SEA CHANGE OR CHARADE?
The Influence of the Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping Reform

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My first and most important teachers are my parents. This work is dedicated to them.
## List of Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECPS</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Peace and Security</td>
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<td>EISAS</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>United States General Accounting Office</td>
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<td>IMTF</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Task Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Investigations Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<td>PMCA</td>
<td>Pre-mandate commitment authority</td>
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<td>SCPKO</td>
<td>Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>SDS</td>
<td>Strategic Deployment Stocks</td>
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<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Standby High Readiness Brigade</td>
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<td>SSRC</td>
<td>Social Science Research Council</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Nation Task Force</td>
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<td>UNLB</td>
<td>United Nations Logistics Base</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission to Liberia</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation to Somalia</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Standby Arrangements System</td>
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<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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Executive Summary

The history of peacekeeping as an effective instrument of the United Nation is checkered. The institution of peacekeeping was relatively effective during the early period of the Cold War, and then became inactive during the 1970’s and 1980’s. It was later hailed by the international community as indispensable in the early 1990’s following the end of the Cold War, only to be shunned as futile in the later half of the decade. If the institution of peacekeeping were to survive, it would have to be revamped. In March of 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan assigned a panel of experts the task of modernizing peacekeeping practices. The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations authored a report prescribing reform in twenty areas. The Brahimi Report addressed several fundamental problems that plagued peacekeeping, including political will, lack of resources and the need for formal structures and reliable mechanisms. This paper will attempt to identify these difficulties and examine their origins.

Chapter One presents the history of UN peacekeeping leading up to the Brahimi Report. The concept of peacekeeping first emerged in 1948 when the General Assembly of the United Nations sent military observers to Jerusalem to monitor the cease-fire following the partitioning of Palestine. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) became the model according to which subsequent peacekeeping operations were created. Following the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, when the Security Council was prevented from taking action over a certain conflict because of Cold War politics, the General Assembly would deploy a peacekeeping operation to the area. As a result, the United Nations was able to assist in the Korean War, despite the Soviet Union’s objection. Between 1948 and 1989, the UN deployed 13 peacekeeping operations; that number increased five-fold in the three years following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The devastating missions in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda quashed the “we can
do anything” attitude of the early 1990’s inspired by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission. With confidence in peacekeeping destroyed, a panel of high-level experts was assembled to assess peacekeeping practices and advise on how to improve them. The chapter concludes with a summary of the Brahimi Panel’s recommendations and identifies the principle flaws they address.

Chapter Two argues that the institution of peacekeeping is greatly impacted by the attitudes of UN Member States. Because peacekeeping is not an original instrument of the UN Charter, it does not have all the necessary financial mechanisms. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) struggles for financing because many of its activities are funded through sources other than the UN Regular Budget. The Brahimi Report sought to create reliable financial mechanisms and would like to see the entire DPKO funded through the Regular Budget. Establishing a fiduciary pre-mandate commitment authority for the Secretary-General and increasing the capacity of the United Nations Logistics Base require incorporating a greater portion of peacekeeping funding into the Regular Budget. With more resources at its disposal, the DPKO will be more effective, which could boost Member States’ confidence in peacekeeping.

Chapter Three discusses the effort to achieve the rapid and efficient deployment of peacekeeping operations, and the protests made by Member States against that effort. The Brahimi Report suggested that the UN demand greater commitment as part of the UN Standby Arrangements System and create an on-call list for important military and civilian personnel. The objective is for deployment to take place within 30 days for traditional peacekeeping operations and within 90 days for a complex peacekeeping operation, which is possible only if the necessary resources are secured in advance. Member States objected to the cost of
maintaining resources for the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) and the geographic
distribution of the personnel nominated for the on-call lists.

The internal and external difficulties that surfaced because of the Executive Committee
on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) is the subject of
the Chapter Four. The Brahimi Panel suggested the organs of the Secretariat be restructured to
consolidate all intelligence capabilities into one unit, eliminating the need to coordinate the
efforts of multiple departments. The EISAS would provide the UN with powerful information
analysis and strategic planning abilities, the prospect of which frightened many developing
countries. The quest to become proactive has led the United Nations to seek the assistance of
think tanks and universities.

The conclusion of the paper argues that the Brahimi Report should be judged as a catalyst
for progress, and offers an explanation of the protests presented by various Member States. It
examines the reasons behind Non-Aligned Movement’s opposition to most of the
recommendations of the Brahimi Panel. Although not all of the objections can be justified, most
are warranted. Finally, the conclusion suggests issues for future research.
Chapter I: Cold War Politics Thaw:

Confidence in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Soars High Then Crashes

On March 7, 2000, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned a high level panel to undertake a comprehensive review of UN activities in the maintenance of peace and security. Over the course of four months, the panel, chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, analyzed all aspects of past and then current peacekeeping operations from preparation and deployment to intelligence capabilities and exit strategies. They were to assess the ability of the United Nations to effectively conduct peace operations. The Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations issued a report on August 17, 2000, referred to herein as the Brahimi Report, which offered frank, specific and realistic recommendations for reforms to enhance the United Nations capacity for peace operations. The contents of the Brahimi Report have been the subject of much debate both within the Organization and among independent observers. Not all of the recommendations were well received; although some reforms were implemented promptly and without argument, and others have spurred progressive action, some of the recommendations have been the subject of intense debate and have been barred from completion.

Terminology

For the purpose of this paper the term peacekeeping will be used to mean all United Nations Security Council authorized third-party intervention, except those with an original Chapter VII mandate that includes the use of “all means necessary” against a clearly defined aggressor. Thus the United Nations authorized action against Iraq in January 1991, and
involvement in Korea in the 1950’s, are not peacekeeping operations but instead collective enforcement actions.

The term “traditional peacekeeping” herein refers to a peacekeeping operation that is impartial and does not seek to influence the political outcome of the conflict. Troops involved in such operations are lightly armed for self-defense purposes only and adhere to minimal force doctrine. In traditional peacekeeping operations intervention is based on the continuing consent from all parties involved, and remains a necessity for the duration of the mission.

Not all interventions in the name of peace that are sanctioned by the United Nations fit the criteria for either enforcement actions under Chapter VII or traditional peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the Charter. There is a wide spectrum of peacekeeping operations that embody aspects of both. Operations that fall between the two extremes will be referred to as “complex-peacekeeping” operations.

“International community” is a collective term that will herein refer to the political elite within the United Nations and Member States and the state-level decision makers of Member States.

End of Cold War Brings Renewed Hope Short-lived

Collective security as envisioned by the Charter of the United Nations never became a reality. Included in the Charter is the provision for armed forces to be made available to the Security Council by Member States in accordance with special agreements as established under Article 43. No such agreements have been negotiated because the permanent Members of the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee could not resolve their disagreements concerning the size and composition of their respective national contributions or where the
armed forces should be based.\textsuperscript{1} The Soviet-American rivalry during the Cold War was reflected in the Security Council; the UN was rendered incapable of exercising the authority to sanction collective security actions enshrined within Chapter VII of its Charter. But the United Nations was to remain relevant in the area of international security; the immobilized Security Council was circumvented. The Uniting for Peace Resolution of November 1950 officially recognized the responsibility of the General Assembly to address issues of international security on which the Security Council is unable to act. Except when ‘the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter,’\textsuperscript{2} Chapter VI of the Charter authorizes the General Assembly to consider any question or matter within the scope of the Charter. The Resolution allowed for seven members of the Security Council (the number of consenting votes required has since been increased to nine) or a majority of the member-states to call an emergency meeting of the General Assembly to consider a matter that had been blocked by a veto in the Security Council.\textsuperscript{3} The Uniting for Peace Resolution gave birth to the invention of the concept of peacekeeping. The “Uniting for Peace” Plan, for which U.S. Secretary State Dean Acheson is given credit, was invoked by Yugoslavia in 1956 after Israel invaded Egypt. The British and the French vetoed the resolutions drafted by the United States and the Soviet Union demanding that Israel withdraw from Egypt. Since the Security Council was unable to take action, the matter was sent to the General Assembly. On November 7, 1956, the General Assembly instructed the Secretary-General to proceed with his plan to establish the UN


Emergency Force to monitor the end of the hostilities between the Israelis and Egyptians. This was the first UN peacekeeping operation in history.²

Comments made by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev of renewed commitment to the United Nations and genuine support for the Security Council model of collective security in September 1989 and then the fall of the Berlin Wall that same year inspired a renewed hope in the capacity of the United Nations to fulfill its purpose, in the words of its Charter, “to save succeeding generations from the scourges of war…and for these ends…to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.” Following the collective enforcement action, which successfully forced the Iraqi military out of Kuwait, a United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was established to observe the cease-fire and monitor the demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait boundary. The success experienced by UNIKOM in April 1991, fostered a feeling of “we can do anything” within the politics of the United Nations. The year 1992 saw a five-fold increase in both the number of peace operations assumed by the United Nations and the number of personnel involved in such operations. The sudden increase in volume alone posed a challenge; for a decade following the 1978 creation of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) the United Nations did not field a new peacekeeping operation.⁵ Three years after UNIKOM confidence in the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations took a serious blow.

The end of the Cold War brought not only an increase in United Nations activities in international security, it brought an increase in media coverage of such operations as well. The 1990’s saw advances in communications technology and more near-live coverage of combat situations. Media began to actively follow peacekeeping operations, broadcasting almost instantly reports and images of conflict confronted by UN peacekeeping personnel. The CNN-

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² Meisler, 107-11.
effect, as it is commonly referred to, agitated the national constituents of Member States and influenced the political will of national decision makers to commit resources to UN peace operations. By the mid-1990’s, a few media-saturated peace operations forays had lead some political elites, practitioners and scholars to pronounce hurried and broad generalizations which resulted in a loss of faith in the ability of the United Nations to engage in effective international security activities.\(^6\) The Clinton Administration was forced to withdraw American forces from the United Nations operation in Somalia following the domestic outcry caused by the televised death of an American pilot of a Black Hawk, which had been shot down by the followers of Somali General Aidid.

On April 6, 1992, the Serbs of Yugoslavia undertook a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Within the first sixty days of the fighting, approximately one million people were displaced. The international community responded with an arms embargo, humanitarian intervention and a UN peacekeeping operation, UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR set up six safe areas for the protection of displaced persons. The mandate authorized UN personnel to use force to “deter attacks” on Srebrenica and the five other safe areas. The mandate was insufficient to protect the people involved, and nearly 20,000 people in and around the safe areas, including a majority of the 117 UN peacekeeping officials lost their lives. The fall of the safe area of Srebrenica resulted in a terrible massacre of the Muslim people. “We [The United Nations] tried to keep the peace and apply the rules of peacekeeping when there was no peace to keep…we tried to eschew the use of force except in self-defense, which brought us into conflict with the defenders of the safe areas, whose safety depended on our use of force.”\(^7\) The international community failed to act

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decisively during the operation of UNPROFOR until the decision to undertake a concerted military effort after the last attack on Sarajevo. The fall of Srebrenica was the result of inadequate resources, inappropriate implementation of policy and political failings.

Two days after the infamous Black Hawk Down incident, the Security Council authorized a humanitarian intervention in Rwanda, United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), but refused to official recognize the true nature of this civil conflict. On April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira and several top aides was shot down by surface to air missiles. The plane was en-route from Tanzania, where the statesmen had completed the negotiations on the implementation of the 1993 Arusha peace accord that called for a broad-based Hutu-Tutsi government in Rwanda. The peace accord was meant to bring an end to civil war with the Tutsi expatriate force, the Rwanda Patriotic Front; it was met with strong opposition from the extremists within Habyarimana’s own government, who are suspected in the plane crash. The death of the president triggered what was later acknowledged to be genocide and restarted the latent civil war. The death toll was suspected to be in the tens of thousand within the first two weeks.

In response, the United Nations allowed a small contingent to remain in Rwanda to secure a cease-fire and safety for foreign civilians. The United States and other countries provided logistical support for delivery of humanitarian aid to refugee camps. The French eventually intervened militarily and established a safe zone in the southwest region of the country. It is generally agreed that the Members of the UN failed to fulfill their legal and moral obligations to the Rwandans. There were several opportunities at which a rapid reaction force
could have been strategically deployed to positively affect the civil war. Instead UNAMIR, a traditional peacekeeping operation with Chapter VI authorization, was deployed under hostile conditions more suited to a peacemaking operation with Chapter VII mandate. There existed strong political pressure to quash the use of the term genocide in connection with the civil war in Rwanda. The United Nations Genocide Convention deemed an act of genocide to be a crime against humanity; crimes against humanity carry substantial legal weight in addition to moral obligations for Members of the UN under the Charter. National decision makers of key Members of the UN were not willing to meet such obligations. The April 1994 genocide in Rwanda effectively destroyed the confidence of the international community in peacekeeping operations and consolidated the position of “we can do nothing” among Member States and state-level decision makers.

