journée._

Also, the testimony which the Châtelet gathered in hope of supporting the conspiracy

---

635 See David Andress, “Nation, People, and Mob: Political Mythology and Social Prejudice in the French
theory actually reveals instead that there is little significant evidence linking Orléans and Mirabeau to any conspiracy thereby aiding the case to exonerate them. It is only through a thorough awareness of the entire investigation and a grounding of each testimony in relation to the 394 others that some significant historical insights can be made from the often contradicting testimonies of the investigation.

The National Assembly deputies, the Commune representatives, the Châtelet judges and the general populace confronted these same issues from the end of the October Days until the National Assembly’s final judgment of the *Procédure criminelle* a year later. The issues and debates connected with the investigation and the methods of the investigation itself were to contribute gradually to the polarization of the political elite, while reinforcing a rallying cry increasingly exalted by *le peuple* – that they were the legitimate source of authority and power for *la Nation*. 
Section III: Chapter 7: Diverging positions: Popular Pressure and the Political Response to the *Procédure criminelle*

The information [in the *Procédure criminelle*] that we examined, isn’t this itself a plot? Someone said that the Châtelet was putting the Revolution on trial: This remark was perhaps a great truth.636

Charles Chabroud, in his Report on the Châtelet’s *Procédure criminelle*

On September 30 and October 1, 1790, Charles Chabroud presented the Comité des rapports’ final evaluation of the Châtelet October Days investigation to the National Assembly. In doing so, he not only renounced the investigation’s weak evidence against Mirabeau and Orléans, but he completely turned the *Procédure criminelle* on its head by insinuating that the investigation itself was driven by unpatriotic forces. How did this investigation, whose denunciation was formed by the Commune’s own Comité des recherches and whose court was entrusted with the temporary power to try crimes of lèse-nation (treason) by the National Assembly itself, become the object of such vehement denunciations only a year later?

The answer, in part, lies in the increased political pressure placed upon the Commune and National Assembly representatives by a strong segment of *le peuple* as voiced by the majority of the Parisian districts and left-leaning press.637 As popular forces continued to doubt the legitimacy of the Châtelet’s judicial powers and its loyalty to the

---

636 *Archive Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860; recueil complet des débats legislatifs & politiques des chambres françaises*, vol. XIX (Paris: Kraus Reprint, 1969), 364 (“L’information [in the *Procédure criminelle*] que nous avons examinée, n’est elle pas elle-même un complot? Quelqu’un a dit que le Châtelet faisait le procès à la Révolution : Cette remarque fût peut-être une grande vérité.”).

637 Jack Censer’s detailed analysis of the radical press illustrates the close relationship between these newspapers and the most vocal districts and reveals the very powerful extent to which the two functioned as the voice of *le peuple*. Jack Richard Censer, *Prelude to Power: The Parisian Radical Press, 1789-1791*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
Revolution, the Commune and National Assembly were forced to respond to the criticism as early as the spring of 1790.\textsuperscript{638} This popular sentiment continued to contribute to the polarization of the political elites over the issue, when in June an unrelated incident led the National Assembly to decree that any deputies accused of political crimes could only be judged by the National Assembly itself. Therefore the Châtelet was forced to surrender its information to the Comité des rapports in early August after it had finished gathering the testimonies. When the National Assembly opened la tribune for discussion of the Procédure and the accusations against Orléans and Mirabeau on October 2, the extent of the great division which the October Days and its investigation had made among the representatives became perfectly clear. The National Assembly swiftly rejected the seven-month labor of the Châtelet while supporting the innocence of two of their most popular deputies. Moreover, it seemed that le peuple once again successfully demonstrated the influential power of their popular demands, reinforcing, as several hundred women had in October 1789, the reality of their sovereignty.

As the initial decrees concerning the formation of the judicial investigation of the Châtelet moved slowly from one governmental body to another in October and November 1789, the public did not seem greatly concerned that so much responsibility for the investigation was being assigned to the Châtelet since the Commune’s own Comité des recherches had laid out its judicial orders. Even the objections of the radical Cordeliers district were minimal. Although the Cordeliers were suspicious of the Old Regime powerhouse, the October 28 issue of Journal de la Municipalité et des districts

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{638} Shapiro, Revolutionary Justice in Paris, 1789-1790, 9-10. Shapiro argues that “the People… would constitute the most significant force opposing the indulgent [judicial] inclinations of the early revolutionary authorities,” 9-10.
\end{footnotesize}
de Paris printed that “The Cordeliers district decided to ask that the judges of the Châtelet be required to take the oath to the nation before the Mayor and the Representatives of the Commune, and named some deputies to give news of their vow to the Commune.”639

In fact the Châtelet investigation was kept under wraps in the beginning stages and when the denunciation was finished on November 30, the National Assembly decreed that “it isn’t yet time to unveil it to the public.”640 In the early months of 1790, it was overshadowed by more immediate problems (judicial and non-judicial) which Paris and the National Assembly had to confront. However, an early April meeting between the Comité des recherches and the Châtelet which revealed that the Châtelet was collecting information about the march of October 5 and other periods as well, thrust the issue into the public spotlight once again.

On April 26, the Comité des recherches appeared before the representatives of the Commune to officially complain that the Châtelet “today gave place to a sort of fermentation that could become dangerous, if your Comité did not prevent this error, by recalling and stressing the limits that, in its opinion, it placed on the denunciation.”641 In fact, in late February, the Châtelet had already asked the Comité des recherches to extend its original denunciation to a plot determined to corrupt patriotic elements that had been in place since July 1789 (obviously of the Orléanist nature), but the Comité had

---

639 Sigismond Lacroix, ed., Actes de la Commune de Paris pendant la Révolution, series I, vol II (New York: AMS Press, 1974), 413 (“Le district des Cordeliers a arrêté de demander que les juges du Châtelet fussent tenus de prêter serment à la nation devant le Maire et les Représentants de la Commune, et a nommé des députés pour faire part de son vœu à la Commune.”).
640 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, III: 81 (“Il n’est pas encore temps de les dévoiler au public”).
641 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 134 (“donne aujourd’hui lieu à une espèce de fermentation qui pourrait devenir dangereuse, si votre Comité ne prévenait cette erreur, en rappelant et marquant les bornes que, dans son avis, il a posées à la dénonciation”).
refused.\textsuperscript{642} The Comité complained to the Commune that its original denunciation only concerned the violence and activities of the morning of October 6, and that without this public clarification “one could cast suspicion on its [the Comité’s] patriotism.”\textsuperscript{643} Thus, the Comité des recherches had taken a huge step to distance itself from the Châtelet in the hopes of sparing its own public reputation when it asked the Commune to publish its declaration.\textsuperscript{644}

As a response to the Comité des recherches’ declaration, the Assemblée des représentants once again sent a message to the National Assembly urging them to quicken their reform of the judicial system.\textsuperscript{645} The popular reaction to the Comité’s appearance was more violent, however. Public opinion exploded and radical newspapers and district representatives proclaimed that the Châtelet’s actions and even the entire court itself was counter-revolutionary.\textsuperscript{646} One citizen articulated this general suspicion in the April 20 Cordeliers’ meeting when he asserted that in surpassing the boundaries of the denunciation, the Châtelet “devotes itself to being the instrument of vengeance or aristocratic and ministerial maneuvers.”\textsuperscript{647} As a result, the Cordeliers released a decree that if a new judicial system was not yet ready, the Châtelet should be replaced by another provisional court whose members were chosen from the different Paris sections.\textsuperscript{648} The Cordeliers district also protested the secrecy of the Châtelet investigation

\textsuperscript{642} Shapiro, Revolutionary Justice in Paris, 1789-1790, 194-196.

\textsuperscript{643} Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 134-135 (“on pourrait jeter des doutes sur son [the Comité’s] patriotisme”).

\textsuperscript{644} Shapiro, Revolutionary Justice in Paris, 1789-1790, 189. Shapiro also argues that this budding separation between the Comité des recherches and the Châtelet, which lasted into the fall, led to the internal collapse of the entire Fayettist regime. Shapiro, Revolutionary Justice in Paris, 1789-1790, 16.

\textsuperscript{645} Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 135.

\textsuperscript{646} Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 140. Lacroix’s footnotes and endnotes are especially helpful in tracing the mobilization of public opinion which the districts and newspapers undertook.

\textsuperscript{647} Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 140 (“se dévoue à être l’instrument des vengeance ou des manoeuvres aristocratiques et ministérielles”).

\textsuperscript{648} Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 141.
as opposed to holding public proceedings. Finally, it called upon the other 59 districts to address the subject as well.

