The Looming Threat of an Avian Flu Pandemic: Concepts of Human Security

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The Looming Threat of an Avian Flu Pandemic:

Concepts of Human Security

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INTRODUCTION

The threat of HIV/AIDS, SARS, West Nile virus, meningitis, polio, and most recently the avian influenza, not to mention many various other devastating diseases that have graced headlines the past few months and years, have increasingly challenged the traditional definition of “national security.” Whether we are safe from attacks by foreign militaries or not, the spread of such diseases has brought to question the role of nation-states in preventing the spread or impact of infectious disease to provide “security” for their citizens.

In its discussion of the threat of global infectious disease and its implications for U.S. national security, this thesis will attempt to answer the following questions: Is global health, or more specifically, the spread of infectious diseases, considered a security concern? To what extent is the spread of infectious diseases abroad a concern of U.S. national security? Given these factors, to what extent is the threat of infectious disease from abroad changing the domestic landscape of U.S. national security? In order to address these questions, I will use the recent threat of avian influenza as a case study. While the implications of my questions on foreign policy are large, focusing on this specific case can help illuminate the issue of how threats of infectious diseases abroad can be dealt with by our government, thus shedding light on the current working definition of national security.

These questions have primarily risen from serious real-world events concerning the spread and threat of infectious diseases. Although my thesis will elaborate on this discussion, it is important to touch on this issue here to justify the importance and urgency of examining this topic.
Practically, there is evidence that new and existing diseases are entering American territory in ever increasing numbers. Nearly 30 diseases, including HIV, West Nile virus, Lyme disease, Legionnaires’ disease, and hanta virus pulmonary syndrome were first recognized in the “latter half of the 20th century in the United States. Multidrug-resistant TB, antibiotic-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae (the bacteria that cause ear infections), pneumonia, meningitis, rabies, and diarrheal disease caused by Cryptosporidium parvum and by E. coli OH157 all also surged at the end of the 1900s.”

Roughly a quarter of all deaths in the world are attributed to infectious diseases, with HIV, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, and malaria parasites as the top three pathogens resulting in death. While travel and migration are not new concepts, the scale, speed, and depth of interconnectedness of both people and goods continues to increase. In turn, this increases the ability of pathogens to not simply spread to new hosts, but to do so with increasing speed and depth. Each day, more than 1.4 million people cross international borders via air travel. The number of refugees has soared; it is estimated that currently 35 million people are fleeing war or persecution. The estimated size of the foreign-born population in the United States in March 2000 was 29 million. Sex tourism and the importation of food and alien plans are other examples of the ways in which pathogens can be spread worldwide. The movements of persons as a result of networks created by

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4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 90.
6 Ibid.
globalization is rapidly increasing, which is worrisome when one realizes the growing playground to which pathogens have access. All of this has created an unstable situation for all states of this increasingly globalized world. With nation-states as the primary actors of the international system, their role in the health security of their citizens has been a topic of increasing discussion.

This thesis will first argue that the theoretical conception of security is changing to one founded in human security, the concept that states must not only protect but also meet the daily needs of individuals. Specifically, the U.S. conception of national security is also evolving to focus on the basic needs of individuals and address health security as a result of the end of the Cold War, the effects of globalization, and September 11. This section will require a descriptive methodological approach along with this theoretical discussion. Next, we argue that the practical threat to U.S. national security by infectious diseases is, in fact, serious and pressing. This discussion will again require a descriptive analysis to point out relevant facts and trends.

After addressing these broad issues, we will take an in-depth look at the recent threat of an avian influenza pandemic and use this case study to argue that infectious diseases are, in fact, considered a security issue, and thus that the notion of human security is prevailing. Specifically, U.S. policymakers have framed the avian flu as a security issue because it coincides with President Bush’s larger security goals, it is seen as a fairly quick, low-cost solution to prove the government’s capability in the wake of September 11 and Hurricane Katrina. Because the government as a whole has received criticism after September 11 and Hurricane Katrina, both Republicans and Democrats have supported domestic and international action to prevent an avian flu. Furthermore,
the fact that the government, rather than public health officials or private doctors, have taken up the cause shows that the issue is more than just a health concern but is important for national security. Additionally, officials have been focused more on domestic prevention instead of international prevention or intervention, which shows that the issue is important for national security. Overall, this thesis argues that global health, specifically the threat of infectious disease, is of increasing importance to U.S. security, both due to practical threats and theoretical changes in concepts of security, and that this new focus of security is making “national security” an issue to be addressed by an increasing variety of domestic and international agencies.

Roadmap

This paper will be organized around the theoretical debate on health security as well as an in-depth analysis of the way in which the threat of the avian influenza pandemic has been viewed by the public and handled by the U.S. government.

The first chapter will involve the theoretical discussion of health security with concepts of human security. We will show that the definition of human security is slowly dominating realism, and with it comes a greater concern for human health.

Chapter two will examine the public’s response and the government’s action to prevent an avian influenza pandemic, primarily during 2005. This case study is used because the general public as well as public health and government officials concur that the threat is serious and pressing. If not adequately monitored and reacted to if an outbreak does occur, officials are comparing the devastation to the influenza pandemic of 1918, with tens or even hundreds of millions of people dying worldwide. The U.S.
government has taken considerable action, both on the domestic and international front in order to both prevent a pandemic and combat one with vaccines and preparedness policies if it was to erupt. Finally, it is most important to note that while U.S. citizens are worried by the threat, and while the government has committed billions of dollars to the issue, in over a year of its existence, it has not harmed an American citizen nor been found on American soil. These facts make the avian influenza a particularly interesting disease to study in the context of U.S. national security. It not only proves that the threat of infectious diseases itself is a cause for government action, both domestically and internationally, but also points to human security as the dominant or at least growing definition of national security.
CHAPTER 1: HUMAN SECURITY

The formation of the United Nations after World War II signified a change in international politics. To prevent against future atrocities, the delegation at the San Francisco conference decided that the rights of individuals must never be forgotten. The end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization have also pointed towards the decreasing power of the nation-state, and thus the increasing emphasis on providing for the needs of individuals. As Realism is in its decline, I argue that human security is slowly but steadily dominating theories of international relations. By focusing on meeting the needs of individuals, rather than the power-politics of nation-states, human security offers a foundation for discussing the spread of infectious diseases as a security issue.

The broad goal of security is to not only offer protection, but to ensure that people are able to live freely without fear for their lives, with the ability to pursue their wishes. If this is the true underlying meaning of security, then security is not only the “absence of war and conflict, but also the control of infectious diseases, the prevention of impoverishment, the elimination of illiteracy, and the protection of people from sudden reversals that threaten the quality of their daily lives.”7 This points to the foundation of human security; nation-states must not only have a responsibility to their citizens to protect them from attacks by other nation-states, but to also protect against a broader set of international threats.

While I will discuss the specifics of how health is a security concern later in the thesis, this chapter articulates the nature and necessity of human security. First, it will outline the historical foundations of the theory, beginning with the United Nations’ San Francisco conference and leading to the more recent Commission on Human Security. My definition of human security, from which I will frame the rest of my thesis, agrees with the definition set forth by the Commission on Human Security. Next, this chapter will present a literature review of varying definitions of human security. It will then discuss the theory’s necessity in today’s world, arguing that the end of the Cold War and the rise in globalization give human security ever increasing value from its inception in 1945. We will also analyze the debate between realism and human security and will argue that human security achieves in offering an accurate theory of international politics where Realism fails. I will discuss human security as a necessary global public good and finally examine critiques of the theory and appropriate responses.

**History of Human Security**

The notion of human security was first evident in the June 1945 San Francisco Conference, which created the United Nations. The U.S. Secretary of State, Edward Rielly Stettinius, Jr., stated, “The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want.”8 Instead of being concerned with weapons, he argued that “[human security] is a concern with human life and

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dignity.”9 After the world saw the atrocities of World War II, which occurred in the traditional world of national security, the new emphasis on “human security” was one of the ways seen to be able to uphold the promise of “never again.”

Since the San Francisco Conference, human security is often associated with the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report on Human Security.10 The report defined human security as: “Safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression; protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in jobs, in homes, or in communities.”11 This definition is developed in relation to seven dimensions of human security: personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health, and food security.12 The report also identified four essential characteristics of human security. These include:

1) Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor. 2) The components of human security are interdependent. 3) Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention. It is less costly to meet these threats upstream than downstream. 4) Human security is people centered. It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace.13

Human security was again a topic of discussion in the UNDP in 1999. Its Human Development Report on Globalization returned to human security in the context of the 1998 Asian financial crisis. Among other instances, it called for specific action to increase human security in times of economic crisis.14

10 Ibid., 18.  
11 Ibid., 19.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.
It has also been argued that the discussion of human security culminated in the creation of an independent international Commission on Human Security in 2001, co-chaired by former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, and Nobel Prize economist, Professor Amartya Sen. The Commission was created through the initiative of the government of Japan after the UN Secretary General called for a world “free of want” and “free of fear” at the 2000 Millennium Summit. The Commission’s final report, published in May 2003, outlines a definition of human security:

...to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood, and dignity.

The Commission also discusses human security as a people-centered approach, with the purpose of protecting people from not only uniformed troops, but from a wide range of threats, including “environmental pollution, transnational terrorism, massive population movements, such infectious diseases as HIV/AIDS and long-term conditions of oppression and deprivation.” Instead of states as sole actors, human security recognizes regional and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society in managing the broad range of human security issues. The report also emphasizes the importance and necessity of empowering people to contribute to their own security.

15 Chen, et al., vii.
17 Ibid., 1.
18 Ibid., 6.
Finally, the Commission writes, “Human security and state security are mutually reinforcing and dependent on each other.” They argue that where state security is more narrowly focused, human security is broad. Instead of only being focused on military power, human security is concerned with human rights, with a broad range of deprivations, and with violent conflict, bother inter- and inner-state. In order to provide for such an expansive view of human security, the Commission advocates for expanding peoples’ real freedoms. This requires not only protection from various threats, but also empowerment so that people can “develop their resilience to difficult conditions.” The Commission also calls on the international community to further strengthen international institutions in order to provide for human security. They argue that because of the increasing interdependence among states, especially on issues of global scale, the international community as a whole must work together to provide freedoms and thus human security.

