Between Faith and Knowledge: "Theological Knowledge" in Gregory of Rimini and his Fourteenth-Century Context

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Boston College
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BETWEEN FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE:
“THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE” IN GREGORY OF RIMINI
AND HIS FOURTEENTH-CENTURY CONTEXT

a dissertation

by

JEFFREY C. WITT

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Abstract

Between Faith and Science: Gregory of Rimini on Theological Knowledge in His Fourteenth-Century Context

By Jeffrey C. Witt

Directed by Jean-Luc Solère

The professional theologian attempts to distinguish herself by claiming some kind of “epistemic advance” over the person of mere belief. This claim to knowledge—and the relation of this knowledge to the other sciences—can therefore be subject to philosophical analysis. What is the subject matter of this discipline? What is the method by which it secures its results? And how does its practitioner “know” when she has passed beyond mere belief?

The theologians of the high and late Middle Ages faced a unique historical challenge. At this time, “theology” first emerged as a distinct academic discipline, and the theological doctors were perpetually engaged in a debate about the exact nature of theology. On the one hand, they were eager to assert that theology made a real epistemic contribution that should be respected by the other sciences. On the other hand, these same theologians struggled with the fact that their discipline did not neatly meet the conditions of epistēmē or scientia laid down by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics.

The main historical focus of this study is Gregory of Rimini, an Augustinian hermit, who flourished in the mid-fourteenth century. But I aim to consider Rimini’s thought as embedded within its fourteenth-century context. Within the writings of Rimini
and his interlocutors, the main conceptual focus of this study is on the debates about how the components of a science (subject, object, premises, etc.) are employed in a theological discourse. I also consider whether and how the results of this discipline should be counted as a genuine science.

The first part of the study is concerned with some preliminary debates. Here I look at how theology distinguishes itself from metaphysics and why a separate discipline called theology is needed. These questions fall under the categories of the subject matter and purpose of theology. They involve extensive definitions and clarifications about the meaning of the “subject” of any science, what constitutes a true “practice,” and how “knowledge” does or does not extend to “practices.” On the question of the subject of theology, Gregory of Rimini can be seen as closely following the intellectual father of his Order, Giles of Rome. Rimini, like Giles, sees theology as an intellectual discipline that does not extend to all that is knowable about God, but only to God as viewed from a specific vantage point. On the purpose of a theological discipline, Rimini follows the tradition of his order in emphasizing love as the primary goal of the theological endeavor, but shows some independence from Giles in asserting that this knowledge should be considered “practical knowledge” rather than “affective knowledge.” In emphasizing theology’s role as directive of the proper love of God, Rimini opposes the position of his main interlocutor, Peter Aureoli, who uniquely suggests that theology should be understood as primarily directive of a separate act of faith and only indirectly directive of an act of love.
The second part of the study turns to the question of method and the epistemic status of the results claimed within the theological discipline. Part two looks first at the ideas of theological method and its scientific status in the work of Giles of Rome. It then considers the development of his ideas in two Augustinians writing at the turn of the fourteenth-century: Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio. The study then turns to an alternative view of theological method advanced by Peter Aureoli and the reception of his position first by William of Ockham and then Gregory of Rimini. Having articulated Rimini’s disagreements with Aureoli and Ockham and having considered his own positive position, the final chapter turns to identify precisely the kind of “knowledge,” scientific or otherwise, that Rimini’s methodology produces.

Part II is the heart of the dissertation. The general thesis is that two distinct traditions emerge. One tradition, associated primarily with Peter Aureoli, looks to provide a kind of justification for theology among the other sciences. It focuses on finding reasons that would strengthen and support, albeit not demonstrate, the claims of faith, reasons that would hold sway even with those outside the religious community. For some, like Peter Aureoli, this meant trying to find supportive probable reasons that would bolster and direct the claims of faith. But for others, like Francis of Marchia, this meant finding a way to declare that theology was a true science, which can provide “evidence” for the claims of faith. Distinctive of this trend is the sharp divide between the habit of faith (which belongs to every believer) and the habit of theology (which uniquely belongs to the professionally trained theologian).
The second tradition, which I label the Aegidian tradition, and of which I argue Rimini should be counted as a member, describes the theologian as more internally focused—focused on the deduction and clarification of the consequences of belief. On this view, the distinctive mark of the theologian is his or her ability to make explicit what the simple believer only believes implicitly. This position closely assimilates faith and theology, claiming that theology never proceeds beyond faith nor finds alternative points of justification for its claims. This conception of theology is less concerned with legitimization and justification in the eyes of the other sciences. Rather, its primary aim lies in the ability to establish and prove the consequences of what the members of the religious community implicitly claim to believe. Thus, the unique ability (and claim to knowledge) possessed by the professional is the power of “self-description.”
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I have dreamed of finishing my doctorate in philosophy for many years. But it has been a longer and more difficult journey than I ever anticipated. That I am now approaching the end says less about me than about the people and institutions that have supported me over the last ten years. I am forever indebted to everyone who has taught, encouraged, put up with, and loved me. At the risk of creating an inevitably incomplete list, I offer special thanks to those who have helped me reached the finish line.

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inconsiderate moments, and she has forgiven me. She has celebrated with me in my
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Introduction

*Between Faith and Science:* this title pinpoints the unique philosophical and conceptual tension that this dissertation will examine historically. Before turning to the historical details and the reason for our historical choice, we need to say something about the larger problem.

I. A Gentle Conceptual Introduction

Once upon a time Aristotle asked a basic, and now perennial, philosophical question: “What does it mean to really know something?” He, like philosophers before and after, recognized that we often hold a belief about something that turns out to be true. However, he was suspicious about whether holding a true belief really captured what we mean when we say “we know” something?

For example, I might assert that I believe the weather will be sunny tomorrow. If it turns out to be sunny, then this occurrence proves that I previously held something to be true that was in fact true. But does this mean that “I knew” that the weather would be sunny? In a similar, but more complicated example, I might say that “I know” the sun will rise tomorrow because during every previous day of my life the sun arose; therefore, it feels inconceivable that the sun will not rise again. But even though it feels inconceivable, do I really “know” tomorrow’s sunrise will occur? Can I be sure of it? How sure can I be?
For Aristotle possessing a true belief was not enough to count as true knowledge. It was too unsteady, too much like successful guessing. Despite my belief that it will be sunny tomorrow, it could still turn out to be rainy, and despite the plausible belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, my past experience does not guarantee that it will do so tomorrow. This lack of certainty suggests that the only things I possess are beliefs that are likely to be true. But “knowing” connotes a higher degree of certainty, wherein I not only hold a true belief but also recognize that this belief must be true, and that it cannot be otherwise.

But herein lies the problem: how do I know when I really “know” something and when I merely believe that something will be true? Lots of philosophers have worked out lots of solutions to this problem. But Aristotle formulated one the most serious and influential answers. One particular distinguishing piece of criteria he pointed to (which we will examine in more detail later) was the fact that the person who truly knows, “knows the cause of the thing.” That is, the knower does not merely believe that something is the case, but she knows why it is this way. This difference between the person who believes that the sun will rise based on past experience and the astronomer who believes the same thing is that the astronomer knows why the sun rises each day. The person who believes based on past experience does not know the real cause because the fact that the sun rose yesterday is not the cause of its rising today.

If we are attentive, we may notice that something is unsatisfactory in this definition of “what it means to know.” “To know” has been used to define “to know,”

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1 See chapter 5, p. 236.
and it appears that we have been led in a circle. To know something is to know its cause
and to know the cause is to know the cause of the cause.

Aristotle solves this circular problem by adding a further criterion: for “true and
certain knowledge” the cause must be accessed through evident first principles. First
principles are certain propositions that are not known through knowing something else.
Rather, their truth is simply evident from the proposition itself. The truth of such
propositions has no other cause that makes them true or known. The principle of non-
contradiction is a classic example. I know that something cannot “be” and “not be” at the
same time. However in this case I cannot explain why. I do not “know” this principle
because I know the cause of this principle. On the contrary, its truth is intrinsic to the
proposition itself and just obvious; it is on the strength of this “obviousness” that it can
function as the cause of other truths as well. In short, the circle comes to a stop at these
evident first principles. The mind cannot ask why any further. The distinguishing mark,
then, of the “person who knows” is that she can trace back her certainty about some truth
to an equally certain and self-evident first principle.

II. The Challenge of Revealed Religion

Aristotle’s system leaves us with a binary between opinion (true or false) and
knowledge (inclusive of nous, epistēmē, and sophia or, in Latin, intellectus, scientia, and
sapientia). But his system is challenged by those who are unwilling to accept this binary

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3 Aristotle’s conception of knowledge is actually broken down in three types essentially connected to the
above discussion of principles and conclusion. For the “knowledge” of principles that have no higher cause,
Aristotle provides the label nous, which is translated in Latin as intellectus. “To know” a conclusion that
as the final word and who consequently want to acknowledge sources of certainty that do not meet the criteria Aristotle laid down. This challenge is voiced with particular urgency by advocates of revealed religions. Religion that places special emphasis on “revealed” (rather than “acquired”) sources of data pose special problems for this binary. The datum is neither obviously true (in the manner of a first principle) nor is it deduced and derived from what is immediately known to be true (in the manner of a scientific conclusion). This data set is given and received from a trusted authority. However, the religious mindset also wants to claim that this data set is “known” with the same certainty and trustworthiness as the data that are known from first and evident principles. In other words, what the religious text reveals is supposed to give us something more than opinion. But it also lacks the evidence and “obviousness” that Aristotle associates with true knowledge.

The solution of revealed religion is to reject Aristotle’s binary and posit a third epistemic category between opinion and knowledge called faith. Faith is distinguished from “science” or “scientific knowledge” because it lacks “evidence,” but faith is necessarily follows from first principles is to have epistēmē or in Latin scientia. The third category is sophia or sapientia, which is slightly harder to appreciate. For Aristotle it connotes a kind of comprehensive knowledge of principles and conclusions. It’s somewhat harder to appreciate because it is not always clear how this is distinguished from scientia, which would also seem to demand a knowledge of principles and conclusions. In the opening chapters of book I of the Metaphysics, Aristotle hints that sophia might be distinguished as a comprehensive knowledge of the highest and most noble things.

4 In his famous work Is theology a Science?, M.D. Chenu comments on the importance of authority in religious knowledge by quoting Paul Ricoeur. The excerpted quote reads: “Authority in theology is not just an accidental addition: it is something fundamental to the revelation and to the truth which the believer finds it in. The facts of revelation can change my personal life, and at the same time they are the foundation of a new form of communal life. In this sense they have authority over my life and our life. The word of God is authority in its application both to my own life and to us all. Authority is something fundamental in the sphere of religion…” (Paul Ricoeur, Histoire et Vérité (Paris 1955, pp. 160-161, qtd in Chenu, Is Theology a Science, 32.).
distinguished from “opinion” because it shares the same level of certainty and trustworthiness that “scientific knowledge” enjoys.\(^5\)

With this new development arises a new problem, which is the specific inquiry of this study. Endemic to most revealed religions is a division between two types of people. On the one hand there is the devout but unlearned and simple believer (often illustrated by reference to an illiterate old woman or *vetula*). On the other hand stands the teacher, the rabbi, or the theologian. Consider the way Augustine describes this division in his first sermon on the *Gospel of John*:

This John, you see, my dearest brothers and sisters, was one of those mountains of which it is written: *May the mountains receive peace for your people and the hills justice* (Ps 71:3). Mountains are lofty souls; hills are ordinary souls. But then the mountains receive peace so that the hills might receive justice. What is the justice which the hills receive? Faith, for *the just person lives by faith* (Rom 1:17; Hab 2:4). Lesser souls, however, would not receive faith unless greater souls—called mountains—were enlightened by Wisdom herself, so that they might pass on to ordinary souls what these ordinary souls can grasp, and thus live from faith as hills because the mountains receive peace.\(^6\)

In this passage Augustine first describes this distinction poetically. What separates the teacher from the simple believer is that the “mountains” possess “peace” but the “hills” receive only “justice.” But he quickly interprets this distinction in more familiar terms. Those, who have “justice” live by “faith” and those who merely have “faith” are

\(^{5}\) E.g. see chapter 7, n. 40. That faith demands this middle position is visible even in a thinker like Paul Tillich, whose notion of faith is in many ways far removed from that of scholastic definitions. Nevertheless, on this point he shows some similarities: “The most ordinary misinterpretation of faith is to consider it an act of knowledge that has a low degree of evidence. Something more or less probable or improbable is affirmed in spite of the insufficiency of its theoretical substantiation. The situation is very usual in daily life. If this is meant, one is speaking of belief rather than of faith” (Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith*, p. 31). Whatever the differences between Tillich and the traditional scholastic view, both views are adamant that “faith” or “religious belief” must be distinguished from mere opinion, where a person gives assent on the basis of probable but not compelling reasons.

identified by the fact that what they “know” or “hold to be true and certain” they receive from the “mountains.” In contrast, the extra-ordinary people are set apart because their possession of “peace” is interpreted as the possession of a “wisdom” that the merely faithful do not have. In this distinction, Augustine has appealed to an epistemic category, as if to say these mountains “know” what the “faithful” only believe.

At this point several questions come to mind. What does it mean to be wise as the Apostle John is wise? Do these wise people “know” in an Aristotelian sense what the faithful believe? Is “wisdom” a replacement for faith? Is faith only for the masses, but not for the exceptional? If so, then the triad of opinion-faith-knowledge still works fairly well. While most people believe on the authority of others, the “mountains” pass beyond faith by reaching out to clear and evident principles, and in so doing they acquire (rather than receive) “knowledge” for themselves.

This is one viable interpretation of how we should understand religious revelation and the quest for understanding. Revelation is given for those who do not have the time,

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7 This is something Augustine himself can often seem to suggest. He repeatedly remarks about the ability the philosophers to see the truth, while they are unable to reach the “homeland” because of their pride. See for example his second sermon on the Gospel of John where he says: “Certain philosophers in this world have sought the creator through the creature – because he can indeed be found through the creature . . . They saw where the were to go, but, being ungrateful to the one who set what they saw before them, they wanted to take all the credit for the sight themselves (Ibid., Homily 2, 57–58.).

But one can also see this in select modern interpretations of the 9th century Jewish Philosopher, Saadia Gaon. Julius Guttman writes: “According to him, the Jewish religion revealed by God, is radically different from all other religions which are merely the work of men and thus falsely claim divine origin. However, the content of this truly divine revelation is identical in Saadia’s eyes with the content of reason. Negatively, this means that there is no contradiction between the two spheres; positively, it signifies that reason is capable of reaching through its own powers the content of divine truth. This holds equally for the theoretical as well as the moral contents of revelation. Both fundamental metaphysical truth and the moral demands of revelation are evident to our unaided reason” (Philosophies of Judaism, 62–63). And later Guttman refers to this as the pedagogic value of revelation: “This view raises the almost inevitable question: What is the purpose of revelation of truths, if reason can apprehend them through its own powers? In reply, Saadia propounded the idea of the pedagogic value of revelation” (Ibid., 62). In a more recent work Raphael Jospe (2009) expresses a similar sentiment about Saadia’s view of revelation: “What
desire, or mental capacity to reach what is, in principle, naturally knowable. But for those with a sufficiently philosophical spirit and the luxury of time and talent, these truths can be pursued, rather than just accepted. They are known in an evident and natural way. Thus, Aristotle’s description of metaphysics as theology in book VI of the *Metaphysics* is representative and exhaustive of “theological knowledge,” and we can conclude that any category of theological knowledge distinct from metaphysics is unnecessary. ⁸

There are, however, many places that Augustine complicates such an easy and harmonious picture. In an important passage from *De Trinitate* XIV, c. 1, which we will encounter again and again in the following pages, he comments on another biblical distinction between those with the gift of knowledge (*scientia*) and those with the gift of wisdom (*sapientia*), both of which are distinguished from faith. Here the notion of “science” is added to that of “wisdom,” and we are left to wonder whether the “mountains” exchange faith for this “science” as well. Furthermore, recalling to mind the exceptional status of the “mountain,” he focuses on the fact that “many of the faithful are not strong in this science,” but only certain people possess this science where faith is defended against the impious, and the pious are assisted in their belief. ⁹ The ability “to
defend” is one of the key identifying marks of those who have reached this epistemic level, but what it means “to defend” and what a person must “know” in order to be able to defend will be one of the central questions that this study follows in the late scholastic debates.

Critical here as well is the sense in which the “science” relates to “faith.” Does the person with this science no longer need faith because he understands what the faithful only believe? It is possible to read Augustine this way. But it is also possible to emphasize the supportive and derivative role that “science” occupies in this passage; in this case, it is as if faith is the central and pinnacle achievement, and “science” is important only to the degree that it helps others and even the practitioner to acquire and hold on to faith. In this sense, the “knower” never surpasses faith nor ceases to rely on it. The “science” Augustine speaks of represents a kind of “theological knowledge” that cannot be easily absorbed into Aristotle’s theologico-metaphysics. But it also claims an identity distinct from mere faith. Thus, we have reached a nebulous place between faith and science, the exact nature of which is not easily described.

For the scholastic thinkers of the Middle Ages, this difficult task of description was not one that could be avoided. The re-introduction of Aristotle bequeathed to these thinkers the unique historical responsibility of defining the faculties and departments that would forever shape the modern academy. Articulating whether and how theology should be recognized as a genuine epistemological achievement, worthy of teaching, study, and assisted in this and how the attacks of the ungodly upon it are to be met, and it is this that the apostle seems to call by the proper name of knowledge (scientia)” (trans. Hill, 371).
dedicated intellectual labor was not just a speculative exercise, but a practical necessity for those who wanted to find a place for this unique activity in the university.

III. A Perennial Problem and a Historical Peak

Given this unique historical responsibility and the “non-secular age” in which scholasticism worked, I suggest that the question of the identity of theological knowledge reached a frenetic peak in this period. To be sure, this is a perennial problem endemic to all revealed religions that have philosophical aspirations (captured in the mantra “faith seeking understanding”). It is a question that continues to take center stage in the contemporary dialog between theology and philosophy, Christian philosophy and secular philosophy, theology and prologomena to theology. But the deep seeds of this remote discussion have a history that began in the Middle Ages. This historical debt is easily seen when, despite the fact that has much has changed, Barth continues to consider in his

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10 One might think of Heidegger’s essay “Phenomenology and Theology” who in his own way discusses the perennial tension we are interested in. Consider for example the opening lines of the essay: “The popular understanding of the relationship between theology and philosophy is fond of opposing faith and knowledge, revelation and reason. Philosophy is that interpretation of the world and of life that is removed from revelation and free from faith. Theology, on the other hand, is the expression of a credal understanding of the world and life – in our case a Christian understanding. Taken as such, philosophy and theology give expression to a tension and struggle between two world views. We, however, see the problem of the relationship differently from the very start. It is for us rather a question about the relationship of two sciences” (“Phenomenology and Theology,” 40).

Karl Barth’s own warning about the ease with which theology can become philosophy is also apropos: He writes “and certainly the introduction of critical reflection which distinguishes dogmatics from proclamation does not mean that a higher norm of knowledge is substituted for the norm of proclamation. Naturally there is the constant threat here that some philosophy will rush in and then raise the claim in concreto that it represents this higher source of knowledge. For whence can this critically reflective thought find its style and norm except in human reason and therefore in concreto in philosophy? Here, then, we always need the insight that critically reflective thought, even though it be that of human reason, and no matter what philosophical tints it has, must still be set in relation to the theme of the Church’s proclamation, and its education must be governed, not by its human origin and nature, but by its divine object.” Barth then goes on to cite the famous dictum of Anselm “credo ut intelligam” in order to emphasize that this phrase “does not imply transition from faith to another genus” (Barth, Church Dogmatics I.1, sect. 3, 2, (Bromily, p. 81).
own prologue to the *Church Dogmatics* whether theology is a science?\textsuperscript{11} The concern remains: what is the labor of theology actually achieving in epistemic terms, and how should these results be regarded by other disciplines that make both complimentary and contradictory epistemic claims?

This historical debt invites us to investigate the roots of a now 700-year-old conversation in a serious way. However a serious investigation must really be a collection of serious *investigations* because the conversation is too diverse and too complex to be captured from one single vantage point.\textsuperscript{12} The present study adds to this collection of serious *investigations* by looking at one thread of this historical discussion that for several reasons has not be fully investigated or exhausted.

**IV. Gregory of Rimini**

The thread in question is the interconnected series of question about the nature of “theological knowledge” found in and informing the work of Gregory of Rimini, a theologian and philosopher working in the mid-fourteenth century. More specifically, this means tracking and assessing the historical conversation that eventually informs the quite influential position taken by Gregory of Rimini on the nature of knowledge *between faith and science*. But why consider Gregory of Rimini in particular? To answer this question we need to know something of his biography.

\textsuperscript{11} See all of *Church Dogmatics* I.1 sect. 1, 1 “The Church, Theology, Science,” but consider for example: "Theology as a science, in distinction from theology of the simple testimony of faith and life and the theology of the service of God, is a measure taken by the Church in relation to the vulnerability and responsibility of its utterance" (Bromily, p. 2) (emphasis mine).

While the end of Rimini’s life and his death in 1358 is rather well established by historians, uncertainty continues to linger regarding his earliest years. It is customary now to cite his birth year as around 1300. However, according to one tradition traceable back to at least 1703, Gregory was 80 years old when he died.\(^\text{13}\) Given the firm and undisputed date of his death in 1358, this would put his birth year at 1278. As Leo Davis relates, this tradition goes further to assert that Rimini was studying and teaching at Paris from 1303 to 1308.\(^\text{14}\) The almost perfect alignment with the Parisian tenure of John Duns Scotus and the absence of any other corroborating evidence make these dates highly suspicious. More than likely these dates are the product of some scholar’s wishful thinking, who hoped to emphasize and contrast Rimini’s later association with the *moderni* with an early training in the *via antiqua* of Scotus.\(^\text{15}\)

In contrast to the speculation of tradition, we do have some hard evidence, which, while failing to give us a precise birth date, does provide us with a more convincing account of Rimini’s early education and eventual elevation to the rank of *magister*. In the *Chartularium* of the University of Paris prepared by Denifle, a letter is included from Pope Clement VI. It is addressed to the Chancellor of the Church of Paris (often referred to as the Chancellor of the University because of his power of granting licenses)\(^\text{16}\) and

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\(^{13}\) For an overview of this story and its sources see Davis, “Man, Intellect and Will in the Writings of Gregory of Rimini,” 49.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 49.

\(^{15}\) Davis writes: “This chronology of Gregory’s early life would situate his formative years at the University of Paris in the milieu of the *via antiqua* of Scotus. Only in his mature years would he have been exposed to the teaching of Ockham who was *Sententiarior* at Oxford from 1317-1319” (Ibid., 49).

\(^{16}\) Cf. Lewry, “Corporate Life in the University of Paris, 1249-1418, and the Ending of Schism.”
asks for the promotion of Rimini to the rank of “Master of Theology.” From this letter we learn that Rimini became a Master of Theology in 1345. But it also provides us with three further pieces of information. First it tells us of Rimini’s inaugural arrival at Paris, 22 years prior to his promotion, meaning Rimini first came to Paris in 1323. Second, it tells us that after six years – presumably 1329 – he left Paris and began to lecture throughout Italy: namely, at Bologna, Padua, and Perugia. Davis points us to a document from Bologna that confirms Rimini’s stay there until 1337. And Rimini must have gone to Padua and Perugia thereafter. Schabel adds an important hypothesis about this time for Rimini’s intellectual development. He says: “Almost certainly while in Italy, Rimini came into contact with theological works of Oxford Scholars from the 1320’s and 1330’s.” Here, he means, first and foremost, William of Ockham, but presumably this list includes Walter Chatton, Adam Wodeham, and Richard FitzRalph among others. This

17 Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 2:557, n. 1097. “Clemens VI ad cancellarium ecclesiae Paris., alias ejus vicegerentem, ut Gregorio de Arimino, Ordinis fratrum Eremitarum sancti Augustini, in sacra pagina baccalareo Parisiensi, qui, jam sunt xxii anni elapsi, in studio laboravit, sex videlicet annos continuos Parisiis, ac postmodum inde ad natale solum rediens Bononiae, Paduae et Perusi cathedram tenuit principalem, et jam sunt anni quattuor, quod ad legendas Sententias redidit Parisios, quorum lecturam ibidem commendabiliter consummavit, consideratione Gocii tituli Sanctae Priscae presbyteri cardinalis pro eodem Gregorio supplicantis, si ipsum per magistrorum studii Paris. in dicta scientia testimonium ad hoc sufficientem esse repercrir, infra unius mensis spatium magistrale cathedram et honorem ac docendi licentiam concedat in scientia memorata, ipsumque ad omnes gratias ab olim illis concessas ibidem, qui consueverunt haec ritus in rigorosis expeditionibus magistrari, prout moris est, admittat. Datum Avinione ij id. Januarii, anno tertio, ‘viri sacrae religionis’.” / “Clement VI, to the chancellor of the Church of Paris, otherwise his deputy, in order that Gregory of Rimini, of the order of hermits of St. Augustine, Parisian bachelor in Sacred Pages, who for now 22 years, has labored in study, for six years he continued at Pars, after that, returning to the place of his birth, he held the principle seat at Bologna, Padua, and Perugia. And now it has been four years since returning to Paris to read the Sentences…”

18 “…jam sunt xxii anni elapsi in studio laboravit…” (CUP II:557, n. 1097).


encounter must be noted because, as we will see, understanding the extent of English influence on Rimini has been one of the dominant preoccupations of modern studies of Rimini. Third, the letter from Pope Clement VI suggests that Rimini returned to Paris four years prior to his promotion or 1341.\textsuperscript{22} At this point some disagreement persists about whether Rimini gave his lectures in the academic year of 1342-1343 or 1343-1344. Evidence of Clement’s letter suggests that Rimini arrived in 1341. The regulations for Augustinian hermits stipulate that a student should spend one year as *Sententiarus dispositus ad legendum*.\textsuperscript{23} And it follows that Gregory would have spent the academic year of 1341-1342, preparing his lectures, before becoming *baculareus actu legens* in 1342-1343 and then spent 1343-1344 as *baculareus formatus* while he waited for the letter of promotion that would come from Pope Clement VI in the first month of 1345. This chronology is complicated by the fact that in several of the manuscripts of Gregory’s commentary — “perhaps 50,” says Damasus Trapp — the date line reads: “Gregorii qui legit Parisius A. D. 1344” giving the impression that Gregory gave his lectures in the academic year of 1343-1344.\textsuperscript{24}

Trapp has an explication for this, which preserves the fairly straightforward chronology. He writes:

The all too common date line ‘AD 1344’ should always be read as: ‘... Gregorii qui legit Parisius ·AD 1344·’... Arabic numbers according to good MSS of the time were to be set off by dots or periods (·1344·). If we

\textsuperscript{22} “…et jam sunt anni quatuor, quod ad legendas Sententias rediit Parisios...” (CUP II:557, n. 1097)
\textsuperscript{23} Ypma, “Le Mare Magnum,” 275–321 passim. For some direct references to *dispositus ad legendum* cf. 300, 313; for *baculareus actu legens* cf. 285, 300, 303, 306, 307, 309, 310; for *baculareus formatus* cf. 285, 294, 300, 309, 310, 315.
thus set them off (·1344·) – as many MSS do – the meaning of that so very common date line need not be absolutely that Gregory ‘legit anno 1344’ but may as well be that Gregory who was a Parisian Doctor was already in a clean MS-edition, with clean Tabulae even, at such an early date as 1344 while many other Parisian Doctors never got a clean Paris edition.”

Without mentioning Trapp’s proposed solution, Chris Schabel more recently offered a different suggestion. Referring to the “four years” mentioned in Pope Clement’s letter, from which we derive our certainty that Rimini arrived at Paris in 1341 and not 1342, Schabel writes: “but perhaps the “four years” refers to the date of his order’s General Chapter of Montpellier, 1341, which may have been the occasion when Gregory was assigned to return to Paris.”

From this suggestion, he goes further to identify this as the “prevailing” view—namely that Rimini arrived to prepare for his lectures in 1342 and gave his lectures in 1343-1344. However, he acknowledges that a degree of uncertainty still remains.

After his promotion to the rank of Magister in 1345, Rimini’s life is fairly well documented. In 1351 Rimini was named Regent Master of the Augustinians at Basle. At this time, Rimini made significant revisions to his lectures. In 1356 he was promoted to vicar general of his order, and in 1357 he became prior general succeeding Thomas of Strasbourg. Rimini’s stint as prior general was, of course, short as he died in the following year.

This biographical picture is an important place to begin since it points us toward the unique place that Rimini occupies in the mid-fourteenth century. Schabel correctly

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25 Schabel, “Gregory of Rimini.”
26 Cf. Davis, “Man, Intellect and Will in the Writings of Gregory of Rimini,” 53.
points out, “Rimini was the first Parisian theologian to make extensive use of a number of Oxford works from the 1320’s and 1330’s.” William Courtenay confirms that Rimini does indeed occupy a unique moment in the history of fourteenth-century thought, when, remarking about the new edition of Rimini’s text, he says: “[it is a] key work for understanding the reception of Ockham at Paris and the development of nominalism as well as Augustinianism on the Continent.” And later Schabel says: “What is certain is that Rimini marks the merging of the Oxford and Parisian traditions, and, therefore, opens a new era in Parisian theology.” It is the quality and character of this “newness” that interests us in this study. In what way is his thought new? From what does it depart? We are especially drawn to this question of newness because it has remained such a stubborn question for so long. The remarks of Courtenay surely provide us with an initial orientation with respect to these questions: the character of “newness” has to do with the emergence of something recognizable as “Ockhamist” or “Nominalist.”

While acknowledging that Rimini opens a “new era,” Schabel also contends that the numerous citations of Oxford sources in Rimini’s work “has tended to obscure his debt to the Parisian context.” Thus, the past with which this newness must contend is the established Parisian and Augustinian traditions. And in many ways Rimini is as important for being a kind of culmination of the Augustinian-Parisian tradition as he is for any departure. (This, at least, is one of the things this study would contend.)

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29 Courtenay, “Late Medieval Nominalism Revisited,” 159.
30 Schabel, Theology at Paris, 265.
31 We will, however, question these labels momentarily.
In his groundbreaking, but now dated history of the Middle Ages, Etienne Gilson acknowledges the influence of Ockham, but then goes on to remark on the extraordinary position Augustine occupied in Rimini’s consciousness. He writes:

[Rimini’s] work therefore raises the curious problem of possible collusions between nominalism and a certain Augustinianism. There may have been secret communications between them (Durand, the *ficta* of Ockham). At any rate, it is worthy of note that Gregory should have been able to confirm by so many quotations from Augustine some theses one would otherwise feel tempted to explain by the spreading influence of Ockham.33

And in his 1981 dissertation, Leo Davis points out that the question so well phrased by Gilson continues to linger. He writes:

Although we have learned a great deal about Gregory of Rimini in the last few years, one of the basic problems posed by Gilson remains unanswered: ‘Whether he is an Ockhamist hiding behind Augustine, or an Augustinian making the best of certain Ockhamist conclusions, we know him too little to decide’.”34

Gilson, Davis, Courtenay, and Schabel are only four witnesses out of many who simultaneously recognize Rimini as a critical figure of the fourteenth century. Yet they have been perplexed about how to account for him. This is not for a lack of trying; several studies (though few in English)35 have attempted to get at the heart of Rimini’s thought and to unmask him as either an Augustinian or Ockhamist. At the present, no recognizable consensus has emerged, and this fact suggests that it may be time for a new approach.

35 We must acknowledge the English monograph by Gordon Leff (*Gregory of Rimini*). But this monograph has been routinely criticized, see: Foster, “Review of Leff’s Gregory of Rimini” and Trapp, “New Approaches to Gregory of Rimini.”
V. Exchanging a “School” for a “Toolbox”

The above quotation from Gilson, cited by Davis, is noteworthy because it contains a latent assumption that has plagued modern studies of Rimini for some time. While attempting to understand this transitional figure, Gilson assumes a kind of antagonism between a conception of Augustinianism and the new “nominalist” doctrine or school of Ockham. Thus, we must assume that there is something duplicitous about Gregory of Rimini. He must either be a disciple of Ockham and member of a “nominalist” school who, despite being a wolf, is still cloaking himself in the sheep’s clothing of Augustine in order to save face amongst his co-religionists. Or he really is an Augustinian who remains true to the tradition of his order while trying to salvage what he can from Ockham. Gilson is right that “we know him too little.” But, in getting to know him, this dissertation wonders if we have been given a false choice.

Underlying the false choice that Gilson give us is the assumption that there was a distinct and identifiable philosophical system called “nominalism” in the fourteenth century and that this system defined a clear “school of nominalism” composed of adherents to the fundamental tenets of the “nominalist system.”36 The traditional narrative espoused by Gileson assumes that, as a system, its adherents are all committed to the same ideological positions in philosophy, theology, and politics: positions built on

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36 Courtenay singles out this assumption about a “nominalist system” and “school of nominalism” as one of the dominant characteristics of the old master narrative (or “traditional interpretation”) of the Middle Ages formed in the early 20th century and still influencing contemporary view of the Middle Ages. He writes: “…The description, however, purported to be an accurate picture of the full implications of the nominalist system that was developed in the early fourteenth century and continued as a major intellectual force into the sixteenth century. Nominalism was not, in the traditional interpretation, simply a system of thought. It was a school that had its own peculiar historical development…” (Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 29–30).
Courtenay describes the key characteristics of this so-called school in the following way:

The picture of nominalism had been fashioned over several centuries and was a composite based more on the late medieval nominalists than upon their twelfth-century counterparts. A particular body of ideas, all interrelated and mutually reinforced, contributed to the definition of nominalism. These recurrent ideas or themes that together compose the traditional view of nominalism are: (1) atomism, particularism, or individualism; (2) excessive stress on the omnipotence of god; (3) voluntarism; (4) skepticism; and (5) fideism. These themes reappeared in different ways and in different groupings as various areas of nominalist thought were explained.  

Particularly relevant to our concern with the nature of theological knowledge and the relationship between faith and reason is the supposed impact that nominalism had on metaphysics and natural theology. It was supposed that nominalism’s concern with direct sensory experience and its distrust in the certainty of the principle of causality led to the diminishment of metaphysical speculation. This, in turn, led to an increasing contraction of natural theology and this “brought about a separation of faith and reason that could only be bridged by fideism, a blind trust in the authority of the church.”  

With respect to Rimini, whom the narrative certainly counted among the members of the nominalist school, it suggests that the character of Rimini’s thought—especially on the nature of theology, its method, and the use of probable and demonstrative arguments—can be predicted according to the characteristics of this school. Further, it

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37 Ibid., 27. See also note 4 on page 27, as Courtenay gives a rather substantial list of early 20th century writers that stand as witnesses to this “traditional narrative.”

38 Ibid., 29.
suggests that the positions he takes are a direct result of his reading of Ockham, Wodeham, and other close English disciples of Ockham.

The last 50-plus years of scholarship have made this old narrative untenable, despite the fact the it continues hold sway in the larger academy. As early as 1974 Courtenay wrote boldly and confidently: “It is already becoming apparent that the term ‘nominalism’, as a description of the thought of Ockham, Buridan, Rimini, D’Ailly, Biel, and other late medieval thinkers, is no longer as appropriate as it once seemed.” Courtenay surveys several convincing reasons. But one especially strong strike against this label is the fact the term itself is an anachronism.

To quote Courtenay: “It is not surprising, therefore, to learn that none of Ockham’s contemporaries ever called him a nominalist . . . By 1270 these labels had ceased to be used and were only reintroduced in the fifteenth century (possible associated with the revival of Albertism and Thomism) to describe a position in logic or, more accurately, a way of teaching logic.”

This anachronism is particularly stark and well-documented in application to Gregory of Rimini. The label of “nominalist” was applied to Rimini relatively early in the history of historiography. Franz Ehrle, in his work Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia (1925) cites approvingly a title given to Rimini by a sixteenth-century

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39 What Courtenay wrote in 1974 does not seem to me (someone first introduced to medieval philosophy at the turn of the 21st century) to be too far off today: “The changing evaluation of nominalism and late medieval thought that has been taking place since about 1930 has not made the impact it deserves.....” (Ibid., 32). The continued relevance of this quotation also seems confirmed by the fact that Courtenay has continually felt the need to write papers like this 1974 piece. Consider for example his 2007 Aquinas lecture: Changing Approaches to Fourteenth-Century Thought.
40 Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 51-52.
41 Ibid., 52.
historian, Johannes Thurmayr of Abensbert (Aventinus). Aventinus names Rimini as the *antesignanus nominalistarum*, that is, “standard bearer” or “leader of the nominalists.” Ehrle’s repetition of this designation set a modern precedent of understanding Rimini as a nominalist and a mere vehicle of transmission of English thought to the Paris in the second half of the fourteenth century. In his article “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century” (1956), Trapp raised severe questions about the value of these labels to understand the associations and divisions of the fourteenth century. In fact, he claimed that the sixteenth-century designation by Aventinus may actually have things completely backward. With respect to Rimini, he relates the story of an exchange of letters in 1346-1348 between Pope Clement VI (the same pope that urged the promotion of Rimini in 1345) and Peter Ceffons concerning issues surrounding the condemnations of errors in 1347. The Pope’s letter to Peter described his concern with the excessive *subtilitas* of certain radical thinkers (named by Trapp as Autrecourt, Mirecourt, Ulcredus, and Aston). The Pope’s concern was about the neglect of the Bible and the Church Fathers by these thinkers. Peter Ceffons

43 Regarding the anachronism embedded in this label Trapp explains that the polemic of Antiqui and Moderni was initially a dispute about *cognitio universalis* and its manner of achievement. But this dispute quickly came to signify and encompass more than a simple disagreement about the finer points of psychology and any particular philosophy of the mind. The earliest history of this contentious debate was eventually written in the 15th century by the victors, which happened to be the Antiqui. He writes: “Once the contention had started it reached a high degree of bitterness like all controversies in which both parties happen to be right. The Antiqui won the victory and wrote the history of this quarrel, but the ‘victory of truth’ alas is not always the ‘victory of truth’” (Ibid., 186.). And elsewhere he writes: “In the course of time the bill of indictment against the 14th century was changed and lengthened as many points as there are letters in the world nominalism but having to do as little with the original indictment as the 10 letters of the world nominalism have with the issue of nominalism” (168).
44 Ibid., 187.
repeatedly interprets this as a condemnation against *subtilitas*, which, in his view, were vital for the advancement of the goals of France.\(^{45}\)

The importance of all this for our picture of Rimini is that, as Trapp states, within the context of this controversy, Peter Ceffons showed enduring and visceral animosity toward those who opposed him. At one point in expressing his displeasure, he names Gregory in connection with those “heresy hunters” bringing accusations against John of Mirecourt. Here the broad label of “nominalism” fails us and obstructs a genuine understanding of what was happening in the fourteenth century. Trapp summarizes:

> This is a surprising development. He who for centuries has been called the *antesignanus nominalistarum*, the standard bearer of the nominalists, may eventually be the standard bearer of the anti-nominalists, the promoter of those condemnations which fell upon the Modernists among the Moderns. The legend of Gregory will have to be reexamined with these new facts and on the basis of the Gregorian texts, now available to every medievalist.\(^{46}\)

Beyond the anachronistic nature of the label, a second strike against the idea of a fourteenth-century “nominalist school” is the inability to identify true adherents. Courtenay traces the recognition of this problem to the earlier attempts to revise the traditional narrative. The early attempts at revision looked closer at the fourteenth century, and, upon finding a number of anomalies, attempted to correct the narrative by one of two strategies. Some remained committed to the original description of “nominalism” as a comprehensive school and began reducing the number of members of

\(^{45}\) Trapp writes: “That *subtilitas* was the main issue of the condemnations is said again and again by Peter Ceffons…Whereas the Pope affirms that neglect of Bible and Fathers produces disputations which are of no practical value in civilian life or in the military camp (we are in the midst of the 100-Years War) Ceffons stresses the importance of *subtilitas* and sciences and literature for the knighthood of France and its glory and opulence” (Ibid., 187–188).

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 188.
the school as more and more anomalies were found. But as Courtenay points out, as more and more research is done and fewer and fewer people fit the pre-defined doctrines of this school, it becomes possible that there may be a major medieval school “in which we cannot place any important late medieval thinker.” The other strategy was to be willing to “take the term ‘nominalism’ as a neutral term that simply describes the thought of William of Ockham and his followers….” While this strategy identifies a reference point to which we can consistently refer for the meaning of the label “nominalism,” it also becomes so flexible and changeable that it “runs the risk of being redefined with every new study.”

With these continuing obstacles, Courtenay points us to new perspectives. In particular he points to the conservative restrain of E. A. Moody and his article “Buridan a Dilemma of Nominalism.” This article offers us some helpful ways to think about the common features recognized by the traditional narrative as “nominalism,” while completely rejecting the idea of “nominalism” as a fourteenth-century “school” or systematic world-view. And Moody identifies the central meaning of Buridan’s “nominalism” by saying:

The only entities signified or consignified by a term are individual or singular things; connotation is construed extensionally, not intensionally.

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47 Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 32. “There are those, first of all, who have accepted the traditional view or definition of nominalism and, upon discovering that a theologian traditionally regarded as a nominalist (for example, Ockham or Gregory of Rimini) does not maintain that system or the particular aspect of it under consideration, have removed that theologian from the ranks of the nominalists.”
48 Ibid., 34.
49 Ibid., 33. “...Upon discovering that Ockham and other ‘nominalists’ did not maintain the positions once attributed to them, they proceeded to redefine the term ‘nominalism’ along the lines of a more accurate description of the thought of Ockham or Biel.”
50 Ibid., 34.
This is indeed the thesis of nominalism, as a thesis of the philosophy of language; that all cognitively significant statements can be analyzed, or paraphrased, in a purely extensional language whose sole domain of reference is the domain of concrete singulars.51

Courtenay summarizes: Moody sees the phenomenon known as nominalism as "essentially the application of logical analysis to philosophical and theological problems in such a way that they became problems about 'the meaning and reference of terms and the truth conditions of sentences'."52 Courtenay’s own conclusion is something similar. He acknowledges a kind of unity between figures traditionally recognized as nominalist, but he thinks the idea of “school” or systematic world-view should be abandoned. “Ockhamism,” he says, “seems to be the least undesirable term.” And, nominalism, he says, “[it] should perhaps be left to the realm of logic, where it was subscribed to by many moderni who otherwise have little in common.”53 The notion of having “little else in common” is what I want to emphasize here, as it acknowledges similarities, while completely destroying the idea of a school where students partake of a common and predictable world-view.

The ultimate payoff of the kind of view taken by Moody and Courtenay is the further recognition that the label “Nominalism” or “Ockhamism” — even when rightly applied to a thinker’s logical-semantic methodology — is not a good predictor of the larger positions and commitments that a given thinker will take. This fact by itself can make sense of much of the confusion that dominates fourteenth-century research. In looking for schools and allegiances, the assumption is that those adopting “Ockhamist”

51 Moody, “Buridan and a Dilemma of Nominalism,” 582.
53 Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 53.
logico-semantical methodology must also be united in their positions about the nature of metaphysics, the interaction between faith and reason, and subject matter and purpose of theology. A large part of this dissertation focuses on showing that this is not the case. While Gregory adopts many “tools” that could be labeled “nominalist” or “Ockhamist,” these commitments do not demand that Rimini’s views on theological knowledge are a direct consequence of these other commitments.

In summary, the assumption we reject is that the constellation of doctrines associated with late-medieval nominalism really do function as a foundation upon which all theological, ethical, and philosophical edifices will be erected. To accept this assumption is to get the impressions that every thinker begins from only one commitment, to nominalism or its opposing counterpart, and then spends the rest of her time merely deducing the consequences that follow. This view ignores the fact that a given thinker may have a number of principled positions and that not every position or commitment can be seen as a consequence of one core philosophical commitment (or in this case it is better to say: one core logical-methodological commitment).

The assumption that nominalism can function as a foundation in this way has led to all sorts of problems and anomalies for fourteenth-century research – similar to the way wandering planets were a source of perennial frustration for the Ptolemaic system. We can hear this frustration in Courtenay’s plea for us to treat thinkers of the fourteenth century as individual thinkers rather than as members of distinct identifiable philosophical schools. He writes:
Perhaps the most significant feature of present research for future work is the growing realization of the independence of fourteenth-century thinkers and the difficulty of speaking about school traditions, even of Ockhamists and nominalists, between 1320 and 1400. The same constellation of ideas and values, perceptions and approaches, can only rarely be found in any two masters. Fourteenth-century logicians, natural philosophers, and theologians must be looked at individually, not as members of schools of thought. This means that for the moment at least, the nominalism of the fourteenth century, if we are to really understand it, must be studied nominalistically.\(^{54}\)

The disconnect between certain “Ockhamist” positions held in common and the diverse (often conflicting) positive philosophical and theological positions held by these same thinkers should cause us to rethink the traditional model of viewing nominalism as the sole foundation upon which a body of doctrines is erected. The diversity of opinions among thinkers we once thought were united in a single school now functions as a set of disturbing anomalies, similar in kind to those which prompted Copernicus to opt for radical paradigm shift. It is possible that fourteenth-century scholarship needs its own paradigm shift.

To stretch the analogy further, we can ask: what if, with Moody, we ceased to see fourteenth-century “Ockhamism” or “nominalism” as a comprehensive world-view, but rather as a distinct set of tools? Then it might become possible to see diverse groups of people sharing the same toolbox, while setting unique foundations, following opposed visions, and constructing wildly diverse buildings. Likewise, it is possible to imagine thinkers who are working with radically different sets of tools, who are nevertheless trying to shape similar foundations and similar buildings. Undoubtedly the kinds of tools

\(^{54}\) Courtenay, “Late Medieval Nominalism Revisited,” 164.

This dissertation does not set aside the notion of “schools” or “traditions” completely. Rather, it primarily sets aside the idea of a fourteenth-century nominalist school, and believes this adjustment allows us to see new alignment and allegiances that were previously obscured.
one uses may often shape the kinds of buildings that are possible. Different tools open up different possibilities. Nevertheless, the vision underlying two thinkers’ attempts to build may be a shared vision, despite the fact that they are working with different toolboxes. We continually run the risk of overlooking this shared vision by focusing on the doctrines of nominalism and realism as mutually exclusive foundations, which remove, from the outset, the possibility of shared visions and inspiration. In the case of Gregory of Rimini, this dissertation is particular interested in understanding the sources of Rimini’s overall understanding and vision of theological knowledge. Understanding “Ockhamism” as a toolbox means that even though Rimini is drawing from a similar tool box to the one Ockham and Wodeham used, he could still be pursuing a vision of theological knowledge significantly different form the vision of Ockham.

In the rest of this dissertation I first follow Courtenay’s injunction of treating fourteenth-century thinkers “nominalistically,” by paying attention to the positive position of Gregory of Rimini on the subject of theological knowledge – its subject matter, its purpose, its method, and its epistemic status. Here I resist the temptation to constantly trace this position back to a nominalist foundation. Instead, my first and primary goal is to identify the distinct vision of theological knowledge that Rimini articulates. I assess the character of this vision and determine to what degree this vision mirrors that of his earlier co-religionists and to what extent it lies in harmony with the position of theological knowledge taken by Ockham and other influential Franciscans. As a secondary and derivative goal, I call attention to when and how Rimini uses a distinct set of tools to defend and articulate this vision against others. Some of the tools he uses
will be clearly “Ockhamist” in character. But we will also notice some distinctively “Ockhamist” tools that Rimini consciously sets aside and some that appear to be simply inconsequential and not well suited for the matter at hand.

Such an approach helps open avenues of connection that were previously closed.55 Instead of frequently attempting to point out how Rimini follows Ockham and

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55 Below is a summary of Trapp’s attempt to re-describe the landscape of the fourteenth century without the traditional label of “nominalism” or a “nominalist school.” At one point Trapp states this goal plainly: “In the fore-going sketch I have tried to master the confusion of the 14th century with a terminology which purposely disregards the traditional cliché of ‘nominalism’” (“Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century,” 152). He writes: “I would like to call the 13th century the great century of speculation, the 14th century of criticism, a criticism moving along two lines, the historicico-critical and the logico-critical” (p. 147). Trapp envisions that we will get a better handle on the complexities and dynamics of the 14th century if we think of its development and disputes along these two different lines. Some thinkers represent a historicico-critical approach to the achievements of the previous century, while others exercise their penchant for criticism in logic. Trapp’s thesis is apropos to our discussion of Rimini because he believes Rimini falls into the line of historicico-criticism and further believes the identification of this outlook to be an effective way to understand many of Rimini’s motivations and alignment with the other names that populate the fourteenth century. He states:

“As far as the Augustinian theologians of the 14th century are concerned they are to be classified as representatives of the historicico-critical attitude. All quote Augustine and early scholastics very carefully, contemporary scholastics at least according to the level of the scholarship of their day. The Augustinians share their love for St. Augustine with many outsiders on the continent and in England. Significantly none of the Augustinians can be called an extremist of the logico-critical attitude” (p. 150-151).