Similar opinions were voiced in many Parisian publications such as the April 19 issue of the *Moniteur* which exclaimed, “the Châtelet must appear to our enemies as an infallible way to destroy all which has been accomplished and to reestablish the ancient despotism upon the ruins of the nascent liberty.” Many of the districts directly published their own decrees rather than waiting for the newspapers to report them. The Oratoire district proclaimed that “the said Châtelet would be denounced, as the enemy of the actual regeneration, to the National Assembly.” The Petit Saint-Antoine district demanded that the National Assembly turn the case and information which the Châtelet had collected so far over to one of their other comités. Not surprisingly, the Jacobins Saint-Honoré district proclaimed that “the Châtelet lost the public’s confidence, without which it can not inspire the necessary respect towards its judgments.” The Carmélites district contrasted the Châtelet with the “good citizens” and asked the National Assembly to forbid the Châtelet any knowledge of *lèse-nation* crimes and to form another High Court. The Saint-Eustache district also asked for a new tribunal to be established. Additionally, the Petits Augustins and the Saint-Etienne du Mont districts publicly threw their support behind the Cordeliers’ demands.

---

651 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, V: 145 (“le Châtelet doit paraître à nos ennemis un moyen infaillible de détruire tout ce qui a été fait, et de rétablir l’ancien despotisme sur les ruines de la liberté naissante”).
654 Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, V: 149 (“le Châtelet a perdu la confiance publique, sans laquelle il ne peut inspirer le respect dû à ses jugements”).
After a fevered and prolific exchange of decrees, 42 of the 60 districts announced their support of the Cordeliers’ initial propositions and the representatives of this district presented their grievances to the National Assembly on May 14.\footnote{Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, V: 156.} The Châtelet responded to this attack by going on the offensive itself. Its own deputation appeared in the National Assembly the next day to claim that the Comité des recherches was withholding important evidence from them which was relevant to the investigation. What they truly meant was that they wanted the Comité des recherches to turn over the unopened letters addressed to Orléans from England which had come up in one of the witness depositions.\footnote{Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, V: 157.} For obvious reasons, this request was not enthusiastically acted upon and the Comité des recherches did not feel themselves inclined to respond until the Châtelet’s \textit{procureur du roi} (royal prosecutor) directly contacted them in mid June.\footnote{Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, V: 157.}

After months of coyly avoiding the issue, a deputation from the Comité des recherches appeared before the National Assembly in early August and said that they had given the Châtelet all the information they had relative to the denunciation which concerned October 6. Technically, since the Comité des recherches had not opened the English letters, they were not “aware” of any evidence in their possession directly relating to October 6. Moreover, the Comité des rapports raised the stakes and claimed that “the prosecutor of the Commune elicited one instruction and the Châtelet followed another,” especially since April.\footnote{Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, V: 160 ("le procureur de la Commune a provoqué une instruction et que le Châtelet en poursuive une autre").} Months of increasing popular pressure had led to the polarization of the Comité des recherches and the Châtelet; the political gloves had come off.

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{658} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, V: 156.
\textsuperscript{659} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, V: 157.
\textsuperscript{660} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, V: 157.
\textsuperscript{661} Lacroix, \textit{Actes de la Commune}, V: 160 ("le procureur de la Commune a provoqué une instruction et que le Châtelet en poursuive une autre").
Due to the impending prosecution of another member of the National Assembly, the deputies had decreed on June 26 that only the representatives themselves could pass final criminal judgment on one of their own. Therefore, by mid August the Châtelet was forced to turn over all of its information to the National Assembly who in turn gave the evidence to its Comité des rapports to examine and report back to the National Assembly. On August 31, the Comité des rapports asked the National Assembly to publish the *Procédure criminelle* “to enlighten and focus the discussions” among the deputies.\(^662\) However, it is more likely that they published the *Procédure* weeks before their report to the National Assembly in order to rally popular opinion against the investigation and weaken the position of its defenders on the right. However, the public had already trained its eye upon the affair – among the 6 most prominent radical newspapers, nine articles had appeared about the case during the week of August 10-16 alone.\(^663\) One pamphlet cried out:

> French citizens, do you grin and bear in silence the winding path of the Châtelet, its actions over the past 10 months, does its actions not sufficiently lift the veil from your eyes which covers the counterrevolution?\(^664\)

The left had adequately armed itself for the final chapter of the October Days saga.

The Comité des rapports announced that its review of the *Procédure criminelle* was complete on September 22. However, in a gesture to the magnitude and potential volatility of the situation, Chabroud requested to present their report in the morning

---

\(^{662}\) Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune*, V: 158, 162 (“pour éclairer et abréger les discussions”).


\(^{664}\) “Le Châtelet dévoilé ou Réponse à la procédure… sur l’affaire du 5 et 6 octobre 1789.” Labatte, 1789. Microform #S88/5181. n°FRBNF36302858. Bibliothèque Nationale Française (Français sousirez-vous en silence la marche du Châtelet contours, ses actions depuis dix mois ne lèvent-ils pas suffisamment à vos yeux le voile qui couvre la contre-révolution?).
session to allow for time for an evening discussion as well. At this point he estimated that it would take him two and a half hours to detail the Comité des rapports’ findings before the deputies could even begin to discuss the matter and draw conclusions. Therefore, the National Assembly waited to finish its most pressing issues before making Chabroud’s report l’ordre du jour for the morning and evening sessions on September 30 and October 1.

In his opening remarks, Chabroud briefly recounted the events of the afternoon of October 5 and October 6 before quickly alluding to the several suspicions, prejudices, and potential libel which formed the atmosphere in which the Châtelet heard testimony concerning journée. Then he revisited the Châtelet’s recommendation to the Comité des rapports which stated:

Considering that MM. Louis-Philippe-Joseph d’Orléans and de Mirabeau the elder deputies at the National Assembly appear to be involved the case being discussed, [we] say that the consignment of the present information… will be brought to the National Assembly conforming with the decree of last June 26 which was sanctioned by the king.

However, instead of immediately accepting this suggestion, Chabroud emphasized that it was first necessary for the National Assembly to reconsider the causes of the journée. Therefore, he outlined his intentions on behalf of the Comité des rapports:

1° To examine the near and distanced causes of the insurrection of the people, and of their excesses which followed.
2° To research if M. de Mirabeau and M. d’Orléans had any part in the causes and effects;
3° To summarize the evidence, pose the assumptions, and finally conclude.

---

665 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 139.
666 Archive Parlementaires, XIX : 338
Chabroud first challenged the theory that there was even a plot to begin with by citing several testimonies which only speak of a plot based on “vague and contradictory” rumors, including those that stated the king should be moved to Paris or that Orléans wanted to become regent. After these ambiguous bruits, he moved on to things which might be considered closer to “fact,” that is to say, direct observations or statements which witnesses directly heard which might indicate the presence of a plot. He continued to pick apart these individual testimonies by comparing them to contradictory accounts given by the same witnesses to other comités. He also revealed that some of the observations may have been in reference to a different plot, rather than the one which may have triggered the October Days. For example, Chabroud insists that Mirabeau and others’ various ominous remarks about something happening soon at Versailles or the king’s possible departure most likely refer to the September 1789 fear that the king would be taken to Metz by an aristocratic plot. Chabroud then briefly addressed the accounts concerning the manufacture of Orléans’ lead signs and his letters from England which were never opened but did not venture beyond this summary since he only wanted to see if it was possible that a plot existed. After addressing some of the testimony which recounts insidious conversations with drunken individuals (including that of the suicidal chasseur at the banquet), he recounted the testimony of Diot and Baras who both had testified that on the night of October 5, they heard men talking about the possibility of receiving 50 louis each, payable through an Orléanist agent, in exchange for killing the

---

668 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: rumors covered from p 339 to 341 (“vagues et contradictories”).
669 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 341 (“fait”).
670 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 342.
671 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 343.
672 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 344-345.
Body Guards and the queen. In a skillful sidestep, Chabroud asked why these men had not made a greater effort to warn the château about these plans in advance and even went as far as saying “I must attribute to their guilty heedlessness all the crimes which were planned before them.”673 Using information from several of the testimonies, Chabroud concluded that although he wished there were more specific details, he hesitantly believed that some of the participants, including soldiers had been paid before and during the journée, although he added that “a formal conclusion would be… hazardous.”674

Next, Chabroud addressed what he called the “natural causes of the insurrection of Paris.”675 He discerned that these established themes and ideas played an important role in forming an environment which was inherently conducive to the king’s return to Paris. For example, he touched upon the famine which threatened the city and the common belief that the food shortages would be solved if the king moved to Paris.676 Chabroud also reminded the deputies that the general populace was greatly concerned that there were counter-revolutionary forces in the royal court which had the potential to ultimately deprive le peuple of their king by moving him farther away from the capital.677 He revisited the fears of civil war which the arrival of the Flanders regiment sparked anew678 as well as the banquets during which it was believed that the national cockade was insulted and Chabroud claims that the toast to la nation was intentionally omitted.679 Since relocating the king to Paris was seen as the cure-all for these “natural causes,”

673 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 346 (“je dois imputer à leur coupable insouciance tous les crimes qui étaient médités devant eux”).
674 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 348. Here is another example of the traditional inclination of the political elite to believe that le peuple never acted entirely of their own accord. (“une conclusion formelle serait… hasardeuse”).
675 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 348 (“causes naturelles de l’insurrection de Paris”).
676 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 348, 349.
677 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 348, 349.
678 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 349.
679 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 350.
Chabroud concluded that the crowd’s October 6 demand “was not due to the chance of
the moment.”

