

A Value Pluralist Approach to Political Ideology: The Six Universal and Conflicting Principles from which our Politics Derive

Author: Brian Ashmankas

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Boston College
The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Department of Political Science

A Value Pluralist Approach to Political Ideology:
The Six Universal and Conflicting Principles from which our Politics Derive

A thesis by
Brian Ashmankas

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The Six Universal and Conflicting Principles from which our Politics Derive
by Brian Ashmankas
Thesis Advisor: Nasser Behnegar

Abstract

Political ideology can be described in terms of value pluralist theory. Much of the variation between political ideologies can be explained by the fact that the principles that are essential to society—liberty, equality, fraternity, peace, loyalty, and civilization—are incommensurable and often conflict forcing each person and community to emphasize some principles over others leading to an imperfect society.

Each political ideology is a combination of interests and the selected balance of principles and thus can be essentially defined according to the level of preference for each of these six principles. This paper studies major political ideologies throughout the globe and develops a model for understanding them in these terms.

This paper further argues for a pluralist democracy, with constantly shifting ideological dominance in a community as the next best thing to an impossible utopia and the only means of preventing the collapse of society due to a lack of essential principles. This model makes clear the fallacy of understanding political ideology in terms of "left" and "right," which not only oversimplify political ideology but also fundamentally misrepresent it. It also leads to narrowing visions of politics that prevent significant changes to a political system and undermine the possibility for pluralist democracy.

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Throughout history and across the globe, philosophers, politicians, theologians, scholars, partisans, revolutionaries, and common people have espoused certain principles and defended their importance to organizing a just, proper, or otherwise good society. In France in 1789, revolutionaries shouted “liberté, égalité, fraternité” leading to an ongoing debate about whether liberty, equality, or the principle alternatively referred to as fraternity, solidarity, and community should be preferred when they so often stand in conflict. But this was not the origin of these principles. They did not suddenly appear in the hearts and minds of men with the storming of the Bastille. More than a century prior, Thomas Hobbes denounced the apparently long-established principle of liberty, favoring instead what he called peace, but what can also be referred to as security, continuing and coalescing a debate over the importance of these principles that remains with us even today. But these principles and debate over them did not begin with Hobbes. The ancient Greeks focused on the balance between freedom and civilization, both principles which extend into the modern world. Equality, fraternity, and peace also extended back to the Greeks and were often topics of debates and oration. Farther back still, the ancient Hebrews generally focused on loyalty to God, but this principle was far from limited to ancient times, Palestine, or even to God. Throughout history all of these and the conflict between them were espoused and debated vigorously. Neither are these principles limited to the Judeo-Christian or Western worlds. Representatives of Islamic, Aryan, Asian, and many other cultures have discussed and written about these principles and others, by various names, long before contact with the West. In the modern era, the rich and diverse principles that form this long-standing and wide-ranging conflict have been disguised and simplified into the broad and changing terms of "left" and "right"

perpetuating an "us versus them" dynamic which creates intractable factions along partisan, cultural, and socio-economic lines. However, this simplified conflict over simplified ideas hides the truth. As a species, we don't always agree on which principles take precedence, but we do share a universal belief regarding which principles should be valued. In the following work, I will examine a number of political ideologies from across the globe to demonstrate precisely this point. Some are traditionally called leftist, others are from the right-wing, while still others fall into neither camp. Some come from the West, others from the Rest. Some are the foundation for powerful parties and factions, while others exist only in the mind of a single scholar or thinker. However, they all share a single underlying set of principles. Before beginning this endeavor I will first examine what political ideology truly means.

The Nature of Political Ideology

The Evolution of Political Ideology

The term ideology was first coined during the first French Empire by Destutt De Tracy. De Tracy defined it as the science of ideas (Kennedy 1979; 353). It was his aim in creating ideology to establish a “theory of moral and political sciences” (Kennedy 1979; 355). Thus ideology, as originally conceived was a rational understanding of ideas from which the basis of all other science would flow since all other sciences were comprised of ideas (Kennedy 1979; 357). In studying the nature of ideas, ideologues (a term that at the time held no negative connotations) hoped to determine an ideal set of politics and morality rooted in reason and science.

However, the ideologues made an enemy of Napoleon who proceeded to deride them as spreaders of atheism and materialism (Kennedy 1979; 362). Eventually Victor Cousin would criticize ideology for not submitting to the right of examination (Kennedy 1979; 263). In other words, the scientific outlook ideologues had of their own belief system caused them to consider alternative views to be irrational, and thus didn’t consider criticisms worthy to be taken into account. No reasonable or rational disagreement was possible in their view. The fact that disagreement did exist caused ideology to take on the form we think of today, as a single set of ideas that may conflict with a different set, both of which are ideologies (Kennedy 1979; 263). Thus ideology ceased to be science, and became instead opinion.

In this paper, I will not be discussing the full range of ideology, but rather be concentrating on political ideology in particular. Although a working definition of

political ideology cannot be determined based on the understanding of the original ideologues, it does create a starting point. It is first clear from the work of De Tracy that ideology is distinguished from much of the previous pre-revolution thought. Rather than being simply any belief system, political ideology is defined by a conscious effort to determine the most rational belief system. Many previous beliefs were based on irrational notions or unexamined assumption, but ideology is distinguished from these because it sought not to make assumptions based on established norms, but sought instead to create a theory based on rationality.

Political ideology is further distinguished from the broader set of ideologies, which include all rationally-derived belief systems, by the fact that it deals with politics (not surprisingly). Politics is still a broad (and often fluid) term and determining what is political and what is not is not immediately clear. As I continue to explore political ideologies throughout this paper the initial understanding will be refined, but for now let us consider two essential aspects of politics in order to construct a viable working definition. First, politics deals not with the internal matters of individuals but the collective relationships among individuals in a society. Second, politics is not simply the study or understanding of these relationships, but a belief in how society ought to be organized. It can also involve a chosen means of establishing this order, that is instrumental policies, and by extension involves the exercise of power but these are not essential characteristics. We would for instance still consider Socrates' discussion of a just society in the Republic to be a political discourse, even though it prescribes no means for it to be brought into effect nor plans to exercise power to do so. From what we learned of ideology from De Tracey and what we discussed about politics, we are able to

construct a working definition of political ideology. Political ideology is a theory of how to organize society most rationally.

In his article “The Concept of Ideology,” George Lichheim describes the Marxist interpretation and understanding of ideology. He sees ideology as firstly “concerned with ideas” and secondly as “placing the satisfaction of ‘ideal aims’ (their own) ahead of the ‘material’ interests on which...society rested” (Lichtheim 1965; 165-166). The first part is quite uncontroversial, very few would disagree that ideology is concerned with ideas. However, the second portion implies that ideology in general is a negative and selfish quality. Lichtheim believes that ideology is a “conscious or unconscious distortion of reality in the interest of some group” (Lichtheim 1965; 184), merely a means employed to further one’s own aims at the expense of the greater good. In other words, ideology is nothing but a false consciousness. Sometimes, a group will distort the truth (perpetuate an ideology) in order that others will unknowingly serve their interests and sometimes they will distort their own understanding of reality in order to justify and motivate themselves in their pursuit of their own interests. At times an ideology will serve both these purposes simultaneously. Sometimes this process is a conscious effort by the group, other times it is subconscious, but for Lichtheim the motivation is always nefarious and the ideas are never genuine.

Additional revelations about the true nature of political ideology is provided by David Hume in his essay "Of Parties in General." Although he does not use the term political ideology, he certainly references the concept. He distinguishes between four types of political parties or factions. First he divides factions into "Personal" and "Real". Personal factions are simply based on friendship or else mutual animosity toward an

opposing faction, but express no meaningful difference. Real factions, meanwhile, are based on "some real difference of sentiment or interest." These real factions are further divided into three types. Factions based on interest arise when sections of society (such as nobles and peasants or merchants and soldiers) have distinct interests and thus come into conflict. Factions based on principles arise from differences in speculative or abstract principles that contradict each other. The third type is factions based on affection, which arise wholly from a difference in opinion as to who should rule (Hume 1748).

From Lichtheim's or Marx's perspective, Hume's division of real factions into three groups would be entirely misguided. He would likely reject the idea of parties based on principles and those based on affection, describing these principles as merely false consciousness that does nothing but mask the fact that the factions are really about interest alone. Some people consciously or subconsciously choose principles and rulers who support their interests, while others are deceived into selecting principles and rulers that benefit others' interests, completely unaware of their real effect. While Lichtheim sees principles and affections as merely means to the end of someone's interest, Hume sees principles as an unaccountable phenomenon and affections as distinct from the hope of receiving any favor, in each case certainly not means to any particular interest (Hume 1748). Determining a resolution to this disagreement between Hume and Lichtheim is essential in understanding political ideology. If Lichtheim is correct and real factions are based on nothing but self-interest, then there is no hope of finding common ground between factions, nor the divergent ideologies that they often represent. Our principles are completely irreconcilable and thus there is no meaningful commonality within

humanity, aside from momentary common interest that may arise from time to time. However, if Hume is correct and principles represent something distinct from simply self-interest, then there is hope that some of these principles at least are universal in nature and thus humanity shares a set of values and not just a set of genes (as I hope to prove in the main section of this paper).

The essential question in this controversy is: If we subscribe to a set of principles or express an affection for a certain leader, are these principles and affections real or a false consciousness meant to either mask the fact that we are actually pursuing our own interest or else being deceived into pursuing another's? Immediately, we can say that expressing principles and affections are not simply a cynical game that we all play in pursuit of our self-interest. There are simply too many examples of humans acting contrary to their self-interest in order to fulfill their principles. Anonymous charitable giving, self-sacrifice, wealthy individuals voting for progressive taxes, and poor ones supporting less entitlement spending all stand as testaments to principles being more than a cynical facade. And certainly, as Hume puts it, we often have affections for people with whom we aren't acquainted, never saw, were never received by, and couldn't hope to receive favors from (Hume 1748).

It is still possible, however, that these principles and affections have been instilled in us by others in order to serve their self-interest. The poor might support less entitlement spending because of their principle of self-reliance, but that principle could merely be a means to support the interests of the wealthy who wish to pay less taxes. Further the impulse toward self-sacrifice could simply be a means for the powerful to convince the powerless to die for them and affections could simply be means of ensuring

loyalty in the masses. However, this also cannot explain away all our principles and affections as simply interest. After all, many common political principles such as charity, equality, mercy, and justice specifically benefit the weak and vulnerable, not the powerful. In addition, humans tend to have an affection for underdogs and outsiders, not those who already possess power. Therefore, principles and affections are, as Hume indicates, distinct phenomena from interest and separate motivations for the formation of factions.

Adopting Hume's approach to factions allows us to further hone in on the meaning and nature of political ideology. So far our working definition states that political ideology is a theory of how to organize society most rationally. Lichtheim might amend this definition as follows: political ideology is a theory of how to most organize society most rationally in order to satisfy one's or another's interests. However, as the above argument shows, this definition is not accurate or at least not complete. In order to better grasp a more complete definition we must delve further into Hume's discussion of factions.

Hume's understanding of parties and factions is further important to the study of political ideology because parties and factions are so often closely associated with political ideology. This is almost certainly because of what Hume calls the strictly modern phenomenon of factions based on principle. However, it is important to note that although Lichtheim's claim that parties are always factions of interest is incorrect, it is also not true that they are always factions of principles, or at least not wholly. Modern political parties and factions are almost always combinations of all of Hume's types.

They generally contain elements of personal ties as well as real differences in interests, principles, and affections.

For example, the Republican Party in the United States espouses an ideology of conservatism, which I will discuss later as being derived from support for some principles and opposition to others. However, at least a portion of their agenda derives not from these values, but rather from a desire to further the interests of the wealthy or business class. In addition, they are also a party of affection, favoring the election of members of their own party to others, regardless of ideology as well as a personal faction due to their shared animosity toward Democrats and sometimes toward intellectuals, public employees, or recipients of public aid as well as almost tribal bonds toward each other. The Democratic Party is, of course, also a mix of all these types. They favor the progressive or liberal principles, support the interests of unions and trial lawyers among others, express an affection for the election of their members over others, and hold mutual animosity toward Republicans and tribal-like loyalty to each other.

Political parties contain elements of all four types of Hume's factions, however faction is not the same as political ideology. Political ideology certainly is related to political parties. It is often a reason for joining them, it can be cause for starting one, and it certainly can inform the motivations of an existing party. Political ideology describes part of the motivation for the formation of factions, however, it does not fully coincide with the full list of causes and motivations behind factions as described by Hume. There are clearly causes and motivations of political factions that we would not describe as political ideology. We can therefore conclude that political ideology encompasses at least one of Hume's causes of factions, but not all four of them. For example, no one

would say that the Hatfields and McCoys subscribed to opposing political ideologies, even though it is clear that they were part of opposing personal factions. Therefore, personal ties (friendship and animosities) are not part of political ideology. That leaves the three "real" causes of factions as candidates.

The House of Lancaster and the House of York were also not of opposing political ideologies. We would most certainly say that they essentially had the same political ideology, namely monarchism, yet they were certainly opposite factions for several decades during the War of the Roses. These factions would be described by Hume as parties from affection, that is over who ought to rule, but not over the actual organization of society. Therefore, affection is not an aspect of political ideology.

This leaves interest and principles as candidates for the motivation behind factions that is political ideology. It seems evident that these two motivations serve in this role together. One's political ideology is determined by both one's political interests and political principles. Take for example two statements of beliefs. "I am a worker and I support unions because they provide me with better working conditions and higher pay" and "I believe that every citizen should be free to choose their own way of life and should be afforded equal rights." The first is a statement of interest and the second is a statement of principle, but both would be considered an aspect of someone's political ideology. This concept has the added benefit of somewhat reconciling Hume and Marx, that is Hume's ideas about factions and Lichtheim's definition of ideology. We can now say that political ideology is a theory of how to organize society most rationally in order to satisfy certain interests and one's principles.

Universalism and Relativism

As noted above, this paper seeks to demonstrate that all world political ideologies share a single underlying set of principles and simply disagree on which of those principles should take precedence when they come into conflict. Unlike political principles, which I argue are universal and therefore provide a common ground for all of humanity, interests are rarely shared by all, but rather held in opposition to another's interests. My health (or self-continuation) might require self-defense or police protection and thus conflict with the health of another. Due to scarcity of resources, wealth acquisition by one generally requires loss of wealth by another. My happiness (pleasure and lack of suffering) might be dependent on any number of circumstances that cause suffering to others that prefer others circumstances. These interests can also conflict with each other, for example, my wealth might come through the drudgery and suffering of some laborers. Finally, there can also be internal conflicting interests. Pursuing my interest in health may conflict with my interest in happiness achieved through consuming sweet and salty food or wealth preserved by eating fast food and not paying for a gym membership. However, neither do these interests inherently conflict. Achieving one of these three interests does not necessarily forego the possibility of achieving the others (for either oneself or others) and increasing one does not necessarily require decreasing the others as I will demonstrate that principles do. Although political ideology contains elements of both interest and principle, this paper, while recognizing the interest-based aspect of political ideology, will be focusing on the principles that underlie political ideologies and compare and contrast these ideologies primarily on these grounds. The discussion of ideological divergence based on interest shall be left for a different study.

At this point it is necessary to address a problem that arises in the working definition of political ideology that I have thus far developed. If political ideology is distinguished from other forms of political belief by rationality and underlying universal principles, why doesn't everyone who reasons come to the same conclusion about at least the principle-based aspect of political ideology (even if they can't be expected to always share interests with others)? This is the same problem De Tracey and his supporters faced when they first created the concept of ideology. Despite having created a rational mode of organizing society, others (often with similar interests) rationally created alternatives and criticized the original ideologues for not submitting to the right of examination. A possible answer to this conundrum lies in the writings of Max Weber.

In "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics," Max Weber discusses value-judgments. These are "practical evaluations of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena subject to our influence." These are "deduced from ethical principles, cultural ideals, or a philosophical outlook," what can collectively be referred to as values (Weber 1949; 1).

Weber carefully distinguishes between these value-judgments and empirical facts, noting that they ought to be excluded from empirical analysis. However, he does not discredit value-judgments as therefore meaningless, but rather believes that one should seek to understand all of them, while not necessarily pardoning all of them. In fact, he believes that this analysis of value-judgments will more often lead to the invalidation of the belief system, rather than its validation (Weber 1949; 14). For Weber, empirical analysis and value-judgments are distinct and serve distinct purposes. Empirical analysis, serves to determine the means, repercussions, and consequences of a given action, but is

incapable of determining even the most basic questions of what ought to be done, given these empirical truths (Weber 1949; 18-19). It is value-judgments that fill this role, allowing us to evaluate the means we use, the consequences that result, and the beliefs we hold. The first is existential knowledge (what is) and the second is normative knowledge (what should be) (Weber 1949; 31). Weber further rejects the idea that one can derive value-judgments from factual assertions (1949; 22).

Hume's principles and Weber's values are very similar notions and most of Weber's argument in regard to values also applies to Hume's principles. The principle-based aspect of political ideology is a value-judgment. It therefore cannot be decided empirically or rationally. This helps to explain how it can simultaneously be rational and vary. They serve as a rational means of organizing society, describing the best means in order to bring about certain consequences, without causing certain repercussions. However, the desirability of these consequences, the undesirability of these repercussions, and the attractiveness of these means cannot be determined empirically and therefore are value-judgments. If two individuals favor different values (or principles) or even a different preference order for the same values, they can each rationally determine the best way to organize society and completely disagree with no empirical means of resolving the controversy.

While values and principles are extremely similar concepts and admittedly overlap in meaning significantly, I believe it is nevertheless necessary to distinguish between them. The term value tends to emit a subjective quality that tends to vary with personal, cultural, and circumstantial inclinations. Principles, meanwhile, tend to describe beliefs that, while not empirically derived, still contain an objective and constant

quality. While admitting to the fluid nature of both these definitions, this is how I will conceptualize them in this paper, allowing for clear meaning throughout this work that is also rooted in how we actually tend to think about these terms. Taking into account the understanding revealed by Weber, I can once again revise my definition of political ideology. Political ideology is a theory of how to organize society most rationally in order to satisfy certain interests and to reflect one's preference for certain principles.

Further reading of Weber's essays also reveal additional understanding about values and individuals' preference for them. These preferences are determined by a number of different ways. Circumstance plays a major role. For instance, Weber says individuals are inclined to adopt or give up ideals based on their chances of success (1949; 23). Cultural norms, certain metaphysical premises (1949;24), prior assumptions (1949; 26), and time period (1949; 33) also inform a person's preferred ideals or values, but the ideals are never determined by science (that is empirical reason or deduction) (1949; 24-25). In other words, Weber's values conform to the definition provided for them above, that is beliefs that are subjective and circumstantial.

Lichtheim summarized Weber's argument as follows: "Every culture has its own norms and values which enter into the perception of what is called 'reality.' Its norms are binding only upon those who accept them, though this does not invalidate them, since it is their fate to be 'objective' and 'subjective' at the same time" (Lichteim 1965; 185). Lictheim claims that Weber's account of normative belief (including ideology) amounts simply to relativism. This definition seems to indicate that no ideology is right and none is wrong and they can only be judged according to the time, place, and circumstances in which they exist. According to this view, all ideologies are legitimate because they are

rooted in the values of that time and place, but none are in a position to be timeless or universal. Lichtheim criticizes this standpoint by saying that it “leads away from the notion of truth as universal” (Lichteim 1965; 185).

Although Lichtheim's analysis of Weber reveals certain commonalities between Weber's beliefs and relativism, he misses some key points which distinguish them. Weber certainly observes that ideals, norms, and values vary according to time, place, and circumstance. This does appear to be relativism on the surface, however, on closer examination Weber does not conclude that this variation in ideals indicates a variation in truth. In fact he is quite clear that "understanding all" does not mean "pardoning all" and that cultural values are not the same as ethical imperatives (Weber 1949; 14-15). In fact, he is very clear about the importance of critically examining belief systems to determine whether their logic and calculations are correct, indicating that more often than not they are not (Weber 1949; 14, 41). Further, Weber concludes this essay by noting that professional thinkers have a moral obligation to oppose prevailing ideas of their time if necessary, an entirely untenable position if relativism is true and norms are judged solely by the time, place, and circumstance in which they take place (Weber 1949; 47). In other words, norms and values may vary, but they are still subject to a universal standard of analysis, based on internal consistency (reason) and ethical imperatives (principles), to determine if they are true and ethical. They are not simply judged by their own terms as would be the case in relativism.

Although, Weber's understanding of normative knowledge (including political ideology) is distinct from relativism it is not immediately clear which belief system is correct. Either there is a universal standard by which belief systems can be judged or else

they are solely determined by and judged according to factors of time, place, and circumstance. In the following few pages I will address this dichotomy and argue that Weber's understanding of political beliefs, rather than relativism, is the best means of understanding political ideology.

The first indication of the fallacy of relativism is best explained by James Rachels in his article “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism.” He shows “that it rests on an invalid argument, that it has consequences that make it implausible on its face, and that the extent of moral disagreement is far less than it implies” (Rachels 1999; 8). On the first point he demonstrates that the relativist conclusion that “there is no objective truth in morality” does not follow from the relativist premise that “different cultures have different moral codes” (Rachels 1999; 2). This is because it is possible for one culture to be wrong, just as when two cultures disagree about the roundness of the earth. On the second point, Rachels shows that relativism prevents us from defining certain practices, such as conquest of neighbors and anti-Semitism, as immoral as long as they conform to the norms of the culture in which they occur. It also eliminates the concept of progress, because under relativistic thinking no one can say that the United States today has made progress over pre-civil rights United States, because each are different cultures with different cultural norms (Rachels 1999; 4). Finally, on the third point, he demonstrates that varied beliefs across cultures rest on similar principles. Although Darius demonstrated the irreconcilable difference in beliefs between the ancient Greeks and Callatians, he did not show that they had varied principles. The Greeks may have cremated their dead and the Callatians may have eaten them, but each of these beliefs is derived from a common principle—that the dead deserve respect (Rachels 1999; 1, 5).

Just as the cultural relativist position collapses under Rachels' arguments, so does ideological relativism and for the same reasons. First, it does not follow from the fact that different persons (or societies for that matter) have different political ideologies, that there is no objective truth about political ideology. Second, ideological relativism would eliminate the possibility for one ideology to be superior to another or to a past form of itself (allowing for progress). We would be prevented from saying that the political ideologies that favor human rights are superior to those that favor robbing the people blind or executing them en masse. Finally, relativism fails to account for the common principles of supposedly heavily varied ideological beliefs in politics. Demonstrating this common principle-base behind political ideologies will consume the bulk of the second major section of this paper, so I will leave the proving of this particular point for that section.