Brahimi Report: Culmination of Self-Criticism

The memory of the Rwandan genocide of April 1994 coupled with the fall of the UN safe-area in Srebrenica, Bosnia in July of 1995 and the collapse of Somalia tarnished the international community’s confidence in UN peacekeeping, from planning and organization to command and execution. In the subsequent years the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General conduct thorough reviews of the fall of Srebrenica and why the UN failed to act in Rwanda. The reports uncovered a range of problems ranging from organizational deficiencies and inadequate resources to political limitations. This sparked a degree of self-criticism within United Nations that is not commonplace for large organizations. This internal critique climaxed when Annan commissioned the Brahimi Panel to investigate all aspects of UN

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peacekeeping. The Brahimi Panel included personalities reflecting a wide geographic
distribution, with diverse experiences in the fields of peacekeeping, peace building, development
and humanitarian assistance. The members of the Panel were Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi (chair), Mr.
J. Brian Atwood, Ambassador Colin Granderson, Dame Ann Hercus, Mr. Richard Monk,
General Klaus Naumann (retired), Ms. Hisako Shimura, Ambassador Vladimir Shustov, General
Philip Sibanda and Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga. The Panel found that “without significant
institutional change, increased financial support, and renewed commitment on the part of
Member States, the UN will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace
building tasks that the Member States assign it in coming months and years.”9 The Panel
produced a forty-eight-page report that included recommendations in twenty key areas that
represented what they felt was “the minimum threshold of change needed to give the United
Nations system the opportunity to be an effective, operational, twenty-first century institution.”10

Summary of Recommendations

The Brahimi Report suggested reform in twenty key areas, ranging from preventative
actions and exit strategies to information gathering and strategic analysis and the rapid
deployment of troops. While some of the recommendations were implemented almost
immediately without any substantial objections, several areas of the Brahimi Report have been
subject of intense controversy, and other recommendations have been outright rejected. In
certain areas the actual changes that have been made resemble a mere shadow of the suggested
reforms. The fate the Brahimi Report is in part the result of budgetary and resource restrictions,
but politics and will have also had a considerable effect on peacekeeping reform.

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When the Brahimi Report was released in August of 2000, the initial response of the United Nations was overwhelmingly positive. Members of every political alignment praised the Panel for their honest and thoughtful analysis of the then current framework of peace operations. But when the real discussion began over the details of the report, there emerged a divergence in opinions. Individual Member States questioned the necessity of various reforms; some Member States went as far as to question the intent and purpose behind certain recommendations. A few recommendations were ruled out because of financial limitations, such as the creation of one hundred-fifty new posts and the addition of a new Assistant Secretary-General, which the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) deemed to be beyond the financial means of the United Nations. Most of these recommendations were revised and implemented on a smaller scale.

The Brahimi Report delved into the clarification and definition of doctrine, as well as peacekeeping strategy and decision-making. It examined possible methods for achieving rapid and effective deployment of peace operations, and the need for additional resources. It also made suggestions to restructure UN Headquarters so it would be better equipped to plan for and support peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report did not limit itself to DPKO; it recommended structural and organizational adjustments be made in most departments of the Secretariat. It also addressed how best to utilize the technological advances of the information age.

While the Brahimi Panel praised the fundamental principles of traditional peacekeeping, they concluded that the nature of peacekeeping changed significantly during the 1990’s and reform of the system is crucial. Heedlessly adhering to such principles as the necessity of consent, impartiality and minimal force doctrine led to the failure of peace operations when open
hostility broke out between the opposing parties. The UN must be able to meet such challenges in the future; the rules of engagement must be stout. The Brahimi Report emphasized the need for truthful and thorough assessment of the conflict, and a realistic and practical mandate to manage the situation. The Report called on the Security Council to leave resolutions authorizing peace operations in draft form until the Secretary-General is able to determine what resources will be available for the operation, so that the scope of the mandate does not exceed what is realistically possible. It also recommended all contributing Member States be allowed a greater voice in preparing the mandate.

The Brahimi Report also addressed expanding the information-gathering and strategic planning capacities of the Secretary-General. Without improved informational capabilities preventative action will be beyond the reach of the Secretariat. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) would create and keep integrated databases on peace and security issues, which it would share with the appropriate organs of the United Nations. It would also analyze policy and generate long-term strategies for the ECPS and alert it of potentially dangerous situations. The EISAS would consolidate the existing Situation Center of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with other existing small but scattered policy planning offices, and it would also incorporate military analysts, international criminal experts and information systems specialists. The success of EISAS would involve the effective use of information technology, which will require a center responsible for user-level information technology strategy and policy for peace operations.

Preparation and preparedness is essential for the success of peace operations. Rapid deployment is crucial in preventing further escalation of conflict. The Brahimi Report suggested a deployment schedule of thirty days after the Security Council adopts a resolution for a
traditional peacekeeping operation and of ninety days for a complex peacekeeping mission. To facilitate rapid deployment the Brahimi Panel recommends an on-call list of qualified personnel to fill critical posts should be created and the United Nations Standby Arrangements System should be improved to include several brigade-sized forces that are trained specifically for peacekeeping operations and can ready for rapid deployment. It would be a revolving list that is continuously updated of qualified military officers and civilian personnel, who could be available for the planning stages of a mission and as such facilitate the rapid deployment of troops. On-call lists of experienced personnel should also be created for all posts critical for every stage of peacekeeping operations. According to the Brahimi Report, the addition of several start-up kits to the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy, along with greater budgetary authority for the Secretary-General during the pre-mandate and planning stage of peace operations would also greatly facilitate rapid deployment.

Peacekeeping must be treated as a primary function of the UN; as such, the Brahimi Panel recommended that DPKO be funded through the regular budget of the Organization. They also called for the immediate increase in resources for all DPKO offices and related Headquarters, which, at that time, accounted for approximately two percent of the total cost of peacekeeping. The increase in resources would allow for a significant number of new posts, including a third Assistant Secretary-General to the Department of Peacekeeping, to be designated as “Principal Assistant Secretary-General,” and act as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General. The Brahimi Panel recommended creating Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) to aid in the planning of new missions and assist in the effective deployment of operations. The IMTF would coordinate the efforts of the necessary offices and various entities. DPKO would also benefit from structural adjustments, for example separating both the Military
and Civilian Police Division, and the Field Administration and Logistics Divisions into two independent divisions. The Brahimi Panel also suggested that several offices and divisions within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs be strengthened.

This paper focuses on three areas of reform addressed by the Brahimi Report. These reforms would greatly benefit future peacekeeping operations, but have proven difficult to accomplish. First it will examine the idea of pre-mandate commitment authority (PMCA) that the Brahimi Panel suggested be given to the Secretary-General, as well as the benefit to be gained by increasing the permanent stock of peacekeeping resources and equipment held by the UN at the Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. The Brahimi Panel felt that the Secretary General should be granted the authority to access up to $50 million during the planning stages of a peacekeeping mission. The Secretary-General would be free to use the funds at his discretion, even before the Security Council formally sanctions the operation. The Organization should also make the significant investment in peacekeeping involved in increasing the number of start-up kits in stock at UNLB, for a total of five.

Second, this paper considers the rapid deployment of troops within the proposed timeframes for traditional and complex peacekeeping operations. To accomplish this goal, the Brahimi Panel suggested compiling a comprehensive list of potential representatives or special representatives of the Secretary-General, force commanders, civilian police commissioners, and deputies as well as other heads of substantive and administrative components. The list should be subject to a fair gender and geographic distribution and open to input from Member States. From that list DPKO can draw a revolving “on-call list” of approximately 100 military officers
that can be ready for deployment within seven days from notice. The UN should establish a three-month training program for persons nominated to the list and provide them with a refresher orientation and mission-specific training closer to actual deployment.

The recommendation to create an additional secretariat to meet the informational and strategic planning needs of the ECPS is the third reform to be discussed. Known as the Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, the Brahimi Report intended EISAS to be administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. EISAS would have preventative, peacekeeping and post-conflict responsibilities. Establishing EISAS would require the Secretariat to accomplish an unprecedented degree of coordination and cooperation among UN departments, as well as institutional reorganization.

These three areas of reform will be used to highlight more fundamental problems preventing peacekeeping from becoming a truly effective tool for maintaining international peace and security.

**Fundamental Difficulties Face Peacekeeping Practices**

When taken in its entirety, the ultimate goal of the Brahimi Report is to make the UN an effective actor in international peace and security. With this objective in mind, the Brahimi Panel sought to correct several fundamental problems with the culture and practices of peacekeeping as it had come to be over half a century. The Brahimi Panel wrote for the benefit of both the United Nations and its Member States. Many of the recommendations are political in nature and require direct support, participation and funding from Member States. The Brahimi Panel thought that if these reforms were implemented, Members States would be forces to
officially recognize peacekeeping as a fundamental responsibility and function of the United Nations. Elevating the status of peacekeeping is the goal addressed in the next chapter. Because peacekeeping was first created as an ad hoc solution to an impasse in the Security Council and because the Charter does not contain any specific provision for peacekeeping, it has been treated and funded as a lesser function of the UN. Peacekeeping has yet to receive the institutional respect it needs to become an effective tool of the UN.

Slow and inefficient deployment of troops and resources is a significant detriment to peacekeeping. The events that took place in Rwanda in April 1994 made rapid and efficient deployment of missions a top priority for the Brahimi Panel. Although the UN immediately identified the conflict, the UN lacked formal practices and procedures from establishing and planning a peacekeeping operation; the existing mechanisms were time consuming and lacked certainty. As more time passed, the situation in Rwanda became more difficult to resolve. The Brahimi Panel attempted to address this flaw through a series of reforms that would allow for as much preparation as far in advance of deployment as possible, which is taken up in the Chapter Three. The ability to deploy peacekeeping missions in the early stages of a conflict could limit the complexity of the task faced by UN troops. They hoped that an on-call list of personnel and that strengthening the UNSAS would substantially decrease deployment time.

The creation of EISAS would require restructuring the Secretariat and embracing technological advances. New threats to international peace and security emerge daily and the nature of international conflict is ever changing; yet peacekeeping practices and mechanisms have remained fundamentally the same. While the institution experienced relative success during the Cold War and was revered during the early 1990’s, the experiences of the final years of the twentieth century made it obvious that greater flexibility and adaptability was need if the
system was to function. The successful establishment of the EISAS would signify the willingness of the UN to adapt to meet unprecedented situations in the future, and it would set a precedent for further flexibility necessitated by fluctuations in international political dynamics.

Before the Brahimi Report

Prior to the release of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations substantial planning for the proposed peace operation was held until after the Security Council approved the mandate for the mission. After the Security Council passed a resolution, the Secretary-General was then free to solicit Member States for the resources allotted to the mission by the resolution. The Security Council authorized the deployment of resources that it deemed necessary to fulfill the mandate, but it was not always within the power of the Secretary-General to assemble such resources. The result was often an under-staffed, under-resourced United Nations peacekeeping force that was unable to complete its mandate. The United Nations involvement in Rwanda fell victim to this weakness in the preparation stage. In May of 1994, the Security Council authorized UNAMIR to be expanded from 2,500 troops to 5,500. Boutros-Ghali was unable to obtain commitment for the full increase in troops; ultimately about five hundred additional troops were sent.

Before the Brahimi Report, the UN’s information and strategic analysis capacity was limited to small individual offices spread across the Secretariat, without a framework for coordinating information. The Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Political Affairs operated separately from the Policy Analysis Unit and Situation Center of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as do other complementary offices. The primary concerns of the policy and planning units of the ECPS tended to be day-today issues and the ECPS lacked the
capacity for forward-looking strategies. The Secretary-General’s initial reform package of 1997 attempted to coordinate the activities of various divisions of the Secretariat, but had yet to realize its intended purpose at the time of the Brahimi Report.

The United Nations never negotiated special agreements with Member States to secure military forces for use by the Security Council; instead any operation undertaken by the United Nations requires the Secretary-General to ask Member States for resources on an ad hoc basis. In 1997, the initial steps were taken in acknowledging the importance of rapid and efficient deployment of troops to areas of conflict. A Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) by means of a Security Council resolution was authorized to address this need. At the same time the Department of Peacekeeping was provided with a Mission Planning division, the UNSAS, and the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters.11 But the UNSAS has yet to become a reliable source for resources; Member States, under the UNSAS, retain the right to say no to the request of the Secretary-General, even within the level of resources agreed upon by the arrangement. The availability of military supplies and equipment is also a significant concern. The mission start-up kits held in reserve at UNLB are critical for the rapid deployment of a mission, but the reserves are frequently depleted and not promptly replenished.

The UN, in the articles of its Charter, was intended to have the capacity to conduct activities in the area of international security, but has effectively yet to realize this ability. The recommendations made within the Brahimi Report represent the most realistic and feasible possibilities for reform towards this end. Some obstacles are financial or time-restricted in nature, but many are political. A review of the range of political responses to individual areas of the Brahimi Report will help to expose the real potential for reform UN peacekeeping and its limits.