In Trapp’s narrative of the Augustinian historicico-critical attitude includes Rimini as a representative example of this historicico-critical school. Rimini is a good example of attention to faithful quotation habits and rigor in the interpretation of Church Fathers. From this perspective the critical shift often associated with Rimini from the Aegidian-Augustiniansim to the Schola Augustinian Moderna is rather obscured. Such a distinction was in many ways based about the labels of nominalism and moderni that Trapp has thrown into suspicion.

Nevertheless, it still seems permissible to ask if Trapp’s perspective is sufficient. After all, we must recognize that the Augustinian thinkers in question still took positive positions. Yes, there is good evidence that they were quite concerned with the accuracy of citation and with faithful interpretations of the Church Fathers. However, their respective commentaries undoubtedly wanted to put their historicico-critical approach in service of something. They were not just archivist or bibliophiles. Their historical knowledge was put in service of their profession as theologians. And as such they had things to say. Trapp’s thesis, therefore, is of definite help in understanding a certain attitude shared among select fourteenth-century thinkers, but it still tells us very little about their theological and philosophical positions. Taking these positions as our starting point, it is conceivable that we could draw very different lines of unity between fourteenth-century thinkers. For example: certain intellectuals might share methodological predilections, while being opposed on a given issue of doctrine. Likewise, two thinkers with very different methodological goals may have many doctrinal commonalities. If we may broach a contemporary example: many thinkers within the field of analytic philosophy may share much in common with those trained in a continental department. At the same time many people within the same continental training may often find themselves ideologically opposed. In short there is nothing to prevent agreement and disagreement from existing among the very same thinkers. The only way to really understand fourteenth-century thinkers from
how his positions are an expression of an Ockhamist foundation, we are freed to show how often Rimini differs from Ockham, even as he employs many Ockhamist ideas and tools. On the old model of nominalism as a foundational world-view, such simultaneous agreement and disagreement would have been incredibly perplexing. But, by envisioning Ockhamist ideas as tools employed by Rimini in service of his own vision, the perplexity vanishes. In a similar manner, such an approach allows us to note commonalities and shared visions between thinkers using quite distinct sets of tools. Most notably, we will be freed to note common visions between Giles of Rome and Gregory of Rimini, which were previously obscured by scholarship’s penchant to separate the two along realist and nominalist lines. This is not to say that Giles and Gregory will never disagree. Their vision of the theological project may differ. Likewise, the tools they use will undoubtedly have an effect on how they view and describe things, even if they do in fact claim a common vision. However, as this dissertation shows, it can no longer be taken for granted that, since the Augustinian Giles of Rome is pre-Ockham and Rimini adopts many of the core positions of Ockham, in all matters Rimini must be a friend of Ockham and a foe of Giles. As we will see, with respect to theology and the nature of theological knowledge, it may very well be the other way around.

VI. A Glimpse inside an Ockhamist Toolbox

If, then, it is prudent to set aside the label of “nominalism” as a distinctive school, we still need to identify, as a working hypothesis, what is distinctive about the tools one
finds in an Ockhamist tool box, particularly as they inform or relate to Rimini’s discussion of theology and the precise nature of theological knowledge. We expect to see Rimini employing these logical, semantic, and ontological tools in a manner that distinguishes him from his Augustinian predecessors. However, to reiterate, what is at issue in this dissertation is whether these tools force him to move in opposing directions on other issues or whether these tools are flexible enough to be used in the constructions of disparate and competing world views.

[1] Perhaps the primary and most infamous feature of an Ockhamist tool box is Ockham’s rejection of universal extra-mental entities. In the prologue of Rimini this is not a tool that appears particularly important for his discussion of theological knowledge and methodology. Thus, for us, it will remain a background concern.

[2] Another feature, which must clearly be separated from the position of universals, is a commitment to intuitive knowledge as direct trustworthy access to things. This must be separated from the position on universals since both Scotus and Ockham acknowledge the possibility of intuitive knowledge, but are opposed when it comes to the issue of real universals. This tool and its accompanying trust in experience prove to be quite important for a discussion of science, the trustworthiness of knowledge, and the reasons for assent. In later chapters,\textsuperscript{56} we will look at the extent to which Rimini shares this commitment to intuitive knowledge and “indubitable experience” and its importance for both scientific and theological knowledge.

\textsuperscript{56} Consider for instance, “Interlude,” p. 308, n. 38.
[3] A critical Ockhamist tool and general shift in scholastic jargon lies in the definitional uses of “the object” and “subject” of a science. In chapters two and three we will have an opportunity to explore Rimini’s clear debt to Ockham. But once again, we will be attentive to how Rimini uses these technical definitions to shape his position on the explicit subject matter of the theological discipline.

[4] A fourth distinctively Ockhamist position, not shared by those who came before him, is his position that distinct sciences are really just aggregates of scientific habits. The uniqueness of this position will become clear when we consider how Ockham and Rimini’s views together diverge from past positions. Where this becomes especially relevant in Rimini’s prologue is where he deals with the practical and speculative nature of knowledge generally and theological conclusions specifically. As always we will be attentive to how his vision of theological knowledge determines his use of these labels and in turn how his understanding of practical and speculative partial habits shapes his views of the kind of knowledge theological conclusions produce.

[5] A fifth distinctive feature of Ockham’s thought shared by his pupil Adam Wodeham is a sharp distinction between apprehensive and judicative habits. In this case, it is not that thinkers before Ockham have refused to commit themselves to such a view, but rather that in Ockham’s prologue this is a distinctive and well used position. Further, it is a position frequently invoked by Adam Wodeham. In chapters six and seven, however, we will see that this is a tool Rimini refuses to pick up and use. A large burden of these chapters will, therefore, focus on what is at stake and what is motivating

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57 See chapter 2, p. 119 and chapter 3, p. 190.
58 See esp. c. 7, p. 318.
Rimini’s divergence from these two forerunners, with whom he holds many other tools in common.

For the purposes of this dissertation, we will let these features stand as five distinctive characteristics of something that Rimini could recognize as “Ockhamism.” Moreover, these are aspects of Ockham’s thought that Rimini in some way engages or at least touches upon in his prologue. One part of our task in this dissertation is to observe the manner of this agreement and engagement. A second is to discern how he uses these tools to provide a philosophical analysis of specifically theological knowledge, wherein he will sometimes agree with Ockham’s own analysis, but will more often go his own way.

VII. Thesis of this Study

Taking seriously William Courtenay’s suggestion to study the fourteenth century “nominalistically,” this study first and foremost makes a claim about what Gregory of Rimini believes theological knowledge is, who can have it, and how it is acquired. However, as we have seen, such a presentation of Gregory of Rimini’s positive doctrine cannot be without consequences for scholarship’s larger attempts to form a narrative about the character of Augustianism in the fourteenth century, the influence of Ockham on Rimini, and the character of scholasticism in the fourteenth century as a whole. Therefore, we consider these larger questions as peripheral satellites to our main thesis. Consequently, our official thesis consists of two distinct points of emphasis. The first pertains to what is distinctive about Rimini’s view about theology and theological
knowledge. The second pertains to the nature of Rimini’s debt to his Augustinian heritage and his use (or non-use) of Ockhamist tools.

To articulate both of these points of emphasis, some background clarification is necessary. In a contemporary work *Types of Christian Theology*, Hans Frei makes a fundamental division between two approaches to theology. 59 On the one hand, theology can be thought of as a “generally accessible subject matter, broadly based, both as a technical concept and as a wider cultural one.” 60 The ramification of this generally accessible field of study singled out by Frei is that “theology and philosophy are bound to be closely if perhaps oddly related.” 61 Philosophy may be involved in the discourse in diverse ways, but what is especially important to Frei is that on this view “the rules of correct thought are invariant and all-fields-encompassing. In the light of its foundational

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59 For Frei (and for us) these two types represent and exhaustive binary of the possible ways to approach the subject. All subsequent controversies and disagreements are about sub-divisions within these two main types.

In her review of contemporary academic theology, Katherine Tanner describes this kind of binary at work in the dominant competing schools of the 20th century (viz. the “Yale” and “Chicago” schools). She writes: “Around the time that *Modern Theology* came into existence in the early 1980s, the main worries of theologians in the United States were methodological in character: Could religious thought and language be intellectually justified? Did religious thought and language conform to common standards of meaning, intelligibility and truth? Or was it possible to argue—with an ironic display of academic rigor informed by the latest philosophy, literary theory, and social science—that they need not have to? Methodological preoccupations distinguished the main schools of thought in academic theology (the one associated with Yale, where I was a doctoral student, and the other with the University of Chicago, where I now teach), and established their complementary strengths and weakness. For example, compromise of Christian witness by conformity to the world’s standards was thought to be the danger of Chicago’s penchant for critical correlation and revisionism, following in the footsteps of Schleiermacher, Troeltsch, and Tillich; stubborn insistence on the irreducible particularity of Christian commitment at the possible cost of cultural irrelevance was thought to be the danger of Yale’s alignment with Karl Barth” (Tanner, “Shifts in Theology over the last quarter century,” 39–40).

61 Ibid., 20.
status, philosophy arbitrates what may at anytime and anywhere count as meaningful language, genuine thought, and real knowledge.”\(^{62}\)

We can get a better sense of what is distinctive about this conception of theology, by noting its contrast. On the other side, there is another conception of theology which does not claim a space within the hierarchy of other disciplines. Frei describes this as follows:

In the previous case [the first type mentioned above], the phrase *Christian theology* was used to give an instance of a general kind of undertaking—namely, a Christian instance. But now theology becomes an aspect of self-description of Christianity as a religion, rather than an instance of a general class. It is an inquiry into the internal logic of the Christian community’s language—the rules, largely implicit rather than explicit, that are exhibited in its use in worship and Christian life, as well as in the confessions of Christian belief. Theology, in other words, is the grammar of the religion, understood as a faith and as an ordered community life.\(^{63}\)

The first emphasis of the overarching thesis of this dissertation is that Gregory of Rimini champions a conception of Christian theology that has lot more in common with the latter conception of theology described by Frei than with the former. He sees theology as a discourse “internal”\(^{64}\) to a specific community of believers, and, as such, it can only be recognized as a kind of “knowledge” within that community. The second emphasis—and perhaps more controversial aspect of this thesis—is that Rimini’s proclivity toward a conception of theological knowledge as something particular to the practice of a religious community, which has little interest in defending its place amongst the other sciences, represents a continuation of the Aegidio-Augustinian tradition he inherits; at the same

\(^{62}\) Ibid.

\(^{63}\) Ibid.

\(^{64}\) It is important to highlight the language of “internal logic” here as this will be descriptor that we will emphasize often, and even see Courtenay employ in our conclusion. See Conclusion, p. 380, n. 33.
time it is a departure first from the Parisian thinker Peter Aurioli, but also from William of Ockham, who despite much disagreement with Aureoli, follows him in some important ways. I suggest that this may be controversial because it seems to fly in the face of many common narratives about William of Ockham as a thinker who condemns most forms of natural theology and introduces a radical skepticism about what we can adequately know about God. Nevertheless, as we progress, this dissertation shows, especially in chapter six, that on the subject of theological method, Ockham does not significantly depart from the dominant paradigm proposed by Petrus Aureoli. Further the conception of theology advocated by Peter Aureoli, despite abandoning theology’s claim to be a genuine science, never abandons the attempt to defend the place of theological investigation within the context of a universal courtroom, where philosophy—as Frei suggests—remains an independent arbiter. Rimini’s fierce reaction to Aureoli’s conception of theological method, and by extension to Ockham, retains a great deal in common with the view of theology or Sacra Doctrina advocated by Giles of Rome, as well as the Augustinians who come after Giles. This remains true, despite the fact that Rimini elsewhere employs many Ockhamist tools to defend and explain his overall position.

In the following chapters this general thesis is advanced in specific ways. Chapter one describes the position of Giles of Rome on the subject matter and purpose of

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65 This is common attitude and one we can see in Richard Lee’s fairly predictable assessment of Ockham: “one finds no natural theology in Ockham. Rather theology is a habit of faith and, as such, must remain with the God of faith” (Lee, *Science, the singular, and the question of theology*, 94). In calling theology a habit of faith, Lee means to point out that Ockham has detached theology from its proper moorings in the wider world of intelligibility. However, we will see that in calling theology a habit of faith, Lee is simply off the mark, since Ockham says explicitly that theology is only an apprehensive habit that can be performed equally well by the believer and the unbeliever (see c. 6, p. 275 and following). But besides the error in the above quote, the general tenor of this book is that Ockham’s focus on the singular leads to an approach to science and theology where knowledge “penetrates [the world] violently” (p. 105) and where “the world…becomes open to human destruction” (p. 105).
theological knowledge. This is our first introduction to what this dissertation calls the Aegidio-Augustinian tradition. Chapter two, building on Giles’s treatment of the subject of theology, emphasizes Rimini’s qualified adoption of the Ockhamist terminology regarding what the “subject” and “object” of a science is over and against the language of Duns Scotus. But with this new terminology, Rimini explicitly defends a famous Aegidian doctrine about the contracted field of theological research and study. The emphasis, in short, is on the absence of Christian theology’s universal cognitive aspirations, namely to know all that is knowable. It is not a discipline that attempts any kind of comprehensive knowledge—neither for the pilgrim or the Blessed—but seeks only to clarify and articulate what is apropos to the religious purposes God intends. Additionally, this chapter draws our attention forward by pointing out that, while Rimini’s conception of theological knowledge has a distinct subject matter, the “subject” alone is not enough to distinguish “theological knowledge.” Thus we see that the manner in which that subject is known (or method) is an equally important part of distinguishing this kind of knowing from the other disciplines, especially theological-metaphysics.

Before turning to Rimini’s consideration of method, chapter three addresses the “end” or “purpose” of theology. This chapter focuses especially on Peter Aureoli’s subtle, but significant revision of what it means for theology to be “practical.” It then looks to Rimini’s reaction to that position. Here we see clear use of Ockhamist tools as Rimini defines what it means for a habit to be practical and the role of speculative propositions in

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66 It is important to note that the notion of “Augustinianism” in the Middle Ages is almost as convoluted and unhelpful as the label “nominalism.” This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 1, see p. 45, n. 13. We will single out an Aegidio-Augustinianism to narrow our focus to a particular reading of Augustine offered by Giles of Rome and those who aim to perpetuate his thought. This may turn out to be something less than a school, but still a recognizable tradition.
such habits. Using these tools, Rimini develops a unique position that, in clear opposition to Aureoli, shares some similarities with Scotus and Ockham, but also shares some clear parallels with the Aegidian-tradition.

Chapter four marks the end of what I consider preliminary considerations (constituting the entirety of part I) and is the beginning of a turn (part II) toward a detailed consideration of the how theology is taught and acquired, whether or not it can be distinguished from faith, and whether it acquires a scientific status. Chapter four considers Giles’s brief remarks about how theology is taught, and it highlights one important assumption: that theology and faith are not to be distinguished as separate habits, wherein theology comes to replace faith.67 In chapter five, we follow two early Augustinians, Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio, who in different ways attempt to be faithful to the Aegidian tradition. Their challenge is to continue to insist on theology’s dependence on faith while dealing with Augustine statement in *De Trinitate* XIV, c. 1 which seems to demand that faith and “this science” are very distinct.68 The importance of these two thinkers is that they provide a witness to a clear Aegidio-Augustinian spirit that extends beyond Giles.

Chapter six begins the decisive moment of the study. Here we consider Rimini’s own description of theological method. As mentioned above, this is where we are introduced to the distinctive method of theology that is put forward by Peter Aureoli, which Ockham approves of with only slight modification. Despite the common opinion that Ockham is a skeptic about the strength of natural reason with regard to theological

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67 See the brief discussion of this concern above, p. 6.
68 Again, see the discussion of this quotation above, p. 6.
truths, we learn that he shares with Peter Aureoli the opinion that theology is “declarative.” This means that theology appeals to resources external to religion and faith and attempts to use these natural resources to support and strengthen the veracity and plausibility of the claims of faith. In Rimini’s fierce objection to this methodology, we not only see a clear break with Aureoli, but also a confraternity with the positions advanced by Augustinus of Ancona and Propser of Reggio. The break with Aureoli and Ockham primarily rests on Rimini’s Aegidian-inspired refusal to admit any division between the habit of faith and the habit of theology. We will see him repeatedly defend the notion that the theologian never goes outside the habit of faith, nor attempts to justify the claims of faith to those outside of the believing community. Accordingly, Rimini’s view of theology and theological knowledge closely approximates the second type of theology described by Frei, which sees itself as a kind of self-description of an already formed and believing community.

Between the sixth and seventh chapters, a short interlude acknowledges other like-minded Augustinian reactions to Peter Aureoli, notably in Gerard of Siena and Thomas of Strasbourg. This section also gives us an opportunity to make some clarifications about the principles of theology. We notice Rimini’s emphasis on the “explicit contents” of Scripture over the “articles of the creed” and speculate about whether this is a significant innovation within the Aegidian tradition and why Rimini makes this subtle change.

The final chapter, which focuses on Rimini’s explicit statements about why theology is not a science, further strengthens the points established in the previous
chapter. Perhaps most importantly, it reiterates that simply because Aureoli, Ockham, and Rimini all deny that theology is a science does not mean that they share similar visions as to what theology is or how a theologian should use reason in the service of faith. This chapter also provides us with clarification about what Rimini means by “acquired faith,” and why, for those within the believing community, this can count as a kind of “compelling knowledge.” For those outside the community, this achievement is not recognizable as a genuine knowledge about reality or actuality, but only about logic and possibility.69 In clarifying the notion of “acquired faith,” Rimini strengthens our identification of his conception of theology as a purely internal practice that makes no attempt to justify the claims of the community to those who have not been initiated.

In concluding, we speculate about the importance of Rimini’s position for our understanding of the larger narrative of the fourteenth century within the history of philosophy. Especially important is how Rimini’s view, combined with that of Jean Burdian in the arts faculty helps to institutionalize a particular kind of relationship between the theology and arts faculties—a relationship that came under severe criticism at the end of the century with the rise of late-Albertism, the via antiqua, and the wegesstreit of the fifteenth century.

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69 That fact that this kind of faith is in a way compulsory should cause us to take notice. For a theologian like Paul Tillich, and perhaps most of us, compulsion and faith seem mutually exclusive. In the Dynamics of Faith Tillich writes: But faith is uncertain in so far as the infinite to which it is related is received by a finite being. This element of uncertainty in faith cannot be removed, it must be accepted. And the element in faith which accepts this is courage” (p. 16). Therefore, Rimini’s description of how acquired faith can be faith and yet also be compulsory is crucial tenet of his position.
Introduction to Part I

Before pursuing the main line of this dissertation, namely Gregory of Rimini’s position on the kind of knowing that takes place between faith and science, it is worth our time to look at a few preliminaries. The preliminaries I have mind are Rimini’s consideration of the subject matter and purpose of theological knowledge. More specifically, I will show that, on these topics, Rimini’s position fits well within a recognizable Aegidio-Augustinian tradition.

The commitment of both Giles of Rome and Gregory of Rimini on these matters sets the tone for how they conceive of the natural or supernatural character of a theologian’s work and achievement. This is the discussion where Giles of Rome declares the range or scope of theological knowledge: a discussion which is subsequently treated by many other authors including Gregory of Rimini. The question asks whether theology is a comprehensive knowledge, exhaustive of its subject matter, or whether it is content to know only a select group of knowable things. Further, in the concern over the “end” of theology, Giles will consider how the theologian is oriented toward this data set? Does it seek to know for its own sake or for some other reason? In this second question we can see that the scope or range is itself built on (or at least intimately connected with) the purpose of theological knowledge. Is this knowledge an end in itself or useful and desirable only for a specific purpose? The answers to these questions have an important, albeit indirect, impact on how one conceives of the appropriate sources of theological knowledge and the standards by which it should be measured and evaluated. I offer, then,
a general thesis, which we can expect to become visible in the intermediate section that follows.

On these topics, Rimini shows his most explicit commitment to an Aegidian position. When it comes to the subject and scope of a theological inquiry, he is adamant that God is considered in a restricted way and that this discipline is limited to a very specific and specialized data set that excludes every bit of knowledge that does not contribute to the practical end of rightly loving God. Inasmuch as we can see Rimini holding a position like this, we can see a visible rift emerge between an Aegidian tradition and a Franciscan position primarily crafted by John Duns Scotus, but visible in a lesser degree in the thought of Aureoli and Ockham.

The rift can be described in the following way. Undoubtedly, for every thinker of the Middle Ages there was a significant difference between our knowledge of God and God’s knowledge of himself. The trouble or disagreement lies in the characterization of that difference. For Aquinas, but even more prominently, for Scotus and the Franciscans who follow him, the primary limitation lies in the lack of evidence resulting from our inability to achieve a clear and intuitive vision of God. Because of the distance between our earthly selves and the presence of God, our knowledge of God is limited. For Scotus, a great gulf exists between heaven and earth, clearly separating what our earthly theology actually knows about God from what is truly knowable.

For Giles and Rimini, it is not so much that this limitation does not exist. It is simply that this is not the primary reason for the limited nature of theological knowledge. Instead of emphasizing the lack of evidence and presence, the emphasis is laid on our
lack of capacity. This conviction and difference will appear most starkly in Rimini’s assertion (following Giles) that even the theological knowledge of the Blessed (those in the presence of God) is contracted and limited only to what this specialized discipline finds useful to its ends. Thus for Giles and Rimini, the line is drawn, not between heaven and earth, but between the finite and the infinite.
Chapter 1: Giles, Science and Theology

I. Introduction: Giles of Rome, *Frater Noster*

Without a doubt, “the first and most important medieval teacher” of the
Augustinian Order is Giles of Rome. This, at least, is the opinion of Adolar Zumkeller,
one of the premier historians of the Augustinian Order.¹ There are good reasons to see
Giles as setting a decisive tone and direction for the order as whole. Zumkeller notes
there is considerable evidence to show that this young order of friars (founded in 1256)
was concerned about creating a unity of thought.² The existence and quality of the corpus
of Giles of Rome was a big asset to this order’s attempt to create the desired unity. Giles
was the first Parisian master of the order and it was fortunate that they gave this honor to
a man of exceptional talents, whom fellow co-religionists could respect. Giles made such
an early impression that the general chapter at Florence decreed in 1287:

> Because the teaching of our venerable Master Brother Giles is an
> enlightenment to the whole world, we order and command it to be
> observed inviolably, that all the *lectos* and students of our Order accept
> and give their assent to the opinions delivered, the positions taken, and the
> commentaries written by our aforesaid master in the past and future, and
> be sedulous in the defense of that teaching with all possible solicitude, so
> that in their own illumination they are able to illumine others.³

In 1290, the Order’s *Constitutions* renewed this sentiment, stating that it was the job of
the prior general “to order as well that all the masters and students should hold in full the

¹ Zumkeller, *Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages*, 11.
² Ibid. “They also show evidence of the energetic effort to prepare the way for a united school of thought.”
³ *Analecta Augustiniana* IV (1911-1912), 203; cited and translated by Zumkeller, 12.
opinions and positions of our venerable Brother Giles, and teach entirely in accordance with his writings." This statute remained in effect throughout the entire Middle Ages and was theoretically obligatory for prior generals through the fourteenth century, of whom Gregory of Rimini was one.

Undoubtedly, Giles of Rome cast his shadow into the fourteenth century. But how intense was this shadow and how long was it cast? For many scholars of the twentieth century, Giles’s influence is distinct enough to recognize a unique kind of Augustinianism that emerges after him. As far back as 1884, Karl Werner identified a schola Augustiniana beginning with Giles and remaining intact into the 1340’s. But here is where Rimini’s place in the order becomes particularly important. The relative unity that is actually recognizable in the first half of the fourteenth century is often said to stop

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4 Constitutions fratrum heremitarum ordinis sancti Augustini (Venice, 1508), f. 36r; cited and translated by Zumkeller, 12.
5 Cf. Werner, Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters, v. III, esp. pp. 13–15. Consider the review of Werner give by Erik Saak: “In 1883 Karl Werner published the first monographic treatment of late medieval Augustinianism. Werner traced the origins of fourteenth-century Augustinianism to the thirteenth-century reaction against Aristotelianism. He argued forcefully for an Order-specific Augustinianism: the Augustinian School is defined by the doctrines of Giles of Rome, according to which Augustinian theologians were required to teach, as formulated by the General Chapter of Florence in 1287. Werner dedicated the first part of the work to explicating Giles’ position on the major theological topics: epistemology, ontology and metaphysics, cosmology and anthropology, the doctrine of God, Christology, soteriology, the sacraments, and ethics. When he came to Gregory of Rimini (d. 1358), Werner saw a major rift in the Augustinian School. Whereas Giles viewed theology as affective knowledge, Gregory having been strongly influenced by the works of the Franciscan theologian and philosopher William of Ockham (d. 1347), sought to combat the uncertainty of the speculative nature of Giles’ theology by turning theology in scientific, practical knowledge. Only by purifying the Order’s theology of speculative Aristotelianism could a true Augustinianism come into being” (Saak, High way to heaven, 684).

See also Trapp who discusses a similar division: “Thomas of Strassburg marks the turning point in Augustinian Modern theology. I call him the ‘last Augustinian of Aegidius’ and Gregory the ‘first Augustinian of Augustine’. The two terms are not mutually exclusive. Aegidianism is old-fashioned Augustinianism coupled with the cognitio universalis, the Gregorian Augustinianism is ‘Modern’, is better acquainted with all the books of Augustine non only with his major works, and goes hand in hand with cognitio rei particularis. / Aegidius remained the venerated figure of the Augustinian School before and after Gregory, but after Gregory especially more corrective reservations were made in regard to Aegidius. What is new in Gregory is the fact that he is the best Augustine Scholar of the Middle Ages from the milieu which created the Milleloquium” (Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century,” 181).
with Thomas of Strasbourg, while a new Augustinian school (*a schola Augustiniana moderna*) begins with Rimini.\(^6\)

We can find this characterization readily available in contemporary accounts of the fourteenth century. McGrath, for example, writes:

> The school of thought which developed during the fourteenth century, based upon the writing of Giles of Rome, was known as the *schola Aegidiana*, suggesting that Giles was regarded as a theological authority by those who followed in his footsteps within the Order.\(^7\)

And later he against states:

> It is . . . clear that a school of thought developed within the Order which remained faithful to [Giles’s] teaching. This fidelity is particularly clear in relation to his teaching on original righteousness.\(^8\)

In McGrath’s account we can see the penchant to understand this order and its unity from a narrow vantage point: on the issue of justification. He offers support for this unity by appealing to justification explicitly: “This fidelity is particularly clear in relation to this

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\(^6\) This division is visible in many sources, but the view is summarized by Denis Janz in his essay “Towards a Definition of Late-Medieval Augustinianism.”

Janz writes: “A third approach to the problem, already evident in the early works of Zumkeller, has been to use the term “late medieval Augustinianism” simply to designate the theology of members of the Augustinian Order. In this way scholars can hold in abeyance the question of the degree of faithfulness to the teaching of Augustine himself, and direct their efforts exclusively to understanding the theology of those who were in the Augustinian Order. Among scholars who follow this approach, Adolar Zumkeller and Damasus Trapp are clearly the most important. In his book-length essay of 1956 Trapp takes “Augustinianism” to designate the theology of members of the Augustinian Order. Augustinian theology thus understood falls into two distinct periods. The first period extends from Giles of Rome (d.1316) to Thomas of Strassbourg (d.1357), during which theologians of the Order were heavily influenced by Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome (this is known as the *schola Aegidiana*). The second period followed Gregory of Rimini (d.1358), and is characterized by a heavier dependence on Augustine himself, even though Giles of Rome remained the official teacher of the Order until 1926 (this is known as the *schola moderna Augustiniana*)” (Janz, “Towards a Definition of Late Medieval Augustinianism,” 121).


\(^8\) Ibid.
teaching on original righteousness.”

Then he cites three Italian studies dealing with justification and the Augustinian Order. He later writes concerning the Augustinian character of this school: “The strongly Augustinian cast of the schola Aegidiana may be particularly well seen in the emphasis placed upon the priority of caritas and gratia in man’s justification.” Here, McGrath cites a study by Zumkellar in support. But if there is wider unity, extending to other doctrines and questions besides justification, we will not know it until we expand our sphere of interest.

It is in light of the important place that Giles occupies in the collective conscience of the Augustinian Order that we look to him first to see what he thought the subject matter and purpose of theology was. This reference point will provide us with a measure by which we can recognize a certain class of Augustinianism when it comes to the question of what theology is. Most importantly, it gives us a version of Augustinianism by which we can measure whether and to what extent Rimini might represent a rupture and the beginning of a schola Augustiniana moderna. There are, in the end, several “Augustinianisms” that we can identify from different vantage points throughout the Middle Ages, and we must clarify what version of Augustinianism Giles represents. By

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9 Ibid.
10 A.V. La Valle, La giustizia di Adamo e il peccato originale secondo Egidio Romano (Palermo, 1939); G. Díaz, De peccati originalis essentia in schola Augustiniana praetridentina (El Escorial, 1961); idem, “la escuela agustiniana pretridentina y el problema de la concupiscencia”, La Ciudad de Dios 174 (1961), 309-356
13 For a quick survey, see Janz, “Towards a definition of late medieval Augustinianism,” who identifies four different waves of definitions used in the 20th century. Notably, he identifies the fourth wave – like McGrath, built around the doctrine of justification – as the most suitable definition (p. 126). We, however, want to look for unity and an Augustinian influence on a different and less explored topic. Still, Janz draws a conclusion regarding the relationship between his preferred definition of Augustinianism and late-medieval nominalism similar to the kind “tool-box” approach we outlined in the introduction. He writes:
zeroing in on a particular topic treated by Giles, we will have given ourselves a firm standard by which we can say Rimini continues or ruptures a very particular conception of Augustinianism: namely, an Aegidio-Augustinianism.

Giles presents his most sustained and holistic treatment of theology in the traditional place for a scholastic theologian: the prologue to his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. But he also retained a life-long interest in the subject and left a series of questions pertaining to the nature of theology, and thus we find considerable relevant material in his Quodlibetal questions and minor treatises. His prologue is immediately distinctive because of its faithfulness to an early custom in the tradition of Sentences commentaries. As is visible in the commentary of Bonaventure, it was customary to ask, what are the four causes of theology? What is its material, formal, efficient, and final cause? Giles structures his prologue in the same way. This fact itself is notable since this kind of organization becomes increasingly rare as the fourteenth century proceeds. Giles begins his prologue with the question of the material cause of theology: that is, what is the primary subject matter of theology? He then considers the formal and efficient cause, and ends by considering the final cause. In the present chapter we concern ourselves only with the first and last question since, taken together, they

“Thus, for example, Gregory of Rimini should be regarded as “Augustinian” even though he may have adopted nominalistic metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions” (p. 126).

For important alternative approach to Late-Medieval Augustinianism developed after Janz’s survey see: Steve Marraone, The Light of Their Countenance, 2001.

14 Cf. Bonaventure, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, proemium (Quaracchi I:1-6); See also the work of A. J. Minnis for lengthy discussions of the medieval prologue genre; Minnis, “The Influence of Academic Prologues on the Prologues and Literary Attitudes of Late-Medieval English Writers”; Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship.
show themselves to be intimately related. We will come back to the remaining two questions in part II when we turn our explicit consideration of how the results of this discipline can be called “knowledge” and what exactly it means to know theologically.

II. A Universal Wisdom?

To begin, then, let us draw momentarily consider a rather banal statement by Alfred Freddoso about the understood goal and purpose of theology for late medieval theologians. As the driving question of his essay, Freddoso writes: “But the question I mean to raise here is a more basic one, Did [sic] the Catholic medieval thinkers see themselves in any philosophically interesting sense as the successors of classical philosophical inquirers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics?” He then turns to what seems to him an obvious and indisputable answer to this question, if three conditions can be granted. The first condition is the one that interests us here. The first assumption is:

The Socratic conviction that the aim of an intellectually and morally integrated philosophical life is the attainment of wisdom—that is, the attainment of a comprehensive and systematic elaboration of the first principles that provides definitive answers to ultimate questions about the origins, nature and destiny of the universe and about the good for human beings and the ways to attain it.17

Believing Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham to sufficiently represent the Medieval Catholic tradition as a whole, he states his purported answer to the

15 Peter Nash has recognized the same interdependence and writes: “We will not be concerned with all that he has to say on the four causes of theology, but will concentrate on the material cause, the subject of theology, though as will appear later, the final cause greatly conditions his delimitation of the subject” (“Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 63).
17 Ibid.
question. “If the term “successor” is taken in a suitably broad sense, then the answer to our question is unequivo cally affirmative.” Freddoso’s picture is not unique; in fact, it is a common narrative used to help us understand this unique period of philosophy and intellectual enterprise.

The claim of this chapter is this: while the picture Freddoso presents is common, Giles of Rome stands as a witness to the fact that this is not the only picture that can be drawn. The case to be made here is that Giles of Rome’s account of theology does not correspond well to description Freddosso has given. Giles does not think that the goal of theology is to have a “comprehensive and systematic elaboration of first principles.” Nor does he think that theology’s primary objective is to provide “definitive answers to ultimate questions about the origins, nature, and destiny of the universe.” Undoubtedly, theology for Giles deals with systematic deduction, elaboration, and argumentation. However, we find him at the same time repeatedly resisting the holistic and comprehensive aim that is such a central part of the classical ideal. We find him almost counseling us to abandon such a project altogether and informing us that the ultimate aim of a theological science involves the perpetual incompleteness of the scientific ideal. Of course, this will leave Giles with some problems and difficulties of his own. In many ways, theology will now appear insufficient, incomplete, and second-rate. Likewise, if theology is reduced to something less than a complete and comprehensive scientific discipline and is doomed to remain incomplete, we might wonder: why begin at all?

18 Ibid.
Where does the value of a theological enterprise lie if it does not quench our thirst for comprehensive knowledge?

After laying out the outlines of his position, we will turn to Giles’s answer to these lingering difficulties. Both the position of Giles and his answers to these questions form a provocative counter-tradition to what Fredosso identifies as the Medieval Catholic Tradition. While this counter-tradition may often fly under the radar of modern interest, Giles’s thought was not quickly forgotten. His ideas were the starting points from which future generations of Augustinian Friars began their theological education.

III. Giles’s Basic Position on the Nature of a Science

It is impossible to understand what Giles identifies as the real subject matter of theology (and more importantly why) without first spending some time discovering just what he thinks a science is. More specifically, we need to be very precise about the constitutive parts of a science that he singles out.

The nature of a science is discussed in several places. His early prologue is undoubtedly an important resource to which we will return. But he lays out the foundational components of a science most clearly in the second question of his third Quodlibet.¹⁹ The question does not ask about the nature of a science per se, but rather speaks directly to our immediate interest in the subject of theology. It asks “whether God

¹⁹ Scholars date this Quodlibetal question to either Easter of 1287 or 1288 (Cf. Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 72n1). It is a nice place to begin, not only because of its clarity, but because it receives a direct critical response from Henry of Ghent in his 12th quodlibet (Christmas 1288) (Ibid).
is the subject in *Sacra Pagina* under a special *ratio*.” However, in the body of the question, Giles shows his awareness that his understanding of the constitutive parts of a science must be laid out plainly if we are going to follow his conclusions. After surveying arguments for and against his position, he stops to identify and clarify the three elements that must be a part of any science.

The first component he identifies is perhaps the most obvious. It is the “thing” (*res*), *which is the principal consideration*. What is presented here in the *Quodlibetal* question is a truncated version of a larger discussion in the opening question of Giles’s prologue: namely, what does it mean to be the subject of any science? The primary dilemma of this question comes from the admission that in any given discipline there are many “things” that are considered; thus the question is asked: “whether it is the same thing to be the subject of a science and to be of consideration in a science.” Giles’s response is an emphatic no, and in the course of his response he develops a distinction between that “thing” which is the subject of a science (which is referenced in *Quodlibet* 3, q. 2) and those “things” which are merely considered in a science.

While he offers five reasons why the subject of science cannot be simply whatever is considered in the science, we can sum them up generally. His main complaint is: if the subject is merely anything considered in the science, then sciences lose their

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20 Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta (1646)*, III, q. 2, 127. “Utrum Deus sub speciali ratione sit subjectum in Sacra pagina.”

21 He explicitly indicates that he hopes such attention to these three parts of any science will help make the truth of the matter more evident: “Advertendum tamen, ut melius pateat veritas quaestionis quaesitae; quod in qualibet scientia tria consideranda sint” (Ibid., III, q. 2, 129).

22 Aegidius Romanus, *Primus Sententiarum*, I, prol., pars 1, q. 1, f. 1vb. “Primo, utrum idem sit aliquod esse subiectum scientiae et esse de consideratione?”

23 Ibid., I, prol., pars 1, q. 1, f. 2ra. “Verum, quia non omne qued est de consideratione scientiae est subiectum, ut patebit. Igitur esse subiectum in scientia, et esse de consideratione scientiae non sunt idem penitus, sed differunt sicut universale et particulare.”
identity and the division of the sciences becomes hopelessly confused. Many “things” are considered in many different ways. But without a clear primary subject, we will have no way to distinguish the unique ways that a given set of “things” are considered within a particular discipline. At one point Giles claims that the division of the science will become superfluous because there would be few ways of identifying what is unique about a given science with respect to any other science that may consider the same “things.”

In light of this negative claim, the question then becomes which “thing” among the many “things” considered ought to be counted as the subject of the science? He goes on to explain that a “thing” can be considered in any given science in four different ways, not all of which permit the “thing” in question to be called a subject. First it can be considered according to three parameters: [1] per se, [2] first and principally, [3] in every mode. Not everything considered in a given science is considered in all three of these

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24 Ibid., “Primum autem est unitas: quia secundum Philosophum in primo Posteriorum, scientia una est quae est unius generis, subiectum, partes, et passiones considerans. Secundum est distinctio: nam scientiae distinguuntur secundum diversitatem suorum subjectorum, nam per idem habet aliquid esse et unum esse et indistinctionem a se et distinctionem ab alis. Si igitur scientia ex subiecto suo habet esse unum habet et esse distinctum. Tertium est dignitas, nam una scientia est dignior alias, quia de digniori subiecto; ut patet per Philosophum in principio De Anima. Quartum est ordo; quia quando subiectum est sub subiecto, et sunt ibi aliae conditiones annexae, scientiae est sub scientia, sicut videmus quod perspectiva est sub geometria, quia linea visualis est sub linea simpliciter sive sub magnitudine continua, quae in geometria dicitur esse subiectum. Quintum est necessitas; quia subiectum unius non est subiectum alterius, et aliquod declaratur in una quod non declaratur in alia. Si autem idem esset esse de consideratione scientiae et esse subiectum in scientia, cum unum et idem possit esse de consideratione plurium scientiarum, ut patet per Philosophum primo Posteriorum et per Commentatorem 12 Metaphysicae, unum et idem esset subiectum plurium scientiarum.”

25 Here we need to make a correction to Peter Nash’s description of the four ways a thing can be considered. Nash elides Giles’s mention of “four ways” with what appears to be a list of what I call ‘parameters’: viz. per se, primo, principaliter, and per omnem modum (p. 63) But a close reading shows us that “primo et principaliter” ought to be taken together, so that we really have three parameters. The “four ways” of considering come from [1] having all of these parameters; [2] having two of these parameters; [3] having one of these parameters; [4] and having none of these parameters. One could imagine it would be possible to increase this list if there was not an intrinsic hierarchy to these parameters. That is, it is not the case that all three of these parameters can be employed separately, rather for Giles only ‘per se’ can be known by itself without the “thing” being also known “in a primary way (primo)” or “in every mode”; likewise, one can know something “per se” and “in a primary way” without knowing it in “every mode.”
ways. The second way of considering something is to consider it [1] per se and [2] in a primary way, but not [3] in every mode. A third and even more restricted way of considering something is to consider it simply [1] per se, but neither [2] in a primary way, nor [3] in every mode. This appears to follow from the fact that not knowing something in a primary way excludes the possibility of knowing that same “thing” in every mode. Finally, the fourth way a knower can consider a “thing” is without any of these parameters; this would be to consider something accidentally rather than per se. Giles suggests that “to laugh” can be considered “accidentally” in metaphysics. Here, laughter does not belong to metaphysics as a sub-category of being, but is imported into the science, only “through another” (per aliud), namely, on account of something else which does belong to the science of metaphysics in a per se way.

Of these four ways, we are looking for that manner of consideration (and the “thing” which can be considered in this manner) which gives unity and order to the entire body of “things” included in the discipline. Of these four ways, it is the first way that

But finally, to know it in “every mode” assumes or necessitates that it is also known “per se” and “in a primary way.”

Here is what Giles writes: “Notandum quod quattuor modis aliquod consideratur in scientia: primo aliquod consideratur in scientia per se et primo et principaliter et per omnem modum; secundo per se et primo, non tamen per omnem modum; tertio per se, sed non primo; quarto et ultimo nec per se nec primo, sed per accidens, et per aliud secundum quod ridere possumus in metaphysica.” (Ibid., I, prol., pars I, q. 1, f. 2rb).

Compare this to what Nash says: “Giles posits that the subject properly speaking of a science is whatever is considered per se, primarily, principally, and in every mode in which the things under consideration may be found. Thus in metaphysics only being is considered in these four ways, for it is the primary and principal aspect under which all the problems are resolved” (Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 63).

It is true that metaphysics treats “things” in all these ways, but it does not do this under four parameters or conditions, but under three. A thing can be known within metaphysics in four ways depending on whether all, two, one, or none of these parameters accompany the “thing” under consideration.

26 Aegidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, I, prol., pars. I, q. 1, f. 2rb. “…sed per accidens, et per aliud secundum quod ridere possumus in metaphysica.”
provides this kind of unity and order. Taking the science of metaphysics as his example, 
Giles says that “being” is the true subject of this science, even though metaphysics has 
lots to say about “substance” and “accidents” (i.e. diverse types of beings.). Substance 
cannot be the subject in the strictest possible sense because a consideration restricted to 
substance would not consider the “things” of the science in every mode, even though 
substance would be considered per se and in a primary way. (Nota bene: for Aristotle, 
substance is a primary kind of being in comparison with all the other ways something can 
be said “to exist”). Most notably, it would ignore or exclude accidents, which are also a 
“thing” considered in this science, but are not primary.

However, according to Giles, substance can be considered to be the subject of this 
science “in a certain way” or speaking loosely. Substance, unlike accident, is 
considered in a primary way. As primary, substance is the sense of “being” through 
which all other senses of “being” must make reference.

27 Ibid., I, prol., pars 1, q. 1, f. 2rb. “Quod autem secundo consideratur, licet non sit simpliciter est 
subiectum in ea, est aliquo modo potest dici subjectum.”

28 Depending on your reading of Aristotle, this might need further nuance, as Aristotle makes important 
distinctions between sensible and non-sensible substances; for Aristotle non-sensible substances are clearly 
primary to sensible substance, just as substances are a primary kind of being with reference to accident. 
Therefore non-sensible substance should be seen as a primary kind of being with reference to sensible 
substances. Cf. Metaphysics, II, c. 1 where Aristotle says: “Now we do not know a truth without its cause; 
and a thing has a quality in a higher degree than other things if in virtue of it the similar quality belongs to 
the other things (e.g. fire is the hottest of things; for it is the cause of the heat of all other things); so that 
that which causes derivative truths to be true is most true. Hence the principles of eternal things must be 
always most true (for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they 
themselves are the cause of the being of other things), so that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in 
respect of truth” (994a1-994a19, trans. Ross, p. 712-713).

Cf. Metaphysics, VII, c. 2, where Aristotle says: “Regarding these matters, then, we must inquire 
which of the common statements are right and which are not right, and what things are substances, and 
whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances, and how sensible substances exist, and 
whether there is a separable substance (and if so why and how) or there is no substance separable from 
sensible substances; and we must first sketch the nature of substance” (1028b33-1029a6, trans. Ross, p. 
784).
I place an emphasis on the two ways something can be called a “subject,” both absolutely and “in some way,” because a tension runs through Giles’s attempt to identify God as the subject of theology. He clearly wants to identify God as the subject of theology, but he also emphatically denies that God is considered “in every mode.” We will see if and how he attempts to work this out in the next section. But for now, with this basic sense of the “subject” (both in the “strict” and “loose” senses) in place, we need to move on to Giles’s description of the second and third components of a science.

The second component, mentioned in Quodlibet III, q. 2, is the ratio. A clear explanation of a ratio and its function can be found in an example given by Scotus, which we will review again in the next chapter. Scotus takes as an example the subject of human being and notes four rationes under which it can be considered: “quidditatively” (e.g. humanity), “under a common concept” (e.g. substance), “under an accident” (e.g. gentle), or “in comparison with something else” (e.g. as the most noble of animals). The example from Scotus is helpful because it prevents us from understanding the ratio of a science as a kind of specifying difference. The ratio does not divide up a more general category into several parts, wherein “being” becomes the only real subject of any science and every other science is merely a study of being under a certain ratio. Instead, Scotus helps us see that ratio indicates the vantage point from which a “thing” is going to be considered. Since all things are a “being” in some way, any reality can be considered from the vantage point (ratio) of “being,” and this, according to Scotus, would be to

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29 See below section “Aegidio-Augustinian Theology and Metaphysics,” p. 84.
30 See below, p. 104.
31 For the exact quotation see below p. 104, n. 20.
consider something through the perspective of a common concept. Likewise, something could be considered only from the perspective of its relation to something else, as human being might be considered only in comparison to other animals. However, this understanding of *ratio* makes it clear that everything can be considered in a comprehensive way when it is considered under the *ratio* of its essence, “whatness,” or quiddity. By comprehensive, it is meant that the consideration extends to *every property* proper to the nature in question and not merely those properties or attributes that fall under a more restricted *ratio*. To consider something under its “quidditative” *ratio* is to be unrestricted in one’s investigation relative to the subject matter at hand. It is to consider to the totality of attributes and properties proper to the nature in question.

To consider something under its quidditative *ratio* is proper to the nature and spirit of a speculative science. 32 Here is a type of investigation which seeks completion and totality. It seeks to know for its own sake and is therefore not limited by some other concern, as is the case in a practical science or productive art. In the latter two cases, one does not pursue knowledge for its own sake, but for the sake of some activity or the production of some artifact. Not every property or attribute of a given subject is relevant to this practical interest, and thus a practical discipline would rarely consider its object under its “quidditative” *ratio*, but rather under some common concept like “good” or

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32 Consider one of Aristotle’s descriptions of theoretical knowledge: “It is right also that philosophy should be called knowledge of the truth. For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action (for even if they consider how things are, practical men do not study what is eternal but what stands in some relation at some time)” (*Metaphysics*, II, c. 1, 994a1ff, trans. Ross, p. 712).
“desirable,” etc. For a practical science, what is knowable is limited by the end for which that knowledge was pursued.

To hint at what is to come, a major concern for Scotus is whether or not a “reality” or “thing” that is not considered quidditatively can really function as the ordering subject of a science according to the conditions Giles laid down. To construct Giles’s reply we must keep in mind the two senses—the strict and loose sense—in which some “thing” can be called the subject. In the strictest sense, the reality must be “considered in every way,” and this would seem to demand a “quidditative” ratio. But in the second looser sense, a “thing” can be called and function as a subject even if it is not “considered in every way.” Thus, substance can “in some way” be the subject of metaphysics, even though to consider “being” qua substance rather than qua being would be to exclude certain types of “being” from consideration. This is a strategy we will see Giles employ as he tries to maintain both that God is the subject of theology and that theology does not treat God in a comprehensive way.

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33 We must say “rarely” because Scotus takes a unique position. He is convinced that theology is practical, but insists that theology must consider God under a “quidditative ratio” God qua God, we will examine why in c. 3, p. 146.

34 As an aside, I think Nash’s presentation of how God is and isn’t the subject of metaphysics is either wrong or ambiguously presented. Nash tends to treat the “ratio” as a specifying difference, distinguishing the study of God from the study of Being. In this case, a restricted ratio creates distinguishes theology from metaphysics. But, to my ears, this sounds like saying, if “human beings” were not considered under a restricted ratio, then this would really be a study of being qua being. The study of human being would then be the study of “being” restricted under the ratio of “human being.” But this is contrary to the illuminating example provided by Scotus, where to study human being qua human is to study human beings under a non-restricted ratio, but to studying human beings qua being is to study them under a common concept and restrict one’s interest in human being to their status as “beings.”