Although general relativism fails to hold up against the arguments of James Rachels, historicism, a form of relativism, is able to address some of his criticisms. Historicism is explained by Leo Strauss as the idea that "the distinction between philosophic and historical questions cannot in the last analysis be maintained" (Strauss 1959; 57) and "the understanding of the institutions of a given country is a product of the past" (Strauss 1959; 61). In other words, political ideas and developments can only be understood in terms of a specific context, specifically the historical circumstances, events, and developments that preceded it. For example, under historicism thinkers such as Plato and Locke would be said to have completely irreconcilable philosophies simply because one is the product of the Greek Polis and the other the product of the English Revolution (Strauss 1959; 63). If historicism is correct, it poses a major challenge to

Weber's ideas about political thought because "understanding all" would necessarily require "pardoning all" as each philosophy would be understood to be the product of its times, preventing any value-judgments whatsoever, including challenging the prevailing ideas of the time.

Rachels arguments have a much more difficult time defeating historicist claims than it did those of more general relativist theories, such as cultural relativism. First, although the presence of variation alone does not prove a lack of objective reality, a demonstration that philosophy originates solely from circumstances certainly would. Second, although Rachels bemoans a world in which judgment and true progress are not possible, historicism certainly provides a viable possibility that such a world is reality by demonstrating that progress and change are nothing more than continuous building upon and reaction against previous historical trends. This means that past societies can only be judged by present ones in the context of the beliefs of the present one, not objectively. (Slavery sounds inherently bad to us today, but from a historical perspective that belief is merely the result of historical occurrences like the civil war, reconstruction, and the civil rights movement.) Finally, historicism unlike cultural relativism can account for common values across cultures by simply citing similar historical experiences.

Despite the appeal of historicism as a viable explanation of political philosophy, Leo Strauss convincingly demonstrates several reasons why it cannot and does not adequately explain the truth about political philosophy. He argues instead that although the presentation of political philosophy certainly is influenced by historical situation and even that certain situations may make the discovery of certain ideas more likely, true political philosophy is as true today as when it first emerged (Strauss 1959; 63-64). For

example, classical philosophers rationally preferred the city to tribe and empire because it guarded the ideals of freedom and civilization (arts and sciences) better than the alternatives. Although the modern state has now overcome the city as a preferred system, this only occurred after the state was able to demonstrate that it could provide for these aims as well as or better than the city had, not because the modern historical context favors states to cities (Strauss 1959; 65). In other words, there are principles (such as freedom and civilization) that transcend historical circumstance and are therefore universal in character (Rachels' final argument). This also suggests the presence of an objective truth that is applied in evaluating systems regardless of the time period (Rachels' first argument). Finally, although Strauss is unable to prove the existence of progress or the legitimacy of judging the past and thus unable to salvage Rachels' middle argument, he does show that the historicist requirement that all beliefs be viewed in the context of their times and thus will one day be superseded by beliefs that better fit those times, disproves historicism as an objective truth when applied to itself. Historicism cannot be considered the best way of examining philosophy past and present, because under its own assumptions, historicism too is merely a product of the historical circumstances of the era in which it developed (Strauss 1959; 72-73).

As the above analysis demonstrates, there is significantly more evidence for Weber's understanding of political ideology than Heidegger's or any other form of relativism for that matter (further evidence for this will be provided through the analysis of political ideologies, which makes up the core of this paper). There is a universal standard by which human belief may be evaluated. However, Weber's analysis is incomplete. He certainly indicates that a universal standard exists for evaluating norms,

but exactly what the universal standard is remains ambiguous throughout his work (just an ambiguous empirical analysis and ethical imperative). This problem is further complicated by the fact that he admits that values vary across time, place, and circumstance. If Weber didn't so clearly indicate his distinction from relativistic viewpoints, our intuition would have us side with Lichtheim. The solution to this dilemma lies partially in the above distinction between principles and values. Weber believes certain subjective values vary across time, place, and circumstance, but seems to imply that there exists more objective and constant principles that do not and which can be used to evaluate those values, without clearly specifying what these are (nor appropriately distinguishing them from the values) beyond a broad category of ethical imperatives. It is in failing to clearly specify this distinction where Weber seems to straddle the categories of universalism and relativism without clearly falling into either camp. Values can be evaluated but not empirically.

A solution to this problem is provided by the theory of value pluralism. Value pluralism allows us to preserve the previously arrived at conclusion that political ideology is arrived at rationally along with Weber's two seemingly contradictory beliefs in the universality and variability of norms, principles, and values. If we limit the principles on which political ideology is based to a select number of universal ones, instead of allowing it to be based on an unlimited number of culturally specific ones, then both truth and rational variation based on principles can coexist. By altering relativism by this single parameter, universal truth is maintained because the principles are universal and value variation is preserved because the principles are plural. The gap in Max Weber's theory is filled by George Crowder's

Pluralism and Its Consequences for Political Ideology

In chapter three of *Liberalism and Value Pluralism*, George Crowder describes the nature of value pluralism with four qualifiers. Pluralists believe that there are certain universal values that are relevant to all cultures and at all times (Crowder 2002; 45). In addition, there is a plurality of several of these values (Crowder 2002; 46). Perhaps most importantly, pluralism is defined by these values being incommensurable (Crowder 2002; 49). There are several characteristics that make values incommensurable. First, they are incomparable—that is, no value is absolutely better than another (Crowder 2002; 50). Second, they are immeasurable in that there is no common measure by which values can be compared. And finally, they are unrankable, which means that the importance of each value is determined on a case by case basis (Crowder 2002; 52). The final characteristic that defines values, according to pluralists, is conflict. All values will necessarily come into conflict with each other (Crowder 2002; 54). This conflict is unavoidable, it is inherent to the values (Crowder 2002; 55).

Given that values are both incommensurable and conflicting, an objectively correct answer can never be arrived at. In order to increase the relative amount of a given value in society, one will have to decrease the amount of another. However, because they are unrankable and incomparable, increasing this value will never be an absolute gain. One must always lose something important to gain something else important. The only way to determine a solution is to opine. Given the inevitability that various persons' opinions will not be in agreement, the conclusions they arrive at will necessarily vary, despite the fact that each comes to his/her conclusion through rational thought.

I will argue in the following pages that variation in political ideology can be explained by pluralist theory, when that theory is applied to political principles (rather than values) specifically. If this is the case it must meet the requirements set forth by Crowder in describing value pluralism. It must be defined by universal principles, and those principles must be plural, incommensurable, and conflicting. Presuming the success of my argument, I would like to revise my definition of political ideology once more so as to incorporate value pluralist theory. Political ideology is a theory of how to organize society most rationally in order to satisfy certain interests and to reflect one's preference for certain principles from among a set of plural, universal, incommensurable, and conflicting principles.

Before moving on to the next section of this paper, it is necessary to provide some explanation and clarification regarding this above definition for political ideology. Namely, political ideology is a subset of political thought, but not all-inclusive of it. While all political thought deals with the proper organization of society, political ideology is specifically thought that is derived from interests and principles and that it is rational. This is not to dismiss a political thought from the (not so prestigious) title of political ideology because it contains some logical leaps, gaps, or fallacies. Indeed, any political thought that attempts to provide a rational/logical justification for the satisfaction of certain interests and/or implementation of certain principles ought to qualify as political ideology. Nevertheless, this definition almost certainly excludes some types of political thought.

Non-ideological political thought falls into two major categories. First are those that are not based on principles or interests. The political thoughts of factions based on

Hume's conceptions of personal ties and those based on affection for instance do not qualify. The attraction and support of many to people, ideas, and institutions based on the fact that they are "their own," rather than on a principle or interest is not a political ideology, but rather political thought derived from personal ties. Meanwhile, the belief that a certain individual or group (such as a dynasty, king, and party) ought to rule is also not a form of political ideology, but rather political thought derived from affections. The former is known as political identity and the latter political partisanship. However, both these non-ideological categories of political thought can sometimes be connected to or combined with political ideologies in practice. For example, during World War II, German political identity was associated with fascism and today there is a strong association between affection for the Republican party and conservative ideology. However, in each case these alternative political thoughts aren't required to coincide and more importantly political identity and partisanship can exist wholly independent of political ideology and vice versa.

The other type of political thought that is excluded from political ideology is irrational political thought. On its face, this exclusion seems to open the door for subscribers of every political ideology to exclude their opponents based on the fact that they are irrational. However, if we return to our definition of rational thought above we see this is not the case. The definition encompasses any thought that attempts to logically justify the pursuit of a certain end. In other words, as soon as a political thought is argued for it becomes rational political thought. The only political thoughts that are excluded from this wide net are pure political identity and perfect partisanship because they cannot rest on a logical argument without incorporating an interest or principle.

Simply believing in a given person or group's exceptionalism (political identity) or fitness to rule (partisanship) is not rational thought because they do not in themselves provide a reason for that exceptionalism or rule. However, any reason given would qualify as a principle ("They value freedom the most") or an interest ("I will be given a high-paying job if the Stalwarts win") and thus shift it into being a thought that is at least partially ideological. As a result, the requirement that political ideology be rational does not further exclude any other political thoughts than those already excluded above. Rather it simply reinforces the division as well as the association of political ideology with interest and principle.

In the main section of this paper, I will seek to determine precisely what these underlying principles are and more importantly if these principles can be said to be part of the universal set of principles that is shared by all humanity, even if they disagree over preference in situations in which they conflict. This will require determining which principles subscribers to a certain political ideology prefer, to what degree they are preferred, and also which principles they reject. In order to accomplish this task I will analyze a large and diverse series of political ideologies. Although a complete analysis of every political ideology ever conceived is obviously impossible, certain ideologies have been selected for analysis so as to constitute a representative sample of the whole. This sample is diverse according to traditional understandings of political ideology (including ideologies that are leftist, rightist, centrist, and none-of-the-above), geographically (including ideologies from the West and the Rest), in popularity (including ideologies that inspired whole movements and those held by small groups), and morally (including ideologies that are considered detestable, those that are generally

taken for granted as moral truth, and everything in between). If each of these diverse ideologies shares a set of principles then I will have proven my thesis of a universal underlying set of principles for all political ideology and thus all of humanity.

At the conclusion of this analysis, I will make one final alteration of my definition of political ideology incorporating the principles I have discovered. The final section in this paper will complete the argument for the value pluralist nature of political ideology and challenge two existing assumptions of political ideology. The analysis of political ideologies in itself will demonstrate the plural and inherently conflicting nature of the principles and to some degree will also demonstrate their universality. This section will reinforce their universal nature by showing that each principle is essential to society, not simply sought by all in it. It will also demonstrate their incommensurability. It will also challenge the assumptions that liberal democracy is inherently the best system of governance and that the left-right spectrum is the best way of measuring and comparing political ideologies, proposing alternatives in both cases.

I will construct a new more accurate visual model of the relationships between political ideology based on the above-mentioned conclusions. In constructing this model, I recognize that no model can ever be a complete and perfect depiction of reality, that is the true relationship among political ideologies. Certainly, it will depict only their relationships based on principles and not based on interest. However, even as a model of the principle-based aspect of political ideology it can never be complete. In recognizing this inevitable fact, my goal will not be to create a perfect model, but rather a more perfect one. I will create a model that better depicts ideological relationships than any previous models.

Analysis of Political Ideologies

Fascism (National Socialism)

I will begin my analysis of political ideologies with a series of prominent and influential Western political ideologies to compare, contrast, and derive fundamental principles from. Once this analysis is complete I will then turn to a select few prominent non-Western political ideologies (and non-Western in origin) that still influence today's world to determine if these derived principles also explain political ideologies outside of the West. This extensive survey will start at the very end of the current spectrum that we use to describe and understand ideology. On the far right lies fascism, a political ideology that rose to prominence before and during the Second World War and has since faded into obscurity. My analysis of this ideology will come from the work of the most infamous fascist, Adolph Hitler.

In the first chapter of his book, *Mein Kampf*, Hitler states that uniting the German people is an end in itself (Hitler 1925; 10) and criticizes Marxists for disparaging nation, fatherland, law, religion, and morality (Hitler 1925; 39-40). He says further that “for me and all National Socialists there is only one doctrine. People and Fatherland” (Hitler 1925; 182). All other aspects of Hitler’s policy are derived from this doctrine.

This doctrine is more accurately referred to as a principle. It has many names. Hitler refers to it as unity (in his case of the German people). It has a strong connection with institutions like nation, fatherland, law, religion, morality, and people. Others (as we shall see later) might refer to it as solidarity, community, interconnectivity, civil society or any number of other names. Essentially it is the belief that we ought to be

interconnected with others and part of a greater whole. This principle will be called many things throughout this work, often depending on the author or ideology being discussed, but in the end they are all the same value. Therefore, for the sake of coherence, I will use the umbrella term fraternity to describe it. I admit this is a rather arbitrary selection, as so many others are equally applicable, but I have selected it because of its close association with the topic of this paper, political ideology. The French Revolution is the origin of the term ideology and also a very famous slogan that includes some of its underlying principles, namely "liberté, égalité, fraternité." Given the importance of fraternity to fascists it is therefore logical to similarly analyze the ideology for the presence of liberty and equality as well. This will provide a useful starting point for truly understanding it.

In fact, in their quest to establish almost complete fraternity, fascists reject equality because it can conflict with this primary principle (making a choice between conflicting principles as predicted by value pluralism). Hitler first rejects democracy because he sees majority rule as ineffective because the most qualified person can lead the state effectively, not the one most able to convince the ignorant masses (Hitler 1925; 73). He further backs this up by saying "It (the state) must take care that the positions of leadership and highest influence are given to the best men. Hence it is not based on the idea of majority, but on that of personality" (Hitler 1926; 365). This is simultaneously a rejection of the idea that people should have equal say and the concept that individuals are in some way fundamentally equal. Hitler would say that people should neither be afforded equal status and political opportunity, nor possess the same fundamental qualities that make them morally or inherently equal.

Furthermore, Hitler rejects both political and inherent equality among peoples. He says that “had it not been possible for them to employ (as slaves) members of the inferior race, which they conquered, the Aryans would never have been in a position to take the first steps on the road which led them to a later type of culture” (Hitler 1925; 244) and that “only by maintaining the distinction between ruled and ruler, master and slave can the culture be maintained (Hitler 1925; 246). Thus fascists also reject equal dignity, respect and rights, and seek to establish a rigid hierarchy in order to best further the interests of the community as a whole and maintain absolute fraternity.

Fascists similarly reject liberty in order to maintain nearly complete fraternity. Hitler says “the sacrifice of the individual existence is necessary in order to assure the conservation of the race” (Hitler 1925; 132). He also seeks to eliminate capitalism and have all economic interests serve the state. This philosophy is most clearly stated when he says “National Socialist workers and employers are both together delegates and mandatories of the whole national community...they will solve these problems together on a higher plane, where the welfare of the national community and the state will be as a shining ideal to throw light on all the negotiations” (Hitler 1926; 488). In other words, human choice in the economic, political, and personal realms is entirely subordinated to the whole, with no room for free will or liberty.

Although Hitler states that "people and fatherland" (that is fraternity) is the only doctrine of national socialism, Nazi Germany's imposition of a oath of personal loyalty to Hitler rather than the German nation or Aryan race and other statements in Mein Kampf cannot be fully understood simply by a belief in fraternity, but indicate another key principle. Despite, his assertion that "People and Fatherland" is the only doctrine of

National Socialists, this oath indicates that this is not the case. This principle refers to a genuine feeling of devotion and faithfulness toward someone or something, rather than simply an agreement or contract to fulfill a given obligation. Certainly, it is true that loyalty is an important principle to fascists. However, the object of that loyalty is not a supernatural being like God or even exclusively people or country, but rather the primary focus is on nature and leader. It is due to this principle that Hitler abhors the mixing and intermarriage of "races." He views it as an "iron law of nature" that different species only cohabit with their own kind and that inter-species mating has very negative consequences (Hitler 1925; 236). As such, Hitler calls to strict adherence to this law of nature so that races will not mix resulting in something inferior to the superior parent (Hitler 1925; 237). This loyalty extends to the leaders of countries as well, hence Hitler's infuriation at the so-called "stab in the back" that took place through the German revolution following WWI. Furthermore, if there is any doubt that loyalty plays an equally important role for fascists as fraternity, citizenship is not earned in the fascist state solely based on racial membership, but also through education, health, and an oath of loyalty (Hitler 1926; 360). The requirements for education and health can be explained by the desire for maintaining the quality of what he sees as the master race, but loyalty cannot be and in some cases loyalty can be counterproductive to fraternity, such as when devotion to a leader causes a people to follow him off a figurative cliff (as devotion to Hitler eventually does for the German people for instance) or when competing personal loyalties lead to strife. Fascism can therefore be explained by a strong preference for the principles of fraternity and loyalty and a rejection of equality and liberty.

The above statements from *Mein Kampf* make clear that fascism essentially breaks down to being support for immense fraternity and loyalty and rejection of equality and liberty. But fascism is not this simple. Although nearly absolute fraternity is the defining feature of the ideology, there is clearly much more that makes it detestable to the modern mind than simply a rejection of liberty and equality. Clearly there are other important principles that it rejects as well. One of these principles is certainly peace. Hitler sees no need for peace, but rather supports a continuous struggle of the races in war and conquest, ending (theoretically) only with the conquest and domination of all the world by a single race, and this state of constant repression can certainly not be called peace, as there remains struggle and violence (Hitler 1925; 239). The only thing that has changed is that the others are too weak to resist.

In searching for other principles that he may accept or reject I turn back to my discussion of Strauss from earlier in this paper. Strauss, as you will recall, noted that freedom and civilization were universal principles and that the nation-state became the dominant form of political organization only when it could demonstrate that it could better provide for these than the city-state. Meanwhile, the city-state was preferred to the tribe which lacked civilization and the empire which lacked freedom for the same reasons (Strauss 1959; 65). Hitler champions the state because it provides for fraternity and sees no reason to protect freedom. But what of civilization? Before this question can be answered we must determine relatively precisely what is meant by civilization. Strauss simply defined it as high development of the arts and sciences (1959; 65), but this is clearly inadequate on its own. When the question is asked "Is Society X civilized?" there is much more behind this question than "Does it have highly developed arts and

sciences?" although this is certainly a piece of it. In contrast to the tribes, which Strauss notes as lacking civilization, civilized societies have rational and objective means of achieving their goals. Certainly this includes having sciences for rationally and objectively assessing nature and society and arts which are organized creative endeavors and disciplines. For Strauss, a student of the ancients, the arts and sciences would include political philosophy and thus also includes a strong, rational, objective, and organized set of laws, practices, policies, and moral codes. To the degree that these things exist in an uncivilized society, they are at best subjective and at worst arbitrary and irrational. In other words, a civilized society is one in which human reason is the guiding light.

Mein Kampf shows that this principle too falls by the wayside in pursuit of total unity and loyalty. This preference for other principles over civilization is most clearly shown when Hitler states that "one of the visible signs of decay in the old REICH was the slow setback which the general cultural level experienced. But by 'Kultur' I do not mean that which we nowadays style as civilization, which on the contrary may rather be regarded as inimical to the spiritual elevation of life" (Hitler 1925; 215). Civilization is seen as a modern interference to the old culture, which is seen as truly important. The objective and rational means of guiding society is a threat to the old institutions and practices, which better protect loyalty and fraternity. Rational civilization could lead to individuals questioning these institutions and practices thus leading to division and disloyalty.

This downplaying or rejection of civilization is further emphasized when he asserts that "instruction in sciences is the last priority, strength of will and decision is

most important as well as willingness to accept responsibilities" (Hitler 1926; 337). Science can be used as a means for the advancement of the race, but it is not important in itself. What is truly important is not the rational understanding of science and nature, but the subjective qualities of people, strength of will and responsibility to the community. Furthermore, he complains that "the whole spectacle of parliamentary life (under the Weimar Republic) became more and more desolate the more one penetrated into its intimate structure and studied the persons and principles of the system in a spirit of ruthless objectivity. Indeed, it is very necessary to be strictly objective in the study of the institution whose sponsors talk of 'objectivity' in every other sentence as the only fair basis of examination and judgment. If one studied these gentlemen and the laws of their strenuous existence the results were surprising" (Hitler 1925; 77). Hitler denounced the "ruthless objectivity of the Weimar Civilization and favored instead subjective preference for one's own people and leaders (i.e. fraternity and loyalty respectively). For this same reason he opposes the "decline of local loyalties and communal monuments in favor of neutral cities (which) is also a decline in culture (Hitler 1925; 220)

The astute observer will of course note that at many places in his work, Hitler laments the decline of civilization seemingly pointing to a preference for this principle after all. He opposes strikes (1925; 29), Marxism (59), racial mixing (238), and the loss of Aryan dominance (240) (1926; 317) because he believes they are a threat to civilization (among other reasons). He says the collapse of civilization would bring the world into a desert waste (Hitler 1925; 58). However, despite the use of the word civilization, it is clear that he is not referring to civilization as normally understood. Indeed, I have already shown that fascists are opposed to all the characteristics of

civilization -- objectivity, emphasis on arts and sciences, and the use of reason as a guiding principle. What Hitler is really lamenting in his various "defenses" of civilization is not the loss of but the establishment of civilization. He is opposed to what he sees as modern civilization because it interferes with his favored "civilization," which is much more accurately called culture as it is based on community and loyalties rather than objectivity and rationality.

Before I complete my analysis it is important to note the role of race in Hitler's fascist ideology. Modern science has shown there to be no meaningful genetic differences between so-called races. Throughout the work, Hitler reveals quite clearly his prejudice for the Aryan race and a dislike for many others, particularly the Jews. Race, despite the modern revelation that it is non-existent, is an extremely important aspect of Hitler's ideology. Hitler and other fascists seek to establish nearly perfect fraternity. Fraternity is based on connections between individuals and there must be a basis for these connections. For Hitler the connections were based on race. For other fascists, such as Mussolini and Franco, it is nation. Conceivably it could also be based on other communities as well, such as religion, values, or perhaps even an extended family. All these differences between fascists are disagreements over the most logical means or policies (and sometimes differences in interest, personal ties, and affections when different fascists belong to different communities), but the principles and desired end is the same. Although race is imaginary, it can form the basis for strong fraternity if its members believe in it and believe it can. During Hitler's time, race was considered a scientific fact, so it was not so much of a stretch to use it as the basis of fraternity, but

even putting this aside, race could still be used as the basis of an imagined community, like a nation (Anderson 1991).

Egoism (Humane Liberalism)

“Freedom can only be the whole freedom, a piece of freedom is not freedom” (Stirner 1907; 210). So says Max Stirner, one of the primary advocates of anarchism in his famous work *The Ego and Its Own*. This immediately reveals that Stirner cares fanatically for and perhaps only for individual liberty. He also believes that all humans should be totally free as well (Stirner 1907; 9). Finally, in seeking to establish his ideal society, Stirner calls on his reader to “assert your humanity against every restrictive specification” (Stirner 1907; 166). Then in describing his ideal society, he says “a general human faith must come into existence, the fanaticism of liberty (Stirner 1907; 177). In other words his ideal society is one of pure liberty, where none are restricted in their actions for any reason.