After outlining rumors of plots and bribery and comparing and contrasting their
effect with the “natural causes,” Chabroud analyzed the major events which unfolded at
Versailles during the evening of October 5 and the morning of October 6. He compared
the testimonies which spoke of the shooting of Savonières on the Places d’Armes and
concluded that Charpentier was the one who fired the shot without sufficient
provocation. Chabroud also concluded that the Versailles National Guard was initially
fired upon by the Body Guards who were leaving the Place d’Armes but does not
mention the jeering which caused the end of the Body Guard column to react in this
manner. Chabroud noted that this last scuffle was followed by the orderly arrival of the
Parisian National Guard and a calm which endured the entire night, and he suggested that
this period of peace actually argues against the presence of a plot. As for the events of
the next morning, Chabroud insisted that the Body Guards must have first shot a citizen
in the court to inspire such a sudden rush of violence which was born out of the urge for
revenge. Moreover he argued that outside the queen’s apartments “an excessive rage
dissipated all of a sudden, when the Body Guards being retired and removed, the band
which was following them could no longer reach the object of its anger.” As for
establishing if there was a plot or not, Chabroud said that the Comité had presented the
evidence so that the National Assembly deputies could decide for themselves. However,

---

680 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 351 (“ne fut pas due au hazard du moment”).
681 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 352.
682 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 353.
683 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 352-353.
684 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 353.
685 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 353 (“une rage excessive se dissipe tout à coup, lorsque les gardes du roi
étant retirés et retranchés, la troupe que les poursuivait, ne peut plus atteindre l’objet de sa colère”).
he did add: “I do not want to conclude from this that there was no plot, but I say that the event does not present me with any vestiges of it, and even I believe to have deduced at least some reasons to doubt in it.”

Chabroud then turned to the Comité des rapports’ second task, to see if Mirabeau and Orléans were the “causes” of the “crimes.” He started by presenting the evidence against Mirabeau. This was comprised of witness testimony which placed him in the courtyards with a naked saber on October 6, recounted some ominous statements, noted that he warned Mounier in the National Assembly that the Parisians were coming, and observed that Mirabeau had tried to convince Orléans not to leave France in the days following the journée. However, Chabroud revealed that the description of the man suspiciously walking among the troops was not close to Mirabeau’s height; that Mirabeau had received news of the uprising from others and was just passing this information onto Mounier out of courtesy; and that Mirabeau had told Orléans not to go to England because his flight would seem like proof against them when there was no suspicious evidence to begin with.

Once again, Chabroud stopped short of passing a final judgment while noting that most of the incriminating evidence against Mirabeau was hearsay and that the accusations against him were “seemed very light at first glance.”

On the other hand, there was more incriminating evidence against Orléans in the Procédure criminelle. Chabroud confronted the testimonies which discuss the exchange of money at the Palais Royal by stating: “If the great sums were distributed, I do not see

---

686 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 354. (“je ne veux pas conclure de là qu’il n’y a point eu de complot, mais je dis que l’événement ne m’en présente aucun vestige, et même je crois avoir déduit au moins quelques raisons d’en douter.”).
687 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 354-356 (“Je ne veux pas conclure de là qu’il n’y a point eu de complot, mais je dis que l’événement ne m’en présente aucun vestige, et même je crois avoir déduit au moins quelques raisons d’en douter.”).
688 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 356 (“très légères à mon sens et au premier coup d’œil”).
that they had been distributed by him [Orléans], and the information at hand, I must think perhaps that these doings had nothing to do with him." 689 Then Chabroud tried to follow the specific actions of Orléans on the morning of October 6. By gathering more information from witnesses and documents outside of the Procédure criminelle, Chabroud asserted that Orléans could not have been present at Versailles at the start of the violence. 690 Like the Châtelet testimonies which give Orléans' whereabouts on October 5, those concerning October 6 also say that Orléans was in different places at the same time. 691 Moreover, those who accuse him of being among the people during the violence all gave different descriptions of his dress and conflict with one another.

Chabroud even went as far as to discredit one of the main witnesses who claimed to have seen Orléans in the queen’s stairway during the attack. The witness was a National Guard, so Chabroud astutely observed that he could not have been inside the château at the start of the violence because the National Guards were only in charge of the outposts and later moved into the courtyards in response to the chaos. 692 In response to the numerous testimonies which said that portions of the crowd shouted “Vive le duc d’Orléans” (or something to that effect), Chabroud brushed them aside claiming that they were nothing but “some acclamations, testimonies of love, flattering homage of the people whose very openness precludes any suspicion.” 693 Nevertheless, in his final summary of the charges which the witnesses brought against Orléans, Chabroud seemed a bit more suspicious of his actions than those of Mirabeau by ordering the deputies “to

689 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 356 (“Si de grandes sommes ont été distribuées, je ne vois pas qu’elles aient été répandues par lui [Orléans], et l’information à la main, je doive penser peut-être que ces faits lui sont étrangers.”).
690 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 357.
691 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 357.
692 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 360.
693 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 359 (“des acclamations, témoignages d’amour, hommage flatteur du peuple à qui sa publicité ne permet pas d’être suspect.”).
search in a general review the motives of the conclusion at which you must finally draw
the line,” thereby implying that there were motives to explore.694

Finally, Chabroud arrived at the Comité des rapports’ third aim – a conclusion
concerning the accusations against Mirabeau and Orléans and a suggestion as to how to
proceed. He once again considered the basis of the suspicions of a plot, reiterating that
the evidence was mostly based on hearsay and rumors, and also reiterated that he could
not separate the contemporary grievances of the people (such as the lack of bread) from
the journée.695 However, instead of then concentrating on his final assessment of the role
of Orléans and Mirabeau, he diverted the deputies’ attention to what the Châtelet’s
conclusions were. He summarized their sentiments by asserting that “the judges of the
Châtelet do not have any doubt; it’s in virtue of your decree of June 26 that they had
resorted to you; and if M. de Mirabeau and M. d’Orléans had not been members of the
National Assembly, already the accusation would exist.”696 Yet contrary to his prior
feigned indecisiveness, Chabroud started to significantly distance himself from the
Châtelet’s position. He began to outline their “errors” by arguing that the Châtelet
assumed that accusation and judgment (in this case of Orléans and Mirabeau) were one
and the same. Then he forcefully separated the integrity National Assembly’s processes
from what he viewed as the inferior work of the Châtelet:

The jurisprudence of our [the National Assembly’s provisional] tribunals, which
makes accusation easy but conviction difficult, saves all its spines for the
judgment. Here [in the National Assembly] one asks for proof, there [at the
Châtelet] one knows other ways and other rules, where soon one knows nothing;
the law is silent; thick books had been written in which the arbitrary has been

694 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 361 (“chercher dans un résumé général les motifs de la conclusion à
laquelle vous devez enfin vous arrêter”).
695 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 362.
696 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 363 (“les juges du Châtelet n’ont pas doute; c’est en vertu de votre décret
du 26 juin qu’ils ont eu recours à vous; et si M. de Mirabeau et M. d’Orléans n’eussent pas été membres
de l’Assemblée national, déjà l’accusation existerait”).
raised to a type of art. The judges were abandoned to themselves, to the caprices of their suspicions, and the decrees were like a spontaneous production in the vast latitude of clues.697

Chabroud argued that the Châtelet only sought out witnesses who would aid its malicious “mission” of accusing Orléans and Mirabeau, rather than searching for the truth.698 He accurately accused the Châtelet of interviewing some individuals for the sole purpose of seeking information outside of the investigation, such as the activities of July. Moreover, Chabroud revealed that the Comité des recherches had provided the Châtelet with a list of witnesses, including Estaing and Le Cointre, important officers of the Versailles National Guard.699 However, the Châtelet neglected to interview these witnesses who obviously would have key testimony and instead sought out other witnesses for information even unrelated to October 6.700

After hours of speaking and pages of evidence, Chabroud turned the tables. Orléans and Mirabeau were no longer under attack, but the Châtelet and consequentially its right wing supporters came under direct assault. In a bold move, Chabroud decreed that the constitution had always been opposed by a “faction always vanquished, but