Nash ambiguous reads as follows: “Unlike metaphysics which, if and when it treats of God, does so sub modo communi, i.e. inasmuch as he is being and the cause of all things, theology considers God sub speciali modo; otherwise it would not differ from metaphysics [this is the claim that causes the most concern]. God, therefore, under a special aspect is what theology principally considers and is its subject” (Nash, 65).
The third and final element of any given science is the presence of an actualizing light. This element is important for our understanding of how theological knowledge of the earthly pilgrim and the Blessed differ. But it is also a key component for our later interest in how the theologian knows and whether this knowledge is a distinct habit from the habit of faith. Both issues will be discussed below.35

Regarding this necessary light, Giles writes that the light is that “through which (per quod)” the principle subject matter is considered.36 In the case of natural philosophy, the light required to make material and sensible objects knowable by an immaterial intellect is the light of natural reason. It may, at first, appear needless to add this third component, since on the surface this amounts to saying that a science requires that it be known by a knower. Without a knower no actual science would exist, but only potential sciences. Giles’s emphasis here comes from the fact that he believes the natural light of reason is not the only way we can become knowers of truth. In other words, abstraction from sensible realities is not the only way someone can arrive at truth. In addition to our natural light, Giles recognizes the light of faith, the light of Glory, and God’s own light.37

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As we proceed further, I want to combat the idea that God is considered under a restricted ratio in theology because otherwise theology would become metaphysics. On the contrary, to consider God quidditatively or under a non-restricted ratio would be to consider God comprehensively in every mode, not merely as one being among many types.

35 For example consider the discussion in this chapter on p. 69, “On the Nature of Beatitude” as well as the discussion of beatitude in chapter 2, p. 131, “VI. Rimini on the Primary Subject of Theology and the Extent of Theological Knowledge.” For the language of lights and the beginning of the discussion of the difference between faith and theology see below “Henry of Ghent’s Lumen Medium and the Response of Peter Aureoli,” p. 249.

36 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 129a. “Ut in scientia naturali res principaliter considerata est corpus mobile; ratio, sub qua consideratur, est in eo quod mobile; lumen per quod consideratur, est lumen rationis nobis naturaliter inditum; per quod lumen fit consideratio in omnibus scientiis humanitus inventis.”

37 Cf. Ibid., III, q. 2, 129–130.
But just what it means to know in the light of faith and for that matter in the light of glory is an open question. How these two lights differ from the natural light and how they differ from each other is a controversial question. But we can make some progress toward an answer, at least negatively, by turning to Giles’s consideration of the distinct ratio under which theology knows God and considering whether that ratio changes or alters when one transitions from the light of faith to the light of glory.

IV. God Under a Restricted Ratio

For He keeps all being in His own embrace, like a sea of essence infinite and unseen.

– John the Damascene, De Fidei Orth. I, c. 9

Giles’s answer begins with a commitment to the first and fundamental meaning of the name God. “By the name God,” he says, “we should understand an infinite sea of substance (pelagus substantiae infinitum)” The phrase pelagus infinitum is not an invention of Giles, nor of his teacher Aquinas, who also employs the phrase. It is a description given by the Church Father John the Damascene. The phrase and definition of the first and most proper name of God is important because it dictates the rest of Giles’s argument. By understanding the term “God” as an infinite ocean, Giles sees the idea of God and infinity as irrevocably connected and he identifies three explicit reasons why God inasmuch as he is God or God under a quidditative ratio (Deus in eo quod Deus sive Deus sub absoluta ratione) cannot be the subject of theology.

38 Ibid., III, q. 2, 128. “Nomine Dei intelligitur quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum; ut innuit Damascenus lib. 1, cap. 20.”
39 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.13, a. 11, resp.
These three arguments really represent two types. The first type is an argument built upon ability and what is epistemically possible. The second two arguments are built on a prior commitment about the purpose of theological knowledge and why we pursue it. In these latter two arguments we will see the unmistakable stamp of an Aegidian reading of Augustine. That is, these two arguments involve a direct appeal to an idiosyncratic interpretation of Augustine. They are therefore a witness to us of what Giles believes to be the intention of Augustine. All of these arguments will become classics within the ensuing scholastic discussion.

The first of the three arguments does not appeal to Augustine. But this is because Giles believes the reasoning is fairly straightforward. The argument insists: if God, as an infinite ocean, is the subject of theology, then a science of that subject will be infinite as well. All that is required for this proof is two basic assumptions. The first (established in Giles’s previous discussion of what it means to be a subject) is that a science receives its species and distinctive character from its object, and the second is that it is impossible for a created finite being to have an infinite science. While straightforward, we can already see that the assumptions of this argument carry with them at least one important implication. Because of the assumed absurdity of any finite creature having an infinite science, the argument requires that not even the Blessed—who though truly blessed, remain creatures, and therefore finite—consider God as he is, but only in a restricted and qualified way. The further implication follows that the transition from

\[\text{Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 128.} \quad \text{“Nam si Deus qui dicitur pelagus infinitum, esset subjectum in hac scientia: tunc ista scientia esset infinita, et tenderet in Deum modo infinitio, nam ab infinito, in eo quod infinitum, non potest scientia trahere speciem, nisi sit scientia infinita.”} \]

\[\text{See above, p. 50.}\]
knowing in the light of faith to the light of glory does not radically alter the subject matter or the extent of what is classified as theological knowledge. This is a consequence many theologians to come will struggle with, but one Giles will whole-heartedly defend.

From this first argument, built around the capacity of a finite intellect, we pass to those arguments wherein we are introduced to Giles’s understanding of the purpose of theology. The second argument rests on the consequence that if God, as an infinite ocean, was the subject of theology, then this science would be able to consider everything. But unlike in the first argument, this one looks past the impossibility of the consequence, and suggests that even if this were possible, it would be a betrayal of what theology and theological knowledge is. The vision of theological knowledge betrayed by this consequence is derived from Augustine and the passage from *De Trinitate* XIV, c. 1, used over and over again by scholastic theologians trying to reconcile Augustine’s discussion of science with its Aristotelian counterpart. For this argument, Giles focuses on the first half of the passage. His paraphrase reads: “By no means is everything, which is able to be known by man in human matters (where there is much of vanity and harmful curiosity), attributed to this science.” The concern about excluding vain and harmful knowledge from theology is what Giles takes to be the central Augustinian point. In the third argument, we will see why Giles thinks Augustine takes this position. But, as this passage will come up again, we should spend a moment considering what Augustine

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42 For the previous discussion of this quotation see above p. 7, n. 9.
43 Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta (1646)*, III, q. 2, 128. “quod est contra Augustinum 14, de Trinitate cap. I, dicente, non utique quicquid sciri ab homine potest in rebus humanis (ubi plurimum vanitatis, noxae curiositatis est) huic scientiae tribuit.”
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means by “this science” and whether or how “theology” as Giles means it corresponds to
this meaning. The familiar citation taken from De Trinitate 14, c. 1, reads as follows:

Now in their discussions of wisdom they defined it as follows: Wisdom is
the knowledge of things human and divine. That is why in the previous
book I expressly said that awareness of each kind of things, namely human
and divine, could be called both wisdom and knowledge. But in terms of
the distinction made by the apostle, To one is given a word of wisdom, to
another a word of knowledge (1 Cor 12:8), this definition can be split up,
in such a way that knowledge of things divine is properly called wisdom,
and of things human is properly given the name of knowledge. I discussed
this knowledge in the thirteenth volume, where I did not of course ascribe
to it any and every thing a man can know about things human, because
this includes a great deal of superfluous frivolity and pernicious
curiosity.

The pronoun “their” in the opening sentence is Augustine’s reference to pagan
philosophers and to their understanding of wisdom: “wisdom,” they say, “is a knowledge
of things human and divine.” But Augustine, at the opening of Book XIV, is in the
middle of unpacking this belief and redefining this Greek idea of wisdom. As the
quotation tells us, Augustine thinks the definition can be split into two—wisdom proper
(sapientia) and knowledge (scientia). He spent the previous book (Book XIII) describing
knowledge (scientia) as knowledge of human things, and in Book XIV means to turn to
wisdom, which is described as a knowledge of things divine. But here at the beginning
of book XIV he is careful to point out that, while knowledge of human affairs (scientia)
can be useful, it should be pursued only in a insofar as it is necessary to support wisdom
proper. General wisdom (inclusive of Augustine’s subdivision of knowledge and wisdom

44 This is a common Stoic definition of wisdom, quoted by Cicero, for example in De Officiis II, 12, 5.
45 Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, c. 1, n. 3 (trans. Hill, p. 371).
46 Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, c. 1, n. 3. “But in terms of the distinction made by the apostle, To one is
given a word of wisdom, to another a word of knowledge (1 Cor 12:8), this definition can be split up, in
such a way that knowledge of things divine is properly called wisdom, and of things human is properly
given the name of knowledge” (trans. Hill, p. 371).
proper) is not interested in this knowledge in an exhaustive way. On the contrary, wisdom only concerns itself with the human and contingent inasmuch as it necessary for a different and higher purpose.

The position taken by Augustine regarding *scientia* reveals something of the ambiguous relationship with pagan philosophy that runs through the heart of his corpus. He is at once an admirer of the aspirations of pagan philosophy and is at the same time a constant critic of philosophy for having lost its way. In principle, Augustine might agree with Aristotle’s assessment that we have a natural desire to know. However, this desire is misunderstood if we understand it as the obsessive zeal of a researcher to uncover every proximate cause of every event no matter how big or small.47

Here we can recall the claim of Fredosso, which we pointed to at the outset. Can we take it for granted that Christian theologians saw theology as the completion of the Greek project? Augustine is ambivalent at best. More importantly, Giles directs us toward this claim of Augustine to make an even stronger claim: he uses the quotation to suggest that theology is limited not just with respect to human things, but also in the manner in which it considers God. On this view, theology undoubtedly still aims to be a kind of wisdom, but—as Augustine is made to suggest—this wisdom does not include everything that is knowable. True wisdom does not mean a comprehensive and all encompassing knowledge. If comprehensive knowledge of all that is knowable is what wisdom means

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47 See for example Jonathan Lear’s explanation of Aristotle’s conception of our desire to know: “Thus, although philosophy begins in wonder, it ends in lack of wonder” (*Aristotle: the desire to understand*, 6). And later he says: “The project of understanding the world lies at the bottom of who we are. Until we have pursued that project all the way, it is not just that we do not yet fully know what the desire to understand is a desire for, we do not yet know who we really are. That is, we don’t yet fully understand what it is to be a systematic understander of the world” (Ibid., 8).
for the Greek philosopher, then both Augustine and Giles are not trying to complete the Greek project of wisdom. On the contrary, they are trying to redefine it. The foundation of this reason is drawn out in the third and final argument of the *Quodlibetal* question.

Giles’s third argument follows from the continuation of the above quotation from Augustine, wherein Augustine sets the parameters that limit the scope of this *scientia*. As written by Giles, the quotation continues: “To this science is attributed only that by which this most saving faith (*saluberrima*) which leads to beatitude is grown, nourished, defended, and strengthened” (emphasis mine).48 From Augustine’s declaration that this “science” (*scientia*) has to do with faith and/or beatitude, Giles explicitly builds his third argument on the presumed end or purpose of theological knowledge: “The third argument is taken from the part of this science, as it is refers to its end.”49 Once more in contrast to the classical view described by Fredosso, which values those disciplines most of all which are “ends in themselves,” Giles believes that the value of theology is not intrinsic to itself or its epistemic achievement, but only in its status as a means or instrument toward something else. He writes: “for this science is like an organ to felicity, and for this end it has been given to man so that he may arrive at beatitude.”50 Thus, for Giles, “this science” is taken to be the discipline of *Sacra Pagina* and is subordinated to and limited by the goal of beatitude.

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48 Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta* (1646), III, q. 2, 129. “Quod illud tantummodo huic scientiae attribuitur, quo fides saluberrima, quae ad beatitudinem dicit, cognitum, nutritur, defenditur, ac robatur.” Hill translates: “All I ascribed to it was anything that breeds, feeds, defends, and strengthens the saving faith which leads to true happiness” (Hill, 371).
49 Ibid., III, q. 2, 128. “Tertia via sumitur ex parte huius scientiae, ut refertur ad suum finem”.
50 Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta* (1646), III, q. 2, 128. “Est enim haec scientia quas organum ad felicitatem: et ad hunc finem data est homini propter beatitudinem adipiscendam.”
There is some ambiguity in Giles’s interpretation of Augustine in both the second and third argument. Giles’s use of the term theology or Sacra Pagina does not always run perfectly parallel to a straightforward reading of Augustine and his use of scientia. We typically think of theology as dealing within divine things, as opposed to other sciences that might deal with human things. But when Augustine speaks of scientia in contrast to “wisdom” he is clearly referring to those disciplines that deal with human affairs, and his point is that wisdom’s interest in these disciplines is limited. They are useful only when they strengthen faith, but are otherwise either superfluous or harmful. It is faith on the other hand that leads us to beatitude. It is not clear if Augustine really means to say that either faith or wisdom is limited when it comes to knowing God. Giles, however, has conflated his idea of theology both with Augustine’s references to “science” and to the “faith which leads to beatitude.” Thus theology or Sacra Pagina is both a limited science about God and that which leads us to beatitude. In this way, theology and faith appear almost indistinguishable in the Aegidian position. What is more, Giles has used Augustine’s limitation of the knowledge of human affairs to defend a limitation of theology in our knowledge about God. Our goal is not to establish the right reading of Augustine, but to articulate what Giles thinks is the right reading; nevertheless, his interpretation of Augustine is by no means obvious.

Finally, the rest of the Augustinian quotation (conveniently ignored by Giles) complicates this conflation between science, faith, and wisdom. The rest of the quotation reads:
Very many of the faithful do not excel in such knowledge, though they excel very much in faith itself. It is one thing to know only what a man should believe in order to gain the happy life which is nothing if it is not eternal; quite another to know how the godly are to be assisted in this and how the attacks of the ungodly upon it are to be met, and it is this that the apostle seems to call by the proper name of knowledge.\textsuperscript{51}

Here there is a clear distinction between those who have the faith, which leads to beatitude, and those who have this science. In a later section,\textsuperscript{52} we will see that future Augustinian hermits will be challenged by this ignored text and will have to find a way to explain it, while still being faithful to the Aegidian reading of Augustine: a reading, which above all emphasizes that theology is merely an instrument, wherein the impetus to know is subordinated to the higher goal of beatitude.

V. The Name of this Restricted Ratio and Theology’s Distinction from all other Sciences

Aside from once again confirming Giles’s reliance on Augustine and his belief that theology must treat God in a restricted way, this third argument takes us one step further than the previous two arguments. The argument does more than simply tell us that God must be considered under a restricted ratio; it also helps Giles to identify what that restricted ratio is.

However, while Giles merges these two questions together (namely whether God must be considered under a restricted ratio, and what that restricted ratio is), caution recommends that we recognize that these are really two different questions. We should anticipate, then, that disagreement about the name of the special ratio does not

\textsuperscript{51} Augustine, \textit{De Trinitate}, XIV, c. 1, n. 3 (trans. Hill, p. 371)

\textsuperscript{52} See below chapter 5, p. 233, “Whether Theology Is Something Different from Faith?”
necessarily indicate disagreement on the larger issue of whether God must be considered under a special ratio. As we look to find doctrinal unity between diverse thinkers, distinguishing between disagreements on a sub-issue versus disagreements on the more fundamental assumption is an important distinction to keep in mind.\textsuperscript{53}

In the case of Giles, the authority of Augustine leads him directly to the particular ratio under which he thinks theology considers God. Given theology’s purposeful orientation to beatitude, he says: “whatever theology considers about God, it considers under this ratio and this condition: that God is our glorifier and beatifier.”\textsuperscript{54} In the same Quodlibet, one objection is given, which is aimed not against the principle of a restricted ratio per se, but against the particular designation of “glorifier” and “beatifier.” The immediate response is revealing of theology’s supposed place within the plan of human salvation and beatitude.

\textsuperscript{53} Consider Thomas of Strasbourg’s clear preference for the ratio “summe diligible.” Strasbourg shows a preference for this name over the name chosen by Giles, but he simultaneous shows reverence for Giles by defending his position against objections, all the while declaring that the debate over the correct name is a minor issue. First regarding the preferred name of the ratio, he writes: “Et licet deficiamus in nominibus subiectum istius benedictae scientiae sub tali ratione speciali sufficienter exprimitebus; potest tamen sic describi, ut dicatur, verum summe diligibile ut proportionatum est rationali animae nondum perfectae per habitum luminis gloriae” (\textit{Commentaria}, I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, f. 2va).

Next consider his simultaneous dismissal of the controversy and respect for Giles: “Advertendum tamen, quod per id, quod superius posui, quantum ad rationem subiecti sacrae theologiae non intendo deviare a venerabili doctore nostro fratre Aegidio, qui licet per alia verba praedictam veritatem expressit, idem tamen (ut credo) dicere voluit: per rationem enim speciale ut ipsemet dicit, non intendit, nisi restrictionem in obiecto illius abyssalis rationis superius nominatae. Cum autem quandoque rationem subiecti istius scientiae explicando, ponit nomen glorificatoris, non est sibi cura de tali nomine, quia ipsum quandoque dicit, quod non possimus nomen aptum invenire, quo talem rationem specialem sufficienter exprimamus. Sed per nomen glorificatoris intendit, quod ratio praedicta nominari debet in ordine ad finem, ad quem nos ducit illa scientia benedicta, qui finis est gloria vitae aeternae, quae principaliter consistit in Dei dilectione. Et ex hoc etiam patet, quod omnes illi, qui arguent contra hoc vocabulum glorificator, magis laborant contra nomen, quam contra doctoris intentionem. Et licet praedictorum rationes non sint contra me, gratia tamen istius doctoris venerandi volo ipsis respondere” (Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 3, f. 4rb).

\textsuperscript{54} Aegidius Romanus, \textit{Quodlibeta} (1646), III, q. 2, 129. “Quicquid considerat de Deo, considerat sub hac ratione, et sub hac conditione, ut est glorificator, et beatificator noster.”
The objection singles out “restorer” as another possible candidate for the restricted *ratio* of theology. This candidate comes up in the *initial objections* listed in Giles’s *Quodlibet*. But it is identified as a problematic term by the objector because it suggests that the purpose of theology in leading toward beatitude is to restore our broken condition. That is, the goal of theology is to heal the wound incurred through sin or save us from our post-lapsarian status. But the objector notes: “if we suppose that man never sinned, there would still be *Sacra Pagina*. And yet man would not have been restored.”

This response is built on a view of theology as a body of knowledge that extends beyond what is relevant to our restoration. Further, it suggests that knowledge required for salvation is only a partial fragment of a wider body of truths enjoyed by those who have already been restored or never needed to be restored in the first place.

In reply, Giles shows us that theological knowledge is not limited to what is merely needed to escape our pilgrim status, but is always limited by the concern for beatitude. This limit exists whether we stand in need of salvation or not. The name “restorer” is acceptable to Giles only if by it one can mean “any kind of provision for a deficiency” (*qualibet suppletione defectus*) and not just the restoration from some historically incurred sickness. Understood in this way, we can recognize that theology is a tool for a supernatural end (beatitude) that lies beyond any natural end, unreachable

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55 Ibid., III, q. 2, 128. “Sed dato, quod numquam homo peccasset, nihilominus fuisset Sacra pagina, non tamen homo fuisset restauratus.”
56 Both Scotus and Ockham will interpret the Augustinian quotation and its limited “scientia” along these lines. For Scotus, see p. 114; for Ockham, see p. 127.
57 Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta* (1646), III, q. 2, 130. “Quod autem dicebat tertio de restauratone, dici debet, quod ibi restauratio debeat sumi large pro qualibet suppletione defectus.”
in principle without divine aid. Here, we find echoes of Aquinas’s departure from the Aristotelian conception of one final natural end for human beings and the addition of a supernatural end alongside our natural end. As an instrument for our supernatural end, 

_Sacra Pagina_ cannot be conceived of as a medicine for a contingent and historically incurred wound, but as a necessary addition to our natural state—necessary, that is, if one wants to transition from natural happiness to the supernatural beatitude.

The distinct character of this _ratio_, as oriented toward a beatitude only achievable through grace and supernatural aid, explains one of the defining differences between theological knowledge and other human sciences. Theology does not begin from sensible things as all other human sciences do. It is not enough that a science considers God as one of the things under its umbrella. It may, after all, be possible for God to be considered _qua being_ in metaphysics or in connection to some other sensible reality. However, for Giles, this is not sufficient. Not only is theological knowledge a kind of knowledge that restricts itself to the goal of beatitude, it is also a unique way of knowing God. To know God under the _ratio_ of glorifier and beatifier is to know God from a vantage point (_ratio_) not found in the sensible world; this is paradoxically a kind of knowing still within our finite capacity, yet supernatural with respect to the way it knows.

58 Ibid. “Si enim homo numquam peccasset: nihilominus tamen ex puris naturalibus non potuisset consequi beatitudinem.”
59 Cf. Aquinas, _Summa Theologica_, Ia-IIae, q. 5, a. 3.
60 Cf. Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 64. “Theology does not directly nor principally treat of sensible things, nor does it begin with sensible things as humanly discovered sciences are forced to do. Theology follows the pattern of divine wisdom, which has itself as principal object and all other things as secondary object, known only in the understanding of itself.” Also see the discussion on theology and metaphysics below, p. 84.
61 See below p. 84.
This, then, is what we can glean from the three dominant arguments with which Giles shapes his position. Amid the introduction of many other arguments pro and con, these three arguments will be repeated again throughout the fourteenth century. As such, they reveal the core commitments that Giles has as a theologian and what he thinks is the authentic Augustinian position on the matter. To summarize, the arguments are: (1) God in himself is an infinite ocean; to have such an infinite object as the object of knowledge would be to have an infinite science, which is impossible (naturally or supernaturally) for any and all finite creatures. (2) A science of God as infinite or under an absolute ratio would mean possessing a knowledge of everything. But this goes against the authority of Augustine, who, on Giles’s reading, states there are many things about which “theology” does not concern itself. And (3) closely related to the second, theology is a tool, an instrument, or an organ. It is not an end in itself, but is a means by which we can attain our supernatural end—not simply salvation, but a beatitude as proper to the pilgrim soul as it is to those who never fell from grace and those who enjoy beatitude in actu.

VI. On the Nature of Beatitude

With Giles’s core beliefs laid out, we can turn to some common concerns that were raised about the implications of his position. The two concerns that we will consider in this section and the next are about the conception of beatitude seemingly demanded by Giles and about the nobility of a “limited theology” in comparison to the universal aspirations of metaphysics. We turn first to the concern with beatitude.
Godfrey of Fontaines raises this concern explicitly in a direct challenge to an early *Quodlibetal* question of Giles, *Quodlibet* 1, q. 21. This question, dated from Easter 1285, asks whether those who are enjoying (*fruentes*) and seeing God, see everything which is in him. The concern is clearly about the nature of beatitude and the implications of Giles’s position on the subject and nature of theology for an acceptable doctrine of beatitude. Giles’s position in his first *Quodlibet* is consistent with the position on beatitude taken in *Quodlibet* III, q. 2. Gregory the Great affirms that the Blessed do in fact see everything there is to see in God, and this opinion is taken as the traditional and authoritative belief about beatitude. But Giles disagrees. His key assertion comes in the form of a distinction between knowing God *totum* and knowing God *totaliter*. Giles writes:

Thus even while they are seeing God it is not necessary that they know everything which is in God, and they do not know every effect that is able to proceed from him. Whence it is commonly customary to say that to know God *totum* is one thing and to know God *totaliter* is something else.

The point is made by a number of comparisons about the way things exist in God. Like numbers in unity, lines in a point, particular virtues in the sun, powers in the soul, and

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62 Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 68n1.
63 Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta* (1504), I, q. 21, f. 11va; Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta* (1646), I, q. 21, 44b. “Utrum fruentes Deo et videntes ipsum vident omnia quae sunt in ipso.”
64 Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta* (1646), 44b. “Et arguebatur quod sic per Gregor dicentem: ‘quid est quod non videant, qui videntem omnia vident?’ Beati ergo, qui vident Deum videntem omnia, etiam omnia vident.”
65 Ibid., I, 20, 45. “Sic videntes Deum non est necessarium videre omnia quae sunt in Deo, aut omnes effectus qui possunt ab ipso procedere. Unde et communiter dici consuevit quod alii sit cognoscere Deum totaliter.”
conclusions in principles, all of God’s effects reside in him. Yet one may know God without knowing all these effects in the same way that one may know unity, point, the sun, the soul, and principles, without knowing all the things contained in them.\textsuperscript{66} For Giles, the Blessed, who know God \textit{totum}, truly see God, but they do not see him \textit{totaliter} because they do not comprehend him. That is, “they do not understand him in every mode in which he is able to be understood, and therefore they do not understand everything which shines in him, or everything which is able to proceed from him.”\textsuperscript{67} Here, Giles reinforces the view that God is a subject in the second and “loose” sense.\textsuperscript{68} Peter Nash draws out the most distinctive feature of this position on beatitude by comparing Giles’s position to that of Thomas Aquinas. Nash writes:

Where Giles differs from St. Thomas is not with regard to the knowledge which the Blessed might have of God’s possible effects (cf. St. Thomas, \textit{De veritate}, q. 8, a. 3, ad 11m), but with regard to their knowledge of God himself. For St. Thomas this [creaturely] knowledge [of God] does not differ specifically from God’s knowledge of Himself, for Giles it does differ specifically, thanks to a different formal aspect [or \textit{ratio}].\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{66} Cf. Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 68. “Things exist in god as numbers in unity, lines in a point, particular agents in the sun, powers in the soul, and (here Giles adds a parallel given by St. Thomas but not by Denis) as conclusions in their premises. Now one can know all of these: unity, point, sun, soul, premises, without thereby having to know all the numbers, lines, particular agents with their effects, and the conclusions derivable from them. Hence know God does not entail seeing all that is in Him or all the effects that can proceed from Him.”

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid. “Nec intelligunt eum omni modo quo intelligi potest, et ideo non intelligunt omnia quae relucent in ipso, vel omnia quae possunt ex ipso procedere” At the end of this same passage Giles makes an unmistakable assertion against the Gregorian thesis: “Non oportet ergo, sanctos, qui vident in patria Deum totum, et non vident ipsum totaliter, videre omnia, quae sunt in ipso” (p. 46a).

\textsuperscript{68} See above p. 50.

\textsuperscript{69} Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 68n6. We should note that there seems to be a typo in the original version of Nash’s text. The actual text reads “for Giles it does \textit{not} differ specifically, thanks
The key is Giles’s commitment to the fact that the Blessed, while beatified, remain creatures and therefore remain finite. Because they are finite they can truly see God, but they cannot comprehend him. And by “comprehend,” Giles means to exhaust everything knowable in God. In contrast, our finite minds are limited such that they can only know certain aspects of what is knowable in God. This particular characteristic is sufficient to make our knowledge of God specifically distinct from God’s own knowledge of himself.

This radical contrast between our knowledge (whether as pilgrims or Blessed) and God’s knowledge of himself is confirmed and perhaps even more clear in Giles’s comparison of the three kinds of theology that appear later in Quodlibet 3, q. 2. He remarks that the theology of the pilgrim and the theology of the Blessed differ in only one thing: the light through which they know. But, surprisingly, they do not differ in any way with respect to the ratio under which God is known. In other words, the transition from faith to evidence or presence does not change the scope of finite theological knowledge. Both the pilgrim and the Blessed know God under the restricted ratio of glorifier. God on the other hand, knows himself in a unique light and under the ratio of God qua God. Thus, his knowledge of himself is of an altogether different type than the knowledge that the Blessed have of God.70

70 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 129b. “Haec scientia a scientia qua pollet Deus differt in duobus; videlicet in ratione considerandi, et in lumine, per quod considerat; sed non differt in tertio, videlicet, in re considerata; de illo enim eodem, ut de ipso Deo, sive de ipso pelago infinito, de quo est scientia Dei, est etiam et haec; sed non sub eadem ratione; quia Deus considerat seipsum, qui est pelagus infinitum absolute, et secundum se, et ut est pelagus infinitum et in hac consideratione clare et lucide comprehenduntur omnes considerationes; ut omnia nuda et apta sint oculis eius.”
If we were to comment on the comparison between Aquinas and Giles already begun by Nash, we might say that, for Aquinas, the radical break happens between heaven and earth. That is, the Blessed share in a kind of knowledge that is fundamentally different from the pilgrim on Earth and specifically the same as God’s knowledge of himself. For Giles, on the other hand, the break is between the infinite and the finite. Inasmuch as the Blessed cannot escape their finite and creaturely nature, their knowledge of God retains a fundamental connection to the theology of the pilgrim. But God’s knowledge, as the knowledge of an infinite being, is of a fundamentally different quality and species, in which no finite being could ever share.\[^{71}\]

\[^{71}\] While Nash rightly initiates a contrast with Aquinas, it is a subtle contrast and therefore needs further clarification. Question 12 of Aquinas's *Summa Theologica* addresses the issue of “comprehension” head-on. It asks in particular if the Blessed see the essence of God and if, in doing so, they comprehend God and know all things.

Aquinas's answer at first looks very Aegidian. Or, rather, Giles's answer looks very Thomistic. Aquinas begins in article one by stating that the Blessed do in fact see God (Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 12, a. 1). Then, in article seven, he asks whether those who see the essence of God comprehend him. And, like Giles, he insists that it is impossible for even the Blessed to comprehend God. But the reason Aquinas gives for this limitation is slightly different. He attributes the limitation, not to the perspective or ratio one has in seeing God's essence, but to the power (or light) with which the Blessed see God (see above, p. 72, n. 70). This, I think, is why Nash remarks that, for Giles, the knowledge of the Blessed is specifically distinct from God's knowledge of himself, whereas for Aquinas this knowledge is of the same type (see above p. 71, n. 69). On Aquinas's view, our weaker knowledge of God can be compared to the intensification and remission of an identical form, e.g., various intensities of the same whiteness: the greater the power of the light of glory graciously given to the beatified mind, the more comprehensive the vision. Despite never reaching an infinite intensity, this vision nevertheless retains a specific identity both with those who have been granted a less intense light and with God who knows his essence perfectly.

With this in mind, we can look again at the language of knowing God *totum* versus *totaliter* and consider how Aquinas and Giles might differ despite both agreeing that God is known *totum* but not *totaliter*. Aquinas suggests it is because we do not know God in the same mode that God knows himself, that is, infinitely. Thus, in a finite way, we know that God is infinite. But God knows his infinite self in an infinite way. For Aquinas these differing modes are determined entirely by the strength of the light of
It is to this position that Godfrey of Fontaines forms a direct response in *Quodlibet* I, q. 5. The question was written during the Christmas after Giles’s Easter *Quodlibet* of 1285, when Giles responded to the quotation from Gregory the Great.\(^{72}\)

Among his many objections against Giles, Godfrey directs one squarely at the conception of beatitude that Giles’s position requires. Godfrey writes:

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\ldots \text{For a similar reason, it should be said that the subject of the science of theology, absolutely speaking, is God simply or under an absolute ratio, that is not under some determined ratio, by means of which some things [knowable about God] are excluded. For while the enigma of faith of the pilgrims, of which God is the object, is succeeded by the open vision of glory. The finite creature can never know God in an infinite mode because the finite mind does not have the capacity to receive a light of infinite strength (Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 12, a. 7, ad 3). Particularly suggestive is Aquinas's emphasis on the fact that this does not mean "the whole object does not come under knowledge" (ibid.). For Giles, on the other hand, the limitation of the light of glory does not sufficiently explain the difference between beatified knowing and God's knowledge of himself. There is also the limitation of the ratio, which suggests that certain aspects of God's essence are not taken into consideration. Thus Giles and Aquinas agree that God is not comprehended even by the Beatified. But Aquinas believes that God is known under the ratio of Deity, and Giles continues to insist that God is known under a constricted ratio. (This does, however, raise some questions about how Giles can consistently claim that God is still known *totum*).}

What does this mean plainly? I think Giles's position calls for an ontological difference in addition to an epistemological difference. As Aquinas makes clear, the finite knowing power of the Blessed approaches the infinite object, but Giles appears to be suggesting that even the Blessed cannot approach an infinite object directly, and thus they must view God's essence from a restricted vantage point rather than quidditatively.

This ontological difference is captured when Giles says of the Blessed: “they do not understand him in every mode in which he is able to be understood, and therefore they do not understand everything which shines in him, or everything which is able to proceed from him” (see above, p. 71, n. 67). The reason the Blessed cannot know God *totaliter* is because they do not know him in every mode. Aquinas, in contrast, claims that the reason we do not know God *totaliter* is because we do not have the strength to see all that the singular vision of the essence of God allows in principle. On this view, *per impossibile*, if an infinite power of knowing were granted to the finite knower, he would be able to comprehend God. But this does not follow on Giles's view because no matter how strong the knowing power is, since God is not known under an absolute ratio, it is *a priori* true that not everything which shines in God can be seen.

Does it remain true then to say that for Aquinas the decisive break is between heaven and earth and not between the finite and the infinite? To be sure, Aquinas is no Scotus, and he seems to be much closer to Giles than Scotus. Nevertheless, the beatified finite knower does distance himself from the pilgrim knower in a way that Giles does not allow. For Giles, the pilgrim and Blessed remain united by the restricted ratio through which they know God, whether that be in the light of faith or the light of glory. This restriction essentially differentiates the finite knowing of the Blessed from the infinite knowing of God. For Aquinas, the Blessed reach a kind of knowing that can only be distinguished from God's knowledge of himself in degree, but not in kind.

\(^{72}\) Cf. Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 69.
the Blessed, still it should not be said that God is seen by the Blessed under some determined ratio, but rather according to himself and absolutely, or under an absolute ratio in which are contained all special rationes under which God is knowable in himself. For if God were not known by the Blessed except under some determined ratio and would remain ignorant about certain aspects of God, the intellect would not be able to rest, which is against the very notion of beatitude…

This complaint illustrates a couple of important points. First, it stands as another example of favoring a strong distinction between earthly and heavenly knowledge of God; in contrast Giles, repeatedly points to a distinction between finite and infinite knowing that transcends a heaven and earth division. But the complaint also shows us a deeper conflict about the nature of the “happy life” and the role that knowledge plays in the achievement of that life. Godfrey’s complaint shows his commitment to the belief that the happy life demands comprehensive knowledge of God. If there were something left to know about God, we would want to know it, and an unsatisfied desire surely does not seem like it could be a part of the happy life.

If Giles were willing to accept this conception of beatified happiness, Godfrey’s argument would surely be a fatal blow. But Giles does not accept this fundamental conception of the happy life, which Godfrey takes to be traditional and obvious. The

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Godefridus de Fontibus, *Les Quatre Premiers Quodlibets*, I, q. 5 (de Wulf, II:14). “Unde et simili secundum hoc dicendum quod subiectum scientiae theologiae, simpliciter secundum hoc dicendum quod subiectum scientiae theologiae, simpliciter loquendo de ipsa scientia, est Deus simpliciter sive sub absoluta ratione, id est non sub aliqua determinata per quam aliae excludantur. Cum enim fidei aenigmaticae viatorum, cuius objectum est Deus, succedat visio aperta beatorum; non debet autem dici quod deus sub aliqua determinata ratione videatur a beatis, sed secundum se et absolute, sive sub ratione absoluta in qua implicite continentur omnes rationes specialles sub quibus Deus est cognoscibilis in seipso, (quoniam si non cognosceretur Deus a beato nisis sub aliqua ratione determinata et remaneret incognitus sub alia, non posset intellectus in hoc quietari, quod eest contra rationem beatitudinis)...”

Nash paraphrases Godfrey’s position in the following way: “With regard to the beatific vision God is seen by the Blessed in Himself and absolutely, i.e. under the absolute aspect which implicitly contains all the special aspects whereby God is knowable in Himself. If the Blessed knew God under certain aspects only, they would not be happy” (“Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 70).
opening of Giles’s prologue to his commentary on the *Sentences* offers some particularly revealing clues to his alternate idea of happiness, which remains consistent with his position on the restricted subject of theology. Even more important, he once again shows his reliance on Augustine as an authority for his view.

In the prologue, Giles references what he will discuss in book four: “For in the fourth book, it is about those things necessary for our sanctification, which is through the sacraments, and about the divine vision, which will be after the resurrection, or about the enjoyment which is determined through charity.” The reference to “enjoyment through charity” is a subtle hint, but it grows in weight as we follow Giles further and discover his repeated affirmations that theology is neither theoretical nor practical but *affective*. The enjoyment in which beatitude consists is not primarily an activity of thought, nor even an activity of the will, but the activity of *affective* love. Nash remarks that it is here that we find the germ of “Giles’ *Augustinian approach to beatitude* which governs his evaluation of theology” (emphasis mine). He starts this final discussion of his prologue by stating that “it is not inconvenient for the same thing to have diverse ends as long as those ends are ordered to one another.” The condition that “where various ends exist, they must be ordered one to another” means that among many possible ends, one end has to be identified as the ultimate end. The ultimate end is distinguished by the fact that every other end achieves the status of a relative end because of its contribution to the absolute end. Likewise, *the degree to which* each intermediate end must be accomplished is

75 Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 66.  
76 Aegidius Romanus, *Primus Sententiærum*, prol., pars 4, q. un, f. 7vb. “Non est inconveniens eiusdem rei diversos esse fines, si unus ad alium ordinatur.”
determined by the ultimate end. Giles states without hesitation that theology has many goals. The three ends he explicitly recognizes are the end of good moral action, speculation of the highest knowable things, and delight since there is love of the perceived end. Of these three goals, one must be identified as the ultimate end, giving purpose (and a status of subservience) to the other two. Giles does not shy away from this, but states clearly: “because delight and charity are intended in the whole of Sacra Pagina, since in this depends the law and the prophets, the principal end intended by Sacra Pagina is to induce man to love of God and neighbor.” But Scripture is not the only reason that Giles chooses delight and love above good action and speculation (for undoubtedly Scriptural support can be marshaled to the other two positions as well). He chooses this position because he believes it receives the support of Augustine and is the position that he believes best represents the spirit of Augustine. He notes that this position—that theology is affective—is manifest in Augustine’s On the praise of Charity (De laude caritatis) and he quotes Augustine in full:

Therefore if anyone is not prepared to examine all the Sacred pages, to unfold every bundle of words, to penetrate every secret of those Scriptures, then hold to love, on which all things depend. In this way, you will possess what you have learned there, and you will have what you have not yet learned. For if you have known love, you have known something, which depends on what you may not yet know. And in that which you understand in the Scriptures, love is clear. And in that which

77 Ibid., prol., pars 4, q. un., f. 7vb. “Et quia videmus Sacram Paginam plura intendere, oportet diversos esse fines Scripturae Sacrae. Intenditur enim per eam bona operatio; nam finis moralis ut dicebatur est actio. Ipsa autem potissime de moribus determinat. Responsum in ea intenditur speculatio, quia de summe speculabilibus tracta. Intenditur in ea dilectio, quia finis praecepti charitas, igitur cum diversi fines in ea intendantur oportet unum istorum ad alium ordinari et unum illorum principalem esse…”
78 Ibid., prol., pars 4, q. un., f. 7vb. “Et quia dilectio et charitas in tota sacra pagina intenditur, quia in ea pendet lex et prophetae, principalis enim finis in sacra pagina intentus est inducere homines ad Dei et proximi dilectionem.”
79 Cf. Augustine, CAG, Sermones, part 1, s. 350, 1532-1535.
you do not understand, love is hidden. And so he possesses both what is clear and what is hidden in the divine words who possesses love in his life.80

Few sentiments would capture better what Giles apparently recognizes as the proper Augustinian outlook on the nature and purpose of theology. With delight and love identified as the “ultimate end of theology,” Giles is prepared to face the objection of Godfrey of Fontaines. The claim that the Blessed will be unhappy if they do not know everything there is to know about God is unfounded. Happiness does not consist in exhausting the possibilities of what can be known. Instead Giles favors a different vision of happiness, built on the authority of Augustine. Against most readings of Aristotle and the classical tradition, our most fundamental desire is not to know, but to love God and delight in him. Knowledge of God is truly an end of theology because knowledge is necessary to love God. But knowledge of everything knowable about God (and therefore all of his effects) does not appear to be necessary for loving God completely. In fact, such an insatiable thirst for knowledge can often get in the way. No doubt this is what Giles was trying to show in his later third Quodlibet (Easter 1287 /1288), and it is more than likely an implicit rejection of the vision of happiness that undergirds Godfrey’s concern. Accordingly, Giles describes theology as an instrument leading, not towards comprehensive knowledge, but toward a delightful loving that does not need to know

80 Augustine, CAG, Sermones, part 1, s. 350, 1534, ll. 17-27. “Si ergo non vacat omnes paginas / sanctas perscrutari, omnia involucra sermonum / evoluer, omnia scripturarum secreta penetrare; tene / caritatem, ubi pendent omnia: ita tenebis quod ibi didicisti; tenebis etiam quod nondum didicisti. si / enim nosti caritatem, aliquid nosti unde et illud / pendet quod forte non nosti; et in eo quod in scripturis / intelligis, caritas patet; in eo quod non intelligis, / caritas latet. ille itaque tenet et quod patet et /quod latet in divinis sermonibus, qui caritatem tenet / in moribus” (translation mine) Cf. Aegidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, prol., pars 4, q. un, ff. 7vb–8ra.
God absolutely or God qua God. Instead, God only needs to be known to that extent that is sufficient for beatitude, that is, *qua beatifier*.

One final qualification about the nature of this loving is in order. If theological knowing is an instrument of beatitude and beatitude is primarily conceived of as an operation of loving, why isn’t theology said to be practical? Why must Giles introduce the third category of “affective”? This, in fact, is an objection raised by Duns Scotus:

And therefore there is a fourth way, which claims that theology is affective. This position is acceptable if ‘affective’ is understood to be something practical. But if ‘affective’ is understood as some third member, distinct from the practical and speculative, this stands against what was said in the first article, where it was shown that love is indeed a practice. It is also against many authorities, which believe ‘science’ to be distinguished precisely into the practical and the speculative, and that there is no third member.  

This is the entirety of Scotus’s objection against Giles. If Giles uses the word affective to mean practical, then there is no real dispute. But if Giles means that love is something other than a practice, then we have a genuine disagreement. Scotus believes that he has already clearly shown what a practice is (viz. an act of the will, either *actus elicitus* or *actus imperatus*), and he also believes that the act of love quite clearly qualifies as such a practice. The burden, then, is on Giles to show whether there is any significant reason that we need to call theology (and the act of love it produces) affective rather than practical. If he cannot, then we must agree with Scotus that he and Giles are really taking very similar positions, and any dispute is a mere quibble over words.

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81 Johannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 303 (Vatican, 1:200). “Et ideo est quarta via, quae dicit quod theologa est affectiva. Quod bene potest intelligi si affectiva ponatur esse quaedam practica; si autem affectiva ponatur esse tertium membrum, distinctum contra practicum et speculativum, sic est contra dicta in primo articulo, ubi est ostensum dilectionem esse vere praxim, et etiam contra auctoritates multas, quae sentiunt praecise scientiam distinguin in practicam et speculativa, et nullum est tertium membrum.”
Despite Scotus’s apparent lack of recognition of any substantial reasons for rejecting the classification of theology as practical, Giles does offer arguments for why the theologically produced act of love cannot be classified as a “practice.” (And here we can see a continued emphasis on the supernatural character of a theological science.) In his prologue, he is obliged to respond to those who view theology and Sacra Pagina as practical in its nature. He lists three arguments which merit a response. The driving force behind all three is that if the aim of theology is to result in good work or action, we can assume that perfect love of God and neighbor would represent the ultimate achievement of such moral science. The proponent of this position appeals to the commonly cited verse in the book of James, “faith without works is dead” and concludes that theology or Sacra Pagina, like faith, receives its completion in good works. Likewise, the objector claims, those sciences that aim to make us good are surely practical, but theology aims to do this more than any other discipline.82

The thrust of Giles’s response revolves around distinguishing the end of love or affection from what he considers to be the practice of good works. Further, he places special emphasis on the chronological priority of love and affection over good works. On the surface, this is a bit confusing. For Scotus, love and good works appear to be the same, or at least love is a type of good work. But Giles sees things differently. For him, the kind of love achieved through affection is a consequence of a prior actualized goodness, not a prior potential for goodness. This is not a good that is acquired through

82 Aegidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, prol., pars 4, q. un, f. 7vb. “Scientiae quae sunt ut boni fiamus sunt practicae, sed ista maxime est talis, ergo etc.”
our habitual actions, but a goodness we receive, or rather is “in us from infusion.”\(^{83}\) The point comes out in two respects. First Giles, appeals to 1\(^{st}\) Corinthians chapter 13, where the Apostle Paul says: “if I give my body up to the flames, but do not have charity, I profit nothing.”\(^{84}\) The verse indicates that there is a wide difference between genuine charity and “good work.” Secondly, Giles acknowledges the Aristotelian logic behind the objector’s position. It makes good Aristotelian sense to say that we become good—or reach the perfection of good—through doing good works. Thus, it would seem that theology aims to produce good works in us, so that we may love God and neighbor more and more perfectly. But Giles responds: while this makes good sense, this is not the way theology works nor is this the kind of loving operation at which theology aims. In response to the objection that good work leads us to perfection, he writes:

“This mode of arguing would be valid according the mode treated by the Philosopher in the second book of the *Ethics*, because we become good by frequently doing good. Nevertheless, this is not valid according to the mode of theology according to which, it is from the fact that we are good, that we do good things.”\(^{85}\)

Giles shows a remarkable consistency in the way he treats theology alongside the natural philosophy, both in metaphysics and in ethics. Metaphysics and ethics have their proper mode of proceeding and function well within their own natural limits. But, as we will see in Giles’s comparison of theology with metaphysics, which is now visible in his comparison with ethics, theology cannot be subsumed into these natural categories. On

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\(^{83}\) Ibid., prol., pars 4, q. un., ad. 3, f. 8ra. “…sed bonitas nostra de qua hic loquimur non inest nobis ex operibus, sed ex infusione…”

\(^{84}\) 1 Corinthians 13:3. Cf. Ibid., prol., pars 4, q. un., ad. 2, f. 8ra.

\(^{85}\) Ibid., prol., pars 4, q. un., ad. 3, f. 8ra. “Et ideo licet ille modus arguendi valet secundum modum traditum a Philosophe in secundo *Ethicorum*, quia ex frequenti bene facere fimus boni, non tamen valet secundum theologicum secundum quem ex eo quod boni sumus bona facimus.”
the contrary, *Sacra Pagina* and theology run counter to our natural expectations. Where all human sciences begin with sensible things, theology alone genuinely studies God. Where sound moral philosophy depicts the proper order of moral development as a progressive and gradual development of a more and more perfect habit, theology introduces a prior perfection, received rather than achieved, from which subsequent acts of affective love are produced.

When comparing Scotus and Giles, who both use the word love to signify the end goal of theology, we must acknowledge that there is a difference behind this word. For Giles, the affective love is not a human action, produced by a human will. For Scotus, it is. Accordingly, we can expect the relationship between theological knowledge and these disparate forms of love to differ. For Scotus, there is an obvious correlation between the completeness of our knowledge of God and the quality of the loving action that our will can produce. But for Giles, such a correlation does not exist. We can understand this lack of correlation as a consequence of the fact that the love or affection he has in mind is not reducible to an action of the will and therefore need not follow the rules of natural psychology. For Giles, the pre-eminent task of theological knowledge is to accompany the proper affection of the soul, and here the correlation between knowledge and affection is not so direct. On account of the different demands made of theological

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86 This will be discussed in more detail below, see pp. 149-158.

87 How exactly they relate is something Giles does not expand on however much we wish he would. Thus we are primarily left with the negative claim: that the correspondence between theological knowledge and infused love is not direct or proportional. But we can only speculate about the positive way theological knowledge and this kind of love do relate.

Without pretending to answer the question we can note that an intriguing thread of similarity is visible in Tillich’s description of Karl Barth’s view on theological ethics and Christian love as a human impossibility. Tillich writes in the voice of Barth: “The church is commissioned to bear testimony to God
knowledge, we can see why Giles can continue to insist on the limited and constricted nature of theological knowledge, while Scotus’s practical theology still looks for comprehensive and all-encompassing knowledge of God: a knowledge, which Giles believes to be both unnecessary and beyond the capacity of any and every finite knower.

So far, we have not seen much from Giles regarding how the theology of the pilgrim and the theology of the Blessed differ. For the most part, we have seen him emphasize how they are similar. However, back in his third *Quodlibet* he does in fact address the matter momentarily, and we would be remiss not to mention it before we move on. The objection is raised that if the pilgrim and the Blessed view God under the same *ratio*, then the theology of the pilgrim and the Blessed will hardly look any different. Giles notes first that this objection fails to appreciate the dramatic difference that is made by the different lights through which the pilgrim and the Blessed know. Knowing through the light of faith and knowing through the light of glory is, as Giles says, “not a small difference.”

Presumably, knowing in the light of glory is sufficient to

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and his Kingdom, yet it is not identical therewith. The church is a historical reality, and as such it does not rank above any other historical reality…Yet it has this commission; that is its truth…That testimony can happen within the church but it can also fail to appear. Yet when it does happen it is not the realization of the Kingdom of God but is only its announcement. The same holds true of all of the church’s activity. Even its instructional and charitable work is the announcement of the Kingdom and not the realization of its presence. Thus, indeed, obedience is rendered to the commands of God, but there is no Christian ethics in the sense of an anticipation of the righteousness of God’s Kingdom. Paul’s hymn to love is an eschatological hymn and does not furnish material of a Christian ethics. For love, like the word of God and the Kingdom of Heaven, is not a human possibility. The one like the other is ‘impossible possibility,’ the object of faith and not of sight’ (Tillich, “What Is Wrong with the ‘Dialectic’ Theology?,” 134–135).