11 Ziring, 172-3.
Chapter II: Commitment of Funds for Peacekeeping: Elevating Peacekeeping Operations to a Primary Function of the UN

The various financial and budgetary reforms recommended by the Brahimi Report address two fundamental defects from which UN peacekeeping suffers. The more apparent objective of the financial and budgetary reforms is to improve the rapid and efficient deployment of peace operations (this we will examine in Chapter Three). The less obvious objective of these reforms is to confer upon peacekeeping the level of respect it deserves. Because of the method by which the first peacekeeping operation was conceived, it has never received the funding and institutionalization deserving of an important and complex tool of the United Nations. The Brahimi Report suggests a variety of reforms that would institutionalize peacekeeping and encourage Member States to recognize it as a primary function of the Organization. This chapter will examine the outcome of the debate surrounding the recommendations to create pre-mandate commitment authority (PMCA) for the Secretary-General and to increase the resources in reserve at the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy, with respect to the status of peacekeeping.

There is no article in the UN Charter that refers to peacekeeping. Peacekeeping was first devised as a creative solution to stalemate in the Security Council. When Cold War politics prevented the Security Council from taking action, peacekeeping was the General Assembly’s improvised answer. Later, the Security Council embraced it as an alternative to the compulsory enforcement action described in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The legality of peacekeeping has been a source of debate since its conception, and it is often referred to as falling under Chapter VI ½ authority. Because only 13 peacekeeping missions were deployed during the 40 years following the first operation to the Middle East, peacekeeping became seen as a tool only
to be employed on an ad hoc basis. As a result, peacekeeping is not funded through the Regular Budget; peacekeeping assessments are made on an ad hoc basis.

The Organization’s attitude toward peacekeeping began to change with the explosion of missions in the early to mid-1990s, and there was an attempt to establish a reliable source for funding. Through subsequent resolutions starting in 1992, the General Assembly adopted a series of reforms to reduce the lead-time of a mission, including the creation of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund.\textsuperscript{12} The General Assembly established the fund, which amounts to $150 million when fully capitalized, to be a pool of money readily available to the Secretary-General for start-up costs. Upon the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), the Secretary-General can draw up to $50 million from the fund during the planning stage of a new mission or an unexpected expansion of an existing operation. The Peacekeeping Reserve Funds, though, was only available to the Secretary-General after the Security Council mandated the peace operation or its expansion.

The United Nations Charter dictates that the Security Council attempt to settle a dispute through peaceful means before resorting to force.\textsuperscript{13} Once a conflict is identified, exploring diplomatic means to resolving the situation requires a significant amount of time. During this stage of the conflict, the Secretary-General does not have the means with which to prepare for a possible UN intervention if diplomatic tactics were not successful. Only after the Security Council authorized a peacekeeping mission was the Secretary-General allowed to begin planning the mission and solicit Member States for the needed troops and resources, at which stage much valuable time would have been wasted that could have been used to ensure rapid deployment of

\textsuperscript{12} UN General Assembly Resolution 47/217 (23 December 1992) established the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund; resolutions 49/233 A (23 December 1994) and 51/218 E (17 June 1997) modified the size of and criteria for the use of the fund, as it stood at the release of the Brahimi Report.

\textsuperscript{13} Charter of the United Nations, Chap. VI, art. 33.
the operation. The Brahimi Report called for “pre-mandate commitment authority” to be granted to the Secretary-General, which means that the Secretary-General would have access to the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund prior to the Security Council resolution authorizing a peacekeeping operation so that the necessary resources, personnel and equipment can be secured and the mission can be deployed sooner.

**Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority**

Officially, the concept of the pre-mandate commitment authority for the Secretary-General was well received. In the annex to its resolution 1327 (2000), the Security Council encouraged the Secretary-General to take all possible measures within his authority to facilitate rapid deployment of the mission during the planning and preparation phase of a peace operation. The Security Council expressed its approval of a more active Secretariat during the pre-mandate stage of a mission by promising to assist the Secretary-General “with specific planning mandates requesting him to take the necessary administrative steps to prepare the rapid deployment of a mission.”

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations also endorsed the recommendation of the Brahimi Panel in its report to the General Assembly during the 55th session, and continues to express its support in each additional report on the question of peacekeeping operations.

While the Organization’s official stance toward PMCA was positive, the reaction of individual Member States varied. The developed countries tended to support the proposed budgetary mechanisms, but many of the developing countries favored resolving past debts owed to Member States before apportioning any additional funds to peacekeeping. The delegation

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from the Republic of Korea recognized the importance of allowing the Secretary-General leeway during the planning stages of a mission and fully backed PMCA.\textsuperscript{16} Kurt Mosgaard, a member of the Denmark delegation and speaking on behalf of the European Union and associated States, acknowledged the pre-mandate commitment authority as an essential element in the quest for rapid deployment.\textsuperscript{17} The United States also felt that the Secretary-General should be allowed access to sufficient funds to prepare for deployment of a probable mission and gave its support to PMCA.\textsuperscript{18} But many developing countries in the Non-aligned Movement were not as enthusiastic about allowing the Secretary-General easier access to greater funds for peacekeeping. Having loaned substantial resources to the UN, they were concerned that they may be unnecessarily penalized because other Member States had failed to fulfill their financial obligations to the Organization; Uruguay, South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Bangladesh and others shared such concerns.\textsuperscript{19}

Despite the initial hesitation of several Member States to grant PMCA to the Secretary-General, the General Assembly, at the advice of the ACABQ and the request of the Secretary-General, has made provisions to allow the Secretary-General access to funds prior to the Security Council adopting peacekeeping mandate. These mechanisms could expedite the deployment of troops once the operation received its mandate. In his report to the General Assembly, 14 March 2002, the Secretary-General urged the General Assembly and ACABQ to authorize PMCA, as recommended by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations\textsuperscript{20}:

\textsuperscript{17} UN General Assembly, “Reform, Peacekeeper Misconduct, Criteria for Senior-Level Appointments Among Issues Raised in Fourth Committee Debate on Peacekeeping,” 57th sess., 21 October 2002, GA/SPD/245.
\textsuperscript{18} UN General Assembly, 5th Committee, “Proposal to Postpone Repayment to Member States of Cash Balances from Closed Peacekeeping Missions Taken up in Budget Committee,” 58th sess., 17 March 2004, GA/AB/3607.
\textsuperscript{19} GA/AB/3607
\textsuperscript{20} A/55/305, S/2000/809, para. 164.
29. …The Organization is taking positive action to achieve rapid deployment, and pre-mandate financial commitment authority is essential in order to meet this goal. The Secretary-General made a further proposal in this regard in paragraphs 117-119 of document A/55/977.\(^{21}\)

In the aforementioned report, paragraph 35 presented an outline for rapid deployment, which would require the pre-mandate commitment authority in the second step. The ACABQ endorsed the outline and stated in its report that “…the actions and activities envisaged by the Secretary-General in paragraph 35 of document A/56/870 fall within the scope of the start-up phase referred to in General Assembly resolution 49/233 A, section IV, paragraph 1\(^{22}\).” The ACABQ went further in its endorsement of the proposed pre-mandate commitment authority, stating that PMCA is consistent with the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel\(^{23}\). The outline for rapid deployment of a mission was subsequently codified by General Assembly resolution\(^{24}\). Because PMCA is required in the second step of the outline for rapid deployment, the Secretary-General is consequently afforded the power.

Even though the ACABQ and General Assembly approved the pre-mandate commitment authority, and many Member States recognized its inherent value, the allocated funds were not immediately utilized for various reasons. Preparation for the United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (MINUCI) brought to light the faults of the then current PMCA mechanisms. The Best Practices Unit, at the request of the General Assembly, prepared an After Action Report

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\(^{21}\) UN General Assembly, *The Concept of Strategic Deployment Stocks and Its Implementation*, 56\(^{th}\) sess., Secretary-General, 14 March 2002, A/56/870.

\(^{22}\) A/RES/49/233 A, section IV, paragraph 1 states: “[General Assembly] Decides that, if a decision of the Security Council relating to the start-up phase or expansion phase of peace-keeping operations results in the need for expenditure, the Secretary-General is authorized, with the prior concurrence of the ACABQ and subject to the Financial Regulations of the United Nations…to enter into commitments not to exceed 50 million United States dollars per decision of the Security Council… however, appropriation by the General Assembly of any outstanding commitments shall automatically restore the balance of the limit of 150 million dollars to the extent of the amount appropriated” (23 December 1994).


\(^{24}\) The outline for rapid deployment, A/56/870, para. 35 is endorsed by ACABQ in its report, A/56/902, para. 23, which is subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution A/RES/56/292.
concerning the difficulties the Secretary-General faced when attempting to access the resources
granted to him by resolutions A/RES/56/256 (18 July 2002) and A/RES/56/292. MINUCI was
the first opportunity to use PMCA since it was proposed in 2000. The After Action Report
concluded that the Secretary-General and DPKO did not seek to utilize the pre-mandate
commitment authority because it was uncertain that the Security Council would authorize
MINUCI; it was thought that the mission would be relatively limited in size and scope; and there
were alternative resources available during preparation.25 The Secretariat was allowed to finance
the first six months of MINUCI from the Regular Budget as if it would proceed as a
peacekeeping mission,26 and it also made use of materials leftover from UNAMSIL and
UNMIBH. Although the possibility of employing PMCA was discussed, the staff expressed a
general lack of familiarity with the process and decided to continue with more traditional
procedures. The staff was also unaware that there existed a less-complicated alternative to the
Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, which would have been more suited to the projected small size of
the mission. At no time was the possibility of utilizing the unforeseen and extraordinary expense
budget explored.27 Afterward, Secretary-General Kofi Annan was able to obtain from the
ACABQ post-commitment authority the amount of $14 million to meet the cost of the most
essential and immediate start-up requirements of the Mission for the period from 13 May to 31
December 2003.28 The Best Practices Unit concluded that: “PMCA mechanisms do exist and do
provide sufficient latitude to obtain pre-mandate financing for missions in a reasonably

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25 Department of Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices, “MINUCI: Use of Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority,”
26 UN General Assembly, “Budget Committee Is Told Deployment of United Nations Mission in Liberia Shows
Improvement Over Past,” 58th sess., 21 November 2003, GA/AB/3593; MINUCI was subsequently extended as a
Special Political Mission.
27 “MUNCI: Use of Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority,” 8.
28 UN Security Council, First Report of Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire, 8 August
Mission in Cote d’Ivoire, 4 November 2003, S/2003/1069, para. 44; MINUCI was authorized by the Security
Council Resolution 1479 on 13 May 2003.
expeditious manner,” and that DPKO and between the DPKO and the Controller’s Office and Member States there needs to be a greater understanding of the different mechanisms at their disposal. 29 It was suggested in the report that guidelines be established and trigger mechanisms be agreed upon to prevent missed opportunities in the future.

The Secretary-General did invoke the pre-mandate commitment authority during the preparatory stage of the United Nations mission to Liberia (UNMIL). At the time of this paper, the United Nations had yet to publicize the details of the PMCA mechanisms utilized by the Secretary-General while preparing for the deployment of UNMIL. Details released of Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations meetings have alluded to the fact that PMCA was used and proved beneficial. Peter Hammerschmidt, of the Canadian delegation, speaking also for Australia and New Zealand, made reference to the importance of PMCA in achieving the progress made in Liberia:

UNMIL was also something of a milestone for the United Nations and its Member States...It was the first major deployment since the establishment of the Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and since the implementation of the recommendations contained in the Brahimi report...He said those delegations could already point to a number of ways in which UNMIL deployment represented an improvement over the past...The early mobilization of resources had been improved by the creation and employment of pre-mandate commitment authority and strategic deployment stocks. 30

Other delegations present during the discussion of the mission also acknowledged the importance of the pre-mandate commitment authority.

29 “MUNCI: Use of Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority,” 8-9.
30 GA/AB/3593
The ACABQ issued an opinion on posting the return of ‘available cash’ to Member States that bolstered institutional support for PMCA.\(^{31}\) Although the decision ultimately belonged to the General Assembly, the ACABQ felt that the available money would better be used to pad the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund rather than resolve UN debt. The ACABQ offered its opinion in light of the upcoming UN missions to Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti and Sudan, each of which will require a pre-mandate fund of $50 million. The Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, as of 29 February 2004 stood at $74 million.\(^{32}\)

Despite how beneficial PMCA was to the deployment of UNMIL and the Organization’s apparent resolve to guarantee its continuing existence, Member States want assurance that the authority will no be abused. In the same resolution that authorized PMCA, the General Assembly provided checks against its hasty use as well. Before the Secretary-General can spend money from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, he must still seek the approval of the ACABQ and must periodically submit to the General Assembly an account of how the funds have been used. The Secretary-General is also responsible for preparing a full account of all monies spent from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund to prepare for a peacekeeping operation if the Security Council ultimately fails to sanction the mission.