Near the end of the work, Stirner calls on his readers to “... renounce every hypocrisy of community, and recognize that, if we are equal as men, we are not equal for the very reason that we are not men. We are equal only in thoughts” (Stirner 1907; 414). He seeks to completely destroy equality, in favor of complete liberty. In discussing his view on equality, he says “equality of political rights...(means) the state has no regard for my person, that to it I, like every other, am only a man, without having any significance that commands its deference” (Stirner 1907; 133). He believes equality takes away the significance of the individual and thus the individual’s liberty. As an example he discusses the level of equality between two hypothetical individuals, Tom and Jim: “As

Tom you would not be his equal, because he is Jim, and therefore not Tom...since as Tom you virtually do not exist to him” (Stirner, 1907; 225). This last statement also demonstrates that Stirner holds no regard for civilization either. Egoism is highly subjective. Tom does not exist to Jim the egoist who views only himself, his own ideas, and own interests as valuable. Egoists would not permit society to objectively assess the quality of his actions, judgments, and beliefs. And thus the rational, objective, and organized set of laws, practices, policies, and moral codes that civilization calls for would be entirely rejected by egoism. Nothing has any objective value or to put it as Stirner does in his first chapter title "All things are nothing to me" (1910; 17).

Stirner has a no more favorable view of fraternity, which he also sees as a mere restriction on liberty. He seeks to eliminate all aspects of fraternity. On the issue of morality he says “morals do not fetter an intellectual man, a so-called independent, a free-thinker.” “Neither command nor property is left to the individual; the state took the former, society the latter” (Stirner 1907; 155), says Stirner as he brushes society and the state (as well as any alternative collective or communal institutions) aside as well. And finally, he rejects the smallest community—the family. He says “this despotism is only broken when the conception of the family also becomes nothing to me” (Stirner 1907; 114). Stirner does not, however, wish that all people should be hermits, closed off from others. Instead, in his ideal society, people will still unite out of need and mutual advantage—“only in this way do they truly unite as individuals, rather than being bound by a tie” (179-180).

Loyalty too is nothing to egoists. Stirner asks "How can I...be free when I must bind myself by oath to a constitution, a charter, a law, 'vow body and soul' to my

people?" (Stirner 1907; 284). Egoists hold no loyalty to governments, people, creed, or law. Further, they hold no belief in obedience in any kind of divine being or force, instead being expressly godless and atheistic (Stirner 1907; 189). Egoists believe only in ownness and "ownness knows no commandment of 'faithlessness'; adherence, etc., ownness permits everything, even apostasy, defection...one must break faith, yes, even his oath, in order to determine himself instead of being determined by moral considerations (Stirner 1907; 311-312).

Finally, in his seeking of liberty Stirner also wholly rejects the sixth principle we have discussed so far...peace. "[Egoism] does not say: Wait for what the board of equity will – bestow on you in the name of the collectivity (for such bestowal took place in 'States' from the most ancient times, each receiving 'according to his desert,' and therefore according to the measure in which each was able to deserve it, to acquire it by service), but: Take hold, and take what you require! With this the war of all against all is declared. I alone decide what I will have" (Stirner 1910; 132). Egoism rejects peace because it requires a means of resolving disputes outside of one's own power and own liberty. Only war and the conquest and defeat of others who stand in one's way can be a means of acquiring one's desserts without surrendering the absolute liberty held so dear by egoists.

Egalitarian Liberalism (American Liberalism, Liberal Egalitarianism)

Next, I turn to liberalism as it is understood in modern America. In *American Liberalism: An Interpretation for Our Time*, John McGowan lays out the foundations of liberal theory in the United States, which he states clearly to be egalitarian liberalism. In defending the ideology, McGowan says "Liberalism, I contend, provides the best

guarantee of liberty and the peace in which to exercise it, while its commitment to equality provides the ever-elusive ideal that makes it a dynamic, restless, and radical political position” (McGowan 2007; 7). Already, the importance of liberty and equality to egalitarian liberals becomes abundantly clear. Meanwhile, peace also seems to hold an important place.

This commitment to liberty and equality even receives its own chapter of that name. According to McGowan, liberalism “seeks to provide the positive goods of liberty and equality” (McGowan 2007; 64). “Liberty requires opportunity to make a living” (McGowan 2007; 64) as well as “the freedom of each individual to make his or her own choices of what end to pursue and how to pursue those ends within the broad field of the permissible” (McGowan 1007; 78). Thus liberals support both the positive and negative aspects of liberty. In addition “modern liberalism begins with the attempt to achieve a ‘decent social minimum’ for all people.” McGowan further supports equal distribution of power, resources, and its companion principle, liberty (McGowan 2007; 66). Egalitarian liberals also seek to remedy social inequalities based on race, wealth, and gender (McGowan 2007; 73).

On a practical level, liberals are essentially supporters of the welfare state. This is a compromise between the liberty of free-market and the equality of state planning. However, their ideology is more than a compromise between the two principles. Liberals see liberty and equality not as in opposition, but as mutually dependent. They see economic freedoms as necessary to protect equality because it holds people responsible for their own choices. Simultaneously, they see limiting the market as necessary so as to

protect people from the consequences of their unchosen circumstances (Kymlicka 2002; 88).

In addition to strong support of liberty and equality, “liberalism also places a high value on peace, security, and stability” (McGowan 2007; 89). Although these are all distinct notions, they are all different sides of the same principle, namely the idea that individuals and society ought to be protected from violent death, violence in general, loss of livelihood, and most importantly fear of the first three (Hobbes 1660; XIII). The principle can be called by any of these names and a number of others, but for the sake of consistency I will use the term that Hobbes (discussed in a later section) most often uses, peace. "Peace is a great blessing because humans are ever ready to come to blows" and despite the ridicule that such an pronouncement often achieves, liberals view "peace as one of the greatest goods any society can secure for its members" (McGowan 2007; 90) and believe "war is always a disaster" (McGowan 2007; 145).

While liberty, equality, and peace are greatly valued by egalitarian liberals, fraternity is meanwhile greatly downplayed. Liberals believe that we can only expect “formal and institutional unity” and that “substantive unity” which McGowan defines in terms of agreement on fundamental beliefs, common dreams, common purpose, and common identity conflicts with the freedom to have substantive differences. This point is further emphasized by McGowan's prime support for the value of the individual life. "Liberalism always calls our attention to--and cries out in protest against--sufferings inflicted on individual human beings by the actions of other human beings" (McGowan 2007; 79). In other words, community should never come at the cost of individual liberty or equality. The individual is considered the primary political value and liberals seek to

both place as much power as possible in individual hands and measure the good of a polity in relation to the quality of individual lives it enables (McGowan 2007; 81)

The reader will, however, interject at this point that egalitarian liberals tend to support large government and significant state action and thus must also be strong supporters of fraternity; however McGowan addresses this objection as well. In defending the seemingly paradoxical state-action liberalism, McGowan says the following. “Although it remains important to provide checks to state power, it is also necessary to use the state to check the power of non-state entities...thus, paradoxically liberalism coincides historically after 1850 with the growth of the state” (McGowan 2007; 142). This point is further explained over the next several pages when McGowan describes the need to protect people’s liberty and equality from capitalism and discrimination (McGowan 2007; 145-164). Liberals also reject a powerful national-security state as state incursion on individual liberty (McGowan 2007; 143-145). Liberals do not believe that a powerful state is an end in itself, but rather a means to preserving liberty, equality, and peace. They are fearful of its ability to limit individual liberty especially. Therefore, liberal support for a large state further emphasizes their support for liberty, equality, and peace and does not express any significant support for fraternity.

McGowan speaks very little about the importance or lack of importance of the principle of loyalty. He notes the importance of the institution of promises to upholding the society he envisions (or any society), but this cannot be considered the same as loyalty (2007; 30). Fulfilling contracts and keeping promises is not the same as loyalty. Loyalty involves an unconditional allegiance to someone or something. Contracts and

promises are simply agreements between members of a society, they involve neither allegiance to the other party and are by their very nature conditional.

McGowan does reference loyalty briefly in his discussion of the individual. Liberalism places the highest value on the individual life. The quality of these individual lives determines the quality of society for them and as such they are skeptical of aggregate measures of the good, such as national glory and wealth. In addition, self-sacrifice for a greater good is permitted and honored by those who benefit, but should not be encouraged by the state or other individuals (2007; 79). While, liberalism does not prevent individuals from declaring allegiance to a group, it insists on these allegiances being freely chosen. The state would be forbidden from reinforcing these allegiances and through education provide the tools for individuals to choose whether or not to accept them (McGowan 2007; 82). In the name of liberty, allegiance to country, family, ethnicity, culture, church, God, or other trans-individual purpose or good would not be encouraged in a liberal society. Loyalty would be permitted as part of the liberal emphasis on liberty, but it would not be valued or encouraged and they would insist on conditionality based on individual choice. Finally, liberals tend to emphasize the importance of cosmopolitanism and secularism and thus have an ambivalence toward patriotism or religious fervor, both forms of loyalty.

Finally, we ought to consider what the liberal position is in regard to civilization. The liberal position on this principle is most clearly made known through McGowan's discussion of the rule of law. Liberals see the law as "no different in kind than promising" with simply more elaborate mechanisms. In the liberal society, law is grounded solely on a series of promises between individuals that eventually become so

internalized that people experience a "wrong" when they are breached. There is no inherent wrong, simply an agreement and a custom between reasoning human beings. (McGowan 2007; 30). They do not ground law in a divine source, nature, or traditional but rather in human beings themselves. It ought to be preserved, but also evolved through "continued examination of its rationale and of its appropriateness in changed circumstances" (McGowan 2007; 31). In other words, liberals wish to organize social institutions on rational and objective criteria, rather than a subjective or even transcendental source which cannot be always rationally explained or understood.

McGowan further explains that even his and other liberal's principle of liberty, equality, and peace are not inherent to humanity, but the result of legal and social construction. Liberty came out of the Reformation's emphasis on freedom of conscience and blossomed from there. Equality is "unnatural" and thus must be established by law (2007; 87). Peace is a good because it provides the kind of stability and security that allows individuals to construct their lives (McGowan 2007; 91). These principles don't hold some kind of inherent value to liberals based in some inherent and transcendental human quality, but are rather legal constructs. They are valued and perpetuated because they are rationally deemed to provide an objective good to the members of society. Civilization forms a key foundation for egalitarian liberalism and thus this must be counted alongside liberty, equality, and peace as the defining principles of this ideology.

Conservatism

The ideals and history of American Conservatism are outlined in Russell Kirk's preeminent book on the matter, *The Conservative Mind*. In the introduction he

immediately outlines six canons of conservative thought and then proceeds to expand on and explain them throughout the remainder of the book through an analysis of conservatives throughout history, from Burke to Eliot as stated in the subtitle.

The first canon involves a belief that “a divine intent rules society as well as conscience” and that “political problems are, at bottom, religious and moral ones” (Kirk 1953; 7). In other words, conservatives believe in a reason, justice, and morality which is beyond human analysis and criticism. The second canon involves “an affection for the proliferating variety and mystery of traditional life, as distinguished from the narrowing uniformity and equalitarianism and utilitarian aims of most radical systems” (Kirk 1953; 8). This canon has several aspects. It shows the conservative support for tradition (as did the previous canon), while simultaneously showing a lack of support for measures that equalize members of society because these weaken tradition. Their belief in tradition stems from the fact that they believe that it results from a collective wisdom gained by humanity over the years that is tempered with experience (Kirk 1953; 33).

Their position on equality is further explained by the third canon, which states that “civilized society requires orders and classes” and that “the only true equality is moral equality” (Kirk 1953; 8). Although conservatives do believe that all men are born equal, they believe that to preach that they are equal in powers, faculties, influence, property, or advantages (or even should be) is a fraud (Kirk 1953; 82). This is because they believe it disrupts the order of society and that “men are saved from anarchy by adherence to the principle of a just order” (Kirk 1953; 58).

The next canon of conservative thought is that “property and freedom are inseparably connected” (Kirk 1953; 8). They believe that any form of economic leveling

or collectivization of property violates this principle and thus erases liberty (Kirk 1953; 9). The last two canons involve skepticism of sophisters, calculators, and others who seek to replace tradition and the classic order with reason and a desire to have slow change rather than rapid progress (Kirk 1953; 8).

At the conclusion of the work, Kirk applies these conditions to the current American condition by laying out four doctrines. These include a belief in the moral nature of society and the importance of shoring up family piety and public honor, a defense of property both personal and corporate, preservation of local liberties, and a natural humility to provide an example to the world (Kirk 1953; 424).

It is first and foremost clear that a defining factor of conservatism is a lack of emphasis on equality. Conservatives tend to have a mild disdain for equality because it interferes with their notion of the good. Economic leveling of any sort threatens freedom. They also oppose equalitarianism and uniformity because they are "narrowing" and believe that equalization weakens tradition and the order and classes on which society rests. Tradition is also a key aspect of the conservative ideology because of its proliferating variety and mystery. For conservatives, tradition is beyond objective assessment by humans, but rather represents the collective wisdom and experience of many generations informed by the divine intent of society. This general skepticism of objective reason is further emphasized by the last two canons which disparage rapid progress, sophisters, and calculators. Together these ideas point to a non-objective (or subjective) value in human life, experience, and development. In other words, conservatism is partially defined by a rejection of civilization in favor of other principles that they deem more important and which could be endangered by objective or so-called

'rational' assessment by human beings unable to fully understand the beneficial purposes of tradition and divine institutions.

Along with a skepticism toward civilization and equality, conservatives also emphasize the importance of liberty, both in the sense of respect for private property and support of local and individual autonomy. This is not to say that property and liberty are equivalent in Kirk's mind. Rather, Kirk sees the maintenance of private property as the best means of securing liberty, in the same way that egalitarian liberals see the state as the best means of securing equality, while not inherently valuing the state. Conservatives simply fear that in collectivizing property individuals would lose individual autonomy and choice, while leveling property would remove the association between choice and consequence, making choice irrelevant. Local autonomy is also an important protector of liberty for conservatives who oppose imposition of the will of distant communities and governments on their own freedom.

A major point of contention between liberals and conservatives is on the principle of loyalty. As noted above, liberals tend to place little importance on patriotism, religious fervor, self-sacrifice, and unconditional allegiances. However, conservatives usually strongly favor all of these things as well as to actively promote and encourage them. They even favor restricting liberty in some cases to maintain these loyalties that might be lost if people could freely choose to abandon them. Furthermore, their love of tradition as a representative of the collective wisdom and experience of many generations informed by the divine intent of society, points to strong loyalty to both one's ancestors and God.

Another indication of the principles of conservatives is in Kirk's support for family piety and public honor. Conservatism is not simply liberty tempered by tradition and loyalty. It also gives significant credence to one's responsibility to society. This includes piety toward the smallest society--the family, maintaining honor in public groups ranging from social groups to nations, and maintaining a humility within a global community. Their love of tradition further emphasizes their support for fraternity because traditions generally form bonds between members of a community. It is this affinity for community that explains why conservatism is generally associated with ethnic ties, nationalism, and religion although none of these are prerequisites for conservatism. In other words conservatism emphasizes liberty, but seeks to check the anarchic tendencies of liberty with loyalty to traditional norms and sense of fraternal membership.

The sixth principle that we have so far discussed seems to be conspicuously missing from Kirk's analysis. Peace and security is not among any of Kirk's canons nor his doctrines. He neither emphasizes nor rejects the principle that individuals and society ought to be protected from violent death, violence in general, loss of livelihood, and fear. Nevertheless, it would certainly be incorrect to say that conservatives in general ignore this principle. In fact security is often a major topic within conservative writing and rhetoric. Conservatives almost always support strong anti-crime, anti-terror, and border-protection measures. These law and order ideals certainly are meant to protect the security of citizens. In addition, belief in a strong military is also a near universal in conservative thought; neoconservative interventionists like Donald and Robert Kagan as well as non-interventionists like Robert Taft agree on this point. Their disagreement is primarily over the best means of using that military in order to achieve peace and

security. To the degree that they tend to be "hawks," it is often a function of balancing their desire for peace with loyalty to one's country, not a rejection of peace altogether.

While their emphasis on security can often come in conflict with their other important principle of liberty, it does not erase it but rather tempers it in the same way that their other principles of fraternity and loyalty do. This is both similar to and contrasts with egalitarian liberals who also seek to balance peace and liberty, but who resolve the conflict in a different way. Liberals oppose a strong national-security state specifically because it restricts liberty, but meanwhile call for other restrictions that may restrict liberty in favor of peace, most notably through often "legal contrivances by which it tries to regulate, contain, and adjudicate conflict" (McGowan 2007; 28, 143-145). Conservatives, meanwhile, tend to support law and order as well as a strong national defense, favoring laws and policies that may restrict liberty in order to protect society from enemies and criminals, while opposing complex legal codes and excessive litigation that restrict the actions and choices of individuals. Conservatism is thus defined as support for the principles of liberty, fraternity, peace, and loyalty, and the downplaying of equality and civilization particularly because equalization and objectivity can undermine these four.

Social Ecology (and other Ecological Philosophies)

In my study and analysis of political ideology I would next like to turn to environmentalism or ecology. Ecology does not fit the general mold of political ideology. While all political ideologies so far discussed propose a proper organization for society, in other words, the proper relationship between human beings within a

society, ecology deals primarily with humanity's place in nature and the proper relationship between society and the natural world (Bookchin 1990; 7). Nevertheless, ecological beliefs systems meet my basic definition of ideology. They are generally argued for based on rational justifications and describe a proper order and organization of a society (simply a more inclusive one than is generally prescribed). They are based on principles and interests (of both humans and nature), rather than personal ties or affections. Furthermore, and more importantly, ecological ideologies constitute a major aspect of modern political discourse and although they are more often than not linked to left-wing political ideologies, they are certainly not inseparable from them and are clearly distinct in regard to their principles and aims.

In his book the *Philosophy of Social Ecology*, Murray Bookchin proposes and outlines a political ideology of the same name. Bookchin seeks to use the long tradition of dialectical reason in order to construct a justification for his social ecology (1990; 12). However, before I turn to Bookchin's political ideology, I would first like to briefly turn to some alternative ecological ideas that he briefly mentions in his introduction. The first of these is the idea that environmentalism has been justified in terms of a belief in "interconnectedness with the world and a caring attitude toward various life-forms." Aside, from the above-mentioned shift from human-human to human-nature relationship, this is certainly the same as the common ideological principle of fraternity. Bookchin even warns that this belief system could lead to a type of ecological fascism based on militant interconnectedness, another indication of the concept's relationship to fraternity (Bookchin 1990; 10). Bookchin also disparages popular ecology, which he labels ecological mysticism primarily because of its radical stance on another major ideological

principle, equality. He notes that the so-called mysticists would equate the “worth” of a mosquito with that of the human being who must bare full moral responsibility for this relationship (Bookchin 1990; 46).

I now turn to the analysis of the underlying principles of social ecology, as described by Bookchin. Early on in his work he sets down specific principles that he says are legitimized by the fact that they are shared by both humans and nature. These are mutualism, freedom, and subjectivity (Bookchin 1990; 85). He goes on to emphasize that because nature legitimates our uniqueness, we have a responsibility to nature, rather than nature being there for us to "use" (Bookchin 1990; 86). Bookchin emphasizes the importance of diversity in nature, noting that it leads to ecocommunity (a term he uses instead of ecosystem to emphasize the interconnectedness and interactivity of nature) stability, freedom within nature, choice, self-directedness, and participation by life-forms in their own evolution (1990; 106). The last four of these ends can each be summarized as forms of freedom, freedom for humanity and nature and indeed Bookchin shortly thereafter emphasizes that freedom is an end in itself (1990; 113). Further his emphasis on ecocommunity stability and the principle of mutualism is explained by his assertion that "humanity belongs in nature, just as nature belongs in humanity" and therefore that we ought to seek a more reciprocal relationship with nature (Bookchin 1990; 125).

For Bookchin, freedom and ecocommunity are not only valuable in and of themselves, but also strongly interwoven with each other. Interactivity enhances participation, wholeness fosters creativity, community strengthens individuality, and freedom requires harmonization with nature. Finally, returning to his third stated principle, subjectivity yields reason (1990; 123). Subjectivity is the last and most

mysterious of social ecology's principles. We have seen freedom and community (each referred to by various synonyms) emphasized or rejected by several diverse ideologies already, but subjectivity seems to be entirely unique to social ecology.

Subjectivity can first and foremost be understood in terms of its opposite. Bookchin speaks of objectivity along with homogenization, noting that the latter is a major danger because it leads to the objectification of human relationships and experiences (1990; 130). Further subjectivity is the end goal of evolution for all life. Evolution is viewed as a striving toward greater complexity and self-hood. This process yields progressively greater subjectivity culminating in self-awareness (1990, 173). Finally, subjectivity seems to be defined in terms of a "recognition that the natural history of mind is mind itself--from the very sensibilité of the inorganic to the conceptual capacities of the human brain" (85). Subjectivity is a rejection of objectivity and develops through an undirected and non-rational, yet somehow purposeful evolution. In other words, subjectivity, while emphasized as principle by Bookchin is in reality the rejection of the principle of civilization in favor of others, in Bookchin's case the self-direction and interconnectedness of all life...that is liberty and fraternity. It is the reflection of the principle, rather than the principle itself. Indeed, Bookchin's subjectivity is justified in a similar way as Kirk justifies his rejection of civilization. Both stand against modernity and objectivity in favor of the results of gradual development (whether tradition or evolution), a loyalty to an intent beyond that of man (whether the divine or natural), and a support for both freedom and community.

Aside from their shared support for the principles of freedom/liberty, community, and subjectivity or the rejection of civilization, conservatism and social ecology also hold

in common an assertion that equality ought to be downplayed, lest it interfere with the three preferred principles. Although Bookchin is very clear about rejecting hierarchy because it involves domination of either humanity or nature of the other, he similarly takes great issue with assertions of equality by other environmental groups. Like Russell Kirk who sees true equality among humans as a fraud, Murray Bookchin sees equality among species as just as much a fraud. It ignores humanity's unique abilities "to reason, to foresee, to will, and to act insightfully on behalf of directiveness within nature and enhance nature's own development" which developed out of nature, but nonetheless make them unique from other species (1990; 116). In addition, the human being's ability to take moral responsibility for itself and others assures that it can never be of equal "worth" to other species who can't (Bookchin 1990; 46).

In addition to the three principles of social ecology (one of which is really a reflection of a principle) explicitly stated by Bookchin, there are also two others that become clear from a full reading of his work. Bookchin laments that we are "trapped in a false perception of a nature that stands in perpetual opposition to our humanity, we have redefined human development itself to mean strife as a condition for pacification" (1990; 87). He says that "civilization has bequeathed us a vision of otherness as "polarization" and "defiance," and of organic "inwardness" as perpetual "war" for self-identity (Bookchin 1990; 86). The theme of these statements is that the goal within social ecology is coexistence with nature, by which neither must fear the "other" and both can exist secure in their livelihood, existence, and stability. In other words, social ecology puts high importance on the principle of peace.