There is no perfect parallel here. But the quotation emphasizes the point that Giles sees of “affective love” as something different from “good works.” Like theological knowledge, it is not something that a person can truly claim to possess or acquire. It is a gift, that always remains a gift, and it can be taken back as quickly as it was given. Like Barth, Giles sees this “charity” as a human (or natural) impossibility. It is a work of God that can appear, but “can also fail to appear.”

88 Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta* (1646), III, q. 2, 131a. “Nam cum dicebatur si scientia nostra esset de Deo, tamquam de glorificatore; non differret a scientia Beatorum, potest dici, quod imo, quia differet in
perfect our loving to the point that beatitude is made possible. But Giles also admits that our orientation to God as glorifier differs in view of our terrestrial status. As pilgrims, we consider God as our glorifier in hope (*in spe*), whereas, as beatified, we consider God as our glorifier in reality (*in re*). At the very least, this places a temporal orientation to the instrumental theological knowledge enjoyed by the pilgrim. Our theology, as pilgrims, is about God as our future glorifier, the one *who will* beatify us, and the one *whom we will* enjoy. The theology of the Blessed considers and loves God as the present object of enjoyment. It is tempting to speculate on the difference that such different temporal orientations might make, particularly with respect to the kind and degree of loving these different orientations make possible. Perhaps our love of God as pilgrims is positioned to change and differ as progress toward beatitude is made and our hope becomes brighter. For those currently and eternally enjoying God in love, this love must be totally perfected even as their knowledge remains forever partial. But regarding these differences, we can only speculate. Giles is sparing in his remarks here and leaves the ensuing tradition, and us, with many questions about how the pilgrim’s love of God should be contrasted with the love possessed by those who have been elevated to glory and know God *in re*.

**VII. Aegidio-Augustinian Theology and Metaphysics**

Giles’s position prompted another important concern again given a voice in the writings of Godfrey of Fontaines (*Quodlibet* I, q. 5). The complaint raises a concern

 lumine, quia sub alio lumine vident Beati, et sub alio viatores, et haec non est modica differentia; ut antea dicebatur.”

89 Ibid., III, q. 2, 131. “Nam de Deo, ut glorificatore, alteri considerat scientia Beatorum, et aliter viatorum; nam scientia Beatorum considerat de Deo, ut est glorificator in re, viatorum autem considerat de Deo, ut est glorificator in spe, non ergo sunt eadem scientia haec et illa.”
about the dignity of theology among the other sciences. According to Godfrey, the restriction of theology to a consideration of God under a restricted *ratio* poses a threat to the superiority and dignity traditionally thought to belong to theology. Godfrey writes:

> Again it happens that, though God is not posited as the subject in metaphysics, nevertheless the metaphysician considers God, not under some determined *ratio*, but simply and absolutely. For although a human science is not able to know about God those things that properly belong to him except from creatures, nevertheless it should not be denied that from [creatures] one reaches a knowledge of God regarding what properly belongs to him on account of his own nature (*secundum se*) and absolutely, as is clear through those things which are discussed in the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics*. And for this reason, metaphysics more accurately is called a truer and more universal science about God than a discipline that considers God only inasmuch as he is a glorifier or supplier of defects.  

The particular concern is paraphrased by Giles as follows: if this restricted *ratio* really were required for theology, then “since, in metaphysics, everything is considered inasmuch as it is a being, and since “being” and “one” are prior to “good,” then metaphysics, which considers God as “being” would be prior to that which considers God as our glorifier, in virtue of the fact that he is our beatitude and our good.” To this objection, Giles’s responds, not by directly denying the logic of the stated argument, but

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90 Godefridus de Fontibus, *Les Quatre Premiers Quodlibets*, I, q. 5 (de Wulf, 11–12). “Item, constat quod licet Deus non ponatur subiectum in metaphysica, tamen metaphysicus considerat de Deo non sub ratione aliqua determinata, sed simpliciter et absolute. Quamvis enim scientia humana non possit cognoscere de Deo quae ei conveniant nisi ex creaturis, tamen non est negandum quin ex illis deveniat in cognitionem Dei quantum ad ea quae sibi convenient secundum se et absolute, sicut patet per ea quae traduntur in duodecimo Metaphysicae. Et secundum hoc metaphysica verius esset dicenda scientia et verius et universalius considerare de Deo quam illa quae considerat de Deo solum secundum quod glorificator vel defectuum suppletor.”

91 Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta* (1646), III, q. 2, 131. “Cum in metaphysica consideretur in eo, quod ens, cum ens et unum prius sit, quam bonum, prior esset metaphysica, quae considerat de Deo in eo, quod ens, quam ista, quae considerat de Deo in eo quod glorificator, et in eo quod est nostra beatitudo et nostrum bonum.”
by distinguishing precisely how metaphysics and theology treat God, so that we can ultimately see that the two disciplines cannot be compared side by side.

The argument appears to set metaphysics and theology side by side as two distinct disciplines that are both concerned with God. But, while Godfrey admits that metaphysics does not consider God as its fundamental subject, the point Giles is trying to make is that Godfrey has not adequately seen the consequences of this admission. In the scholastic tradition, there was a long standing debate whether the subject of metaphysics is God or being.\textsuperscript{92} Aristotle did not leave us with a clear answer, and thus the idea that metaphysics considers God as its subject has always remained a possibility. But this has always posed a problem for the idea of a separate discipline known as theology. If metaphysics is the study of God, then isn’t metaphysics a theology? Why do we need a second theology?\textsuperscript{93} Godfrey understands Giles’s answer to the above question in the following way: both disciplines consider God, but under different rationes, and in this way they differ. Metaphysics considers God inasmuch as he is being and theology considers God inasmuch as he is our good. Here we have an attractive potential solution to the problem of the difference between metaphysics and theology. But for Godfrey there is a problem with this solution. It describes the relationship between metaphysics and theology in such

\textsuperscript{92} For one entry point into this debate see: Biard, “God as First Principle and Metaphysics as a Science.” as well as Wippel, “The Latin Avicenna as a Source of Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics”; Wippel, \textit{The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines}.
\textsuperscript{93} One can see this in the very opening of the prologue of Gerard of Siena, an Augustinain Hermit and close-follower of Giles. (For more on Gerard, see below p. 296, “Gerard of Senis on the “Virtual Habit” of Theology and the Principles of Theology”.)

In the very first question he asks: “An cognitio divinae veritatis acquisita in Theologia possit haberri per scientias a philosophis adinventas.” And in the opening arguments for the affirmative, the belief in theological nature of metaphysics is evident. For the second affirmative argument says: “Veritas considerata a Theologo continetur sub veritate considerata a metaphysico, ergo cognitio talis veritatis haberri poterit per metaphysicam…” (Gerardus Senensis, \textit{In Primum Librum Sententiarum}, prol., q. 1, a. 1, p. 1a).
a way that, metaphysics must be prior to theology because “being” is prior to “good,” and therefore the science that studies God as being must be prior to the science that studies God as good.

An obvious reply might be to question the assumption that “being” is prior to the “good.” But this is not the route that Giles takes. Instead his response is to argue that his position has been misunderstood and misinterpreted. He says explicitly: “if there were two sciences and each was about God only as he is known through creatures, one of them would be about God inasmuch as he is being and another would truly be about God inasmuch as he is good or under a special ratio.”94 In short, he identifies the picture Godfrey has painted, and then agrees that, as the picture has been drawn, the science that considers God inasmuch as he is being would be prior. “No one would doubt,” he says, “that the science considering God, inasmuch as he is being, would be prior.”95 He admits that, if this indeed were his position, then he would be forced to agree that metaphysics is prior and therefore of greater dignity than theology.

However, he insists that this is not his actual position. He refutes the notion that that these two disciplines can be put on the same plane and compared side by side. Such a comparison overlooks one very important difference. The difference was already pointed to in his hypothetical example of two sciences stated above. In the hypothetical, Giles was careful to note that the two sciences being compared side by side were about God only to the extent that God can be known through creatures: that is, as a mere “thing”

94 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 131. “Si ergo essent duae scientiae, et quaelibet esseet de Deo solum, ut est cognitus per creaturas; una tamen illarum esseet de Deo, in eo, quod ens, alia verossset de, Deo in eo , quod bonum, vel sub aliqua speciali ratione, nulli dubium [dubium rep.] esseet, quin scientia considerans de Deo, in eo, quod ens, esseet alia prior.”

95 Ibid.
falling within the larger consideration of the science in question. This means God is not actually the subject of either one of these potential “human sciences.” In his own words he actually he says that neither of these human sciences considers God “in se or secundum se, but only as he is known through sensible things.” If we keep in mind our earlier discussion of the four ways “things” can be considered in a science, we should be able to see that Giles is making a rather remarkable statement about metaphysics and its relation to God: a statement that Aristotle, in all likelihood, would not accept. The suggestion is that, as known through sensible things, God is not known in a primary way, and this relegates God to the lower two ways that a “thing” can be considered: either per se but not in primary or exhaustive way or accidentally. In either case, God has become an after-thought in all human sciences, akin to the way “accidents” are considered in metaphysics as derivative kinds of being or the way “risibility” can be accidentally considered in metaphysics.

The position is predicated on the belief that the primary subject of any and all human sciences is sensible (sensibilia). Theology distinguishes itself by being the only discipline that does not take sensible things as its primary subject, but begins from God as its true primary subject. In fact, Giles says that this science is about God inasmuch as he is God (in eo quod Deus). This is a somewhat subtle point to grasp. He has been telling for some time now that theology does not treat God inasmuch as he is God, but as

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96 Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta (1646)*, III, q. 2, 131a–b. “Dici debet quod nulla scientia humanitus inventa possit considerare de Deo, nec in se, nec secundum se, sed solum ut cognoscitur per haec sensibilia.”

97 See our discussion of the four ways a thing can be considered above, starting on p. 50.

98 Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta (1646)*, III, q. 2, 131b. “Considerat enim haec scientia de Deo, in eo, quod Deus; ita quod ipse Deus sit subjectum in hac scientia; quod de nulla scientia humana dici potest…”
God as glorifier and beatifier. Despite the somewhat confusing use of the phrase *in eo quod Deus*, he does not mean to deny any of that here. What he is trying to point out is that even though theology treats God as glorifier, this does not mean that God is not the genuine and *primary* subject of this science. He only means to point out that God, as our *primary* subject is known in a restricted way (i.e., he is not known “in every way”), thus making God the subject of theology in the second and loose sense of the term.\(^{99}\) This, however, is not the case when it comes to a human science. While a human science, like metaphysics, might have something to say about God, God is not the primary consideration. God, if he is known at all, is known as a consequence of knowing some sensible thing. All this becomes evident when Giles explains why theology, as a discipline that has a God as its subject, is truly superior to metaphysics. He says:

> But a science considering God in himself (*in se*) and having God entirely as its subject, considering Him under any *ratio*, whether special or general, is of higher value (*dignior*) and prior to any other science which would consider God only as he is knowable through creatures. For in this mode [theology] is of more value (*dignior*) and prior to every other science, because it is most greatly divine, and it is like a divine science because a science receives its species from its subject. Since no human science is able to be about God as its subject, and theology is about God as its subject, this science will be of greater value than any other human science. Therefore, no matter *under which ratio* a human science would consider God, from the fact that it is not able to have God as its subject, it will not be of the same value as theology, and because it is of greater value, it is therefore prior.\(^{100}\)

\(^{99}\) Again see the discussion on the subject of a science above, p. 50.

\(^{100}\) Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta* (1646), III, q. 2, 131b. “Sed scientia considerans de Deo in se, et habens ipsum Deum omnino pro subiecto, sub quacumque ratione consideret ipsum, sive sub speciali, sive generali, dignior et prior is quamcumque alia scientia, quae considerat deum solum, ut est cognoscibilis per creaturas, et quae non habet Deum pro subjecto; nam hoc modo theolog[a] [corr. ex metaphysica, quia metaphysica falsum patet] est dignior et prior omnibus aliis scientiis; quia est maxime divinia, et est quasi Dea scientiarum, et quia scientia recipit speciem a subiecto, cum nulla scientia humana possit esse de Deo, tamquam de subjecto, et ista sit de Deo tamquam de subjecto, erit magis digna, quam aliqua alia humana.
In this reasoning, nothing is more important than the belief that a science receives its distinctive and essential character or quality (Giles says “species”) from its primary subject. All human sciences are marked by their earth-bound orientation, and this orientation will color (or cloud) any accidental vision they provide of heavenly things. Considering God, then, through a human science is like spying something in one’s peripheral vision, while always focused on something else.

This position offers a new and distinctive answer to the question of why we need theology, if metaphysics can already claim to treat divine matters. We need theology because metaphysics, despite appearances, does not actually treat God as its subject (either in strict or loose sense). As such it only tells us certain things, and more than that, it does so in a derivative way. To be sure, theology too, whether of the pilgrim or the Blessed, only tells us some things about God. But much of what it does tell us cannot be derived from other sensible subjects. These truths can only be known if God himself is the primary starting point of our knowledge. It is precisely this status as a “quasi” divine science that makes explicitly theological knowledge necessary, prior, and more valuable than what any other human science can tells us about God.

VIII. Some Later Concerns and Questions

By approximately 1290 (some 15 or so years after Giles began his prologue), the debate at Paris on the subject of theology had apparently heated up to the point that Giles decided to write a separate treatise on the subject of theology, Quaestio de subjecto.
theologiae.\textsuperscript{101} This treatise contains, as Nash correctly states, “a summary of all the arguments he has seen raised against his position.”\textsuperscript{102} Here we can find a compiled list of ten arguments against the position Giles has been asserting for the last fifteen years. And, in different ways, the above mentioned issues can all be found within this list. In the opening argument, we can find a concern for theology as the noblest science and the requirements for theology to retain its superior status. The seventh argument points out that the theology of the pilgrim and the theology of the Blessed are supposed to differ only in the light through which they see God. But, the argument assumes, the Blessed must see God inasmuch as he is God if they are to be genuinely beatified, therefore the pilgrim must see God in this way as well. These arguments continue the fierce, but often unstated, disagreement about what constitutes the happy life.

However, the majority of the arguments (2-5, 6, 8-9) raise a slightly different concern. These arguments revolve around the question of the requirements of a genuine science. More specifically, they insist from different perspectives that a science must start from what is prior, what is immediate, or what is absolute as opposed to what secondary, derivative, and relative. The arguments insist that to consider God under a restricted \textit{ratio} is to begin from what is derivative. As such, there must be a source from which this derivative attribute is derived. But it is the job of science to identify and understand this derivation from what is prior. I draw our attention to these particular arguments because they have clearly taken on a greater significance since the writing of \textit{Quodlibet} III, q. 2,

\textsuperscript{101} Aegidius Romanus, \textit{Quaestio de subiecto theologiae}; cf. Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 80n1, for approximate dating.

\textsuperscript{102} Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 80.
and because they become some of the most essential points of disagreement for Scotus and the tradition that follows him. It gains even more weight because it is the position of Scotus above all others that Gregory of Rimini attempts to refute in his own response to the question of the subject of theology. But to recognize the concern here is at once to see that the objection is not unique to Scotus, though it undoubtedly receives its classical articulation from Scotus.

Giles makes a concerted, though brief effort, to reply. He understands the objection in terms of a mandate that a genuine science of God must be understood “reduplicatively” (reduplicatio). The language of reduplication refers to a twofold priority, a priority of universality and a priority of immediacy. Relying on chapters 4 and 5 of book one of Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics*, Giles uses a triangle and its essential properties as an example. The attribute in question is “having three sides.” While “having three sides” can be true of plain figures and triangles, it is true of triangles universally. For while some plain figures may have three sides, this is not true of all plain figures; however, it is true universally of triangles. At the same time, having three sides is also universally true of all isosceles triangles. However, it is not true immediately. That is, all isosceles triangles have three sides, but not in virtue of being isosceles, but in virtue of being triangles. Therefore when it comes to “having three sides” triangles have a twofold priority. In this way, triangle is understood “reduplicatively.”

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103 For instance in I, c. 5 Aristotle, speaking of having “two right angles” (i.e. their angles equal 180 degrees) rather than “three sides,” says: “For this reason, even if you prove of each triangle, either by one or by different demonstrations, that each has two right angles—separtely of the equilateral and the scalene and the isosceles—, you do not know of triangles that they have two right angles, except in a sophistetical way; nor do you know it of triangles universally, not even if there are no triangles apart from these. For you do not know it of triangles as triangles, nor even of every triangle…” (*Posterior Analytics*, I, 5, 74a25-32 (trans. Barnes, 9)).
This example is used to explain the kind of priority that the objection demands, which it supposes God under a restricted *ratio* does not have. But Giles’s response, in short, is to affirm once more that this is a kind of knowledge that created beings cannot have. However, he is willing to admit that this kind of priority belongs to God’s knowledge of himself. But created beings cannot have this kind of knowledge precisely because they are created and to know God reduplicatively would be to know him infinitely, which is simply impossible.

In this response Giles does not tell us anything particularly new. And yet the response does not seem entirely satisfying, for underneath the surface there is the lingering question: if a genuine science demands a reduplicative object, and this is not possible for creatures, in what sense are we justified in talking about theology as a science? Giles does not give us a clear answer to this question, but we can see that it lingers. Thus, we should not be surprised that it will become a key question as the heart of the objection is raised once again by Scotus. Nor should we be surprised that subsequent thinkers, still attempting to be faithful to the teaching of Giles, are willing to abandon the idea that theology really is a science.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ The tenth objection in this compendium of arguments also raises an important concern that has so far been implicit, but will become a key concern in the ensuing years. While going into detail will take us a bit far afield, I review the basis of the argument here.

The objection questions Giles’s perhaps deepest assumption and starting point. Above in our consideration of Giles’s core arguments we saw that he started from John the Damascene’s definition of God as in an infinite ocean. It was this definition that was at work in Giles’s rejection of the idea that creatures could have God as reduplicative object. God and infinity are inseparable notions. Thus, to have God as a primary and reduplicative object would be to have an infinite object, which is impossible for finite creatures. It is this inseparable nature of deity and infinity that the objection questions. Without a doubt this is the objection of Henry of Ghent which is voiced in his own quodlibet a couple of years earlier. Giles’s reply comes in the form of a small treatise on the divine names. For the tradition to come, this answer will in no way be the final word. The question will be raised repeatedly and we will need to see where various theologians come down on the issue.
IX. In Sum: The Core of Giles’s Augustinian Position on the Subject and Purpose of Theology

Godfrey of Fontaines never lets up in his opposition to Giles’s fundamental picture of beatitude: a picture that has fundamentally shaped the entirety of his understanding of theology. But Giles continues to respond to Godfrey even late in his literary career. This later response reveals to us a consistency within Giles’s overall position. Such a consistency helps us to define the very heart of an Aegidio-Augustinian perspective on the nature of theological knowledge.

About the same time that he was composing his specialized treatise on the subject matter of theology, Giles composed his fifth set of Quodlibetal questions. In the first question of this fifth Quodlibet, he takes up the question of whether we are united to God more through love or understanding. The heart of this question pinpoints a concern that has proved decisive: what does the happy life look like? In this question, Giles finally brings this fundamental question to the surface. His answer is as we would expect. It is consistent with everything he has said from the opening of his prologue until this point. First he brings forward the authority of Hugh of St. Victor, who famously said, “love goes in, where knowledge (scientia) stands outside” and then declares: “the rational creature is more greatly united to God through love, than through vision, and

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105 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), V, q. 1, 276b. “Utrum creatura rationalis magis uniatur Deo per amre, quam intelligere? an contra?”

there is a greater union through the will than the intellect.” 107 It is through love that we are most intimately tied to God. Giles offers three reasons for this position. But the second in particular continues to focus on the inescapable nature of finite knowing and the ability of love to circumvent these creaturely limits. In love, the soul is said to be moved to the thing, while in understanding the object moves to the soul. 108 As the object comes toward us, “the thing is understood according to what is in us,” but in love, the thing is loved “as it is in itself” (prout est in se ipsa). 109 This schema is then applied to what loving will be like in the presence of God. Even in heaven, the Blessed will know or understand God “according to our mode.” 110 And as we know from what we have already seen, this remains a fundamentally finite knowing. But in love “we are united to God as he is in himself, and according to the divine mode.” 111 Love is described as a kind of ecstatic going outside oneself. And in this way, love is allowed to reach a kind perfection and completion beyond what is possible in finite knowing. 112

In sum, Giles’s conviction about the nature of beatitude leads him to expect certain things from a proper knowledge of God. Theology cannot just be a code word for any and all knowledge of God. To be sure, much knowledge about God can be derived from creatures. But this knowledge is neither sufficient nor always helpful to the goal of

107 Ibid., “Creatura rationalis magis unitur Deo per amorem, quam per visionem, et potior est unio per voluntatem, quam intellectum.”
108 Ibid., V, q. 1, 278a. “Verum est enim, quod in diligendo sit motus animae ad res, et quod objectum amoris sit res, ut est in seipsa; in intelligendo vero sit motus rerum ad animam…”
109 Ibid., “…intelligitur enim res secundum quod est in nobis; diligitur autem, ut dicebaums, prout est in se ipsa.”
110 Ibid. “…Deo secundum quod erit in nobis, et secundum modum nostrum.”
111 Ibid. “Sed per diligere uniemur ei ut ut[sic] est in seipso, et secundum modum divinum.”
112 Ibid., V, q. 1, 277b.“Quare amor transformat, quia scilicet ponit amantem extra se, et collocat ipsum in re amata…Divinus ergo, id est amore, quo diligimus Deum, est faciens extasim, ide est ponens amantes extra seipso, non permittens eos amore, sive ipsos amantes esse sui ipsorum, sed facit eos esse amantes amatorum, id est, rerum amatarum.”
beatitude. Theology is therefore a distinctive body of specialized knowledge about God and his effects limited by its relevance to one particular end: the end of affective loving and thereby enjoying God. As he sees it, there is much knowledge about God and his effects (which we both can and cannot access) that should nevertheless not be included in theology proper. Such knowledge is at best irrelevant (vana) to the goal of theology, but is more likely harmful (noxia). Likewise, we can already see that this distinctive body of knowledge must also be known in a certain way; as a quasi-divine science, it cannot know through sensible things, but must be supernaturally and graciously given knowledge. But, in what sense this can be called knowledge and in what way this can be distinguished from mere faith is still a question left to consider.

To be clear, then, we can mark out the Aegidio-Augustinian position as one that emphasizes the following: 1) the primacy of the love of God over the knowledge of God, 2) the nature of theological knowledge as an instrument to that act of loving, and 3) the explicitly limited and restricted character of that knowledge of God in light of the finite character of all creatures. Moreover, we cannot deny that there is a clear Augustinian cloud that hovers over Giles’s opinion. This is due, in large part, to the fact that Giles wants his position to be recognized as such. Whether his opinion is faithful to the real position of St. Augustine or not, Giles is self-consciously attempting to brand his position as Augustinian. As we have seen, at nearly every critical juncture, Giles has appealed to Augustine for support. He has actively shaped his opinion in light of what he believes to be Augustine’s own opinion on the subject and purpose of theology.
Chapter 2: Gregory of Rimini on the Subject of Theology

I. The Subject Matter of Theology

Turning to Rimini’s views on the subject matter of theology requires us to jump past the early questions of his prologue and turn directly to question four, where he asks the customary question: “Whether God, inasmuch as he is God, is the subject in our theology?” His answer begins in his usual way: with a clarification of terms. He divides his question into two parts. In the first part, he aims to explain what it means for something to be the subject of a science. Then, in the second part, he states that he will answer the specific question about the subject of theology. There is a point of possible confusion here, which we should avoid from the outset. Rimini asks specifically: What is the ratio of the first subject of a science? Our previous discussion of Giles’s use of the term ratio might tempt us to think that Rimini is initially asking about ratio under which the subject of a given science should be considered. But to read Rimini’s question this way is a mistake. The subsequent inquiry shows that Rimini is initially concerned with a more general question: what do we mean when we call something a subject? This is a question that needs to be answered before he can go on to decide whether God is in fact the subject of theology and in what respect (or under what ratio) he might be the subject.

Rimini’s organization of the text is almost word for word in step with Ockham’s earlier treatment of the same question. In the ninth question of his prologue, Ockham

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1 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4 (Trapp I:121). “Utrum deus, inquantum deus, sit subiectum in theologio nostra.”
2 Ibid., I, prol., q. 4 (Trapp I:122). “Quae sit ratio subiecti scientiae inquantum huiusmodi.”
begins in the exact same way: first, he says we need to know what it means to be a subject (\textit{quid est de ratione subiecti primi alicuius scientiae?}) and then we can consider the more specific question about the subject of theology.\(^3\)

The very fact that both Ockham and Rimini have to ask “what is a subject” in such an explicit way before they can even consider what the subject of theology is shows that this terminological question has become particularly pressing. Ockham’s next move, which Rimini continues to follow, points us to one major source of these developments. Both authors turn to Scotus, whose articulation of what it means to be a subject of a science is decisive for his further position on the \textit{ratio} under which theology considers God. We must therefore see what Scotus has to say on the matter before we can go any further.

\section*{II. Scotus on the Subject (and Object) of a Science and the Subject of Theology}

The primary passage of Scotus’s corpus referred to by Ockham and Rimini is taken from the prologue of his \textit{Ordinatio}, part three. Scotus asks, whether theology is about God as its first object.\(^4\) Right away we can see that Scotus is interested in the same

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\(^{3}\) Guillelmus de Ockham, \textit{Ordinatio}, 1, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:227). “In ista quaestione est una difficultas: quid est de ratione subiecti primi alicuius scientiae? Ideo primo videndum est de ea; secundo ad quaestionem.”

\(^{4}\) Scotus’s own discussion does not begin in a vacuum, but takes in orientation from previous discussions. Most notably the discussion of Henry of Ghent, SQO, a. 19, which asks two questions: “Prima de quo est ista scientia ut de subiecto: utrum de Deo, an de aliquo alio. Secunda de quo est ut de materia; utrum de quolibet scibili universaliter” (Henricus a Gandavo, \textit{Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum}, a. 19 (I:114v)).

In the first article, Henry makes a sharp distinction between the material considered in a science and the proper subject of that science: a clarification similar to Giles’s distinction between the “things” considered in a science and the “subject” of a science. In his discussion, the subject is identified by its causal role in producing knowledge (see below p. 102, n. 14). Henry makes it clear that God alone can fulfill this role. In his second article, Henry suggest that theology does not extend to everything knowable absolutely, but everything knowable under the aspect (\textit{ratio}) of belief, and he admits that if there are other knowable things that do not fall under faith, then they are not “determined” from this science. This article
topic as Ockham and Rimini and that he broaches the topic with a terminological
difference. Scotus asks about the “object” of science, while Ockham and Rimini ask
about the “subject.” In fact, while quoting Scotus, Ockham and Rimini at times both take
the liberty of changing Scotus’s use of “object” to “subject.”

5 We will venture an explanation for the terminological shift in due course, but for now it is enough to
recognize that this is the passage that Ockham and Rimini are primarily reading.

Scotus breaks this general question down into three parts: (1) “whether God is the
first object of theology,” (2) “Whether God is the first object under a special ratio,” And
(3) “whether theology is about every thing on account of each thing’s attribution to the
first subject of theology.”

6 His third and final question in particular shows us that the key concern is how far theology extends its reach.

7 Is theology a universal master science encompassing all knowledge within its orbit? Does it obtain knowledge about every
knowable thing? Or is it a particular science dealing only with a special subset of things
and propositions? This was a central issue at stake for Giles of Rome, and by linking

suggests some agreement between Scotus and Henry on the causal role of the subject/object of a given
science, but some disagreement about the extent of the theological science. The limited extent suggests that
Henry believes God to be known under a restricted ratio. However, Henry, in his 12th quodlibet, suggests
otherwise, and Scotus reads him as committed to the view that God is known under the absolute ratio of
Deity in the second question of the prologue of the Reportatio. (Cf. Johannes Duns Scotus,
Reportatio I-A, I, prol., q. 2 (Wolter 57, n. 158)).

Henry writes: “Quod est subiectum huius scientiae inquantum credibile est, ad istum scientia
pertinet. Si qua autem sunt alia scibilia quae sub fide non cadunt, neque per fidem credenda esse
determinantur ex hac scientia. Ommno non sunt de consideratione huius scientiae, qualia sunt quam
plurima quae propria sunt scientiis physicis, quorum notitia etiam si per fidem teneatur firmissime, in nullis
ad credenda de Deo adminiculatur; ut est notitia d numero, ordine, et motu caelorum et caeterorum
huiusmodi…quia aliena sunt a nostro studio, et a divinae lectionis sacrae, his quia foris sunt relinquamus”
(SQO A. XIX, q. 2, f. 117r X).

5 See for example Guillelmu de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTH I:227, ll. 16–17). Or Gregorius
Arnimensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:123, l. 3). Compare with Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio,
I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:96, n. 142).

6 Cf. Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:90–94, n. 124, 133, 139).

7 Henry of Ghent’s second question of article 19 shows that he makes the same connection as well. See
above, p. 98, n. 4.
these three sub-questions together, Scotus shows us that this is still very much on his mind.

In his provisional set up, with which he hopes to answer these three questions, Scotus takes up the discussion that initially interests Ockham and then Rimini. He says we first need to be aware of a distinction between (i) *theologia in nobis* and *theologia in se*. Second, (ii) we need to know what it means to be the first object of a science (*secundo assignabo rationem primi obiecti*). And finally, (iii) we need to be informed about the different parts of theology. While the first and third conditions are important, Ockham and Rimini focus directly on the second, and accordingly we will focus our attention here.

According to Scotus, the first object of a science is distinguished by the fact that it “contains virtually in itself in a primary way all the truths of that habit.” In effort to explain and defend what he means by this definition, he offers two arguments in the *Ordinatio*, both of which Ockham and Rimini cite in their descriptions of the Scotist position. He first argues that a first object…

...contains immediate propositions, because the subject of them contains the predicate, and accordingly contains the evidence of the entire proposition; and immediate propositions contain conclusions, therefore the subject of the immediate propositions contains all the truths of that habit.

The argument offered here is based on a prior conviction about what it means for something to be a science. For Scotus, a distinct science is identified by the unique

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9 Ibid., prol., pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 142 (Vatican, I:96). “...objectum primum continet propositiones immediatas, quia subjectum illarum continet praedicatum, et ita evidentiam propositionis totius; propositiones autem immediatae continent conclusiones; ergo subiectum propositionum immediatarum continet omnes veritates illius habitus.”
interconnecting web formed by its subject, principles, and conclusions. And in the 
*Ordinatio* he claims that such a web must also be the result of a series of deductive 
moves.\(^\text{10}\) However, by the time he writes the *Reportatio*, he gives up this criterion that 
each proposition must actually be deduced and is content to accept as a science any web 
of truths that are in principle deducible. This allows him to acknowledge that God also 
has “scientific” knowledge, since he knows all the truths of a given science, but 
obviously does not deduce them through a discursive temporal process.\(^\text{11}\) Such a 
deductive system, or potentially deductive system, requires a unique principle object. 
This object must be capable of being the starting point for every other truth within that 
scientific system, and only an object which contains “virtually” every other truth that 
belongs to that science is so capable.

The second argument is built around the notion of primacy (*primitas*) and relies 
on Aristotle’s explanation of universal predication required by a genuine science in 
*Posterior Analytics* I, 4.\(^\text{12}\) Scotus explains that his definition employs the notion of

\(^\text{10}\) Ibid., prol., pars 4, n. 208 (Vatican, I:141). “…dico quod scientia stricte sumpta quattuor includit, 
videlicet: quod sit cognitio certa, absque deceptione et dubitatione; secundo, quod sit de cognito necessario; 
tertio, quod sit causata a causa evidente intellectui; quarto, quod sit applicata ad cognitum per syllogismum 
vel discursum syllogisticum.” However earlier evidence of the changes to be made in the *Reportatio* are 
already evident at the end of the same paragraph, where he toys with the idea of the dropping the fourth 
criteria about discursive reasoning: “Ergo theologia in se non est scientia quantum ad ultimam conditionem 
scientiae; sed quantum ad alias tres condiciones est scientia in se et in intellectu divino” (Vatican, I:142).

the account of the Rep. I-A…it becomes immediately clear that Scotus non longer distinguishes between 
the several levels at which science (and theology) is possible, but speaks of science in universal terms as 
applied to any—generic—intellect, and only then qua in the intellect of a pilgrim. Discursive thinking is no 
longer a necessary condition for science. Removing this restriction automatically removes the problem with 
such a science being in an ‘ideal’ or perfect intellect that does not employ discursive thinking; hence this 
problem is not even mentioned” (“The Nature of Theology in Duns Scotus and his Franciscan 
Predecessors,” 39).

secundo sic: quia primitas hic accipitur ex I Posteriorum, ex definitione universalis, secundum quod dicit 
adaequationem…” Aristotle himself states: “something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary
primacy on account of the required adequacy between the object and the habit. He writes: “the object would not be adequate to the habit unless it virtually contains all things to which such a habit inclines one to consider, because otherwise, the habit would exceed the object.”\(^{13}\) In other words, Scotus assumes that the first object is the real cause of our cognitive habit, and therefore it would be a genuine problem if we ended up with effects (i.e. knowledge) that were disproportionate to the capability of their cause. Once more: it would be problematic to know more than the cause is capable of causing us to know.

Ockham reveals the crucial, but unstated assumption of this reasoning in his slightly altered restatement of the argument. He writes from the perspective of Scotus: “the object is to the habit just as the cause is to the effect. But the cause is not adequate unless it contains virtually the whole effect, therefore etc.”\(^{14}\) This description shows us an assumption that Ockham and Rimini may not share. This is the claim that the subject of a science is the cause of our knowledge of all the different truths that are collected under the umbrella of that science. This may partially explain the shift in terminology between object and subject. Scotus is thinking about the subject of a science in terms of the causal

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13 Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican, I:96–97, n. 143). “Obiectum non esset adaequatum habitui nisi virtualiter contineret omnia illa ad quae consideranda habitus talis inclinat, quia si non, habitus excederet objectum illud.”

14 Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:228). “Obiectum autem se habet ad habitum sicut causa ad effectum; non est autem causa adaequata nisi contineat virtualiter totum effectum; ergo etc.” Rimini shows himself to be reading Ockham rather than Scotus by following this deviation to the letter, something not recognized or noted by the editors of the Rimini text (cf. *Lectura*, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp 1:123)).
connection between an external reality and the knowledge it causes. Thus he says on the following page: “The habit which is called a science is the intelligible species of the first object.”\textsuperscript{15} The concept of the intelligible species has a long history, but it suffices to say its function is decidedly causal; it is vehicle of transmission whereby an extra-mental object can become an intra-mental object. Ockham and Rimini are unhappy with this assumption about the subject/object and its causal role. Rimini, in his explicit rejection of the argument, states unequivocally that neither the subject nor object is the cause of knowledge. On the contrary, he says, the conclusions of a demonstration are the causes of an intellectual habit. Further, he says no extra-mental object is responsible for causing these conclusions.\textsuperscript{16}

This, then, is Scotus’s basic position on what it means to be a subject of a science, when the subject is conceived of as the object. As we can see, it is built upon the assumption about the causal role that a first object is expected to play in producing the integrated knowledge of a given habit. From here, we can sketch out the implications of Scotus’s view on the object of a science in general for of our more particular concerns with the principle subject matter of theological knowledge and the scope of the theological body of truths.

With this understanding of the subject/object of science, Scotus feels that the answer to the original question of this section of the prologue—viz. what is the first object of theology—is rather straightforward. Given the requirement of virtual


\textsuperscript{16} Gregorius Ariminensis, \textit{Lectura}, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:136). “Cum enim habitus causetur ex notitiis, quae sunt conclusiones, et illae ex praemissis, quas subiectum non continet primo virtualiter, ut est probatum, patet quod subiectum non primo et adaequate continet habitum.”
containment, he writes: “nothing virtually contains all theological truths except for God.”

Therefore, God must be the object of theology.

Having dealt with the question of the object of theology generally, he next turns to the more specific question: “Under what ratio does theology considers it object?” He first provides an analogous example that we already used to understand what scholastic thinkers meant by ratio, but it will be helpful to review this example once more. He says: let us think about Human Being as “rational animal,” as a “substance,” as “gentle,” and as “the most noble of the animals.” Each of these, for Scotus, represents a way that Human Being can be considered, and, as such, represents a genus of rationes under which Human Being can be considered. Respectively, these genera are: under the proper quiddity (humanitas), under a common concept (substantia), under an accident (mansuetum), and lastly under a relation to something else (nobilissimum animalium).

But, as his position on the first object of a science and the idea of virtual containment has already made clear, the first object must be known in a way prior to the knowledge of every other part of that science and must be known in the most perfect way. It is, after all, from the knowledge of this first object that the knowledge of everything else in that

17 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 151 (Vatican, I:102). “Nihil continet virtualiter omnes veritates theologicas nisi Deus.” Scotus then provide the proof of this claim: “Probatio minoris: nihil aliud continet eas ut causa sive ut illud ad quod habent attributionem nisi Deus, quia Deus nulli ali attribuitur; nec aliquid continet eas ut effectus demonstratione quia, nam nullus effectus demonstrat Deum esse trinum, quod est potissime veritas theologica, et similia; igitur etc.”

18 This concern belongs to the second of the three main questions that structured the third part of the Prologue. See above p. 99.

19 See above chapter 1, p. 31.

science depends.\textsuperscript{21} Yet in only one of these four ways of knowing Human Being is Human Being known in an independent and primary way, i.e. without some other truth of the science already being presupposed and with enough clarity so one can see all truths contained within it. Scotus holds that only when Human Being is known “quidditatively” is this knowledge of Human Being able to perform the causal function required of a first object.

From this example, Scotus extrapolates that only when God is known quidditatively, in his essence, can there be a genuine theology. He compares the opinions of those who claim that God is known under a restricted ratio to those who tried to know Human Being under a concept which depends on a prior knowledge that lies outside of what is contained in this restricted ratio. The case of triangles and isosceles once more comes to mind.\textsuperscript{22} To know triangle under the ratio of isosceles can lead to inevitable errors. For instance, one might be tempted to claim that all isosceles figures have three sides because they are isosceles. The error in this absurd conclusion comes from failing to realize the dependence and virtual containment of isosceles within the more primary and independent concept of triangle.\textsuperscript{23} It is telling that Scotus, by way of critique,

\textsuperscript{21} Cf. Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican, I:97, n. 144). Here Scotus explains the preeminence that the knowledge of the first object must have: “Expono quod dixi ‘primo virtualiter’, quia illud est primum quod non dependet ab alio sed ab ipso; ita igitur ‘primo continere’ est non dependere ab aliis in continendo sed alia ab ipso, hoc est, quod, per impossibile, circumscripto omni alio in ratione objecti, manente intellectu eius, adhuc contineret objective. Nihil aliud autem continet nisi per rationem eius.”

\textsuperscript{22} In this explanation and our earlier discussion of triangles used to explain what Giles meant by knowing something “reduplicatively” we can see that Scotus is insisting on a perspective on God that Giles explicitly denied to finite creatures (see c. 1, p. 92).

\textsuperscript{23} Juan Carlos Flores in his essay on accidental and essential causality, using the example of colors, provides a helpful description of the sense of primacy and independence that Scotus demands of the first subject of a given science. He writes:

“This form of causality [essential causality] may be elucidated through the causal relation between genus and species. From a prior concept, say color, another, say redness, is derived as posterior to it.
explicitly mentions the position to which Giles and others adhere (viz. of God as “restorer (reparatoris), glorifier, or head of the Church”)\(^\text{24}\) as examples of rationes of God that are not suitable for the first object of theology. As the example suggests, these would not qualify because they lack the virtual containment of all other truths proper to God. Instead, like isosceles, the characteristic of God as glorifier is a concept contained in and dependent on higher truths within the total hierarchy of truths proper to the science in question.

Despite the implicit, but obvious critique of Giles at this point, our earlier sketch should be enough to convince us that Giles would probably agree with much that Scotus has said up to this point. In fact, Giles’s agreement is practically explicit when he says in Quodlibet III, 2 that God is the subject of his own self-knowledge and this subject is under the ratio of Deity.\(^\text{25}\) Accordingly, Scotus’s critique of Giles up to this point is rather unfounded. Both agree in the perfectly comprehensive nature of God’s knowledge

Further, redness as a quidditative concept could not exist, or would entail a contradiction if there were no concept of its genus, namely color. The reverse, of course is not true. One can imagine the possibility of someone never having seen a particular color, yet having experienced many other types of color and thus possessing the generic concept of color. The concept of color, then, can be understood as essentially prior to all concepts of particular colors, prior in such a way that particular color-concepts depend on its existence as their preserving, prior, higher cause. Conversely, an understanding of redness together with one of the other colors such a blueness or greenness, can lead one to the understanding of the generic concept of color as their genus. For Scotus, the hierarchical causality existing between prior and posterior implies that they are all related according to essential dependence rather than...accidentally related. In essential dependence, the existence of the posterior is virtually included in that of the prior” (“Accidental and Essential Causality in John Duns Scotus’ Treatise «On The First Principle>”, 101–102).

Important for us here is the fact that the language of virtual containment is used to identify and characterize essential causes. In the case of the triangle, isosceles is said to essentially depend on the prior concept of triangle which makes possible the existence of isosceles triangles (as well as equilateral and scalene triangles). But note that other types of triangles are not possible because possibility is tied to the definite nature of triangle as cause, and its nature is such that only certain kinds of effects are possible. In the case of God, God as glorifier and beatifier are similarly dependent effects of God’s nature qua God. It is because of who God is in his quiddity that he can also be seen as glorifier and beatifier.

\(^{24}\) Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:106, n. 158). “Ita posset poni de Deo aliqua scientia sub ratione respectus ad extra, ut aliqui ponunt sub ratione reparatoris, glorificatoris, vel capitis Ecclesiae…”

\(^{25}\) See above c. 1, p. 72.
of himself. Furthermore, both agree, as nearly all scholastics do, that God’s knowledge of himself is significantly different from our knowledge of God or *theologia in nobis*. However, we do find substantial disagreement when we turn to their respective attempts to characterize this difference.

Characterizing Scotus’s vision of this difference is difficult and controversial. Since following this thread could take us on a long detour, I simply want to emphasize one aspect of this position germane to our thesis: namely, that the resulting sub-division between the theology of the Blessed and the pilgrim is fundamentally anti-Aegidian. In this division, *theologia in nobis* in principle still considers God under the absolute *ratio* of Deity. Scotus then deals with the obvious concern about whether this means pilgrims know everything about God in a twofold manner. He admits that, in extreme cases, this is actually still possible for pilgrims, but he also insists that in most cases, *theologia in nobis* is limited either by our confused earthly way of knowing a quidditative concept of God or by the limited revelation of Scripture. The main point here is that any limits and restrictions imposed on “our theology” are not intrinsic to “our theology” in principle. Rather, they are historically incurred limits pertinent to our earthly existence, but not our finite nature; thus they are limits made to be surpassed. To see this, we need only look at three aspects of Scotus’s position. First, we need to look briefly at his description of the theology of the Blessed. Secondly, we need to see that, in rare cases, Scotus thinks even creatures without evident intuitive knowledge can know God under the absolute *ratio* of deity distinctly and with absolute clarity. Thirdly and finally, we need to note that for most earth-bound creatures, our theology is limited to what can be derived from creatures
or revealed Scripture. Again, important here are two facts: that what can be derived from creatures is still considered to be about God and therefore theological knowledge (contra Giles), and that the knowledge acquired through Scripture is considered to be a contraction of what is theoretically possible for finite creatures.

**Theology of the Blessed**

One witness to the fact that Scotus believes “our theology” for the Blessed treats God under an un-restricted *ratio* comes from his discussion of abstractive and intuitive knowledge. For him, two facts are taken to be obvious. (1) The Blessed enjoy a direct vision of God as present, which he labels intuitive knowledge, and, as a present causal object, (2) the Blessed known God absolutely or under the *ratio* of Deity. But in understanding intuitive knowledge through the direct causal presence of the object, we know that Scotus means to indicate that God, as the object of this habit, virtually contains all truths of the theological habit.

In the end, Scotus qualifies his position slightly by admitting that theological knowledge of the Blessed can be restricted in one particular way. He writes:

> I say that that it is possible that [this knowledge] extends to anything, that is to everything knowable, since all knowable things are not infinite. However, de facto, the only limitation comes from the will of God

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Steve Dumont notes this assumption when he explains Scotus’s development of the division between abstractive and intuitive knowledge. He writes: “Scotus carefully specified that “intuitive” is here taken narrowly, opposed not to discursive reasoning but to cognition through a species. Scotus then argued that these two types of cognition are distinct because we expect intuitive, not abstractive, cognition of God in beatitude. Thus, in his earliest text on the matter Scotus introduced the term ‘intuitive’ only when dealing with the beatific vision and seems to have regarded this usage as uncontroversial” (Dumont, “Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” 582).
revealing something in his essence; and therefore the theology of the 
Blessed in actuality is of as much as God voluntarily shows to them in his 
essence.\footnote{Johannes Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio}, 1, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:137, n. 203). \textquotedblright{Dico quod possibile est 
eam esse de quocumque, quia de omnibus scibilibus, quia scibilia illa omnia non sunt infinita. De facto autem non habet limitationem nisi ex voluntate Dei ostendit aliquid in essentia sua; et ideo actualiter theologia eorum est de tot quot Deus voluntarie ostendit eis in essentia sua.\textquotedblright{}}

But this restriction only confirms our central thesis: that finite theological knowledge is 
in principle unrestricted. Any limitation is external to the creaturely nature itself and only 
subject to the caprice of God.

\textit{The Subject of our Earthly Theology}

That our theology in principle can consider God under the absolute \textit{ratio} of Deity 
is even more visible when we turn away from the knowledge of the Blessed and turn to 
the creature who has not yet reached beatitude.

Earthly knowledge of God is distinguished from heavenly knowledge by 
evidence. This is true for Scotus as much as it was for Giles, though Giles focuses 
especially on the unique light enjoyed by the Blessed, while Scotus focuses on the direct 
presence of the beatific object. However, when the object is no longer present, Scotus’s 
language shifts, from the considering the \textquote{object} of our knowledge to considering the 
\textquote{subject} of our knowledge. He describes this terminological shift in the following way:

\begin{quote}
Therefore, to such habit not having evidence from an object, a first subject 
is given about that first known thing, that is, about the most perfect first 
thing, to which the first truths of this habit immediately inhere.\footnote{Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:110, n. 168). \textquote{Tali igitur habitui non evidenti ex objeceto datur subiectum primum de aliquo primo noto, id est perfectissimo primo, id est cui immediate insunt veritates primae illius habitus.\textquote{}}}\end{quote}
Richard Lee notes the same shift in terminology from the object as the complete *objective cause* of a science to the linguistic and referential function of a subject in the overall construction of a mental habit. He writes:

Scotus’s terminology shifts from speaking of the ‘subject’ of a science to speaking of the ‘object’ of a science, though at times he uses both interchangeably. However, these two terms have different senses that point out different aspects of the role it fulfills. The term ‘subject’ finds its philosophical site in Aristotle’s logical and metaphysical writings as that which is able to take predicates. The term ‘object,’ on the other hand, finds its philosophical site in relation to a potency (such as sight and its proper object) or as the relation of cause and effect. Scotus likens the ‘object’ of a science to the latter. The object of a science is related to the *habitus* of science as a cause is related to its effect. Each science would have one determinate thing that serves both as the subject to which all propositions must refer and as the object that functions as a cause of the habit. These no longer need to be held apart.29

The name “object” is reserved for the reality that actually contains the truths of a given habit. When an object is directly causing the habit through its presence, then the subject and object of a given science are identical. However, our earthly, non-beatific knowledge lacks this presence. Thus, we can only speak of God as the subject of our earthly theology, but not as the immediate object. If anything might cause a restriction to our knowledge of God, we can imagine it would be this lack of presence. But Scotus, somewhat controversially, concedes in his later *Reportatio* that it is theoretically possible for the earthly pilgrim to know God through a representing species, but still under the absolute *ratio* of deity. Further, he concedes that this species, while representing God

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without evidence, is capable of providing us with complete and comprehensive knowledge of all the truths of this habit. He states:

I respond to the question that the pilgrim is able to know truths knowable \emph{per se} about God under the \emph{ratio} of Deity, that is to know them absolutely and perfectly; absolutely and not \emph{a posteriori}, but \emph{a priori} under the \emph{ratio} of Deity; perfectly, because with a cognition that is superior to the cognition of faith.\footnote{Johannes Duns Scotus, \emph{Add. magn.}, prol., q. 2, n. 15 [Vives 22:31a]. \textquote{Respondeo ad quaestionem quod viator potest scire veritates per se scibiles de Deo sub ratione Deitatis, scire, inquam, simpliciter et perfecte; simpliciter non a posteriori, sed a priori sub ratione Deitatis; perfecte, quia cognitio superiori quam sit cognitio fidei} (quoted by Dumont, \textquote{Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition}, 590.)}

He even goes to the extreme of saying that, with this species, the theologian is capable of being a \textquote{perfect theologian.}\footnote{Johannes Duns Scotus, \emph{Quodlibet}, q. 7 n. 10 [Vives 25:290b-91a; ed. Alluntis, pp. 262-63]; \textquote{Iuxta istam conclusionem haberi potest corollarium, quomodo theologia potest esse scientia in intellectu viatoris, stante simpliciter statu viae, quia intellectus potens habere conceptum virtualiter includentem omnes veritates de ipso necessarias ordinatas, immediatius scilicet, et mediatus, potest de illo objecto habere scientiam completam, sic autem potest intellectus viatoris habere de Deo; ergo etc...Esset ergo viator perfecte scientifice theologus...} (Quoted by Ibid.) See also Marrone, \textquote{The Light of Thy Countenance}, 535. \textquote{Abstractive understanding of this sort fully sufficed for science strictly construed, and Duns insisted that any theologian receiving it would be able to theologize ‘perfectly scientifically’}.} However, we also need to note that Scotus thinks this is not a frequent occurrence and it requires supernatural aid.\footnote{Dumont writes: \textquote{Scotus held that although such a strict science of God under the aspect of Deity is compatible with the wayfarer state absolutely speaking, it is nonetheless not available according to common disposition. The distinct knowledge of God from which this strict science of theology is derived results from divine action, which while, while going beyond common revelation, does not violate the wayfarer state. Apparently, Scotus had in mind some sort of infusion by God of a species distinctly representing the divine nature, or perhaps the retention of such a species in abstractive cognition after the intuitive cognition of God given in rapture had passed}}. His main point is that it is possible to have distinct and perfect theological knowledge of God, without being in a beatified state or in the direct presence of God. It is a state he grants to special pilgrims,
like the prophets and apostles, but not to the everyday theologian. Thus, for the everyday theologian, there is another kind of earthly theological knowledge, which the pilgrim possesses in, what Dumont calls, the “common disposition.”