The mechanisms of the pre-mandate commitment authority are not adequate to allow the Secretary-General to secure all resources necessary for the start-up and deployment of a peacekeeping operation. Some resources, such as military equipment and communication technology, are not readily available and require time to acquire and may entail a significant capital investment. The mechanisms available as part of PMCA are not sufficient to cover such

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\(^{32}\) GA/AB/3607.
expenses; an alternative source of funding is required. Member States and the UN must be willing to make a permanent investment in peacekeeping.

**Strategic Deployment Stocks**

Rapid deployment requires readily available equipment and resources. The UN Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy originally housed two peacekeeping start-up kits, which include all material resources necessary for the initial deployment of an operation, but the increase in the number of peacekeeping operations experienced in the early 1990’s had taxed the stocks at UNLB. If UNLB was to continue to serve its purpose, it would have to receive greater and more regular funding under the UN budget. The Brahimi Panel recommended that the General Assembly “authorize and approve a one-time expenditure for the creation of three new start-up kits at Brindisi (for a total of five), which would then automatically be replenished from the budgets of the missions that drew upon the kits.”

Some Member States objected to the significant cost of acquiring three additional kits and maintaining a total of five start-up kits. As a result, the Secretary-General had to revise the Brahimi Panel’s recommendation and presented the General Assembly with three detailed alternatives for Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS).

The objections raised by Member States to financing the Strategic Deployment Stocks were similar to those raised over the pre-mandate commitment authority. The Non-aligned movement and developing countries were again concerned with how financing the Strategic Deployment Stocks would affect the repayment of UN debts. On behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum Group, Fiji brought attention to the large sums of money owed to a small number of troop-contributors by the United Nations for troop or contingent-owned equipment costs. Purchasing three additional mission start-up kits would delay repayment. A representative from

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33 A/55/305-S/2000/809
Kenya informed the Special Political and Decolonization Committee that delaying the reimbursement of monies owed caused great hardship to troop- and equipment-contributing countries, especially to developing countries. Cuba shared similar concerns with the other developing countries. Developed countries, though, which have much greater resources available to them, did not express the financial concerns of the developing countries. In the conclusion of this paper will discuss the disparity of resources at greater length. In general, Member States of high incomes favored increasing the resource at the United Nations Logistics Base. On behalf of the European Union and associated States, Greece remarked that the United Nations Logistics Base played a crucial role in rapid deployment and therefore fully supported allocating the requested funds for the Strategic Deployment Stocks. Most Member States, though, favored an alternative to the large, one-time expenditure proposed by the Brahimi Panel and requested that the Secretary-General provide them with details plans for procuring equipment and maintaining the UNLB.

In his Report to the General Assembly on 1 June 2001, Secretary-General, Kofi Annan set forth three alternatives to the Panel’s recommendation for consideration. The first was a "heavy strategic reserve" of equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, which would require the pre-purchase and storage of nearly all the materials of the start-up kits and could entail an initial investment as high as $350 million. The second suggestion in the report was for a "light strategic reserve" option, which would entail substantially lower up-front investments, estimated at $30 million, but would rely on extensive "retainer" contracts for the "just-in-time" delivery of goods and services and would incur very large annual costs.

hypothesized at over $100 million per annum. And the third was a "medium strategic reserve" option, which attempts to keep the initial investment, costs and annual recurring costs at lower levels, with the initial investment at $170 million and the annual recurring costs at $40 million. The Secretary-General’s report recommended the "medium strategic reserve" option as the most economical and practical choice.36

In the 164th meeting of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on 19 June 2001, the delegates took up the issue of augmenting the reserves at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, and the pre-commitment authority of the Secretary-General. The Western Member States, overall, supported budgetary reform that sought to improve the rapid deployment of a mission and were willing to make the financial commitment to peacekeeping. The representative from the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, Stig Elevemar, expressed his support for PMCA. He also conveyed his country’s support for progress toward a rapid deployment system and for the Brahimi Report as a whole, though he, as did most delegates, requested greater detail pertaining to the three options for equipment stocks necessary to achieve the proposed 30/90 days deployment time-lines.37

The Member States associated with the non-alignment movement did not feel that available funds should be spent on increasing the supplies at UNLB when the United Nations owed a large arrearage to troop-contributing states for past operations. The delegation from Zambia made reference to the fact that UN debt owed to Member States that contributed troops to the mission in Sierra Leone alone amassed to $50 million. Members of the non-aligned

movement expressed what could at best be considered a non-committal support for improving the rapid deployment system, and made it clear that no funds should be spent until the United Nations absolved its debt to Members that contributed troops and resources to past peacekeeping operations.  

Ultimately, the need for a strategic deployment stock was recognized, and a resolution endorsing a three-stage plan for implementation was adopted by the General Assembly, without a vote. The first step was to acquire sufficient supplies at United Nations Logistics Base to be able to rapidly deploy a headquarters for a traditional peacekeeping mission. The General Assembly, in a resolution, endorsed “the concept and implementation of the strategic deployment stocks for one complex mission.” In this spirit, the General Assembly approved about US$140 million for the strategic deployment stocks, taking into account the reserve at the UNLB at Brindisi, Italy, as of 30 April 2002 that meets the requirements of the strategic deployment stocks. By December 2002, the DPKO achieved the first significant milestone and promised to make considerable progress toward meeting its second goal, which was to be able to deploy the immediate operational capability required for a traditional peacekeeping mission. 

The second stage of the SDS plan was completed as of 31 December 2003. The strategic stock facilitated the rapid deployment and operational readiness of the UN peacekeeping operations in Liberia and the Cote d’Ivoire, as well as the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the Office of the Special Representative of the

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41 A/RES/56/292.

Secretary-General in Iraq. The third stage is to acquire sufficient strategic deployment stock at UNLB to be able to deploy the immediate operational capacity required for both a tradition and a complex peacekeeping mission. Although at this time the third stage of the plan has not been realized, UNLB continues to make progress toward a fully operational SDS.

With the increase in funds available to the DPKO, there also came a call for greater accountability. According to the terms of the same resolution that authorized SDS, the Secretary-General is required to make a detailed accounting to the General Assembly of all expenditures, and he must submit separate reports on the implementation of strategic deployment stocks and on the budget and performance of the UNLB. General Assembly discussion on peacekeeping support accounts emphasized the importance of effective oversight and strengthening the management of the peacekeeping program, due in part to the enlarged UNLB support account. Bob Jalango, who represented Kenya during a two-day debate on the need for the rapid deployment of United Nations peace operations, expressed concern over the Secretariat’s review of the practices used to procure equipment for a mission. He hoped that the reforms would bring about greater ‘efficiency, propriety, accountability and transparency’ in the process. But he also felt it was important that when procuring goods and services for peacekeeping operations priority should be given to developing countries, especially troop contributing countries in close proximity to the mission area.

In addition to increasing the Secretary-General’s accountability, several Members favored an independent source of review. They supported creating additional posts for the Investigations Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and apportioning the funds for the resident auditor posts from the support accounts, which had previously been funded

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44 GA/PK/175
under individual peacekeeping mission budgets. Some felt that greater oversight would be necessary to avoid misuse of monies because they believed that the number of peacekeeping operations was declining. Japan, for example, argued that the increase in support account for the UNLB would be hard to justify if the current trend in the decrease in the number of peace operations continued. The ABACQ has also made a report drawing similar conclusions. Yet there is no reason to believe that this trend will continue; the UN has peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Haiti, and is preparing for a mission to Iraq.

Result-based budgeting is an additional precaution against the inappropriate use of funds. In the year 2000, the General Assembly authorized the Secretariat to start “results-based budgeting,” which established objectives for each department or program and defined “performance indicators” to measure the progress made toward them. The Secretariat became responsible for “accomplishing missions” as opposed to simply “carrying out activities.” The United States, Japan and the European Union are major proponents of result-based budgeting. Japanese representative Yukio Satoh remarked that “the new systems for determining scales of assessment, result-based budgeting, and progress in reforming human resources management…were particularly important for the administrative and budgetary reform of the Organization.” Under results-based budgeting, the ACABQ and General Assembly would require the Secretary-General to take into account the specific characteristics and mandates of each mission before submitting a budget proposal. The budget must agree with the mandates of

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45 UN General Assembly, “Peacekeeping Support Account, Role of Oversight Services Among Issues Taken Up in Budget Committee,” 57th sess., 12 May 2003, GA/AB/3563.
46 GA/AB/3564
the General Assembly and the proposal must contain all information Member States would need to reach a well-informed decision, “including full justification of required resources.”

**Peacekeeping Receives Some Respect**

The Charter identifies the maintenance of international peace and security as a primary function of the United Nations, but in practice, especially in terms of financing, peace operations have not received priority. Peacekeeping could be a more effective instrument for maintaining international peace and security if it were to receive the necessary funding. The initial hesitation to the Brahimi Panel’s financial recommendations highlighted Member States’ attitude toward peacekeeping, but the Brahimi Report has brought about some positive change in their opinions. Progress has been made toward the budgetary and financial reform suggested by the Brahimi Report, although the national interests of Member States have had a substantial influence over the final outcome. The Secretary-General has received pre-mandate commitment authority, and despite the staff’s initial confusion and unfamiliarity with the available mechanisms, PMCA has been established as a tool of DPKO. But before Member States would grant the Secretariat fiduciary authority, they insisted that the Secretary-General be accountable to the General Assembly. He still must seek the approval of the ACABQ before gaining access to the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, and the Department of Peacekeeping has become subject to results-based budgeting, under which DPKO stands to lose funding for the rapid deployment support accounts if sufficient progress is not made toward pre-determined indicators. If reform does not prove to show sufficient “progress”, the General Assembly reserves the right to reduce or revoke funding. But even with these out-clauses, the changes that have been made to the budget in favor of peacekeeping have created greater possibilities for the department.

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50 GA/AB/3570
The recommendations by the Brahimi Panel discussed in this chapter concern financing and budgetary issues that would force a shift in the Organization’s priorities. Member States have indicated that they are willing to recognize peacekeeping as a primary function of the United Nations by allocating a greater portion of the total budget for peacekeeping operations and allowing the Secretary-General greater flexibility in accessing and spending. The next chapter will explore the Brahimi Panel’s concern for rapid deployment of resources through an examination of the attempt to strengthen the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) and the progress made toward establishing the On-Call List for military personnel and civilian police and personnel. Rapid deployment is a crucial component of effective and efficient peacekeeping operations. The successful establishment of the on-call list and a reliable UNSAS will go far toward making rapid deployment possible, but to do so, Member States will have to cooperate with the Secretariat and possibly surrender a small degree of sovereignty to the United Nations.
Chapter III: The Rapid and Efficient Deployment of Troops
Not Just a Political Mark on the Wall

It cannot be denied that the availability of military force is necessary if the United Nations is to have a role in maintaining international peace and security. According to Article 43 of the Charter, the Security Council was to have an armed force provided by Member States for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. All Member States were to contribute to the force in accordance with individual agreements negotiated with the Military Staff Committee, which was created by the UN Charter to advise the Security Council in military matters. In April of 1947, the Military Staff Committee produced a report describing the general principles that were to govern the organization of the United Nations armed forces, but disagreements persisted over certain details that were never settled due in part to the advent of the Cold War. The members of the Security Council were unable to agree upon the standard by which the required size of the contribution of each Member State would be determined, the timeframe for deployment and withdrawal of troops, and the location of the training base. 51

Cold War politics prevented the Security Council from taking decisive action on a number of issues. When it became obvious that the situation in Korea required assistance, the United Nations had to find a way around the impasse in the Security Council, and the standard of voluntary contribution on an ad hoc basis was set. Weakness and inconsistencies of the ad hoc system became apparent from the beginning. Much time was wasted in the planning stages, and the deployment of missions was delayed as the Secretary-General scrambled to receive commitments from individual Member States once the Security Council issued the mandate for the operation. Although many Member States have outright rejected the idea of a standing army

51 “Report by the Military Staff Committee,” 30 April 1947.
under the control of the United Nations, there exists a general consensus that a more reliable system of troop contribution is necessary.

**UNSAS Substitute for Standing Army**

The United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) was first implemented in 1994. As part of UNSAS, Member States promise to contribute specified resources within an agreed timeframe to be used exclusively for UN peace operations authorized by the Security Council. The UN and individual Member State negotiate pre-arranged terms for the commitment of operation resources. According to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which outlines the terms of each arrangement, “The resources agreed upon remain on ‘standby’ in their home country, where necessary preparation, including training, is conducted to fulfill specified tasks or functions in accordance with United Nations guidelines.” When needed, the Secretary General can request these resources, which are then rapidly deployed with the approval of the Member State.  

As part of the MOU, the Member States assume the responsibility for the costs incurred while troops are on ‘standby’ and are responsible for training personnel for peacekeeping duties.

During the first six years, the system was not as widely embraced as hoped. Both the number and quality of the troops ear-marked by Member States showed lackluster support for the Standby Arrangements System. The Brahimi Report recommended that:

Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days.