It has already been referenced in regard to subjectivity that loyalty is also important in social ecology, but like the other principles in this environmental ideology, the principles are directed toward the relationship between humanity and nature rather than among humanity. In the case of loyalty, they believe in a reverence for nature, but most importantly a belief in acting according to its intentions and a recognition of our origins and place within it. Nature, explains Bookchin, is ever-striving and developing, not simply moving, but rather unceasingly improving its capacity for self-organization and creating increasingly complex forms (1990; 78). To reject the principles of social ecology "would be to cut across the grain of nature, to deny our heritage in its evolutionary process and to dissolve our legitimacy in the world of life" (Bookchin 1990; 86). In fact, social ecology's reverence and gratitude for nature goes so far as to reject competing loyalties, such as God or Spirit. To recognize these "means nature cannot be trusted to develop on its own spontaneous grounds" (Bookchin 1990; 82). Thus social ecology and conservatism share a set of principles, but are radically different in that these principle are applied to entirely different relationships, one between humans and the other between humanity and nature.

A final note ought to be made before turning to the analysis of the next political ideology. The incorporation of environmental ideologies into the broader composite of political ideology does require a slight alteration to the working definition. It includes not only relationships among humans, but also between humans and nature as well. Conservatism and other ideologies I will subsequently discuss among other things detail a proper relationship between man and God. Rather than describe the most rational way to organize society, political ideology is a theory of how to organize relationships between

and among humanity, nature, and the supernatural most rationally, in order to satisfy certain interests and to reflect one's principle preference from among a set of plural, universal, incommensurable, and conflicting principles.

Deep Ecology

The subtitle of Bill Devall and George Sessions' book, *Deep Ecology*, is "living as if nature mattered" and indeed this is the goal of their ideology regarding the proper relationship between humanity and nature. Although both Devall and Bookchin would be considered environmentalists, deep ecology is significantly distinct from social ecology as will become clear in the following paragraphs. Devall and Sessions call on readers to reawaken their understanding of Earth Wisdom and recognize the unity between humans, plants, animals, and the Earth (Devall 1985; ix). The term "reawaken" demonstrates that deep ecology is a reactionary, rather than a progressive ideology. Deep ecologists lament the shift in the balance of power from nature as something humans feared to something that they dominate (Devall 1985; x). They oppose what they call the dominant social paradigm of technocratic industrial societies, which distinguishes humans from the creatures and environment that they dominate. This paradigm also believes in unlimited resources, unlimited progress, and places people as masters of their own destiny (Devall 1985; 43). Deep ecologists rather place humans as part of nature and dependant on it.

The authors set down two ultimate norms of deep ecology, which they say are not derivable from other principles. It is these that constitute the underlying principles of the ideology. The first is self-realization, which includes a search for one's unique biological

personhood that lies beyond our simple Ego, identification with the nonhuman world rather than just with one's family or species, and a recognition of ourselves as part of a larger Self or an organic wholeness that includes all aspects of nature (Devall 1985; 67). This self-realization seems to be the same principle as the interconnectivity, interactivity, wholeness, community, and harmonization that Bookchin discusses and values so highly. However, unlike Bookchin, Devall and Sessions tend to downplay individuality and freedom, incorporating the self into the whole, rather than the whole enhancing the individual self.

The second base principle of deep ecology is biocentric equality. This principle states that "all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realization within a larger Self-realization." Because all organisms are part of an interrelated whole, they are all equal in intrinsic worth. While recognizing mutual predation as a fact of life that cannot be sidestepped (even vegetarians prey on plants which are also part of the whole), Devall and Sessions call instead for minimal impact rather than no impact on the rest of the environment (1985; 67-68). It is not difficult to see that this principle is equivalent to the principle of equality that has been so prevalent throughout previously analyzed ideologies.

Expanding on these norms, Devall and Sessions list several basic principles that are derived from these. They assert the inherent value of the flourishing of human and nonhuman life as well as the inherent value of richness and diversity in life. They go on to say that the current human population and its interference in the nonhuman world runs counter to the flourishing of nonhuman life and thus policy and ideological change is

needed to address this concern. They also say that subscribers to these principles have an obligation to seek to implement the necessary changes (Devall 1985; 70). From this list we can see that deep ecology also shares with social ecology a rejection of civilization. They reject objectivity that may "objectify" non-human life and fear the growth of technology, science, and human growth and development that interfere with and in some cases exploit the non-human world. It also values the flourishing, richness, and diversity of life, a belief best described as the inherent (rather than assessed) value of being which supports the previously mentioned self-realization and biocentric equality at the expense of a civilization that views things in objective terms.

Like social ecology, deep ecology also places an important emphasis on loyalty to nature and its laws, to remaining loyal to our existence as part of nature. "The study of our place in the Earth household includes the study of ourselves as part of the organic whole" (Devall 1985; 66). They later note that "our destructive tendencies toward nature have not ethical or religious justification," implying an obligation to our Earth household and organic whole (Devall 1985; 76). This obligation is not limited to simply not destroying nature, but, as noted above, also to actively protecting it as well as the richness and diversity of life. We have an obligation to implement changes that will protect nature (Devall 1985; 70).

Deep ecology places itself in direct opposition to what it calls the "dominant world view." This world view places humans as distinct from the nature over which they have dominion and are able to dominate. It also places humans as masters of their own destiny and in possession with unlimited opportunities from a vast world. This makes all problems soluble either by humans directly or through technology (certainly a further

rejection of civilization) (Devall 1985; 43). This world view both separates humans from each other and places them in a perpetual war with it for domination and control. Deep ecology calls instead for a recognition of humanity as part of nature as well as harmony and coexistence. The dominant world view calls for perpetual war, deep ecology believes in furthering the principle of peace. Thus for all their differences, social ecology and deep ecology agree on four of their six principles. Each values fraternity, loyalty, and peace, downplays civilization, and disagrees only on the relative importance of equality and liberty, although their views of these two principles are completely opposite.

Leviathan (Hobbesianism)

Thomas Hobbes is well-known as a defender of absolutism and monarchism. However, he did not defend it in the usual way. Indeed he rejected traditional defenses of the monarchical institutions that derived from appeals to the principle of loyalty, personal ties to a dynasty, and affections for certain monarchs. Instead he composed an entirely new political ideology in defense of the Cavalier's cause, an ideology that he gave no particular name, but is probably best referred to by the name of the book in which it is described and the government that it proposes, leviathan.

Hobbes begins to describe the commonwealth in chapter seventeen. Here he lays out the foundation for how society ought to be organized and how humanity ought to relate to each other in a meticulous and rational way, that is, he describes his political ideology. Hobbes says that although men naturally love liberty and dominion over others, their final end is the creation of a commonwealth that wholly restrains these desires (Hobbes 1660; XVII). "It is a precept, or general rule of reason: that every man

ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war" (Hobbes 1660; XIV). Since all men are governed by this precept and none has the power on his own to force others to not make war on them, all seek the helps and advantages of war and therefore exist in perpetual war with each other. The only way to avoid this state of constant war is to establish a common power to keep them all in awe, "to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will." Each must agree to give up their right to govern themselves to this single body, to unite as a multitude into one person and establish a mortal god that is responsible for peace and defense known as a commonwealth or leviathan (Hobbes 1660; XVII).

In order to protect peace (protection from violent death, violence in general, loss of livelihood, and fear of all three) (Hobbes 1660; XIII), Hobbes calls for all to surrender their liberty (right of governing themselves and to follow their own will). This peace is valuable to Hobbes because it allows for industry, culture, society, arts, and knowledge, but most importantly it is valuable in itself. It is valuable because it is the absence of the constant state of fear that accompanies the constant state of war. In summary, peace is to be valued by Hobbes because without it life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short and liberty is not valued because it interferes with and prevents this peace (Hobbes 1660; XIII). Therefore, leviathan is certainly a political ideology that places the greatest importance on the principle of peace and that totally rejects the principle of liberty. Although he does allow for some liberty of the subjects in the silence of the laws, the commonwealth's unlimited legislative power means that this limited liberty to subject to

the will of another and thus not liberty at all (Hobbes 1660; XXI). However, it is not yet clear what other principles, if any, he holds.

When in the state of nature there are certain natural laws that exist that allow for effective commodious living, however, since these run counter to man's natural passions toward partiality, pride, and revenge they are meaningless unless enforced by a common power (Hobbes 1660; XVII). Therefore, Hobbes' establishment of a common power has as its end not just peace, but also the enforcement of these natural laws. We can therefore determine other principles of leviathan by determining the underlying principles of these laws. After the law that men seek peace comes the law that they are willing to lay down their liberty, if others are to an equal extent, to achieve peace (Hobbes 1660; XV). These are the laws that emphasize Hobbes' principle of peace. The subsequent laws require men to (3) be just by fulfilling the covenants that they make, (4) to have gratitude to those that give them free gifts, (5) to have complaisance and strive to accommodate others, (6) to pardon others, (7) to use punishment only for correction not for cruelty, (8) to not hate others, (9) to acknowledge that all are equal by nature, (10) to be modest in claiming one's fair share, (11) judge equally between opponents, (12) divide equally where possible and hold in common or decide by lot when not, (13) and give safe conduct to mediators (Hobbes 1660; XV).

Hobbes says that these laws are really "theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defense of themselves," indicating that their primary purpose is the advancement of peace (Hobbes 1660; XV). For laws three through eight this seems to be their sole purpose. However, beginning with the ninth law there appears to be a second purpose as well. Hobbes notes, in opposition to traditional monarchism, that all men are

essentially equal. Because the weakest can kill the strongest by deception or confederation, no one can make a claim at being inherently superior to another (Hobbes 1660; XIII). However, in this state of nature and war pride prevents men from acknowledging their equality with others. In the commonwealth, the laws require it. Hobbes believes it is important to recognize the principle of equality alongside the principle of peace. Laws nine through twelve all compel men to acknowledge their equality of nature and right and to maintain as far as is possible equal shares of what can be possessed.

Along with peace and equality, the leviathan also seeks to establish a deep sense of unity (also known as fraternity) between the people of the commonwealth. Certainly, he laments not only the poverty, brutishness, nastiness, and fear of violent and imminent death of the state of war, but also its solitary nature. The commonwealth is more than simply the tool of a single king that all the wills of others are sacrificed to, but rather it is the amalgamated will of all the people. In fact, Hobbes says that the commonwealth is "one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author" (Hobbes 1660; XVII). In fact, the commonwealth is such a united whole that Hobbes says it cannot be justly severed into a disunited multitude, nor can its power be transferred to another (1660; XVIII). All the people are wholly united into an unseverable whole.

Besides peace, equality, and fraternity, Hobbes also seems to value another principle as well, although it is better hidden in his work than his support for the others. Besides peace, equality, and fraternity, the commonwealth is also meant to protect arts, sciences, knowledge, industry, trade, culture, and commodious building (Hobbes 1660;

XIII). This list seems to be conspicuously similar, if only more extensive to what Strauss has called civilization (1959; 65). Indeed, other comments he makes throughout his work support the notion that civilization is also a key principle for the leviathan ideology. For example, Hobbes distinguishes humans from animals only by our ability to reason. Reason meanwhile derives not from some subjective or inherent value of the human, but is merely the result of our ability to speak and therefore imagine the effect of a given cause. Both humans and animals are essentially complex machines (Hobbes 1660; IV) that can be rationally and objectively analyzed and assessed. Furthermore, we lack free will and our reason is little more than simple arithmetic performed by a complex machine (Hobbes 1660; V). All our endeavors and passions are nothing but motion toward or away from other things (Hobbes 1660; VI). Subjectivity, as discussed by Murray Bookchin, certainly is rejected by Hobbes and thus its opposite in civilization is favored.

Although not strongly referenced in *Leviathan*, Hobbes' ideology supports obedience for the sake of peace and fraternity but not genuine loyalty. While opposing the sedition against the king and his regicide on the grounds that it threatened the absolute power of the commonwealth which was necessary to guarantee peace and divided what was not justly divisible, he did not support true loyalty to the king. Following the revolution, he supported oath-swearing by former cavaliers to the regicide parliamentary government on the grounds that they now held the sovereignty necessary to secure peace and unity. The obligation to Charles I ended with his decapitation because he no longer had the means to provide the protection that his authority was based on. Obedience is important so far as it promotes peace and unity, loyalty is of no importance in the ideology of leviathan.

We can therefore conclude that Hobbes favored the principles of peace, equality, fraternity, and civilization but rejected liberty and loyalty which could conflict with these principles. Of course his rejection of these principles that were valued by both Hobbes' society and others created quite a stir among his contemporaries. His rejection of loyalty did not play well with his fellow royalists and his rejection of liberty simply further incensed his parliamentary rivals, leaving him at times stuck in the no man's land between the two competing factions. One of the parliamentarian, John Locke, would write his *Second Treatise of Government* in opposition to many of his arguments and thereby found the political ideology of liberalism, which has grown and developed over time to become the dominant political ideology of the West. It is this ideology that I turn to next.

Liberalism (European Liberalism, Classical Liberalism)

I now turn to a discussion of liberalism, the prominent and dominant political ideology of the West, which in turn dominates the politics of even the non-Western world. Given its importance, I analyze liberalism more extensively than previous political ideologies, focusing on the works of three prominent liberals instead of just one subscriber. These will include the founder of modern liberalism, John Locke, prominent liberal thinker John Stewart Mill, and the modern vanguard of liberalism, an international organization of liberal parties known as Liberal International. John Locke best provides a description of his political ideology in his *Second Treatise of Government*, while John Stewart Mill best describes his in *On Liberty*. Finally, Liberal International outlines the

principles and values of their ideology in the “Liberal Manifesto”, the most updated version of which is in the “Oxford Manifesto” in 1997.

At this point it is important to note that despite the various definitions of liberalism, I have chosen, as a matter of editorial choice, to refer to the European and Canadian (and global) style of liberalism simply by the name liberalism, whereas I use the term egalitarian liberalism to refer to the American type, despite the American type usually being referred to as simply liberalism within the United States. This distinction reflects no preference on my part, but rather the fact that this form of liberalism has no appropriate alternative names, whereas the latter does.

The essential principle for Locke is freedom or liberty. Locke describes liberty in the state of nature as the state of being "free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule." Meanwhile, within civil society freedom is more limited and described not as the ability to do what one pleases and to be subject to no laws but rather to be free from the absolute and arbitrary power of another (Locke 1698; 2:21). Locke sees this freedom as necessary to man's self-preservation and thus does not accept arguments from Filmer or Hobbes that call for its elimination (Locke 1698; 2:22).

Although the state of perfect freedom is surrendered by man in establishing a society and a commonwealth, it is not done so eagerly nor completely. The freedom to be lord of one's own person and possessions and subject to no one is considered a positive and valued state. It is not surrendered for any cause, but only to avoid constant invasion of others and to protect himself from threats to his person and property by others. It is to avoid the continual fears and dangers associated with the state of nature

(Locke 1698; 2:123). Even upon being pushed to surrender one's liberty for one's security, Locke still calls for a significant amount of liberty to be held back from this exchange. Indeed, along with protection of life and property, the commonwealth that is established is also charged with protecting liberty (Locke 1698; 2:131). In addition, the government is limited so as not to excessively restrain liberty. It cannot rule absolutely or by arbitrary decree, but instead must be restrained by law. It also remains subject to the will of the people and cannot take property, in whole or in part, without their consent (Locke 1698; 2:135-139). In other words, Lockean liberalism is characterized by emphasizing and balancing both the principles of liberty and security. In addition to these principles, Locke also notes that reason ought to be man's "only star and compass." He opposes societies organized based on custom, which he says originates in fashion, which in turn came about from repeated acts of folly and craft. Instead he proposes a society organized based on reason as nature intended, in other words civilization (Locke 1968; 1:58).

Along with liberty, security, and civilization it is also clear that Locke sees the egalitarian aspects of the state of nature positively and therefore values the principle of equality, going so far as to say that the law of common equity is a measure set down by God (1698; 2:8). However, just as he calls for the restriction of liberty through the establishment of government for the sake of peace and security, so too does Locke call for equality to be balanced against security, recognizing that they cannot be achieved in their totality together. When a man enters into a society, he chooses to give up this equality so as to preserve himself, his liberty, and his property (Locke 1698; 2:131). Furthermore, liberty is generally preferred to equality when they come into conflict. In

this commonwealth, Locke makes clear that natural equality is not meant to include "all sorts of equality" but rather only the kind that prevents a man from being "subjected to the will or authority of another man" (1698; 2:54). In other words, only the type of equality that is consistent with liberty, rather than in opposition to it, is supported. Inequality resulting from choices made under liberty is allowed instead of restricting these choices. Age, virtue, natural skills, merit, birth, alliance, benefits, and gratitude all provide justifications for inequality for Locke. However, nothing can justify the type of inequality that implies subordination to another (1698; 2:54).

Finally, civil society (Locke's word for the principle of fraternity) is also valued by Locke. He declares that God gave men "strong obligations to necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it" (Locke 1699; 2:77) in order to, as he often does, support his own position by referencing the Almighty. "Those who are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between them and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another" (Locke 1698; 2:87). The establishment of a civil society, which is the opposite of the state of nature, is a secondary reason (aside from security) for ending the state of nature. It is also another reason why Locke opposes absolute monarchy, which he also sees as lacking the characteristics of civil society, because the king is not subject to the laws and the people have no juridical redress against him and therefore not part of the civil society (1699; 2:94).

In establishing this valued society, the people in a state of nature give up some of their liberty, most notably their ability to dissolve the society if they wish, because they

form a single body politic (Locke 1698; 2:211). However, the restrictions on liberty in favor of the community end here. Although they cannot leave this society, there is no indication that they are significantly restrained in their choices within that society outside of the restrictions we have already noted to exist for the preservation of security and equality. Although the people exist as one body politic, they do not surrender their individuality and become a single man as they do in the leviathan (Hobbes 1660; XVII). Like the government, Locke would surely oppose the exercise of arbitrary or absolute power over any of its members (1698; 2:21). In addition, each member of a civil society continues to own himself and his property. Common consent does not determine the distribution of property (nor can it opt to redistribute it), but rather it is appropriated by the labor of individuals on the commons (Locke 1698; 2:25-28). Therefore, both one's liberty and one's security are generally not subjected to the needs of the community. Finally, Locke tends to maintain a relative balance between his two lesser principles, equality and civil society. Civil society is limited in its ability to make some members subordinate to others because all retain their natural equality, however, the desire for more perfect equality and less subordination does not warrant the elimination of civil society and a return to the state of nature.

It is worth noting at this point that although Locke recognizes the constraints of value pluralism in balancing conflicting principles off each other, he is not a true value pluralist in every way. Locke seemingly sees all of his other principles as simply means to a single overriding principle, security. For Locke, liberty is not an end in itself, but rather the only realistic means to self-preservation (i.e. security), because to give it up is to put oneself at the mercy of a master (Locke 1698; 2:22). The dictates of reason and

nature meanwhile requires humans to preserve themselves and their posterity indicating that civilization too is a means to security because it causes us to follow these dictates (Locke 1968; 1:56). His declaration that in the state of nature the law of nature and reason still prevent one from destroying oneself and others in one's possession confirm that Locke views civilization as a means to security (Locke 1968; 2:6). Equality also serves as a means to self-preservation for Locke as it "is that measure God has set to the actions of men for their mutual security." Those who transgress the rule of equality are a danger to the self-preservation of all the rest (Locke 1698; 2:8). Finally, civil society also serves this purpose as necessity is one of the driving forces behind man being driven into community, that is his inability to survive on his own (Locke 1698; 2:77). Although Locke is in many ways what Crowder would call a monist because a single principle (in this case, security) is end goal of all others, this does not prevent them (as indicated above) from being subject to the value pluralist laws that govern all political ideology (Crowder 2002; 48).

The value-conflict between security and Locke's other principles does not go away because he (or any other philosopher for that matter) does not believe in them. Although Locke sees equality, civil society (fraternity), reason (civilization), and liberty as means to self-preservation (security) and thus essentially extensions of security, they are not. In reality, there exists clear conflicts between these principles. Security requires restrictions on liberty in the form of restrictions placed on people's actions so they don't harm others and complete liberty requires the absence of such restrictions. In some sense Locke recognized this conflict in his requirement to give up rights for protections, but still insisted that liberty was generally a means to security. Furthermore, security

requires an apparatus (usually but not necessarily a state) that arbitrates between competing interests and desires and thus places an arbiter in some sense above his fellow men demonstrating a conflict between equality and security. Civilization and civil society also presents a challenge for security. A person can be most safe from the threats of other people walled off from them and making his own laws partial to himself, but if he seeks the benefits of civil society and civilization, he must sacrifice this safety, join with others, and establish objective laws that may not always favor him. Locke is thus a monist, but his political ideology is still subject to the laws of pluralism. This point will become even more clear when I, later of this study, turn to the utopian ideology of communism.

Although, liberalism has developed over time in its policy-approaches and arguments, a study of both *On Liberty* and *The Oxford Manifesto* reveal that the principles have remained clearly in place. Right from the beginning of his work, Mill makes clear that his intent is to assert a very simple principle " that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others" (Mill 1959; 13). In other words some of the most important principles of liberalism are peace and security and these two essential principles come into conflict and must be balanced off each other. There also is a strong indication that he supports civilization just as Locke does, but I shall return to this point shortly. A person's own good, happiness, wisdom, or righteousness are meanwhile not adequate reasons for compulsion, which would contradict both individual liberty and security (Mill

1959; 13). This leaves no option for the restriction of liberty of conscience, opinion, sentiment, expression, publication, taste, pursuit, and free association which cannot interfere with the peace and security of others but only affect the individual (Mill 1959; 15-16). The expression of opinions is only to be limited when such expression would directly cause harm to others by for instance inciting a mob to kill or damage property (Mill 1859; 52).

The 475 authors of the Oxford Manifesto similarly emphasize these two principles. "Liberty and individual responsibility are the foundation of a civilized society" and "the state is only the instrument of the citizens it serves" (Liberal International 1997). Liberty is still sacrosanct. Tolerance (i.e. Mill's freedom of conscience, opinion, and expression) is similarly emphasized. However, there is seemingly little reference to the long-time liberal principle of security or peace. Modern liberals have instead shifted the focus to support for institutional arrangements such as democratic accountability, separation of powers, fair trials, limits on economic influence by the state and monopolies, and moral duties of individuals to others in society. These arrangements protect liberty, but more importantly place a high value on peace as well. Liberals primarily support these arrangements because they believe that "a peaceful world can only be built upon respect for these principles and upon cooperation among democratic societies" (Liberal International 1997). They are simply more specific than their predecessors about the best means to peace and security for all. The notion that liberty is extensive, but ends when it threatens the peace and security of one's neighbor remains in place.

Mill further emphasizes the importance of civilization, sharing with Locke a belief in a rationally and objectively organized society. He rejects the subjective or inherent value of human experience and custom and instead believes "it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way." Tradition, customs, and other experience should be rationally applied according to one's own character and circumstance. They should be interpreted and adopted based solely on rational choice and personal perception and judgment (Mill 1859; 54-55). Furthermore, the comparative worth of human beings are determined by his ability to reason, judge, discriminate, and exercise self-control. Humans who are subject to custom and subjective biases are seen as merely automatons (Mill 1859; 55). Taken together, these form an argument for a rationally organized society, whose members assesses proper policies and practices with objective measures, rather than based on tradition and custom.