The Subject of our Earthly Knowledge in the Common Disposition

As both Steve Dumont and Steve Marrone note, the exceptional case of earthly theology is a later anomaly and aberration in the context of Scotus’s larger corpus. Marrone states: “Here was Duns positing for the wayfarer just the kind of scientific theology he had twice rejected elsewhere in the commentaries on the Sentences.” The more usual position held by Scotus (especially in the Lectura and Ordinatio) is that our earthly theology is not a complete science because the “subject” representing God is not an intelligible species directly infused by God, providing distinct knowledge of God’s essence. Rather, it is a complex concept, providing “confused” but still quidditative knowledge of God. Continuing the passage quoted above, where Scotus describes the shift from subject to object, he tells us what the subject of our earthly theology usually is.

The first thing is the “infinite being” because this is the most perfect concept that we are able to have about that which is in itself the first subject. But nevertheless this concept has neither of the aforementioned

33 Marrone sees this as a slight concession to Henry of Ghent who wanted to raise the profile of the theologian above the philosopher by introducing a distinct knowledge of God. Scotus is sympathetic to Henry and his concerns for theology, but severely restricts the number of pilgrims who enjoy this kind of distinct knowledge. Marrone writes: “[Scotus] even added that if such intellection in a species was what Henry had had in mind with his theory of a lumen medium, as unlikely as he thought this to be, then Henry’s ideas could be nearly totally vindicated. One had only to be cautioned that where Henry believed such special knowledge was available to all hard-working theologians, he was sure God granted it in just the most extraordinary circumstances. The Apostles and prophets might have theologized scientifically; in his own day theology was routinely a less strictly demonstrative business.” (See also Johannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, I, prol., q. 2 (Wolter 65, n. 184ff)).
34 Dumont, “Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” 592.
35 Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance, 534.
conditions, since it does not contain virtually our habit in itself, nor does it contain this habit as it is known to us.\textsuperscript{36}

The substitution of “infinite being” as an intelligible species “confusedly” representing God, for the first time, genuinely limits our earthly theology. This is a theology derived from natural sensible things, and we can wonder if this should count as a discipline, which takes God as its subject in any way. For Giles it is clear that it does not; he was adamant that any science that began from sensible things was not really about God. But Scotus is more optimistic about our natural access to God and insists that even this theology still considers God “quidditatively.”\textsuperscript{37} The limitation, therefore, does not stem from the ratio under which God is considered, but simply from the confused, and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{36} Johannes Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio}, I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:111). “Illud primum est ens infinitum, quia iste est conceptus perfectissimus quem possumus habere de illo quod est in se primum subiectum, quod tamen neutram praedictam condicionem habet, quia non continet virtualiter habitum nostrum in se, nec multo magis ut nobis notum contingat ipsum habitum.”

\textsuperscript{37} Something still remains unclear here about whether this quidditative knowledge amounts to knowing God under the ratio of Deity or not.

Marrone shows that it is absolutely essential to Scotus’s project that we are naturally able to reach a quidditative concept of God. He writes: “First among all scholastics, Duns moved beyond the analogical unity of ‘being’ to claim that the concept was, in its absolute simplicity, fully univocal. At a stroke he thereby eliminated the noetic discord between knowing creatures and knowing the divine and made it easy to explain how, starting with only knowledge drawn from and legitimately referring to created objects, one could work by natural means to meaningful, indeed quidditative, cognition of God” (\textit{The Light of Thy Countenance}, 500). And later “For Duns, the wayfarer’s concept of God was quidditative in the full sense of the word” (491). His critique of Henry’s analogical approach to God through a knowledge of creatures centers on the fact that without a univocal concept of we can never truly bridge the gap between creatures and God. The prospect of a univocal concept of being allows for us to a construct a truly quidditative concept of God – as “infinite being”. However this concept remains complex – rather than simple – and as such it provides us with confused or general knowledge of God rather than a distinct or special knowledge of God, which would allow us to have a perfect and exhaustive theological knowledge. However, Scotus continues to insist that this is a quidditative and proper concept nonetheless, and judging by his earlier remarks about a quidditative ratio it seems like even the pilgrim in the common disposition must have a concept of God under the ratio of Deity, otherwise it would not be quidditative and proper.

Nevertheless, elsewhere, Marrone and Scotus suggest that the pilgrim in this life does not know God under the absolute ratio of Deity. Marrone writes: “Both [William of Ware and Scotus] conceded one could make the same point by noting that mind’s natural knowledge of God in \textit{via} was not under the formal aspect of divinity (\textit{sub ratione Dei}) or the Godhead’s particular essence (\textit{sub ratione huius essentiae ut haec})…” (p. 492);

Whatever the right answer, the important thing for us is the fact the limited nature of the pilgrim’s knowledge comes from its earthly and common status not from its finite or essential nature. Thus this is an accidental limitation, which will eventually be overcome.
indistinct, nature of this knowledge. It is as if an earthly cloud hangs over what it in principle could be a complete knowledge of God. But once this extrinsic and historically incurred limitation is removed, our natural finite capacities are sufficient for complete and total knowledge of God.

Finally, our earthly and common theological knowledge can be supplemented by a knowledge of Scripture. As confused, this knowledge does not allow us to deduce all further theological truths, and thus the revealed Scripture becomes a necessary supplement for the purposes of salvation. But special emphasis should be laid on the fact that what Scripture reveals is a partial and utilitarian fragment of the totality of theology enjoyed by the Blessed and in principle possible for the finite creature. This is how Scotus answers the very Aegidian objection based on Augustine *De Trinitate* passage. In the opening *sic et non*, Scotus cites Augustine, XIV *De Trinitate*, c. 1, as a

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38 For a further division in the knowledge of God through scripture, see Scotus’s fourth and fifth ways of knowing God, presented in the prologue to the *Reportatio* (q. 2, Wolter 68-69, n. 197). Here, there is a division between those who know in Scripture what is necessary for salvation and those who know in detail what Scripture says as well as how to defend, solve doubts, and provide further reasons. Thus, on one reading, we can see an earthly natural theology and scripture colliding.

It should also be noted that Marrone spends a good deal energy showing that Scotus believes that the natural quidditative, but limited, knowledge of God is of particular importance for our earthly understanding of Scripture. He writes: “But what today might be called positive theology – looking to divinity’s precise attributes, like “triune,” and manifesting its hidden truths, was also in Duns’s opinion elaborated on the basis of natural understanding of God as “infinite being.” Although the particular propositions Christian theology held as true were divinely revealed, the intentional content of the term ‘God’ contained in them did not exceed the concept compounded naturally by the wayfarer’s intellect. It was, in fact, the very referential limitation of positive theology to concepts that could be devised naturally by intellect which opened it up to general discourse, exposition as well as debate, even among non-believers” (Ibid., 528–529).

Two things are important here: our engagement with Scripture remains limited not by what is proper to finite creatures, but by our contingent mode of understanding through sensible creatures, endemic only to our earthly existence. This is also visible in a later quote from Scotus, who suggests that Scripture is understood according to the common quiddities available to us as earth-bound knowers (see below p. 115, n. 41) Secondly, Scotus shows a concern for grounding even positive theology within the wider academy, where its results and claims can be tested and discussed by those outside of the community of belief. This is an approach to theology that we will see even more clearly in Peter Aureoli and ultimately rejected by Gregory of Rimini.
potential objection to his conclusion, which claims on the basis of the authority of Augustine that knowledge of everything “should not be attributed to this science.”

Scotus then responds at the end of the question saying that Augustine is not speaking about *theologia in se* but “only to what is treated Scriptures.” In other words, he means this restriction applies to what is included in the Scriptural text – a special body of knowledge set aside for the purpose of achieving earthly salvation. But Augustine’s restriction does not apply to the knowledge that will be enjoyed by the Blessed when they view the naked essence of God.

Once again, it is important to see that the common earthly theological knowledge is a truly limited theological knowledge, whether limited through our confused knowledge derived from creatures or from the limited salvific purpose of Scripture. It certainly does not extend to all things knowable about God. However, this limit is

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40 Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:140, n. 207). “Ad primum argumentum dico quod concludit de theologia non in se sed prout traditur in Scriptura sacra.”
41 This is further confirmed when Scotus discusses the limited nature of “our theology” after pointing out that knowledge of the Blessed is only limited by God’s will (discussed above). Regarding the theology of the pilgrim he writes: He writes: “Just as the theology of the Blessed has a terminus which comes from the will of the revealing God, so it is for our [theology]” (Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:137, n. 204) “Sicut theologia beatorum habet terminum, ita et nostra, ex voluntate Dei revelantis.”).

Then he indicates where this limit has been set, saying: “The terminus established by the divine will, beyond general revelation (quantum ad revelationem generalem), is of those things which are contained in the divine Scripture. . . . Therefore *theologia nostra* is about nothing but what is contained in Scripture and about those things that are able to be elicited from it” (Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:137–138, n. 204). “Terminus autem praefixus a voluntate, quantum ad revelationem generalem, est illorum quae sunt in Scriptura divina . . . Igitur theologia nostra de facto non est nisi de quae continentur in Scriptura, et de his quae possunt elici ex eis.”)

Scotus clearly identifies the contents of Scripture as the central locus for *theologia in nobis*. His reference to “general revelation” is ambiguous, but suggests that *theologia in nobis* includes what can be known from general revelation or from the sensible things (which certainly fits well with his discussion of “infinite being” as the quidditative but confused subject of theology from which the truths of theology can be deduced), and that beyond this God *has willed* to reveal to us only what is contained in Scripture. In this sense, then, *theologia in nobis* would be inclusive both of a kind of natural theology and a theology that begins from the claims of revealed scripture.
proper to our common earthly existence. It is not a limit intrinsic to finite knowledge of God in general. In the end, it is a limit we ought to aspire to transcend and we should hope to one day leave beyond. In contrast, the Aegidian perspective views creaturely theological knowledge as essentially limited; to hope to one day transcend this limitation is a grave error and a distraction from the more ultimate goal of beatific loving.

III. Ockhamist Critiques of Virtual Containment

Having seen Scotus’s understanding of both the first object and first subject of a science, as well as the believed consequences for finite theology (of the earthly and beatified type), we are now in a position to consider how Ockham and Rimini receive this position. Distinctive of their response is a deep-seated suspicion about what can only be described as realist assumptions built into Scotus’s general account of how a genuine body of potential knowledge becomes known. It was, after all, from the requirement that “each science have a single object, which can be identified as the cause of the entire cognitive habit,” that Scotus built his entire system. Such an object was said to contain virtually all the truths that make up the habit in question, and from that object or representing subject, the practitioner of a given science could draw out all the truths that belonged to that discipline. It is to this realist supposition about the causal production of

In the next paragraph he adds to this volitional limit, but points to a particular earthly defect; not a defect or limit of finitude, but a limit proper to the creature in its transitory earthly state. This defect limits our ability to know “many special quiddities” (Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:138, n. 205). “De potestate theologiae nostrae dico quod non potest esse de omnibus, tum propter defectum intellectus nostri, non potentis concipere in speciali multas quidditates.”) Following this there is an appeal to the “revelation of the common law,” saying that this “common” revelation is limited to those truths, the terms of which are commonly [and] naturally conceived by us” (Ibid. “Revelatio autem secundum communem legem non est nisi de his quorum termini communiter naturaliter possunt concipi a nobis”).
knowledge that Ockham and Rimini initially react. While providing some modifications of his own, Rimini generally follows Ockham in his response, and Ockham begins his response with three negative conclusions against the Scotist position.

In the first place, Ockham rejects the idea that someone’s knowledge of one “incomplex” reality could be the sufficient cause of another “incomplex” knowledge of another thing. By “incomplex,” Ockham is employing a customary way of distinguishing between the knowledge of a simple reality versus the knowledge of a proposition (something “complex”). Rimini glosses Ockham’s rejection in the following way: if the terms “subject” and “passion” (predicates) are understood as nothing other than the “incomplex” knowledge of what the terms signify in the common way of speaking, then the “subject” term (as an “incomplex” knowledge) does not contain an attribute or passion (as another “incomplex” piece of knowledge). Ockham’s second conviction is that the subject itself, not just the knowledge of it, likewise does not always virtually contain its actual attributes. Third and finally, Ockham complains, even if someone had a distinct knowledge of both the subject term and the predicate term, this would not be enough to also have the knowledge that they go together, that is, that one term is actually the predicate of the other. In Ockham’s terms, to have knowledge of two

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42 Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:240). “Primo, quod universaliter numquam notitia unius rei extra incomplexa est causa sufficiens, etiam cum intellectu, respectu primae notitiae incomplexae alterius rei.”

43 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:124). “Secunda, quod notitia subiecti non sic continet, scilicet primo virtualiter, notitiam passionis. Et, si subiectum et passio primo modo accepta non sint aliud quam notitiae incomplexae subjecti et passionis secundo modo acceptorum, ut aliqui volunt, tunc idem est dictum primo modo accipiendio subiectum et passionem, quod subiectum non continet passionem.”

related realities is not enough to know that they are related (or form a true composite proposition).\textsuperscript{45} At this point, Rimini goes on to provide a further negative conclusion, which only furthers the point Ockham is making. He says: “in the fourth place, one principle does not virtually contain knowledge of another nor does one premise virtually contain knowledge of another premise.”\textsuperscript{46} In other words, just because a person knows one proposition, it does not follow that they know the other premises of the syllogism.

The general point, on which Ockham and Rimini are insisting, contra Scotus, is that the body of knowledge that makes up an intellectual habit is not simply caused, either in an actual or virtual way.\textsuperscript{47} Rather this body of known conclusions is constructed from several different sources of knowledge. These different pieces are brought together from different places to form a distinct habit. The notion that a science is the simple unfolding and deduction from the reception of a single (and simple) cognitive cause, according Ockham and Rimini, simple does not stand up to experience.\textsuperscript{48} All in all, this shift suggests a real adoption of “Ockhamist tools” that neither Giles nor Duns Scotus share.\textsuperscript{49} We need to watch, therefore, whether this sends Rimini’s vision of the


\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:124). “Quarta, quod unum principium non continet primo virtualiter aliud seu una praemissa aliam.”

\textsuperscript{47} We will however see some disagreement between Ockham and Rimini about the “caused” vs. “constructed” nature of mental propositions later in chapter 7. See pp. 318-327.

\textsuperscript{48} Gregorius Ariminensis, \textit{Lectura}, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:125–133). Here Rimini goes through example after example, showing how one piece of knowledge cannot be derived from another.

\textsuperscript{49} As we have seen, Giles shares with Scotus the fundamental view that the subject of a science determines the species and nature of a science. It was for this reason that Giles thought the ratio under which theology considers God must be restricted. For if God was considered under the ratio of deity, theology would be forced to be an infinite science on account of the fact that the subject God as God is an infinite subject. But
theological subject in a radically new direction or whether he can still be seen as pursuing a recognizably Aegidio-Augustinian position.

IV. What it Means to be a Subject for Ockham and for Rimini

If an object or concept virtually containing an interconnected body of truths does not exist, then this clearly cannot be what we mean when we talk about the subject of a given science. From the point of view of Ockham and Rimini, then, the question of just what we mean when we speak of a “subject” needs to be revisited. While Ockham does not say so explicitly, we can imagine that, after surveying the preceding discussion of subjects and objects, virtual containment, and rationes of consideration, he thought that the whole discussion had become rather murky. In an apparent attempt to bring rigor back to the discussion, Ockham provides us with what might, at first, appear to be his own definition. However, any good Aristotelian will recognize that rather than giving us a new definition, Ockham is trying to lead us back to the strict Aristotelian meaning of the term. He writes: “Therefore I say that what it means to be a subject of a science (de ratione subiecti scientiae) is nothing other than to be a subject with respect to a predicate in a proposition known in a science properly speaking.” Ockham explicitly rejects this point view. As he turns to provide his own account of what it means to be a “subject” he writes: “I say that it is not part of what it means to be a subject to contain virtually its attributes, as has been declared. Nor is it the case that a science is determined and specified by that subject…” Ockham even goes further: “Nor is it from the subject that a science receives its dignity.”

50 Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:247–248). “…ideo quod quod non est de ratione subiecti continere virtualiter passiones, sicut declaratum est. Nec etiam quod ab ipso determinetur et specificetur scientia…”)
the precise definition that Aristotle gives to hypokeimenon in the Categories, the Greek predecessor of the Latin word subiectum. What distinguished a hypokeimenon for Aristotle was its ability to receive and lose accidents, while remaining intact. And here Ockham follows this definition. The subject of a science is that part of the scientific demonstration which takes on an accident or attribute, “such that,” he says, “what is the subject of the science and the subject of a known [or demonstrated] conclusion are universally the same.”

With this definition, we also can recognize that Ockham is using the term scientia in a stricter way than we have seen previously. Where Scotus was speaking of a body of knowledge involving many known truths and was asking what the subject of this body of knowledge was, Ockham understands scientia to refer to a single demonstrative syllogism beginning from two known premises and resulting in one known conclusion. Once again, we can think of Ockham as attempting to cut through murky waters and bring us back to a strict Aristotelian demonstration of epistēmē.

However, this divergence in the use and meaning of the word scientia provides space for an objection, which Ockham fully recognizes. The objection runs along the following lines: perhaps it is true to say that the subject of a single demonstrative syllogism is just the subject term of the concluding proposition, but what if we are

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51 Cf. Aristotle, Categories, II, 1b10-1b15.
52 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:248). “…ita quod universaliter idem et sub eadem ratione est subiectum scientiae et subiectum conclusionis scitae.”
53 Of Ockham’s innovation here, Armand Maurer once said: Ockham “was the first, to my knowledge, to speak of a science as an arranged ensemble of written propositions…In this respect, as in so many others, he was truly the initiator of the via moderna” (Maurer, “Ockham’s Conception of the Unity of Science,” 112).
54 Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 2, 71b20-71b24, “But we say now that we do know through demonstrating. By demonstrating I mean a scientific deduction; and by scientific I mean one in virtue of which by having it, we understand something” (The Complete Works, trans. Barnes, I:115).
interested in the subject of a science, conceived of as a collected body of knowledge composed of many conclusions?\textsuperscript{55}

Responding to this objection, Ockham introduces an important distinction that both he and Rimini will continually employ in this and other contexts. The distinction is between a “partial” and a “total” science or habit. When we speak of a \textit{scientia} as a single demonstrative syllogism resulting in one known conclusion, Ockham and Rimini regard this as “partial habit.” However, they both acknowledge the possibility of a “total habit,” which is a habit that includes within itself—“either formally or equivalently,”\textsuperscript{56} says Ockham—many partial habits. A central question that accompanies this division is how a total science is constituted. What accounts for its unity is a question to which both Ockham and Rimini devote separate questions.\textsuperscript{57} For the moment, however, if we are willing to concede to Ockham that such a unity exists, then he finds the objection easy to answer. He posits the possibility of a “total subject” conceived through an analogous relationship with the subject of partial sciences, saying: “Therefore just as the subject of a partial science and the subject of the conclusion are absolutely \textit{(simpliciter)} the same, so the subject of the total science and the subject of all the conclusions are absolutely the

\textsuperscript{55} Guillelmus de Ockham, \textit{Ordinatio}, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:248). “Si dicatur quod ista ratio non procedit nisi de scientia unius conclusionis habita per unam demonstrationem, nunc autem quaeritur de subiecto scientiae per quam sciuntur multae conclusiones...”

\textsuperscript{56} Cf. Ibid.; Gregorius Ariminensis, \textit{Lectura}, I, prol., q. 4., a. 1 (Trapp I:133). Rimini lays this out quite nicely, saying “scientia potest etiam dupliciter accipi: Uno modo pro aliquo uno habitu unius conclusionis determinatae seu de sic esse, sicut illa significat. Alio modo pro collectione plurium habituum diversarum conclusionum pertinentium ad unam totalem scientiam, illa videlicet unitate, quae superius in praecedenti quaestione declarata est.”

\textsuperscript{57} See below, p. 123 and p. 124, n. 65.
same.”\textsuperscript{58} While he states this rather assertively—as if there was nothing problematic about what he says—his meaning is not absolutely clear. It is easy to see how the subject of the single conclusion and the subject of a “partial science” could be the same. But it is much harder to understand how the subjects of many different conclusions can all be the same as one single subject. It would be one thing if all the many conclusions that make up a total science all had the same subject, but, as a later objection makes plain, this is rarely the case.

The objection complains:

It does not seem that the subject of a science and the subject of the conclusion are the same, because in any science, like metaphysics, mathematics, and natural philosophy, there is one subject, and yet there is not one subject of a conclusion, but there are many subjects of many conclusions.”\textsuperscript{59}

Ockham’s initial response is to deny the assumed major premise of this argument. Namely, he counterintuitively claims that, when speaking strictly or according to the force of the word (\textit{de virtute sermonis}), there is \textit{not} one subject of metaphysics, mathematics, or natural philosophy, but several subjects. And so it seems that, strictly speaking, the subject of the total science should always be rendered as the plural, “subjects,” for the

\textsuperscript{58} Guillelmus de Ockham, \textit{Ordinatio}, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:248). “Ergo sicut subiectum scientiae partialis et subiectum conclusionis sunt simpliciter idem, ita subiectum totius scientiae et subiectum omnium conclusionum erunt simpliciter idem.”

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:251). “Tertium dubium est, quia non videtur quod idem sit subiectum scientiae et subiectum conclusionis, quia culuislibet scientiae, sicut metaphysicae, mathematicae et naturalis philosophiae, est unum subiectum, et tamen non est unum subiectum conclusionis, sed sunt multa subiecta multarum conclusionum.”
subject of total science is an array of as many subjects as are found in a unified science.  

Nevertheless, Ockham makes a concession according to a more common mode of speaking. He writes:

Frequently a first subject among all the subjects is assigned to be the first subject of a total science. Still, according to the truth, there is not one subject, since just as this science is not one, so it does not have one subject. Nevertheless, among all these subjects there is able to be some first subject on account of some kind of primacy.

Along these lines, Rimini follows Ockham quite closely. In his effort to identify a single first subject of a total habit, Rimini appeals to what it is that makes this collection of partial sciences one total science in the first place, and here we can see in part how Rimini, at least, will attempt to account for the unity of science. According to Rimini, any total science must be constituted by a group of partial sciences whose own subjects “have some analogy or order between themselves.” Rimini tells us further to “think about that one subject from among these [partial] subjects, to which other subjects have such an order and on account of which other subjects are considered, the more perfectly it

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60 Cf. Chambers who writes: “Indeed the unity of a science such as theology or metaphysics for Ockham will only be that of an aggregate or collection of habits. The unity of a habitus for Ockham depends upon the unity of its proper act(s) and the unity of act in turn is dependent upon the ‘object(s) of those acts. Thus the various objects of the habit(s) of the theologian are the various concluding propositions and the ‘subject-parts’ of those propositions that comprise the conclusions of his science. Consequently, while theology may be specifically distinguished from other scientifc habitus by either the subjects or the predicates of its propositional conclusions, its internal unity consists in a ‘collection of several habits related according to a certain and determinate order’. Once again we see a hint of the merely propositional unity of even a real science such as theology” (“William Ockham, Theologian,” 386–387).

61 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh 1:255–256).

62 For Rimini’s complete discussion one needs to consult the entirety of q. 3 of his Prologue.

63 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp, I:134). “Verum, quia quandoque talia subjecta habent ordinem inter se” and later “aliquam aliam analogiam seu ordinem habent inter se, talis scientiae dicitur esse aliquod unum primum subjictum.” Ockham says very much the same thing, and pinpoints three types of order. He writes: “Veruntamen inter illa subjecta potest esse multiplex ordo, sicut aliquando est ordo praedicationis, quia in illa scientia demonstrantur aliquae passiones de communi, aliquae de inferioribus suis” (Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 [OTh 1:255]).
By finding an ordering principle, which organizes and orders the subjects of all the partial habits, we will be able to identify something which we can call the first subject of the total habit.

V. Ockham’s View of the Primary Subject and the Extent of Theological Knowledge

When Rimini takes up this further question of whether God is the subject of theology, in article 2, question 4 of his prologue, he begins by reminding us that we can mean theology in two ways, either as a “partial habit” or a “total habit.” If we mean theology as a partial habit, then Rimini asserts nonchalantly that God is sometimes the subject and sometimes not, and Ockham is certainly in agreement here. But we can still

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64 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp, I:134). “Puta illud ex his subiectis, ad quod cetera talem ordinem habent et propter quod perfectius cognoscendum cetera considerantur.”

65 However, Ockham and Rimini do show some small divergences when it comes to distinguishing the ordering principle through which a first or primary subject can be distinguished. Both agree that the order in question revolves around a certain kind of primacy among the multiple subjects of any science. But Ockham notes three types of primacy corresponding to three types of order: primacy of predication, primacy of perfection, and primacy of totality (Cf. *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:256–257)). Likewise, Ockham thinks different partial subjects can be primary according to different kinds of primacy, in his example of metaphysics he seems tofavor the primacy of predication as decisive for what should be seen as the first subject of metaphysics.

Rimini, in contrast, only focuses on two kinds of primacy: “primacy of attribution” and “primacy of community or predication.” Rimini writes of the subject of medicine: “Sic medicinae primum subiectum est corpus sanabile inquantum huiusmodi; nam quaecumque in medicina totali partialiter considerantur, attributionem habent ad ipsum inquantum huiusmodi, vel sicut causativa sanitatis vel conservativa vel significativa aut aliquo alio modo, ut patet ex 4 Metaphysicae, et hoc solum est vocari primum subiectum primitate attributionis.” About Physics and Logic he writes: “Quandoque aliqua subiecta non habent talem ordinem inter se, eis tamen est aliquod commune, cuius per se passiones in aliqua parte illius totalis scientiae considerantur et in alius partibus passiones partium subiectivarum. Verbi gratia est physica; in aliqua enim eius parte consideratur de corpore mobili ad ubi, et in aliqua de mobili ad formam et sic de aliis generibus corporum mobilium, quibus commune est corpus mobile, de quo consideratur in libro Physicorum. Simititer in aliqua parte logicae consideratur de syllogismo topico, in aliqua de syllogismo demonstrativio, quibus commune est syllogismus simpliciter, de quo consideratur in libro Priorum. Et illud tale commune consuevit vocari primum subiectum in illa totali scientia, primum, inquam, primitate communitatis vel praedicationis” (*Lectura*, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:134–135)).

66 Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:137). “Si primo modo, dicendum quod aliquius theologiae deus est subiectum et aliquius non. est enim subiectum illius, qua aliquid de ipso probatur; illius autem, qua nihil de ipso, sed de alio probatur, non est subiectum. Exemplum primi “Deus potest per se ipsum, quidquid potest
ask about the primary subject of the entire aggregate of “partial habits.” It is with this question that we can turn once again to the scope of theological knowledge and make a comparison between not only Ockham and Rimini, but also between these two thinkers and Scotus and Giles. A comparison is warranted because, despite different conceptions of what constitutes a science, the primary subject for Ockham and Rimini says a lot about the kinds of propositions that are to be included in a discipline. As we will see, Ockham and Rimini have no problem entering into conversation with Giles on this point, and thus we must conclude that there remains room for a kind of comparison here, despite differing conceptions about why a first subject is the subject of a given discipline.

For Ockham’s part, he claims that when we use the word “subject” to indicate that which is supposited (not that which actually terminates our act of knowledge), and we mean to reference a subject which has a kind of primacy among many other subjects, then “God” is indeed considered under the ratio of deity. Ockham’s reasons stem first from the fact that he thinks it obvious that God is the subject of many partial habits included


In light of the fact that Ockham provides a complicated discussion about the nature of suppositing subjects, it is notable that in Rimini’s text no discussion precedes this assertion about the proper and improper sense of the word “subject,” nor is there a discussion of whether our earthly and finite minds can have an act of knowledge that terminates in God himself or whether they must be directed toward a “stand in” concept like “infinite being.” Rimini simply asserts: sometimes God is the subject and sometimes not, depending on the subject term of the theological conclusion in question.

This does not necessarily mark a divergence with Ockham. Rimini could very well be operating under the assumption that we working with the improper sense of term “subject” that Ockham previously distinguished. If so, then he and Ockham are very much in agreement. For Ockham thinks that sometimes the subject term of a theological conclusion will be “suppositing” for God as God, sometimes for person of the Trinity and sometimes for creatures. Nevertheless, it is odd that Rimini, who had been tracking with Ockham so closely, would leave out a discussion of whether God is the subject as the terminating object of the act of understanding or simply as that for which the object or act of understanding supposes.

67 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:271). “Nam opinio quod Deus sub ratione deitatis est subjectum theologiae potest verificari intelligendo subjectum illud pro quo supponitur et quod est primum aliqua primitate.”
within the habit of theology.\textsuperscript{68} From here it is only a short step to claim that this “partial subject” has a kind of primacy over all the other “partial subjects.”\textsuperscript{69} The primacy is accounted for on the following basis: “For with respect to creatures, He is first by primacy of nature and causality; with respect to the persons, he is in some mode prior.”\textsuperscript{70} Ockham is quick to point out that this does not mean that this subject itself contains virtually all other theological truths or it is the subject of every other conclusion. Nevertheless, all the other conclusions in some way reference and depend on the attributes predicated of God \textit{qua} God.

Ockham then goes on to try to show the concord of diverse historical positions on the subject of theology. But, importantly, there is one historical position that he cannot tolerate: the position of Giles of Rome (viz. that God is the subject inasmuch as he glorifier). He dismisses this opinion as “entirely irrational”\textsuperscript{71} and gives the following reason:

All these [names], [glorifier, beatifier, redeemer, restorer] are predicates attributed to a subject. Thus the following are theological propositions: God is glorifier, God is redeemer, God is restorer, and the same for other like things; and thus such [names] are not the \textit{ratio} of the subject, but the predicates attributed to the subject.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{68} Of course, Ockham is willing to admit this, if we are going to speak properly, namely that God is the subject if we are talking about what is being supposed for by the actual term that terminates our act of knowledge.

\textsuperscript{69} Guillelmus de Ockham, \textit{Ordinatio}, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:271). “Nam inter omnia pro quibus subiecta propositionum theologicarum possunt supponere ipse Deus habet aliquam primitatem…”

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:271).

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:273). “Videtur omnino irrationalis …” See below for a further consideration of Ockham’s opposition.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:273), “…quia omnia talia sunt quaedam praedicata attributa subiecto. Unde ista est propositio theologica; Deus est glorificator, Deus est redemptor, Deus est reparator, et sic de aliis; et ita talia non sunt ratio subiecti sed praedicata attributa ipsi subiecto.”
At precisely this point, Ockham shows himself to be aware of the same Aegidian objection, based on *De Trinitate* XIV, c. 1, that Scotus addressed: “But then there is a doubt concerning what theology is about: whether it is extends to everything, or something and not about other things.”

His reply comes in the form of another division between types of theology that resembles, not Scotus’s initial division between *theologia in se* or *theologia in nobis*, nor the distinction between partial theology and total theology, but Scotus’s nuanced distinction between sub-types of *theologia in nobis*. The distinction identifies a type of theological knowledge that encompasses only those things that are necessary for salvation and another type that is about every “incomplex” thing (though not every “complex” truth).

In finding a precedent for the former meaning of theology, Ockham turns to the passage from *De Trinitate* and interprets it the way Scotus did. Concerning the part of the quotation that says this science “does not extend to everything that is knowable by man,” Ockham interprets Augustine to be speaking of a type of theology which is necessary for this stage of life and for reaching eternal life. Later he speaks of it as being concerned only with those things that are necessary for salvation.
But while similar in certain respects, this is not exactly the way Giles chose to interpret this very important quotation. For Giles, Augustine was not speaking of theology’s focus as limited to only what would procure salvation from this life, but rather to those things which are appropriate for beatitude, not just for the pilgrim progressing towards beatitude in hope (in spe), but also for the Blessed enjoying beatitude (in re). In Ockham’s view, the limitation of this meaning of theology is attributed to the fallen state of humanity, and, in this way, he, with Scotus, puts a limitation on earthly finite theology which is not proper to finite theology per se and which therefore does not apply to the Blessed. But as Giles’s discussion of the difference between God as glorifier or beatifier and God as restorer made clear, he does not think theology’s subject matter and extent is determined by the fallen earthly status of the pilgrim. The subject matter of the limited theology of creatures Giles spoke of was in principle the same for both the earthly pilgrim in need of salvation and the beatified saint. Any difference was only attributable to light and clarity of the knowing, not the subject matter or extent of the knowing. To see that this is not the case for Ockham, we only need look at his understanding of the second meaning of theology.

Of the second mode of theology, he at one point suggests it should be considered theology simpliciter (indicating that this is the more proper meaning of theology). And regarding this type, he asserts that it does extend to every simple thing that exists. He reasons that “there is no incomplex thing about which a theological attribute cannot be

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79 See above, c. 1, page 83.
80 See above chapter 1, p. 66.
81 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:273). “Aliter accipitur theologa pro omni habitu simpliciter theologico sive sit nobis necessarius pro statu isto et investigandus sive non.”
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predicated.” And then he reasons further, “but about everything about which a theological attribute is able to be predicated, theology is able to prove this attribute, therefore [theology] is able to consider about every such [incomplex] thing.”

82 He does, however, limit theology’s extension with regard to complex propositions, unless perhaps a theological attribute can be predicated of a given proposition. Therefore theology is not a universal knowledge in the sense that it encompasses and claims to prove every possible truth—or as Scotus said, to everything knowable—but it is universal in that it extends to every real thing and can claim to include every possible knowledge of God and every relation to God within its scope.

Finally, Ockham’s concluding remark to this section is worth noting as it illustrates an ambiguity about the meaning of “our theology” in his own thought. He writes:

But speaking about our theology in the first mode, I say that our theology is not about everything, neither complex or incomplex. For since time hardly suffices for [reaching] those things that are necessary for salvation, therefore man in this life ought not to investigate other things.

84 Particularly interesting about this quotation is that Ockham slightly modified it in a later revision. He qualifies the strong sense of “ought not” and adds “or rather, it is not

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82 Ibid. “Primum patet, quia non est aliquod incomplexum de quo non praedicetur aliqua passio theologica; sed de omni illo de quo praedicatur passio theologica potest theologia suam passionem probare; ergo de omni tali potest considerare.”

83 Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:274). “Secundum patet, quia multa sunt complexa quae in nullo penitus sunt theologica, sicut ‘omnis triangulus habet tres’ etc., et huiusmodi, et ideo de istis non est theologa tamquam de aliquibus scitis in theologa, nisi praedicando forte aliquam passionem theologicae de istis.”

84 Ibid. “Sed loquendo de theologa primo modo, dico quod theologa nostra non est de omnibus, nec complexis nec incomplexis. Quia enim tempus vix sufficit ad illa quae sunt necessaria ad salutem, ideo alia non debet homo pro statu isto investigare, [vel non oportet] maxime in particulari.”
necessary” to investigate other things.\footnote{Ibid.} A couple of things are revealed here. First, Ockham again defines the limited nature of theology’s consideration as a \textit{this} world, earthly limitation. Because we are fallen and have a hard time knowing even the things necessary for salvation, our theology \textit{in this life} should not focus on anything else. The implication is that once salvation has been procured, this limitation is no longer necessary, and the theology of the Blessed will extend at least to every knowable thing, though perhaps not every knowable proposition. The second noteworthy thing is the way Ockham goes on to qualify the limitation of our theology in this earthly life. By changing “ought not” to “need not,” he is suggesting that the theologian, in this life, could extend his work outward to other possible theological propositions if he wanted to, though this is not necessary and perhaps not advisable since simply attaining a knowledge of things necessary for salvation is a difficult task in itself. In the end, there does not seem to be an intrinsic limit on the nature of finite theology itself, but simply a limit of prudence: a prudence that is no longer necessary when our creaturely knowledge transitions from that of a fallen creature to that of a beatified creature. As has been emphasized before in Scotus, the real division between types of theology is between our earthly theological knowledge and that which we will enjoy in heaven. But for Giles, the emphasis has always been on the fundamental division between infinite knowledge and creaturely knowledge (whether that creaturely knowledge is of the earthly pilgrim or the Blessed in heaven). All in all, Ockham’s division of theology can be roughly summarized in the following chart.
Here we can see a three-fold division of “our theology” that roughly corresponds to similar three-fold division in Scotus.

VI. Rimini on the Primary Subject of Theology and the Extent of Theological Knowledge

While Ockham dismisses Giles’s position on the “restricted” ratio of the subject of theology as “completely irrational,” Rimini in stark contrast begins his treatment of the topic by claiming: “I put three conclusions in conformity with the doctrine of our brother Giles.”86 The first conclusion he introduces is that: “God, inasmuch as he is God, is the first subject of our theology.”87 This, however, is a bit disconcerting because it does not seem like an opinion Giles would want to hold. Yes, Giles believes God is the subject of

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87 Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:137–138). “Prima est quod deus, inquantum deus, est subjectum primum theologiae nostrae” (emphasis mine).
our theology, but not under the ratio of deity, or inasmuch as he is God, but under the ratio of glorifier or beatifier.

We will see below why Rimini can appear to contradict Giles while declaring his intention to be faithful to him. But first we need to see Rimini’s justification that God is the primary subject among many partial subjects. Here he provides an explanation more or less in step with Ockham. He writes:

From the subjects of partial theological habits, the first subject of the total theological habit is that for which the other theological subjects (inasmuch as subjects are of this type, namely theological) have, through themselves, an analogy or order. The subject of the total habit, in as much as it is of this type, is ordered to nothing.

But God, says Rimini, is precisely this kind of ordering subject, through which all the partial subjects have a kind of “analogy” and “order”.

The presence of this primacy for Ockham, and order for Rimini, can also help us explain a problem resulting from their rejection of Scotus’s position. The problem is that once the deductive tie between all theological truths and the first object, virtually containing all the truths of the discipline, have been severed, it is not always apparent why a particular conclusion should be labeled “theological.” The presence of an ordered relation to the primary subject “God” is certainly part of this answer. However, as we turn to later chapters, we will see that this order around a first subject can only be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition. By the end of this chapter, we will see

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88 See below, p. 134.
89 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp, I:138). “Ex subiectis partialium theologicarum illud est primum totalis theologiae subjectum, ad quod cetera subjecta theologica, inquantum huiusmodi subjecta scilicet theologica sunt, habent per se analogiam et ordinem, ipsum vero ad nihil aliud inquantum huiusmodi ordinatur. Deus est huiusmodi.”
that Rimini thinks that it is quite possible for the other sciences to say something about God without this knowledge being theological.\textsuperscript{90} And in a later chapter, we will see him fully acknowledge that the same proposition can be part of theology as well as part of another science.\textsuperscript{91} Something else, therefore, must be added besides this order before a proposition can be truly labeled a theological proposition. Nevertheless, a certain connection to God inasmuch as he is God is a necessary condition for inclusion within the body of knowledge classified as theology.

Rimini then goes on, as Ockham does, to give examples of the kind of connectivity between partial habits that he has in mind. His general rule is stated as follows: “Generally, nothing ever really enters theological consideration, unless that [partial] subject in some way has an attribution to God.”\textsuperscript{92} He leaves us with two categories of such attribution. In the first way, subjects are admitted to theological considerations when they are considered as effects of God, which manifest some attribute or perfection of God. He includes under this category God’s power, justice, mercy, disposition, and providence. The second way in which a subject can be admitted to the total habit of theology is when it is considered as part of a “precept or instruction” which is showing God’s will or what pleases and displeases God.\textsuperscript{93} True to the claim Rimini said he would defend, he insists that the subject which provides the kind of primacy

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{90} See below, p. 141, n. 112.
  \item \textsuperscript{91} See below, c. 6, p. 287.
  \item \textsuperscript{92} Gregorius Ariminensis, \textit{Lectura}, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:138). “Et generaliter nihil omnino intrat considerationem theologica, nisi secundum quod ipsum aliquo modo habet attributionem ad Deum.”
  \item \textsuperscript{93} Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:138). “Minor declaratur, quoniam quaecumque alia intrant considerationem theologica, vel considerantur inquantum sunt effectus Dei manifestantes eius potentiam, iustitiam vel misericordiam, dispositionem et providentiam, vel inquantum praecepta et documenta Dei manifestantia eius voluntatem sive quid ei placeat vel displiceat, et generaliter nihil omnino intrat considerationem theologica, nisi secundum quod ipsum aliquo modo habet attributionem ad Deum.”
\end{itemize}
needed for this connectivity between theological conclusions is God “under the ratio of deity or inasmuch as he is God.”

Given the fact that Rimini has claimed—even while stating that he was trying to defend the position of Giles—that the subject of the total habit of theology is God inasmuch as he is God, we can legitimately wonder if Rimini shares Ockham’s view that finite theology extends to every knowable relation to God and therefore to everything knowable about God. By turning to the second and third supposedly Aegidian conclusions, we can see how the first conclusion, which Rimini defends, might not necessitate further allegiance with Ockham and might still fall in line with the intention of Giles and the spirit of the Aegidian tradition.

At the outset of his second conclusion, he is willing to acknowledge the danger of his position up to this point. He writes:

If God were the subject of our theology under the ratio of deity absolutely, then God would be comprehensible through our theology habit in act, or it would be possible to have such an act. The consequence is false (emphasis mine).

Rimini is speaking about the matter in slightly different terms than Giles did. Giles would never want to say that God is considered under the ratio of deity. Rimini, as we have seen, is perfectly willing to use this expression (to the point that it makes us doubt whether he can really be holding the same position as Giles.) However, he adds a further qualification that we have not yet seen. He distinguishes between God under the ratio of

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94 Ibid., prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:138). “Quod vero sit subiectum sub ratione deitatis sive inquantum Deus, declaro.”
95 Ibid., prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:139). “Secundam conclusionem probo: Si deus sub ratione deitatis absolute esset subiectum theologiae nostrae, deus esset comprehensibilis per theologiam nostram actu habitam vel possibilem haberi.”
deity *absolute* from that same *ratio* considered *contracte*. From an Aegidian perspective this is a redundant move, since to know God under the *ratio* of deity is to know God absolutely, whereas to know God under any other *ratio* is to know God in a more constricted way.\(^9\) Nevertheless Rimini dismisses the idea that the *ratio* of deity could be known absolutely, for this would lead to a *comprehensive* vision or knowledge of God, which is simply impossible.

The reason given for this impossibility is Aegidian. He explains: the consequence is false because “God is not able to be comprehended by the knowledge of any created or creatable creature, otherwise it would not be accurate to believe that God is incomprehensible.”\(^{97}\) Two things stand out here. First, the commitment to God’s incomprehensibility hearkens all the way back to the assertion of John Damascene that loomed so large in Giles’s thought. God is an “infinite sea” (*pelagus infinitum*) that cannot be fully explored. The second point is the manner in which Rimini identifies this *inability to comprehend* as an essential attribute of “creaturelyness.” This lack of comprehension is not due to human beings’ earthly or fallen status. On the contrary, this limitation belongs to all creatures in virtue of being created. In fact, Rimini extends this limitation to all “creat-able” things whether actual or merely possible. This stands in stark contrast to Ockham’s division between a theology which only considers what is

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\(^9\) Rimini actually comments on this shift in language towards the end of his second conclusion. Cf. Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:140). “Infert enim quod theologio esset infinita, si haberet deum pro subieicto sub aliqua ratione deitatis, id est Deum inquantum deum absolute absque contractione ad aliquaque de ipso cognoscibilia, cum ut sic infinitae veritates sint de ipso cognoscibiles.”

\(^{97}\) Ibid., prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp, I:139). “Consequens est falsum, nulla enim notitia et nullis notitiis creatis vel creabilibus deus comprehendi potest, alias non veraciter incomprehensibilis crederetur.”
necessary for salvation and a more strict sense of theology, proper to those who have already been saved or are ready to go beyond what is necessary for salvation.

This difference grows even starker in Rimini’s comments on the nature of theology of the Blessed. In the background, we should call to mind once more Godfrey of Fontaines’s complaint against Giles’s limit on the knowledge of the Blessed. He complained that any such contraction in our knowledge of God would prevent true beatitude. For as long as there is more to know about God, we will continue to be dissatisfied. Despite various disagreements and disputes, Duns Scotus and Ockham appear to share this conviction. But in his third argument for his second conclusion Rimini shows that he cannot be said to follow Ockham here. With Giles, he rejects this kind of vision of beatitude and heavenly happiness, arguing that even the Blessed do not know God under the ratio of deity absolutely because their theological knowledge is still a creaturely knowledge, and, as such, they cannot know God in a comprehensive and unlimited way. The following quotation from Rimini makes the case plain, and accordingly, it ought to be singled out as the foundational quotation for the main argument of this chapter.

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98 See chapter 1, pp. 69-84. We can see that this is a clear concern persisting into the fourteenth century as it is a concern raised explicitly by Rimini’s predecessor, Thomas of Strasbourg: “Praeterea in theologia beatorum Deus est subiectum sub ratione absoluta, ergo et in theologia nostra. Consequentia patet etiam per contrariae opinantes, et similiter per illud Psalmus: ‘Sicut audivimus, sic vidimus in civitate domini virtutum’. Antecedens probatur tripliciter. Primo, sic, quia si non, tunc appetitus beatorum maneret incompletus. Secundo, quia cognitio beatorum est intuitiva, quae terminatur ad essentiam divinam secundum suam propriam existentiam, et non secundum aliquam rationem contractam. Tertio, quia dicit Augustinus in: ‘Hoc est plenum gaudium nostrum frui trinitate; ad cuius imaginem facti sumus.” (Commentaria, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (1564 f. 2vb)). Strasbourg’s response continues the Aegedian-like position that Rimini will also advance. He admits that the blessed are completely happy and enjoy an infinite good, but he denies that this enjoyment is the result of an infinite comprehensive knowledge (Cf. f. 3vb).
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If therefore our theology or some other created or creatable theology has God as its subject inasmuch as he is God absolutely, then this theology has to consider everything about Him; everything, which is able to be verified and known, and, as a consequence, to comprehend, either by believing, if such theology is only faith, as is ours, or by seeing, if it is the knowledge which the blessed have. Whence Giles was elsewhere able to argue in the same vein for the proposed conclusion: God is not the subject of the theology of the Blessed inasmuch as he is God absolutely, otherwise he would be comprehensible by a created science.”

In this quotation we have stumbled upon a direct confrontation with the opinion of Scotus and Ockham. Here we see that the restricted nature of theology—i.e. the restriction that Augustine suggest in *De Trinitate* XIV, c. 1—cannot be accounted for on the basis of our temporary and earthly status or limited to our temporal concern for eternal life. Moreover, this restricted body of truths cannot be seen as a small fragment of the total theology we look forward to in beatitude. On the contrary Rimini believes that this limitation is proper to finite creatures, whether fallen or beatified. The thirst for an all encompassing comprehensive knowledge of God is not, then, a desire we await to be fulfilled, but only a temptation to what is improper, unnatural, and inappropriate to finite human beings. For Rimini, beatitude is not a transition to a more comprehensive knowledge of God, but a coming to see intuitively those truths which are necessary for beatific enjoyment, which were previously only known through faith.