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of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{54}

The Brahimi Panel was aware that there was general resistance among Member States to establishing a standing UN army or police force. It was noted that some had avoided entering into reliable standby arrangements with the United Nations, and that Member States did not want to pay for the expenses of building a reserve of equipment.\textsuperscript{55} During a press conference following the release of the Brahimi Report, a reporter asked if it was realistic to expect Member States to approve the proposal to strengthen the UNSAS, given the system’s past performance. Brahimi responded that:

Member States had given the strong impression that they understood the Organization’s unique role, and realized that it should be helped to do better. While the idea of a United Nations army might not be a bad one, Member States did not want that. The standby arrangements system was the next best thing.\textsuperscript{56}

Consistent with the intent of the report, the Brahimi Panel did not strive for the optimal outcome; the recommendation was realistic and obtainable in scope and was meant to achieve the best available solution to a problem. A genuine commitment to the UN Standby Arrangements System would be easier to achieve than a UN army, yet would still make it possible to deploy a mission within the 30-90 day timeframe.

Almost a year following the release of the Brahimi Report, Member States and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations had mixed reactions to the recommendation to strengthen the existing UNSAS. They recognized the benefit of rapid and efficient deployment,

\textsuperscript{54} Report by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, para. 117 (a).
\textsuperscript{55} Report by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, para. 90.
and most Member States agreed that an effort should be made toward this end, but they could not agree on how to go about doing so. Developed countries, in general, responded favorably to the recommendation to strengthen UNSAS, but low-income countries once again raised the issues of finance, necessity and ethics.

Cameron Hume, speaking on behalf of the United States during a meeting of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, made a to-the-point statement concerning UNSAS: “If we want the 30-90 day standard to be more than a political mark on the wall, Member States will have to contribute as conscientiously as they can to the standby arrangements, as well as resources for pre-positioned equipment of some scale.” Substantial commitment has been made since 2001 toward securing pre-positioned equipment. As discussed in Chapter Two the United Nations Logistical Base has developed the capability to deploy the resources needed for one complex mission within the 30-90 day standard and is making advances toward the goal of having the ability to deploy one complex and one traditional peacekeeping operation per year. Progress has been less substantial in the area of the UNSAS. Although Member States have been willing to support the effort, verbally and in writing, active participation is the exception rather than the norm. Even the most active Member States have limited their participation to their discretion.

Officially, the UN has endorsed proposals to strengthen the Standby Arrangements System and make it more relevant. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping has called on the “Secretary General to formally canvass the Member States participating in the United Nations Standby Arrangements System regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential

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operation once it appears likely that the United Nations might have an implementing role. In speech, many Member States have been supportive of reforming the UNSAS to make the system more constructive. Argentina has voiced its support for strengthening the system and stressed the importance of fostering the political will of Member States to cooperate with the United Nations in this endeavor. Indonesia and Byelorussia have also attached great importance to the system, and Turkey claimed to take a leadership role in establishing a more permanent peacekeeping structure. The Republic of Korea pledged in 2001 to increase the size of its standby force. Some Member States have cautioned against relying on the UNSAS. Uruguay would not support creating a standby brigade-strength regional force for UN use; it is concerned that Member States may not be willing to bare the cost of maintaining such a force, as well as the fact that troop deployment is still conditional on the ad hoc approval of the home state.

Actual enrollment in the system has been limited, accounting for less than forty-two percent of Member States. As of the release of the last status report issued by DPKO, in July 2003, eighty Member States have joined the Standby Arrangements System and met at least the requirements for level one. The system has four levels: the first level requires Member States to submit a “List of Capabilities,” which describes what resources, including troops and equipment the Member State would make available to the Security Council for use exclusively in peace operations, along with response times and restrictions. The second level requires the

59 GA/PK/171
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61 Member States that have joined the Standby Arrangements System by year: Chad, Ghana, Jordan, Netherlands, Poland, Sri Lanka, Spain and Syria (1993); Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Guatemala, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Senegal, Turkey, USA, UK and Uruguay (1994); Australia, Bangladesh, Estonia, Ireland, Kenya, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Russian Federation, South Korea, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (1995); Bolivia, Brazil, Germany, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Slovakia, Sweden, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine (1996); China, Greece, Lithuania, Niger, Romania, Singapore and Tunisia (1997); Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Latvia, Mali, Mongolia, Namibia, Paraguay and Thailand (1998); Armenia, Chile and France (1999); Croatia and DR Congo (2002); and Malawi and Peru (2003).
submission of “Planning Data Sheets,” which is a detailed list describing the contribution; this level is essential to the Secretariat’s ability to plan for potential shortcomings in resources available. Ten Member States are currently at the second level and have submitted Planning Data Sheets to the Secretariat. The third level of UNSAS requires a real commitment from Member States, who sign a general Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Secretary-General at this time. In the MOU, the Member State specifies what resources they will provide for a mission, the timeframe in which the materials will be available for deployment and conditions of use; the MOU is a formal document that includes technical data and restrictions on resources.62 Forty-five Member States have signed Memorandums of Understanding with the UN. Many participants of UNSAS have yet to reach this level of commitment; the United States, which joined the system in 1994, has yet to sign a Memorandum of Understanding and remains at level one. Two Member States, Jordan and Uruguay, though, have assumed a significant degree of commitment to UNSAS by joining the new Rapid Deployment Level, which went into effect on 25 July 2002.63 As participants in the Rapid Deployment Level, Member States sign a specific MOU and agree to make the resources commitment to UNSAS available for deployment within 30-90 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution. Level-four status also requires representatives of the Secretariat to visit the Member State to confirm that the promised resources are available and meet the specifications. But similar to the original system, resources can only be deployed following appropriate governmental approval.64

Perhaps more important than the numbers is the quality of the troops contributed by Member States. Missions in the 1990s, at times, received bodies as opposed to peacekeepers.

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62 UN Standby Arrangements System Military Handbook
Some Member States sent ill equipped and/or ill-trained soldiers, forcing troops from other
Member States, or the United Nations, to compensate for the inadequacies:

Soldiers without rifles, or with rifles but no helmets, or with helmets but no flak
jackets, or with no organic transport capability (trucks or troops carriers). Troops may be untrained in peacekeeping operations and… some units have no personnel who can speak the mission language.65

Such troops are a greater liability than asset to a mission, and the Brahimi Report argues that:

Troop-contributing countries that cannot meet the terms or their memoranda of understanding should so indicate to the United Nations, and must not deploy. To that end, the Secretary-General should be given the resources and support needed to assess potential troop contributors’ preparedness prior to deployment, and to confirm that the provisions of the memoranda will be met.66

The issue becomes more pressing as an increasing percentage of troop-contributing countries are developing states.

Eighteen months after the General Assembly ‘took note’ of the Brahimi Report and the Security Council ‘endorsed’ the enhancement of the UN Standby Arrangements System, troops contributed by some Member States were still under-qualified and improperly equipped for the missions to which they had been deployed. Jean-Marie Guehenno, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations expressed his disappointment in the lack of cooperation and commitment shown by Member States to the success of the system. When addressing the General Assembly, he made a pointed assessment of the progress made toward improving the UNSAS:

We need Member States to assure us that the human resources they offer are not only suitable to the task, but also meet appropriate standards… I [have] emphasized the need for the Secretariat to have accurate data, if UNSAS is to be useful in rapid deployment. We have instituted a regime of quarterly reporting to ensure accurate data. Despite these efforts, the response so far, I

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regret to say, has not been adequate. As at 31 January (the due date of the first report), only 21 Member States have provided updates. We can only assume that those who have not done so are not active in the system. On the basis of the present reporting, a total of 44,000 troops are available in UNSAS. This is a significant decrease. Previously, about 147,000 troops were declared available. We will continue this reporting regime, and I hope to be able to report more positively in my annual report at the end of this year.67

Since its introduction in 1994, UNSAS has provided support for operations in Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Haiti, Liberia, Central Africa Republic, Sierra Leone, Lebanon and Western Sahara. The United Nations mission to Haiti, UNMIH, drew nearly seventy-five percent of its personnel from the standby arrangements database.68 The system will also be called upon to assist in the deployment of the United Nations operation to Iraq in the near future, suspected to commence in 2004.

On-Call List Exists in Writing

Another aspect to reforming the United Nations Standby Arrangement System is the establishment of a personnel “On-Call List.” Advances have been made towards fulfilling the Brahimi Report recommendation for the On-Call List of key civilian and military personnel necessary for the start-up and the continued success of a peacekeeping operation. The Military Division of the DPKO has identified 154 positions for which an On-Call List is to be compiled, of which nine posts have been identified as part of the ‘Core Planning Element.’ Qualified personnel who can be ready to fill any position of the Core Planning Element within seven days

notice, as well as a list of qualified persons who can be prepared to fill the remaining positions on the list within fourteen days of notice are nominated by individual Member States.

The Civilian Police Division has completed the design for a model civilian police headquarters that consists of 100 positions and has provided comprehensive job descriptions for each post. Because not all personnel are needed at all times nor can all of the posts be introduced at the same time during the mission, the list has been divided into three stages of development. The Personnel Management and Support Service has also created an On-Call List of 110 specialized posts required for the start-up phase of a field mission. This staff is to be available to fill the posts on 96-hours notice and can remain in the field for up to three months.69

Genuine support for and commitment to the on-call list does exist. Member States ranging from the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland to China and Bangladesh have indicated their support for the recommendation through official channels.70 In October 2002, India went as far as to pledge a brigade and 60 officers to the On-Call List.71 But not all Member States fully support the system, and concern has been expressed over the equitable geographical and gender distribution of the personnel included on the list.

The Non-Aligned Movement in particular is concerned that the on-call list is misrepresentative of geographical and gender distributions. These countries resent what they feel is a gross inequality between the numbers of troops contributed by developing countries and the number of commanders that also come from this part of the world. Speaking on behalf of the

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Nonaligned Movement, Jordanian Ambassador Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein said the three top military posts in a mission should go to contributing states, adding that:

No force commander or senior officer, whatever their competence, should be appointed to a mission where his or her country is not making a sizeable contribution in the form of troops. We certainly do not want to see a situation where the industrialized world begins to supply the commanders while [we], in the developing world, only supply the commanded. 72

Equal representation is a significant concern to the Non-Aligned Movement as they struggle to establish their influence in international relations.

Other members of the Non-Aligned Movement have expressed similar concerns about inequitable distribution of control. Masood Khalid, Pakistani representative, noted that there was still a gap between the views of DPKO and those of several Member States on the On-Call Lists, and that many troop-contributing countries remained severely under-represented at UN Headquarters. 73 Representative from Singapore, Yap Ong Heng, was wary of the current method used to fill the positions of the on-call lists, saying that many Member States have had difficulty nominating personnel for the specific posts, especially developing countries. He recommended establishing a training center to which personnel could be sent to acquire the skills necessary to fulfill the duties of each post, so there is no inequitable or uneven treatment for developed and developing regions. 74 In response to the concerns over geographical representation in recruitment, Guehenno noted that it is the Department’s foremost obligation to identify the most qualified candidate for the position. 75

With regard to military and police on-call lists, results have been varied. At the close of 2003, thirty-nine Member States had nominated a total of 668 personnel for the 147 positions on

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73 GA/PK/175
74 GA/PK/175
75 GA/PK/175
the military on-call list. Other Member States have indicated that they are willing to nominate qualified personnel on an as-need basis. The system has been used to establish the mission headquarters for UN operations in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, but it has yet to meet desired response times, and there has been a lack of familiarity among the personnel with UN practices and procedures. The civilian police list has received very few nominations; only nine countries, at the time of the report, had pledged personnel to fill the posts. With the demand increasing for civilian police officers as UN peace operation progress, the Secretariat urges Member States to participate in the mechanisms established to achieve effective and rapid deployment.76

The Secretariat has had some success in employing the on-call lists. The rapid deployment of civilian personnel has been used to place experienced staff on the ground quickly for the start-up of a mission. The rapid deployment team mechanism has allowed forty-four Department of Peacekeeping Operations staff, mostly in UNMIL, to be deployed to the mission efficiently and effectively. The entire mission support component of UNMIL was also established quickly utilizing the mechanism.77

Although some progress has been made toward strengthening the UNSAS and filling the posts on the on-call lists with qualified personnel, they remain inadequate sources to staff an entire peacekeeping operation. Member States frequently fail to take interest in missions that do not directly affect their national interests. Many view conflicts in which the United Nations has involved itself as regional issues to be dealt with by regional organizations. Such sentiments encourage Member States to refuse the Secretary-General’s request for troops and resources, possibly employing the out-clause contained in their MOU if they participate in the UNSAS. As a result, the UN has looked toward regional organizations and multinational forces to supply

personnel for Security Council sanctioned peacekeeping missions. Member States seem to embrace this alternative to deploying blue helmets, but certain staff of the Secretariat would rather UN conduct peacekeeping operations with UN peacekeeping troops.