**Varying Definitions of Human Security**

Advocates of human security believe that despite the many differences of people throughout the world, they also share commonalities, including “a desire for physical security, access to economic opportunities that go beyond mere economic survival, freedom of speech and of association, legal and political rights that include the right to association, the right to express and practise one’s own religion, and fair and equitable

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20 Ibid., 10.
21 Ibid., 12.
treatment, including the right of due process, in a court of law.” 22 Together, these form the three dimensions of human security, according to Hampson and Daudelin: freedom from fear/safety of peoples; freedom from want/equality and social justice; and liberty/rights and rule of law. 23 By focusing on the safety of all peoples, human security is somewhat of a humanitarian concept. It presumes that by addressing the “underlying causes of conflicts and violence,” such as “economic despair, social justice, and political oppression,” wars can be prevented. 24

Besides the landmark definitions created primarily by the United Nations, many other authors have contributed to the understanding of human security within the broad framework of consensus as described by Hampson and Daudelin above. Alkire provides an overview of the various contributions by authors to the definition of human security. She argues that there are currently 25 definitions of human security, with increasingly wide usability. 25

First, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty discusses human security as an emerging concept, which “means the security of people—their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 26 While some critics of human security argue that definitions are too expansive and vague, this report argues that a broad view is needed for governments to

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23 Ibid., 16.
24 Ibid., 17.
26 Ibid., 26, as cited from in *The Responsibility to Protect* (December 2001).
fully address the various threats to humans. It states, “Being wedded still to too narrow a concept of ‘national security’ may be one reason why many governments spend more to protect their citizens against undefined external military attack than to guard them against the omnipresent enemies of global health and other real threats to human security on a daily basis.”

Furthermore, the report argues that international institutions have a responsibility to safeguard human security, including human rights and human dignity, when states fail to do so.

Alkire also points to other leading authors in their definitions and discussions of human security. Rothschild places human security in a historical context, arguing that human security is one part of “extended security,” which she bases “in conceptual antecedents in European political thought.” Other authors, including King and Murray and Thomas, address the “freedom from need or vulnerability aspect of human security, whether this is caused by war or by structural events such as financial crisis.” King and Murray focus on issues associated with freedom from want by arguing that human security is an individual’s “expectation of a life without experiencing the state of generalized poverty.” Thomas views human security as entailing a wide range of freedoms, including “basic material needs, human dignity, and democracy.”

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28 Ibid., 27.
29 Ibid., 22.
30 Ibid., 23.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
conflict-related threats have not decreased in value according to these authors, they instead look to the deeper roots of poverty as causes for security issues.\textsuperscript{33}

For Hampson, security is defined as the “absence of threat to core human values, including the most basic human value, the physical safety of the individual…”\textsuperscript{34} In addition, Hampson views human security as an underprovided public good. Thus, he calls market and political failures into question, as he believes they have inevitably led to such under-provisions.\textsuperscript{35} Leaning and Arie base their definition in the “human development and capability approach, yet [they emphasize] the psychological and the non-material aspects of security.”\textsuperscript{36} Human security is thus a precondition for human development.

Another human security theorist, Paris, argues that human security is identified as “a broad category of research on military and/or non-military threats to societies, groups and individuals.”\textsuperscript{37} However, he criticizes other definitions of human security for being too expansive and vague, “encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied.”\textsuperscript{38} While theoretical definitions of human security are important, Paris stresses the necessity of utility when creating definitions of security. Similarly, Buzan

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 25.
Weaver and de Wilde criticize human security for being incoherent.\(^{39}\) Others argue that the specification of human security is arbitrary.\(^{40}\)

As is indicated in Alkire’s expansive overview of the various contending authors of human security, the definitions vary in terms of their broadness. In fact, it seems that the primary debate between authors of human security is the argument between the broadness and narrowness of the definition. Owen distinguishes authors of human security into these two separate camps with clarity. Authors who argue for a narrow focus cite “pragmatism, conceptual clarity, and analytical rigor as reasons to focus human security on violent threats.”\(^{41}\) They argue that pointing towards the lowest common denominator of “individual vulnerability and well-being under the rubric of security” is not useful.\(^{42}\) If the definition of security is to be used to make policy decisions, security must be clear with specific recommendations. Owen cites authors within this narrow camp as Krause, Mack, and Macfarlane, and says that each argues for the inclusion of violence into traditional security thinking. They base this argument on the normative fact that 95% of all warfare is now within, rather than between states.

Alternatively, those among the broad camp of human security argue that the definition should be highly inclusive, more than just the safety from violent threats. Authors including Leaning, Alkire, Thakur, Axworthy, Bajpai, Hampson, and Winslow and Eriksen cite the substantive importance of a wider range of issues, including poverty,

\(^{40}\) Ibid.
\(^{42}\) Ibid.
disease, and environmental disasters.\textsuperscript{43} This view has become broader with the creation of the Commission on Human Security, and their definition provided in 2003, as discussed above. They argue that human security includes “all critical and pervasive threats to the vital core ‘consistent with long term [human] flourishing.’”\textsuperscript{44}

Owen attempts to create a “hybrid” definition of human security to address both the broad and narrow proponents. His threshold definition first takes from the Commission on Human Security’s belief that “human security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats.”\textsuperscript{45} This establishes severity, immediacy, and scope. However, the second part of Owen’s definition provides clarity on the scope of issues that human security should address. He writes, “[H]uman security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats.”\textsuperscript{46}

However, despite this apparent “broad versus narrow” argument within human security, Owen contends that the theory is actually not so polarized. Instead, the main difference is only when regarding appropriate policy responses, rather than the actual merits of specific threats to human security. This brings us to questions of the usefulness of human security when it comes to policy decisions. Owen points out that the broadness of human security can result in an overlapping of interests from various professional fields, including development and humanitarian organizations, to conflict resolution.

\textsuperscript{43} Owen, 375.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 376.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 382.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 383.
Such interdisciplinary approaches can decrease policy redundancies and increase effectiveness to create “integrated solutions to real-world problems.”

Additionally, others argue that human security gives a voice to those who might otherwise be politically marginalized. It can also be a rational response to the increasingly global nature of topics within international politics. Owen writes, “Governments of various scales must take on a wider mandate than simply economic growth, political stability, and invasion by foreign armies.” Finally, human security can be used to re-evaluate our understanding of sovereignty. Instead at looking at state sovereignty legitimized by the international community, human security encourages legitimacy to be defined according to the citizens of the state. Thus, under human security, states can only be legitimate sovereign entities if they meet the demands and needs of their citizens. By placing the person at the center of international politics, human security provides a policy framework by which to solve problems of war and deprivation at their core. Instead of consistently looking to states to define their interests as a whole among the international community, human security challenges states to look inward to determine their policy goals.

The Necessity of the Theory of Human Security

There is evidence that human security concerns are becoming more apparent in international politics. Today, human security is a prevalent theory of international security due to at least seven factors, according to Hampson et al. First, Hampson argues

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47 Owen, 377.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
that international institutions have been developed to strengthen the protection of a wide spectrum of human rights. They argue that this has been done at both the global and regional levels.  

Second, democracy has increased after the end of the Cold War as the “preferred system of government in the world.” As democracy promotes the rule of law and protects human rights, so does its spread increase the prevalence of human security concerns. Third, non-governmental organizations have had an increasing impact, especially within humanitarian and development fields. They have thus “raised the profile of human security concerns by stressing the need to address the plight of refugees and particularly vulnerable groups...” Fourth, Hampson argues that the media has increased awareness on humanitarian issues, promoting issues of human security. Fifth, Hampson contends that a new tier of “middle powers” is emerging within international politics, further promoting human security. Next, he argues that economic globalization is redefining relationships between states and peoples. Finally, international conflict is changing, increasing in inner-state rather than inter-state violence.

During the Cold War, the definition of international security was one of national security, founded in Realism’s belief that a nation-state’s primary concern is its own self-interest in order to survive. While “high” politics referred to national security, “low” politics were concerned with international trade and other international non-military

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50 Hampson, et al., 8-9.  
51 Ibid., 8.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid.,8-9.  
54 Ibid., 10.
transactions. Hampson and Daudelin argue that the Middle East War and oil shocks in the 1970s lessened this distinction between “high” and “low” politics.55

“High” politics have further decreased in importance as the number of armed conflict has decreased in the last decade. The 2005 United Nations *Human Security Report* argues that conflicts are down by 40% since 1992.56 In addition, the average number of people killed per battle is down, from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. The nature of such conflicts has also changed, since wars are no longer primarily fought by large, mechanized armies, but are fought “in poor countries with small arms and light weapons between weak government forces and ill-trained rebels.”57 However, although armed conflict has decreased, the recent *Human Security Report* also argues that we must not become complacent. It argues that “underlying causes of conflict are rarely addressed, so the risk of new wars breaking out and old ones restarting remains real.”58

In addition, while the nature of armed conflict is changing, “soft threats” of hunger, sanitation and diseases are more serious threats to many people throughout the world.59 It can also be argued that these “soft threats” are causal factors in many conflicts, as well as the resulting conditions of many conflicts. Nevertheless, with or without an actual conflict involved, these “soft threats” pose enough problems in and of themselves, thus making them security issues.

In addition to the changing landscape of national security due to the end of the Cold War, globalization has been a primary motivator for the evolution towards human

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55 Hampson, et al., 14.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
security. Globalization, by increasing interactions between people and goods, and in many cases decreasing the impermeability of borders, has created an environment of rapid change. According to Chen, such rapid change not only means quickly changing financial flows, but the ability of diseases to spread easily and reach endemic proportions. He argues, “The increasing global threats to human security are outgrowing national abilities to tackle them, and outpacing international responses.”60

Chen argues that human security can be useful for making the outcomes of globalization “better for people, adding value to existing perspectives such as poverty, inequality, human rights and conflict resolution and prevention.”61 By focusing on the “well-being and dignity of people rather than on the protection of national borders,” human security provides a more complete set of criteria necessary for “assessing the impact of globalization on human well-being, encompassing as it does socio-economic aspects and personal safety from the consequences of violent conflicts.”62 Human security is unique in that it takes globalization into consideration and focuses on the “risks of sudden change for the worst,” whether it be a disease outbreak or a financial crisis.63 We must remember that these global crises affect all persons, not only the world’s poor, which further makes human security an important theory to take into consideration. While it may be an important theory to address development in the third world, it is applicable and necessary for all states and for the collective international community.

60 Chen, Human Insecurity in a Global World, 4.
61 Ibid., 1.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 5.
As a framework for understanding the human impact of globalization, human security “covers insecurities related to the failure to meet basic economic and social needs as well as those related to conflicts between groups and nations, and the failures of communities, nations and the global community to provide protection against threats.”

Comprehensive in nature, human security goes beyond national boundaries to address global problems. Chen argues that human security addresses new “insecurities” that result from globalization, including global crime, human trafficking, instability and contagion in financial markets, labor market instabilities and threats to job security, spread of diseases, and conflicts within national borders. Globalization also increases interactions between people, exacerbating the spread of diseases and making containment more difficult. Chen argues that current economic liberalization “goes against the imperative of a response.” He writes, “Strong profit incentives drive investment in research and development for treatments and cures, but this also restricts access to those with purchasing power.”