697 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 363 (“errements”; “La jurisprudence de nos [National Assembly’s] tribunaux, facile pour l’accusation, réservait toutes ses épines pour le jugement. Ici [in the National Assembly] on demandait les preuves, là [at the Châtelet] on connaissait d’autres moyens et d’autres règles, ou plutôt on ne connaissait rien ; la loi se taisait ; de gros livres avaient été faits, où l’arbitraire était érigé en une espèce d’art. Les juges étaient abandonnés à eux-mêmes, aux caprices de leurs soupçons, et les décrets étaient comme une production spontanée dans la vaste latitude des indices.”).
698 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 363.
699 After Chabroud’s report, the National Assembly ordered that his “Pieces Justificatives du Rapport de la Procédure du Châtelet sur les affaires des 5 et 6 octobre” be published. This collection contained 18 documents which were procured outside of the Châtelet’s information and used by the Comité des Rapports in forming their decision. There are letters, declarations, and government documents which were written before and after the October Days. For example, it included Le Cointre’s lengthy declaration made on December 11, 1789 concerning the events of the journée. Jean-Baptiste Charles Chabroud, “Pieces Justificatives du Rapport de la Procédure du Châtelet sur les affaires des 5 et 6 octobre,” (Paris: Chez Baudouin, October 8 1790), from “The Maclure Collection of French Revolutionary Materials.”
700 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 363.
always in rebellion” which now opposed it in secret. 701 “There is the malady,” Chabroud exclaimed, “and this grand [criminal] procedure which attracts all the regards, is only perhaps a passing fever that it produced, and that it is going to explain to us.”702 Later he continued, “The information [the Procédure criminelle] that we have examined, isn’t it itself a plot?”703

With one last violent tirade, Chabroud shifted the blame entirely from “these pure days where the good citizens only have one soul” to a “conspiracy… A league has formed on the debris of the ancient regime, in order to attempt the overthrow of the new regime.”704 At the conclusion of the October Days saga, one “plot” had been replaced by another. The Procédure whose initial intent was to find the “auteurs” of the journée became viewed as a political plot and vehicle of the right to thwart “the friends of liberty.”705 Before leaving the podium, Chabroud announced the Comité des rapports’ final proposed decree – that there was no place for any accusation against Orléans and Mirabeau.706

After Chabroud stepped down from the tribune, only one deputy had a chance to speak and the general discussion of the Comité des rapport’s suggestions was postponed until the next session convened on October 2. Bonnay was first to speak and he tried to insist that the only evidence that was legal to use in the decision-making process was the

701 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 364 (“faction toujours vaincue, mais toujours révoltée”).
703 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 364 (“L’information que nous avons examinée, n’est elle pas elle-même un complot ?”).
704 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 367. See the appendix for his full final accusation against this “ligue” and his absolution of Orléans and Mirabeau. (“ces jours purs où les bon citoyens n’avaient qu’une âme” to a “conspiration… Une ligue s’est formée sur les débris de l’ancien régime, pour tenter le renversement du régime nouveau.”).
705 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 366 (“des amis de la liberté”).
706 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 367.
original information collected by the Châtelet. The right applauded his speech.\(^{707}\)

However, the right was already on the defensive and carefully qualified its statements which supported the Châtelet so as not to appear unpatriotic. This was a weak resistance to the left who already had the ball in their court with Chabroud’s report. Members of the left continued to side with the people. Mirabeau spoke of “the fears that it [the \textit{Procédure}] gave to the friends of liberty and the hope that it lavished upon its enemies”\(^{708}\) and Chabroud even read a letter written the day before by a Parisian National Guard who asked why the Châtelet took so many depositions of people who were not even at Versailles during the \textit{journée}.\(^{709}\) Mirabeau invoked the image of “the most false appearances” that “the enemies of public good want to find in popular movements,” thereby giving \textit{le peuple} a stake of their own in the investigation.\(^{710}\)

The right, led by Maury, attempted to at least salvage an accusation against Orléans since they were quickly losing ground in the case against Mirabeau. Maury maintained that there was a plot against the queen and that he was prepared to revisit the Châtelet’s evidence to that effect if necessary.\(^{711}\) Montlosier rose to approach the tribune amidst murmurs and complained that the deputies were rushing into a decision and that Chabroud’s report should first be distributed for review.\(^{712}\) Yet, the unabashed rhetoric of the left overshadowed their conservative colleagues. Barnave asked for “the most

\(^{707}\) \textit{Archive Parlementaires}, XIX: 393.
\(^{708}\) \textit{Archive Parlementaires}, XIX: 400 (“les craintes qu’elle [la \textit{procédure}] a données aux amis du liberté, et les espérances qu’elle a prodiguées à ses ennemis”).
\(^{709}\) \textit{Archive Parlementaires}, XIX: 397.
\(^{710}\) \textit{Archive Parlementaires}, XIX: 400 (“les apparences plus fausses” that “les ennemis du bien public voulaient trouver dans les mouvements populaires”).
\(^{711}\) \textit{Archive Parlementaires}, XIX: 399.
\(^{712}\) \textit{Archive Parlementaires}, XIX: 404.
profound scorn for this [criminal] procedure, [and] for those who directed it.” The most scathing attack directly against the right came once again from Mirabeau who surpassed Barnave’s insinuations in exclaiming, “Yes, the secret of this infernal procedure is finally exposed: it is there in its entirety (M. de Mirabeau designated the right side).”

Within a year, the nearly accused had become the denunciator and the room filled with applause and then another encore of clapping from the left and spectators. Maury acknowledged the defeat of the right at this point and informed the National Assembly that “we,” as in the right, “cannot participate in the deliberation.” After some members of the right completely retired from the room, the Assembly closed the discussion and decreed that neither Orléans nor Mirabeau were to be accused of a crime based on the information which the Châtelet collected. The atmosphere in the National Assembly had entirely changed since the year before; the October Days increased the divide between the political elites. Moreover, the left was looking increasingly towards popular justification for their actions, and this effort to maintain power through appeasement led to the polarization of the National Assembly. Thus, in the grand scheme of the early Revolution, the political reaction to the October Days investigation strongly reinforces

---

713 *Archive Parlementaires*, XIX: 404 (“le plus profond mépris pour cette procédure [criminelle], [et] pour ceux qui l’ont instruit”).
714 *Archive Parlementaires*, XIX: 403 (“Oui, le secret de cette infernale procédure est enfin découvert : il est là tout entier (M. de Mirabeau désigne le côté droit).”).
715 *Archive Parlementaires*, XIX: 404 (“nous,” as in the right, “ne pouvons participer à la deliberation”).
716 *Archive Parlementaires*, XIX: 404.
717 This is argument which Shapiro advances as the main reason for the 1789 to 1791 breakdown between the left leaning and right leaning components of the Fayettist judicial machine. Also Timothy Tackett offers an excellent analysis of the polarization of the National Assembly and the factions which were created in *Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790)*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
Tackett’s argument that:

the ideological choices that emerged most dominant in the course of the Revolution developed, above all, as a function of specific political contingencies and social interactions within the Assembly and between the Assembly and the population as a whole.\textsuperscript{718}

\textsuperscript{718} Tackett, \textit{Becoming a Revolutionary}, 76.
Conclusion

Only a year passed between the “crimes” of October 6, 1789, and the October 2, 1790, dismissal not only of the criminal investigation, but of the Châtelet itself. The viewpoint of a significant number of deputies had changed in regard to the origins of the journée, due in part to the vocal objections of le peuple. However, the deputies of the left seem to have primarily renounced one hypothesis as a way to divert blame to a rival faction, and were more concerned with the journée’s political ramifications than judicial integrity.

In reframing this reappearing issue of the origins of the October Days, I have argued that the journée can be thought of as both spontaneous and premeditated. It was a continuation of themes and assumptions from the early Revolution and even before; it was born not only out of recent events but out of gradually developing tensions. At the same time, this type of premeditation does not necessarily imply that there was an overarching political conspiracy. On the contrary, this analysis has shown that the journée was popularly fueled and was, for the most part, spontaneous, beginning with the chaos at Les Halles.

The Châtelet investigation, even in attempting to prove there was a conspiracy, does not reveal any substantial evidence that there actually was a master plot behind the journée. Equally as important, I have argued that the Châtelet witness pool is not a well-rounded representation of those who observed the events of and participated in the October Days. Therefore, it is critical that the evidence collected in these individual depositions be viewed within the context of the investigation as a whole. Only then can it
be effectively and accurately used to answer questions about the spontaneous or premeditated nature of the journée.

Additionally, the growing gap between the left and right’s positions on the journée became a large chasm by the time Chabroud reported to the National Assembly. Ultimately, the right supported the Châtelet while the left sided with popular opinion. It is evident that the left used the final verdict on the case as a political tool. Instead of discussing the investigation, the left only allowed cursory comments after the Comité des rapports gave its conclusion. Wasting no time, the left dismissed the investigation while accusing the Châtelet of its own counter-revolutionary conspiracy, therefore indirectly implicating some of its right wing supporters.