**The Regional Force Alternative**

Despite the reforms made in the Standby Arrangements System, regional organizations and multinational forces have received increasing support in recent years. There has emerged an informal consensus that peace operations are a regional concern as opposed to an issue of international peace and security and are therefore not a matter for the United Nations, citing the provision in the UN Charter for the primacy of regional dispute-settling mechanisms. The Charter states that such regional organizations shall partake in enforcement actions under the authority of the Security Council; this is not always the circumstance. While non-UN peacekeepers have played a significant role in several peacekeeping efforts, in other missions the presence of independent troops has proven disastrous. Yet enthusiasm for an alternative to deploying blue helmets continues to grow.

The term regional organization refers to a variety of bodies, formed on a geographic basis, that may deploy peacekeepers with or without authorization from the Security Council, and operate independently of the authority of the Secretariat. Multinational forces refer to ad-hoc alliances created to deal with the particular conflict. Many multinational forces have a ‘lead nation,’ and frequently use force to bring about an end to conflict. These forces, as well, may be deployed with or without authorization of the Security Council, and operate freely from the management of the Secretariat.

Consent, a necessary component for the success of a traditional peacekeeping operation, may be easier to obtain if the peacekeeper are sent on behalf of a regional organization. Forces

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78 Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations encourages regional arrangements for the settlement of disputes.
sent by regional organizations are more likely to be familiar with the customs and traditions of the local population; the greater the similarities in cultural ideals and physical appearance, the more likely the people are to welcome the peacekeepers and pacify any feelings of intrusion. The troops themselves may be more homogenous, better trained and equipped, and operate more efficiently because they will likely share a language and have strong political motivations in seeing the mission succeed.

Yet this is frequently not the circumstance. Most regional organizations and multinational forces do not have the capacity of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union. Many regional organizations and multinational forces are comprised of developing countries that lack the finances and resources to properly train and adequately equip their troops and personnel. Even when the resources are available, such forces are not as politically cohesive as desired, and these forces may be prevented from taking action due to conflict in political interests, very similar to the political difficulties that have prevented the Security Council from taking action.79

Financial difficulty is not the only obstacle facing multinational forces and regional organizations. When the resources are available, problems with chain of command have resulted in casualties during United Nations peace operations in which both non-United Nations and blue helmet peacekeepers have been deployed. Both the missions in Bosnia, UNPROFOR, and Somalia, UNOSOM and UNITAF, experienced difficulties associated with having multiple chains of command. In UNPROFOR, NATO operated along side the UN peacekeepers; both the forces were responsible to separate commanders and received orders independent of each other. NATO had command over the air strikes, while the Secretary-General managed the peacekeepers

on the ground. Coordinating efforts proved to be difficult at times. Similar problems with coordinating efforts plagued UNOSOM and UNITAF, or United Task Force, which was comprised of troops from over twenty countries, primarily the United States. UNITAF was sanctioned by the Security Council at the suggestion of the United States, but remained outside the command of the Secretary-General. The fractured command structure intensified the seriousness of the implications of the U.S. Ranger’s black hawk helicopter being shot down by supporters of General Mohamed Farah Aidid. As a result, the United States withdrew its troops and support from Somalia.80

Multinational forces and regional organizations are growing in number and size. NATO, for example, admitted seven new members on 2 April 2004. The induction Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia was the largest expansion of the alliance in its 55-years of existence.81 The regional organization of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been sending soldiers from its member states to intervene in regional crises since 1990. The troops of ECOWAS will soon join the ranks of the African Union Force, which leaders hope will begin operations sometime in 2005, and be fully operational by 2010. The African Standby Force will be comprised of brigades originating from north, west, east, south and central Africa. Intervention will take place on humanitarian and peace-building grounds, as well as in cases of genocide and serious threats to legitimate order. An African body modeled on the UN Security Council will have the sole authority to deploy,

manage and terminate the force’s missions. It has already sent peacekeeping troops to Burundi, but the mission has been plagued by financial problems.\(^8^2\)

Julian Hartson, Director of the Middle East and Asian division of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, argues that delegating UN authority to organizations that do not fall under the operational control of the United Nations could potentially undermine the standing of a Security Council mandate, as could suggestions that conflicts are addressed according to a de facto class system, whereby high interest by major powers translates into engagement of NATO, or multinational forces; moderate interest leads to the use of United Nations operations; and low interest leads to delegation to other regional organizations. Regular reliance upon regional or multinational forces activities in one part of the world is likely to beget imitation in another, and ultimately is likely to favor the development of competing spheres of influence.\(^8^3\)

Deployment of peacekeeping operations under the flag of the United Nations may pose fewer problems than those encountered when operations are composed of multiple flags with different objectives. UNSAS offers a legitimate alternative to a standing UN army. The pro-rated pay scale used to finance missions and compensate personnel guarantees that the troops from developing countries are not at a disadvantage. Because troops are paid by the United Nations and not by the individual country that contributed the personnel, troops from developing countries, in general, are compensated at a higher rate than they would be if employed by their home country. Centers to train volunteers for the posts included on the military and civilian on-call lists would ensure a familiarity with UN procedure and practice and eliminate another


\(^8^3\) Julian Hartson, 10 March 2004.
disadvantage frequently cited by developing countries. Because UN peacekeeping was founded on the principle of impartiality and based on mutual consent, blue helmet troops are less likely to have ulterior political motives; their ultimate objective is peace.

This chapter examined the progress made toward achieving rapid and efficient deployment of a peacekeeping operation, without which it is difficult for missions to be effective. The Brahimi Report recommended that the United Nations Standby Arrangements System be enhanced through securing more dependable and realistic Memorandums of Understandings from Member States, and that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations establish an On-Call List for military personnel, as well as civilian personnel and police to which Member States appoint qualified persons. Although an increasing number of Member States have joined the UNSAS, they represent less than half of the members of United Nations, and just over half of these countries have signed MOU. The On-Call Lists have been established, and sufficient persons have been nominated to fill each post, but some Member States contend the lists may not be equitably representative geographically and in terms of gender. Although neither mechanism has reached its potential envisioned by the Brahimi Report, both mechanisms are operational and have been successfully employed in recent peacekeeping missions.

Chapter Four addresses the controversy that accompanied the suggestion that the United Nations establish a fine-tuned intelligence agency to fulfill the information and strategic analysis needs of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS). Referred to as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis System (EISAS) in the Brahimi Report, its objective is to equip the United Nations with the capacity to anticipate potential areas of conflict, making early intervention possible. This effort would require the cooperation of multiple entities within the Secretariat as well as the consent of Member States. EISAS represents the third category of
fundamental reform identified by the Brahimi Report as necessary for the DPKO; the Secretariat would have to undergo organizational and structural reform far beyond that assumed during the first series of reforms initiated by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1997. This level of reorganization would prove that the UN has the ability to adapt to ever-changing international political relations. But reform has encountered difficulties originating from both inside the Organization and Member States.
Chapter IV: Enhancing the Intelligence Capability of the United Nations: Requires Internal Determination

The reform that this chapter discusses is fundamentally different from reforms discussed in the previous chapters. First, establishing the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis System (EISAS) requires creating something new, as opposed to enhancing an existing mechanism of the United Nations. The UNSAS, the logistic base in Brindisi, Italy, and the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund existed before the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations issued their report. Secondly, these reforms will require cooperation of both Member States and the individual departments of the Secretariat. The importance of interdepartmental cooperation has been recognized both within the Secretariat and by Member States, but it has proven difficult to achieve. Both Member States and staff have shown hesitation to proceed with the recommendation for the EISAS, but for very different reasons. Currently very little has been done to create the proposed cross-departmental intelligence agency.

EISAS: The Vision

The Brahimi Panel proposed a new information-gathering and strategic planning unit be created to support the informational and strategic analysis needs of the Secretariat and the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), which was established during the 1997 reforms. In January 1997, the Secretary-General initiated institutional reforms throughout the Secretariat, which reorganized the management of the Secretariat’s responsibilities around the five areas that comprise the core missions of the United Nation. The organization and structure of all UN departments, programs and funds were effected. Five Executive Committees were designed as instruments of policy development, decision-making
and management; peace and security issues became the responsibility of the ECPS. It was feared that without such an entity, the Secretariat would never progress beyond a reactive institution, unable to become a truly effective tool in maintaining international peace and security, and the ECPS will not fulfill the role for which it was created.

The EISAS of the Brahimi Report would be the focal point of the United Nation’s conflict prevention capability. Its primary function would be to create and maintain an integrated database pertaining to issues of peace and security and to distribute that knowledge efficiently to the appropriate organs of the UN. The knowledge the unit obtained would also be used to generate policy analysis for the DPKO, formulate long-term strategies for the ECPS, and bring potential crises to the attention of its leadership. It would also propose and manage the agenda of ECPS itself, helping transform it into the decision-making body conceived of by the Secretary-General in his 1997 reform package.

Attempting to utilize existing UN resources and structures to meet its ends, the Brahimi Panel recommended consolidating the existing Situation Center of the DPKO with a number of the small, uncoordinated policy planning offices, combined with a small team of military analysts, experts in international criminal networks and information systems specialists. Annan argued in favor of establishing the EISAS as a facilitator of information sharing, cooperation and coordination among the departments of the Secretariat.

This structure would allow much better use of the wealth of information already existing within the United Nations system and in open public sources. It would ensure that the humanitarian and development perspective is part of the strategic analysis work and of the mission planning process. It would

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facilitate better cooperation and coordination between the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other parts of the system, as called for by Member States. It would provide analytical support for the formulation by the system of policy options and medium- to long-term strategies of a crosscutting nature, which increasingly require a multidisciplinary approach. And, finally, it would help move the Organization to a point where, in close collaboration with the Member States concerned, it is able to better analyze, and target its resources at, the root causes of potential conflicts. Surely, we can all agree on the importance of this service. 87

In sum, EISAS would create a more efficient UN Headquarters, by providing a single source for information from which the entire Secretariat could draw. It would eliminate the unnecessary expenditure of resources by multiple departments working on the same or similar projects due to lack of coordination. EISAS would be a fine-tuned intelligence agency that could be a valuable asset to United Nations peacekeeping operations.

**EISAS: The Controversy**

On the record, the initial reaction of Member States to EISAS was positive. In resolution 1327 (2000), the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposal for EISAS as set forth in S/2000/1081. In a later resolution, the Security Council acknowledged the advantages to peacekeeping if the Secretariat had such intelligence and analytical capabilities:

8. The Security Council reiterates that the Secretary-General should possess the capacity for efficient information gathering and analysis to provide credible, objective analyses and sound advice to support the Council’s deliberations during mandate formation, periodic or episodic review of a mandate and consideration of withdrawal of a mission. 88


But the language employed by the Security Council is weak; the resolution simply endorses the suggestions made by the Brahimi Report. None of the terms of the resolutions passed by the Security Council require action to be taken by either Member States or the United Nations. The Security Council restrained itself to only voicing its approval of the idea.

The EISAS was subject to a wide variety of praise and criticism, similar to that which was expressed during debate over other aspects of the Brahimi Report. The developed countries that are traditionally active in peacekeeping operations came out as the strongest advocates of the system; the developing countries were much more critical of the proposal. Early on it became evident that the fate of EISAS would not be an easy decision. The Secretary-General has been quoted saying, “One area where we seem to have run into some controversy is this whole area of information, if you need to set up a unit, you have to gather information for planning purposes to be able to anticipate. And so we're going to have to do quite a bit of convincing on that aspect.”

But despite all the obvious benefits EISAS would bring to the United Nations, some Member States were not convinced.