Despite economic liberalization as a result of globalization, Chen argues that governments must provide for basic health needs as a global public good founded in moral necessity.

**Refuting Realism**

Human security most starkly refutes the theory of Realism. Realism is founded on the assumptions that the nation-state is the primary actor of the international system and that the international system is anarchic—there is no overarching authority. This

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65 Ibid., 10.
66 Ibid., 11.
makes for a world of constant competition. Realism is also founded on the assumption that all states inherently possess offensive military capability, if not through weapons, at least through their population. Under Realism, states are also always unsure of the actions and intentions of other states. Finally, the basic motive of all states is survival, and states think strategically and rationally on how to survive in an anarchic world.  

Mearsheimer argues that these assumptions result in three patterns of behavior. First, in an anarchic international system in which every state is most concerned with its own survival and has at least a certain amount of military capacity, states fear each other. Each state aims to guarantee its own survival; in order to do so, they seek maximum relative power positions over other states. In a Realist world, states are constantly competing, creating an international system of uncertainty.

Brown is one author who refutes the validity of Realism from the human security perspective. He argues that the contemporary world society suffers from an international crisis, which is the “incongruence between the traditional state-sovereignty system and the increasing interdependence of peoples.” He writes that Realism is “unable to comprehend, let alone counter, the structural contradictions underlying the contemporary security threats.” Instead, Brown argues that policies and institutions must be “informed by a concept of world interests that focuses on the needs of humankind as a whole and that can provide a basis for reconciling or arbitrating among conflicting

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68 Ibid., 11.
national, international, and subnational interests.” 70 Within an anarchic international system, Realism provides structure by making nation-states both the “agents and objects of the most significant occurrences in world politics.” 71 Individuals must look to the nation-state for protection and to provide or support basic needs. Thus, states and statesmen work for the “national interest,” the “safety and well-being of the nation as a whole.” 72

While military power must be taken into consideration within an anarchic world polity, this is not sufficient in itself. Brown questions the “realistic capability” of Realism to provide “contemporary statespersons and citizens in making policy choices that are rational (let alone morally tenable) in the sense of servicing their basic interests and values.” 73 He argues that focusing on war ignores various other international disputes that are increasingly relevant with globalization, such as trade, monetary, ecological and immigration policies. 74

Brown describes and ranks “world interests,” or “conditions that are desirable for the entire planet Earth viewed as an entity.” 75 They include: survival of the human species, reduction in the amount of killing and other extremely brutal treatment of human beings, provision of conditions for healthy subsistence to all people, protection of citizen rights, preservation of cultural diversity, preservation of the planet’s basic natural ecologies and environments, and enhancement of accountability. 76 Brown argues that the

70 Brown, 1.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 3.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 10.
76 Ibid., 11-14.
survival of the human species, which he describes as “in a reasonably healthy condition of body of mind,” should be the “cardinal world interest.” Brown argues that state action should be focused on not only ensuring the survival of its citizens, but the human species as a whole. Furthermore, despite the fact that individual states and the international community through the United Nations insist upon a certain degree of human rights, an international system with nation-states as primary actors focuses more on states’ interests as a whole, rather than “human rights.” Thus, Brown argues that a more applicable theory of international relations must understand the increasing inter-state need for and practice of cooperation.

Brown founds his argument in ethical beliefs. He writes:

> The elevation of this objective [conditions for healthy subsistence to all people] to the level of a world interest emanates from the fundamental ethical premise that the most basic human right is the right to live one’s naturally given right (the sine qua non of other rights)—a right that can be negated not only by physical violence but also by the denial of the requisites for human survival: uncontaminated and adequate water, food, and air; shelter against climatic extremes; and protection against disease.

Clearly, Realism is inadequate not only because it fails to take into account the various ways that states interact post-Cold War, but it also fails to uphold an ethical argument for the right of every person to simply live. If states, as the largest social constructs accorded the responsibility of protection do not uphold this natural right, who will?

Realism was the dominant theory of international relations during the Cold War, and perhaps rightly so since military capacity meant power; without it, the very sovereignty of states was threatened. Yet the end of the Cold War brought forth new

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77 Brown, 11.
78 Ibid., 9.
theories of international relations. Human security is one of the more recent, and
growing, such theories. In addition to providing a new post-Cold War framework, human
security offers a necessary discussion of security in an increasingly connected, globalized
world, in which threats may be no longer constrained to borders.

**Human Security as a Global Public Good**

Hampson and Zacher discuss human security as a global public good. First, they
identify characteristics of global public goods as having “universality of benefits, non-
excludability of benefits, and non-rivalness of benefits (or jointness of supply).”\(^{80}\) For
human security to be defined as a public good, everyone must benefit, and adding more
consumers must not increase costs. Yet making human security a global public good
becomes difficult as states must work together to provide such goods. Unless actually
upheld by international institutions, the idea of global public goods is difficult to provide
since states may free-ride off other states.\(^{81}\)

However, although Hampson and Zacher argue that human security should be a
public good, they do acknowledge that some international regulations regarding health
have not produced results. Instead, they write that the “…only practical way of reducing
the international spread of diseases was by assisting developing states in improving their
health practices, which would consequently reduce the incidence of highly infectious

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\(^{80}\) Fen Olser Hampson and Mark W. Zacher, “Human Security and International
World*, eds. Lincoln Chen, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Ellen Seidensticker (Cambridge:
Harvard University, 2003) 46.

\(^{81}\) Ibid., 49.
diseases among their own [developed] nations.\textsuperscript{82} Thus, while it should be a global public good, it seems that the best way to practically supply such a good is to do so through increasing individual state capacity. If this is the case, Hampson and Zacher do have some amount of faith in the World Bank and major foundations in providing assistance to individual states, especially the Gates foundation, as their roles have been growing within the international community.\textsuperscript{83}

Hampson and Zacher cite five reasons why international collaboration around providing health security as a public good is lacking. They argue that the spread of epidemic diseases has recently dropped, decreasing concern by the international community; that developed states do not need help from the international community because they have the infrastructure in place to address such health issues; that developing countries worry that reporting disease outbreaks will cause more negative impacts than positive solutions; that other actors, such as non-profits, have taken responsibility for providing services that would otherwise be handled by inter-governmental agencies; and that the increasing number of international travelers has made it more difficult to screen them for diseases.\textsuperscript{84} To elaborate, if developing countries adopt such regulations, they risk trade and travel restrictions if they report outbreaks; additionally, they may lack the basic resources to even be able to report or address outbreaks.\textsuperscript{85} Also, if non-profits and other non-state actors, such as Medecins Sans

\textsuperscript{82} Hampson and Zacher, 50.  
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 51.  
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 52.
Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), are addressing such problems, some argue that there is no need for inter-governmental agencies to do the same.\textsuperscript{86}

\textbf{Criticisms of Human Security}

Human security is critiqued on both its theory and its policy implications. In terms of its theory, critics argue that shifting the notion of security towards the individual “proliferates the concept without adding any analytic value—the more harms that are labeled ‘security threats’, the harder it is to study the relations between them.”\textsuperscript{87} These authors argue that threats must be clearly defined and studied separately. Practically speaking, the broadness of human security means that prioritizing political action can be quite difficult, if not impossible. Additionally, grouping all such topics under the umbrella of “security” could result in addressing issues of social welfare through inappropriate methods, such as militaristic solutions.\textsuperscript{88}

Furthermore, some critics argue that human security dilutes the meaning of security by focusing too much on global problems, or even on topics in other countries. Specifically, Krause argues that we should not base our own security on issues of humanitarian concern in other countries. Yet in response, others argue that globalization means that issues in foreign countries are increasingly relevant to our own interests. For example, the socio-economic environment of the Middle East can result in a breeding ground for terrorists. However, defenders of human security also argue that we must not only think of such cases in terms of our own military security; first, militarized

\textsuperscript{86} Hampson and Zacher, 52.
\textsuperscript{87} Owen, 378.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 379.
humanitarian assistance may not be the most effective, and second, we must be focused on the interests of people.

Finally, there is the critique that “security” is linked with violence alone, and that refocusing the definition towards more liberal causes is simply just a “repackaging of a liberal humanitarian order.”\textsuperscript{89} Owen points out that this was the center of debate at the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2002. While rebuttals have been largely in the form of arguments against Realism, proponents of human security again argue that the astonishing number of preventable deaths due to non-military factors or inner-state violence cannot be addressed solely by states alone.\textsuperscript{90} Furthermore, an interdisciplinary approach to threats to security can better address such concerns instead of only looking at such issues through a military perspective. Even if inter-state violence was the only threat to human existence, as traditional security maintains, addressing inter-state violence purely in militaristic terms can fail to fully address the issue. Instead, human security focuses on the underlying problems of both inner- and inter-state violence as well as other threatening issues.

\textit{Health and Human Security}

This analysis of human security shows that the theory is not only viable, but also increasingly relevant. Under the definition set forth by the Commission on Human Security, it is clear that the threat of infectious disease is a reasonable security issue. Both outbreaks and epidemics of diseases are of concern as the definition calls for the protection of people from both critical and pervasive threats. While diseases can have

\textsuperscript{89} Owen, 379.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 378.
negative impacts on the wellbeing of a state’s economy or government, human security
ultimately argues that these are secondary to the primary threat that diseases have on
individuals. Again, the focus of human security is not on the state but on the freedoms of
humans, making the threat of infectious diseases of even greater importance, as
individuals are ultimately the ones that must fight against pathogens.

As Realism is in its decline, human security argues that the international
community must strengthen as a whole to address such global issues. Regional and
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society must all
work together to provide global public goods. Health care is one such global public
good, especially as globalization is increasing the possibilities of the depth, breadth, and
speed of the transmission of infectious diseases. With human security as a framework, it
is imperative that the international community collaborate to prevent against a broader
range of threats to individuals. Yet while the protection against the spread of infectious
diseases clearly falls under the realm of human security, it is still necessary to examine
the extent to which the spread of diseases are of actual threat to individuals, a task that
will be undertaken in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 2: AVIAN INFLUENZA

The avian flu is a useful case study to argue that the definition of national security is changing to one based on human security. First, the worldwide impact until April 21, 2006 has resulted in no more than 113 deaths, with 204 confirmed infected.\(^9\) Granted, the death rate among those who are infected is quite high. Infections have occurred in nine countries—all in Asia and the Middle East—but not yet on American soil. Second, despite the relatively small impact and the apparently slow spread of the virus, fear of the disease has exploded, triggering a fair amount of government response on both the domestic and the international level, in a very short time period. The government has responded by attributing money from the Department of Defense towards preventing a pandemic of this disease. Consistent with the definition of human security, the foreign threat in this case is a disease. People are looking to the government to combat it, and the government is taking steps to do so, both internationally and domestically, if it does arrive on our soil. The government’s discourse on the subject has been a valuable indicator in itself, because public officials have alluded to the threat of the disease as similar to the threat of terrorism. It is not a threat of another government with arms, but a naturally occurring disease with the potential to kill thousands, perhaps millions. As a case study, the avian flu clearly illustrates that the public as well as the government views diseases as a national security concern, and as a result, the government will take great action in not only protecting our own citizens from the disease, but also preventing its spread throughout the world.