The pervasiveness of this question of the spontaneous or conspiratorial origins of the October Days and other journées corresponds closely with the development of the identity of le peuple. Although the Declaration of the Rights of Man endowed the Nation, composed of le peuple, with absolute sovereignty, government representatives were not always adept at listening to the voice of the citizens. As le peuple voiced their grievances through demonstrations such as the October Days, the authenticity of their demands were sometimes brushed aside by representatives who did not believe that le peuple were capable of carrying out such movements on their own. Instead, officials assumed that popularly propelled movements such as the October Days could only be a result of a political plot. Between October 1789 and October 1790, le peuple clearly continued the struggle to reinforce the sovereignty with which it had been endowed. The reactions to the journée and the ensuing investigation revealed the increasing conviction of le peuple that the government should be responsive to their demands. In this case, the districts,
along with many popular newspapers, became more active and vocal in April 1790, ultimately forcing the National Assembly to divide over the issue of the Châtelet investigation by October 1790.

As the left increasingly justified their positions as being beneficial to *le peuple* or *les bons citoyens*, they set up a precedent which every dominant party would thereafter claim as their own in order to maintain power. The October Days were merely one step in this process; nonetheless, the women who initiated the march, along with the militia and others who encouraged it, revealed that *le peuple* would not wait long for their grievances to be addressed. *Le peuple* was an active revolutionary force of its own accord, and not one which the political elites could ignore.

Additionally, the leading role which women played during the October Days was highly praised by the general populace and helped to set the tone for their future revolutionary endeavors. These hundreds of “Mariannes” proved that they were active and valuable *citoyennes*, who, in seeking to provide for their family and *la nation*, were also good patriotic mothers. By 1791, some women organized on a higher political scale through their own revolutionary clubs, yet these were unfortunately outlawed by late 1793. However, a discussion of the degree to which women achieved a political voice throughout the Revolution extends beyond the confines of this thesis.

On a judicial level, the October Days investigation crippled the Châtelet and finally forced the National Assembly to quicken its reform of the judicial and criminal system which the Commune had been demanding since the summer of 1789. Shortly after

---

719 For a discussion of how these women continued to draw strength from their traditional roles to expand into organized public politics, and the reaction of their male counterparts see Suzanne Desan, “Constitutional Amazons: Jacobin Women's Clubs in the French Revolution,” in *Re-Creating Authority in Revolutionary France*, eds. B. T. Ragan Jr. and E. A. Williams (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 11-35.
the dismissal of the *Procédure criminelle*, the National Assembly held elections for six new tribunals to take over judicial responsibilities. In the early months of 1791 this new set of tribunals and procedures was implemented to replace the defunct Châtelet and other provisional courts.\(^{720}\)

One of the difficulties in analyzing the origins of the October Days and the subsequential reaction is the sheer number of factors which must be taken into consideration. Since the *journée* was a reaction to both short term and long term stresses applied in a constantly evolving environment, it is difficult to determine the exact degree to which each factor influenced the *journée*. Also the great number of people, governmental bodies, and troops involved in the October Days all had different perspectives which frequently merged and diverged over the course of 24 hours. This wide range of considerations obviously exposes the limitation of any analysis which attempts to define and categorize these variables. So many factors appear to be synthesized within the *journée* that it is doubtful if even the participants were completely aware of the divisions within their motivations. Furthermore, the October Days and the ensuing reaction all unfolded over a revolutionary and consequently unstable background. Not only were the opinions of different groups shifting, but they were evolving in an environment of constant change, without the trusty historical markers provided by a more permanent government and society. The structure of the Commune, national government, and legal system underwent constant revision and changes frequently occurred on a day to day basis.

However historically challenging this plethora of considerations may be, it is what makes the Revolution such a fascinating topic to study. The attempted journey to

synthesize the popular and the political, the social and the economic, the ideological and
the practical, and the traditional and the contemporary into a workable mold was just as
difficult for the revolutionaries to navigate as it is for historians to trace their path. The
duality of the spontaneous and premeditated nature of the October Days and the ensuing
political and judicial response remains bound in these paradoxes, although it has been the
intent of this thesis that they emerge somewhat more defined.
Appendix:
Differing Perspectives on the October Days: A Summary of Secondary Source Arguments

Henri Leclercq’s account of the October Days is the most conservative among the works I consulted. His heavy reliance on conservative sources such as the Châtelet investigation and a collection of letters from aristocrats, many of whom became émigrés, may help explain his conservative analysis of the events. Leclercq strongly believes in the participation of Orléanist agents in the October Days. He also suggests that Mirabeau was his fellow party member, which Leclercq implies fits in with Mirabeau’s ambitions to become a minister. In an attempt to support a long term Orléanist agitation plot, Leclercq asserts that “money was literally thrown from the windows of the Palais-Royal” on a regular basis.721 He places Orléans at the chateau in the morning hours of October 6 and recounts a scene in the National Assembly where “the Viscount of Mirabeau caresses the throats of the prettiest [marchers].”722 Although Leclercq does not believe that Lafayette was part of a plot and absolves him from responsibility for bringing the Parisian National Guard to Versailles, he remarks that Lafayette should have personally stayed closer to the king during the night.

It is obvious that Leclercq does not sympathize with the crowd although he does make the distinction between women marchers and brigands. He describes the crowd in the court yard on the morning of October 6 as “a crowd of women nearly naked, some men armed with pikes menacing the windows with their awful cries.”723 Nonetheless, his

---

722 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 73 (“le vicomte de Mirabeau caresse la gorge des plus jolies [marchers]”).
723 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 130 (“une foule de femmes presque nues, des hommes armés de piques menaçaient les fenêtres avec des cris affreux”).

171
detailed account of troop and crowd movement is especially helpful in explaining the infiltration of the château. Ultimately, he gives credit to Lafayette for controlling the crowd and easing tensions between the Body Guard and the National Guard troops. As for the scene at the Hôtel de Ville later that day, Leclercq writes that “This sinister Tuesday was one of these dazzling days of autumn which embellish the Ile de France.”724

Marc de Villiers tries to examine the “legends” of the October Days through a detailed chronological account of the events of the journée which he maintains were greatly influenced by a leftist plot. De Villiers believes that about 100 women and men within the crowd were paid agents of the duc d’Orléans and an ambiguous patriot party. De Villiers believes that this idea of premeditation explains how some men were disguised as women since men would only have a chance to disguise themselves quickly if they were waiting for such an opportunity. As for the rest of the original 500 citizen marchers, de Villiers asserts that they were really marching with the intent of getting bread and if the king came back to Paris, it would be a fringe benefit for them. Although some aspects of the movement were left uncertain because of the degree of popular participation, de Villiers argues that agents were always present at key turning points during the October Days, and urged the crowd in their preferred direction. He maintains that the patriots really organized most of the secret agitators but that they used the money and rallying name of Orléans. De Villiers describes the patriots as people who eventually wanted to get rid of the French monarchy entirely, but who would be willing to take the first step towards popular rule through a provisional and temporary Orléans throne. De

724 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 150 (“Ce sinistre mardi était une de ces radieuses journées d’automne qui embellissent l’Ile de France”).
Villiers also argues that the timing of the march with the National Assembly’s push to get August decrees passed was not coincidental.

De Villiers also attempts to trace the movements of various people and discern their intentions on the morning of October 6. He separates the swelling crowd into bandits, paid marchers/agitators, and unaware citizens. While the bandits attempted to plunder insider and outside the chateau, de Villiers stresses the conciliatory actions of the citizens towards some Body Guards in the Place d’Armes to show that not all were ill-intentioned. He dismisses the alleged initial shooting of the 17 year-old Parisian boy by the Body Guards and concludes that the story of the shooting was altered after the journée by people who needed to give the crowd a justifiable motive for their violent actions. De Villiers maintains that agents among the crowd were able to lead a group to the queen’s apartments but that the conflicts in the courtyard were smaller and more random incidents. By revealing the internal structure of the château, de Villiers greatly clarifies the movement of the king, queen, and Body Guards during the invasion.