For the most part, developed states supported the EISAS. They realized the value of a modern intelligence agency to DPKO and the UN. The Canadian delegation, which is a strong proponent of strengthening the DPKO, wants to eliminate macro-management by reinforcing the management and planning functions of the department. Canada is adamant on granting the Secretary-General information-gathering, analysis and dissemination capabilities. To be effective in the ever-changing international political environment, the DPKO needs the ability to anticipate and prepare for possible conflicts; Canada is committed to realizing this goal. Stig Elvemar, a representative of the European Union, supports strengthening the logistic planning

and support abilities of the DPKO. The European Union backed the Brahimi Report proposal for a new system-wide policy and information analysis system. Russia has also found it important to strengthen the information and analytical capacity of the Organization,\textsuperscript{90} and the Rio-Group\textsuperscript{91} maintains that establishing a special organ for the compilation of data and analysis of information is of extreme importance to the success of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{92}

In general, a majority of Member States are not as zealous as Canada to grant the Secretary-General and DPKO unlimited authority. Many acknowledge the need to process and analyze information, but would prefer a less powerful alternative to the EISAS of the Brahimi Report. Egypt has been supportive of the United Nations developing the capacity for strategic planning and information analysis. It favors creating an independent information gathering and analysis unit for areas and situations in which the United Nations is involved. But Egypt is wary of granting the UN the authority to gather information on areas where the Organization is not formally involved. Classifying unrestricted intelligence as a delicate issue, they have asked for a clear definition of the term ‘analysis’, which would allay their concerns about abuse of the proposed capacity. Pakistan has also asked that clear and precise terms of reference for the proposed unit be presented to the Special Committee of Peacekeeping Operations.\textsuperscript{93}

Furthermore, Nepal agreed the Secretary-General needs a system-wide analysis unit to process and analyze information, but believed that EISAS would be problematic for both Member States

\textsuperscript{90} UN General Assembly, “Allocation of Significant Resources Testifies to Importance of UN Peacekeeping, Fifth Committee Told as it Concludes Peacekeeping Discussion,” 31 October 2001, GA/AB/3473.
\textsuperscript{91} Created in 1986, the Permanent Mechanism of Political Consultation and Coordination, known as the Rio Group, is meant to systemize political cooperation among the Member States. The membership includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, and a representative for the Caribbean Community.
\textsuperscript{92} GA/PK/170
\textsuperscript{93} GA/PK/170
and the Secretariat because to collect the information it requires creating a new bureaucracy, or substantially expanding an existing one.\textsuperscript{94}

Some Member States are more hostile to the idea of allowing the UN extensive intelligence capabilities. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is concerned with maintaining the balance of power within the United Nations. Its members insist on commitment to decision making based on consent and to the settlement of disputes, whenever possible, through non-force mechanisms. When discussing the possibility of creating EISAS, the countries that identify themselves as the non-aligned movement worry about the attention given to the idea of strategic planning. Some NAM countries want the analysis and logistics division separated into two independent units because they are concerned with possible abuse of the proposed capacity for strategic planning. These Member States are also uncomfortable with the fact that there is no timeframe attached to the definition of the division’s intended purpose of long-term analysis. They fear that if specific parameters are not defined, the UN will be more likely to overstep its bounds and abuse the power. Other countries argued that the United Nations currently has in existence entities with such capabilities, so there is no real need for an additional intelligence division of the DPKO. South Africa demanded that the need to transform the Best Practices Unit into the Peacekeeping Strategic Planning Unit be clarified, because it was unconvinced by the claims made by the Brahimi Panel. Algeria, in association with the non-aligned movement, has pointed out that the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Public Information already perform some of the information analysis called for by the Brahimi Report.\textsuperscript{95}

Delaying the establishment of EISAS has also received substantial support from both Member States and within the Organization. The ACABQ recommended that the unit not be

\textsuperscript{94} UN SKPO, “Special Committee on Peacekeeping Stresses Consultation with Troop Contributors, Exit Strategies, Personnel Protection, Gender Component for Mandates,” 164\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, 19 June 2001, GA/PK/172.
\textsuperscript{95} GA/PK/170
established at that time until further examination of the management structure was conducted because it wanted a clarification of the intricacies of the system. Russia supported the advice of the ACABQ, agreeing that additional information would be beneficial before endorsing EISAS. The Indian delegation criticized the Brahimi Report, arguing that the creation of EISAS would not make “a lot of difference to a peacekeeping operation” or the peacekeepers involved. While they were open to the Strategic Planning Unit, the Indian delegation did not believe that the more powerful analytical brain of EISAS was necessary and favored delaying serious deliberation over the EISAS because it was not an issue of emergency.

While there is some validity to the claims that the capacity for information analysis exists to a certain degree in the existing divisions of the Secretariat, very little cooperation exists between these divisions, and, even when viewed in its entirety, the Secretariat does not have near the intelligence and analytical capacity that would be achieved through the creation of EISAS. In attempt to gain some progress, the Secretary-General, in a report to the General Assembly, proposed a scaled-down version of the EISAS presented in the Brahimi Report. The revised version was fashioned to take into account some of the concerns expressed by the Member States; it focused more on strengthening the capacity of the ECPS by enhancing the information capacity of DPKO, the Department of Political Affairs and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The revised EISAS did not include the cartographic office or the media monitoring capabilities that the Brahimi Panel conceived for the system, and the revised proposal placed a heavier burden on the Department of Public Information to fulfill the responsibility of

The conclusion of this paper will attempt to clarify the underlying reasons why Member States object to aspects of EISAS.

**Internal Barriers to Reform**

The fate of EISAS has largely been a product of political pressure from Member States, but United Nations personnel have also had an effect. While some Member States are concerned with abuse of power and the misuse of resources, a majority support improving coordination and cooperation among the relevant departments of the Secretariat. The Secretariat staff, however, is concerned with the effort required for coordinating the work of various departments.

In an informal conversation, the Senior Political Affairs Office for the Asia and Middle East division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Mary Eliza Kimball remarked on the difficulty of accomplishing interdepartmental cooperation. She said that the difficulties surrounding the EISAS went beyond the lack of political will of the Member States to the lack of will of the staff members of the United Nations, because it required coordinating the separate entities of the Secretariat. She noted that even members of the Brahimi Panel were skeptical of successfully organizing such interdepartmental meetings. They themselves were not enthusiastic about devoting the time and effort necessary to make such cooperation possible; it imposes yet another duty on the already over-extended and understaffed departments of the Secretariat.99

In a report released in February 2004, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) identified four major factors impeding full implementation of United Nations reform proposed in 1997 and by the Brahimi Report. One of them was the reluctance of UN managers, who resisted implementing certain reforms. Yet managerial support is critical for the

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98 GA/AB/3415
99 Ms. Mary Eliza Kimball, interviewed by author, Milton, Massachusetts, 10 March 2004.
institutionalization of reforms in the long term. When the GAO interviewed UN managers, the typical response was that the departments lacked the resources to support regular monitoring and evaluation exercises required for the reform, and that these evaluation requirements would detract time and money from the department’s primary responsibilities. Despite managerial resistance, the report did conclude that lack of cooperation from Member States was a greater impediment to reform than that posed by the management and that reform under the Secretary-General advanced faster than that under the authority of Member States.\textsuperscript{100}

**Responsibilities Intended for One Unit Spread Among Many**

After subsequent proposals meant to enhance the intelligence capabilities of the United Nations, discussion concerning the establishment of one organ within the Organization that remotely resembles EISAS has ceased. Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno has said that the revisions to the system were made to reflect the concerns of the Member States.\textsuperscript{101} Rather than one agency within the Secretariat whose main purpose is intelligence gathering and analysis, the responsibilities of the EISAS that received the least criticism were divided among separate units of the Secretariat. The focus shifted from creating a new unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to ensuring the best use of the existing resources. Efforts have been made to improve the effectiveness of the Best Practices Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Public Information and the Situation Center.


\textsuperscript{101} GA/AB/3415
The potential policy analysis capability of the Best Practices Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping has received substantial attention. It is hoped that the unit will prove to be a useful tool in the planning and management of peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{102} Using information gathered during previous peacekeeping operations and conflicts in which the United Nations was involved, the Best Practices Unit is expected to make policy recommendations for conducting future missions. The unit is to judge whether past efforts were effective and base its conclusions on this analysis. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations envisioned that:

The Unit needs to be able to develop generic guidelines, procedures and best practices and to incorporate lessons learned into all aspects of today’s peacekeeping operations. The Unit should have the capacity to mainstream best practices into the planning of new operations, provide feedback to missions in the field, interact effectively with other entities within the Department and with other relevant parts of the Secretariat and continue to participate as appropriate in integrated mission task forces.\textsuperscript{103}

In an attempt to honor the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel to streamline the Secretariat and increase efficiency by preventing efforts of individual departments from overlapping, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations stated in its report of 11 March 2002, that for no reason is the Best Practices Unit to duplicate the work done by other departments of the United Nations, and the Committee also called for the Best Practices Unit to be renamed to better reflect its responsibilities.\textsuperscript{104}

Currently, the Best Practices Unit resembles the organ described by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. It has a staff of 14 personnel, ten of which are funded through the DPKO support account and four of which are included in the DPKO regular budget. The unit is responsible for coordinating the assessment of United Nations peacekeeping

\textsuperscript{103} A/56/863, para. 68.
\textsuperscript{104} A/56/863, para. 69.
experiences, keeping detailed records of the procedures followed during a mission and the results. The Best Practices Unit is called upon to conduct lessons learned exercises, including a series of ‘After Action Reports,’ which are to stimulate informed discussion of current issues in peacekeeping. One report, for example, discussed the extent to which the existing pre-mandate commitment authority mechanisms were adequate to meet the future needs of DPKO, in light of MINUCI. The Unit also evaluates the successes and failures of a mission to determine which practices are effective. From this analysis of best practices and lessons learned during a mission, the unit tries to establish guidelines and make recommendations for better planning, conduct, management and support of peacekeeping operations.105 Thus, in 2002, the Best Practices Unit began preparing a manual for multi-dimensional peacekeeping. The manual is a compilation of policy and operational information, as well as guidelines and standard operating procedures.

In the same report of 11 March 2002, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations outlined the responsibilities of the Situation Center. The center has been assigned the responsibility of gathering information and monitoring current situations. It serves as a point of contact and a constant communication link between the field and Headquarters through the life of a peacekeeping operation. It also functions as a monitoring mechanism, though it is limited to present peacekeeping mission areas, and situations and security threats that have been identified as such by the United Nations. The center is not permitted to survey areas in which other UN organs are not involved. After gathering the appropriate information about the monitored areas, it provides daily situation reports and situation briefings to other UN organs. Because the center is responsible for monitoring all peacekeeping operations, it also has the duty of notifying Member States of casualties incurred during a mission. Because it is the best single source of

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information on current missions, when necessary, it functions as a crisis center for the crisis management team.\textsuperscript{106}

Despite the current state of hibernation the discussion of EISAS has assumed, the quest to augment the intelligence and strategic planning capabilities of the Secretariat has not been abandoned. There is an active effort to plug into information and analysis providers beyond the Organization, especially an increasing number of think tanks located in New York City. When it became apparent that instituting EISAS was not immediately possible, donor governments, especially the United Kingdom looked to funding think tanks to work alongside the UN to increase its intelligence and strategic planning capabilities. One think tank that the Secretary-General has worked with is the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, which is funded by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). The forum as a staff of only four people who write country reviews for areas in which the United Nations becomes involved; they also set up workshops to inform and train United Nations personnel in areas relevant to the particular peace operation. The efforts of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum have proven very useful. As a result of an increasing dependency on a number of think tanks for strategic planning, the Department of Political Affairs has launched an internal review of the relationships between the Secretary-General and outside organizations.\textsuperscript{107}

The Knowledge Project, headed by Dr. Thant Myint-U of the Department of Political Affairs, in cooperation with the Social Science Resources Council, is an in-house review that was spurred by the Brahimi Report.\textsuperscript{108} The project operates on the premise that the UN Secretariat needs a greater capacity for strategic planning so that it can provide senior officials

\textsuperscript{106} UN Headquarters, “The Structure and Responsibilities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.”
\textsuperscript{107} Dr. Thant Myint-U, interviewed by author, via telephone, 26 April 2004.
\textsuperscript{108} David Harland, Director of the Department of Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, interviewed by author, via email, 7 April 2004.
with options when the UN intervenes in a conflict. It reviews the relationship that exists between the Secretariat and think tanks, and asks whether the cooperation served the UN’s purpose, whether the Secretariat should be associated in such a way with these outside organizations, and what would be the right relationship to develop between the Secretariat and the think tanks. The Knowledge Project seeks to understand the Secretary-General’s information analysis needs; what the capabilities are currently available to him, and how they are being provided; and what additional outside resources will be necessary to fulfill the needs of the Secretariat, including relationships with think tanks and universities. They also hope to suggest ways to utilize resources beyond those in geographic proximity to United Nations Headquarters. At this time, the Knowledge Project is still in progress; the committee expects to deliver its conclusions to the Secretary-General sometime this June. Preliminary findings suggest that think tanks and universities are great assets to the United Nations.

The Knowledge Project is likely to conclude that problems of the Secretariat are as much the result of the demand side as the supply side; no formal information request process exists. Even if the Secretary-General had unlimited resources at his disposal, the Secretariat lacks any formal policy planning process; it is not designed to be proactive. Its original purpose was to execute the decisions of the other organs of the United Nations. As such the Secretariat is well equipped to handle the technical side of the process, but it lacks any formal mechanism or even the culture necessary to undertake strategic planning.109

The GAO report came to similar conclusions.110 EISAS was meant to solve this problem; it would have created a central place for all information and where all relevant work could be feed. Outside organizations have the potential to provide the United Nations with vital

109 Interview with Dr. Thant Myint-U.
110 GAO Report 04-339
information and strategic planning abilities, which would otherwise be unavailable to the Organization due to current information-gathering restrictions. But Secretariat must first complete organizational reform and revise how it understands its function before it will be able to fully utilize the resources available for strategic planning.

In reference to EISAS as proposed by the Brahimi Report, Director of DPKO Best Practices Unit, David Harland admits, “The capabilities that remain are spread around the Organization.” By dispersing the capabilities envisioned for the EISAS among a variety of units within the Secretariat, a fundamental importance of the recommendation has been lost. The concentration of United Nations intelligence capacity within a single unit was meant to increase efficiency and effectiveness, which is impossible when the duties are spread among various departments and divisions because it requires coordinating the efforts of separate offices. When these responsibilities remain within a single unit, coordination and cooperation are no longer issues. If the United Nations is forced to seek necessary information and intelligence for peacekeeping operations from outside of the Organization, the issues of coordination and cooperation have the potential to become even more difficult.