We examined periodicals and other information about the avian flu from 2005 and until the beginning of February 2006, since this covers much of the recent threat of an outbreak. I had to stop researching and begin writing my thesis in March 2006. Even during February 2006, however, the number of articles continued to grow as the virus reached other areas of Africa and Europe. While these arguments are based on the facts over the course of 2005 and the beginning of 2006, the subsequent events could skew the outcome of my argument. But, regardless of the “outcome” of the avian flu – whether or not it results in a pandemic – at this time, it is apparent that the public response and the government action is in itself important, regardless of the final outcome.

In examining the avian flu as a case study, this chapter will address the following questions. First, what is the public’s perception of the government’s role in preventing an avian flu outbreak and intervening in the event of an outbreak on U.S. soil? Second, how has the United States government responded to the threat of avian flu? This analysis will include policies set by the President and Congress, cooperation with foreign governments and international bodies, and various policies delegated to U.S. bureaucracies. Ultimately, this section will examine what the government’s response to the global threat of avian flu says about the U.S. definition of national security and the ways in which security issues are addressed by a multitude of U.S. actors.
PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT’S ROLE

Most periodicals throughout the studied time period argue overwhelmingly that a pandemic is inevitable and that it is the responsibility of both local and federal governments to take action to prevent an outbreak or control it if it does occur. Of course, many of their facts came from the government itself, with Health and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt often quoted. In addition to Leavitt, the representatives from the Department of State have also been quoted in many articles, signifying their role in the issue, in not only taking action, but in being spokespeople that U.S. citizens look to when seeking solutions to the potential problem. As articles overwhelmingly mention government officials, from those in the Department of Health and Human Services, to the State Department, to the United Nations, it is clear that the public has looked to the government rather than non-profits or private health practitioners for both information and protection from the avian influenza. Furthermore, the dialogue present in most articles suggests that people expect the government not only to create strong infrastructures at home, but also to combat the disease worldwide in order to prevent its spread to our soil. At no point in my studies have I come across any article or editorial arguing that the U.S. government should do less, either domestically or internationally. If anything, the discourse within most articles compares the potential damages of an avian influenza pandemic to terrorism, and calls for more government action at every level to “protect” our citizens.

Like many articles, the National Review cites the Health and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt as saying earlier in October, “We are not prepared for a
This article also argues that the threat of a pandemic continues to be significant, even though by October 2005 it had only killed 60 people in Asia. Since then the number of deaths has doubled, but this still gives no indication that a pandemic is on the way. Like many other authors, Sally Pipes compares the threat to the 1918 Spanish flu epidemic, which also started among birds and is blamed for over 50 million deaths.93

To prevent a pandemic, this article calls for more production of flu vaccinations. It points out that the U.S. vaccine industry has declined from 26 companies in 1957 to a mere four today. Flu vaccines are only produced for the U.S. market by two companies: “a French firm with a factory in Pennsylvania, and a California firm with a factory in Great Britain.”94 This refers to Sanofi-Pasteur and Chiron, respectively. However, Pipes writes that producing vaccinations are expensive, from building the factory to getting the vaccination completed and inspected. Lawsuits also dissuade companies from creating vaccines. Yet in the end, Pipes also argues that American companies are not actively developing vaccines because the Food and Drug Administration imposes “excessively strict screening.”95 While this article does not explicitly show that Americans view the threat of a pandemic as a security issue, it does display the seriousness of a pandemic as portrayed both by the government and by periodicals, as well as argue that the government should do more to protect its citizens from this threat.

An article in the Modesto Bee in Central California, argues that the large bird population in California’s Central Valley could be greatly threatened by the avian flu. The article is careful to note, however, that the threat to humans is slim since

93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
transmission to humans has been the exception, and transmission between humans has not occurred.\textsuperscript{96} Furthermore, it argues that extensive planning “is warranted not just because of avian flu, but because of the history of flu pandemics. ‘We usually have three per century and it’s been more than (35 years) since we’ve had one,’ [Dr. John Walker, Stanislaus County’s public health officer] said.”\textsuperscript{97} The article states, “Francine Bradley, poultry specialist with the University of California at Davis Cooperative Extension, said the disease has been found in birds in Siberia. Certain birds are known to migrate from that region to Alaska, where they mingle with waterfowl that make an annual trek along the Pacific Flyway to California.”\textsuperscript{98} However, the article also points out that the area is somewhat prepared for the flu, as it has already taken measures to prevent terrorism and the West Nile virus. With clear references to its preventive measures against terrorism, as well as its discussion of President Bush’s $7.1 billion plan for dealing with an avian flu pandemic, this article in a small local paper is another example of the widespread discourse that believes avian flu is an issue of national security and should be dealt with accordingly by governments at all levels.

An article in Texas’ \textit{Corpus Christi Caller-Times} accurately reports that the spread of the virus among humans has been geographically limited, but suggests that citizens of Corpus Christi, Texas should be worried. To curb fears, it stated that the city manager was in the process of developing a local plan.\textsuperscript{99} Furthermore, it argues that the

\textsuperscript{96} Ken Carlson, “Valley readies for Avian flu counties taking lesson from past, President’s program costs $7.1B,” \textit{Modesto Bee}, November 2, 2005, 1.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 1.
“country’s only defense” is Tamiflu. However, it warns, “But if the virus does adapt and begins spreading through humans like the common influenza strain, it could be apocalyptic with only limited amounts of anti-viral medication and a vaccine that has not yet been developed.” Another recurring theme in most articles is again stated here. “It’s not a matter of if, it’s a matter of when,” said Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s infectious diseases spokesman Dave Daidle.

However, it can be argued that the media has simply instigated unnecessary fear over the threat of a pandemic, and that this could be more of a cause for government action rather than actual concern by citizens. In particular, one article in *U.S. News and World Report* in June 2005 was entitled “A Nightmare Scenario.” In this widely publicized report, the author writes that the avian flu could infect “as much as a quarter of the world’s population and kill as many 180 million to 360 million people—at least seven times the number of AIDS deaths, all within a matter of weeks.” The death toll varies vastly between 180 and 360 million—figures so broad they seem to be nothing less than rough guesstimates. Unlike many articles, however, the author compares this to the normal yearly death rate from the ordinary flu, which kills between 1 and 2 million people worldwide. The difference is obviously huge, although the average person probably would not be able to estimate the normal annual death rate. This author intensifies his “nightmare scenario” by pointing out that only 300 million doses of flu vaccinations are produced each year, whereas the world’s population is closer to six

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100 Garcia, 1.
101 Ibid., 2.
102 Ibid., 2.
104 Ibid., 1.
In reality, for a variety of reasons, the entirety of the world’s population would not be receiving the vaccination anyway. Perhaps this comparison is only a tactic to intensify the story and scare readers, exacerbating the potential of the situation.

As a solution, this article advocates for coordinated responses of “the medical community, of food providers, of transportation, and of care for first responders from public health, law enforcement, and emergency management at the international, federal, state, and local levels.” Quite clearly, the media has loudly advocated for broad government action, from the local to the international level. In addition to coordinated responses, this article also calls for strengthening the World Health Organization. Again, strengthening international institutions coincides with human security, strengthening international actors for the safety and security of the individual, regardless of nationality. Finally, the article argues, “The Bush administration must think of this as terrorism to the nth degree and immediately set up a senior-level emergency task force to develop a strategy. It could serve as a permanent framework for curtailing the spread of future infectious diseases.” By comparing terrorism to the threat of the avian flu, this article blatantly blurs the distinction between the two threats. Does it matter where the threat of massive loss to human life comes from? According to U.S. News and World Reports, apparently not. Any major threat is considered a national security concern and should be a priority by the U.S. government. One of their final sentences drives home their point, and the point of many other newspaper articles. They write, “If avian flu were allowed to

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105 Zuckerman, 2.
106 Ibid., 3.
107 Ibid.
develop into a pandemic, it would be a direct threat to our health, security, and prosperity.”

However, there has been some understanding that the hype around the avian flu has been more a pandemic of fear than an actual disease. And, it is this fear that has unnecessarily prompted wide scale demand for government action. An article in *Maclean’s* argues that there is “a tremendous amount of hysteria for something that hasn’t even happened—and may never happen, if past experience is any indication.”

This is in reference to previous threats of bio-terrorist attacks and other plagues that failed to originate. Even with West Nile, SARS, and mad cow disease, “the amount of paranoia surrounding the threat has been exponentially larger than the threat itself.”

The threat has become a popular topic among bloggers, as well. Globalization has therefore allowed for not only the flu to potentially be spread like wildfire, but it has also allowed fear to blaze across society even faster. *Maclean’s* reports:

“Flu bloggers have developed a kind of online community,” says Crawford Kilian, a 64-year old communications teacher from Vancouver who started out blogging about SARS, but has since switched his focus to H5N1. “But now, after watching what’s happened in New Orleans, I began biting my lip about ‘what if’ and ‘what’s more’,” he says. “What if we get something like a hurricane and we get avian flu? How do we cope with it then?”

Perhaps through the spread of fear, I believe that periodicals and blogs have made human security, especially in the context of the avian flu, a dominant theory among the general population. When the mass of the population is fearful, and reporters and leaders are calling for government action, it does not matter whether the threat is a foreign military

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108 Zuckerman, 3.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., 3.
or a disease, if the death toll is similarly atrocious. Just as fear of an avian flu pandemic has spread, perhaps unnecessarily, so too has the notion of human security and the subsequent call for government action at every level.

One article, however, points out that fear surrounding avian flu is unfounded but not new. It first compares today’s situation with the hype over the 1976 fear of a deadly “swine flu,” which failed to cause the projected “million” deaths.\(^{112}\) It also describes the SARS outbreak, which it states, “led to 750 stories in the New York Times and Washington Post,” which was the same number of deaths, it points out.\(^{113}\) The actual number of cases of SARS in the United States only amounted to 71, with no deaths. Clearly, the fear of SARS was highly exaggerated. This article also argues that journalists, as well as public officials, are perpetuating fear. It states, “What we can say with confidence is that there is never such a thing as helpful hysteria. And the line between informing the public and starting a panic is being crossed every day now by politicians, public health officials, and journalists.”\(^{114}\) Specifically, the author argues that the media has tweaked the facts when writing about the avian flu. It says that “the media have generally morphed the federal government’s leaked estimate of 200,000 to 1.9 million deaths to simply ‘1.9 million deaths.’”\(^{115}\) In addition, it states that Dr. Irwin Redlener, director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University claimed on ABC News’s Primetime on September 15, 2005, “We could have

\(^{112}\) Michael Fumento, “Fuss and Feathers; Pandemic panic over the avian flu,” The Weekly Standard, November 21, 2005, 1.
\(^{113}\) Ibid.
\(^{114}\) Ibid.
\(^{115}\) Ibid., 2.
a billion people dying worldwide.” Later, he apparently said that he meant a billion people could fall ill, not die.