Liberal International is also a strong supporter of civilization, placing it like Locke and Mill, alongside liberty and security as one of its essential principles. They even seem to take for granted the importance of civilized society in their assertion that liberty and responsibility are the foundations of it. Furthermore, they are strong proponents of the plethora of strong, rational, and objective institutions that compose modern civilization. These include a democratic and accountable state, separation of powers, fair trials (speedy, public, and free of political influence), markets free of both state and monopolistic control, and of course rule of law (Liberal International 1997).

In addition to their well-disguised emphasis on peace and civilization, Liberal International reveals their other principles through their central values. I have already

discussed freedom and tolerance, both aspects of the principle of liberty. The others are responsibility, social justice, and equality of opportunity (Liberal International 1997). Responsibility is a value that seems to act as a counterweight to liberty. Together they form the foundation of a civilized society and indicate a liberal belief that although freedom is sacrosanct, we must also consider the good of others and society in exercising it. This notion along with their call for greater cooperation, pairing of rights and duties, and opposition to the weakening of social ties, indicate that modern day liberals share with Locke an emphasis on the principle of civil society (fraternity, unity), but also like Locke they do not place it on par with liberty and stand in opposition to ideologies that would make the state more than simply an instrument of the people or violate human rights for some greater good (Liberal International 1997).

The fact that their remaining central values of social justice and equality of opportunity point to the principle of equality is relatively clear. What is not quite so immediately obvious is the importance of this principle to modern liberals. Certainly their counterparts, the egalitarian liberals, opted to emphasize this principle to a greater degree than John Locke, however this seems to have been the origin of the split in this ideology, meaning that the liberals of the Liberal International likely continue to share Locke's preference for a more limited "natural equality." They seek to eliminate societal inequalities such as racist ideologies and discrimination and to relieve poverty, ignorance, and the wealth gap which points to a stronger form of equality than Locke proposed. However, their remedies to such problems indicate more in common with Locke than not. Rather than seeking greater equality of condition, they strive for equal opportunity through free markets, believing this "leads to the most efficient distribution of wealth and

resources." They want to provide a fair game through rule of law and "equal access to a full and varied education" rather than making everyone a winner. And rather than seeking wealth redistribution and state action to increase equality, they strive for "the promotion of private enterprise and of opportunities for employment" (Liberal International 1997). In other words, they share with Locke a strong belief in natural equality, but see many areas in which inequality can be justified. Mill expresses the importance of these two principles, while also seeking to place limits on them. He says a healthy political life requires competing equally free and talented parties to compete and seek balance between not only liberty and discipline (security), but also property (liberty and security) and equality as well as sociality (unity) and individuality (liberty) (Mill 1859; 45). He even devotes a whole chapter to the strong limits placed on the authority of society over the individual and the importance of leaving the individual to his own devices to suffer his own consequences when his choices affect no one but himself (Mill 1859; 69-70).

Liberals place three principles, liberty, security, and civilization on pedestals, emphasizing their importance over all the others. Equality and fraternity meanwhile also serve in important, though secondary, roles in a liberal society. Finally, the remaining principle, loyalty is either heavily downplayed or completely sacrificed at the alter of their preferred principles. Prior to laying out the framework for his preferred liberal society in his more famous second treatise, Locke spends his first treatise dispensing of Filmer's various claims to the justice of monarchs' sovereignty and dominion over their subjects, eventually concluding that civil power is not assigned by divine institution and is not sacred in itself (Locke 1698; 1:107). Rather, power is derived from the will of the

people and is legitimized only by their consent (Locke 1698; 2:95), not due to some form of loyalty to either the monarch or a supposed divine source of his authority. Only contractual agreements can establish authority, no one naturally owes loyalty to another human being or to something greater, whether institutional or spiritual. Not only is monarchy rejected by Locke but any form of authority derived from loyalty rather than contract. Mill echoes these sentiments. As a believer in the value of free-will and human capacity, Mill sees the notion that "all the good of which humanity is capable comprised in obedience" detestable (1859; 57-58). Indeed, he believes a human become his best when he is allowed to establish "his own mode for laying out his own existence," unrestrained by such loyalties to something greater than their own will whether god, king, or custom (Mill 1859; 63). Liberal International further demonstrates the liberal rejection of loyalty through their previously mentioned emphasis on institutions, such as constitutional democracy and civil society, as the basis for a stable and just political order rather than based on some transcendental or spiritually-derived authority (1997).

Christian Democracy (Centrist Democracy)

While liberalism serves as a shared point of reference and basis for all of the West, departures from this core vary in Europe and North America. So-called centrist parties and individuals on both continents tend to be liberal, but what is called center-right and center-left have quite distinct meanings depending on the side of the Atlantic. In the United States and Canada, egalitarian liberals (New Democrats and Democrats) compose the center-left and conservatives (Conservatives and Republicans) compose the center-right. However, in Europe these roles are filled mostly by social democrats and

Christian democrats respectively. While sharing much with their North American counterparts, these two philosophies are distinct political ideologies. It is to these that I now turn.

There is no single philosopher whose ideals can be associated with the ideology of Christian democracy. However, the international voice of the Christian democratic ideology is Centrist Democrat International. The name of this organization was changed from Christian Democrat International in 2001 to reflect membership of parties in non-Christian countries. Thus it is clear that the ideology is one of certain universal principles that are not restricted to Christians. These principles are outlined most clearly in two of the organization's publications, one published in the mid-90s and the other in 2004.

The “CDI Basic Programme” explains the Christian democratic ideology’s “fundamental values, which are equally important and universally applicable. These are freedom and responsibility, fundamental equality, justice, and solidarity” (Centrist Democrat International 1995; 4). The “CDI Statutes” further outline the Christian democrat ideology. According to these statutes, their organization is based on “the principle of Christian or integral humanism, that is, a humanism open to transcendency and committed to brotherhood” (Centrist Democrat International 2004; 1). In describing their values, they again emphasize the “irrevocable dignity of every person,” “the promotion of individual rights” and “the recognition and assertion of the social nature of human beings” (Centrist Democrat International 2004; 1). They then go on to support “the attainment of the common good as the objective of political society,” “the necessity to reconcile the private interests of the individual with those of others and society as a

whole,” and “the promotion of all forms of community organization and participation” (Centrist Democrat International 2004; 1-2).

The assertion of the social nature of human beings and their promotion of all forms of community organization and participation emphasizes the importance of fraternity. In addition, Christian democrats also believe that “there is no freedom without culture” and “recognize the family as being the cornerstone of society” (Centrist Democrat International 1995; 9-10). Furthermore, the attainment of the common good is seen as the objective of political society. The purpose of society and government is not to protect the individual, as liberals assert, but rather to support the community as a whole.

Fraternity plays an essential role for Christian democrats who assert that it is the purpose of all political life. Furthermore, this principle provides an important and meaningful check on liberty and autonomy. For Christian democrats freedom is both autonomy and responsibility, not “irresponsible independence” and they see both aspects of the value as essential to society. Furthermore, private interests aren't only to be reconciled with each other, but also with the interest of society (the community) as a whole (Centrist Democrat International 1995; 4). Christian democracy clearly seeks to limit liberty in favor of the common good and responsibility to the community as a whole. However like the liberal position in regard to equality, the limitations it places on liberty are not the same as completely downplaying or rejecting it (as leviathan and fascism do). Autonomy and private interests are restrained, but far from outright eliminated. Furthermore, the promotion of individual rights is central to Christian democracy (Centrist Democrat International 2004; 1).

Besides freedom and responsibility, Christian democracy also strongly emphasizes the principles of fundamental equality, justice, and solidarity” (Centrist Democrat International 1995; 4). Fundamental equality is explained further in the statutes to mean that “all human beings are equal in that they are endowed with the same dignity” (Centrist Democrat International 1995; 5) and that this individual dignity is irrevocable (Centrist Democrat International 2004; 1). However, equality is not simply the basic matter of equal dignity. Christian democrats also support greater economic equality, believing “the fight against poverty in the world is the most pressing challenge with which we are confronted” (Centrist Democrat International 1995; 2). Justice is a fluid term that often encompasses a variety of different principles and depending on the ideology emphasizes different ones. However, for Christian democrats, a fundamental "characteristic of justice is to attribute to each individual his due and actively seek greater equality of opportunity and life in society” (Centrist Democrat International 1995; 5). In other words, justice, for Christian Democrats, is primarily about equality of rights, opportunities, and status. Finally, “solidarity (while in many ways coinciding with fraternity) means, above all, protecting those who are weakest in our own society and in the world” (Centrist Democrat International 1995; 5), another clear statement in support of equality, clearly a fundamental principle of Christian democracy that stands alongside fraternity in importance.

Besides fraternity, equality, and limited but meaningful liberty, Christian democracy is also based on “the principle of Christian or integral humanism, that is, a humanism open to transcendency and committed to brotherhood” (Centrist Democrat International 2004; 1). Integral humanism is a philosophy articulated by Jacques

Maritain which became a major influence on Christian democracy. Integral humanism starts with the idea that the spirit, as the principal part of man, calls us to something better than a purely human life (Maritain 1996; 152). In other words, its focus is on spiritual rather than material aspects of a humanity that has the potential to transcend beyond its basic humanity. Maritain's humanism seeks to render man more truly human as well as to develop his virtues, creativities, reason, and abilities (1996; 153). It respects human dignity, but does not worship man. Humans are both inherently valuable and asked to sacrifice for a better life for their brothers or the concrete good of the community (Maritain 1996; 155). What Christian democrats call integral humanism is very similar to what Murray Bookchin calls subjectivity. It emphasizes both the inherent and non-objectifiable worth of each human being, human dignity and self-betterment, and most importantly their ability to achieve transcendence. In other words, integral humanism is a critique of civilization in favor of brotherhood (fraternity) and to some extent loyalty (in the form of sacrificing for one's brothers and worshipping and loving God, but not in strong allegiance to a particular nationality, religious tradition or law, or particular conception of God). Rather than focusing on rational organization of society, human reason and achievement, and objectively assessable criteria for development, integral humanists (and by extension Christian democrats) focus on strong communities with loyal members, human spirituality and humility, and transcendence.

Fraternity and equality are both strongly emphasized by Christian democrats. Liberty and loyalty also play an important, though secondary, role and civilization is rejected in favor of these. Finally, peace also plays an important role for Christian democrats. In their statutes, they list the "search for peace" as one of their values

(Centrist Democrat International 2004; 1). Furthermore, they "affirm the transcendental right to life" as "inherent to the human person" pointing to the other side of peace and security, which is preservation of life (Centrist Democrat International 1995; 10). In addition to these assertions, Christian democrats have long been the advocates of increased European integration. The European project is one that is meant to increase the security of Europe and achieve peace on the continent; it is thus clear that Christian democrats have a strong affection for this principle.

Social Democracy and Democratic Socialism

In opposition to the so-called center-right Christian democrats of Europe are generally the social democrats. Although, social democracy has varied in its meaning over time, often referring to radically socialist or communist parties, the modern social democratic parties tend to have a relatively consistent political ideology, one that lies somewhere between their communist predecessors and the dominant liberal ideology of the West. This modern use of the term is described by Mark Olssen in his 2010 book, *Liberalism, Neoliberalism, Social Democracy: Thin Communitarian Perspectives on Political Philosophy and Education*.

Olssen "seeks to provide a thin communitarian approach to political philosophy for the global twenty-first century and a new understanding of social democracy" (Olssen 2010; ix). Social democracy's explicit communitarianism indicates an emphasis on fraternity that distinguishes it from egalitarian liberalism, which it is often said to coincide with. However, the thinness of this communitarianism distinguishes it from its political rivals the Christian democrats who make fraternity preeminent in their political

ideology. Social democrats seek to use the state as an instrument of the public good. They seek an institutional pattern in which "the essential control of the economic affairs of society belongs to the public and not the private sphere of society" and hence defend welfare politics and public spending (Olssen 2010; 7-8). They criticize neoliberalism for attacking the notion of the public good and thus are strong defenders of it (Olssen 2010; 12).

The thin communitarianism of social democracy, while advocating a strong notion of the public good, public interest, and public control, does not support unity to such an extent as to undermine diversity. Social democrats instead seek to strike a balance between what they call an "assimilationist political framework" that pays little attention to differences in cultural groups and which perceives diversity as a threat to unity and the multicultural approach which pays no attention to the overarching political community and which legitimates all internal cultural practices, no matter how offensive. They seek "to balance difference and diversity on the one hand, with commonality, universalism, and consensus on the other" leading to a fraternity and unity that is important, but restricted, especially relative to social democracy's other principles (Olssen 2010; 132). Sheri Brennan further defines the communitarian aspects of social democracy by noting that social democrats do seek to build social solidarity not on "shared ethnic or religious backgrounds", but on "shared values and responsibilities" (24).

The primary criticism the social democrats levy against wholly market-based economies is their "inattention to notions of public interest, equality, or the global common good." Capitalism, they say, "progressively and cumulatively excludes certain

categories of citizens from meaningful participation, generates calamitous and irrevocable patterns of global inequality, and poverty, and unleashes forces of monopolization with consequent patterns of centralization, hierarchy, and inequality in resource distribution as well" (Olssen 2010; 12). Public interest and global common good lead back to thin communitarianism, but the remainder of these criticisms reveal one of the arch-principles of social democrats. Their laments against the inattention to equality, exclusion of certain groups, global inequality and poverty, centralization, hierarchy, and inequality of resource distribution all point to a significant emphasis on the principle of equality. In order to protect this equality social democrats support a strong state and deeper democracy, defined as a "dispersed network of power where unauthorized and dangerous individual actors are self-notifying (Olssen 2010; 78). In other words they seek to achieve equality, by placing most power within a state that is controlled equally by all citizens.

Liberty also plays an important role in social democracy, but not in the same way as it does for their center-left colleagues, the egalitarian liberals. "In relation to liberty, [social democracy] presupposes the irreducible moral status of each person and would oppose governmental policies that conflicted with or inhibited self-creation" (Olssen 2010; 201). However, social democracy also allows for soft paternalism that restricts the domain of liberty. While negative rights, positive rights, and permission for the development of capabilities would be requirements in any social democracy, the state would "nudge" individuals into making good decisions in regard to nutrition, social responsibility, political and civic participation, and higher education and skills. Furthermore, individual discretion would be limited in regard to sports, religion, lifestyle

preferences, career choices, and in other areas (Olssen 2010; 230). Finally, the concept of autonomy (certainly an essential aspect of liberty) is entirely rejected by social democrats because it "obscures...the sense of interdependency between people; their reliance on each other at critical times, and on structures of social support" (Olssen 2010; 173). They assert that autonomy should be replaced altogether with the notion of an "equally balanced network of spaces, or points of reference, where the integral agency of individuals and groups is safeguarded, where freedom can be exercised, and power relations enacted." So long as power is equalized through rights, autonomy is not needed to prevent the individual from being sacrificed on the altar of some aggregate or collective calculus (Olssen 2010; 174-175). In other words, social democrats believe that equality protects the individual as well as or better than the liberty provided by autonomy, permitting the establishment of what can best be called a thin libertarianism to exist alongside its thin communitarianism. Both fraternity and liberty are defended, but also restricted for the sake of equality, which social democrats believe can adequately fill the gap.

Peace and security are also emphasized by social democrats. The protection of security is an essential characteristic of social democracy (Olssen 2010; 230). Olssen supports using utopian models as bulwarks against totalitarianism specifically because they enable values such as freedom, equality, justice, and security (2010; 79). Finally, their conception of the good requires security and the stability of structures (Olssen 2010; 116) and their concept of democracy requires security, among other things (Olssen 2010; 157). This emphasis on peace and security, along with equality, liberty, and fraternity seems to make social democracy almost indistinguishable from Christian democracy,

with variation between the two being based on proportions of rather than selection of principles. However, social democracy deviates from Christian democracy primarily on the principles of integral humanism. Like its brethren across the Atlantic, the egalitarian liberals, social democrats see little value in tradition (especially religious and ethno-cultural tradition). In addition, they do not believe in non-objective assessment of the good or human transcendence. Social democrats legitimize the positive state and its power based on how faithfully and effectively it serves democratic aims. This requires "a conception of the good which is non-metaphysical, in the sense that it seeks to order life in relation to any super-sensible, transcendent, or religious ideal" (Olssen 2010; 115-116). The state and its actions are justified solely based on objective measures of authenticity and effectiveness and not by anything subjective or metaphysical. In other words they are strong supporters of civilization and see little place for religious or traditional loyalties.

Like the Centrist Democrat International, Olssen is not explicit in regard to his ideology's position regarding the principle of loyalty, however it is clear that it is not of strong importance to them. I have already mentioned above their rejection of religious and traditional loyalties. Furthermore, all socialists tend to downplay national loyalties in favor of peace, unity, and cooperation. They are not pro-patriotism nor in favor of strong religious fervor. Social democrats also share a cosmopolitan and secular perspective with egalitarian liberals. Thus we can say that loyalty is downplayed by social democrats in favor of the principles of equality, peace, civilization, fraternity, and liberty with the former three holding a higher place than the latter two.

A close kin to social democracy is an ideology known as democratic socialism. Joseph Schumpeter describes socialism as "an institutional pattern in which the control of the means of production and over production itself is vested with a central authority -- or as we may say in, in which, as a matter of principle, the economic affairs of society belong to the public and not the private sphere" (2010; 150). This approach shares Olssen's thin communitarianism that argues for "the essential control of the economic affairs of society belongs to the public and not the private sphere of society" (Olssen 2010; 7-8). It differs only in whether to allow the market to continue to exist as a subject of the public sphere or to determine distribution based on a political act that is nevertheless subject to alternative market forces (Schumpeter 2010; 155-156).

Also shared between the social democrats and democratic socialists is a strong emphasis on equality. Schumpeter would pair his socialism with the distribution of equal shares of society's products to all (2010; 156) and a democracy that is "the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote. (2010; 241). Thin libertarianism is also shared. He seeks a level of freedom between absolute and zero and believes democracy is usually the best guarantee of this (Schumpeter 2010; 243), however, socialism won't mean increased personal freedom, but rather simply sovereignty of the people over the executors of power (Schumpeter 2010; 269). In other words, he shares Olssen's view that equal rights better protects the individual than autonomy.

Socialist International (SI), an international coordinator for parties and organizations advocating democratic socialism, complements Schumpeter's approach

(1989; I.10). Like Schumpeter, SI places a very high importance on equality, essentially equating it with the notion of justice (a notion that varies greatly based on one's preferred principles). They believe justice requires an end to discrimination, equal rights and opportunities, compensation for physical, mental, and social inequalities, and freedom from dependence on those who control the means of production or political power. It also requires placing equal value on all human beings as well as economic, social, and cultural equality. They also claim as principles freedom and solidarity, certainly synonyms for liberty and fraternity respectively (Socialist International 1989; II).

Furthermore, SI calls on all committed to peace and progress to work with them to make them a reality and believes the above principles can only be achieved and enhanced in a peaceful world (1989; I.3, II.1). "Peace is the precondition of all our hopes. It is a basic value of common interest to all political systems and necessary for human society" (Socialist International 1989; III.1). Clearly, like social democrats, democratic socialists place peace and security as a fundamental value, equal to equality in its preeminence. Democratic socialism also shares with social democracy a deemphasis on loyalties in favor of internationalism, cosmopolitanism, and secularism. Finally, they also hold in common a rejection of the thesis of integral humanism in favor of a belief that the institutions of human rights and democracy are ends in themselves. Like social democrats they would legitimize institutions based on how faithfully and effectively it serves these material and measurable aims rather than on a metaphysical, non-material, subjective, or otherwise transcendental criteria. That is, they favor civilization. Indeed, in terms of every principle, democratic socialism and social democracy are equivalents. They vary only in terms of practical implementation of those principles and even this

difference is waning as even Socialist International has accepted "socialisation and public property within the framework of a mixed economy" (1989; V.60).

Libertarianism

The next ideology I will discuss is libertarianism. The most prominent defender of libertarianism is Robert Nozick. In his book *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* he lays out the tenets of and defends libertarianism. The opening sentence of the book is "Individuals have rights and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights) (Nozick 1974; ix). The other side of this notion is that "a person may choose (or permit another) to do to himself anything" (Nozick 1974; 58). Together these maxims demonstrate that libertarians are supporters of both negative and positive liberty in virtual totality. A person is not restricted in choices that affect only himself and highly restricted (and perhaps outright prohibited) in making choices that affect others without their consent. Libertarians are supporters of "the minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on" (Nozick 1974; ix) and that "the minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified" (Nozick 1974; 149). Already the libertarian support for individual rights and individual liberty becomes abundantly clear.

In defense of liberty, Nozick lays out three principles. To paraphrase, all are entitled to their holdings if they acquired it through voluntary transaction with another who was entitled to it or acquired it from the commons by mixing their labor with it (as Locke said property was acquired) and are not entitled to it by any other means (Nozick 1974; 151). However, despite the name, libertarians are not concerned solely with the

principal of liberty. They are derived from the liberal and Lockean tradition and thus place security at a level equal to that of liberty. Despite coming out thoroughly against almost any form of redistribution on the grounds that it interferes with the freedom of free exchanges and choices, Nozick also admits that his minimal state is partially redistributive, in that it provides protection even to those that do not purchase it. Therefore, unlike the ultraminimal state, or dominant protective agency, the minimal state provides security to all at the expense of some liberty (Nozick 1974; 26).

Nozick justifies this slight deviation from total liberty by arguing that first a system of competing protective agencies (that is security firms within a stateless society) gives way without coercion, but rather only through market forces, to a single dominant protective agency (also called the ultraminimalist state or protection monopoly). In other words, the protection market exists in what economists would call a natural monopoly (Nozick 1974; 52). Furthermore, Nozick believes the ultraminimalist state is morally obligated to provide protective services to all, whether paying customers or not, thus becoming the redistributive minimalist state (1974; 52). The logic of this moral obligation is as follows. The ultraminimalist state imposes restrictions on non-clients against self-help activities in order to protect its clients. As such it is morally obligated to compensate those non-clients for this restriction (Nozick 1974; 119). Because the least expensive way to provide this compensation is to simply provide protection to these independents, this becomes the state's obligation to both its clients and non-clients (Nozick 1974; 110). Thus, the need for security for all, imposes justifiable, but limited restrictions on everyone's liberty.

Despite his support for the minimal state and the restrictions on liberty and redistribution that this brings, "the minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified. Any state more extensive violates people's rights" (Nozick 1974; 149). As such, distributive justice cannot be permitted because ownership in a free society can only be determined by free action and free exchange, not a central authority that decides how to dole out resources (Nozick 1974; 150). Nozick opposes the establishment of a desired pattern to the distribution of wealth. He says "to maintain a pattern one must either continually interfere to stop people from transferring resources as they wish to or continually (or periodically) interfere to take from persons resources that others for some reason chose to transfer to them" (Nozick 1974; 163). Although Nozick would oppose establishing any pattern of distribution for the sake of liberty (even a more unequal one), it is clear that he is specifically critiquing the idea of making the distribution of resources more equitable, up to and including complete equality. In renouncing the legitimacy of equalization measures, Nozick states that "the legitimacy of altering social institutions to achieve greater equality of material condition is, though often assumed, rarely argued for" (1974; 232). Furthermore, he departs from his liberal brethren in also rejecting efforts to achieve equality of opportunity. He notes that there is no centralized race for a prize that requires a single starting point, but rather "different persons separately giving other persons different things" (Nozick 1974; 235-236).