In sum, we can see that Rimini joins Giles in his opposition to Godfrey of Fontaines’s view of beatitude. Our complete and utter happiness does not appear to lie in

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99 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp, I:139). “Si igitur theologia nostra vel aliqua alia creata vel creabilis habet deum pro subiecto inquantum deus est absolute, igitur habet considerare de ipso omne, quod de ipso verificari et cognosci potest, et per consequens comprehendere vel credendo, si talis theologia sit fides tantum, ut est nostra, vel videndo, si sit notitia, qualis est beatorum. Unde potest alter in eadem virtute sic argui ad propositum: Deus non est subjectum theologiae beatorum inquantum Deus absolute, alias ipse esset creata scientia comprehensibilis…”
the satisfaction of our every cognitive curiosity about God, but only in the knowledge of those truths that are necessary for finite creatures to love God in the manner proper to their creaturely nature. Here, too, lies the possibility of an enduring conception of theological knowledge that does not see itself as the heir of Greek philosophical aspirations (as suggested by Freddosso in chapter 1). On the contrary, we have here a kind of philosophical critique that throws into question the goal or end of comprehensive knowledge (of everything knowable or simply everything knowable about God). This critique, in turn, suggests that human nature is not fulfilled by having every question answered, but actually in putting many of those “curious” questions aside and turning to perfectly love what is incomprehensible.

However, we know that the limited character of theology, even in its perfected state, is only half of Giles’s core position. His denial that God as God is the subject of theology is the negative half which is coupled with his positive position, that God is the subject of theology as glorifier and beatifier. Similarly, up to this point, we have only seen the negative half of Rimini’s position. In his third conclusion, he introduces his positive position on the extent or orientation of the contraction. Unsurprisingly Rimini turns to the passage from De Trinitate XIV and states: “From [this quotation] it is acknowledged that God is the object [confusingly, he says ‘object’ here] of theology under the same ratio, both in faith and also in the vision of heaven.” Having given us an interpretation that shows that the theology of the pilgrim and the Blessed are united in

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100 See above, c. 1, p. 47.
101 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:140). “Ex quo innuitur quod deus sub eadem ratione est obiectum theologiae et fidei ac etiam visionis patriae” (emphasis mine).
their creaturely status, he then uses the quotation to declare under what contracted *ratio* God is considered by the pilgrim and the Blessed. Given that Augustine suggests theology’s job is to lead us to beatitude, Rimini admits that it is perfectly apt to identify this contraction *as God inasmuch as he is glorifier or beatifier,* just as Giles claimed.102

But Rimini ends his defense of this conclusion by making a concession to those who worry about the specific name Giles has given to this contraction (a worry most visible in Rimini’s immediate Augustine predecessor at Paris, Thomas of Strasbourg).103 Rimini points out that what is important here is the contraction and limit to our theology and not the precise name. The name is inserted to insist on this contraction and that fact that God is not known as deity absolutely.104 But, while he is not adamant about the precise name, the derivation of the name from the Augustinian quote makes it plain that the body of knowledge collected under the umbrella is grouped together on account of a common purpose, the ultimate end of beatific love of God.

102 Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp, I:140). “…et per consequens secundum illam contractionem videtur obici fidei et theologiae, secundum quam obicitur visioni gloriae, et cum haec ad illam ordinetur, satis congrue potest talis contractio per illam denominari, ut dicatur quod deus inquantum glorificatur vel beatificator sit theologiae subjectum.”

103 Strasbourg writes: “Dico, quod Deus est subjectum Sacrae Scripturae sub ratione speciali, et non sub ratione absoluta, sive abyssali. Et licet deficiamus in nominibus subjectum istius benedictae scientiae sub tali ratione speciali sufficienter exprimentibus; potest tamen sic describi, ut dicatur, Verum summe diligibile, ut proportionatum est rationali animae nondum perfectae per habitum luminis gloriae. . . .” Thomas ab Argentina, *Commentaria,* I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (1564 f. 2va) . But he later says: “…non intendo deviare a venerabili doctore nostro fratre Aegidio, qui licet per alia verba praedictam veritatem expressit, idem tamen (ut credo) dicere voluit: per rationem enim speciale ut ipsemet dicit, non intendit, nisi restrictionem in obiecto illius abyssalis rationis superius nominatae . Cum autem quandoque, rationem subiecti istius scientiae explicando, ponit nomen glorificatoris, non est sibi cura de tali nomine; quia ipsum quandoque dicit, quod non possumus nomen aptum invenire, quo talem rationem speciale sufficienter exprimamus. Sed per nomen glorificatoris intendit, ad quem nos ducit illa scientia benedicta, qui finis est gloria vitae aeternae, quae principaliter consistit in Dei dilectione. Ex hoc etiam patet, quod omnes illi, qui arguunt contra hoc vocabulum glorificator, magis laborant contra nomen, quam contra doctoris intentionem. Et licet praedictorum rationes non sint contra me, gratia tamen istius doctoris venerandi volo ipsis respondere” (4rb). See above, chapter 1, p. 66, n. 53.

104 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura,* prol., I, q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp, I:140). “Cui tamen hoc non placet, alter exprimat contractionem illam, dummodo fateatur quod non inquantum deus absolute, sed contracte sit subjectum theologiae….”
In wrapping up his overall position on the subject of theology, Rimini turns to defend Giles’s opinion against ten objections which can more or less be attributed to Scotus, Peter Aureoli, and William of Ockham. For the most part, the objections involve a variation on a common theme. The objections of Scotus circle back and forth over the predictable concern that God, under a restricted ratio, is not sufficient to virtually contain all the truths of the science. But of course, Rimini, with Ockham, has rejected that such containment is a requirement of the subject of any given discipline, and he therefore easily dismisses these objections.

The objections from Peter Aureoli and Ockham are only slightly different. The complaint is that the notion of God as glorifier simply leaves out too much. As Aureoli points out, if we understand God as glorifier, then we are not really understanding that by which God glorifies. God glorifies, according to Aureoli, not as a restricted entity, but under the ratio of absolute deity. Likewise, he complains that, to restrict God in this way would be to leave out theological truths like the Trinity. Ockham, as we saw, complains that attributes like glorifier and beatifier are just that, “attributes,” and therefore they cannot be the ratio of the subject. With respect to these objections Rimini more or less flatly disagrees. To Aureoli, he responds that the Trinity is in fact included in the notion of God as glorifier. To Ockham, he replies, if this reasoning were true, then we would not even be able argue that the essence of God is the subject of

105 Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:140–142).
106 For the objections attributed to Aureoli and Ockham see: Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:142).
107 Ibid.
108 See above, p. 126.
theology, since certain propositions attribute existence to God, asserting that “God is,” yet it belongs to the very substance of God (absolutely considered) “to be.” 109

Finally one further objection attributed to Ockham is worth mentioning in light of an early critique raised against Giles. 110 Ockham insists that theology is the noblest habit and yet, if it begins from a constricted ratio, it could be subordinated to another science. It is suggested that metaphysics, which often considers God in its different parts, would therefore have a claim to be a more noble discipline than theology which considers God only in a limited way. 111 In response, Rimini offers another Aegidian-like answer. In the first place, he admits that theology which considers God under a restricted ratio is subordinate; that is, the contraction of the subject matter of theology is a real limitation. But he insists that it is only God’s knowledge of himself that considers God in a less limited way than our theology. In contrast, even if metaphysics or some other human science does consider God, it does so in a more, not a less, restricted way than theology: “since no other science considers as many truths about God as theology.” 112 So Rimini appears to concede that natural human sciences do at times treat propositions where God is the subject matter. However, this still does not appear to count as theological knowledge, suggesting again that theological knowledge cannot be solely defined by the

109 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:145). “…si ratio valeret, potest eodem modo argui quod Deus non sit subjectum sub ratione essentiæ; quod est contra doctorem sic arguentem. Hoc patet, quia etiam ista propositio est theologica ‘deus est’, sicut probatur ex illo verbo Apostoli Ad Hebraeos 11 ‘Accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est’.”

110 Here we have in mind the critique about the nobility of theology in comparison to sciences, like, metaphysics with more universal aspirations. See, c. 1, pp. 84-90, “Aegidio-Augustinian Theology and Metaphysics.”

111 Cf. Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:142). Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTH I:227, ll. 10–11).

112 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:145). “Cum nullus alius tot veritates de Deo consideret quot theologia.”
proposition itself, but also has something to do with the special way that it considers God. Here we brush up against the question of “how” one knows in the discipline of theology, which is the proper concern of later chapters.

VII. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tried to describe the different characterizations of the theological knowledge as “body of truths,” while momentarily abstracting from the question what it means for that body of truths to be classified as “known.” In short, the concern here is decidedly more ontological than epistemological. We have concerned ourselves with distinct fields of knowledge that claim to possess within them truths about God, and we have considered this question both with respect to the knowledge possessed by finite earthly pilgrims and beatified creatures. We have left off for subsequent consideration both why we would want to know this select body of truths and what it means to really know it. At the present, a couple of important results have risen to the surface.

First, in the fourteenth century, from Giles to Scotus, from Ockham to Rimini, competing conceptions exist over how to characterize the body of knowledge that theology intends to claim as its own. With Scotus on one extreme, Giles and Rimini on another, and Ockham somewhere in the middle, we can see a spectrum of ideas.

On the one hand, Scotus sees theology (not just God’s knowledge of himself, but also the knowledge of the perfected finite creature, in principle) as a universal science: a

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113 See above, p. 132.
science which extends to all that is knowable, and when known, clarifies all truths, and illuminates all realities. Even if this is not a knowledge that the earthly pilgrim can possess, it is presented by Scotus as a knowledge for which the pilgrim should hope and even strive. In short, perfect theology has a place among all the other sciences as their parent, and as a parent, it embraces all other sciences, and is the key to unlocking all the mysteries held therein.

In Ockham we see something similar, though tempered by the fact that theology is not an interconnected web containing within it and explaining all possible truths. Nevertheless, it is a body of truths that extends to everything that is, inasmuch as it is related to God. Again, this seems to be a theology that creatures should look forward to and strive after. There is even the hint that eager pilgrims should be allowed to strive towards this wider spectrum of truths, if the necessary theological truths have already been obtained.  

But Giles and Rimini have a different orientation. There is no emphasis on a wider, comprehending body of truths in the hoped for beatific knowledge. They always put emphasis on the difference between the appropriate body of truths for an infinite knower (God) and the appropriate body of truths for finite knowers. From this orientation, the pilgrim is not encouraged to hope for a knowledge that someday illuminates all realities and quenches completely the human longing to know. Nor is there any encouragement to know truths about God that fall outside of the purview of God as glorifier and beatifier. Instead, the knowledge that pertains to beatitude is treated as

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114 See above, p. 129.
sufficient, not just for the earthly pilgrim, but for the creature *per se*. There is little, if any, hint that one should go beyond, whether in this life or the next.

Secondly, we have also begun to see glimpses, first in Giles, but now in Rimini, that the designation “theological knowledge” cannot be accounted for solely by reference to a unique body of truths that lies within it. To be sure, in order to be numbered among the truths of theology, the truth or proposition in question must have a connection to God as its primary reference point, (that is, God only inasmuch as he beatifies and glorifies). However, the supernatural (non-sensible) character of this knowledge also seems to be equally important. This was a dominant theme in the work of Giles, and it will be reiterated in our later consideration of Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio. We have also seen Rimini mention the fact that theology is a discipline that treats God more sufficiently and exhaustively than other sciences, which also claim to conclude things about God. Here there is no explicit de-legitimization of the work of these other sciences; Rimini simply does not make room for their results under the umbrella of strict “theological knowledge.”

The importance of the supernatural, non-sensible, and otherworldly characterization of theological knowledge takes us toward the question of “how” we are to know this given body of truths, both in a descriptive and normative sense. This is a transition, however, that we must put off for one more chapter because we still need to consider the question of “why we should pursue this knowledge” or “what is the purpose of theological knowledge.” This is a question that, as we will see most clearly in the

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115 See chapter 5.
position taken by Petrus Aureoli, has implications for how the earthly pilgrim should use this knowledge, and this in turn has consequences for how we should think about the acquisition of this habit.
Chapter 3: Rimini and the Purpose of Theological Knowledge

I. Introduction

As we transition from the question of theology’s principle subject matter and the degree of its extension to the question of the purpose of this knowledge, one puzzle still lingers. This puzzle stems from an unstated assumption hidden within Scotus’s argument for why theology must extend to all things knowable in the first place. Scotus believed that the first object of theology must virtually contain everything knowable only because he thought the first object must be adequate to the truths that constitute the habit in question. His answer therefore to the specific ratio under which God must be considered started from the assumption that theology includes everything knowable and then proceeded to look for an object that would be adequate to such an extensive body of truths. However, we have not yet seen why Scotus assumes that theology should be so comprehensive.

Previously, we mentioned how competing notions of happiness stood in the background of discussions about beatitude and the proper extent of theological knowledge. Godfrey of Fontaines was at odds with Giles because he thought that happiness or beatitude could not possibly be achieved if there were still more to know about God.1 In Godfrey’s case it is easy to see the connection between happiness and the requirement of comprehensive knowledge. Godfrey believes that theology has two ends,

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1 See above, c. 1, p. 69.
one which is practical and one which is theoretical. While he admits that theology has a practical component, he also believes that theology goes beyond this practical purpose and includes an exclusively speculative element. Thus, while we may use theological knowledge to help us to love God, we also want to know other things about God that do not help us to love better, and therefore theology aims to achieve this latter objective as well.2 The case is different, however, for Scotus. Unlike Godfrey, he claims that theological knowledge is entirely practical. Its only goal is to direct and guide us toward the right love of God. It is not immediately clear, therefore, why a less than an exhaustive knowledge of God will be insufficient for theology to achieve this purpose. Giles, for example, thinks that an exhaustive knowledge of God is not necessary for perfect beatitude and therefore for a perfect love of God. Even Godfrey acknowledges this, since he admits that theology is not only practical, but also has some purely speculative intentions. If these two thinkers can conceive of theology as achieving its practical (or affective) aims without requiring us to comprehend God or know everything there is to know about God, then why can’t Scotus take this position as well?

The question reminds us that the concern over what theology considers as its subject is not an isolated question. On the contrary, it is question intimately tied up with a different set of questions: why do we need theological knowledge, what is its purpose,

2 See especially Godfrey’s thirteenth Quodlibet, q. 1 in Godfridus de Fontibus, Les Quodlibets onze-quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines, (Hoffmans V). There he writes: “…videtur aliquibus quod ipsa est simpliciter practica, non obstante quod tractat de aliquibus puris speculabilibus sed istud etiam non videtur …oportet ponere praeter scientiam moralem alias scientias speculativas in quibus de istis principaliter et propter se tractatur plenius et magis explicite” (Hoffmans V:172-173); and later: “Sed quia, ut dictum est, talis speculatio non sic perficit quod quietet appetitum, nec etiam sufficit ut per eam solam adipiscì possimus illam perfectissimam in vita futura, ideo etiam praeter illa quae scientia docet de talibus speculabilibus debet cum illis docere de agibilibus per quae illa perfectam speculationem per modum meriti consequi valeamus. Quod autem magis principalis finis huius scientia sit speculatio…” (Hoffmans V:177).
and what does it need to achieve this purpose? For Giles, Scotus, Ockham, and Rimini this is the final concern in each of their respective prologues. Yet in many ways it is decisive for everything else. In declaring the final cause of theological knowledge, one sets the tone for all the other questions under consideration, including the debate over the proper subject of theology.

As was the case with the last chapter, answering the specific question about whether theology is a practical or speculative knowledge involves answering many preliminary questions. Rimini’s fifth and final question follows, by his time, a customary set of preliminary questions. The general consensus is: first we need to understand what a practice (praxis) is. Then we can consider what the difference is between practical and purely speculative knowledge, as well as between a practical and speculative habit. And finally, once these questions have been answered, we will be in a position to say whether theology is practical or speculative.

II. From Giles to Scotus: On the Nature of a Practice

While Giles does not steadily follow this division of subordinate questions, the definition of a practice is hugely important for his own position. We can recall that it was because he understood a praxis to be something “within our power” that he insisted theology was not a practical knowledge but affective. The love that theology aimed to achieve in us was, for Giles, a loving affectation because it was an act which “was not in our power.”

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3 See above, c. 1, p. 79.
In Scotus’s account, his attention turns first to defining precisely what a practice is, and in this way, he sets the agenda for the ensuing tradition. Aureoli, Ockham, and Rimini all begin from this question and Scotus’s answer to it. Naturally, therefore, we must start with the definition of a practice given by Scotus and its consequences for theology.4

III. Scotus on the Nature of a Practice

The opening question is put bluntly: “what is a practice?” The response of Scotus is equally direct: “Therefore I say in the first place that a practice, to which practical

4 In his monograph, *Duns Scotus* (1999), Richard Cross makes some generalizations regarding the division of opinions about the end and purpose of theology. I regard this division as simply too broad to be of any use. On the one hand, he writes, there is the “majority non-Franciscan view in the late thirteenth, and early fourteenth centuries is that theology is a theoretical science, or at least primarily a theoretical science . . .” On the other hand, there exists, “a different broadly Franciscan, view is that theology is neither theoretical nor practical but rather affective or contemplative” (p. 9). The division between Franciscan and non-Franciscan here is misleading, as Cross’s own footnote makes clear (see his n. 36). As examples of this “broadly Franciscan position,” that theology is affective, he lists one Dominic (Albert the Great), one Augustinian (Giles of Rome), and two Franciscans (Gonsalvus of Spain and Bonaventure). But of course we can and do find a host of Franciscans before and after Scotus identifying theology as preeminently practical. Likewise, we will see that some Augustinians continue to identify theology as affective (like Gerard of Siena and Strasbourg), while other Augustinians concede that theology is indeed practical (like Gregory of Rimini). But the Franciscan William of Ware and the Augustinian Augustinus of Ancona identify theology with a fourth characteristic, namely as “contemplative.”

For Ancona’s opinion see see I, prol., pars 1, q. 1, a. 2 (Troyes, BM, ms. 0296, f. 5ra) where he writes: “viso ergo nullum istorum modorum perfecte intellectum quietare, volumus illum modum ponere quem magis concedimus esse verum et consonum dictis Sanctorum, dicendo hanc scientiam, nec esse principaliter speculativa et practica...nec simpliciter affectiva...sed esse simpliciter contemplativam.”

For William Ware, see Daniels, “Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Wilhelm von Ware und Johannes Duns Scotus,” p. 225, n. 1. “M fol. 4v col. Per Augustinum De Trinitate ubique ubi loquitur de hac materia. Nam talis est ista scientia, non est speculativa nec practica sed contemplativa”

The point here is to resist any easy identification of a school based solely on the surface opinion they take. The commitments that underlie that opinion are for more important. Likewise the fact that opposition by certain Augustinian thinkers to the idea that theology should be classified as practical shows us that an easy assimilation between practical and affective positions is not possible and that there is something deeper at stake here than a simple disagreement over words.

In order to understand this opposition, we need to appreciate what it means to think of theology as practical. Cross is, of course, correct when he says that Scotus identifies theology as practical. And since Scotus’s own position will loom large both in the influence it extends to subsequent developments and within Rimini’s arguments for his own position, an outline of the Scotist position vis a vis the Aegidian position outlined above is a necessary prerequisite of moving forward.
cognition extends, is [1] of some potency other than the intellect, [2] naturally posterior to intellection, [3] able to be elicited in conformity with right reason, so that this act itself is right.”

He, then, proceeds to justify and explain each of these conditions.

From the first and second conditions, a corollary is said to follow: simply that a practice can be nothing other than an act of the will. The reasoning is this: if a practice is naturally and necessary posterior to intellection (condition two) and also not an act of the intellect (condition one), then the only act that meets these conditions is an act of the will.

In this reasoning, Scotus is implicitly excluding those acts which exist only in a sensitive exterior power on the belief that they do not meet condition two. Acts and operations that belong to our sensitive nature, like sensing, feeling, reflexes, etc., are not “essentially” posterior to an act intellection. Without an essential connection to our knowledge, it remains possible for actions of this type to occur without our consent. But Scotus wants to reserve the term “practice” for morally praiseworthy and blameworthy actions alone. Acts that can acquire praise or blame are essentially posterior to intellection because morality requires that we know what we are doing.

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5 Johannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 228 (Vatican, 1:155). “Dico igitur primo quod praxis ad quam cognitio practica extenditur est actus alterius potentiae quam intellectus, naturaliter posterior intellectione, natus elici conformiter intellectioni rectae ad hoc ut sit rectus.”

6 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 230 (Vatican, 1:156). “Ex his duabus condicionibus sequitur corollarium, quod videlicet praxis ad quam extenditur habitus practicus non est nisi actus voluntatis elicits vel imperatus, nam nullus alius actus ab intellectione vel praeter intellectionem essentialiter posterior est intellectione, quia quicumque alius detur actus eiusdem rationis cum ipso, posset esse prior, sicut patet discurrendo per actus potentiarum omnium.”

7 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 231 (Vatican, 1:156). “Hoc patet secundo sic, quia praxis est actus qui est in potestate cognoscentis.”

Scotus is relying on his understanding of Aristotle here and he bases his argument on what he reads in Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* VI. He writes: “Quod probatur ex VI Ethicorum, quia artifex eget virtute ad recte agendum; non autem indiget virtute respectu illius quod non est in potestate sua; igitur artifex in potestate sua habet factionem: multo magis prudens habet in potestate sua actionem, quia est formaliter virtuosus” (Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 231 (Vatican, 1:156–157)).
His third condition only furthers this point. By insisting that a practice be one of the types of actions that are capable of being in conformity and directed by right reason, he is restricting these actions to those kinds which can in principle be directed by reason and can therefore be considered virtuous and meritorious. However, despite ruling out those actions for which we are not morally responsible, his corollary emphasizes that the meaning of “practice” extends to include both acts of the will themselves (\textit{actus elicitus}) as well as acts commanded (\textit{actus imperatus}) by the will. The former act might be an act like love, while the latter might be an act such as giving money to the poor, which clearly involves operations that lie outside of the will, but nevertheless is still directly commanded by the will. But the latter possibility raises an objection regarding the consistency of this corollary with his first condition. This objection, while addressed by Scotus himself, will be raised again by others who remain unconvinced by his reply.

\footnote{Cf. Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 233 (Vatican 1:158). Later readers, like Ockham and Rimini, will take this third condition to mean that a practice in its strictest definition is only those operations which are done in conformity with right reason. Thus, even actions within our power, but which are morally bad, would not count as true practices.}

\footnote{Scotus acknowledges two kinds of acts that can be said to be acts of the will: an \textit{actus elicitus} and an \textit{actus imperatus}. Cf. Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 231 (Vatican, 1:157). “Ex hoc ultra: si omnis praxis est in potestate cognoscentis et nihil est in potestate voluntatis nisi vel actus elicitus vel imperatus, sequitur propositum ut prius.”}

This is a distinction perhaps made famous in contemporary philosophy in the works of Roderick Chisholm, but it has plenty of scholastic precedent. The distinction is not only present, but is also discussed by Aquinas. In short, an \textit{actus elicitus} is meant to describe a direct intention to act elicited by the will and is sometimes called an \textit{actus interior}. The \textit{actus imperatus} is an \textit{actus exterior} which is actually an act of another power of the soul, but commanded by the previously elicited act of the will. Thus Aquinas says that every \textit{actus imperatus} has its origin in an \textit{actus elicitus} (cf. Anthony Kenny, \textit{Aquinas on Mind}, p. 86.) Some acts of the will do not need to manifest themselves in exterior acts, like the act of loving, but most acts do, such as helping the poor or caring for widows and orphans. Chisholm picks up the language because it helps him explain the distinction between metaphysical freedom and political freedom. For example: in a prison cell, one still has the metaphysical freedom to help one’s neighbor. That is, the act can be \textit{elicited} even though the agent is denied power to perform the \textit{actus imperatus} by the physical coercion of the prison walls.
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Someone might say: if you extend the meaning of an “act of the will” to acts merely commanded by the will (actus imperatus), then intellection can surely be a practice (which was expressly denied by the first condition). After all, what prohibits the will from choosing—and therefore commanding—that an individual engage in a purely intellectual activity?  

Scotus does not derive his reply to this concern from something intrinsic to his initial description, but instead he appeals to a further assumption. He replies: if we grant a very wide and loose definition of “practice” as a mere operation, then speculation can indeed be a practice. However, if we understand a “practice” to be “an operation to which the intellect is able to extend, then no intellection is a practice.”

The assumption is that the intellect cannot be (strictly speaking) the terminus of its own extension. Little more is said on the subject and it is no wonder that this assumption will be routinely questioned in the ensuing years.

IV. Scotus on the Nature of Practical Knowledge

From this precise definition of a practice and its three conditions, we can move on to identify when a particular piece of knowledge is practical and extends to the operation of another power and when it does not. This is the very next question Scotus raises by

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10 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, a. 1–2, n. 232 (Vatican, 1:157). “Contra istam condicionem videtur sequi quod tunc aliqua intellectio erit praxis, quia aliqua potest esse actus imperatus voluntatis sicut actus alterius potentiae imperatur ab ipsa. Et tunc ultra: ergo prima condicio est falsa, quod scilicet praxis est operatio alterius potentiae ab intellectu.”

11 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 232 (Vatican, 1:157). “Respondeo: licet speculatio sit quaedam operatio et ita praxis, extendendo nomen, tamen ut praxis dicitur sola operatio ad quam intellectus potest extendi, nulla intellectio est praxis; et hoc modo accipitur praxis quando ad praxim dicitur cognitio practica extendi.”

12 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 232 (Vatican 1:157). “Ipsa enim nata est denominari quasi accidentaliter a praxi ad quam est extensibilis, non autem potest esse terminus talis extensionis.”
asking: “How does practical cognition extend to a practice?” Once again, he provides a very direct answer: the extension “consists in a double *aptitudinal* relation, namely of conformity (*conformitas*) and natural priority (*prioritas*).” While a direct answer, it is not a very clear answer. He gives us only a few brief indications of what he means by conformity and priority, and then points us directly to book VI of Aristotle’s *Ethics* where he believes their meanings are rather plain. The passage of Aristotle at issue is taken from book VI, c. 2, where Aristotle says:

What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire (emphases mine).15

In the present passage, Scotus draws the criteria of priority from the mere fact that for a practice or choice to be good, the choice must pursue *what intellect has already asserted*. And the criteria of conformity simply asserts that to be practical knowledge it must be a truth that directs or commands what is, in itself, the correct or *right desire*. In later discussions by other authors, we will see that practical knowledge is sometimes described as “directive” of right action. But this is meant in very much the same spirit as Scotus’s

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13 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 236 (Vatican 1:161). “Qualiter cognitio practica extendatur ad praxim.”
14 Ibid., “Nam ista extensio consistit in duplici relatione aptitudinali, videlicet conformitatis et prioritatis naturalis.”
use of “conformity,” which Scotus himself suggests a few paragraphs later. In fact, when Scotus begins to speak of conformity as an adjective rather than an abstract noun it is hard to find an appropriate English translation for *conformis* other than to describe the piece of knowledge in question as “directive of” or “appropriate to” what is the correct and right practice.

While addressing priority and conformity only briefly, Scotus’s primary attention is on the use of the term “aptitudinal.” This word is used to indicate the fact that practical knowledge does not have to achieve an actual relation of priority and conformity with a given practice in order to be classified as practical. If such a relation were required in actual fact, Scotus argues that such knowledge would be called practical only accidentally and contingently since actual practice is always a contingent affair. That is, it would only be practical when it is actually being employed on behalf of a practice currently in operation. But as soon as the operation is to be over, it would cease to be practical knowledge and would become speculative knowledge once more. It is sufficient, then, for practical knowledge to be practical simply by being knowledge that is appropriately disposed (both by priority and conformity) for the direction of an actual action, whether

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16 Johannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, prolog., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 237 (Vatican 1:162). Hoc declaratur, quia conceditur communiter cognitio practica extendi ad praxim ut directiva ad directum sive ut regulativa ad regulatum. Cognitionem autem esse priorem naturaliter praxi et ei conformem, non est esse conformatam praxi quasi priori, sed est esse conformativam praxis quasi posterioris, sive, est esse cui praxis sit conformanda, quod est cognitionem dirigere et regulare in praxi.”

17 Accordingly, I will vary between using the word “appropriate,” “suitable,” and “directive” to translate Scotus notion of “notitia conformis.”
or not that action ever takes place.\textsuperscript{18} Richard Cross confirms this reading through his own synopsis of the speculative possibilities of theology in the Scotist system:

Scotus does not hold that it is necessary that any of the propositions in theological science actually have acting-directing force. For any science to be practical it is necessary merely that the contents of this science \textit{could} have action-directing force (emphasis mine).\textsuperscript{19}

What Scotus refers to as the “aptitudinal” nature of certain kinds of knowledge, Cross interprets as its “action-directing force.”

The final question Scotus asks before he puts these preliminary definitions to work is: why does some knowledge acquire this “aptitudinal” extension to a practice while other pieces of knowledge do not?\textsuperscript{20} In other words, where does this “aptitudinal disposition” come from? What is the cause that distinguishes some knowledge as practical and some as purely speculative? Is it from the final cause of the said knowledge or from the object of the science? Against the opinion of Henry of Ghent,\textsuperscript{21} Scotus is adamant that the aptitude for extension that this knowledge has does not come from the intended purpose of the knower, but from the “object.” His argument is a version of his previous insistence that knowledge can only be identified by its “aptitude” and not by its actual use. His overall point is that the intention of the one who knows (i.e., what they

\textsuperscript{18} Johannes Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio}, I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 237 (Vatican I:161–162). “‘Aptitudinali’ dixi, quia neutra relatio requiritur actualis. Quod enim praxis actualiter sequatur considerationem quae sit conformis ipsi considerationi, hoc omnino est accidentale considerationi et contingens; si enim ab actuali extensione diceretur praxis, nulla esset necessario practica, sed eadem quando quae practica quandoque speculativa, quod nihil est; igitur sufficit duplex aptitudinalis extensio sive aptitudo ad extensionem.”\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{20} The explicit way he asks this is: “a quo habeat cognitio extensionem ad praxim” (\textit{Ordinatio}, I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 239 (Vatican I:164)).

\textsuperscript{21} In his opening remarks, Henry seems to acknowledge three co-causes practical/speculative knowledge: “Quarum diversitatem declarat ex tribus; et ex parte obiectorum, et ex parte modi cognoscendi, et ex parte finis…ex parte finis (quam ut expressius dicit \textit{de Anima}) practicus intellectus differt a speculativo, fine” \textit{(Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum}, a. 36, q. 4, f. 234v).
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plan to do with this knowledge) can only account for the actual use of the knowledge and not its more fundamental intrinsic “aptitudinal” disposition. Thus, at one point, he gives the following argument: if the knowledge were determined to be practical by its “actual extension,” then a worker who did not intend to work would not have practical knowledge.²² For Scotus, this is clearly absurd, and therefore knowledge must be distinguished only by its aptitude for extension, which comes prior to the knower’s intended use for that knowledge. Along these lines he says: “An aptitude does not belong to one nature while being repugnant to another, unless on account of something absolute in its nature, for it is because a nature is of such a kind, that such an aptitude belongs to it.”²³ In this quotation, Scotus concludes that an “aptitude” is part of the intrinsic nature of knowledge and is already predetermined prior to its use.

By ruling out the possibility that the end or intention of the knower could determine the extended nature of certain types of knowledge, Scotus looks for something else that can explain the intrinsic and essential orientation of all practical knowledge. He writes: “This condition of consideration in itself is from some other cause prior to its


²³ Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 252 (Vatican I:169–170). “Sed aptitudo non convenit uni naturae quae repugnat aliis nisi propter aliquid absolutum in tali natura; quia enim haec natura est talis, ideo convenit sibi talis aptitudo; igitur praesupponit in ipsa consideratione aliquam conditionem intrinsecam per quam conveniat sibi talis aptitudo.”
[intended use]; but its prior causes are the intellect and the object; therefore [the intrinsic nature of this knowledge] is acquired either from the intellect or from some object.”24

Appearing to dismiss the former possibility, 25 Scotus describes why it is the “object” of knowledge and not the end for which that knowledge is used that is the decisive factor in determining the directive aptitude of practical knowledge. Building on his earlier discussion of the first object of a science and its virtual containment, he writes:

The first object includes principles, as well as the means leading to conclusions, and thus it [includes] the entire practical knowledge; but this is not true when it comes to the end of that knowledge;26

One of the arguments for why “end” does not virtually contain the aptitudinally directive knowledge required of a practical habit runs as follows:

Because from the end as end no nature or natural aptitude is had except when [that] end is loved or desired and thus moving the efficient cause to action.27 However, this knowledge [caused by the object] includes these principles and conclusions naturally and before the [end is actually] loved. For the truth of the practical principles does not depend on the will any more than speculative principles, and the same goes for conclusions necessarily following from the principle.28

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24 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 252 (Vatican I:170). “Ista condicio considerationis in se est ab alia causa eius priore; sed causa prioris eius sunt intellectus et objectum; igitur convenit sibi ab intellectu vel ab aliquo obiecto.”

25 I presently cannot find any explicit discussion of why it is not the knowing intellect that determines the aptitudinal character of knowledge. However, it may be that Scotus believes it obvious why this cannot be the decisive factor. Namely, since it is the same intellect that knows speculative and practical things, this same intellect cannot account for the prior aptitude of our knowledge. Thus it must be the distinctive character that determines the nature of this knowledge, prior to being put to some use in order to achieve some particular end.

26 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 262 (Vatican I:176). “Ideo enim praxis dat talem aptitudinem sive talem naturam habentem aptitudinem, quia ut objectum primum includit principia, et mediantibus illis conclusiones, et ita totam notitiam practicam; non autem in quantum finis…”

27 On this point, see also Ibid., I, prol, pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 253 (Vatican I:170).

28 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 262 (Vatican I:176). “…tum quia a fine ut fine nulla natura vel aptitudo naturalis habetur nisi amato et desiderato et sic movente efficiens; prius autem naturaliter quam ametur includit dicta principia et conclusiones; veritas enim principii practici necessarii non dependet a voluntate magis quam speculativi, nec conclusiones necessario illatae ex tali principio.”
Thus, what we see here is Scotus’s continued dependence on the notion of virtual containment. But now it is employed, not to explain the extent and unity of a given science, but to explain how all the knowledge within a given science should be classified either as practical or speculative, prior to the intention of its possessor. Everything depends on the nature of the object, which virtually contains both the principles and the many conclusions of a given science. And through determining and virtually containing all the conclusions of a given science, the first object also determines the aptitudinal character of the habit as a whole (i.e. whether or not it contains a potential *conformitas* or propositions that are able to direct a practice).

V. Scotus on the Practical Nature of Theology

Within this framework, we can now turn to see how theology should be classified and why Scotus’s outright claim is that theology is indeed practical. The proof for this is based on the fact that theology meets the criteria of a practical science. “All of necessary theology is for, the created intellect, directive (*conformis*) of the act of the created will [condition 3] and also prior to that act [condition 2].”

Scotus is confident in making such a statement because he believes that “the first object of theology (God under the *ratio* of Deity) is virtually directive of right volition, because it is by reason of this first

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29 Ibid., l, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 314 (Vatican, 1:207). “Sed tota theologia necessaria intellectui creato est sic conformis actui voluntatis creatae et prior eo; igitur etc.”
object that principles of right volition are found.” Richard Cross points us to place in the *Lectura* where Scotus says this perhaps more clearly and succinctly.

The intellect perfected by the habit of theology apprehends God as one who should be loved, and according to rules from which praxis can be elicited. Therefore, the habit of theology is practical.

The job of theology is to apprehend God—this we have already seen. And through such apprehension, everything that is known is somehow directive of a right and proper love.

One objection to his position (and Scotus’s response) helps clarify how it is that knowledge of all necessary truths about God could have such a regulative function for the practice of love. In the third objection, the objector begins by agreeing with Scotus that the first object of theology does in fact virtually include within it a conformity or applicability to right practice. However, the objector also thinks that this first object contains many other truths that do not have this kind of suitability/applicability to right action. (This might easily be seen as the position held by Godfrey of Fontaines.) For the objector, propositions like “God is three” and “the Father generates the Son” are obvious instances of truths which carry no practical implication. That is, they are not applicable (*conformis*) to right action. Scotus’s response is instructive.

I say that the first object includes only knowledge that has an application (*conformem*) for a correct will, because by virtue of this object, nothing is

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30 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 314 (Vatican, 1:207–208). “Probatio minoris, quia primum objectum theologiae est conforme virtualiter volitione rectae, quia a ratione eius sumuntur principia rectitudinis in volitione.”

known from it that is not either the rectitude of some volition or virtually including knowledge of such rectitude.\textsuperscript{32}

Regarding propositions like “God is three” and “the Father generates the Son,” Scotus sees these as having real importance for the rectitude of the will. They are good examples of the latter of the two options stated in the above quotation: \textit{those truths virtually including knowledge of the rectitude of a given volition}. In this case, the proposition “God is three” contains “knowledge of the rectitude of love tending into three persons, such that if an act [of love] were elicited about only one person, while excluding the other (as the infidels would elicit), this act of love would not be right.”\textsuperscript{33}

From one perspective this description of the practical function of theology sounds rather similar to some of the things we have seen in Giles’s own account. Notice the way Scotus says in the quotation cited above from the \textit{Lectura}: “theology apprehends God as . . .” The function or end of theology appears to be depicting how God is perceived by the intellect. Likewise for Giles, we say that the intellect grasped God as our glorifier and beatifier because the affective end only requires cognitive assistance from this limited and constricted perspective.

Is Scotus saying something similar here? Cross helps us answer this question by reaffirming what Scotus has already said: namely, that all knowledge included in the first


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 322 (Vatican, 1:210). “Prima quidem includit virtualiter includit notitiam rectitudinis dilectionis tendentis in tres personas, ista quod si actus eliceretur circa unam solam, excludendo aliam (sicut infidelis eliceret), esset actus non rectus.”

Here we can anticipate an objection raised explicitly by Gregory of Rimini: namely, if Scotus is going to rely on his virtual containment theory, then why shouldn’t metaphysics be counted as practical as well since surely almost anything that can be said about being can have implications of “right practice.” See below, p. 185.
object is practical, even if it is not currently resulting in an actual practice. The point, in short, is that every ounce of theological knowledge that we can obtain has an application for the way we love God. Cross says:

Scotus, however, provides a further argument to show that theology is not at all theoretical. He reasons that every item in the science of theology is, or can be, action–directing, because the more we know about theology, the more we might be disposed to love God. And Scotus proposes a distinctive description of a merely practical science that theology thus described would satisfy: ‘Every science that deals with theoretical items in no greater detail than is necessary for praxis is practical and not theoretical’. Theology on Scotus’s account will necessarily satisfy this description, since any putatively theoretical item that theology covers increases, or can increase, our disposition to love God34 (emphases mine).

On the one hand, Scotus’s commitment to the practical nature of theology seems to align him with the basic intuition of Giles: that the knowledge quotient that makes up the discipline of theology only extends as far as is necessary to complete the desired end. However, we can see that despite such an emphasis on the purely practical importance of our knowledge of God, Scotus’s position—as Cross explains it—immediately makes conceivable the notion that theology might demand a comprehensive knowledge of God, since everything knowable about God, everything contained in the first object,35 orients us toward loving of God with greater rectitude. As long as our knowledge of God remains incomplete, our love remains incomplete. A strong connection is therefore made between the ideal of perfect loving and perfect knowing, such that we must expect that for the Blessed to love God perfectly they must also know and comprehend him perfectly. This

34 Cross, Duns Scotus, 9.
is not an intuition Giles of Rome would share. For him, no such connection exists between perfect comprehension and perfect loving.

To this we need only add the fact discussed earlier: that Giles does not believe the loving that theology produces is actually practical. Instead, he calls it affective to emphasize the fact that the limited nature of theological knowledge does not produce or enable us to elicit an act within our power. In contrast, the supernatural character of theological knowledge produces in us an act of loving that, strictly, speaking lies outside of the power of the will to elicit.\footnote{See c. 1, p. 79.} This difference, combined with Giles’s insistence that no essential connection exists between perfect loving and perfect knowing constitutes the real disagreement between Scotus and Giles.

VI. Aureoli and his Modified Scotism

Since both Ockham and Rimini consider the opinion of Aureoli alongside Scotus, we must move from Scotus to the position of the most important Franciscan at Paris after him. In treating Aureoli, Ockham and Rimini both remark on the strong similarities between his position and that of Scotus. In his survey, Ockham first lists the opinion of Aureoli as: theology is absolutely (\textit{simpliciter}) practical. He then moves—without providing a rebuttal—directly to Scotus, saying: “There is another opinion agreeing in the conclusion that theology is purely practical.”\footnote{Guillelmus de Ockham, \textit{Ordinatio}, I, prol., q. 12 (OTh 1:334). “Alia est opinio concordans in conclusione, quod est pure practica.”} While there is truth in what Ockham says, namely that Aureoli and Scotus both conclude that theology is purely and absolutely practical, in this section we will see that that Scotus and Aureoli reach this conclusion for
somewhat different reasons. While the qualifications that Aureoli makes are subtle, they are not inconsequential. We will focus on two such changes here. The first is his disagreement with Scotus’s definition of a practice. The second is the fact that he adds a third condition to the two conditions (viz. _conformitas_ and _prioritas_) given by Scotus to explain when knowledge extends to practice: or in other words, why knowledge can be called practical. After describing these changes, we will point out how these changes reflect substantial differences between Aureoli and Scotus about the precise reason why theology is in fact practical.

VII. Aureoli on the Nature of a Practice and Practical Knowledge

Aureoli announces that if Scotus’s definition of a practice were accepted: “logic would not be practical, of which the opposite will be shown below, and neither will theology be able to be practical inasmuch as it is ordered to nourishing and generating belief.”

This early objection shows that one of the primary motivations in his concern with how to define a practice comes from his assumption, not merely about the practical nature of theology, but more precisely about the kind of act or practice to which theological knowledge extends. But since we will see this assumption put to work in Aureoli’s two explicit arguments (an _a priori_ and _a posteriori_ argument) for why theology is purely practical, we can momentarily put this concern aside and look at how

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39 See below p. 169.
Aureoli’s conviction that logic is a practical forces him to qualify Scotus’s definition of a practice. The definition of a practice according to Scotus, once again is:

…An operation of some potency beside the intellect, naturally posterior to intellection, able to be elicited in conformity to right reason toward that which is right.40

Aureoli is concerned with the first of these three conditions: namely, that a practice must be the operation of some potency other than the intellect. As we have already seen,41 Scotus anticipated the objection that an intellectual activity could be considered a practice as well, seeing as how such an operation could be an act commanded by the will (actus imperatus). Scotus, however, insisted that the intellect “cannot extend to itself” and therefore intellectual operations cannot be counted as practices. Aureoli pin points this as the precise point of contention and writes:

Although in the preceding many things have been said well [by Scotus], nevertheless that definition of a practice, from which a practical habit is defined, as an operation ‘of some potency other than the intellect’, as if a practical habit is not able to be considered directive of any operation remaining within the intellect, does not appear to contain the truth.42

Rather than directly oppose Scotus’s belief that the intellect can not extend to itself, Aureoli takes an indirect route. Drawing on Aristotle as an authority, he provides several arguments for why logic cannot be speculative. For example, he says, no habit which is not pursued for its own sake can be called speculative, but logic is not pursued for its own

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41 See above p. 152.
42 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 3, a. 2 (Buylaert, 1:235, n. 58). “Quamvis autem in praemissis multa sint bene dicta, illud tamen quod dicitur praxim, a qua dicitur habitus practicus, esse operationem ‘alterius potentiae ab intellectu’, quasi nullius operationis intra intellectum manentis possit poni habitus practicus directivus, veritatem non continet ut videtur.”
sake, but in order to direct the acts of other sciences.\footnote{Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2 (Buytaert I:236, n. 61). “Praeterea, nullus habitus cuius finis non est actus proprius, sed actus alterius, potest poni [sic] speculativus. Talis enim non est “gratia sui,” quae ponitur una conditio speculativi habitus in \textit{I Metaphysicae}. Sed logica et similes non habent pro fine actum proprium mediantibus ipsi elicitum, sed actum aliarum scientiarum mediantibus ipsis directum. Unde non sunt gratia sui, sed propter introductionem, ut patet in eodem. Ergo non erunt speculativae, sed magis activae.” (For the entire list of arguments see pp. 235-237, nn. 58-65).} The rest of his reasoning runs as follows. If logic is not speculative, it must be practical; if it is practical it must extend to some act besides itself. But what can logic “extend to” and “be directive of” except an act of the intellect? Thus, Scotus’s definition must be revised because it demands consequences that cannot be accepted.

At the conclusion of this argument, Aureoli presents his final redefinition of a practice in the form of a general rule about what counts as practical knowledge: “Every habit is truly and purely practical, which not only has as its end some act which it elicits, but also an act which it directs, wherever and in whatever the directed act exists.”\footnote{Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 65 (Buytaert I:237). “Ex praejectis potest colligi regula generalis quod omnis habitus est vere et pure practicus, qui non som solum habet pro fine actum quem elicit, immo et actum quem dirigit, ubicunque et in quacumque potentia sit actus ille directus.”} The final line \textit{wherever and in whatever the directed act exists} represents Aureoli’s qualification to the Scotist definition of a practice, and by extension, practical knowledge. The key condition is not whether the act lies inside or outside of the intellective potency, but whether the act in question can be directed.

Leaving behind the definition of practice, Aureoli offers a second qualification to the Scotist position, of which—he continues to insist—he generally approves.\footnote{Cf. Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 58 (Buytaert I:235) and n. 74 (I:239).} Now the concern is not the definition of practice, but why knowledge is classified as either practical or speculative. Scotus argued that knowledge was deemed practical because of the object and the double aptitude of the knowledge deducible from that object. This
double aptitude was an aptitude of primacy and conformity to right practice. Aureoli parts ways with Scotus at this point, saying: “It does not seem sufficient to say” that a practical habit consists in these two aptitudinal attributes.46 On the contrary, knowledge is practical on account of a certain activity (activitas) attributable to the knowledge, not per se, but on account of the particular capacities and abilities of the beholder of that knowledge.47 His examples for why the condition of “activity” must be included give us a clearer picture of what he exactly means by “activity” and why the capacity and ability of the knower are relevant. These examples show that Aureoli is not rejecting Scotus’s aptitudinal criteria, but simply claiming that the two conditions identified by Scotus are insufficient and that a further aptitudinal condition is necessary.

Two examples are especially vivid. The first example asks us to imagine someone with a perfect natural knowledge of all the changes a rose undergoes and every mode through which it comes to be. In this case the knower in question has knowledge in perfect conformity with right practice. If they perchance happened to meet someone with the power to produce a rose, they would be able to give them step by step instructions for producing the actual rose. In the same way, this knowledge would enjoy a kind of primacy over the practice of production because the knowledge of the rose about to be generated would precede its production. And yet, for all this, Aureoli insists that the possessor of this physical knowledge does not have practical knowledge because she is not able to put her knowledge of how a rose is produced into action. Only a person who

46Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 66 (Buytaert I:237). “Illud autem dicitur habitum practicum consistere ‘in duplici respectu aptitudinali’ non videtur sufficienter dici.”
can use their knowledge to produce the rose can be considered to have practical knowledge, everything else is just abstract speculative knowledge. So Aureoli concludes: “Therefore it is by reason of activity alone that a habit can be called practical, and not on account of priority and conformity.”48 Again, he is not denying that this knowledge must also be prior and have some conformity, but he is simply asserting that these are not sufficient conditions. Nor is he denying the aptitudinal character of these conditions; one does not have to be in the actual act of producing a rose for it to count as practical. Rather, they simply must be capable of performing this action, which, in the case of the rose, is something the natural scientist lacks.

This reading is confirmed in Aureoli’s second example. Here he considers the knowledge that an angel has of moral science (i.e. ethics). Aureoli insists that this knowledge in the mind of angel is of the exact same kind or species as the moral science existing in the mind of a human being. However, this same knowledge in the mind of the angel should not be called practical, while the knowledge in the human being should most definitely be called practical. He then moves to point out the decisive difference, allowing us to draw an analogy between the angel’s knowledge of ethics and the human being’s knowledge of the generation of a rose.