A poll done by Harris Interactive sheds quantitative insight as to the public’s response to the threat of a pandemic. The study finds that:

...a majority (53%) of U.S. adults are either not very or not at all familiar with this virus and that a large number (41%) are not very or not at all concerned that the United States might be part of an avian flu pandemic in the near future. Despite this lack of familiarity and concern, majorities of adults believe that particular steps should be taken to prepare for a potential pandemic.117

In addition, over 71% of adults surveyed think it is absolutely essential or very important to “develop plans to quickly provide medical supplies to areas of the globe that experience outbreaks of avian flu.”118 Sixty-one percent also agree that it is essential to invest government dollars in the development and production of avian flu vaccines. Media reports definitely suggest that the popular opinion is for government intervention throughout the world, but this poll further solidifies the argument.

Overall, the general public opinion as displayed in newspaper articles between 2005 and the first months of 2006 overwhelmingly show a belief in human security. Comparisons between terrorism and the avian flu have been made time after time. The nature of the threat is less important than the potential damage to human lives and the capacity and willingness of the government to take action, whether it be on domestic ground or in the international arena. Let us now examine government response to these concerns.

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116 Fumento, 2.
117 “Avian Influenza: U.S. adults only moderately concerned about avian flu, but endorse preparation,” Life Science Weekly, September 20, 2005, 1. Note: Study was conducted online between August 3-5, 2005, with 2,236 adult participants, for The Wall Street Journal Online’s Health Industry Edition.
118 Ibid., 1.
GOVERNMENT ACTION

“Today I am announcing a new International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza... We invite all nations to participate. It is essential we work together, and as we do so, we will fulfill a moral duty to protect our citizens, and heal the sick, and comfort the afflicted.”

-- President George W. Bush, September 14, 2005

As a case study, the avian flu shows the willingness of the U.S. government to participate in the global arena to prevent a pandemic. It is quite significant that the government has allocated $7.1 billion to combat this threat, by pledging to strengthen international monitoring and prevention systems as well as by domestic preparedness. Policymakers have compared the possibility of a pandemic with terrorism. A National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza has been created to correspond to the National Security Strategy. In general, there has been overwhelming consensus that this is not only a significant threat, but also one that should be addressed by the government at all levels, both internationally and domestically. It is not something to be considered by public health officials alone, but by the Department of State and the Department of Defense as well.

The President and both parties in Congress have been quite vocal and have taken widespread action on this health security issue, which has been basically unprecedented in scale. This is due to several factors. First, the Bush administration has been a strong advocate of prevention policies because health security falls in line and is mutually consistent with the administration’s other international security goals of increasing democratic infrastructures abroad to protect our own citizens. Second, the government has pursued avian flu prevention policies as damage control from the devastating effects of September 11 and Hurricane Katrina. Third, both Republicans and Democrats have
acted on the issue so that each can be seen as “humanitarian” and as capable of addressing security issues, regardless of the nature of the threat. While each has sometimes tried to out-do the other party, the end result has generally been bi-partisan agreement. Again, this has been the result of general public uncertainty with national security and a fear about the possible impacts of globalization. While the measures promised by the U.S. government have been relatively grand in terms of building local capacity and encouraging higher production of vaccinations, in reality, the measures have had little influence on global prevention programs. This point helps show that when it comes down to it, the government will choose more domestically favorable measures instead of globally effective policies. In the end, the government is not attempting to protect humans throughout the globe, but is seeking to protect its own citizens on the basis of human security. This section will look at these factors of U.S. government action in preventing an avian flu pandemic, but will first give an overview of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, the largest piece of policy on the issue. It will finally argue that the U.S. has, indeed, added human security to its definition of national security.

Overview of National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza

The main legislation to protect American citizens from an avian flu pandemic has been funding for President Bush’s National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, which was published by the Homeland Security Council in November 2005. Legislation allocated $7.1 billion dollars to implement the National Strategy, but so far, the President’s plan
has been approved for $3.3 billion in funding this year and $2.65 billion for 2007. The purpose of the Strategy is described:

The *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza* guides our preparedness and response to an influenza pandemic, with the intent of (1) stopping, slowing or otherwise limiting the spread of a pandemic to the United States; (2) limiting the domestic spread of a pandemic, and mitigating disease, suffering and death; and (3) sustaining infrastructure and mitigating impact to the economy and the functioning of society.

Of the $7.1 billion dollars allocated, the largest portion—over $6 billion—will go towards research and stockpiling vaccinations. Within this category, most funding will go towards purchasing vaccines for the Departments of Health and Human Services and Defense and the stockpiling of antiviral medications. This leaves approximately $650 million to prepare all levels of government to respond to an attack and approximately $251 million to detect and contain outbreaks before they spread worldwide. Bush’s plan gives the primary responsibility for creating stockpiles of vaccines and antiviral drugs to the federal government, but holds states and local governments responsible for delivering vaccines and controlling local outbreaks. According to Dr. Jeffrey S. Duchin, chief of communicable diseases for Seattle and King County health department, this figure [of $350 million allocated for 2006] is too small to accomplish the intended desired results. He stated, “That $350 million sounds like a lot, but divided among 5,000 health departments, it’s only $70,000 each.” While $7.1 billion may be a large

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121 See Appendix B.
122 McNeil, Jr., 1.
123 Ibid., 1.
number, much of that sum is going towards purchasing vaccines rather than building local infrastructures or preventing outbreaks abroad before the disease reaches our soil.

**Consistency with the National Security Strategy**

Bush’s avian flu strategy coincides with his administration’s goals both abroad and at home. Abroad, the National Security Strategy advocates for U.S. internationalism, the aim of which is to help make the world not just safer but better. In the aftermath of September 11, the 2002 National Security Strategy realizes the new security threats posed by terrorism. In response, the Strategy focuses on pursuing freedom, democracy, and free enterprise around the world.\(^{124}\) By spreading these systems, which are founded in neo-liberalism, the Bush administration believes that it can create a safer world by preventing conditions that give rise to terrorism. In addition to specific promises to fight terrorism, these broader goals seek to spread American ideals throughout the world. In fact, it sees its mission as a moral responsibility to spread the gifts of freedom and democracy, since the administration believes that these are fundamental human rights.

When announcing the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza in September 2005, President Bush stated, “It is essential we work together, and as we do so, we will fulfill a moral duty to protect our citizens, heal the sick, and comfort the afflicted.”\(^{125}\) If the Bush administration can succeed in taking measures to prevent a pandemic, it will be seen as “humanitarian” in other areas. In this way, the Bush

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administration sought global action to help legitimize its other “humanitarian” goals, including democracy promotion in the Middle East.

Specifically, on the international level, Bush’s strategy includes $251 million from Congress “to help our foreign partners to train local medical personnel, expand their surveillance and testing capacity, draw up preparedness plans and take other vital actions to detect and contain outbreaks.”\(^{126}\) However, the “foreign partners” seem to only include Singapore and Indonesia at this point, with talks occurring in China.\(^{127}\) The rationale provided for this international approach is that, “A flu pandemic would have global consequences. So no nation can afford to ignore this threat. And every nation has responsibilities to detect and stop its spread.”\(^{128}\) This rhetoric is similar to Bush’s National Security Strategy. Just as terrorism is the responsibility of all moral nations to fight, so too is controlling this infectious disease. Morality is again a key term in justifying this cause, as is consistent with human security. However, while he discusses the importance of this issue as one to be addressed by all nations, he refers to helping “our foreign partners” and does not mention international institutions such as the World Health Organization or the United Nations. This clearly leads us into a political debate whether such organizations would be effective anyway, but it is important to recognize that “global prevention policies” are still considered within the context of strategic American diplomacy.

A second international aspect of President Bush’s plan includes an International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, which was announced in September 2005.


\(^{127}\) “Fact Sheet: United States Leadership on Avian Influenza,” 2.

\(^{128}\) “President Bush Outlines Flu Pandemic Strategy.”
at the high-level segment of the United Nations General Assembly. President Bush described this partnership on CNN in November 2005 as:

...a global network of surveillance and preparedness that will help us to detect and respond quickly to any outbreaks of the diseases [sic]. The partnership requires participating countries that face an outbreak to immediately share information and provide samples to the [WHO]... Already 88 countries and nine international organizations have joined the effort.  

A meeting with senior officials from these countries and organizations in October 2005 resulted in the agreement of three priority areas for further action: “building stockpiles of drugs and supplies; speeding vaccine development and distribution; and implementing rapid response and containment measures.” Bush may be pursuing some international strategies to prevent a pandemic, but his primary tactic, both internationally and domestically, has been to increase the production of effective vaccines.

It is important to note two other areas of international involvement beyond the National Strategy. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were collectively allocated $25 million for direct investment to foreign governments. Secretary Leavitt (HHS) stated, “We have military, naval laboratories [in Asia] that form an important part of the public health construct for that region. We’ll primarily be investing in laboratory capacity, in surveillance, in training.” USAID has obligated $13.7 million to prevent the spread of avian flu in Southeast Asia. Administrator Natsios indicated that $10 million of this was taken from the Emergency Supplemental Budget for the Tsunami, further showing that

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129 CNN Live Today, “President Bush Outlines Flu Pandemic Strategy.”
these two situations are viewed similarly as threats to human security.\textsuperscript{132} Still, this $25 million of foreign aid is small compared to other measures.

In its quest for global involvement in order to spread its values, it is no surprise that the Bush administration has attempted to take the lead on the prevention of an avian flu pandemic. Furthermore, its action on the issue has been consistent with the National Security Strategy in regards to its efforts on the home front. This two-pronged approach of increased international involvement along with domestic security strategies—which can be seen in Bush’s policies of promoting freedom abroad while instituting the Department of Homeland Security—similarly applies to his approach on the avian flu. While attempting to have international input on the subject, he has been adamant about taking domestic measures. In addition to preventing this specific threat, building up domestic infrastructures and response capacities will be beneficial in the face of other security threats, including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or any other event in which people would need emergency assistance or direction on preventative measures. Thus, by building up local capacity to prevent avian flu abroad and at home, the Bush administration is working to not only prevent an avian flu pandemic, but to prevent other threats and their impacts. The administration’s policies on the avian flu are not, therefore, solely in response to the threat of this specific pandemic, but are in coordination with its grand strategy.