Aside from rejecting equality in favor of liberty and security, Nozick also turns away from fraternity, loyalty, and civilization for the same reasons. Rather than supporting a large united community with strong social bonds that together would constitute extensive and solid fraternity, Nozick instead calls for "a wide and diverse

range of communities which people can enter if they are admitted, leave if they wish to, shape according to their wishes; a society in which utopian experimentation can be tried, different styles of life can be lived, and alternate versions of the good can be individually or jointly pursued" that is totally free association but no true communities with any kind of uniting bonds (1974; 307). Nozick further admits that the minimal state would be unlikely to inspire people to struggle and sacrifice or to man barricades under its banner (Nozick 1974; 297) and one can extrapolate that none of its free associations, religions, or ideals would inspire anything similar indicating that loyalty too is downplayed. Finally, civilization is also considered unimportant to Nozick relative to liberty. He notes that either "people are different, so that there is no one kind of life which objectively is best for everyone and...the different kinds of life are so different that there is not one kind of community (meeting certain constraints) which objectively is the best for everyone" or "for each person, so far as objective criteria of goodness can tell (insofar as it exists), there is a wide range of very different kinds of life that tie as best, no other is objectively better for him than any one in the range" (1974; 310). Either way, no objective assessment of societies arts, sciences, laws, and practices can be determined within this framework of nearly perfect freedom, thus leading to a lack of civilization.

Communitarianism

Charles Taylor is one of the most prominent subscribers to the political ideology generally referred to as communitarianism. He has crafted various works on the subject that together reveal the intricacies and most importantly for our purposes its underlying principles. First and foremost, it is important to note that Taylor has adopted many of the

notions and theses that combine to form value pluralism. He explains that people are governed by a wide variety of goods, but find that they are required to rank them and at times this ranking leads to one becoming of overriding importance relative to the others. However, having multiple goods does not necessarily diminish the importance of a person's prime good (Taylor 1989; 62). These goods can be ranked in tiers so that those on each tier are incomparably more worthwhile than those below. The most important goods are those that define morality and thus are used to judge, weigh, and decide about the other goods. Taylor labels these hypergoods (1989; 63). In many cases these goods (especially the higher-tiered ones) correspond to the universal principles that I have discussed in this paper (while the lower ones are preferences and interests), which also must be ranked and in some cases chosen between. Therefore, in studying the important goods that make up Taylor's world view, we can determine what principles communitarianism consists of.

Taylor lists several examples of goods in this section without clearly indicating whether he and communitarians favor them or not. These consist of "self-expression, of justice, of family life, of worship of God, of ordinary decency, of sensitivity, and a host of others." He then gives an example of someone who might hold an overriding preference for their relationship with God or justice (Taylor 1989; 62). Shortly thereafter, he again suggests that "love of God or the search for justice" may be incommensurably higher than other goods, such as fulfillment or ordinary desires (Taylor 1989; 63). In his conclusion, Taylor seems to resolve this ambiguity when he notes that there is widespread agreement about the moral standards, even if the sources of this morality is unclear. These include "the demand for universal justice and

benevolence...the claims of equality...the demands of freedom and self-rule...(and) the avoidance of death and suffering (1989; 295). The latter three clearly coincide with the principles of equality, liberty, and security respectively. Meanwhile, the worship and love of God, which Taylor seems to exemplify in the earlier section as a predominant good, is reinforced by his words near the close of his work where he affirms a hope in Judeo-Christian theism as a means of retrieving buried goods, despite a terrible historical record of the religion's adherents (1989; 521). This points to the principle of loyalty to God, a true loyalty because it exists in spite of past failures not because of some rational argument for its ability to provide another benefit. It is allegiance that is unconditional. Thus these four principles play an important role in communitarianism, but it is still unclear how strong of a role.

Justice is also referenced as one of these higher goods, both in the earlier discussion of goods and hypergoods and in the conclusion. Justice, as discussed earlier under liberalism, is not a principle in itself but rather an amalgamation of other principles (i.e. it is just to provide people with freedom, treat them as equals, remain loyal to them, etc.). The principles emphasized by a given individual generally determine which aspects of justice are emphasized as well. The ideal of human dignity plays a similar role (i.e. human dignity requires freedom, equality, safety, etc.). In Taylor's case its universal characteristic and pairing with universal benevolence seems to point to a communal interpretation (providing for the common good and treating the good of all others in society as one's own good). This focus on fraternity/community is reinforced by the name given to the ideology, but more importantly by the primary argument of Taylor's works.

Taylor believes that instead of leaving the question of good life to the individual, we need to establish a moral ideal or standard of what we ought to desire (Taylor 1992; 16-18). He also concludes that self-fulfillment and authenticity are worthy goals, but are self-defeating if they don't take into account our ties with other people (Taylor 1992; 35). As opposed to the classical culture of authenticity, self-fulfillment to Taylor requires unconditional relationships and moral demands beyond the self (Taylor 1992; 73). In other words, he and other communitarians see persons as embedded in social roles. One cannot change one's role in society without losing part of oneself (Kymlicka 2002; 227). Taylor stands in opposition to both general (and imprecise) ideological categories, opposing the atomization and individualism of the right's unrestricted capitalism and the left's form of authenticity that separates people from society (Taylor 1992; 95). Taylor supports the preservation of traditional communities alongside self-fulfillment that is embedded in community. He also seeks to prevent the fragmentation of society and the creation of a common consciousness to unite local fragmented groups (Taylor 1992; 100).

One could add to this emphasis on fraternity by adding that most of the minor goods that Taylor lists are very community focused, such as family-life, ordinary decency, and sensitivity (1989; 62). Furthermore, he emphasizes that there is an inherent and unbreakable connection between our understanding of the self, the narrative we use to make sense of our lives, our conceptions of society, and our notions of the good (Taylor 1989; 105). Selfhood and morality are inextricably intertwined themes (Taylor 1989; 3) and the self can only be described in reference to those around it (Taylor 1989; 35). Finally, he asserts that individualism is an illusion because we always exist as part

of a group and our thoughts are always linked to and necessarily inspired by those of others (Taylor 1989; 37).

Taylor's ethic of authenticity further indicates that loyalty also plays a central role for communitarians. I have already discussed the importance of love and worship of God to communitarians, but this loyalty also extends beyond our relationship to God to include our relationships with other human beings as well. He opposes any societal arrangement that marginalizes citizenship, duty, and relationships (Taylor 1992; 43) and particularly what he calls a modern "culture of narcissism" that recognizes few external demands or serious commitments to others (Taylor 1992; 57). These are both characteristics of the normal concept of authenticity. Taylor is critical of such "authenticity" but rather than eliminating authenticity altogether, he proposes that it be redefined with the "understanding that self-fulfillment requires unconditional relationships and moral demands beyond the self" (Taylor 1992; 73). Taylor's authenticity, like the more general term, relates to liberty, but its most essential quality is the principle of loyalty. Loyalty is an essential aspect of meaningful self-fulfillment and authenticity for communitarians.

These various assertions and arguments for a preeminence of fraternity and loyalty in our lives indicate that they are not only important principles in communitarianism, but also the main ones. They are what Taylor himself would call the ultragoods, the goods by which all others are judged, weighed, and decided about and it is incomparably more worthwhile than the others (Taylor 1989; 63). Indeed, despite the clear importance of the other three principles I have discussed, Taylor clearly indicates that when they come in conflict with fraternity and loyalty, the latter two usually win.

For example, communitarians support freedom and self-rule (Taylor 1989; 295) and believe choice is important to protect (Taylor 1991; 3). However, they argue that being free to act as one wishes is meaningless unless a set of communal standards exist to determine what is worth doing (Kymlicka 2002; 223). In addition, the old orders that restricted individualism also gave meaning to our lives and that the current emphasis on individualism results in people who are self-centered and self-absorbed (Taylor 1992; 3-4). Together these indicate that liberty, although important, is clearly significantly less so than fraternity.

It is also clear that equality plays a much lower role in communitarianism than fraternity and loyalty. The common good that communitarians support is not simply what a majority prefers, but is a standard for evaluating people's preferences. It therefore takes precedence over individual claims to self-determination and equal rights (Kymlicka 2002; 220). Majority votes and equal rights are key pillars of equality and to downplay the importance of these is to downplay equality as well, however, his opposition to widening inequality (Taylor 1991; 2) and commitment to the "claims of equality" (Taylor 1989; 295) indicate that it is still important. In regards to peace and security, he is clear early on in his work that our greater aversion to human suffering over the past few centuries is a positive development rooted in religious and other classical sources. However, he opposes the centrality of this aversion to our notion of morality that has developed. This importance came about, he believes, due to the decline of the cosmic moral order because it was "left over." He instead argues that such notions should be of "merely infrastructural importance" and that higher forms of life and the good should take precedence (Taylor 1989; 12-13)

Only the principle of civilization remains in our discussion of communitarianism. Their view toward this principle is hinted at when Taylor defines his malaises of society as "features of our contemporary culture and society that people experience as a loss or a decline, even as our civilization 'develops'" (Taylor 1991; 1). And indeed two of the three malaises (the third being individualism) relate directly to what we call civilization. The first of these is the primacy of instrumental reason or the measuring of success based on the calculation of maximum efficiency -- that is the rational and objective assessment of societal good. He opposes this instrumental reason's ability to redesign society against the grain of old orders, sacred structures, social arrangements, and modes of action based on the "order of things of the will of God." He believes this ideal leads to the objectification of people as "raw materials and instruments for our projects" and can justify inequality, environmental degradation, and putting dollar values on human lives. He is also critical of the "dominant place of technology" (Taylor 1991; 2). The third malaise notes the loss of freedom that results from the emphasis on individualism and instrumental reason. In this section, Taylor borrows much from Tocqueville. These two forces, asserts Taylor, impose structures that make acting against the grain difficult and enclosing people in their own hearts. He fears the establishment of a government that, although democratic, is run by an "immense tutelary power." Political power is centralized and bureaucratized. This order triumphs in the absence of a vigorous political culture (Taylor 1991; 3). Civilization is portrayed in the most negative light by communitarians, not because it is inherently bad, but rather because it is a threat to what they deeply value, most notably fraternity and loyalty, but also liberty, equality, and peace.

Communism (Marxism)

Before turning to the study of non-Western political ideology for the purpose of comparing its underlying sets of principles with those of the West, I would be remiss if I did not first discuss one of the most influential and controversial political ideologies of our time. It is generally assumed that social democracy and democratic socialism, as discussed above, are merely more mild forms of communism. However, these ideologies are actually quite distinct, most notably in their acceptance of the notions of value pluralism. Whereas modern socialists seek to balance various principles against each other in order to arrive at what they see as the best of all possible worlds given the existence of conflict between these principles, communists, as best described by Marx and Engels in their manifesto, have a much more utopian tinge that actually rejects the need for such conflict in principles. They claim to hold the answer to the problem of value conflict.

Certainly they share with democratic socialists and social democrats a belief in equality. However, despite the socialist emphasis on equality, the communist support for equality is much greater. One could even go so far as to call it total equality in the same way that Stirner argued for total freedom. Socialists seek to use the strong state to end patterns of global inequality, inequality of resource distribution and poverty, along with monopolization and centralization of power and the means of production (Olssen 2010; 12). However, Marxists believe that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (Marx 1848; 158). In other words all the ills of society for all of history are caused by inequality among the classes. Further, he says, in describing his ideal society and how it is arrived at, that the proletariat “sweeps away by force the old

conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally” (Marx 1848; 176). In other words, socialists seek to actively battle inequality, communists seek to entirely abolish it.

Under the scheme of the value pluralist nature of political ideology that I have demonstrated and defended throughout this paper, such a strong position on equality would require the elimination of the other five principles due to value conflict. However, this theorem is rejected by communists. Instead they opt to take an equally strong position on fraternity as well. While socialists call for a thin communitarianism that seeks commonality and consensus based on a strong notion of the public good, public interest, and public control while opposing assimilation, communists seek total fraternity (Olssen 2010; 132). Communists seek to eliminate all nationalist antagonisms and nations generally and to replace it with the proletarian class which "must constitute, itself *the* nation (Marx 1848; 174). In other words, there will only be one nation, undivided by separate national struggles, and it will be the proletariat as a whole. They aim to "form the proletariat into a (single and united) class" and then to rest all political power from the bourgeois and place it in the hands of that class (Marx 1848; 169). And of course, eventually even rival classes are eliminated or incorporated into the proletariat (Marx 1848; 176) ending all such divisions and resulting in total assimilation and unity.

The value pluralist would say that surely this absolute equality and unity would make liberty impossible given the end of individual consciousness and materially consequential choices, but Marx objects, calling also for total liberty. Marx explains the history of class struggles as a continual struggle between oppressor and oppressed (Marx

1848; 159) culminating in the current age with only one oppressor class (the bourgeois) and one oppressed class (the proletariat) which all others have been melted into by the functioning of capitalism (Marx 1848; 165). His goal is to liberate the proletariat from this oppressive state by overthrowing the oppressor (Marx 1848; 169). In this process they eliminate private property, an act called by its critics to be the abolition of freedom. However, Marx denies this charge, noting that the abolition of personal possessions acquired by one's own labor is not aimed at, but rather the abolition of capital. They claim that capital is created by all and controlled by the few in order to oppress the many (Marx 1848; 170). They seek not to deprive any of the ability to appropriate the products of society, but rather to deprive all of using that appropriation to subjugate the labor of others (Marx 1848; 72). Therefore, their aim of abolishing private property is to establish rather than abolish liberty, to free all from oppression, exploitation, and control by others -- to grant total liberty to all.

Before moving on to the discussion of the other three principles in relation to Marxism, its challenge to value pluralism much be addressed. Crowder lists communists among the utopians because they do not accept one of the four premises of pluralism; that is, the various universal principles necessarily come into conflict (Crowder 2002; 55). However, like Locke's monism (which rejected the plurality of the principles), rejecting this premise does not prevent an individual from being subject to it. In order to demonstrate Marx's error I will first examine why the six principles must necessarily come into conflict even though all are valued by humanity and seem important to any society. The short answer is the imperfection of each human being. The reader will recall the brief discussion of the conflict between security and Locke's other principles.

It was the harmful actions, interests, desires of humans that required liberty, equality, fraternity (civil society), and civilization to be restricted to acquire security and more so the uncertainty that humans have toward which actions others will take and what desires and interests they have. Thus it is more than humanity's imperfections or even their harmful actions, interests, and desires (which one could conceivably imagine them overcoming), but rather the very fact that humans have the ability to choose.

Humans do and will always have the ability to choose between what the Greeks would call agape or the unconditional, self-sacrificing, and universal love of one's fellow man and lust for power, or the desire for control of one's fellow man and the sacrifice of them to the self. This notion contains within it other evils such as violence, hate, greed, deception, and destructiveness as well because they are all means of control (to coerce, despise, acquire, manipulate, and to destroy are all ways of controlling). Marx believes that total liberty is achievable alongside total fraternity and total equality, but this is simply not the case. In a state of total liberty, the desire to have power over others would remain in human beings and all would choose this over agape at least sometimes. As a result, choices to coerce, despise, manipulate, and destroy would sometimes be made leading to unequal relationships as some would be controlled, put down, or in fear of others. Meanwhile, true unity and fraternity could not exist if some are used as means to the ends of others, hated by them, or live in fear. In both these examples, the power motive inherent to human beings means that to increase equality or fraternity is to decrease liberty and vice versa. Finally, this is also the case between fraternity and equality. In a situation of total unity, the will to power will lead some through manipulation, rhetoric, and strength of personality to hold greater influence over the

group than others, leading necessarily to inequality. Total equality would thus require total self-sufficiency on the part of all with no true fraternity.

Theoretically, this problem of value conflict of principles due to the desire for power could be resolved through individuals consistently choosing agape over power and by their example inspiring all others to do the same. Given human lust for power, even among the best of us this is at most an exceedingly long-term and difficult goal to achieve and one that no political movement has any hope of bringing about because by definition it must be a free choice by all involved. However, Marxism proposes precisely this, a political movement that uses power to bring about utopia. He proposes "overthrow the bourgeois supremacy" through violent revolution and "conquest of political power by the proletariat" (Marx 1848; 169). Furthermore, once power is gained and the state is seized by the proletariat, they propose to centralize and monopolize all property, credit, communication, transport, factories, instruments of production, development, and education in the hands of the proletarian controlled state (Marx 1848; 175-176). In other words, he seeks to solve the problems created by power through the exercise of total power.

Civilization is also valued by Marxists. Although critical of the bourgeoisie in most ways, he does give them credit for stripping away the halos and tearing away the sentimental veils that once justified old relations of power, labor, and family (Marx 1848; 161). He says "all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profane, and man is at last compelled to face for sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind" (Marx 1848; 161-162). The bourgeoisie creates civilization by turning "loosely connected provinces with separate interests, laws, governments, and systems of taxation"

into "one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national-class interest, one frontier, and one customs tariff" (Marx 1848; 163). All is rationally and objectively assessed in such a society except, Marx would argue, the relation of the bourgeoisie to the proletariat, but by rationalizing the rest of society they set the stage for the rationalizing of this as well, establishing perfect civilization. "The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself" (Marx 1848; 164).

The importance of peace to communism can certainly be disputed. He makes no secret of his support for violent revolution by the proletariat, certainly a contradiction to peace. However, this support for war would appear to be much more in line with the conservative notion of war in order to achieve national security and peace than the fascist support for continued war ending only in domination of all others by the Aryan. Indeed, Marx doesn't reject peace, but rather sees existing society as a veiled civil war between the classes. This war will necessarily end in the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat. At this time the first ever society in which conflict between oppressing and oppressed classes (and by extension for Marx all other conflicts) will be established, that is total peace and security (Marx 1848; 168).

Finally, it is necessary to discuss the communist position on loyalty. Certainly, most of the veils and halos that Marx discusses roughly correspond to ancient loyalties. He is glad to see civilization destroy the reverence and honor given to some occupations as well as the complex series of family and feudal loyalties that constituted the middle-ages (Marx 1848; 161). He also notes that the "working men have no country" and that "law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeoisie prejudices" (Marx 1848; 166,

168). Certainly old loyalties are rejected by Marx, but it is still a question if he replaces these old loyalties with reconstituted ones, as he replaced old sources of fraternity (nation, religion) with one based on a nearly universal class. If he believes he has found a way to resolve the value conflict between all principles then certainly there is nothing to stop him from doing so, however there is no indication that he chooses to do so. Like socialists, communists reject loyalty, but unlike socialists it is not because of its tendency to conflict with other principles but rather because it isn't seen as necessary. There is no place for loyalty where all are equal, free, united, secure, and civilized, conflict no longer exists, and no higher purposes, relationships, or deities are recognized.

After total power is exercised by the proletarian state for an undetermined amount of time, Marx claims that it will no longer be necessary and will thus give way to the utopian society without value conflict that he foresees. "When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared...the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so-called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another...[The proletariat] will have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally" (Marx 1848; 176). In other words, Marx sees the root of human antagonism and the desire for power as having purely material origins. Class differences (or differences in material interest) are the root cause of these. Thus the application of power to remove these material differences would eliminate this problem and thus allow for an end to the inherent conflict between his principles. However, the human will to power and acts of power cannot be fully explained by class distinction or difference in material interest. Indeed, the world is rife with examples of violence, hate, deception, and destructiveness that have little to do with

material interest or are even contrary to it. Even greed, particularly the greed that relates to the acquisition of material things, often has more to do with fear and pride than interest. An end to material differences and class conflict will not therefore eliminate value conflict because it will not bring an end to the inherent human tendency to seek power. Nowhere is this more evident than in countries where communism was attempted.

Rather than bringing about an end to value conflict, placing total power in the hands of those that seek to end value conflict (by ending class conflict) achieves precisely the opposite. Power cannot solve the problem of value conflict because it is the source of that conflict. By concentrating and enhancing that power, the result is thus not a resolution to the problem but an enhancement thereof. More power leads to so much conflict as to reduce all the desired principles down to negligible levels. The result of communism has always been a totalitarian regime where liberty is virtually non-existent, where rigid hierarchies exist between party and non-party members and within each, where fear of the government and others leads to a lack of both fraternity and true peace, and where bureaucracies implement irrational and arbitrary policies that are not successful or examined objectively. Ironically, the one principle that appears to exist in such societies is the only one that Marx rejected, loyalty. Party loyalty (and even personal loyalty in the case of some rulers) seems to have been the most valued principle in these countries, while all the principles Marx hopes to see increased all but disappeared. Power leads to value conflict between the principles. More power leads to more conflict and thus less of each principle. Presumably less power would lead to less conflict and more of all of the above, but this is not an appeal to anarchism or primitivism

where state power is simply distributed to individuals or other institutions. Rather the only way to reduce the conflict and achieve more of all the principle that we require for a good society is a concert of individual efforts to choose agape over power. We will often fail at this task, but the less we do the better off we are.

Political Islam

Political Islam is a relatively new political ideology on the field and one that sees its origins not in the West, but rather in the Middle-East, South Asia, and North Africa. It grew specifically in opposition to Western thought and so it seems likely that its predominant principles would be entirely distinct from the five important principles that we have so far discussed.

Overall, political Islam is a single coherent ideology, but it has been discussed and defended by several different scholars throughout its existence, each with slightly different ideas about how to implement it. Its basic principles are the same in all cases though. The first prominent writer of this political ideology was S. Abul A'la Mawdudi, who began his work for Islamic reform in the 1940s in what is today Pakistan. Mawdudi considers the Islamic system to be the very antithesis of the Western one in that it allows no autonomy for personal or private affairs. All family relations and individual choice is governed by Shari'ah law. Although the family is glorified, the western notion that it can govern its own affairs is rejected. This is something it shares in common however with Hitler's fascist state (Adams 1983; 119-121).

It further shares in common with fascism the idea that the head of state should be the locus of all power and authority (Adams 1983; 78). However, this ruler is only to be

a viceroy of both Allah and the community, where sovereignty actually rests (Mawdudi 1960; 277). The founder of the Iranian regime, Ruhollah Khomeini, similarly calls for an absolute government where power is concentrated, but distinguishes this from other governments by the fact that legislative power and sovereignty rest solely with God and not with the leader (Khomeini 1970). Sayyid Qutb, a prominent leader in the Muslim Brotherhood, rejects the need for a leader at all, but shares with Mawdudi the belief that sole sovereignty belongs with God and opposition to all earthly authorities (Qutb 1964; 10-11). In fact, he seeks to eliminate the lordship of man entirely in favor of that of God (1964; 25). In other words, whether through an earthly intermediary or directly, all human choice is to be subject entirely to the will of God, no one may justly choose their own life or their own leaders. All liberty is eliminated.