For inasmuch as the angel knows what chastity is, just as he does about all the other virtues, still this knowledge of chastity is not practical in the angel, in the same way that knowledge of the generation of a rose is not practical in us. But truly moral knowledge, in our intellect, is practical. But these two moral sciences differ in nothing except in activity. For the

48 Ibid., I, proem., pars 3, a. 2, n. 71 (Buytaert I:71). “Ergo sola ratio activitatis dat habitui quod sit practicus, et non respectus prioritatis et conformitatis.”
knowledge of chastity which is in us who are able to acquire chastity has
the nature of active knowledge. But this is not the case in an angel.49

At the end of his angel example Aureoli turns back to the rose example once more to
bring the point home. If God gave us the power to create a rose, then the person with the
knowledge of how a rose is generated could certainly be said to have practical
knowledge.50 This emphasizes that the question of practical knowledge rests primarily on
the ability and power to carry out a practice which is in conformity with right reason. The
requirement of a certain capacity in the knower—as entailed in the idea of activitas—
forces Aureoli to qualify Scotus’s subsequent conclusion that the object (or formal cause
of the knowledge) alone is responsible for whether or not this knowledge is practical or
speculative. Scotus was, according to Aureoli, correct to conclude that practical
knowledge does not receive extension to a practice through its end. But he also thinks
that the object is not quite sufficient.51 Given his reasoning on behalf of the criteria of
activity, this qualification is a mere corollary to what he has already said. He returns once
again to the angel and moral science. The same object, it is assumed, is responsible, for a
moral science of the exact same kind in the angel and in us. And yet in us the knowledge
is practical and in the angel the knowledge is speculative. The object is clearly not
sufficient to explain this, and therefore the “object in relation to the one knowing” is the

49 Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 71 (Buytaert I:238). “Quantumcumque enim sciat angelus quid est
castitas, sicut et omnes virtutes morales, non tamen scientia de castitate est practica in eo,
quemadmodum nec scientia generationis rosae est practica in nobis. Moralis vero, in nostro intellectu, est practica. Sed istae
duae morales in nullo differunt, nisi in activitate. Scientia namque de castitate quae est in nobis habet
rationem activi, qui possimus acquirere castitatem; in angelo non habet.”
generatione rosae Deus communicaret potentiam exsequendi, scientia illa statim indueret practici
rationem.”
51 Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 74 (Buytaert I:239). “Illud vero, quod dicitur rationem speculativi et
practici non sumi a fine, sed ab objecto habitus, utique verum est et bene dictum. Non tamen sufficiens est
ut videtur. Non enim objectum sufficit.”
decisive factor for determining an object’s extension.\textsuperscript{52} The criteria of \textit{activitas} is not something that can be determined by looking at either the object or the knower independently. It can only be assessed through an awareness of the type of relation that holds between the object and the knower.

**VIII. Aureoli on the Purely Practical Nature of Theology**

When Aureoli finally turns to describe his position on theology’s \textit{purely} practical nature he relies on two proofs, an \textit{a priori} proof and an \textit{a posteriori} proof, each of which rely in turn on the qualifications and adjustments Aureoli has made to Scotus’s initial position.

We can start with his \textit{a priori} proof. This proof begins from understanding practical knowledge as something which is caused by an object which holds a special relationship to the knower. Aureoli then builds on what he has just argued for by saying: “a purely practical habit is about an object which is attainable by the knower, through more excellent operations and through more noble acts than the acts of this [practical] habit.”\textsuperscript{53} The latter clause \textit{through more excellent operations and through more noble acts} is not a qualification that we have seen yet, but is one that Aureoli thinks is intrinsic (and therefore \textit{a priori}) to practical knowledge. It is after all better to be healthy than to simply know what health and sickness are, and likewise, he says, it is better to have

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 76 (Buytaert I:240). “Apparet igitur quod practica vel speculativa ratio non competit habitui ex obiecto solo, sed ex obiecto relato ad talem scientem, qui habeat posse agere et fabricare obiectum.”

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 82 (Buytaert I:243). “Ille namque habitus est pure practicus, qui est de obiecto attingibili a scienti, excellentioribus operationibus et per nobiliores actus quam sit actus illius habitus.”
virtue than to simply know what virtue is.54 From this definition and justification, Aureoli makes his final move to show that his own conception of theology fits this description perfectly. In so doing, he tells us a lot more than the simple fact that theology is purely practical. He also reveals in detail the conception of theology and its primary task which he has assumed from the outset.55 He writes:

But, the theological habit has God as its object, which is attainable by us through more excellent operations, more noble acts, than [the act by which we] understand believed things (creditiva) through an intellection had in this life from purely natural things… (emphasis mine)56

The quotation continues, but we must stop and note the position already emerging. The specific and primary act that constitutes theological knowledge is to produce an “understanding” of “believed things” through the observance of nature alone. This is a radical departure from the Aegido-Augustinian position. For Giles, theology distinguished itself from all other human sciences by its operation solely in the light of faith and its refusal to begin from sensible things. All other sciences proceed from purely natural things, but theology does not. Yet, for Aureoli, the opposite is true. The proper act of theology is an “understanding” achieved through natural means. Moreover, Aureoli’s description sharply separates the “understanding” produced by the theological act from an altogether different intellectual act of belief. As the quote continues we see this separation of theology and faith even more clearly.

54 Ibid., I, proem., sect 3, a. 3, n. 82 (Buytaert I:243). “Melius est enim homini habere sanitatem et esse sanum quam scire sanitatem et esse sanum quam scire sanitatem et esse aegrotum; et melius est habere virtutes quam scire quid est virtus…”
55 See the opening quotation of our discussion of Aureoli above, p. 163.
56 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 82 (Buylaert I:243). “Sed, habitus theologicus habet pro objecto Deum, quod est a nobis attingibile excellenterioribus operationibus, per nobiliores actus, quam sit intelligere creditiva intellectione ex puris naturalibus habita in hac via.”
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For God is attained more nobly if he is adhered to through faith and is
looked up to through hope, and loved through charity, and if his counsel
and precepts are obeyed, than if believable things are expounded in murky
way [through the habit of theology]. Therefore this habit is purely
practical.57

Theology is identified as practical because it is said to be directive of four different
practices that are superior to it in nobility.58 (Aureoli later tells us that he takes these four
acts from a list given by Augustine in De doctrina christiana.)59 Among these four
practices, one in particular has been repeatedly singled out as the proper end of theology
by the tradition that precedes Aureoli, namely to love God. It is more unusual to see the
act of faith put alongside the act of charity (as though theology’s job is to produce both
acts of faith, hope, love, obedience) as opposed to theology and faith being somehow
connected and working together to produce the love of God. For Aureoli, at least part of
theology’s immediate directive job is to produce and maintain a proper and correct assent
of faith, not simply acts of love. This stands at odds even with Scotus, who also sees
theology as purely practical, but does not say anything about theology producing a
separate act of faith, but only speaks of theology as disposing us to more perfect acts of
love in accordance with right reason. If anything, faith, for Scotus, functions as a kind of
substitute theology that allows us to practice the right kind of loving even in this life,

57 Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 82 (Buytaert I:243). “Nobilius enim attingitur Deus, si sibi adhaereatur
per fidem et in eum assurgatur per speram, et diligatur per caritatem, et si eius oboediat conciliis et
praecipitis, quam si hoc modo nubilose credibilia exponuntur. Ergo iste habitus erit practicus pure.”
58 This emphasis on the nobility of these four practices over the practical knowledge of theology itself is
emphasized in Aureoli’s third proposition, that theology as practical science is more noble than any other
speculative science and likewise is more noble than it would be if theology were speculative. The reason it
is said to be so noble is because it elicits and directs acts which are so much more noble than its
he states: “Sed constat quod Deum diligere, in Deum credere et sperare, nobilius est quam credibilia
declarare” (Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 90 (Buytaert I:246)).
59 See below, p. 174. Though this does not appear to be an explicit citation, Aureoli is probably referencing
Book I, c. 39 (PL 34:36).
where perfect evident knowledge of God is impossible. What was true for Scotus was even more true for Giles. The close alignment between the acts of faith and the theological habit is something we saw to be a distinctive element of Rimini’s account of the subject matter of theology. Nevertheless, at this point, it still seems like Aureoli can easily accept the idea that “the love of God” is the end of theology, just as much Scotus did, as long as the acts of faith, hope, and obedience can be set alongside the act of love.

However, in Aureoli’s second argument the distinctiveness of his division between faith and theology becomes even more pronounced, to the point that the act of love is better seen as an indirect end of theology, while the true end is the act of faith. In this case theology’s primary practical function is to direct and support right belief and faithful assent, while belief is oriented toward producing the act of love. The argument for this position is what Aureoli’s calls his *a posteriori* argument. It is *a posteriori* because it looks not to the intrinsic nature of the knowledge itself, but to the proper end that the knowledge in question is meant to direct. It then attempts to show that this end is a genuine practice and therefore the knowledge that produced it must be practical. In doing so, Aureoli once again reveals much about his underlying assumptions about theology. He says: a true practical science has as its end not just an act which it elicits but one which it directs, “but,” he says “the theological habit does not have as its proper act [merely] something which it elicits, but rather an act which it directs, which is to believe

60 This is a conjectural conclusion, owing to the fact that Scotus gives little explicit attention to rigorously distinguishing between the act proper to theology and the cognitive act proper to faith.

61 Consider in particular the quotation where Rimini speaks of theology “when it is only faith” and theology when there is direct vision. See above c. 2, p. 137, n. 99. The quotation identifies earthly theology as almost the very same thing while contrasting it with a theology that trades faith for a direct vision of God.

62 See below for some speculation about what is motivating Aureoli here, p. 175.
Here he singles out the act of belief as the proper act, which theology directs. What is even more important is where Aureoli finds an authority for this decisive position. He looks to no further than De Trinitate XIV, c. 1, the quotation that has again and again proved decisive. Where Giles looked to this quotation to show that theology leads to beatitude (and affective love), Aureoli reads this as saying theology’s job is to direct right faith, and it is this correctly produced faith that will lead to beatitude, namely the act of loving God. Through this interpretation the act of loving is no longer considered the direct goal of theology, even though theology can continue to be called “purely practical” as it was for Scotus. It is practical, not because it helps us to love, but primarily because it helps us to believe. This is why it was so important that the definition of a practice not be restricted to an act outside the intellect. Aureoli wants to call theology practical, but he also wants the primary practice it directs to be a purely intellectual act, i.e. to believe. He cannot have it both ways unless we are allowed to acknowledge purely intellectual acts as genuine practices.

In the next paragraph, Aureoli will assert once more the priority of the act of belief over and above the other three acts; the act of the belief is the one theology is primarily concerned with, while the other acts, including love, will follow from a proper faith. He writes:

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63 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 84 (Buytaert I:244). “Sed habitus theologicus non habet proprie actum quem elicit, immo actum quem dirigit, qui est credere…” Ockham sites this passage explicitly in support of the fact that Aureoli like Scotus thinks theology is purely practical. However he does not comment on the quite different reasons that theology is thought to be purely practical. For Scotus it was because theology directs the act of love. But as this very passage indicates, for Aureoli theology is purely practical primarily because it directs the act of belief. Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 12 (OTh 1:334).
But it should be considered, that although this habit is extended to directing four acts, namely to believe, to hope, to love, and to live virtuously according to every virtue, as Augustine deduces in the end of book I of *De doctrina christiana*, nevertheless the act of believing (*credere*) is directed by this habit [theology] in a *more immediate way* since this habit is declarative of believable things. Nevertheless, in a more final and ultimate way, [theology] is ordered to love, just as faith is ordered to charity.64

Because the ultimate goal of faith is to produce charity, theology can be said to produce love. But this is only possible through the transitive mediation of faith: a separate act and habit from theology. The primary and immediate task of theology is to direct faith and assent in accordance with right reason. This is a fundamentally new position on the nature of theology that does not fit either the Aegidio-Augustinian tradition or even the Scotist position, despite much agreement with Scotus elsewhere.

But once more we ought to linger long enough to appreciate how decisive the interpretation of the quotation from *De Trinitate* XIV has been. Already in the last chapter, we saw that it was Scotus and Ockham’s interpretation of this quotation that led them to the believe that a restricted theology only applied to those in need of salvation and it did not apply to those who wanted to go beyond what was necessary for salvation. More decisively, this restriction did not apply to those who no longer needed salvation, but enjoyed a heavenly and beatific knowledge of God. It was Rimini’s more Aegidian interpretation that led him to disagree with Ockham. But now we see another interpretation of this quotation that proves even more dramatic. For Aureoli, theology

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64 Petrus Aureolus, *Scriptum*, I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 85 (Buytaert I:244). “Est autem considerandum quod, quamvis iste habitus extendatur ad dirigendum quatuor actus, videlicet credere, sperare, diligere et virtuose vivere secundum omnem virtutem, ut Augustinus deducit I *De doctrina christiana* in fine, nihilominus credere immediatius dirigitur per istum habitum, cum sit habitus credibilium declarativus; finalius tamen et magis ultimate, ordinatur ad diligere, sicut et fides ordinatur ad caritatem.”
cannot be identified with that “saving faith, which leads to beatitude.” The theologian’s job is simply to assist people with the independent act of belief. However, in the end, it is belief alone that disposes us and leads us to right love, not the work of a very specific theological procedure, which attempts to use natural and universally accessible sensible realities to expound and “declare” believable things. The notion of theology as “declarative” will prove to be a decisive description of theology that is perhaps the most distinctive feature of Aureoli’s position. But this is something we will take up in a later chapter.65

In the meantime, we are in a position to speculate about at least one reason that Aureoli might be inclined to take this distinctive position and equally distinctive interpretation of Augustine. In his opening list of objections, Aureoli points to one argument that is especially damning to the field of professional theology. The argument that bothers Aureoli states that the habit of theology cannot be responsible for producing our love for God because the simple believer often loves God more than those professional theologians possessing a theological habit.66 This argument is damning because, whether a person denies the consequence or accepts it, they are in bad shape. If they accept it, then the question must be asked, if the goal of all this intellectual effort is to love God, and lots of people love God without theology and many people without theology love God much better than those with theology, why do we need theologians at all? At best, they are superfluous. At worse, they are a harmful distraction. But if

65 See chapter 6, p. 256.
66 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 3, n. 17 (Buytaert I:223). “Quod patet, quia habitus iste non augmentat dilectionem, cum fideles simplices aliquando plus diligent quam habitum huiusmodi habentes. Ergo nec erit affectivus, nec practicus, nec ad dilectionem ordinatus.”
someone wants to deny that simple people love God more than theologians, one will have to admit that many simple believers, who appear to love God, may actually not love God and many people, who appear to be theologians, but do not love God, are not actually theologians. These are hard conclusions to accept, though in various ways many of those who accept that the end of theology is a greater disposition to love do end up biting the bullet and holding one of these possible positions.67

However, if one did not want to admit either of these alternatives, but still wanted to insist that theology was practical and was still connected to love as its ultimate end, then Aureoli’s own position might provide this possibility. Holding to Aureoli’s position, a person could explain how a person without theology could still love God. This person can love God because theology is not really necessary to love God, rather only faith is necessary. And as Aureoli has made abundantly clear these are two different things. But theology can still be said to work towards the love of God by trying to build up, encourage, and strengthen faith. Of course, not every faithful person will need this extra help, but some might and the theologian can help these people. Likewise, by separating the habit of theology and the habit of faith, we can explain why some genuine theologians may not show signs of loving God. Though theology aims to build up faith, it is not identical with faith. Therefore, it is conceivable that a person could come up with very strong arguments for those things that ought to be believed without actually taking the step to believe through faith. But since it is through faith and not theological knowledge (as Aureoli conceives it) that we love rightly, it follows that this unbelieving theologian

67 See for example Gerardus Senensis, *In Primum Librum Sententiarum*, prol, q. 5, a. 5 (Padua, 1598), 73a-74b.
could have a very impoverished or distorted love for God. In Aureoli’s reply to this particular argument we only get a few suggestive hints confirming our speculation. To Henry of Ghent, who insists that theology must be for its own sake (or speculative) rather than for something else, like love, Aureoli replies: no, in fact, theology is not for its own sake, but for the sake of the act of faith and virtue. 68 In replying that theology is for the sake of faith, his position would appear to bypass Henry’s concern over who loves God more, the theologian or the simple believer. Consequently, theology’s connection to virtue, especially the theological virtue of love, should be conceived of as the indirect result of theology’s assistance with right belief.

IX. Ockham and Rimini on Practice

With the positions of Scotus and Aureoli in the background, we can now turn our attention to Ockham and Rimini. In posing the question, “Is theology practical or speculative?” both Ockham and Rimini, like Aureoli, follow the pattern of questions set by Scotus: first taking up what it means for something to be a practice, then asking what makes knowledge in general either practical rather than speculative, and finally answering the original question about theology. Ockham divides these questions into the three final question of his prologue, while Rimini turns them into the three articles of the fifth and last question of his prologue.

For our present purposes any consideration of Ockham and Rimini’s view on the definition of a “practice” need only be brief because they both come to roughly the same

conclusion as Aureoli. Namely, both thinkers agree with Aureoli’s critique of Scotus and both believe that the definition of a practice should be expanded to include those operations occur entirely within the intellect. An example of Ockham’s explicit critique of Scotus on this point is visible when he says: “every operation following a choice is a practice, but the act of understanding follows a choice and deliberation.”69 And then he gives an illustration: “for someone is able to deliberate whether they should study or not, and afterwards choose to study. Therefore this [act of] study, which follows deliberation and choice, is truly a practice.”70 For Rimini’s part, we see the exact same objection and even a comparable example. He writes: “[Scotus] argues against himself, [because he admits that] every act commanded by the will is a practice, but speculation is of this type.”71 The consequence he proves: “For the consideration of logic and metaphysics and other speculative habits is able to be commanded by the will.”72

Likewise, both Ockham and Rimini recognize the fundamental objection that Scotus has to this conclusion, namely, that it is impossible for an intellectual act to extend to itself and that if this were the case then logic would be a practical knowledge.73 And both Ockham and Rimini find this highly suspect. Rimini, for one, highlights Scotus’s

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70 Ibid. “Potest enim aliquis consiliari an debeat studere vel non, et postea eligere studere. Ergo istud studium sequens consilium et electionem est vere praxis.”

71 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 5, a. 1 (Trapp I:151). “Praeterea, ipse arguit contra se ipsum: Omnis actus imperatus a voluntate est praxis, speculatio est huiusmodi, ergo etc.”

72 Ibid. “Potest enim imperari a voluntate consideratio logica et metaphysica et aliae quaelibet habituum speculativorum.”

heavy reliance on his prior belief that logic is not a practical science. But, he points out
that lots of respectable people believe that logic is a practical science. Both Aureoli and
Ockham show themselves to be among such people.

In the end and despite their criticisms, Ockham and Rimini do hang on to an
important aspect of Scotus’s definition of a practice. Namely, while they recognize that
the word “practice” can be used very loosely, the technical definition they want to use
mandates that a practice is an operation that lies within the power of our will, where
reason functions as the moving principle and the action is a result of choice of the will.
This is the gist of their definition of practice, more or less in conformity with the
qualified Scotist position given by Aureoli, and it was a definition of practice like this
that motivated Giles to reject the classification of theology as either practical or
speculative. From here, Ockham and Rimini turn to consider what makes knowledge
practical.

X. Ockham and Rimini on Practical Knowledge and Practical Habits

While appearing to argue for similar positions, Ockham and Rimini pick up in
different places. Ockham begins at question eleven, asking “whether practical and

74 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 1 (Trapp I:152). “Ad illud vero, quod de logica infertur, potest primo dici quod istud
a multis non reputatur falsum sed verum.”
75 This is something we have already seen in Aureoli, and Ockham states explicitly: “Et quando dicitur
’tunc logica esset practica’, ista conclusio est concedenda, sicut post patebit” (Ordinatio, I, q. 11 (OTH
I:310, ll. 4–5)). See also Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTH I:316, ll. 3–7).
76 Ibid., I, prol., q. 10 (OTH I:294). “Circa tertium dico quod praxis ultimo modo dicta est omnis operatio
existens in potestate voluntatis, consiliata ab intellectu, respectu cuius est electio voluntatis”; Gregorius
nostra est praxis, ita quod descriptio praxis, a qua habitus dicitur practicus, sit operatio existens in hominis
potestate,” and on (p. 152, “Ad istud dico quod extensio illa, qua intellectus dicitur esse practicus, non
semper est ad aliquam operationem extra intellectum, sed aliquando ad actum alium intellectus directum
speculative knowledge are distinguished through their ends or through their objects.”

Rimini asks in question five, article two: “What [kind of] knowledge is practical and what [kind of] knowledge is speculative?” In other words, what is the difference between these two kinds of knowledge? It is only after answering this question that Rimini turns in his third article to ask Ockham’s question about the reason for, or cause of, this difference. Recalling the order Scotus followed, Ockham has left out a question, which Rimini reinserts. We must therefore turn to Rimini first to see what he thinks properly distinguishes practical knowledge from speculative knowledge. Along the way, we will aim to assess whether this might be Ockham’s position as well, despite not taking up the question explicitly. Then, and in light of the definitions given by Rimini, we can turn simultaneously to how Ockham and Rimini will use a very un-Scotistic understanding of the “object” of a science to answer the question: from where does a given habit derive its practical or speculative nature?

Rimini begins his response by stating outright the definition of “practical knowledge” that he wants to defend. While acknowledging that “practical knowledge” can be used and defined in loose and imprecise ways, he says he wants to reserve the strictest meaning for the present discussion:

Strictly and properly, practical knowledge is knowledge formally directive of a practice, and anything of this type is a complex knowledge declaring

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77 Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:302). “Secundo quaero utrum notitia practica et speculativa distinguantur per fines vel per objecta.”

78 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:155). “Quantum ad secundum articulum, quae notitia sit practica et quae speculativa et similiter de habitu, videndum est.”
how or through which means something should be done or something similar.\textsuperscript{79}

In this definition he first demands that this knowledge be “directive” of a practice. This is quite in keeping with the previous tradition. That practical knowledge is directive was acknowledged by Aureoli\textsuperscript{80} and was an idea conveyed in Scotus’s notion of practical knowledge as \textit{conformis}.\textsuperscript{81} However, he adds that this knowledge must be “formally directive.” What he means by “formally” is that this knowledge is directive by explicitly stating how or by what means something should be done. And since only a proposition can give direction in this formal way, he adds the further condition that all practical knowledge is necessarily complex or propositional. This requirement is already contained within the requirement that practical knowledge be \textit{formally} directive. A simple example is given to drive home the point: “The humors of a man laboring with a certain sickness should be tempered with a kind of medicine, which when prepared in the proper way ought to be taken with his food.”\textsuperscript{82} This piece of knowledge gives explicit direction that some action or operation should be done. Rimini believes this definition to be at odds

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:156). “Stricte et proprie notitia practica est notitia formaliter praxis directiva, et quaelibet talis est notitia complexa enuntians qualiter vel per quae aliquid est agendum vel aliquid simile.”

\textsuperscript{80} See above, p. 165.

\textsuperscript{81} See the discussion of Scotus sense of \textit{conformis} above, p. 153. If there is a difference it might only be that Scotus thinks true practical knowledge is only that which directs or commands rightly. For of course, if it commands us to do something incorrect or wrong, it can hardly be called knowledge. Nevertheless, this is a description suited the forth and most strict definition of a ‘practice’ (Cf. \textit{Lectura}, I, prol., q. 5, a. 1 (Trapp I:154)). But while Rimini acknowledges this definition, he wants to use the penultimate definition of a ‘practice’: namely, an operation that has its starting principle in reason, but does not necessarily have to be the correct or ethically right action. (Cf. Ibid., I, prol. q. 5, a. 1 (Trapp I:148, 155)).

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:156). “Humores hominis tali aegritudine laborantis tali medicamine contemperandi sunt, taliter dispositus talibus cibis uti debet.”
with both of the positions marked out by Scotus and Aureoli. He immediately turns to four corollaries following from this definition directed against the two Franciscans.83

Adding the criteria of “formally directive” is the decisive part of Rimini’s definition. He mentions two other, less proper, uses of practical knowledge and both lack this formal directive sense. As a result they are described as merely virtually directive, either in an immediate way84 or in a more remote way (remote).85 As an example of the second use of “practical knowledge” which comes closest to the proper use, Rimini gives the following examples:

‘Health is due to the proper or adequate mixture of the humors’, ‘such and such a medicine has such and such a power’, ‘the flesh of birds makes for smooth and easy digestion’ and similar things, which do not direct according to themselves formally and immediately to the production of health or another related operation, nevertheless they virtually contain knowledge, which immediately directs according to itself for the causation of health.86

The difference in this example is plain. It does not tell us precisely what to do. However it is knowledge that, with only a few connections, could turn into an explicit direction

83 Cf. Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:158–161). The first corollary insists, contra Scotus, that “no complex knowledge can be called practical.” The second insists that despite what Scotus says, that “God is three” and that “the Father generates” are not practical pieces of knowledge. The third is a bit more involved but is again aimed against Scotus. According to Rimini, Scotus believed that while theoretical medicine can be called speculative relative to the concrete knowledge used to practice medicine, it is still practical. But Rimini insists that this is false: theoretical medicine does not tell us to do anything, whether generally (or universally) or in particular (dealing with individuals). The fourth and final corollary is aimed against Aureoli. According to Rimini, Aureoli believes practical and speculative can be distinguished by the fact that practical knowledge is acquired through experience and speculative knowledge is acquired through deduction. But Rimini counters that Aureoli is wrong because the practical knowledge of medicine can be acquired merely through study and not through experience (or actual practice), but this knowledge is still practical.
84 Cf. Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:161–162).
85 Cf. Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:162–163).
86 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:161). “Sanitas est debita humorum temperies vel adaequatio’, ‘tale medicamen talis virtutis existit’, ‘carnes volatilium sunt leves et facilis digestionis’ et similes, quae licet non secundum se formaliter et immediate dirigant ad sanitatis causationem aut aliam operationem de propinquo, tamen virtualiter continent notitias secundum se immediate ad causandum sanitatem dirigentes.”
about what to do. Rimini’s explanation of this example also serves to fill out the meaning of “formally” a bit more. Now we see the criteria of “immediately directive” added as a synonym. What distinguishes practical knowledge in the proper sense is the direct and immediate command it gives about action. This looser sense of practical knowledge does not directly tell us “to do” anything.

The last sense of “practical knowledge” that Rimini recognizes is similar to the second in that it can only be practical knowledge because of its potential to produce formally directive knowledge. It is distinct from the second sense only because it “virtually contains” formally directive knowledge in an even more remote and distant way. Identifying this sense of practical knowledge allows Rimini to acknowledge that even metaphysics, physics, and mathematics can be useful as principles to a practitioner, just as the geometric knowledge can eventually be useful to the mechanic who wants to build something. Nevertheless, this knowledge is distinct from the second type of knowledge (i.e. knowing what different medicines do or what kind of wood is the best for different kinds of projects) because this second type, while not immediately directive, is only one step away from being directive. On the contrary, many deductions may be needed before the geometer’s knowledge of a point can be useful to the mechanic or builder.

With these three senses in hand, Rimini ends article two by insisting that when we talk about practical and speculative knowledge in the proposed question, we mean only the proper sense. Everything else, whether it is virtually directive or not, should be
classified as speculative knowledge.\(^87\) While Ockham does not explicitly treat the different senses of “practical knowledge” as Rimini does,\(^88\) we do find him identifying “practical knowledge” in accordance with Rimini’s strict definition. At one point Ockham states:

> But in that conclusion which is known in a practical knowledge, something doable by us is posited…since practical knowledge is about our actions...therefore I say that since practical knowledge is directive of some practice, it is necessary that practical knowledge always has some practice or something doable by us as its object, at least, as its partial object.\(^89\)

From this strict definition of “practical knowledge” as formally directive, Rimini extends this definition to the proper meaning of a practical habit taken as a whole. In the course of doing so, he reveals his further criticisms of Scotus and Aureoli.

Opening the discussion, Rimini first states his understanding of Scotus’s position and then documents his complaint. The definition as stated by Rimini reads:

> A practical habit is that which concerns an object virtually containing knowledge directive of an operation of the will…that truly is a speculative habit, which is about an object not virtually containing directive and correct knowledge of an operation of the will regarding it.\(^90\)

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\(^87\) Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:163). “Ex his patet quae notitia proprie practica dicitur, quoniam notitia complexa secundum se praxis formaliter directiva, omnis vero alia notitia speculativa dicenda est.”

\(^88\) At least, we do not find Ockham doing this in his prologue.

\(^89\) Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:315). “In illa autem conclusione quae scitur notitia practica ponitur aliquid operabile a nobis…cum notitia practica sit de operibus nostris….Ideo dico quod cum notitia practica sit directiva alicuius praxis, oportet quod semper notitia practica habeat praxim…vel aliquid operabile a nobis pro objecto saltem partiali.”

We find Ockham using the definition of practical knowledge defined by Rimini as part of an argument for why the nature of practical science is in fact determined by the ‘object’ of the science or habit and not the ‘end’, showing us the importance of this understanding of “formally directive knowledge” for the further arguments both Ockham and Rimini want to make.

\(^90\) Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:163). “Hic dicitur quod habitus practicus est ille, qui est de objecto virtualiter continentem notitiam directivam operationis voluntatis circa ipsum ac etiam rectitudinem operationis praedictae, quae operatio secundum ipsum est vere et primo praxis. Ille vero
We can add to this definition the facts that emerged from our treatment of Scotus; namely that a practical habit is that which descends from an object and therefore is able to produce knowledge which is “aptitudinally” prior and *conformis* to an action or operation within our power. (And of course Scotus excludes intellectual acts from qualifying as said operations.)

Rimini finds this position troubling for two related reasons. First, Scotus himself identifies God as an object fulfilling the above criteria. But if this were true, it would be impossible for there to be any purely speculative knowledge about God. Rimini finds this consequence to be problematic and even inconsistent with other things Scotus has said. Despite this accusation of inconsistency, our own exposition has shown that Scotus would most likely accept this consequence. In Scotus’s account, we saw that all knowledge that was deduced from God as the object was to be regarded as practical because it could potentially (or virtually) direct us to a more correct loving of God. Thus for Scotus propositions like “God is three and one” and “the Father generates the Son” were clear instances of practical knowledge and therefore genuine parts of a

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habitus est speculativus, qui est de objecto non virtualiter continente huiusmodi notitiam directivam et rectitudinem operationis voluntatis circa ipsum."

91 Ibid., prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp, I:163). “quia, cum secundum ipsum deus sit tale objectum, unde et theologiam ideo ponit practicam, sequitur quod de Deo non possit esse aliquis habitus speculativus.”

92 Cf. Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:163–164). Rimini writes: “Hoc etiam consequens, ut apparat, videtur esse falsum secundum hunc doctorem; nam in solvendo quodam argumentum factum in principio quaestionis ad probandum theologiam non esse practicam ex auctoritate Boethii assignantis ‘tres partes scientiae speculativae, quarum una est theologia’ ait sic ‘dico quod Boethius intelligit per theologiam metaphysicam’. Hic, ut apparat, non vult negare Boethium, sed exponere quasi concedens dictum Boethii secundum expositionem quam dat; quod si sic, ipse hic videtur concedere metaphysicam esse speculativam, quod, si non concedat, ex confessione tamen sua auctoritas Boethii est contra eum.” (See Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 2, p. 228, 12-13.)

93 Rimini too notes this, despite his subsequent accusation of inconsistency in other passages. He writes of Scotus: “hoc autem consequens, quamvis ipse [Scotus] concedat mihi…” ((Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:163)).

94 See above, p. 158.
practical habit. But Rimini raises a concern about these examples in his earlier section on the proper meaning of practical knowledge. “None of these,” he says, “formally direct us to an operation.” That “God is three and one” does not immediately tell us to do anything, and therefore it cannot be practical.95

In light of Rimini’s earlier distinction between the different senses of practical knowledge and his willingness to acknowledge that propositions which are not formally directive can still be very useful, he cannot be disputing with Scotus about the fact that non-directive actions can have practical import. On the contrary, his complaint is that Scotus’s way of explaining the matter ruins a very common sense distinction. Namely, there is something categorically different about a proposition like “God is three in one” and “God should be loved above everything else.” The distinction between speculative and practical knowledge was a helpful way of designating this difference. But Scotus, in his effort to show how very theoretical sounding propositions can have important consequences for right action, has lost any way of meaningfully articulating this difference. This is something Rimini wants to recover.

The second criticism is really a more general version of the first and reinforces the key point at issue. Rimini claims that if Scotus’s position were accepted, not only would speculative knowledge of God be impossible, but so would speculative knowledge of any kind. He argues, again from a rather common sense perspective, that it is obvious that we have knowledge that does not make direct claims about how we should act, but he

95 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:159). “Et hoc etiam ulterius sequitur contra eundem doctorem in eadem quaestio quod nulla talium ‘deus est trinus’, ‘pater generat filium’ est vere et proprie practica cum nulla talium formaliter dirigat nos ad aliquam operationem.”
believes Scotus’s position disallows this obvious possibility. He reasons as follows:

“There is nothing in the world that is not good, and as a consequence does not virtually contain some knowledge directive [i.e. both having priority and conformity] of an operation of the will regarding the thing in question.” 96 This consequence is the logical conclusion of Scotus’s minimal condition of virtual containment, for he leaves no verbal room for the obvious difference between certain kinds of propositional knowledge.

Immediately after finishing his critique of Scotus, Rimini turns to Aureoli’s position, which itself was formed in response to Scotus’s position. In Aureoli, Rimini thinks he has actually found a temporary ally in his campaign against Scotus. In his opening remarks, he writes:

I agree with [Aureoli] in his negative judgment of [Scotus’s] position, namely that a habit is not practical on account of those criteria of conformity and priority, nor precisely from the fact that an object is of such a kind. However, when he says that a habit is practical on account of the criteria of activity…that the one knowing has the ability to do or make the object of this science…this does not seem to me to be true. 97

Despite his agreement with Aureoli’s negative position, Rimini is not impressed with his solution of adding *activitas* or the capability of doing the action in question. There are five particular complaints. 98 We need not labor through all of them. Suffice it to say that Rimini thinks Aureoli’s position is incoherent and at the same time does not solve the

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96 Ibid., prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp, I:164). “Quoniam nulla res est in mundo, quae non sit bona, et per consequens quae non contineat virtualiter aliquam notitiam directivam operationis voluntatis circa ipsam.”

97 A paraphrase translation from: Ibid., prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:166). “Demisso eo, quod haec opinio dicit contra aliam, videlicet quod habitus non est practicus propter illos respectus conformitatis et prioritatibus, nec ex eo quod est talis vel talis obiecti praecise, quia in his negativis convenio secum, quantum tamen ad illud, quod dicit, quod habitus est practicus propter respectum activitatis ad intellectum supra posuitum et quem habet, et ‘ex obiecto relato ad scientem, qui habet posse agere et fabricare obiectum’ ac alia quaedam, quae consequenter dicit, ipsa non videntur mihi vera.”

98 Ibid., l, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:166–169).
initial problem resulting for Scotus’s position. That is, it fails to make sense of the common sense impression that a clearly practical piece of knowledge, which immediately and formally directs action, could rely on pieces of knowledge that by themselves are clearly speculative and offer no explicit direction whatsoever. Rimini believes Aureoli’s modified Scotist position still demands that we regard some abstract non-directive knowledge as practical because of its virtual practical implications. But once again this leaves us with no verbal space to articulate the difference between these potentially practical propositions and those that give us explicit direction. One example taken from among Rimini’s critique can show this sufficiently: namely, his critique of Aureoli’s appeal to the natural scientist’s knowledge of the production of the rose.

Rimini remarks: if you simply say a practical science is one which virtually contains knowledge that we are in principle capable of doing, then, despite what the rose example suggests, natural philosophy or physics will still be considered a practical science. This is not because Rimini thinks we are actually capable of producing a rose with our knowledge of the natural world, but because we are still capable of producing lots of things with our physical knowledge. Turning more to psychology than to pure physics, he asks us to think about our natural knowledge of the acts of the soul, namely, our acts of understanding and volitions. The natural knowledge of these acts and how they are generated, combined with the fact that intellection and volition are within our power, would make this natural philosophy (or psychology) practical.\footnote{Cf. Ibid., I, prol. q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:169).} The same thing could be said about geometry, since the geometer both knows and is capable of making
shapes. In both cases, Rimini deems it apparent and well supported by authority that both physics and geometry are not practical habits despite the fact that Aureoli’s definition would mandate that they be categorized as such.

Rimini’s answer to what a practical habit is depends primarily on the distinction he already made between “partial” and “total habits.” When it comes to the single demonstrative syllogism constitutive of a “partial habit,” the answer is quite easy. If the habit, through the mediation of the act it elicits, is “formally directive of a practice,” then the partial habit is practical. Likewise, that habit which does not produce (elicit) a conclusion, which is “formally directive of habit,” is a speculative habit.

The only other question Rimini now needs to answer is: how do we classify a “total habit,” which is constructed of several conclusions or elicited acts? Again the answer is straightforward if we are discussing a “total habit” which includes only speculative “partial habits.” In this case such a “total habit” is speculative. Geometry is such an example for Rimini. On the other hand, if a “total habit” includes only practical “partial habits,” then the “total habit” is clearly practical. Rimini cites “practical medicine” as an example, which is supposed to be distinct from theoretical medicine.

The last difficulty is to decide what to call a “total habit” that encompasses both practical

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100 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:169–170).
101 See chapter 2, p. 121.
102 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:171). “Et isto modo sumpto habitu dico quod ille habitus est practicus, qui mediante suo actu elicitus est formaliter praxis directivus, hoc est eius proprius actus elicitus est formaliter praxis directivus.”
103 See immediately below.
104 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2, (Trapp I:171–172). “Alio modo sumitur habitus pro collectione plurium partialium habituum, ut frequenter supra dictum est. Et sic sumendo habitum dico quod vel ille includit praecise habitus speculativos, sicut verbi gratia tota geometria proprie sumpta, et constat quod talis est speculativus, vel includit praecise practicos sicut verbi gratia medicina practica condistincta contra medicinam theoricam, et tunc non est dubium talem esse proprie practicum…”
and speculative “partial habits.” Rimini gives a more detailed description of such a “total habit,” where the speculative “partial habits”…

…have an agreement of the type of subject and an analogy to the practical habits\textsuperscript{105} such that they are like principles, or rather the conclusion of those [speculative habits] are the principles of the conclusions of the practical habits.\textsuperscript{106}

Such speculative “partial habits” are said to be virtually directive and Rimini cites the whole of medicine as such an example of a “total habit,” which includes both theoretical and practical medicine.

In such cases, Rimini thinks it is perfectly fine to call these mixed “total habits” practical as long as we remember that not every “partial habit” included in them needs to be classified as a practical habit. In this way, he keeps the good and gets rid of the bad within Scotus’s initial position. He recognizes the practical import and potential of many explicitly theoretical propositions. Nevertheless, by employing the distinction between “partial” and “total habits,” he has found a way to justify our intuitions that there is something different between propositions that directly and immediately tell us what to do and those propositions that only have potential implications for what we should do.

XI. Ockham and Rimini on the Object of a Practical Habit

Ockham and Rimini’s discussion of the “object” of a practical science differs significantly from the way Scotus and Aureoli discussed the “object” and its impact on

\textsuperscript{105} We must remember that it was analogy and order through the primary subject that united the diverse parts of a total habit. See above, chapter 2, p. 123.

\textsuperscript{106} Gregorius Ariminensis, \textit{Lectura}, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:172). “…habentes convenientiam generis subjici et analogiam ad practicos, ut pote quasi principia seu potius quorum conclusiones sunt principia respectu conclusionum habituum practicorum quales.”
the practical nature of knowledge. As part of his critique of Aureoli’s appeal to the natural philosopher’s knowledge of a rose, Rimini’s offers a helpful illustration. In this illustration, he introduces us to an important terminological shift at the center of this discussion. In the previous chapter we already saw the transformation of meaning and use of the term “subject.” But now we are faced with a similar transformation of the meaning of the term “object.”

Aureoli, we can recall, had claimed that the natural philosopher’s knowledge of a rose could be called practical (if it were in our power to produce it) because the rose, as an object, yields knowledge that is doable in principle. But Rimini asks: “What does [Aureoli] mean by saying that a practical science has ‘as its object something doable from itself’ and that a science is not practical, unless it belongs to a knower who is able to do and make the object?” The reason Rimini asks this is because of his confusion regarding the way Aureoli (and also Scotus) generally uses the word “object.” He continues: “For it happens that, by the word ‘object’, he understands that which is commonly called a ‘subject’, namely that which signifies or as that for which the subject of the conclusion supposits.” What Aureoli means by “object” is really what Ockham and Rimini (apparently, the new standard of common usage) mean by “subject.” Rimini’s identification of the subject as either that which signifies or that for which the term

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107 See above c. 2, pp. 119-124.
109 Ibid. “Constat enim quod per objectum intelligit illud, quod communiter vocatur subiectum, rem scilicet, quam significat vel pro qua supponit subiectum conclusionis et de qua dicitur aliquid sciri…” (emphasis mine).
supposites is a definition we can also find explicitly in Ockham. But important for both Ockham and Rimini is the fact that the subject is necessarily incomplex or non-propositional. But, then, it must be asked: how can an incomplex non propositional knowledge be “doable” as Aureoli suggests? Rimini speculates that Aureoli must have some propositional directive action in mind regarding the rose, but the point about the imprecision of Aureoli’s language has been made. An object can only be doable, and therefore formally directive, if it is propositional. Thus, the “subject” and “object” of any habit need to be more sharply distinguished.

In Ockham and Rimini’s respective discussions of whether the “object” or the “end” of a habit determines if a habit is practical or speculative, we see a new and sharply distinguished meaning of “object” in use. In question 11, Ockham generally takes this new meaning for granted, but at one point states it clearly, equating objects with “known conclusions.”111 Rimini in question 5, article 3 more exhaustively reviews the different possible meanings of the term, while pinpointing the one he would like to use. “In one mode,” he says, “[object is meant] properly as that, namely, which is known, and thus the

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110 In question 9 of his prologue Ockham explains the difference between the subject as “that which does the suppositing” and “that for which something is supposited.” He only acknowledges the latter as the “subject” in an improper way. The truest and most proper sense of subject (the former) is the actual mental term that suposites for something else. He writes: “Secundo, dico quod subiectum primo modo dictum potest accipi dupliciter: vel pro illo quod supponit in conclusione, vel pro illo pro quo supponitur, [§ et tune accipitur subiectum improprie, §] nam non semper est idem quod supponit et pro quo supponitur. Hoc patet, nam in ista propositione ‘omnis homo est risibilis’ illud quod supponit est aliquod commune ad omnes homines, sive sit conceptus sive non; sed illud pro quo supponitur est aliquod singulare, quia per istam non plus denotatur nisi quod omne singulare contentum sub homine potest ridere, et non denotatur quod aliquod commune potest ridere” (Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:266)).

111 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:310). “Sed isto ultimo modo distinguuntur per obiecta, hoc est per conclusiones scitas.”
object is the total significatum of the scientific conclusion." \[112\] Rimini agrees with Ockham and then takes his definition a bit further. He says the object is “that which is known” just as Ockham said the “known conclusions.” But, then, Rimini goes on to clarify that what is actually known at the end of demonstration is the “total significatum” of the proposition, not merely the proposition itself. Ockham will not agree with this further description. \[113\] Nevertheless, both agree that the proper meaning of an “object” should be what is known through the demonstration. And what is known through a demonstration is necessarily complex and propositional, for it is always the known predication of some attribute to a “subject.” But, as Rimini’s treatment of Aureoli already made clear, he is willing to recognize that the term “object” is sometimes used in other ways. He says: “In another mode, the object is accustomed to be called by some that about which something is known.” \[114\] But he is quick to let us know that he thinks this use of “object” “is more properly called subject than object, after the fashion of the

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\[112\] Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 5, a. 3 (Trapp I:174). “Uno modo propri e pro eo, scilicet quod scitur, et sic objectum scientiae est significatum totale conclusionis scienti ficae.”

\[113\] For more information on the complexe significabile see my article “Adam Wodeham” in the *Stanford Encyclopedia* as well as Bermon, *L’assentiment et son objet chez Gregoire de Rimini*.

Considering the amount of scholarly attention given to idea of a complexe significabile it is worth acknowledging that it does not make a major impact in our discussions here. For Rimini, it appears to be an ontological concept that lies a different level than the concern over the subject matter and purpose of theology. We will however have a chance to briefly revisit the issue in our final chapter where it will make a larger impact. See below, c. 7, pp. 318-327.

\[114\] Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 5, a. 3 (Trapp I:174). “Alio modo consuetum est vocari ab aliquibus objectum scientiae illud, de quo aliquid scitur, sive illud, quod scitur esse tale vel tale, et illud est id, pro quo supponit subjectum scienti ficae conclusionis…” (emphasis mine).

There is a potential point of confusion here as the editors provide a footnote after “ab aliquibus” almost appear to suggest that this is Ockham’s usual way of speaking of an object. But this is clearly not the case. The passage referred to is the passage which identifies the two different ways we might mean a subject (viz. as that which supposes or that for which it is supposed.) But the passage in no way suggests that Ockham would like to refer the “object” as that that which supposes or that for which it is supposed. I think it much more plausible that by “ab aliquibus” Rimini has Aureoli and Scotus in mind. The above example about the rose as ‘object’ in Aureoli’s terminology, but ‘subject’ in Ockham and Rimini’s makes this amply clear.
moderns [he must have Ockham in mind here, as well as Adam Wodeham].” 115 At the end of this introductory paragraph, Rimini indicates that he will continue to use “object” and “subject” in the modern way to avoid ambiguity, despite the fact that he is sometimes forced to use these terms otherwise when treating the opinions of others. 116

I belabor the point about terminology because the definition is decisive for the position both Ockham and Rimini will take. For one thing, it helps us to recognize a difference underlying verbal sameness, since this new definition opens up the possibility of two different positions encoded in the same language. Scotus asked whether it was the object or the end of a science that was decisive for determining why knowledge was practical or speculative. But even if Ockham or Rimini were to conclude that an object were the determining factor, this would not indicate agreement with Scotus. Scotus used the word “object” for something close to their meaning of a subject. But Rimini begins his position by stating that “no practical habit is distinguished from a speculative habit by its subject.” 117 Thus, with a different vocabulary Rimini has flatly contradicted Scotus’s position. This can be easy to lose sight of since he will later affirm that the object can and does distinguish a practical habit from a speculative habit. Thus, verbally, he appears to hold the same position as Scotus. But in meaning, he is expressly rejecting the Scotist position. Before we fill in the rest of Rimini’s position, let us look at how Ockham builds the position and then see how Rimini follows.

115 Ibid. “Et magis proprie vocatur subjectum, et sic aliqui moderni tantummodo vocant, et non objectum…”
116 Ibid. “Et sic etiam ego usus sum pro maiori parte in quaestionibus praecedentibus, quamvis aliquando conformans me in modo loquendi opinionibus, de quibus tractabam, etiam subjectum appellaverim objectum. In praesenti autem articulo ad vitandum ambiguitatem significationis utar distincte nominibus subjecti et objecti iuxta sensum praemissum.”
117 Ibid. “Prima est quod non quilibet habitus practicus a quolibet speculativo distinguitur subjecto.”
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For Ockham the major challenge of the present question comes not from Scotus or Aureolus, but from Henry of Ghent, who goes unmentioned in Rimini’s account. Henry of Ghent’s opinion, visible in his *Summa*, a. 36, q. 4, ad. 2, is that speculative and practical sciences are distinguished by their ends.\(^{118}\) Undoubtedly it was against this opinion that Scotus formed his original position about the decisiveness of the object rather than end for determining the practical or speculative character of a science.

The central move of Ockham’s response is to recognize that an “end” can be understood in two ways:

In one mode [we understand an ‘end’] as something being acquired through some operation, as health is the end of walking; and this end is loved and desired by the love of desire (*concupiscentia*). The other ‘end’ is loved by the love of friendship (*amicitia*), on account of which the first end is produced, for it is because man loves (*diligit*) himself that he desires (*concupiscit*) health for himself, and therefore works to achieve the latter.\(^{119}\)

Ockham then applies this distinction to the different senses in which we can speak of an “end of a science.” “Properly speaking,” he says, “the end of a science is that which is loved by the one acquiring the science (*ab addiscente*).”\(^{120}\) But while the “end of a


One of Henry’s arguments (cited by Ockham in *Ordinatio*, I, q. 11 (OTh I:304)) suggests that a science cannot be determined by a subject because the same subject is able to belong to both a practical and speculative science. Therefore he concludes it must be determined by its end. But Ockham and Rimini can disagree with both Scotus and Henry because they recognize a third possibility: namely that science can be distinguished by its object or its proper conclusion. (See our earlier mention of Henry and his ambiguous statements about the “cause” of practical knowledge in c. 2, p. 155, n. 21.)

\(^{119}\) Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:306). “Uno modo pro aliquo adquirendo per aliquam operationem, sicut sanitas est finis deambulationis; et iste finis est amatus et desideratus amore concupiscentiae. Alius est finis amatus amore amicitiae, propter quem primus finis producitur; quia enim homo diligit seipsum concupiscit sibi ipsi sanitatem, et ideo ad illam habendam operatur.”