Unlike Leclercq and de Villiers, George Lefebvre does not concentrate solely on the October Days but views it within the context of pre-Revolutionary patterns and the early events Revolution. Therefore, he gives a detailed discussion of the state of the grain market before and during the early months of the Revolution and points out that problems in the grain market had been traditionally attributed to aristocratic and even royal conspiracy. He also notes that Paris and other big cities were unique in the fact that they bought bread from bakers instead of buying a week’s supply of grain to make their own. It can be assumed then, that the inhabitants of Paris were even more vulnerable to sudden changes in the food supply. Despite his account of the distressed state of the bread supply
in Paris, Lefebvre attributes the start of the October Days mainly to a political reaction since the king had refused to sanction the constitutional decrees which would limit his veto power. Lefebvre insinuates that Orléans and Mirabeau did have a small scale plot to organize the march, but that the women would have gone regardless of their participation or not. Additionally, he hints that the “agitators” of Paris probably had an agreement with some left leaning National Assembly deputies. Retrospectively returning to the food crisis, Lefebvre stresses that the journée did not solve the bread crisis by citing the high bread prices of mid-October.

In his book, *Les Femmes de la Revolution*, Michelet devotes one chapter to an account of the journée. On a whole, his work is written in a very romantic style and consequently, his ideas also tend to follow the same trend. Michelet cites a general fear that foreign troops were going to start a war, and the general hunger and bread shortage as factors in the initial formation of the march. He follows the women from the Hôtel de Ville through the dramatic conflict with the guards at the Tuileries gardens, to Maillard’s heroic efforts to find food for the women at Sèvres, and finally to the National Assembly where he emphasizes the women’s admiration for Mirabeau. Michelet concludes that the women entered the château the next morning because some men had agitated them in this direction. Michelet's final assessment is optimistic: “The revolution of October 6, necessary, natural and legitimate if there ever was one, all spontaneous, unsolicited, truly popular, belonged above all to the women, like that of July 14 to the men” and foresees
the implications of the women's actions with an exuberant cry of “adieu, old monarchy!”

The aim of Louis Gottschalk and his student Margaret Maddox’s work is to give a detailed account of Lafayette’s life, and in this case, his actions in the French Revolution. Of special interest to this discussion are the two chapters on October 5 and 6, but Gottschalk and Maddox also skillfully weave the journée within the context of the events of the prior months as well. For example, they stress Lafayette’s actions on August 30 which prevented the Palais Royal from marching on Versailles and other more minor incidents of September during which Parisians wanted to go to Versailles in order to remove the king from aristocratic and counter-revolutionary influences. The chapters on the October Days give nearly an hour by hour break down of all of Lafayette’s movements as well as the movements of the crowd and other troops in relation to keeping or breaking the peace. Gottschalk and Maddox draw several conclusions about both the involvement of Lafayette and his troops during the journée. While they prove that Lafayette attributed the many crowd agitations in Paris from mid-July until the October Days to Orléanist conspiracy, these historians do not actually assert that there was an overarching October Days conspiracy to begin with. Additionally, they reveal that Lafayette even curiously believed that Mirabeau was manipulating Orléans’ alleged conspiracies and resources for his own end.

In this work, Lafayette is completely cleared of any scheming of his own during the summer and early fall. Gottschalk and Maddox refer to Lafayette’s frequent near loss of control over situations before and during the October Days as convincing supporting

---

725 “La révolution du 6 octobre nécessaire naturelle et légère s’il en fut jamais, tout spontanée, imprévue, vraiment populaire, appartient surtout aux femmes, comme celle du 14 juillet aux hommes”; “adieu, vieille monarchie!”.
evidence to this claim. The frequent oaths of loyalty to king, city, and nation which Lafayette made his troops repeat during the summer also support this conclusion. Above all it appears that Lafayette was interested in building a reliable militia and maintaining order as his primary duty. This explains the slow and cautious pace at which Lafayette and his troops approached Versailles. Lafayette’s deference to both royal and municipal authority suggests that Lafayette did not have any malicious plans in mind. Rather Gottschalk and Maddox insist that he sought to maintain the peace, ensure the security of Paris, and reconcile the crowd with the king and royal troops after the chaos of the early hours of October 6. Thus Gottschalk and Maddox’s assessment of the journée begins and ends by removing any blame from the hero of their study.

Barry Shapiro studies the October Days within the context of the judicial investigations of the early Revolution. As for his thesis, he argues that revolutionary leaders wished to preserve Enlightenment ideals of judicial leniency as long as possible and were only forced to take extreme action when public opinion turned against them. In other words, the Terror was not the inherent outcome of early revolutionary justice. Therefore, Shapiro mainly demonstrates that revolutionary politicians were willing to use cases like the Châtelet October Days investigation as political bargaining chips of a centrist oriented municipal regime. Nonetheless, Shapiro does address the march itself. He cites the Saint-Huruge march attempt as a precursor to the journée. In making this link, he also emphasizes the political motives of each march as being linked to objectives of the political left. He casts only a cursory glance upon the bread problem as he refers to the artificial and aristocratically imposed scarcity cited by some members of the press. Shapiro maintains that the crowd went to the Hôtel de Ville of their own accord and that
most of its members wanted to burn the building and wreak havoc. He argues that the idea to march on Versailles was only a distraction. Shapiro concludes “it can be suggested that the October Days began as a revolt against the Fayettist municipal regime but that the regime was somehow able to… ‘seize’ the movement and re-focus its energies onto national rather than local issues” which turned the crowd to Versailles. He presents Lafayette as an opportunist who did not plan the uprising but led the Commune to take advantage of it once it began by redirecting it at Versailles. In keeping with his politically oriented perspective, Shapiro maintains that Lafayette benefited the most from the march since he finally controlled the crowd, controlled the National Guards, and moved the king into his Parisian arena. Yet in his final analysis, Shapiro concludes that the schism which formed between the Comité des recherches and the Châtelet, especially on the subject of the October Days, started the ultimate collapse and failure of the juggling Fayettist governing machine.

Albert Mathiez’s masterful study of the October Days is often regarded as the best secondary account of the journée. In his three articles published from 1898 to 1899, Mathiez addresses the question of the origins of the October Days as the result of a spontaneous popular movement or a preconceived conspiracy. Mathiez concludes that the women of Paris started the movement and were not joined by any men until 11:00 am at the Hôtel de Ville and that it was a generally spontaneous movement. However, Mathiez also concedes that while the demonstration itself was spontaneous, the ideas of the movement (including grievances and proposed solutions) were not new or sudden but had developed over the summer. These ideas were often supported by popular newspapers and Mathiez believes that the left of the National Assembly was in close communication
with Parisian radicals by the end of the summer. Mathiez attributes the beginning of rising tensions to the reluctance of the king to accept the constitutional decrees and feudal reforms of August 4 and his subsequent calling of foreign troops to Versailles and the Parisian area. The people were unsure where the loyalty of the Flanders regiment lay (with the nation or counter-revolutionary aristocratic forces) and their fears seemed to be confirmed by the reported degradation of national symbols at the October 1 banquet hosted at Versailles. Therefore, Mathiez maintains that the women began the demonstration with the twofold intention of remedying the bread crisis and seeking revenge on the unpatriotic actions of troops at Versailles.

Mathiez also concludes that the relocation of the king in Paris would not have benefited Orléans (if his ambitions were for the throne) since the king’s flight would have been more beneficial than trapping him in Paris. However, Mathiez does believe that Orléans did hand out money to encourage popular unrest prior to the journée, but that the participants of the journée were not paid by him, although many of the participants admired him. Mathiez also briefly discusses Mirabeau’s actions in the demonstration and concludes that he was not responsible for a conspiracy plot either. His conclusion about Mirabeau’s involvement is the same as that of Orléans “Even if the duke d’Orléans had not existed we would have probably seen the same scenes” and that “the course of events would not have been changed.”726 Nor does Mathiez believe that Lafayette had a hand in arranging events since he is portrayed as being reluctantly forced to march on Versailles by the threats of his troops. Yet, Mathiez does point out that Lafayette encouraged the

726 Mathiez, Albert. “Étude Critique sur les Journées de 5 & 6 Octobre.” Revue historique. Vol 68 (1898), 279. “Quand mêmes le duc d’Orléans n’aurait pas existé nous aurions vu probablement les mêmes scènes” and that “le cours des choses n’en aurait pas été changé.”
court not to resist the demands of the crowd on October 6. Mathiez ultimately concludes that the whole movement could not have been orchestrated through bribes or other conspiratorial means. Therefore, Mathiez is able to carefully balance the paradox that the journée was of popularly based spontaneous origins while its themes and ideas were premeditated.