Political Islam also shares in common with fascism the rejection of the principle of civilization. "Islam... leaves no room of human legislation in an Islamic state, because herein all legislative functions vest in God and the only function left for Muslims lies in their observance of the God-made law" (Adams 1983; 77). All Muslim people act as viceregents of God (Mawdudi 1993; 118). Humans serve only to carry out God's laws and laws, traditions, and ideas that they create are meaningless or even heretical. Islamists believe Shari'ah is superior to human law purely because it comes from the Creator and not humans (Qutb 1964; 18). What God creates is intrinsically valuable, but what humans create is meaningless. As such, the notion of a strong and organized society crafted through human reason with objective and assessable standards of success would be essentially heresy to Islamists. And although Mawdudi and Qutb refer to their

systems as an Islamic civilization, it is clear that it is only a civilization in the most general of terms, not in terms of the principle itself.

An important aspect of political Islam is Jihad. Qutb explains what this concept means to him and his fellow ideologues most clearly. This movement uses the methods of preaching and persuasion for reforming ideas and beliefs and it uses physical power and Jihad for abolishing the organizations and authorities of the Jahili system which prevents people from reforming their ideas and beliefs but forces them to obey their erroneous ways and make them serve human lords instead of the Almighty Lord (1964; 33). It is not defensive, but rather must destroy systems of oppressive activity (1964; 38). Islamists seek continuous war not to force people to convert, but rather to destroy those forces that prevent them from converting by violence, threat thereof, or other type of coercion. Regardless of the motivation, constant war against all competing authorities to Allah, including states, churches, bosses, chieftains, and others is an inherent aspect of this political ideology and therefore the principle of peace is wholly rejected, just as it was by fascists.

A major principle of political Islam is fraternity. The Islamic State is run and controlled exclusively by Muslims and more specifically those Muslims that subscribe to the ideology of the Islamic State (Adams 1983; 78). All racial, geographical, and national divisions are eliminated for the establishment of united whole (Mawdudi 1960; 55). In addition, along with God the community as a whole possesses sovereignty (Mawdudi 1960; 277). While, nationalism is seen as a uniting force for Hitler and even more so for Mussolini, Mawdudi views it as a dividing force instead. In fact, he originally opposed the establishment of an independent Pakistan (and the partition of

India), favoring instead the establishment of Dar-al Islam, a single Islamic state in control of all the Indian subcontinent and presumably expanding further through jihad. For Mawdudi the key uniting force is instead a common ideology and faith in Islam (Adams 1983; 104).

Qutb praises the Islamic Civilization for being a truly multi-cultural society. It was never for one-minute an Arabic civilization and unlike communist or imperial multicultural civilizations that were based on exploitation, oppression, class, and material pursuits it was (and presumably will be) based on relationship (Qutb 1964; 28-29). "The distinctive feature of a Muslim community is this: that in all its affairs it is based on worship of God alone" (Qutb 1964; 51). While based around a common worship of the same God, this nearly perfect and all-encompassing fraternity is also an important end of political Islam as demonstrated by both Mawdudi's and Qutb's fervor for the wonders of that community and opposition to divisive nationalism. Qutb also expresses a similar love for the traditional family, the smallest and foundation of the community whose purpose is the upbringing of children. Khomeini further confirms this priority of fraternity in his call for the "preservation of the Islamic system and defense of the territorial integrity and independence of the Islamic *ummah*" and his lamentation of the division of the Islamic homeland by imperialists and tyrants (Khomeini 1970).

In accordance with the control of the state by Muslims only, Jews and Christians (called *Zimmis*) are forced to pay a tax known as the *Jizya*, so they do not maintain independence or remain sovereigns or rulers in their land (Mawdudi 1993; 183). While they retain equality under the law and religious freedom, they become distinctly second-class citizens with no independence, political rights, or influence on the system in which

they live (Mawdudi 1960; 305 - 308) (Adams 1983; 78). However, within the Muslim community for Mawdudi there are no classes (1960; 158). Further, there are no racial, geographical, or national divisions or hierarchies (1960; 55). Qutb adds that there is no authority of anyone over another and that all are equal under God. The only "grouping" of men is by faith alone (1964; 10-11).

Islamists therefore express a genuine belief and support for equality. Equality among men along with equality of power and the elimination of class and racial hierarchies are taken seriously by them. However, with the exception of equality under the law, this belief stops at the door of their religious community. While all are equally subjects of God, they are all simultaneously part of an Islamic community that is indivisible along any line. Sovereignty rests not with any individual, but with God and with the community as a whole. Therefore, we can see that there lies a conflict between Islamists' support for fraternity and equality that they resolve by allowing each to limit the other without eliminating the other (equality is mostly restricted to those who accept the fraternity of the Islamic community, while fraternity is restricted by granting equal rights to individuals within it and even some equal rights to those outside). It is in making these tough choices between equally valued principles that differences in political ideology arise.

From the above discussion it is revealed that one of the primary principles of political Islam is the same as fascism (fraternity), simply particularized toward a religiously-based community instead of a racially or nationally-based one. They even agree on the essential elimination of several other principles, such as liberty, peace, and the civilization. They depart, however, from fascism in their support for the principle of

equality, which they value and balance against their support for fraternity, while fascists seek to eliminate it entirely. However, explaining political Islam with these five principles is clearly inadequate. It misses the elephant in the room. Fundamentalists are significantly concerned with following God's (as they conceive Him) will. While God is universal to each religious community, which together holds a singular conception of Him, the conception of God, his will, and his nature vary across communities (which cannot determine the actual and full truth in this life) and thus cannot be seen as a universal principle. However, God or God's will is not the principle in question here, but one that we have already discussed, namely loyalty. Unlike the amorphous "God's will," the principle of loyalty is universal across cultures (although it could be directed at a variety of different foci, such as leader, country, or nature depending on the political ideology). God is simply the focus of that loyalty in this case.

Qutb best explains the importance of this principle to Islamists. In following God's law in the Shari'ah, he believes that humanity can become in harmony with the rest of the universe. For Qutb, God established natural laws so that the universe would operate harmoniously and Shari'ah is an extension of these laws that when followed allow humanity to operate harmoniously with nature. It maintains balance and prevents collisions and disturbances (Qutb 1960; 58). "Man cannot understand all the laws of the universe, nor can he comprehend the unity of this system; he cannot even understand the laws which govern his own person, from which he cannot deviate by a hair's breadth" (Qutb 1960; 60). Humanity owes obedience and submission to God and to his law even though he lacks understanding of the purpose for that obedience. However, it is not reasonable to say that simply submissiveness or total obedience is a principle of this

political ideology. After all, fundamentalists radically oppose other authority figures. This obedience is owed to God because he is wiser and has greater understanding of the functioning of the universe than man. Therefore the principle at work here is an obedience that comes from a total trust in God, in other words, loyalty. This is quite similar to the argument by fascists in favor of loyalty; there are negative consequences for disobeying the law (whether of God or of nature), but it is beyond the scope of man to fully understand them. This connection is analogous to that of Bookchin and Kirk, who share the same principles, despite one deriving them from natural evolution and the other from his understanding of the divine.

This loyalty to God explains why Islamists cannot reconcile themselves with rival authorities to God, or Jahili. This is clearly an extremely important principle for them, of even greater importance than fraternity and equality. Furthermore, it extends beyond simply God to include loyalty to God's law. All Islamists oppose man-made law and legislatures composed of men, allowing for at most bodies for interpreting God's law, whether by jurists or consultative bodies (Qutb 1960; 60) (Khomeini 1970) (Adams 1983; 78). There also seems to be a strain among at least some Islamists that emphasize loyalty to the "religion of one's fathers" indicating a further focal point for this important principle on ancestors. Therefore, political Islam emphasizes fraternity, and equality, but loyalty is clearly the overriding and essential principle. Following God's law and opposing rival authorities to Him is the most important principle and overrides considerations of equality and fraternity. Liberty, civilization, and peace meanwhile are totally rejected for it. Despite all the anti-Western rhetoric, political Islam derives itself from a selection from the same six basic principles that liberalism and other western

ideologies originate from. I will next move farther "east" and examine a political ideology from India to determine if the same can be said about it.

Integral Humanism

Like political Islam, integral humanism frames itself specifically in terms of opposition to the western way of life and values (Udadhya 1965; 9) and instead seeks to use Indian tradition and civilization to resolve societal difficulties that the West has been unable to do (Udadhya 1965; 12). Distinct from the philosophy of the same name that is essential to Christian democracy, this is the ideology of the Bharatiya Janata Party and the former Bharatiya Jana Sangh of India. Both parties spent most of its history as the main opposition to the Indian National Congress, which takes a much more western (particularly drawing from liberalism and socialism) approach to politics.

Udadhya challenges the West by first explaining its primary principles as he sees them. These are nationalism, democracy, and socialism and to a lesser degree world unity and peace. Nationalism is defined for him as the fusion of the nation and the state and also in terms of secularism or independence from the Church (Udadhya 1965; 8). Democracy is primarily defined by the principles of the French Revolution, liberty, equality, and fraternity but later he asserts that the granting of individual liberty is its primary trait (Udadhya 1965; 9, 18). Finally, he says "equality is there at the root of socialism" (Udadhya 1965; 11). He notes that the West has struggled with balancing these ideas and has been unable to find a solution, usually sacrificing one at the expense of others and thus suggests using Indian culture to solve the dilemma more effectively (Udadhya 1965; 11-12). In other words, despite standing in opposition to the West,

Udadhyaya specifically accepts the principles that I have discussed in this paper and recognizes the problem of their conflicting nature proposed by value pluralism, providing further evidence that they extend beyond western ideologies and are indeed universal. It should also be noted here that while rejecting the Western way of life, he argues for the adoption of Western science, noting its universality, and makes significant use of scientific knowledge throughout his work as examples indicating civilization is also accepted by him. His opposition to going against nature at the opening of his work and his attachment to his Hindu religion also indicates that loyalty extends to integral humanists as well (Udadhyaya 1965; 5, 54-58).

"The basic cause of problems facing Bharat is the neglect of national identity" (Udadhyaya 1965; 5) This assertion points to the essential importance of fraternity to the political ideology of integral humanism. Although importance is placed on all the principles, this is the one that is most important and whose presence allows for the proper balance between the other five that the West has been incapable of achieving. "The first characteristic of Bharatiya culture is that it looks upon life as an integrate whole...the diversity of life is merely an expression of the integral unity" (Udadhyaya 1965; 18). It is this unity in diversity that forms the central thought of the culture (Udadhyaya 1965; 19). Furthermore, integral humanists believe that mutual cooperation and mutual sustenance form the basis of civilization (societal existence, rather than the principle) (Udadhyaya 1965; 20). In order to achieve this unity and cooperation, they focus on the notion of Dharma from their Hindu tradition. These constitute the natural laws of life that bring humans into harmony, peace, and progress (Udadhyaya 1965; 23). They also regulate all social activities (including those of the king and God) and form the basis of the nation

(Udadhyaya 1965; 27, 56-58). Together these notions further secure the place of fraternity at the head of the principles of integral humanism.

But what of integral humanism's other principles? I have previously established that none of them are rejected or downplayed by the political ideology and that all play an important role. However, given the importance of fraternity, it would seem likely that they play a reduced role by comparison and indeed this is the case. Aside from fraternity, equality and liberty play the next most important roles to integral humanists. They position themselves as a third way between capitalism and socialism, both of which they see as removing our fundamental humanity. Capitalism turns us into economic men who think only of material calculation. As a result "the capitalist is guided not by the necessities and desires of the consumer, but by their purchasing power. The needs of the wealthy and well-fed are attended to rather than those of the poor and the hungry" (Udadhyaya 1965; 74). Meanwhile, "socialism arose as a reaction to capitalism" and its inequality, but "the needs and preferences of individuals have as much importance in the socialist system as in a prison manual." In other words, "there is no such thing as individual freedom in the socialist system (Udadhyaya 1965; 75-76). Thus, integral humanism is critical of both the thin libertarianism of socialism and the thin egalitarianism (what Locke would call natural equality) of capitalism or liberalism and seeks to establish greater equality than under liberalism and greater liberty than under socialism.

Despite integral humanism's emphasis on liberty and equality they are also mindful of the difficulties such emphasis places on their primary principle of fraternity. Where these principles come into conflict, they generally choose fraternity. For example,

although they deviate from Hobbes in their assertion that nation is distinct from state and is self-born rather than created by contract, they share with him the notion that "society is an entity with its own SELF" with all the parts of human beings, including a soul (Hobbes 1660; I) (Udadhyaya 1965; 32-33). As such the individual's liberty is partially restricted because its own feelings, strengths, intellect, emotions, and energy are subverted to goal, ideal, or mission of the nation that constitutes the nation's soul or Chiti, which is not simply the sum of these preferences but defines the nation even as its members change over time (Udadhyaya 1965; 33-36). Similarly, this notion of self-born and independent society also challenges equality at times. Because preferences of individuals do not constitute the goal, mission, or ideal of the nation, they cannot for instance vote to change the mission or to separate from that nation. Majority voting can choose governments but not change the character or soul of the nation. He gives examples of Goa and Kashmir, which he says would remain part of India even if a majority in each area voted otherwise. Similarly, he says Charles DeGaulle was on the side of the French nation even though a majority of the French sided with Petain (Udadhyaya 1965; 57).

Finally, I turn to the final three principles. Civilization, loyalty, and peace are all only slightly emphasized by Udadhyaya, but nevertheless they are emphasized. In this way, Udadhyaya has managed to craft an ideology that unlike all the Western ideologies we have discussed does not wholly sacrifice one or more principles at the expense of others. In terms of loyalty, I have already mentioned their focus on loyalty to nature and God. Furthermore, their focus on the traditional values of Bharatiya culture indicates a form of loyalty to the society and to their ancestors. However, they also say that "we will

remove those traditions which obstruct this process" of national unity (Udadhyaya 1965; 80), indicating both its clear subservience to the principle of unity as well as an approach to society based in reason. This, along with Udadhyaya's belief in science as a universal indicates the importance of civilization alongside loyalty. These two principles are carefully balanced. Loyalty to one's ancestors shouldn't simply be discarded in the face of rationally organizing society, but neither should it always trump it. Together these two constitute two of the integrated parts of the self that is society. Traditions are the mind, but reforms are the intellect.

Peace and security also play a small role in integral humanist society. They indicate that global peace is a positive goal that the West too greatly downplays and also emphasize the state as a fundamental institution of society because it provides protection to the nation. In addition, the king (or presumably any executive), under Hinduism is given the right to punish when it is "aimed at securing conditions under which society can live peacefully and according to Dharma." However, the state is but one of the many equally important societal institutions, not the sole representative of society. It is rather subservient to Dharma and constructed by the nation, indicating that the peace and security that it provides is not as essential as it is to Westerners who emphasize the state and its peace-making abilities over other institutions and as leaders of the nation (Udadhyaya 1965; 41-46). I will now conclude my studies of world political ideologies and move yet further east to the dominant political ideology of China for thousands of years.

Confucianism

Chinese political ideology, like Western political ideology, comes in many forms. Along with Confucianism many diverse ideologies emerged, especially during the Warring State Period. These include in particular Mohism and what would eventually come to be called legalism. However, unlike in the West, where fascism and socialism challenged the dominance of liberalism in recent history (and in socialism's case continues to do so to a certain degree), these rivals to Confucianism have long ago become obsolete in relation to it. Confucianism is the dominant political ideology of the Chinese people and many of the surrounding regions (even while communism with a tinge of capitalism is the official ideology of the rulers). Therefore, I will use it as my example of political ideology from the region. Political Islam and integral humanism, although both standing in opposition to the West and liberalism, have been shown to rest on the same basic universal principles on which Western political ideology rest. Here I will show that Confucianism, an ideology that developed entirely independently of Western influence, does as well and therefore show with a high probability that these principles truly are universal to all of humanity, regardless of background.

The leading figure in the tradition of Confucianism was a man named Kong, sometimes referred to as our master Kong or Kongfuzi by his followers, this title became Latinized as Confucius. However, this man would not have called himself the founder of this tradition, but one who sought to keep alive the tradition (or political ideology) of the ancient sages and rulers (De Bary 1999; 41). Living in a chaotic time, Confucius "promoted the style and manners of the noble person (junzi) and the efficacy of moral force or virtue (de), rather than violence and coercion, as a strategy for rulers" (De Bary

1999; 42). Although there is much to Confucianism, it is most defined by three central tenets which constitute the conduct of the noble person (junzi). These include filial devotion (xiao), humaneness (ren), and ritual decorum (li). Devotion and loyalty to one's parents and ancestors is essential to Confucianism and as the government is seen to be modeled on the family, this same devotion and loyalty is also expected toward the ruler. Humaneness toward others is important because it encourages reciprocity in others; this is especially true in terms of a ruler acting humanely toward his subjects. Finally, devotion to rites and traditions is a means for the ruler of expressing virtue and moral power to the people and constitute an ideal mode of government (De Bara 1999; 43).

The term mandate of heaven or what heaven ordains is also an essential doctrine to Confucianism, although the term itself was coined following Confucius' death. Confucius felt personally responsible to the beneficent ordered process that prevails in the wider world and in the individual life and saw it as a source of life, support, and austere comfort. This ordered process is called tian or Heaven and includes both natural forces as well as the notion of a natural and moral order (De Bary 1999; 170). Although its processes were difficult or even impossible to understand, he believed that in the long-term rewards and punishments would be appropriately doled out (De Bary 1999; 43-44). This notion is further explained by a later advocate of Confucianism named Mencius. For him, the ancient sage kings had "moral authority that they wielded by virtue of their having gained the empire through the will of Heaven as signaled by the willingness of the people" (De Bary 1999; 115). In other words, the people owe loyalty to their ruler because he is ordained by Heaven, which they also owe loyalty to, but the ruler also owes such loyalty to carry out the order of Heaven and thus a certain loyalty to the people

whose willingness signals his success at this devotion. Another Confucian thinker, Xunzi adds to this that "acting in accord with what is proper to the species is called felicitous, while acting in defiance of what is proper is called calamitous and this is Heaven's rule" (De Bary 1999; 170-171).

Loyalty is clearly an essential and central principle for Confucianism, much as it is among Islamists, American conservatives, European fascists, and ecologists both social and deep. This includes one's loyalty to one's family and especially one's parents, loyalty to ancestors and their traditions and rites, loyalty of people to ruler, loyalty of the ruler to the people, and the loyalty of both to Heaven or the "ordered process that prevails in the wider world" and the individual life (De Bary 1999; 43). Following the guidance of the teacher is also a key loyalty of the political ideology (De Bary 1999; 165). Rites and rituals are established to maintain all these loyalties, which are seen as a positive force in themselves. However, these rites and rituals also serve a second purpose and the loyalties also serve an instrumental good besides their inherent good for Confucians.

"Heaven and Earth are the root of life, ancestors are the root of the human species, and rulers and teachers are the root of order...if even one of these were lacking, human beings would have no peace" (De Bary 1999; 175). Thus the loyalty to Heaven, ancestors, rulers, and teachers is not only good of itself, but also serves to preserve peace, the other major principle that defines Confucianism. The various rites that serve Heaven, honor ancestors, and exalt rulers and teachers are also meant to bring peace to those who practice them. Those who follow them will be orderly, at peace, and be preserved, while those that do not follow them will be chaotic, in danger, and perish (De Bary 1999; 175). Furthermore, the ministers of court have certain duties to remonstrate and reprove the

ruler who acts against Heaven and if he does not yield their warnings they also have the duty to depose him, "lest the situation in a state come to violence" indicating a careful balance between the principles of loyalty and peace (De Bary 1999; 124). This lack of peace or war is undesirable for many reasons, but particularly because it interferes with the basic needs of the people -- food, clothing, shelter, and education (De Bary 1999; 115). In addition, there is certainly the notion in the writings of Confucius that devotion to the ruler that the people ought to feel is a means to societal stability and that the reciprocity encouraged by the ruler's humaneness is aimed at avoiding violent revolt against the alternative methods of violence and coercion, certainly both aspects of peace (De Bary 1999; 42-43).

Another major theme of Confucianism is "the idea that what ultimately matters in human interaction is the motivation of the actors and their capacity for mutual respect and regard based on common humanity" (De Bary 1999; 114). The notion of mutual respect and regard certainly points to the previous two principles of loyalty and peace. However, their basis in common humanity points to a third, fraternity. Additionally, Confucianism is greatly focused on human relationships with a particular focus on the family. Finally, to the degree that Confucianism focuses on economics, it devises a notion known as the well-field system that focuses on a cooperative and mutually-supportive village life (De Bary 1999; 155). Under this system, one in nine plots of land are set aside for mutual aid and its cultivation is prioritized over the private fields. People are tied to their village throughout their life and cannot move. They also provide protection and defense for each other and assist each other in times of illness and distress (De Bary 1999; 131).

Another characteristic of the well-field system is that everyone, regardless of rank, be granted a field of equal size (De Bary 1999; 131). In addition, the term *junzi* or nobleman takes on a relatively egalitarian implication as compared to earlier use of the word which implied inherited social mobility. "Personal commitment and developed moral power," which are accessible to anyone are rather the source of Confucian nobility (De Bary 1999; 42). Together these economic and political systems seem to point to an egalitarian strand in Confucianism. However, also essential to Confucianism is rank and hierarchy. "Some labor with their minds, while others labor with their strength. Those who labor with their minds govern others, while those who labor with their strength are governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern others are supported by them" (De Bary 1999; 132). Although, noblemen that do not adhere to morals and rites are made commoners, and commoners that achieve culture and learning become noblemen, this social mobility is hardly equality. Instead, it is simply a system for most appropriately ranking individuals. "Where ranks in society are equal, there will not be proper distinctions; where power is equally distributed, there will be no unity, when the masses are on the same level, it will be impossible to employ them. That there is a Heaven and there is an Earth shows that there are differences of higher and lower, but it is only after an enlightened king is established that the state is managed on the basis of regulations" (De Bary 167-168). Furthermore, the equality of land ownership can hardly be seen as a means to equality. Rather, it is a means of assuring that all are able to mutually assist each other and guaranteeing that all work to produce sufficient amount to sustain both noblemen and commoners. Just because high and low possess the same amount of land, it does not mean their ranks or power is the same.

Equality stands in the way of Confucian loyalty, peace, and unity and thus is discarded. Liberty holds no higher place. Xunzi and Mencius both stand by the ideal that "the humaneness and rightness of the true king gives him unassailable authority and an ability to compel the allegiance of others" (De Bary 1999; 166). In addition, although the ministers have a duty to depose a ruler that endangers the peace, there is no notion of rights or revolution in Confucianism (De Bary 1999; 124). Confucius does assert absolute necessity of a government to have the confidence of the people (even more so than sufficient food and military force), however this is not the same as freedom (De Bary 1999; 55-56). It means that the people as a group must be confident in the ruler's ability to wield his unlimited authority with righteousness and to compel with nobility, not that any one of them can oppose this authority and compulsion if turned against him.