Specific domestic measures undertaken by the administration include a National Bio-surveillance Initiative to “help us rapidly detect, quantify and respond to outbreaks of disease in humans and animals, and deliver information quickly to state, local, and

\textsuperscript{132} United States, Department of State, “Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael Leavitt... on U.S. Government Efforts to Combat Avian Influenza,” 2.
national and international public health officials...."133 The second main component of Bush’s domestic strategy is to stockpile vaccinations and antiviral drugs and to develop new vaccine technologies. To deal with the avian flu in the short term, Bush has asked Congress for $1.2 billion “for the Department of Health and Human Services to purchase enough doses of this vaccine [based on the current strain of the avian flu virus] from manufacturers to vaccinate 20 million people.”134 Stockpiling antiviral drugs is another measure, for which Bush has asked Congress $1 billion, in order to “treat first responders and those on the front lines, as well as populations most at risk in the first stages of a pandemic.”135 Thus, most of President Bush’s plan involves the research and production of antiviral vaccinations. The third part of his domestic strategy involves creating emergency plans in every state and community in order to respond to an outbreak.136

When outlining these strategies, Bush makes it clear that they will not only be beneficial in the event of an avian flu pandemic, but in other cases as well. He states:

The steps I have outlined will also help our nation in other critical ways. By perfecting cell-based technologies now, we will be able to produce vaccines for a range of illnesses and save countless lives. By strengthening our domestic vaccine industry, we can help ensure that our nation will never again have a shortage of vaccine for seasonal—seasonal flu. And by putting in place and exercising pandemic emergency plans across the nation, we can help our nation prepare for other dangers – such as a terrorist attack using chemical or biological weapons.137

For Bush, the threat of an avian flu provides the political space and opportunity to devote a significant amount of money to building general domestic infrastructures that can be

133 United States, Department of State, “President Outlines Pandemic Influenza Preparations and Response,” Remarks at William Natcher Center, National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, November 1, 2005.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
useful in other situations. While Bush has no doubt been committed to this issue, the political landscape has allowed him to use the issue to take measures he might not have otherwise been able to implement.

In addition, this domestic policy shows that the nature of the response to any “security threat” is all very similar. With the indiscriminate nature of terrorism—similar to diseases and natural disasters—the new response is not just a buildup of military and weapons but a strengthening of local response programs and the national stockpiling of resources, such as vaccines. Justifying measures taken to control an avian flu outbreak by relating them to other national threats signifies their similarities in the view of the present administration, furthering the idea that national security is now based on human security and the prerogative to protect citizens from a plethora of threats.

The symbolism of the name of this policy—the “National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza”—is quite significant. Since the language reflects the National Security Strategy of 2002 and the document clearly states that it is consistent with the National Security Strategy as well as the National Strategy for Homeland Security, it is clear that the administration is regarding the issue seriously as one of national security. (However, it is important to note that the Strategy addresses influenza broadly, rather than just focusing on the avian influenza, even though it has clearly been created in this specific context.) The Strategy begins with a warning that “the next pandemic is likely to come in waves, each lasting months, and pass through communities of all size across the nation and the world.” The Strategy also makes the distinction of the type of threat with which we are dealing by writing that “it will ultimately threaten all critical infrastructure by
removing essential personnel from the workplace for weeks or months.” Thus, in addition to the obvious loss of human lives, the administration sees it as a greater threat to economic productivity. While the more specific short-term action is specified in legislation, this Strategy signifies the seriousness with which the administration regards a potential influenza pandemic.

**Congressional Rhetoric and Partisanship**

While Democrats and Republicans have varied slightly in the ways in which prevention and intervention should be handled, the general consensus by both parties has been that the threat of a pandemic is real and that the government must act both domestically and internationally. This has led to a fair amount of government action despite the fact that the disease has not spread from human-to-human and has remained fairly isolated. Both parties want to be seen as “humanitarian” and as capable of preventing security disasters. Thus, policymakers have repeatedly made comparisons between the potential impact of a pandemic flu and the damages caused by both September 11 and Hurricane Katrina. For Republicans, the avian flu has been an opportunity to assert their power in the wake of these events and the Iraq War. For Democrats, it has been an opportunity to get their foot in the door on a security issue, an area that Republicans have typically dominated. Pursuing prevention strategies has also been important for Democrats to show that they have the ability to prevent such catastrophes. While the threats of disease, terrorism and natural disasters are all very different, they are similar in that they can result in massive loss to human life and damage

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to the economy. It is this similarity that is important to policymakers, and since this is one case where such devastations can be prevented, both parties are taking up arms.

Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) clearly compared the threat of the bird flu with the devastations caused by September 11. At a Woodrow Wilson Center Forum he stated:

It is potentially an unprecedented threat to the American people many magnitudes greater than 9/11, and we can’t afford to be penny-wise and pound-foolish. We can’t afford to delay any longer. And we can’t afford preparation timelines that stretch out to 2009 and 2010.... Most of what we’re talking about here spills over into what the 9/11 commission talked about in terms of lack of local preparedness.... And the fact, I think, that the possibility of this hitting us is greater than any kind of terrorist activity. A terrorist activity might kill a few people. You’re talking about hundreds of thousands of Americans dying. And it really would set off a pandemonium in this country.139

Clearly, the threat may exist and these deaths could potentially become reality. I am not discounting that the American public should be aware of such a threat and its seriousness. However, terrorism and disease are two very different issues. While they share similar outcomes, the ways in which they must be addressed are quite distinct. Indeed this comparison helps portray the potential seriousness of a flu pandemic, but it also serves to show that policymakers are still trying to “make up” for any mistakes that may have led to September 11, and that policymakers are making the comparison in order to garner support for new policies, thus portraying them as “security-minded” and “tough.” In reality, while there are definite measures to protect against the spread of an infectious disease, diseases operate in very different ways from terrorists. According to public opinion as discussed earlier in this chapter, it is important for government officials to be concerned with both threats, but it seems that by making the close comparison between

disease and terrorism, policymakers are trying to show that they are capable of protecting citizens, no matter what the danger.

Similarly, legislators have remarked that the devastations of Katrina must not reoccur through an avian flu pandemic. In a news conference on avian flu held by Democrats in November, Senator Barrack Obama (D-IL) stated that “...the United States cannot afford to have an Katrina-level preparedness or a Katrina-like response to an international outbreak of avian flu.” In his remarks, he also compared the U.S. pandemic preparedness plans to those of Japan, France and England, who have “stockpiled enough Tamiflu [antiviral vaccine] to cover a quarter of their population. With enough to cover just 2 percent of our population, the United States is, again, not one of those countries.”140 While Tamiflu clearly would not have much impact when faced with another hurricane, drawing images of recent events has been a common tactic by Democrats to argue that more must be done before we make the same mistakes and repeat history.

As seen above in the National Strategy, Republicans are looking to vaccines as the primary solution to a potential pandemic. While much of Bush’s rhetoric has focused on international policies and local infrastructure, when it comes down to the numbers, faith lies in the power of vaccines. Private pharmaceutical companies end up winning big. Despite the fact that the overall Strategy calls for a large chunk of taxpayer money, most of the money will go to private companies, a policy that is consistent with general Republican beliefs in the private sector. According to Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael Leavitt, the U.S. lags behind others in terms of its stockpile. He said,

140 “Senate Democrats Hold a News Conference on Avian Flu,” Congressional Quarterly, November 1, 2005, 2.
“In 1997, the World Health Organization recommended that each country stockpile at least enough for 25 percent. France and Britain now have enough stockpiled for 25 percent; we only have 2 percent in America. So obviously, we’re playing catch-up ball.”\(^{141}\) However, the United States has already taken some measures after September 11 and the anthrax scare. Secretary Leavitt reported, “The Strategic National Stockpile – stores of antibiotics, disinfectants, intravenous hookups and other emergency supplies—sits on rolling pallets in warehouses around the country, ready to be delivered within 12 hours.”\(^{142}\) We must also not forget that our nation faced large shortages of flu vaccines the past few years before the threat of an avian flu was even serious. The administration faced criticism earlier when not being prepared with vaccines; this policy is thus ensuring that similar circumstances are not repeated, especially in the event of a larger pandemic.

In contrast to viewing vaccines as the primary tool, Democrats have been more adamant about even more government involvement, both in taking preventative measures abroad and in building up local infrastructure. Democrats have also stressed the seriousness of the threat and have hence argued that the administration has not done enough. During a hearing of the House International Relations Committee in December 2005, Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) argued:

I am singularly unimpressed by the administration’s proposal to spend only 3 percent of its $7 billion avian flu budget on tackling the virus where it is already emerging: in markets and small villages across the continent of Asia. We should be channeling our funds to reducing the chance that avian flu will mutate into a highly transmittable form, detecting outbreaks when they occur and controlling the spread of outbreaks to avoid a global pandemic.\(^{143}\)

\(^{141}\) “Remarks by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) to the Woodrow Wilson Center Forum,” 2.
Representative Lantos has also called for more support of the United Nations and the World Health Organization, which are taking their own measures. Similarly, Senator Harkin’s number one priority is “to dramatically step up international surveillance of avian flu outbreaks overseas.”

Senator Harkin has also described the issue as “a national emergency,” and thus, “it ought to be paid for as an emergency.... [and] be backed by the federal government.” This is interesting because despite the gravity in his statement, there has been no detection of the disease, whether in a bird or in a human, on U.S. soil. Yet it is clear that the Democrats regard the issue with much urgency. Senator Harkin has also criticized Republicans for removing funding from the avian flu prevention bill. House Majority Leader Roy Blunt was also quoted as saying that the Republicans did not think there was a “compelling need” for funding and that it could wait another year.

Democrats have also criticized the President’s plan in its effectiveness. Senator Obama argues that, “the plan does not lay out a clear chain of command in the event of a crisis.” He says, “It’s unclear whether the Department of Homeland Security or the Department of Health and Human Services will lead the response effort.” In response, Senator Obama has advocated for a single person who will work with all agencies and have access to the president in order to streamline the chain of command. And while Senator Harkin has advocated for more international action, he has also been critical of the government’s policies around state and local preparedness, referring to them as the

144 “Remarks by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) to the Woodrow Wilson Center Forum,” 4.
145 “Senate Democrats Hold a News Conference on Avian Flu,” 6.
146 “Remarks by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) to the Woodrow Wilson Center Forum,” 3.
147 “Senate Democrats Hold a News Conference on Avian Flu,” 3.
148 Ibid., 8.
“weakest link.”149 Indeed, Democrats have used the opportunity of this looming threat to try to show that they are capable of protecting citizens, more so than the party in power, by pointing to Republicans’ past and current mistakes. However, only hindsight will be able to judge which plan of attack has been best.