George Rudé’s work addresses the motivation, composition, and actions of revolutionary crowds and he uses several important revolutionary events, including the October Days, as specific examples. Rudé reveals that most spontaneous revolutionary activity led by the menu peuple was motivated by food problems. He refers to pre-revolutionary examples of popular unrest concerning bread problems and reinforces the traditional myths of the pacte de famine. Rudé argues that this mentality was maintained during the Revolution and reveals that the idea that popular demonstrations could solve revolutionary grievances was reinforced through a decrease in bread prices following the fall of the Bastille and the early August demonstrations at the Hôtel de Ville.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Rudé draws on these trends to explain the October Days. He argues that before the involvement of the National Guard, the early events of October 5 “seemed no more than a continuation of similar demonstrations during September” and were linked to the traditional assumptions and responses of the menu peuple. Besides the ubiquitous spring and summer references to statements supporting a move of the king from Versailles to Paris, Rudé illustrates that pressure and motivations for the eventual march greatly accumulated in September, starting with the guards who were placed in bakers’ shops for the first 16 days of September. Rudé points to the September 13 Versailles bread riot in which the king came out “pour calmer les
esprits,” the September 15 efforts of Parisian women to bring grain carts into the city, and the September 17 women’s complaint of the exploitation of le peuple by the bakers. Rudé also reveals that a man was arrested in September for shouting that the people must bring the king to Paris. Thus, Rudé concludes that the ideas of the October Days were in no way new themes. Rudé also seems to excuse the violence and confusion of members of the crowd on October 6 by arguing with the help of municipal burial records, that it is probable that a Body Guard shot a 17 year-old boy in the courtyard, spurring the chaos.

Rudé has little confidence in the testimony of the ensuing Châtelet investigation and notes that “the venality of the masses was taken for granted and the remedy for popular insurrection was sought in the tracking down of presumed conspirators rather than in the removal of social grievances.” He asserts that the investigation was used to shift blame for actions from the masses in order to maintain the popularity of political leaders who needed someone to take the responsibility. Therefore, Rudé does not believe that the march was the result of a plot.

Olwen Hufton’s study concerns the divide between the women’s world and the men’s world at the start of the Revolution and how these gender roles directed the participation of women during the Revolution. Although women were excluded from citizenship, the division of spheres allowed their opinions and actions to be felt throughout the Revolution in situations regarding bread and religion. Therefore, their lack of citizenship did not prevent them from taking part in journées such as the October Days.

Hufton insists that 800-2000 women deliberately met at the Hôtel de Ville on October 5. However, she fails to explain how exactly arrangements were made to do so
and insists that the journée was not the result of a plot. Hufton frequently divides the roles in the journée along gender lines. She argues that the women wished to keep the men out of the Hôtel de Ville because they did not want their demonstration to become violent and they wanted to voice their opinions on the bread crisis alone. Hufton also attributes the “uglier mood” which led to the rush of the queen’s bedroom to the arrival of men late on the night of October 5. She also offers an explanation of why the market women in particular would be hostile to Marie Antoinette. Maria Leczinska, wife of Louis XV, had indulged the poissardes of Paris with visits to Versailles and courtly attention whereas Marie Antoinette abhorred them. Hufton also explains that women in revolutionary crowds, such as the one which marched on Versailles, were either over the age of 50 or young and childless, because mothers, for the sake of their children, rarely put themselves in danger. Therefore, the action of the women in the journée was predetermined by the obligations and constraints of their gendered world, yet the movement was popularly based and, for the most part, spontaneous.

Like Olwen Hufton, David Garrioch emphasizes the women’s allocation of the domestic sphere via gender roles as the main socially enabling factor for the march on Versailles. He also illustrates that most of the events which took place on October 5 had occurred in slightly different and in a more isolated manner before the October Days. This would include religious processions organized by women, the trips which les dames des Halles made to Versailles, and the recent “flour wars” in which women rebelled against merchants and the government over price inflation.

Garrioch surmises that women were more likely to act on domestic issues than men because home life was their only identity whereas men were recognized by trade and
skills. Yet, the domestic work which they were charged with did not isolate women, but forced them to go about the community daily to gather supplies and sell their wares. Thus, women were most likely to organize on a neighborhood basis, rather than by trade like men. However, Garrioich documents the relatively recent inter-district trade trend which was spreading throughout Paris in order to account for the cooperation between faubourgs on the October Days. It is not surprising then that *les dames Halles* were the both the most vocal of the October Days participants and the main suppliers of the satellite markets spread throughout the city. Garrioich portrays the October Days as the sum of the women’s past activities and connections implemented on a new and larger scale.

As Mirabeau’s biographer, Barbara Luttrell addresses the October Days insomuch as they affected Mirabeau. The main point of Luttrell’s argument is a defense of Mirabeau as someone with ambition, yet with enough willpower and ideological conviction to put *la nation* before himself. Luttrell maintains that Mirabeau was not involved in any October Days conspiracy and in fact, its outcome was not in his favor. Since Mirabeau believed that keeping the monarchy would provide a Montesquieu-like system of checks and balances, moving the king closer to the pressure of the revolutionary crowds would not have served his interests. Luttrell also argues that the October Days violate Mirabeau’s ever-present goal of stability and order. Moreover, a joint conspiracy between Orléans and Mirabeau does not fit either since a coup d’état would reinforce the idea that the throne was a political “prize” to be won rather than a traditionally strong executive branch. Since Luttrell maintains that Mirabeau was not involved in a plot, she explores the reasons why the blame was immediately shifted to
him. Luttrell contends that Lafayette saw him as a rival for power and did not want to see him rise to the position of minister. Once the entire October Days investigation and consequently Mirabeau was handed over to the Châtelet, Luttrell argues that the royal court was all too willing to inhibit the political career of a vocal representative who detested the rights of the nobility, and had voted the Church property over to the State. Thus by default, Luttrell argues that the journée was not the result of a plot, but rather popularly propelled.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume 1</th>
<th>Deposition Number/ Page Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I/10-17</td>
<td>XLIV/78-79 LXXXVIII/141-143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/17-18</td>
<td>XLV/79-80 LXXXIX/143-144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III/18-19</td>
<td>XLVI/80-81 XC/144-145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV/19-20</td>
<td>XLVIII/82-85 XCI/145-147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/20-22</td>
<td>XLIX/85-86 XCI/147-148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI/22</td>
<td>L/86-88 XCV/149-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII/23-24</td>
<td>LI/88 XCVI/150-151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII/24-25</td>
<td>LII/88-89 XCVI/151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX/25-27</td>
<td>LIII/89 XCVII/152-153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X/27-28</td>
<td>LIV/89-90 XCVIII/153-154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI/28-30</td>
<td>LV/90-91 XCIX/154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII/30-32</td>
<td>LVI/92-93 C/154-155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII/32-33</td>
<td>LVII/93-94 CI/155-158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV/33</td>
<td>LVIII/95 CII/158-159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV/34-36</td>
<td>LIX/96-97 CIII/159-160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI/36-37</td>
<td>LX/97-98 CIV/160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII/37-38</td>
<td>LXI/98-101 CV/161-162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII/38-42</td>
<td>LXII/101-103 CVI/162-163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX/42-43</td>
<td>LXIII/103-104 CVII/163-164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX/43-45</td>
<td>LXIV/104 CVIII/164-165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXI/45-46</td>
<td>LXV/104-105 CIX/165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXII/46-48</td>
<td>LXVI/105 CX/166-167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIII/48-50</td>
<td>LXVII/105-106 CXI/167-171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIV/50-51</td>
<td>LXVIII/106 CXII/171-172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXV/52</td>
<td>LXIX/106-107 CXIII/172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXVI/52-53</td>
<td>LXX/107 CXIV/172-173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXVII/53-54</td>
<td>LXXI/107-108 CXV/173-175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXVIII/54-57</td>
<td>LXXII/108-109 CXVI/175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIX/57-58</td>
<td>LXXIII/109-111 CXVII/175-177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXX/58-61</td>
<td>LXXIV/111 CXVIII/177-178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXI/62-63</td>
<td>LXXV/112 CXIX/178-180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXII/63-64</td>
<td>LXXVI/112-113 CXX/180-183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXIII/64-65</td>
<td>LXXVII/113-114 CXXI/183-184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXIV/65-66</td>
<td>LXXVIII/114 CXXII/184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXV/66-69</td>
<td>LXXIX/115 CXXIII/185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXVI/69-70</td>
<td>LXXX/116 CXXIV/185-186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXVII/70-71</td>
<td>LXXXI/117-132 CXXV/186-187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXVIII/71-72</td>
<td>LXXXII/132-136 CXXVI/187-192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXIX/73-75</td>
<td>LXXXIII/136-137 CXXVII/192-196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XL/75-76</td>
<td>LXXXIV/137-138 CXXVIII/196-198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XLI/76-77</td>
<td>LXXXV/138-139 CXXIX/198-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XLII/77</td>
<td>LXXXVI/139-140 CXXX/200-201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XLIJI/77-78</td>
<td>LXXXVII/140-141 CXXXI/201-202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CXXXII/202-203
CXXXIII/203
CXXXIV/203-205
CXXXV/205-206
CXXXVI/206
CXXXVII/207-208
CXXXVIII/208-210
CXXXIX/209-213
CL/213-217
CXL/217-218
CXLII/218-219
CXLIII/219-220
CXLIV/220-221
CXLV/221-222
CXLVI/222-225
CXLVII/225-227
CXLVIII/227-234
CXLIX/234-236
CL/236-237
CLI/237
CLII/237-238
CLIII/238-239
CLIV/239-242
CLV/242-246
CLVI/246-247
CLVII/247-249
CLVIII/249-252
CLIX/252
CLX/253
CLXI/253-255
CLXII/256-257
CLXIII/257-258
CLXIV/258-259
CLXV/259-260
CLXVI/260
CLXVII/260-262
CLXVIII/262-265
CLXIX/266
CLXX/266-270