The Confucian rejection of liberty is also shown in Mencius' opposition to the ideas of Yang Zhu, whose words he says have overflowed the world in his time. Yang Zhu advocated individualism and withdrawal from public life and official service in the interest of self-preservation and Mencius opposes him for his egoism and denial of the sovereign. He also opposed Mozi for believing in treating everyone equally regardless of family bonds (De Bary 1999; 134, 136). Together, these show that at one time, the principles of equality of all and liberty from the ruler held enough sway in China so as to challenge the dominant ideology of Confucianism. Thus, although these are rejected by Confucianism, their appeal still extends universally regardless of background. All the principles I have discussed in this work have appeal to every human being. Although various political ideologies make difficult choices between them and then become institutionalized in the culture of a different area, there is always the possibility that the

absence of these principles in society will inspire political ideologies to emerge that embrace the rejected principle and oppose those of the dominant ideology. This helps explain the rise Mozi and Yang Zhu in the Confucian world, of liberalism with its emphasis on liberty in an Islamic world long torn between political Islam and Arab socialism, and the rise of socialism and fascism in the liberal West where equality, fraternity, and loyalty were so much downplayed.

One of the most common criticisms of Confucianism is that it advocates rule of man, rather than rule of law. Confucianism is focused on establishing rulers who personally have the styles and manners of a noble person and who are moral, righteous, and humane (De Bary 1999; 42-43), rather than establishing offices and institutions that would efficiently and objectively dole out justice regardless of their occupants.

Confucianism supports a mandate of Heaven that requires a ruler to act according to "an ordered process that prevails in the wider world and in the individual life," but which is not always comprehensible to either (De Bary 1999; 114) and adherence to rites and traditions established by Heaven, ancestors, rulers, and teachers (De Bary 1999; 175). It would thus oppose a system of codified and rational laws to govern society.

Confucianism is opposed to our final principle of civilization, but even this stance was not immune to backlash indicating that this principle as well has global appeal. Legalism once supported the objective and rational organization of government and a strong legal system that Confucianism opposed. It advocated centralized power, regimentation of people, expansive warfare, unification, and standardization indicating a preference for civilization over liberty and peace (De Bary 1999; 207-208). It challenged the

dominance of Confucianism and even rose to prominence during the Qin Dynasty before it fell into decline and Confucianism regained its dominant position in China.

Having completed my analysis of a representative group of political ideologies I can now refine my definition of political ideology once more to include these six principles. Political ideology is a theory of how to organize relationships between and among humanity, nature, and the supernatural most rationally, in order to satisfy certain interests and to reflect one's principle preference from among a set of plural, universal, incommensurable, and conflicting principles, which include liberty, equality, fraternity, civilization, peace, and loyalty.

Value Pluralism Explains Political Ideology and Assumptions Challenged

The Principles are Universal

We have shown from the discussion of the political ideologies above that the principles meet Crowder's first and second characteristics of value pluralism, that is they are plural and conflict with each other. In addition to this they are also universal. This has been shown by their presence in every society. Even where they appear absent from dominant ideologies, they tend to crop up in opposition ones. But why this universality occurs is not immediately clear and without such an explanation it could still be a coincidence, however unlikely, that distant cultures all share the same principles. The reason is simply that these are the principles that are essential for any society to exist in any kind of stable and lasting way. To demonstrate this I turn to the smallest of societies, the marriage. In demonstrating that they are essential for the existence of a society of two, I will have also shown that they are just as essential for any larger society.

Loyalty, as we have seen, is an unconditional allegiance, faithfulness, or devotion to someone or something outside of oneself. It can be directed toward God (or gods), nature or natural forces, leaders, ancestors (often through tradition), institutions, family, or friends. It can be summed up as "a practical disposition to persist in an intrinsically valued (though not necessarily valuable) associational attachment, where that involves a potentially costly commitment to secure or at least not to jeopardize the interests or well-being of the object of loyalty." (Kleinig 2007; 2). The subject of loyalty is generally an individual, but the object can be anything which one can become attached or devoted to (Kleinig 2007; 3.4-3.5). It is also important to note that loyalty does not necessarily

require disdain or hatred toward the objects of opposing loyalties, although this is sometimes associated with it (Kleinig 2007; 3.2). Little needs to be said about the essential need for loyalty in the society of marriage. Spouses that are not committed or devoted to each other and to the institution and ideals of marriage and who do not support each other will quickly drift apart from changing emotions or even outright betrayal. This is of course true for a larger society as well. If members of a society maintain no allegiance to each other or devotion to a common ideal, they would simply be common residents of the same region.

Civilization, or where human reason serves as a guiding light in establishing strong, rational, objective, and organized set of laws, practices, policies, and moral codes, is also essential to any society no matter how small (Strauss 1959; 65). Certainly there can be no marriage with no means of conflict resolution and if reason and objectivity is not the guiding light for such resolutions. If they are resolved instead by some subjective, arbitrary, or worse yet coercive/manipulative means then the conflicts will continue even if an argument is temporarily resolved. This need for guidance by reason extends also to all marital decisions and interactions, not just conflicts. There must be a rational objective way of making decisions and interacting or arguments would certainly ensue regularly (which of course could not be resolved effectively). The end result would not be a marriage but a constant struggle. This unending struggle would extend to any society that rejects or reduces civilization.

Peace or the protection from violent death, violence in general, loss of livelihood, and fear of all three is equally essential (Hobbes 1660; XIII). Certainly no marriage could function in the presence of abuse, violence, and fear, but this necessity extends

beyond this as well. The need for each party to "feel safe" with each other is also extremely important. That means that both are willing to protect each other from both mental and physical harm, but also that there is total trust between the two that they will not be the ones to inflict that harm. Without peace and security the marriage relationship cannot last and the same is true for any relationship between more than two people, up to and including a society.

Consent is one of the defining features of marriage. Although this has often not been applied in practice, someone who is married without his or her own consent is not a spouse but rather property, a slave (this does not necessarily require that the spouses choose each other specifically, but it does mean they are willing to be married absent coercion). Liberty is the name we give for consent on the societal level. It includes negative liberty or the absence of interference by others, positive liberty or the ability to make one's own choices, and a third concept that amounts to a lack of dependence on others (who may be able to exert interference arbitrarily at any time (Berlin 1958; 6-7, 16) (Skinner 2002; 255). Although Berlin divides these notions, they are at bottom the same principle, essentially that the individual is able to make his own choices. Although certain types of coercion might be used to achieve self-mastery in others, this is not individual liberty, but rather collectivity because the individual is no longer making his/her own choices (Reed 1980; 370). Just as a marriage cannot exist without consent, so a society cannot exist without liberty. If individuals are part of a society against their will they, like the coerced spouse, are slaves. An empire or dominion could exist under these circumstances, but this would not be a society.

The need for equality within a marriage is certainly the most controversial of the claims I will make in this section. Certainly many traditional marriages where one spouse acts as head of household and chief decision-maker appear successful. Furthermore, unequal wealth is almost always the case, even where both spouses work full time (which is often not the case). But when the true meaning of inequality is examined, we can see that it is incompatible with marriage. Equality implies sameness in one or more respects. However, equality is not sameness. If two or more people are the same in all respects then they are identical, not equal (Gosepath 2007; 1). Rather, it is specific to sameness in regard to treatment, dignity, respect, distributable goods, and distributable burdens (Gosepath 2007; 2.1, 2.3-2.4). Certainly this is essential for a successful marriage. There can be a leader or head in a marriage, but that leadership cannot be used to treat the other poorly or to diminish their dignity and respect or it would be an abusive relationship. Similarly, one spouse could make more money than the other, but this would not entitle him or her to a larger share of the benefits of the marriage or a smaller share of its burdens; a successful marriage must share both of these. The same is true of any successful society. There can and often must be leaders and inequality of wealth is acceptable, but no society can exist where some are treated poorly, given no respect or dignity, shoulder much more of the burdens, or reap much less of the benefits. If this were the case we would be forced to conclude that these were coerced or manipulated into being part of that society and thus are not really part of that society at all.

Fraternity is the defining characteristic of a community and “community implies that there are relationships between a group of people, usually in a certain locale, that go

beyond casual acknowledgement” (Bruhn 2005; 11). Fraternity is also sometimes referred to as social capital. “Social capital refers to connections among individuals—their networks of connections that generate trust and reciprocity” (Bruhn 2005; viii). Finally, “in true communities members share a common belief in community itself as a uniting value” (Bruhn 2005; 11). In summary, fraternity is the characteristic of a society that unites them through relationships, connections, and shared thoughts, that turns many into one. Marriage is referred to as a union and much of the custom surrounding it relates to the two becoming one. Marriage could not exist if the two spouses remained entirely independent of each other. They must build a relationship, connection, and shared thoughts if it is to last and like the other principles this is the same for a larger society, which requires these as well.

All these principles are essential for a successful and lasting society, whether it is of two people or many. However, in the marriage I have discussed they presumably possess love for each other, while agape is not a constant in a larger society. As mentioned above, agape allows for the principles to exist simultaneously and not conflict, but in its absence steps power and with power comes value conflict between these principles. This leaves us with a particularly tragic situation. Because there will always be the lust for power in society, all the principles cannot wholly exist simultaneously. However, without all six principles wholly present, society cannot sustain itself. It is doomed to always be imperfect and even to eventually end in what might be called divorce or separation on a grand scale. Political ideologies each present a preferred model of the imperfect society based on a particular preference for certain conflicting

principles over others, but none presents a resolution to the tragedy caused by the human weakness to seek power over love.

Democratic Pluralism

There is however an upside to this apparent tragedy. Although the desire for power means we can never come to factual conclusion regarding the best relationship among humans and between humans, nature, and the divine this inherent conflict also provides us with the best means of opposing this desire for power. Throughout history, the dominance of a single idea has almost always led to the concentration of power and despotism. However, the plural nature of the principles and thus of political ideologies can protect us from this dangerous dominant idea because there will always be various competing ideas which are all equally legitimate. In other words, value pluralism allows for a pluralist democracy that holds power in check through discourse, accountability, elections, checks and balances, and competition. And because a resolution of these different ideologies is impossible, these power-resisting aspects of pluralist society need never be removed by the sudden discovery of the empirically best way of doing things. Power leads to value-conflict, but value-conflict helps stem this power. Although utopia is impossible, pluralist democracy gets us as close as we can ever come in the City of Man.

Of course it is important to note that the pluralist democracy, while standing in contrast to one-party communism for instance, does not necessarily coincide with liberal democracy. Liberalism is not essential to democracy. And, like any other political ideology, its uncontested dominance over political discourse would lead to the

concentration of power where elections become meaningless and there is no competition between competing ideas. Furthermore, liberalism by focusing on liberty, peace, and civilization limits the role of equality and fraternity, and outright rejects loyalty.

Therefore, the dominance of liberalism in a democratic society, while keeping people mostly free, secure, and civilized, also leads to alienation, inequality, and a lack of commitment, which over time undermine the very basis of society and democracy.

Pluralist democracy would provide access to the political discourse and process to all political ideologies, not just liberalism and the slight variations thereof (such as egalitarian liberalism). This access to discourse and the process would guarantee the cycle of shifting dominant ideologies necessary to prevent societal decay from the lack of one principle or another. Any political ideology that agreed to maintain the basic rules of democracy (those that protect this cycle) should be able to compete in the political arena and contrary to popular belief, liberalism does not hold a monopoly over these basic ideas. These include voting rights for all adults, each of which is worth the same, the absence of coercion and manipulation as means to political power, the ability for others to continue to compete for power (i.e. they couldn't outlaw rival parties or cancel elections), and transparency so that the first three cannot be removed free from public knowledge or accountability. The end result would be a vibrant political system that while being unable to provide for all essential universal principles simultaneously would introduce downplayed principles into the limelight just as their absence began to erode the framework of society.

The need to compete for these votes meanwhile would require all political ideologies to dispense with inhumane associated partisanship or identities, while

allowing the principles and interests to remain intact. For example, a democratic fascism could not murder minorities where racial minorities have voting rights and people of conscience within the majority do not live in fear of protecting them, but it would be able to establish a hierarchical system unified around a traditional culture and strong militant leader in order to introduce a spurt of loyalty and fraternity into a society where betrayal and disunity are rampant. Similarly, a party of political Islam could establish certain gender roles for the sake of perhaps family unity or loyalty to God's law, but could not turn women into slaves of their husbands while these women possess the right to vote free of fear.

In divorcing liberalism from democracy, we can also more easily encourage the spread of the latter globally. Liberalism holds little appeal among the Confucian dominated society of China, but a democracy would not be incompatible with Confucianism by any means. While a Confucian democracy would allow for few individual rights, provide little equality, and have few laws (all hallmarks of liberalism), the mandate of heaven is still signaled by the willingness of the people (De Bary 1999; 115). This is easily adaptable to a democratic system where people could signal their willingness or lack of willingness through elections. Meanwhile, one could also allow for elected ministers with the role of remonstrating the ruler and if necessary calling for new elections (De Bary 1999; 124). The people would only lack freedom, equality, and civilization so long as they voted to lack them in favor of equally important loyal rulers, peace, and unity. Indeed, such democracy would almost certainly lead to a rise of competing ideas to Confucianism espoused by those who seek equality (socialism or

mohism), liberty (liberalism or yangism), and/or civilization (liberalism or legalism), protecting the society that depends on these principles.

Such a democratic system is also adaptable to the middle east and north Africa where liberal parties could compete with Islamist and socialist ones continually to prevent the degeneration of society or in India where integral humanism and the Indian National Congress' mix of liberalism and social democracy (or even two parties that advocate each of these separately) could compete with additional parties that advocated greater loyalty (perhaps a Hindu communitarianism or political Islam), which all three relegate to relatively low positions. And of course this could even improve Western democracies, by allowing socialist and communitarian parties to compete with equality, fraternity, and loyalty-poor liberals. In our increasingly globalized world there would even be great opportunity for cross-pollination of ideology, leading to greater ideological diversity everywhere. This diversity would be even more enhanced by the liberation of political ideology from the narrow left-right spectrum, which groups otherwise highly distinct ideologies into two simple categories and thus encourages two static parties, in favor of a more comprehensive understanding as developed by this paper.

The Principles are Incommensurable

The final requirement that political ideologies must meet in order to qualify as being pluralist is that they must be incommensurable. As discussed above, incommensurable is a characteristic of certain values that makes them incomparable, immeasurable, and unrankable. By showing that these values are in fact

incommensurable in addition to being conflicting, I will have completed my proof that political ideology can best be understood in terms of value pluralism.

Incommensurability, according to Crowder, has three essential aspects. Incommensurable values are incomparable, unrankable, and immeasurable (Crowder 2002; 50, 52). I will begin by showing that the six principles are incomparable. In other words, none of the six principles is absolutely better than another (Crowder 2002; 50). This is demonstrated by the same factor that makes them universal. Because all are essential to society and the absence of any one of them leads to the breakdown of society, it is no more possible to say that one is absolutely better than any of the others than it is to say that an ace is absolutely better than a deuce in a house of cards. The principles are also unrankable in that their rank varies on a case-by-case basis (Crowder 2002; 52). This is clear from the wide variety of political ideologies I have analyzed here. Each ideology places a different rank on each principle. However, none has the ideal ranking leading to the wide variation that we see and as we have seen in the discussion of pluralist democracy, one political ideology might be necessary to preserve one society and another one might be necessary to preserving another with different deficiencies.

The final aspect of incommensurability is immeasurability. The principles have no common denominator or measurement (Crowder 2002; 52). This is clear by the fact that each is itself a measure of a different aspect of individuals in community. Liberty is a characteristic of individuals. Individuals have choice and although their ability to make that choice often depends on the actions of others who may interfere with their self-mastery the liberty or lack thereof is still solely in the individual. Even when we speak of group freedom, which also incorporates a fraternity that might restrict liberty of its

members, we are still referring to the freedom of the individuals in that group from restrictions from outside that group. Equality, meanwhile, cannot be measured in terms of a single individual, but rather necessarily describes a relationship between multiple individuals. An individual cannot be equal, but more than one can be equal to each other. Fraternity then describes a community (even a community of two). Unlike the other two, it cannot exist in a single individual nor is it determined by comparing individuals within a community. The community as a whole is united or the community as a whole is divided. In some ways peace/security is similar to liberty in that it is held in the individual, the individual is either safe or in fear. However, unlike liberty, peace and security do not exist where one individual is not in fear, but necessarily means that all in the community are safe. Civilization, like fraternity, exists in the community as a whole, but unlike fraternity it is determined by the sum of the actions of individuals rather than a group consciousness. A community is civilized where the individuals in it use reason and objectivity as their guide. Finally, like liberty and security, the subjects of loyalty are individuals, but unlike either of these it is dependent on a relationship to something else. An individual or even a whole community of individuals cannot be loyal without an object of that loyalty. Each of the principles measures a different aspect of individuals in community and thus no common measurement can be used to measure any two of them.

Constructing a Visual Representation of Political Ideology

Because under this new understanding of the political ideology the two sides of the left-right spectrum are replaced with six principles, ideology can no longer be expressed along a single line. Instead, we must construct a new model of political

ideology that better expresses and compares political ideologies. Of course any model will by definition be imperfect, but the goal will be to create a way by which the conclusions I have drawn about political ideology will be accurately expressed while allowing for easy understanding and visual appeal.

Certainly, the most obvious model would be one that replaces a line that measures "leftness" or "rightness" with six independent lines that each separately measure one of the principles of a given political ideology. Each line would be vertical and parallel with "wholly rejected" at the bottom and "total" at the top. If one wanted to compare multiple ideologies one could plot each ideology's position on each of these lines and quickly compare which principles are more emphasized by each and which are more downplayed. However, a model that is really six separate models does not provide a unified view of any political ideology.

Alternatively, one could select any two of these lines and place them perpendicular to each other to form a Cartesian coordinate system whereby multiple ideologies could be plotted at specific points along the grid for easy comparison. One could also craft a three-dimensional coordinate system using a computer to compare three at a time. However, as 6-dimensional objects do not exist (at least in our space), this method cannot be used to compare a political ideology on all principles at once.

A further difficulty of both the above models is that they fail to address the inherent conflict between the various principles that account for political ideology. It is easy to imagine an ideology with points at the top of all six of the lines or with a point in the upper right hand corner in the second model. Indeed, in both cases there is a place on the plot for these non-existent positions. This makes them inaccurate and more


importantly less valuable as tools for demonstrating the conclusions of this paper. To view each principle independently of each other denies their essential and tragic relationship and if people were to use to it craft their own preferences just about anyone would prefer generous amounts of all principles.


The best model, I believe, is thus to plot each political ideology in the form of a pie chart. An ideology based entirely on an unrestricted amount of a single principle (i.e. egoism) will have that principle take up the entire 360° while others will take up some smaller portion of the circle depending on level of preference. The principles will always be in a set in the same order, starting at 0° and moving clockwise, for easy comparison between political ideologies. The order will be based on each principle's relative relationship to individuals and the community as discussed above: liberty, peace, loyalty, equality, civilization, fraternity. Meanwhile, the fact that increasing the slice of any one principle requires a reduction somewhere else drills home the essential conclusion of this paper in regards to the principles that compose political ideology. It is also important that a consistent color scheme be used for quick and easy recognition of what each ideological pie chart represents. These colors will be: Liberty -- Green, Peace -- White, Loyalty -- Yellow, Equality -- Purple, Civilization -- Gray, and Fraternity -- Red.

Finally, I turn to the most imprecise aspect of this model. General guidelines must be selected for determining the segment given to a principle for a certain level of preference for a political ideology. Clearly, an unrestricted amount will equal 360° and a total rejection will be 0° but in between these two it gets a bit more complicated. This is firstly because a political ideology is not precise and thus as long as the principles are within a certain range of its balance they would qualify as that political ideology. More

importantly though is the fact that it is impossible to accurately quantify qualitative values for principles. For instance, what segment of the pie should be given to the fraternity Olssen's "thin communitarianism?" Because quantified values are necessary for any model I have chosen 45° or one eighth of the pie. This selection was based on the fact that thin implies meaningful but less than average, and average in the six-principle scheme would be one sixth or 60°

The smallest segment of the pie that I will assign will be 40° or one ninth of the pie. This is for principles that are important, but are distinguishably less so than the thin ones (for instance communitarian liberty). A principle that plays a key role for a political ideology, but which its subscribers explicitly balance off of others (for instance equality, liberty, civilization, and peace in egalitarian liberalism) will be assigned 90° or one fourth of the pie. Principles that are given importance beyond this amount will be given 120° or one third of the pie (for instance peace in the leviathan). And finally, those principles that are assigned overwhelming importance by a political ideology will be given half the pie or 180° . Below are models of each of the political ideologies I have described in this paper, with the exception of communism which cannot be adequately depicted due to its rejection of the necessities of pluralism (however we can imagine a circle completely brown or black in color due to the various pigments completely overlapping and drowning each other out).





Conclusion

Adopting this understanding of political ideology will have many implications for the human race. In particular, overthrowing the tyranny of the right-left spectrum will permit for a greater variety of political ideology to flourish in society. It will remove the artificial ties that lump all adherents of fraternity and/or loyalty together as rightists and all adherents of equality and/or civilization together as leftists. It will permit variations from liberalism (often called centrism), which aren't necessarily considered extreme. And it will allow for novel combinations of principles which might solve the deficits in principles of a time, but which would be inconceivable in terms of right and left. Together these will allow for a vibrant pluralist democracy and a stable society.

Value conflict will continue to be a challenge for us as long as time continues. However, by truly understanding this conflict and the political ideology that derives from it we can mitigate this problem. Certainly understanding one's opponents is one of the best ways to prevent opposition from becoming enmity, especially when it is seen that you essentially share the same principles in different orders. So is taking care to rationally examine your own political ideology for its own inherent imperfections and principles to minimize the influence of political partisanship and identity on one's thought process. Often these forces turn valued principles such as fraternity and loyalty into particularist fault lines, when different loyalties need not lead to disdain and different fraternal groups need not be in opposition. Indeed a shared belief in such principles could, for instance, bring Hindu nationalists and Pakistani Islamists together, if political partisanship and identity were put to the side.

Furthermore, there is no reason why an individual cannot become a pluralist democrat in ideology, supporting for instance conservative ideals in one election where societal loyalty and liberty seem in jeopardy and then supporting socialist ones in the next where equality and civilization appear to be lacking. This fluidity of ideology would further the vibrancy of democracy and eliminate an us-versus-them mentality that tears any society apart. Perhaps in the next election a new ideology will be devised that supports all of these at the expense of peace and fraternity, which have overwhelmed these others of late in this given society.

In the United States, the greatest challenge to pluralist democracy and the greatest beneficiary of the left-right spectrum is the two-party system. The two-party system emerges from an understanding of political ideology in which all are simply to the left or to the right of each other. Any third challenger is understood only in these terms and thus will always be a "spoiler" to one or the other. Furthermore, challengers limit themselves to this scope introducing ideas that vary little from the ideological status quo. The two-party system in turn leads to a highly non-vibrant political system that changes only along a continuous pendulum swing and a highly unstable society then slowly degenerates as certain principles are continuously minimized or excluded from a society that requires them to exist. It also emphasizes partisanship and dichotomy over principles and diversity, leading to rigid party memberships and establishing fault-lines where none need exist given the universal and rational underpinnings of all political ideology. This paper develops a new understanding and model of political ideology, proposes a new form of democracy for best preserving society, and most of all seeks to undo the dominance of two parties whose authority is illegitimate and whose effect is disastrous.

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