Avian Flu is a Security Issue

The rhetoric in Congress has echoed Bush’s remarks that this potential pandemic is, in fact, a security issue. In addition to arguing that both domestic and international action on the issue is imperative for moral reasons, members of Congress also stress the seriousness of health security because diseases are indiscriminate and difficult to control within borders, especially due to globalization. This rhetoric further shows that the avian flu is thought of as an issue of national security, and one that must be dealt with both abroad and at home in various capacities. Just the fact that the International Relations Committee in the House of Representatives took on the issue as its own reflects its seriousness. In a hearing of this committee in December 2005, Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL) clearly argued that the avian flu is a key concern of the committee because it is a global threat and because the nature of the disease is such that it is difficult to detect and control. In order to protect U.S. citizens, Senator Hyde calls for containing an outbreak “beyond the borders of the U.S.”150 This threat is not one that should be only prevented domestically, but one that needs to be addressed internationally in order to truly be most effective.

149 “Remarks by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) to the Woodrow Wilson Center Forum,” 4.
150 “Panel One of a Hearing of the House International Relations Committee,” 2.
Additionally, it is very interesting that the Pandemic Influenza Act, one of the first pieces of legislation to prevent an avian flu pandemic, was made as an amendment to the Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations bill (along with emergency supplemental appropriations to address hurricanes in the gulf of Mexico). Senator Harkin defended this amendment by saying that “it should have been on the Labor, Health and Human Services bill... but we didn’t have a Labor, Health and Human Services bill and we didn’t know if we were going to get one, so that’s why I put on DOD. But as I said, we prevailed and it was put on the bill.” Although it seems Senator Harkin would have preferred the amendment to not be on the Department of Defense bill, it is significant that measures to prevent the spread of a disease were included with the DOD, a department traditionally concerned with weapons and warfare.

Senator Harkin made other remarks that indicate his view that the avian flu can and should be considered within the Department of Defense, because of its capacity for destruction. He compared the avian flu to Pearl Harbor, drawing parallels between the impacts of disease and war. He says:

...it’s interesting to note that today our topic is avian flu, and today is December 7th, the anniversary of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Let’s be clear: when a flu pandemic hits—and experts say it is indeed, a matter of when, not if—it won’t be a sneak attack we’ve been warned about for years, one which we’ve been attacked before.... The allusion to Pearl Harbor is relevant in another respect, because avian flu is more than just a public health issue. It’s a threat to our national security, a threat to our economy of the first order.  

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152 “Remarks by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) to the Woodrow Wilson Center Forum,” 2-3.
153 Ibid., 1-2.
As an advocate of government involvement to prevent a flu pandemic, it is clear that Senator Harkin views this as a serious security issue.

In a hearing by the House International Relations Committee discussing the avian flu, Representative James A. Leach (R-IA) argued more broadly for government protection against all disease by committing to health security. He stated:

…it’s self-evident that the greatest foreign policy issue of our time is neither the problem of war and peace between nation-states and our other problem, terrorism, but rather the human vulnerability to disease we all share. The global spread of the HIV virus and the mounting threat of the first avian pandemic in the new century have begun to focus public attention on this fact…. Yet what is self-evident is that we have... the capacity to act, and failure to do so could be the single greatest failure of public policy and public duty in our lifetime.154

While Congress has been focused on taking action on the avian flu, it is obvious that larger debates about health security are circling.

**Health Security and Borders**

Clearly, the avian flu is being considered a security issue, yet the ways in which diseases must be fought are obviously different than traditional concerns. It is implied that disease is something that can be fought and controlled by nation-states. Fighting diseases, however, is something relatively new in the U.S. security arena, and discussions around the avian flu make this clear.

First, diseases do not recognize barriers posed by borders. This raises considerable questions about the capacity of the nation-state or the nation-state system to be effective. Senator Harkin recognizes this issue. He stated, “An avian flu pandemic is going to move across state lines—they don’t recognize boundaries, it doesn’t recognize

154 “Panel One of a Hearing of the House International Relations Committee,” 3.
boundaries. It’s going to be a national crisis. It’s going to require a federal response. It’s just not reasonable to expect each state to independently come up with this kind of infrastructure and this capacity.” While Senator Harkin argues that our federal government must be the one to take the lead on this issue because domestic states cannot, by themselves, be completely effective, the same must be considered at the international level. Bush’s Influenza Strategy has identified international capacity building, but his primary emphasis and congressional action has been on domestic policies. Perhaps this is partly due to politics and these actors’ positions as elected officials.

In contrast, the Department of State has advocated for more international involvement, as is to be expected. (Yet again, involvement by the State Department demonstrates the significance of this security issue.) Dr. Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs, stated, “Since diseases do not respect borders, an effective global response is critical... Indeed, dealing with avian influenza before it reaches our border is a necessary form of forward defense.” Under Secretary Dobriansky also discussed the State Department’s role. She stated:

The Department of State is involved because the only way to avoid the much higher potential toll of a flu pandemic is in concert with other nations. This issue requires the involvement of not only Ministers of Health and Agriculture but also Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Executive Offices of Presidents and Prime Ministers.

The difficulties of controlling a disease when considered a security threat are complicated when observing the international political arena. Officials have been

155 “Remarks by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) to the Woodrow Wilson Center Forum,” 5-6.
156 Paula J. Dobriansky, “Responding to the Global Threat of Avian and Pandemic Influenza,” (Remarks to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2005).
157 Dobriansky, 1.
especially worried about the avian influenza outbreaks in Africa and other areas of weak infrastructure for fear that the lack of awareness of the disease and a failure to report could lead to a serious outbreak that would be difficult to control. While we cannot practically control all areas of the world, we must be worried about the ways in which other states are dealing with (or are not dealing with) the issue, for it could have a huge effect on our own security. Similarly, there should be concerns about outbreaks of the disease in war-torn areas. The devastation caused by the Spanish influenza in 1918 was magnified by warfare. While today’s wars are fought much differently, an outbreak of the avian flu in Iraq, for instance, could have major effects on the war’s outcome and the rebuilding of that nation. In addition to posing a risk to our own troops, an outbreak would be quite politically damaging. Iraq has already seen a 15-year-old girl die of the bird flu within its borders in January 2006. The New York Times reported, “The finding suggests that the virus may be spreading widely—and undetected—among birds in Central Asia, which is poorly equipped to identify and report infections, officials said.” 

A spokeswoman for the WHO stated her concern that we have seen the first signs of the bird flu in Iraq in humans, rather than birds, which “points to serious gaps in surveillance.” This is almost to be expected in a country trying to re-build in such conditions. However, this example points to the necessity for our government to commit to measures to prevent a major outbreak in Iraq and the Middle East, at least for political reasons.

159 Ibid., 1.
CONCLUSION

While fear around an avian flu pandemic may be justified, the United States government has taken a fair amount of action and has engaged in a significant amount of dialogue around the prevention of a pandemic. Most of this discourse and activity has been geared towards proving their capacity in addressing security concerns, or their capability to protect American lives against whatever threat might be present. This is quite worrying when one realizes that prevention and intervention policies are being created with politics—not science—in mind. Perhaps this is a theme among many administrations, but it seems apparent that current leadership is pursuing politics instead of science, perhaps endangering citizens by not fully appreciating scientific expertise. True it is difficult to “predict” a pandemic, but those quoted (or misquoted) in the media have predominately been bureaucrats, not epidemiologists or other scientists. One must wonder whether or not domestic and international policies would be different if experts were offered stronger input in decision-making.

We must also question whether this has become such a high-profile issue for political or scientific reasons. Is the avian flu truly a threat? Or has it been made to be seen as such for political reasons—to raise legitimacy for an administration that has been questioned on its ability to provide security, both domestically and abroad? If the latter is true, which I fear it is, our leadership (both in White House and Congress) may have unnecessarily heightened fears and anxieties. It is important that measures have been taken to strengthen preparedness and response systems, but this could have been done without creating something close to mass hysteria.
Yet regardless of reasons why, by putting such time and resources towards preventing an avian flu pandemic, the government has legitimized the threat of disease as a security issue. The repercussions of this precedent may be quite large. In the past, national security has been focused on protecting citizens from foreign militaries. Now, in the age of militant action by non-state actors, the United States has had to expand its definition of national security. It has gone even farther to place public health issues under the category of “national security,” requiring government action both at home and abroad. What will this mean for the future?

With the proliferation of emerging and re-emerging diseases throughout the globe, as well as the increasing speed and depth at which diseases can potentially spread due to globalization, our government, as well as many others throughout the world, may not only add infectious diseases to the list of potential national security threats, but may slowly shift their focus towards these threats. Instead of being concerned with countries with large militaries or terrorist organizations, countries with poor health infrastructures or high amounts of disease might become our worst enemies. Will there be a day when we give more money to foreign countries to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases than to support their military? Actions to prevent an avian flu pandemic have been primarily focused on vaccine production, with some degree of building local capacity and strengthening foreign prevention and response systems. This may have been the right decision for this issue in the context of current politics and in the view of the current administration, but what other ways can governments fight diseases, both within our borders and beyond? A few other possible solutions may be to improve infrastructures throughout the world, including access to adequate health care, clean
water, pest control, virus detection, and education. If these tactics become more accepted as ways to protect American citizens by preventing diseases from spreading in the first place, this will dramatically change the way in which we structure our foreign policy, foreign aid, and national defense.

Another outcome might be substantial international cooperation for successful “campaigns” against such diseases. When every person on the globe faces the same threat to their life, perhaps nations will finally work together for the sake of humanity. In theory, such cooperation could occur through the auspices of the United Nations or the World Health Organization, yet in practice this is unlikely. How might cooperation occur instead? Perhaps increased bilateral agreements will be the result, as is happening today. But will this be enough for true global coordination? Domestically, states may begin to see more federal money for increasing emergency response systems. So far they have received some, but greater threats will only encourage the federal government to ensure that the local level is more prepared.

Despite the trends moving towards human security, there is still the possibility that this trend could reverse itself. Perhaps such high government involvement is simply an anomaly, a result of other circumstances such as September 11 and Hurricane Katrina. Indeed it is crucial that we think about security not inside a vacuum; while the avian flu has been an issue of greater importance than in the past, our military has also grown substantially due to the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq. It is unreasonable to speculate whether or not diseases would be of greater concern without these other “hard security” issues occurring simultaneously. Yet the fact that the government has put so much effort to the prevention of this disease, while concurrently scrambling to fund a
war-in-progress further shows its significance. Our government may not seek to prevent the spread of all diseases, and its efforts may be still very limited, especially when compared to the scope of funding for military campaigns, but I believe that it is nevertheless moving in the direction towards human security.