Volume 2
CLXXI/1-5
CLXXII/5-6
CLXXIII/6-7
CLXXIV/7-8
CLXXV/8
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Reference</th>
<th>Volume 3 Reference</th>
<th>End of Investigation at Châtelet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCLXVIII/135-136</td>
<td>CCCXIV/184</td>
<td>Information Faite À Langres:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCLXIX/136-137</td>
<td>CCCXV/185</td>
<td>CCCLXXXIX (unofficial #)/58-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“CCLXIX b”/137-138</td>
<td>CCCXVI/186-187</td>
<td>CCCLXXXXX (unofficial #)/59-60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| CCLXX/138 | CCCXVII/187-189 | À Pont-Audemer :
| CCLXXI/139 | CCCXVIII/189 | CCCLXXXIX (unofficial #)/60-64 |
| CCLXXII/139-141 | CCCXIX/190 | À Annonay :
| CCLXXIII/142 | CCCXX/190-192 | CCCLXXXXXI (unofficial #)/64-67 |
| CCLXXIV/142-143 | CCCXXI/192 | 
| CCLXXV/143 | CCCXXII/192-193 | 
| CCLXXVI/144-145 | CCCXXIII/193 | 
| CCLXXVII/145-147 | CCCXXIV/193-194 | 
| CCLXXVIII/147 | CCCXXV/194 | 
| CCLXXIX/147 | CCCXXVI/194-195 | 
| CCLXXX/147-149 | CCCXXVII/195-196 | 
| CCLXXXI/149 | CCCXXVIII/196-197 | 
| CCLXXXII/150 | CCCXXIX/197-198 | 
| CCLXXXIII/150-151 | CCCXXX/198-202 | 
| CCLXXXIV/151-152 | CCCXXI/202-203 | 
| CCLXXXV/152 | CCCXXXII/203-204 | 
| CCLXXXVI/153-156 | CCCXXXIII/204-205 | 
| CCLXXXVII/156-157 | CCCXXXIV/205-206 | 
| CCLXXXVIII/157 | CCCXXXV/206 | 
| CCLXXXIX/157-158 | CCCXXXVI/206-207 | 
| CCXC/158-159 | CCCXXXVII/207 | 
| CCXI/159 | CCCXXXVIII/208-210 | 
| CCXII/159-160 | CCCXXXIX/210 | 
| CCXCIII/160 | CCCXL/210-211 | 
| CCXCIV/160-163 | CCCXLII/211-212 | 
| CCXV/163-165 | CCCXLIII/212-214 | 
| CCXVI/165-166 | CCCXLIV/214-216 | 
| CCXVII/166-167 | CCCXLV/216-217 | 
| CCXVIII/167-168 | CCCXLVI/217-218 | 
| CCXIX/168 | CCCXLVII/218-221 | 
| CCC/168-169 | 
| CCCII/170-171 | 
| CCCIII/171 | 
| CCCIV/171-172 | 
| CCCV/172-173 | 
| CCCVI/173-174 | 
| CCCVII/174-176 | 
| CCCVIII/176 | 
| CCCIX/177-179 | 
| CCCX/179-180 | 
| CCCXI/180 | 
| CCCXII/181-182 | 
| CCCXIII/183-184 | 
| CCCXLVII/12/13 | 
| CCCLVIII/13-14 | 
| CCCLIX/14 | 
| CCCLX/14 | 
| CCCLXI/15 | 
| CCCLXII/15-17 | 
| CCCLXIII/17-18 | 
| CCCLXIV/18-19 | 
| CCCLXV/19-21 | 
| CCCLXVI/21-22 | 
| CCCLXVII/22 | 
| CCCLXVIII/22-23 | 
| CCCLXIX/23-25 | 
| CCCLXX/25-27 | 
| CCCLXXI/27 | 
| CCCLXXII/27-28 | 
| CCCLXXIII/28-31 | 
| CCCLXXIV/31-32 | 
| CCCLXXV/33-34 | 
| CCCLXXVI/34 | 
| CCCLXXVII/35 | 
| CCCLXXVIII/36 | 
| CCCLXXIX/36-38 | 
| CCCLXXX/39-40 | 
| CCCLXXXI/40-48 | 
| CCCLXXXII/48-49 | 
| CCCLXXXIII/49-50 | 
| CCCLXXXIV/50 | 
| CCCLXXXV/50-51 | 
| CCCLXXXVI/51-52 | 
| CCCLXXXVII/52-54 | 
| CCCLXXXVIII/54-55 | 
| CCCLXXXIX/58-59 | 
| CCCLXXXX/60-64 | 
| CCCLXXXXI/64-67 |
À Milhaud:
CCCLXXXIII
(unofficial #)/67-70
À Geneve :
CCCLXXXXIV
(unofficial #)/70-79
Chabroud : Je ne vois plus qu’une conspiration, celle qui a été ouverte contre la Constitution. Une ligue s’est formée sur les débris de l’ancien régime, pour tenter le renversement du régime nouveau.

Elle a fit : la force est unie contre nous à la justice, nous avons développé d’inutiles efforts ; ployons pour nous relever ; opposons l’intrigue à la force, et l’artifice à la justice.

Agissant ensuite dans l’ombre, elle a marqué un but dont elle ne s’écarte pas ; déconcertée, elle substitue une mesure à une mesure nouvelle, et son art est de se reproduire sous toutes les formes.

Elle avait appelé cette armée qui devait envahir Paris et la liberté naissante, elle a suscité, elle a nourri cette procédure, monstrueuse, cette guerre de greffe, passez-moi l’expression, dont le prétexte n’a pu dérober à nos yeux la prétention secrète.

Je m’abuse peut-être, mais partout je crois voir son influence.

Je l’accuse de la tiédeur dans laquelle le patriotisme semble s’engourdir, et de cette sécurité dangereuse qui a pris la place d’une sage et nécessaire réserve.

Je l’accuse des nuages qui ont obscurci ces jours purs où les bons citoyens n’avaient qu’une âme et ne formaient qu’un vœu.

Je l’accuse des vains démêlés où cette milice généreuse qui, de la capitale, donna à tout l’Empire un si noble exemple, ne craint pas d’exposer enfin le fruit de ses travaux.

Je l’accuse de l’inconcevable illusion dont nous sommes frappés ; et où germe, entre les vrais serviteurs de la patrie, cette défiance qu’ils devaient garder pour ses ennemis.

Je l’accuse de la division cruelle qui se propage entre nous et dans la sein de l’Assemblée nationale, alors même que la liberté est l’objet commun de notre culte ; comme si les dogmes de cette religion étaient à la merci des tristes disputes qui enfantent les sectes !

Ainsi l’on nous égare pour nous surprendre, et l’on nous divise pour nous vaincre ; et lorsque nous allons échapper à une embûche, d’autres plus dangereuses peut-être sont dressées, où nous sommes attendus, que dis-je ?... où nous semblons courir de nous-mêmes.

Citoyens, vous êtes les maîtres de votre sort. Abjurez de funestes débats ; que les soupçons, que la défiance n’habitent plus parmi vous. Serrez-vous, continuez de former cette masse imposante qui doit repousser tous les assauts. Vous n’avez pas acquitté votre dette envers la patrie ; elle est toujours menacée, Le temps viendra, mais il n’est pas encore, où, délivrés d’alarmes, vous n’aurez plus qu’à recueillir, dans le bonheur du peuple et la prospérité de l’Empire, la récompense digne de vous, qui vous est promise.

Et quant aux malheurs du 6 octobre (car il faut enfin ne plus voir que d’horribles malheurs dans cette journée fatale) ; nous les livrerons à l’histoire éclairée pour l’instruction des races futures ; le tableau fidèle qu’elle en conservera fournira une leçon utile aux rois, aux courtisans et aux peuples.

Voici le décret que le comité vous propose :
L’Assemblée nationale, après avoir ouï le compte, que lui a rendu son comité des rapports, de l’information faite à la requête du procureur du roi au Châtelet, les 11 décembre 1789 et jours suivants, et des charges concernant M. de Mirabeau l’aîné et M. Louis-Philippe-Joseph d’Orléans.
A déclaré et décrété qu’il n’y a pas lieu à accusation.
Works Consulted


192