Although the Secretariat has not been allotted some of the far-reaching intelligence capabilities of EISAS, the entire significance of system was not lost in the modifications. The Best Practices Unit has received greater attention since the release of the Brahimi Report, and greater emphasis has been placed on developing guidelines and standard operating procedures for multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. The Situation Center has been enhanced, and priority has been placed on gathering information during United Nations operations that may prove useful in future efforts of the United Nations. Peacekeeping policy analysis has been identified as a task of the Department of Political Affairs, and the Department of Public

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111 Interview with David Harland, 7 April 2004.
Information has dedicated more resources to efforts relating to Peacekeeping. Any attention afforded to the subject of increasing the effectiveness of peacekeeping forces the Organization to recognize the significance of strategic planning to peacekeeping. The debate that originated over EISAS has not ended. The Knowledge Project promises to continue the discussion, and it may even force the Secretariat to examine problems with the structure of the organization, which is as much a problem as opposition of Member States.
Conclusion: Brahimi Report Catalyst for Slow Progress

Peace and international stability are in the interest of all countries. International collective security is a difficult goal to achieve. It requires the political willingness and financial backing of individual sovereign states that most likely have no direct national interest in the situation. UN Peacekeeping is an arrangement that best resembles genuine collective security. But the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been plagued with a lack of political will and financial difficulties. The Report by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations was meant to provide a means by which to prevail over these problems. It is important to keep in mind that the Brahimi Panel was given only four months in which to identify the underlying difficulties of UN peace operations, and then make realistic recommendations that would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping. Despite the unparalleled expertise of the panel, it would be unfair to demand perfection under such time restrictions. The Brahimi Report should not be judged as a fix-all, but rather as a catalyst for reform and progress. The Special Committee on Peace Operation recognized that it was only the beginning of reforms to come. Only a percentage of the Brahimi Panel’s suggestions have been followed and many have been altered, but the Brahimi Report has forced Member States and the Organization to scrutinize the existing mechanisms, triggering real progress.

No provision in the UN Charter establishes an authority for peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping has suffered because it lacks clear definition, but the UN has repeatedly refused to set parameters that might restrict its use. The first major step toward institutionalizing peace operations came in 1997, when the post of Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations was created. The Brahimi Report sought to elevate the status of peacekeeping

operations further through budgetary reform, and force Member States to recognize the primacy of peacekeeping. The pre-mandate commitment authority (PMCA) requires a level of trust in the Secretary-General and DPKO, and places a degree of importance on sufficient funding for peacekeeping operations that did not previously exist. The Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) involves a substantial commitment of resources to peacekeeping missions that are not easily liquidated. The After Action Report issued by the Best Practices Unit following MUNCI confirmed that the budgetary mechanisms of PMCA are in place and available to the Secretary-General.  

The goal set for the SDS maintained at the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) is to acquire the resources and logistical capabilities to support the start-up of one traditional and one complex peacekeeping operation per annum, and it is on schedule to be completed. The SDS differs from the suggestion of the Brahimi Report to acquire additional start-up kits to be kept at UNLB, for a total of five, because after serious debate, the cost-benefit analysis of the original suggestion proved to be inadequate. The subject was not dismissed, though, once the original suggestion was abandoned. Instead the Secretary-General was asked to submit an alternative and after several revisions, the results of the discussion spurred by the Brahimi Report have proven effective. UNLB has already facilitated the deployment of the UN peace operations in Liberia and the Cote d’Ivoire, as well as the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Iraq. Member States, after expressing some apprehension, have embraced peacekeeping as a legitimate power afforded to the United Nations. The reoccurring arguments against budgetary reforms serve to highlight the significance of allocating finances; how money is spent is of great interest to states.

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113 See page 25.
Progress has also been made toward improving the effectiveness of UN peace operations. Many of the mechanisms needed to deploy a peacekeeping operation rapidly and efficiently are in place. The On-Call Lists for key military and civilian personnel, as well as crucial command positions for civilian police, exist and are operational. The Rapid Deployment Level has been added to the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) and has received Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from two Member States. Since the Brahimi Report, the number of participants in the UNSAS has increased significantly because the Brahimi Panel emphasized the value of peacekeeping to the international community. The success of these mechanisms, nevertheless, hinges upon the political will of Member States, but there have been small signs that countries may be reevaluating a former indifference toward the fate of UN peacekeeping operations. The intent of the budgetary reform was to increase the resources available to peacekeeping so that Member States might be more willing to contribute troops.

The international community’s confidence in peacekeeping is a critical component in determining political will. The hardships experienced by the UN missions to Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990’s, coupled with an increase in the media exposure, caused the international community to loose confidence UN peacekeeping operations. Under Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guehenno hopes that an increase in the initial supplies for peacekeeping operations will lead to more effective and efficient missions, which will result in an increase in confidence in the abilities of the United Nations. A renewal of confidence in the Organization that existed in the early 1990s may encourage countries to participate in the UNSAS, easing the burden on the Secretary-General to secure resources, especially troops, for peacekeeping operations, and there is reason to believe that it is possible. The United Nations will look to UNSAS to field the upcoming mission to Haiti. Member States have already committed troops to the operation in

\[114\, \text{GA/AB/3420}\]
Haiti, including the United States, which has been reluctant to engage in recent peacekeeping operations, and Brazil, which has agreed to command the operation.115

But the success of peacekeeping is dependent on more than the political will of Member States. It also requires the cooperation and coordination of well-established institutions that can meet the needs of peacekeeping; these entities must be forward looking to cope with the unpredictable nature of international relations. The ECSP Information and Strategic Analysis System (EISAS) would have better equipped the UN to anticipate future conflicts, placing it in a better position to resolve the problem quickly, and its strategic analysis component would have made it easier for the UN to manage unprecedented situations. But little progress has actually been made to improve UN intelligence capabilities. The EISAS has been de-clawed and dispersed around the Organization, making a complex web of otherwise unconnected departments within the Secretariat. This is exactly what the Brahimi Panel wanted to avoid. Previous attempts at restructuring the Secretariat have shown that it is a challenge to achieve effective interdepartmental coordination, due in part to lack of will among staff. EISAS was meant to concentrate the necessary intelligence mechanisms into one entity, eliminating the need for complicated, time- and resource-consuming interdepartmental cooperation. But Member States viewed the EISAS as threat to their national sovereignty and a potential to upset the delicate international balance of power.

**Concerns Expressed Have Validity**

The concerns raised by the Member States may seem petty and insignificant compared to the objectives of the Brahimi Report, but many of their concerns are warranted. Peacekeeping

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operations occur almost exclusively in developing countries, so developing countries take interest in when and in what conflicts the United Nations becomes involved. Balance of power in the UN is frequently an issue that is raised by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Developing states lack the access to the resources readily available to the developed states, especially in reference to information technology.\textsuperscript{116} Delegations that represent the developing countries tend to lack the depth and numbers enjoyed by the delegations from developed countries. Also NAM does not have permanent representation on the Security Council, which is responsible for crafting peacekeeping operation mandates, and therefore developing countries are less able to influence the trajectory of the United Nations, despite possessing a majority in the General Assembly.

The desire to maintain the international balance of power and to guarantee national sovereignty drives international politics, which in turn affects states’ attitudes toward the UN. Developing countries are not only in competition with other states, but with the United Nations as well. These Member States are wary that the UN will establish intelligence capabilities that can potentially be used against them to violate their national sovereignty. Because of the technology gap that exists between developed and developing countries, the developed countries would have most likely equipped and staffed the proposed EISAS. The concern for balance of power goes beyond abuse of intelligence capabilities; many Member States have called for reform of the Security Council because they believe the current framework creates an imbalance of power in favor of the already powerful Member States and excludes the interests of the smaller Members. EISAS could potential widen the gap between the NAM and developed countries by making the United Nations further reliant on the later.

\textsuperscript{116} UN General Assembly, “Under Secretary-General Describes Transformed Public Information Department with Renewed Focus, Clarity of Purpose in Statement to Fourth Committee,” 57\textsuperscript{th} sess., 29 October 2002, GA/SPD/248.
Financing is a grave concern to the developing countries, because a vast majority of the world’s wealth is controlled by very few of the world’s countries. In 2002, the total value of all the goods and services produced by the entire world was valued at 32,312,147 million U.S. dollars. The richest seven countries account for over two-thirds of the total GDP; the United States alone produced roughly a third of the world’s goods. With U.S. GDP reported at 10,383,100 million U.S. dollars, the United States has a GNP roughly equal to the combined size of 201 out of the 208 economies tracked by the World Bank.\(^{117}\) Yet an increasing majority of peacekeeping troops come from low income Member States. They tend to fully support the UN in its pursuit to maintain international peace and security, but they fear that they are bearing a greater share of the responsibilities.

Money was an issue during every debate over suggested reforms. The Non-aligned Movement would have liked the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund to be secondary to resolving UN debt to Member States. The On-Call List sparked the question of who would pay to train the necessary military personnel and civilian police and personnel. Because of their developing status, money is a legitimate concern to the NAM. Many Member States are owed large arrearages for their contributions to peace operations; between 30 June 2003 and 29 February 2004, the UN took out loans totaling approximately $152 million to support ongoing peace operations.\(^{118}\) By the end of 2003, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which has monitored the cease-fire line between Israel and Syria since October 1974, had accrued approximately $26 million in unpaid assessments, which was money owed to


\(^{118}\) GA/AB/3604.
Member States that contribute troops to the Force.\textsuperscript{119} The cash shortage was due in part to substantial arrearages that developed countries owed the United Nations, particularly the United States.

In 1998, Member States owed $977 million for the regular budget; the U.S., as the Organization’s largest contributor, accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total arrears. The U.S. had accumulated such a substantial debt to the UN that the U.S. was in jeopardy of losing its vote in the General Assembly; because the U.S. failed to pay its UN dues, it did lose its seat on the ACABQ. In June 1998, the U.S. owed the UN about $1.5 billion in dues and assessments. This debt included over $965 million for peacekeeping operations, yet the U.S pushed for peacekeeping reform.\textsuperscript{120} The Clinton administration praised the Brahimi Report, in part because it did not require large sums of money. The Democratic administration supported UN plans to expand the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, southern Lebanon and the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, but the Republican Congress refused to appropriate adequate funds.\textsuperscript{121} In December 2000, the United Nations was forced to modify the scale by which dues were assessed, and the U.S. share was reduced. The United States has since devised a repayment plan with the UN based on the adjusted scale. Had the U.S. kept current with its payments to the UN, the objections to the Brahimi Report voiced by the NAM would have been considerably weakened. Because of U.S. failure to pay its UN debts, the NAM had justification to impede the reforms. Before money could be spent on improving the current system, developing countries wanted assurance that the UN would make good on its existing debt.


New Issues Raised

Peacekeeping is a gray area for the United Nations. There is no legal basis for peacekeeping to be found in the UN Charter, and although there are certain principles associated with UN peacekeeping, the institution has never been defined. As such, it is unclear what resources and capabilities should be placed at the disposal of the DPKO. The constant debate over the finance and abuse of authority lends itself to a discussion over the definition of peacekeeping. Although the UN has resisted defining peacekeeping because that any definition would be restrictive, to identify a general purpose of the DPKO and establish a sound legal stance for UN peacekeeping may strengthen arguments for reform.

The United Nations increased reliance on outside organizations is another interesting issue raised in the aftermath of the Brahimi Report into which further would be worthwhile. In both the areas of intelligence and military resources, the UN has sought outside sources to compensate for internal inadequacies. The Knowledge Project will render a verdict on the worth of the relationship between the UN and non-profit organizations in terms of strategic planning. If the results are deemed favorable, it may justify the UN looking outside of the Organization to accomplish tasks otherwise made impossible by the concerns of Member States. An in depth examination of the UN’s relationship with regional organizations and multinational forces may also expose a viable solution to the difficulties in securing peacekeeping troops.

Member States have shown a renewed interest in United Nations peacekeeping operations since the release of the Brahimi Report. The Security Council and General Assembly have reaffirmed the UN’s role in the maintenance of international peace and security by fortifying its capacity for peacekeeping. The fourth committee in their report to the General
Assembly on 31 July 2001: “stress[ed] that the authority of the Security Council, as well as the United Nations, in the field of maintaining international peace and security, in any case, shall not be violated.”  \(^{122}\) The Organization has reaffirmed its self as an important international actor. The Brahimi Report is, in part, responsible for dispersing the apathy that afflicted UN peacekeeping operations in the later years of the Twentieth Century. Collective security may be difficult to achieve, but the reflection, debate and action stimulated by the Brahimi Report has the potential to make peacekeeping a more effective instrument of the United Nations.