Additionally, our government has vested interest in improving health worldwide and preventing against the spread of diseases because diseases may become the new explicit weapon by terrorists. Never mind the intrinsic threat of diseases; bio-terrorism is another serious concern on its own. While the best ways in which bio-terrorism should be fought is arguable, strengthening local reporting and response systems can only be beneficial in this type of situation. Thus, for the sake of preventing human harm by disease, whether it is fabricated or natural, the government should continue to build upon its human security policies. September 11 may have been devastating to the United States, but a pandemic could be thousands times more devastating to the world. We must continue to learn from our mistakes and be prepared for future threats—whether they are as large as atomic bombs or as small as microbes.
APPENDIX A: Charts and Graphs to Display Definitions of Human Security

Traditional and human security: Comparative Aspects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Security</th>
<th>Human Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorially Sovereign State</td>
<td>Not necessarily spatially oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic and Military</td>
<td>Community and individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalized</td>
<td>Socio-political, socio-economic, environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal (political) Structured Violence</td>
<td>Non-institutionalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic and military; unilateral</td>
<td>Informal (intuitive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstructured Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scientific, technological; multilateral governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Classification of Security Studies by Roland Paris

Source of Security Threat?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States (Realism)</th>
<th>Military, Non-military, both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>Redefined Security (e.g., environmental and economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[cooperative or comprehensive] security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societies, Groups, Individuals</td>
<td>Human Security (e.g., environmental and economic threats to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>survival of societies, groups, and individuals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrastate Security (e.g., civil war,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ethnic conflict, and democide)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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APPENDIX B: National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza\(^{162}\)

**Funding Breakdown:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detect and contain outbreaks before they spread worldwide</td>
<td>$251 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accelerate development of cell-culture technology</td>
<td>$2.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of new treatments and vaccines</td>
<td>$800 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departments of Health and Human Services and Defense to purchase influenza vaccines</td>
<td>$1.519 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile antiviral medications</td>
<td>$1.029 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare all levels of government to respond to a pandemic</td>
<td>$644 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7.1 billion</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National Strategy for Pandemic Flu**

![Pie chart showing the distribution of funds for different activities.]

- **Contain outbreaks worldwide:** 9%
- **Development of cell-culture technology:** 15%
- **Development of new vaccines:** 39%
- **Influenza vaccines for HHS and DOD:** 22%
- **Stockpile antiviral medications:** 4%
- **Prepare all levels of government to respond:** 11%

**National Strategy for Pandemic Flu: Main Points\(^{163}\)**

**Pillar One: Preparedness and Communication**

- We will support pandemic planning efforts, and clearly communicate expectations to individuals, communities and governments, whether overseas or in the United States, recognizing that all share the responsibility to limit the spread of infection in order to protect populations beyond their borders.
- A critical element of pandemic planning is ensuring that people and entities not accustomed to responding to health crises understand the actions and priorities.


required to prepare for and respond to a pandemic. Those groups include political leadership at all levels of government, non-health components of government and members of the private sector. Essential planning also includes the coordination of efforts between human and animal health authorities.

- In combination with traditional public health measures, vaccines and antiviral drugs form the foundation of our infection control strategy. Vaccination is the most important element of this strategy, but we acknowledge that a two-pronged strategy incorporating both vaccines and antivirals is essential.
- Research and develop vaccines, antivirals, adjuvants and diagnostics represents our best defense against a pandemic. To realize our goal of next-generation countermeasures against influenza, we must make significant and targeted investments in promising technologies.

Pillar Two: Surveillance and Detection

- Early warning of a pandemic and our ability to closely track the spread of avian influenza outbreak is critical to being able to rapidly employ resources to contain the spread of the virus. An effective surveillance and detection system will save lives by allowing us to activate our response plans before the arrival of a pandemic virus to the U.S., activate additional surveillance systems and initiate vaccine production and administration.
- Although influenza does not respect geographic or political borders, entry to and egress from affected areas represent opportunities to control or at the very least slow the spread of infection.

Pillar Three: Response and Containment

- We recognize that a virus with pandemic potential anywhere represents a risk to populations everywhere. Once health authorities have signaled sustained and efficient human-to-human spread of the virus has occurred, a cascade of response mechanisms will be initiated, from the site of the documented transmission to locations around the globe.
- The most effective way to protect the American population is to contain an outbreak beyond the borders of the U.S. While we work to prevent a pandemic from reaching our shores, we recognize that slowing or limiting the spread of the outbreak is a more realistic outcome and can save many lives.
- Rather than generating a focal point of casualties, the medical burden of a pandemic is likely to be distributed in communities across the nation for an extended period of time.
- Movement of essential personnel, goods and services, and maintenance of critical infrastructure are necessary during an event that spans months in any given community. The private sector and critical infrastructure entities must respond in a manner that allows them to maintain the essential elements of their operations for a prolonged period of time, in order to prevent severe disruption of life in our communities.
- Effective risk communication is essential to inform the public and mitigate panic.
APPENDIX C: Avian Flu Congressional Activity

Senate Hearings:
“Role of U.S. Agriculture in the Control and Eradication of Avian Influenza”
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry
November 17, 2005

“UN Efforts to Combat Avian Flu”
Congressional Global Health Caucus and United Nations Foundation News
Conference/Briefing
November 15, 2005

“Avian Influenza – Are We Prepared?”
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
November 9, 2005

“Pandemic Influenza”
Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee for Labor/HHS/Education
November 2, 2005

“21st century Biological Threats”
Senate Subcommittee on Bioterrorism/Public Health Preparedness, HELP Committee
May 11, 2005

House Hearings:
“Statement of Jim Kolbe”
Congressional hearing on Avian Flu
March 2, 2006

“Statement of Dr. Ron DeHaven, Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service”
U.S. Department of Agriculture to the House Agriculture Committee
November 16, 2005

“Avian Flu: Addressing the Global Threat”
House Committee on International Relations
December 7, 2005

“Review of the Prevention, Detection, and Eradication of Avian Influenza”
House Committee on Agriculture – Public Hearing
November 16, 2005

“Pandemic Flu Plan Assessment”

(Accessed April 9, 2006).
House Energy and Commerce Committee, Full Committee Hearing  
November 8, 2005

“Pandemic Influenza”  
House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee for Labor/HHS/Education  
November 2, 2005

“The Next Flu Pandemic: Evaluations of U.S. Readiness”  
House Committee on Government Reform  
June 30, 2005

“Threat of and Planning for Pandemic Flu”  
House Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Energy and Commerce  
May 26, 2005

“Efforts to Prevent Pandemic by Air Travel”  
House Subcommittee on Aviation of Committee on Transport and Infrastructure  
April 6, 2005

**Senate Legislation:**
S. 1912 Global Network for Avian Influenza Surveillance Act  
Sen. Lieberman (D-CT); no co-sponsors  
*Would establish a global network for avian influenza surveillance among wild birds nationally and internationally to combat the growing threat of bird flu; Introduced October 24, 2005*

S.AMDT.2283 to HR 3010 (Labor-HHS FY2006 Appropriations)  
Sen. Harkin (D-IA); 10 co-sponsors  
*Would allocate nearly $8 billion for comprehensive national effort to prepare for avian flu pandemic; Passed October 27, 2005.*

S. 1880 National Biodefense and Pandemic Preparedness Act  
Sen. Kennedy (D-MA); 7 co-sponsors  
*Would amend the PHS Act to enhance biodefense and pandemic preparedness activities; Introduced October 17, 2005.*

S. 1873 Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act  
Sen. Burr (R-NC); 6 co-sponsors  
*Would prepare and strengthen the biodefenses of the United States against deliberate, accidental, and natural outbreaks of illness; Introduced October 17, 2005.*

S. 1828 Influenza Security Act  
Sen. Clinton (D-NY); 2 co-sponsors  
*Would amend PHS Act to secure adequate supply of influenza vaccine; Introduced October 6, 2005.*
S. 1821 Pandemic Preparedness and Response Act
Sen. Reid (D-NV); 14 co-sponsors
Would amend PHS Act to prepare for influenza pandemic; Introduced October 5, 2005.

S. 969 Attacking Viral Influenza Across Nations
Sen. Obama (D-IL); 9 co-sponsors
Would amend PHS Act to prepare for influenza pandemic; Introduced April 28, 2005.

S. 975 Project BioShield II
Sen. Lieberman (D-NH); 2 co-sponsors
Would provide incentives to increase research by private sector entities to develop medical countermeasures; Introduced April 28, 2005.

House Legislation:

HR 4603 Pandemic and Seasonal Influenza Act of 2005
December 16, 2005
To amend the Public Health Service Act with respect to pandemic influenza, and for other purposes. Appropriation is authorized to carry out this title $750,000 for fiscal year 2007.

HR 4476 Global Network for Avian Influenza Surveillance Act
December 8, 2005
To establish a global network for avian influenza surveillance among wild birds nationally and internationally to combat the growing threat of bird flu, and for other purposes.

HR 4396 National Vaccine Authority
Rep Joseph Crowley (D-NY); 1 co-sponsor
Would establish the National Vaccine Authority within the Department of Health and Human Services; Introduced November 18, 2005.

HR 4392
Rep. Thomas Allen (D-ME); no co-sponsors
Would provide for the importation of pharmaceutical products under a compulsory license as provided for under the World Trade Organization; Introduced November 18, 2005.

HR 4358 Influenza Vaccine Emergency Act
Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-OR); 11 co-sponsors
Would amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for emergency distributions of influenza vaccine; Introduced November 17, 2005.

HR 4245 Influenza Preparedness and Prevention Act of 2005
Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-CA); 6 co-sponsors
Would provide for programs and activities with respect to pandemic influenza; Introduced November 7, 2005.
HR 4062 Pandemic Preparedness and Response Act  
Rep. Lowey (D-NY)  
*Would amend PHS Act to prepare for influenza pandemic; Introduced October 27, 2005.*

HR 2863 Department of Defense FY2006 Appropriations  
Original Senate amendment from Sen. Harkin (D-IA); 10 co-sponsors  
*Would allocate $3.9 billion for avian flu preparedness; Reported October 7, 2005.*

HR 3369 Attacking Viral Influenza Across Nations Act of 2005  
July 20, 2005  
*To amend the Public Health Service Act with respect to preparation for an influenza pandemic, including an avian influenza pandemic, and for other purposes. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act (and the amendments made by this Act) for each of the fiscal years 2006 through 2010.*

HR 1268 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005  
*Provided $25 million to USAID to prevent and control the spread of avian flu; Signed by President May 11, 2005.*
BIBLIOGRAPHY


“Senate Democrats Hold a News Conference on Avian Flu.” Congressional Quarterly, November 1, 2005.


United States, Department of State. “President Outlines Pandemic Influenza Preparations and Response,” Remarks at William Natcher Center, National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, November 1, 2005.