\(^{120}\) Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:307). “Secundo, dico quod finis scientiae proprie loquendo est illud quod amatum ab addiscente...”
science” can ultimately be seen as the same thing as the “end of the one acquiring this science,” he warns us to avoid thinking that the final cause of the science and the final cause of the one acquiring the science are exactly the same thing. The final cause of the science is said to be the direct reason that the science was acquired, but this final cause cannot always be equated with the final cause of the knower. He gives an example: often a student will endeavor to acquire a given habit or knowledge because it leads to certain gain or profit (lucrum). This, then, is the final cause of the science in question, but Ockham does not want to identify this as the final cause of the knower or learner in question. Rather this gain or profit is something loved by the knower for some other further end. In Ockham’s example, it is the knower’s love of self that is this further end. In this case, the end of the science is the end of the knower, in the first sense mentioned above (amor concupiscentia), but not the second (amore amicitiae). Accordingly, while the profit of this science is in fact an ‘end’ of the knower, it is not the final cause of the knower. Nevertheless, this profit is the final cause of the acquired science in question.121

By making this clarification and closely tying the final cause of a science to the instrumental end sought by the knower in the pursuit of their own final cause, Ockham reaches the following conclusion: it is quite possible and valid to think that “of the same

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121 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:307–308). “Verbi gratia, aliquis addiscit scientiam propter amorem amicitiae ad seipsum et concupiscit ipsam scientiam sibi ipsi vel aliquod lucrum attingibile per ipsam scientiam, tunc dico quod ipsemet est causa finalis illius scientiae quia est amatus amore amicitiae, et aliter ipsa scientia non producetur in effectum. Et ita ipsemet amatus a se ipso est causa finalis scientiae, quia ipse scientia est cuius esse sequitur ad ipsum sic amatum; et ita ipse habet rationem alciuius causae, quia est ad cuius esse sequitur aliiud. Et tamen ipsemet non est causa sui ipsius, quia ipsemet non dependet sic a se ipso. Similiter, ipsum lucrum vel aliquid tale est causa finalis aliquo modo ipsius scientiae, quia est per quod respondetur ad questionem factam [per] ‘propter quid’. Si enim aliquis quaerat ‘quare iste addiscit’ vel ‘quare scientia pro ductur’, convenienter respondetur ‘propter lucrum per ipsam adquirendum’. Et tamen illud lucrum non est causa finalis ipsius scientis, quia ipse sciens non dependet ab eo essentialiter, sed tantum est desideratum et concupitum a sciente, propter quod agit ad adquirendum scientiam.”
science of the same species there are able to be many final causes.”122 Given the above distinction, the logic seems obvious. A person could attempt to master the science of geometry for many reasons: to impress people, to build things, or just for the sake of it. Thus the very same science could have diverse final causes, depending on the reason it is sought.

An objection faces the above conclusion, which Ockham acknowledges: “isn’t the real final cause of a science, not what is actually intended, but what ought to be intended (aptana)?”123 A related objection is listed just below: “doesn’t everything have just one essential cause, but how could this be, if everything intended [by the one acquiring the science] can count as a final cause?”124 He dismisses the first objection in a typically parsimonious fashion, noting that there can only be a discussion of a thing’s cause inasmuch as it is actually being caused, and it is not actually caused unless it is actually being intended. Accordingly, the only final cause is the actual final cause, and to speak of “a non-actual final cause” is meaningless. However, he qualifies this slightly in his response to the second objection. Concerning the objector’s insistence on an “essential final cause,” Ockham is willing to concede some coherence to this notion. Namely, if we are discussing how everything “ought to be intended, if everything were ordered appropriately,” then it is possible to acknowledge one suitable final cause that is ordained by nature. However, he reminds us that what “ought to be” is distinct from what actually

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122 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:309). “Et ita eiusdem scientiae secundum speciem possunt esse plures causae finales.”
123 Ibid. “Si dicatur quod non est de ratione causae finalis actualiter intendi sed quod sit apta nata intendi…”
124 Ibid. “Praeterea, unius rei est una causa finalis essentialis, sed si omne tale intentum esset causa finalis, essent plures causae finales, cum talia plura possint intendi.”
is. And if this “suitable final cause” is not what is actually intended, then it is not the true and proper final cause.\textsuperscript{125} We mention this here because Rimini will discuss a science’s “proper (or essential) end,” and if we do not have clarity about the distinctions Ockham is allowing and disallowing here, then we will not be able to understand how Rimini is using the phrase “proper end.”

Clarity about the actual end of a science allows Ockham to move forward and provide a direct answer to the question, which he backs up with four supporting arguments. He begins with a claim, which the first of the four arguments aims to establish: “sciences are distinguished among themselves intrinsically and formally.”\textsuperscript{126} To look closely at his argument for this will take us far afield. But it is sufficient to say, Ockham thinks a science possesses a kind of simplicity such that no external factor can differentiate them. If sciences are different, he says, it is because of something intrinsic to their own nature.\textsuperscript{127} It is from this claim that he builds his case. An “intended end” would only distinguish these sciences causally, that is, according to the reason for which they came into being, but this is not a formal or intrinsic determination.\textsuperscript{128} Ockham’s argument relies on his earlier arguments about the true end of a science to show how such causal determinations are unhelpful since one and the same science could have distinct reasons for coming to be; again, one might simply enjoy the knowledge or one might

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid. “Ad omnes auctoritates respondeo quod procedunt de fine qui secundum rectam rationem – saltem ut in pluribus – deberet intendi si omnia essent convenienter ordinata, et ideo quasi ex natura sua habet quod sit ordinabilis ad talem finem. Si tamen non actualiter intendatur non est vere et proprie causa finalis.”

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:310). “Ex his respondeo ad quaestionem quod istae scientiae se ipsis distinguuntur intrinsece et formaliter…”

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:311). “Primum patet, quia istae scientiae sunt formae simplices, sicut alias declarabitur de omnibus accidentibus; sed formae simplices non possunt distinguui intrinsece et formaliter nisi se ipsis; ergo etc.”

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:310). “Sed per fines vel per finem distinguentur causaliter, sicut causaliter distinguuntur per causam efficientem.”
want to impress people with the knowledge. The *raison d’etre* is clearly different, but the
science itself remains the same. He does, however, make one concession following from
his willingness to allow a “suitable final cause” in accordance with right reason. He says:

Still, it should be known that by accepting ‘end’ as that which *ought to be*
the end according to right reason—in the mode already explained—[the
sciences] are distinguished through their ends as through something
proper, because one thing is the [ordained, though not necessarily actual]
end of one science and something else [is the ordained end] of another
[science].129

The logic behind this concession is found in that sense of “end,” which does not appeal to
the causal account of a science’s coming into being. The “ordained end” may in fact have
nothing to do with the actual reason that a science was acquired. But the “ordained end”
is somehow proper or intrinsic to the nature of the science itself.

From rejecting the actual “end” as a candidate of distinction, Ockham turns to
another candidate, which was not expressed in the formal title of this question (which
asked about “ends” and “objects”). He turns to the notion of a “subject.” As we already
anticipated, Ockham and Rimini both reject this view based on their understanding of a
subject that which occupies the grammatical role of a subject in a proposition. Therefore,
depending on what is predicated of the subject, we can have both practical and
speculative knowledge about the same subject. Again, this is a clear rejection of the
positions offered by Scotus and Aureoli, who take the opinion that a science is
determined by its “object,” but by “object” they mean something closer to what Ockham
means by “subject.” And when Ockham next turns to argue that sciences are formally

129 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I: 311). “Verumtamen sciendum quod accipiendo finem pro illo qui secundum
rectam rationem debet esse finis, - modo exposito -, sic distinguuntur per fines tamquam per aliquam
propria, quia alius est finis unius et alterius.”
distinguished by their “objects,” this cannot be construed as agreement with Scotus or Aureoli despite the verbal similarity.

Ockham concludes that since sciences cannot be distinguished by their actual ends or their subjects, they must be distinguished by their objects. It is here that he defines objects as “known conclusions.” The fourth and final argument supporting his overall position addresses this final claim. Objects determine a science because the known conclusions either express something doable by us or not doable by us. In this division between a directive proposition and non-directive propositions, we can see that Rimini has followed Ockham closely. For Ockham, like Rimini, if the known conclusion expresses something immediately doable, then this object formally determines the science as practical. But if the known conclusion does not give us immediate formal direction, then this object is the decisive factor that determines the science to be purely speculative. These designations hold fast, regardless of the actual purpose for which the science is acquired.

The thorough and straightforward account given by Ockham makes following Rimini’s concerns rather simple. Rimini’s third article of question five is structured around three conclusions: 1) the subject of science does not determine whether it is speculative or practical; 2) the object of science does determine whether it is speculative or practical; 3) the proper end of a science does determine whether it is speculative or practical. Of these three, the first two follow the reasoning of Ockham closely. Rimini

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130 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:310). “Sed isto ultimo modo distinguuntur per obiecta, hoc est per conclusiones scitas.”
131 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 3 (Trapp I:174). “Prima est quod non quilibet habitus practicus a quolibet speculativo distinguitur subiecto. Secunda, quod quilibet practicus a quolibet
shares the same subject/object terminology that Ockham employs and reaches the same conclusions. But only Rimini’s third conclusion initially stands out as confusing and potentially problematic. Resolving the problem is only a matter of understanding how Rimini is employing the term “proper end.”

After declaring that, indeed, a “proper end” can be the decisive factor because the proper act elicited by all speculative habits is to know, while the properly elicited act of all practical habits is something other than simply to know, Rimini stops to clarify the sense of “proper end” he is using. He states: “And I speak about the end suitable to the habit from its proper nature not from the will of the one having the habit.” Very much in the language of Ockham, he speaks of an end according to the intrinsic “proper nature” of a science. However, Rimini does not linger to differentiate this “ordained proper end” from the “actual final cause” of the science determined by the intentions of the particular knower in question.

With all these components, distinctions, and definitions in the background, we are finally in a position to look at how Ockham and Rimini apply this background reasoning to the central question at hand: Is theology itself practical or speculative?

XII. Ockham and Rimini on Theology’s Practical Nature

The treatment of this question by both thinkers at once presupposes much. In neither case are we given an argument that theology should be practical or should be...
speculative. But rather they assume certain things about theology and the kinds of propositions that fall under its aegis. They then proceed to ask how we should classify this body of conclusions, given all the things that have been said about practical and speculative habits thus far. Despite not arguing for what theology should be, their respective discussions of this habit does or does not conform to the characteristics of speculative or practical habits reveal much about what theology is presupposed to be.

With such a concordant account of the nature of practices, practical knowledge and what makes a habit practical or speculative, it comes as little surprise that Ockham and Rimini develop answers to this final question along similar lines. Ockham’s rather brief response starts by reminding us: neither theological knowledge nor a theological habit or science is one single thing. On the contrary, theology is made up of many really distinct pieces of knowledge. In line with this distinction, some of the pieces of knowledge are strictly speaking speculative and others are simply practical. 133 Rimini also begins his formal response in a similar way. He opens by drawing two conclusions based on the two different ways a person could mean “theology.” The first conclusion treats theology as referring “to one habit of only one theological truth.” 134 When speaking about theology in this way, Rimini draws the same conclusion as Ockham: since it is the individual objects (or “known conclusions”) that determine whether or not an individual “partial habit” is speculative or practical, the nature of each “partial habit” will depend on the distinct theological truth in question. Rimini, like Ockham, points out that

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133 Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 12 (OTh I:337). “Ideo aliter dico ad quaestionem quod theologia non est una notitia vel scientia, sed habet vel continet plures notitias realiter distinctas quarum aliquae sunt practicae simpliciter et aliquae speculativae.”

the presupposed body of theological truths contains many propositions that *are not* “formally directive” of a practice and many propositions that *are* “formally directive” of a practice. Both thinkers give roughly the same examples. “God is three and one,” “God is omnipotent,” “God creates the world,” and “the Father generates” are all examples of non-directive propositions.135 These partial theological habits are speculative. But the category of “theological truth” is also assumed to extend to propositions like “God should be worshipped,” “God should be loved on account of himself and above all things,” “Your neighbor should be loved on account of God,” and “Pray in all times and places.”136 These propositions are “formally directive” of an operation within our power and therefore are practical.

With this conclusion, Ockham ends his formal response, but Rimini, who appears to be more concerned about acknowledging the legitimacy of the second sense of theology as a “total habit,” goes further. In treating theology as a “total habit” including many “partial habits” within it, Rimini draws on his earlier definition of how to identify a “total habit.”137 Rimini previously explained that when a “total habit” is made up of a combination of speculative and practical “partial habits” then this overall habit is most conveniently called practical. And this is what Rimini says is true of theology in the second sense. The speculative partial habits, after all, are virtually directive of a practice,

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137 See above, p. 189.
in that formally directive habits can easily be drawn from their conclusions. To show us that this kind of “virtual direction” takes place, Rimini tells us to…

...think of the love of God and the principles of such practical conclusions...since those theological truths signify divine perfection or divine operation to the outside, of creation or providence or of other benefits, like the incarnation of Christ or other things on behalf of our redemption and training or glorification or other things contained in Sacred Scriptures not from itself formally directive of the love of God, all of which virtually (virtualiter de proximo) contain truths formally directing us to love God.139

By drawing special attention to the “total habit” of theology in a way that Ockham does not, Rimini really makes the full circle connection between the original position of Scotus and the common sense corrections he wants to make. In showing the close connection between purely speculative theological truths and the practical act of properly loving God, Rimini has drawn a picture that looks similar to the one Scotus drew, wherein all the different theological propositions are working together to bring about an act of love in perfect concord with right reason. However, by insisting on more rigorous definitions, Rimini, with the help of Ockham, has sought to preserve an observable difference between the kinds of propositions that theology houses under its roof. Rimini is willing to admit that speculative propositions do much of the work Scotus wants them to do, but he

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139 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 4 (Trapp I:181–182). “Puta dilectionis erga deum, et talium practicarum conclusionum sunt principia; ergo etc. Assumptum patet, quoniam quaecumque veritates theologicae significant divinam perfectionem aut divinam operationem ad extra, creationis vel providentiae aut alterius eius beneficii, ut incarnationis Christi et aliorum pro redemptione nostra aut eruditione vel glorificatione aut quaecumque alia in sacra scriptura contenta non secundum se formaliter directivae dilectionis dei, omnes virtualiter de proximo continent veritates nos formaliter dirigentes ad diligendum deum...”
has tried to maintain the linguistic space wherein he can verbally mark the distinctions between the clearly diverse components of theological knowledge. Rimini also maintains his distance from Scotus, by never drawing the further conclusion: because many formally speculative truths contribute to practical knowledge, therefore theology must include every possible speculative truth about God. In refraining from such a claim, Rimini remains consistent with his earlier position on the contracted nature of the body of theological truths.

XIII. Assessment of Gregory of Rimini vis-à-vis the Position of Giles of Rome

This then is the basic position on theology’s practical nature that both Ockham and Rimini take. In concluding this chapter, we should assess the compatibility of this overall position with observed position of Giles of Rome. There are some striking differences which we need to identify, and then we need to assess the extent of these divergences.

The most significant divergence is the unhesitant classification of the “total habit” of theology as “practical.” Aside from the fact that Giles does not distinguish between the “partial” and “total habits” of theology, the label “practical” to any piece of theological knowledge is a designation that Giles and the Aegidian tradition rejects. Giles does not reject this because he thinks theology is speculative. Rather, he identifies the act of love, which the theological habit is said to produce, as an act which is not in our power. Because the act is not in our power, it cannot be a practice and therefore neither is the habit which elicits this act practical. Giles instead opts for the name “affective.” Rimini,
along with Scotus, Aureoli, and Ockham, agrees with Giles in one respect. Namely, they agree that a practice is something which is in our power. However, Rimini departs ways with Giles, as Scotus did, by noting that our theology in this life elicits acts of love which are in our power. These acts can in fact be called practices and theology can be designated as a practical knowledge. Here is a dramatic divergence with Giles. Rimini and Ockham are linked closely to Scotus regarding the ultimate act elicited from theology in this life, though they clearly have significant disagreements about how to describe the various parts of the habit. Aureoli continues to call theology practical as well. However, in directing theology primarily toward the act and practice of faith/belief rather than love, he stands out as unique.

However, there is a manner in which we can see Rimini departing from the ultimate position of Scotus and approaching the Aegidian position in a partial way. This possibility is found in some brief discussions of the nature of the theological knowledge of the Blessed that appear in Rimini’s reply to certain objections at the very end of this same question. The objection states:

140 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 4 (Trapp I:185). “Ad quartum dicendum quod dilectio Dei, quae habetur in via, illa nec est beatitudo nec pars beatitudinis, et talis est praxis, cum sit operatio in nostra potestate existens, et huiusmodi est theologa nostra directiva” (emphasis mine).

There is something slightly surprising in this divergence since Rimini is well known for strong views on predestination. (Consider for example his not so endearing epithet, “Torturer of Infants”). Schüler, Prädestination, Sünde Und Freiheit Bei Gregor Von Rimini. Consider also Schabel’s description of Rimini on predestination: “Gregory reacted by charging that both the theory of the privative cause and the notion of the positive cause of predestination in those who are predestined are Pelagian. Instead Gregory returned to the traditional view as it concerned predestination: it stems only from God's merciful will. However, Auriol's criticism of the asymmetry of the traditional position led Gregory to claim that not only do the predestined play no causal role in their salvation, but neither do the reprobate contribute to their damnation. In short, there is no reason either for one person's salvation or for another person's damnation except the inscrutable will of God: we do not know why some are saved and others damned. This, after all, Gregory believed, was the theory of Paul and of Augustine” (“Gregory of Rimini,” section 4). There is something both Augustinian and Aegidian about this view, and it would be an interesting further study to consider how this view squares with his view that the love of God directed by theology in this life is within our power.
Love of God is not a practice, for beatitude consists principally in enjoyment and delight of God. However, according to the philosopher, beatitude consists in speculation, therefore the love of God does not belong under the genus of practice but rather should be reduced to the genus of speculation"\textsuperscript{141}

Now we have already seen that Giles himself would agree with this objection in certain respects and disagree in others. In the first place, he would agree that the kind of love he has in mind is not an actual practice. However, he would strongly disagree with a vision of beatitude which is a purely speculative vision of God. On the contrary, the culmination of the proper love of God in actuality, rather than merely in hope, is how he would characterize beatitude (a love that is perfected, even though knowledge of God remains incomplete). We have already seen how this position stands in opposition to those who envision beatitude as a complete comprehensive knowledge, which leaves nothing unknown.\textsuperscript{142}

But in his reply, Rimini stakes out a third position between the Aristotelian point of view held by the objector and the position of Giles. Rimini creates a new division between the practice that the theology of this life directs and the activity proper to beatitude, which is directed (or somehow follows from) the theological knowledge of the Blessed. Rimini replies to the objection as follows:

To the fourth objection it should be said that the love of God, which we have in this life, is neither beatitude nor part of beatitude. And this

\textsuperscript{141} Gregorius Ariminensis, \textit{Lectura}, I, prol., a. 5, a. 4 (Trapp I:183). “Quarto, ostenditur quod dilectio Dei non sit praxis, nam beatitudo consistit principaliter in fruitione seu dilectione dei, secundum Philosophum autem beatitudo consistit in speculatione, igitur dilectio dei non ad genus praxis sed potius speculationis reducenda est.”

\textsuperscript{142} See above chapter 1, p. 69.
Subtly, Rimini creates a distinction between our love of God in this life and whatever it is that the Blessed do in the state of beatitude. The explicit focus on the operation of love in this life as an operation within our power and the rejection of this kind of love as having any place in beatitude suggests that the activity of beatitude is not an act equally within our power, and therefore cannot be called a practice. This inference is confirmed as Rimini goes further:

Indeed [the activity], which we have in heaven, is not a practice, if it is not in the power of the one loving, as is more commonly held. Nor does our theology direct this [activity]. Rather, with respect to this [activity] there is no formally directive knowledge, and therefore no properly practical knowledge. For this [heavenly activity] is accompanied only by an intuitive and simple vision of God which is not able to able to be called practical in a strict sense (emphasis mine).144

This continued quotation reveals a more detailed account of the relationship between the proper act of beatitude and the knowledge act of beatitude. Not only is the act of beatitude not in our power, but the kind of knowledge proper to beatitude cannot even qualify as practical or formally directive. Rimini’s explanation betrays his assumption that all knowledge of beatitude is simple and intuitive. That is, there is no “propositional knowledge” in the theology of the Blessed. But since practical knowledge as formally directive is by definition propositional, the knowledge of the Blessed cannot be described

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143 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, prol., q. 5, a. 4 (Trapp, I:185). “Ad quartum dicendum quod dilectio Dei, quae habetur in via, illa nec est beatitudo nec pars beatitudinis, et talis est praxis, cum sit operatio in nostra potestate existens, et huiusmodi est theologia nostra directiva” (emphasis mine).
144 Ibid., prol., q. 5, a. 4 (Trapp I:185). “Illa vero, quae habetur in patria, non est praxis, si non sit in potestate diligentis, sicut communius tenetur, nec ad illam dirigit nostra theologa, immo nec respectu illius est aliquae notitia formaliter directiva, ac per hoc prorie practica; solam enim intuitivamac simplicem Dei visionem comitatur, quae nequaquam practica proprie dici potest” (emphasis mine).
as practical. And yet we must assume there is some connection between this intuitive and simple vision of God and the proper act of loving God which is no longer in our power. At this point, we can only speculate since Rimini does not elaborate. We can, at least, wonder if a fitting name for this knowledge is “affective.” Rimini only provides us with one clue: he speaks of the fact that the proper activity of beatitude is not within our power as a position which is “commonly held.” But we can wonder: “commonly held by whom?” However common this position, it is not a position held by Scotus or even Aureoli. For Scotus, the most ideal conception of theology in se is practical and the practice it produced was most certainly something within our power. Could it be that Rimini means to refer to the common position of the Aegidian tradition? It is, of course, possible, since this was a position held by Giles and many Augustinians who followed him, including his immediate predecessor at Paris, Thomas of Strasbourg. 

We must finally also look to Ockham, who up till now has been left out of this final consideration. Could it be that Rimini means to single out Ockham and the so-called “moderns” by his reference to this “common” position? Ockham does not provide us with an explicit consideration of the practical or speculative nature of beatific knowledge, but the question does come up in one of the objections to his general opinion at the end of question twelve. Here the over-arching objection is concerned with Ockham’s classification of some parts of theology (some “partial habits”) as practical while other parts are not. The objection starts by admitting that this might be true when we treat

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145 Cf. Thomas ab Argentina, Commentaria, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Venice, 1564: 14vb). “Dicendum quod dilectio dei sive affectio, est proprius finis nostra theologiae.”
theology as merely what is contained within Scripture, but not when we considered theology *in se*. Ockham’s general reply begins by questioning this Scotist idea of theology *in se*. “There is no such thing,” he says, “as theology in itself if we mean that it is not in some intellect.” However, Ockham goes on, “if we mean theology *in se* as that knowledge which has evidence from its object and is an evident habit from its object, as is the case for the Blessed, then I say there are distinct habits or there are at least able to be distinct habits.” It is here that a concern for the theology of the Blessed makes an appearance, even if beatific knowledge is not exactly what Scotus meant by *theologia in se*. The immediate import is Ockham’s claim that even for the Blessed, theology is a conglomeration of many distinct habits with many distinct pieces of knowledge. This is true even when it comes to direct and immediate knowledge of the divine essence—not merely some concept suppositing for the divine essence—because “diverse attributes are [still] able to be known about God.”

But this commitment to the diversity of habits that make up theology raises several other concerns for the objector, the second of which is especially relevant. The objector claims that, if this is true, theology cannot be practical, because, “when the Blessed knows [the distinct proposition] ‘God should be loved most of all by the

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146 Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 12 (OTh I:342). “Ad secundum dico quod nulla est theologia in se ita quod non sit in aliquo intellectu.”
147 Ibid. “Si tamen loquatur vocendo theologiam in se illam quae habet evidentiam ex objecito et est habitus evidens ex objecito, sicut est in beato, dico quod ibi sunt habitus distincti vel saltem possunt esse.”
148 Ibid. “Sed dico quod de eodem subiecto possunt esse distinctae notitiae propter distinctionem praejectorum, sicut declaratum est in praecedenti quaestione…ita de Deo possunt sciri diversae passiones, et per consequens poterunt haberi diversi habitus.”
pilgrim” he will not have practical knowledge,” though this was surely a piece of practical knowledge for the pilgrim. Ockham responds, first by partially conceding the point. Indeed, this particular piece of knowledge for the Blessed remains a part of beatific theology, but it can no longer be considered practical. However, Ockham goes on to state: “the Blessed knowing [the distinct proposition] “God should be loved most of all by the Blessed” does in fact have a practical piece of knowledge and this knowledge is theological.” By committing himself to this counterexample, Ockham has distanced himself from the position of Rimini in two ways. First, he admits that while the Blessed have an intuitive and direct knowledge of God, this does not prohibit them from having complex propositional knowledge as well. Thus, in principle, practical knowledge remains a possibility for the Blessed: a possibility ruled out by Rimini. But more importantly, by conceding that the Blessed do in fact have practical knowledge, Ockham also commits himself to the view that the Blessed still engage in “practices.” This practical knowledge formally directs the act of love required of the Blessed, which in turn must be construed as a practice, if it is directed by practical knowledge. Accordingly, this act of love must be an act within the power of the Blessed; it must be an act which proceeds from the knowledge that the Blessed possess and enacted or elicited by the choice of their beatified will. Rimini explicitly ruled out the idea that the love of the Blessed is an act within our power, and thus Ockham cannot be listed as one of the “common” opinions that view the beatified act of loving as act not within the power of

149 Ibid., I, prol., q. 12 (OTh I:343). “Quia beatus cognoscens quod Deus est summus diligendus a viatore non habet scientiam practicam…”

150 Ibid., I, prol., q. 12 (OTh I:344). “Tamen dico quod beatus cognoscens quod Deus est summus diligendus ab ipso beato habet notitiam practicam et illa erit theologica.”
the Blessed. The question forces itself upon us one last time: Who does Rimini have in mind when he appeals to “common opinion” now that Ockham has been ruled out along with Scotus and Aureoli? We must acknowledge a separate influence: an influence which we can currently only identify in the position Giles of Rome and anyone who follows him on this point.

XIV. Conclusion

In sum, Rimini’s position is characterized by a common sense division of the obvious difference between types of theological propositions. He stands in opposition to Scotus here and is an acolyte of Ockham. Practical knowledge, for both Ockham and Rimini, is a proposition “formally directive” of a genuine practice. When the habit of theology is taken as a whole, Rimini privileges the practical. Love appears to be the true end of our theology and Rimini is ready to acknowledge, with Scotus, that abstract speculative propositions can have an important practical import.

While love is distinguished as the real and proper end of the theological habit, we need to be very careful about what we mean by the act of love. Scotus carefully distinguished the act of love he had in mind from the act of love identified by Giles. For Giles, theology produced an affective love, which was not an act that originated from a human will; that is, it was not an act lying within our power. For Giles, theological knowledge produced this act and was the originating cause of further good acts. For Scotus, theological knowledge provided the possibility wherein we ourselves could will and produce an act of right love and thereby become good. Rimini’s analysis of practical
knowledge and its ensuing act of love departs from Giles on this point. The practice of love that theological knowledge directs is identified by Rimini as an action that lies within our power and is produced through the choice of our will.

But finally, at the last moment, Rimini departs from this generally Scotist position. Departing from Ockham as well, Rimini hints at a difference between the act of love that theological knowledge in this life aims to produce and the act of love that the still contracted theological knowledge of the Blessed serves and directs. In this way Rimini has taken a middle position between Scotus and Ockham on the one hand and Giles on the other.¹⁵¹ Both extremes refuse to acknowledge a difference between the elicited act on earth and in heaven. For Giles theological knowledge in this life and theological knowledge in beatitude produce an affective love, which is not an act of love elicited by the agent’s will. For Scotus and Ockham, theological knowledge in this life and the next both direct an act of love that is still elicited through the agent’s will. Rimini takes a Scotist position regarding the practical nature of theology in this life, but takes a more Aegidian position regarding the affective nature of theological knowledge in the next. Of course, regarding the latter, we are forced to speculate a bit since Rimini does not invoke the language of an affective knowledge. However, in clearly ruling out the notion of both beatified love as a practice and beatified knowledge as a practical knowledge, he comes very close to taking this position.

¹⁵¹ This is an intriguing middle position because it focuses on a divide between heavenly and earthly “theological practices,” despite the fact that (as we saw in the last chapter) Rimini was adamant about denying any difference between the subject matter of earthly and heavenly theology. On the subject matter of theology, Rimini follows Giles in focusing on a divide between finite and infinite theology over any divide between earthly and heavenly theology. But when it comes to the practices elicited from that knowledge, Rimini re-focuses on an earth/heaven divide.
Introduction to Part II

The previous three chapters have in a way set the table for the main concern of Part II. In particular, three results of our study so far help to shape the discussion going forward.

[1] The first is the close Aegidian assimilation of faith and theology, built in large part on Giles’s reading of the passage from *De Trinitate* XIV, c.1. [2] The second and closely related point that emerged is Peter Aureoli’s strong opposition to this Aegidian assimilation. In contrast, he opts for a separation between the habit of belief and the habit of theology, which supports the habit of belief. [3] A third important point that emerged especially from chapters one and two was that, whatever theological knowledge is, its content alone is not sufficient to distinguish from the other sciences. For Giles especially, the supernatural character by which these truths were known was an especially important part of what it means to know something theologically. Rimini, in turn, showed signs of following suit (signs which we will find confirmed as we go forward).

The first and third results in a sense go together, and the second helps to highlight a problem. Theological knowledge is distinguished for Giles and Rimini, not just by what it claims knows, but by how it claims to know it, namely through the supernatural light of faith. Where other sciences and disciplines begin from evident principles, theology is said to treat that which cannot be accessed through appeals to sensible or natural things. Rather, theology treats a subject matter, which can only be directly accessed through a supernatural, but nevertheless inevident, faith.
The question that faces those who so strongly assimilate theological knowing with faith and inevident beginnings is: in what sense can this claim to knowledge really count as a kind of knowing? Embedded as it is in faith, what separates the simple believer from the theologian? Or in other words, how can theologians claim to distinguish themselves from the simple believer, if their knowledge continues to rely on faith and never finds a certainty or evidence apart from or beyond faith? As we will see, in Aureoli’s account of theological method, his separation of theology from faith and his insistence that theology looks to naturally known probable principles (while faith remains a separate inevident act of assent) allows him a path of escape from this problem. However, for thinkers like Giles of Rome and Gregory of Rimini, a more nuanced and subtle response will be required.

In the following section, then, we are first going to look at the clues that Giles gives us about how he thinks the habit of theology is acquired and his relative silence about how this theological skill should be distinguished from the possession of faith. Then we will look at two early Augustinians, Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio, who share Giles’s basic convictions, but provide some further details about how the theologian could still be distinguished from the person of mere faith, despite the fact that no outside justification or evidence has been acquired.

Finally, in the last two chapters, we will look at Gregory of Rimini’s general position on both the method of theological knowledge (what for earlier scholastics, like Giles, would be called the “efficient cause”) and the epistemic status of this achievement
(or the “formal cause” of theological knowledge), that is whether or not theology should be classified as a genuine science.

Within these two formally distinct questions, we will actually see Gregory of Rimini establish and defend one basic position against two Franciscan extremes, the position of Peter Aureoli (chapter 6) on the one hand and Francis of Marchia (chapter 7) on the other. I will argue that, in different ways, both of these Franciscan positions attempt to solve the above problem by sharply separating the theological habit from mere faith. In their own manner, each Franciscan appeals to arguments and evidence that come from outside of faith and thereby bring a kind of external justification to faith that can be universally recognized, or at least appreciated. In contrast, Gregory of Rimini will defend a position that attempts to keep the theological habit entirely contained within the same habit of faith. In so doing, he will work out a solution to the above problem that makes no appeal to outside justification, but looks at theology as a habit of self-description or as a peculiar kind of self-knowledge. In this way, he remains faithful to the original core of Giles’s position and stands in accord with other Augustinians, who further developed this Aegidian position.
Chapter 4: Giles of Rome: Between Faith and Knowledge

I. Introduction

The combination of Giles’s position on the unique and restricted subject matter of theology with Sacra Pagina’s purely instrumental status as means to a supernatural kind love leads us to the central ambiguity of the Aegidian position: the relationship between faith and the discipline or habit of theology claimed by the professional academic theologian.

As we have seen, the important quotation from Augustine’s De Trinitate is a customary place that theologians went to formulate an answer to this concern. Consequently, Giles’s interpretation of this passage provides us with some clues as to how he conceives of this relationship. Augustine speaks of a particular scientia whose job is to consider human and mortal matters only to the extent that knowledge grows, nourishes, defends, and strengthens that most salvific faith which leads to beatitude. Giles employs this quotation to show a couple of things. First, he uses it to show that theology is an instrument or an organ that leads to beatitude. Of course, Augustine does not use the word theology or Sacra Pagina here. He simply speaks of faith as leading us to beatitude. In the course of using this quotation to defend the idea that theology leads to beatitude, Giles clearly aligns Augustine’s use of the word “faith” with his use of the word “theology” and Sacra Pagina. At the same time he uses the quote to say that theology is limited in its knowledge of God, where Augustine was simply speaking about
the limited value of knowledge about human affairs for genuine wisdom. Thus, Augustine distinguishes between a faith (or faith-knowledge) that is instrumental to beatitude and a science that supports and aids that faith, while Giles elides the two concepts to speak about a knowledge that both leads to beatitude and is limited in its knowledge of God.

But such elision raises questions. If theology proper is distinguished from other human sciences by its reliance on special revelation and infusion from God, then it is questionable whether it should be distinguished as a science at all. If it is not a science, it becomes an open question whether this quasi-scientific knowledge should or can be distinguished from the regular faith of the simple believer. A customary trope was to compare the knowledge of the theologian to the faith of an illiterate old woman (vetula).\(^1\)

Considering the closeness of Giles’s conception of faith and Sacra Doctrina, what difference can there be between the vetula and the professional theologian? Either the theologian is nothing other than a simple believer who adheres to revealed truths or the professional theologian alone possesses the instrument leading to beatitude, while the person incapable of a rational investigation of revealed truth is out of luck.

II. The Efficient Cause of Theological Knowledge

Giles’s discussion of the efficient cause of Sacra Pagina or theology offers us some clues about how an answer to this ambiguity might eventually be developed. However, we do not get much more than clues. In fact the most distinctive characteristic

\(^1\) Cf. Marshall, “Quod Scit Una Uetula.”
of Giles’s position on this question is that God is the real teacher of this knowledge, which must be received, just as faith is received. Thus the central ambiguity is reinforced: how does the faithful theologian differ from the one who simple receives God’s instruction in the light of faith?

In light of his stark divorce between the human sciences and theology as something given by God, the question posed at the beginning of part three of his prologue raises an understandable concern. The question asks: “does God alone teach theology”? Given that theology is in no way a human science, can anyone really teach it but God himself? What is more, this concern has a genuinely Augustinian precedent standing behind it. The conclusions of De magistro resound implicitly in the background of the question; God alone is the true teacher of knowledge. But if this is true, what justifies the intellectual effort of the theologian to teach himself and others? Wouldn’t ceaseless prayer and supplication be the best means of acquiring theology? Might the pious religious practice of the simple believer be a more effective means of acquiring theological knowledge than anything that can be accomplished in the classroom? This is not merely a theoretical question, but one with real world implications. Throughout the Middle Ages, sitting side by side with the schools and its universities, were the monasteries, which represented a very different approach to the pursuit of knowledge and God.² The answer one gives, therefore, to this kind question is decisive for the value one gives to each of these institutions.

² For a survey of monastic culture in the Middle Ages begin with Jean Leclerq, The love of learning and the Desire for God, (Fordham, 1996).
Giles’s *sed contra* reserves hope for the justification of the theologian’s efforts through recourse to an Aristotelian adage: “The sign of one who knows is the ability to teach.”\(^3\) This single appeal to the commonsense notion that if I really know something, whether God taught it to me or not, then I can explain it and share it with someone else. This is a criterion of knowledge that will be raised again by later theologians asking similar questions.\(^4\) But it presupposes that human effort can still achieve results even when we are dealing with a knowledge that lies beyond what our purely natural capacities are able to discover on their own.

With the supernatural character of theology firmly established on the one hand and the belief that genuine knowledge brings with it the power and capability to teach, Giles attempts to reconcile this Augustinian-Aristotelian difficulty. His first response is to identify different layers of efficient causality. These are identified as distinct types of agents: a universal, particular, and administrative agent.\(^5\) The identity of these three efficient causes is discovered through observing nature, particularly the production and growth of life. In one respect, the rotation of the celestial bodies is responsible for this growth. Here one must think of the action of the sun. But the sun by itself does not cause a fruit tree to bear fruit. The nature of a fruit tree also has something to do with the production of its fruit. Finally, even the sun and the intrinsic nature of the fruit true are

\(^5\) Aegidius Romanus, *Primus Sententiarum*, prol., pars 3, f. 7rb–7va. “Respondeo dicendum quod secundum quosdam triplex est agens: universale, particulare, et administrativum, sicut est videre in rebus naturalibus. Nam agens universale est ipsum corpus superceleste[?] sive Deus; particulare est natura aliquius rei; ut natura frumenti in productione frumenti[?]; administrativum est, quod adhibet semina, vel subministr[?] ea per quae operatio habet fieri, sicut est videre in sanitate.”
not sufficient. Nature teaches us that there is also an administrative efficient cause. In the case of the fruit tree, the administrative is something that helps the seed to grow and become a fruit. Judging by Giles’s second example, he must have in mind a farmer who waters and cares for the seed. The second example deals with the production of health. Here God is identified as the universal efficient cause and the nature of the human person is identified as the particular cause. But the doctor is said to be an administrative cause to the effect of health.6

From these two examples, a transition is made to the production of learning in general.7 Giles writes: “In this instance, the universal agent is God, the particular agent is human reason, and the administrative agent is man or an angel.”8 The final explanation of how this process works is fully Augustinian in character. He proceeds from the belief that in human reason are some inchoate seeds planted by God, just as is the case with the growth of natural things. And from these seeds, the knowledge is drawn out into actuality. In the mind, these seeds are the first principles, which God, the universal effective cause, inserted “naturally” into the mind. From these seeds or principles knowledge is ultimately produced of which God is the universal author, reason is the particular author, and men or angels are the administrative authors.9

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6 Ibid., prol., pars 3, f. 7va. “. . . sicut est videre in sanitate, nam agens universale est corpus superceleste[?] sive Deus; particulare est natura hominis; adminstratum est medicus, qui nihil aliud facit nisi quod scientia adhibet.”

7 Ibid. “Sic est et in doctrina sicut est in productione naturalium.”

8 Ibid. “Nam agens universale est ibi Deus; agens particulare est ibi ratio humana; agens adminstrativum est ibi homo vel angelus.”

9 Ibid. “Et sicut videtur in rebus naturalibus quod sunt ibi quaedam inchoationes seminum ex quibus seminibus res in esse producantur, ita etiam in doctrina, sunt enim quaedam seminaria scientiarum in intellectu nostro ex quibus omnes scientiae oriuntur. Haec enim seminaria sunt prima principia quae Deus unicamente naturaliter inseruit et ex istis seminibus scientia efficitur Deo auctore universaliter, ratione particulariter, homine et angelo administrative.”
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Giles leaves us to speculate somewhat about how this general schema is to be applied in the case of faith-knowledge. When it comes to the knowledge of *Sacra Doctrina*, the revealed doctrine is a likely source of God’s general teaching. It stands as a data source, which human beings cannot derive or deduce for themselves, but can only receive and pass on. However, the above account also leaves room for human beings and angels to have an administrative role in the passing on of theological knowledge. This question occupies the final section of Giles’s treatment of this subject and requires him to provide a separate analysis of knowing that focuses on the immediate mechanics of knowing rather than the three different efficient causes.

Giles asserts that, in order to really know something, two things are required: an arranged order of species and a light. We have already seen that he discuss the necessity of a light for any cognitive discipline, but now it is discussed in more detail alongside the initially obtuse requirement of an “arranged order of species.” Behind this assertion is a way of thinking about cognition, quite common to the medieval world. Cognition and the acquisition of knowledge is modeled after the physical act of seeing.\(^{10}\) Giles explains that the eye cannot see its object unless there is a light. But at the same if there is no object, then the light is useless. This helps explain the second requirement of an arranged order of species. Referring still to visible objects he writes: “An order of species is also required, because if the visible thing did not *diametrically* offer itself to the eye, such that

\[^{10}\] For a definitive history of this causal theory of knowing see Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham*. 
there would be an *indirect* multiplication of species, then there would never be vision.\(^\text{11}\)

Giles, like those before him, thinks vision takes place through the object’s impression of a likeness on the ocular organ. But of course, in viewing a stone, it is not a stone itself that physically affects the eye. Rather the stone emits a physical, though transparent, likeness that eventually affects the eye. But here he is particularly attentive to the orderly nature in which a chain of species reaches the eye. It must proceed diametrically otherwise there is no vision. If the process is somehow distorted or “unordered,” then real vision does not happen. (One might think here of a transmission of species distorted by a prism). In any case, a proper succession is essential to Giles for proper vision.

This then is analogously applied to intellectual vision. In addition to some light which illuminates the intelligible objects that our minds hope to see, a proper ordered arrangement of species is necessary. He gives us one more analogy.

Just as letters rightly ordered make syllables and speech, which the same letters arranged differently constitute nothing. So the same words arranged in one way make us to know, while arranged in another way do not generate knowledge.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^{11}\) Aegidius Romanus, *Primus Sententiarm*, prol., pars 3, f. 7vb. “Requiritur etiam ordo specierum quia nisi res visibilis diametraliter offeretur oculo, ita quod esset indirectum multiplicatio speciei, nunquam esset visio.”

The translation is a bit difficult here, since in one way the sentence seems like it could be construed to say “unless the visible thing was diametrically offered to the eye, *with the result* that there would be an indirect multiplication . . .” But on the other hand it seems like it could also say, “if the visible thing was not offered diametrically, and as a consequence, the multiplication of species would then be indirect, then there would be no vision.” I opt for the latter, since the passage wants to emphasize order versus disorder, and it is possible that the ‘diametrical’ and ‘indirect’ form a parallel contrast.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., prol., pars 3, f. 7va. “Quia sicut litterae recte ordinatae faciunt syllabras et orationes quae eadem aliter ordinatae nihil constituunt, ita eadem verba uno ordine prolatae faciunt scire, quae prolata aliter non aggenerant scientiam.”
These elements lead Giles to assert that there are actual two distinct ways to teach someone. The first way of teaching has to do with the light. The second has to do with the order of species.

Teaching by the light actually involves two sub-modes; either by the creation of a new light or by the strengthening a created light. Angels, according to Giles, are not able to create a new light in us, but that can strengthen an existing light. It is left to God alone to be able to create new lights in us. But angels are instructive because besides being able to strengthen an existing light they can contribute to the ordered arrangement of species in us. How do they do this? Giles says “by leading the phantasms back, in an orderly manner, to the first sensitive object.”13 While suggestive, he does not expand on this statement and leaves us to guess exactly what he has in mind.

In comparison to angels, human beings are even more limited. Like angels, they cannot create new lights for people, and unlike Angels, human beings cannot even strengthen the lights of other people. However, human beings do have one teaching power in common with angels, and this is the human ability to “in some way affect the order of phantasms.”14 But how do human beings engage in the task of ordering and arranging? Giles provides us with one small clue. Human beings can teach or order in this

13 Ibid. “Potest etiam angelus efficere in nobis ordinationem specierum reducendo phantasmata ordinate ad primum sensitivum.”
14 Ibid. “Potest tamen aliquo modo ordinem phantasmatum efficere…”

It is worth noting the way the language of phantasms has entered in our discourse, when before we had only been concerned with the ordered arrangement of species. Giles offers us no help in sorting out this shift in language. I suggest that we do not get thrown off track too much by this language. It is quite conceivable that Giles uses the word phantasms to indicate a kind of intra-mental species analogous to the physical species affecting the eye in the production of physical sight. Perhaps the focus on phantasms rather than species is indication of the way human beings can teach other human beings, namely by helping to order the thoughts of others, while human beings are less likely to be able to affect and alter the physical transmission of sensitive species, though this might be possible as well.
way when “they write or say things in an ordered way; on account of these things [written or said] the ones hearing or reading are moved to grasping (capturing) knowledge.”

This is all the help we get, but he appears to suggest that through language we can help order the concepts of others and help them see the sources and causes of what they know.

He concludes by acknowledging that people often say that God alone teaches (here we must think of those who argue from Augustine’s De Magistro); he admits that in a way they are right, for neither humans nor angels teach without the power of God. In this case, it is God’s infusion of the light of faith that makes all other teaching within theology possible. But if God’s power is operating, angels and humans can have some positive effect. This positive effect is primarily achieved through speaking and writing, and through speaking and writing we are able to order and arrange the phantasms in our minds and the mind’s of others. The extent of our knowledge, therefore, is in many ways limited by the light we have been given and that which has been illuminated. But with regard to what we are given, we can make a better and worse use of it; what has been illuminated can be organized poorly and thus we can still lack vision or it can be arranged well and thus we can see. Human effort and teaching are not, according, to Giles ineffectual in this process of ordering. While the effect of this effort is limited and contained within the context of what was originally given or taught by God, it can still produce results.

In conclusion, Giles’s position on the human ability to teach Sacra Pagina, and thus the defining characteristic of the theologian, remains general, but it does retain

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15 Ibid. “Potest tamen aliquo modo ordinem phantasmatum efficere inquantum aliqua ordinate scribit vel dicit; propter quae audiens vel legens movetur ad scientiam capiendam.”
some defining characteristics. [1] One characteristic is the fact that the human teacher begins from what is first supernaturally given; their knowledge and their teaching begin from a supernatural source. If Giles is clear about anything, it is that theology does not begin from any knowledge of sensible or natural things. [2] The second characteristic is that the theologian does not go beyond what God has taught. The administrating human being only arranges and orders in an effectual way what God has already given.

In light of these two characteristics, we must again note how oddly Giles’s description of theology fits with Augustine’s definition of that science, which nourishes and strengthens faith. For Augustine, the person with science was able to use their knowledge of temporal matters to bolster faith. But this is not allowed in Giles understanding. The human involvement with *Sacra Doctrina* is merely to arrange what has already been given and to never go beyond it. Thus, our original ambiguity remains: How does the theologian go beyond faith? What possible claim to knowledge can he make, since he always begins with what has been received through faith and never progresses beyond it? Let us turn now to two later Augustinian witnesses, who attempt to nuance Giles’s position, while remaining committed to the two characteristic of theological teaching articulated above.
Chapter 5: Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper Reggio: On the Habit of Theology and the Habit of Faith

I. Augustinus of Ancona

The exact birthdate of Augustinus of Ancona is unknown, but the present conjecture is that he was born sometime around 1275. In the year 1300, the Augustinian order selected him to “read” the *Sentences* and he finished those lectures in 1303, which now survive in one manuscript (Troyes ms. 0296). When he completed his education in Paris, he was sent to teach in Italy. He later returned to Paris around 1315 as a Master of Theology, where he conducted quodlibetal debates and disputations. He died in the year 1328.¹

While Augustinus is most well known for his political works,² Adolar Zumkeller notes that “in both epistemology and psychology, as expressed in his widely known treatise *De cognitione animae*, Augustine of Ancona is a faithful disciple of Giles of Rome.”³ And later he writes: “his teaching bears quite a Thomist stamp, and in the way that for him Giles is always the mediator of Aquinas’ teaching. Yet, even in relation to

² See Michael Wilks (1963), *The problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages. The Papal Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists*; William J. Bouwsma (1968), *Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty*, University of California Press, p. 312; As Zumkeller noted in 1996, of the “many-sided and voluminous writings. . . only the works on ecclesiastical policy have until now been examined in more detail” (Ibid., 31). This claim seems to me to be as true today as it was when it was written.
³ Ibid., 32.
Giles, Augustine shows a pleasing independence.4 For us, two questions from his prologue give us a rare glimpse into the lasting influence of Giles’s thought on later Augustinian hermits. The two questions are strikingly familiar in their content and phrasing.

In part two of his prologue, question three, Augustinus asks, just as Giles did, “whether God alone teaches this science.”5 The second question of the same part of the prologue asks “whether the habit of theology differs from the habit of faith.”6 This question in particular, which Giles did not explicitly treat, shows that the ambiguity identified in the previous chapter has not gone away. Instead it has become an urgent question needing direct attention.

In treating the position of Augustinus of Ancona, we will first look at how he expands Giles’s description of how God and humans respectively teach theology. We will then look at how he addresses the central problem of distinguishing faith from theology, while preserving its entirely supernatural character.

II. Whether God Alone Teaches this Science?

Augustinus begins his response to this question by positing two Aegidian requirements in order for any doctrine to be learned. First a light is needed and second an “order of species is needed.” From this assertion, he makes the predictable division that a doctrine is able to be taught in two ways, either through the light or through the ordering

4 Ibid.
5 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, 9rb; “Tertio quaeritur utrum solus Deus hanc scientiam doceat?”
6 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 2, 8rb; “Secundo quaeritur utrum habitus istius scientiae differat ab habitu fidei.”
Chapter 5: Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper Reggio: On the Habit of Theology and the Habit of Faith | 229

of species. And here, Augustinus is particularly valuable because he adds helpful details where Giles was vague and opaque.

These two possible ways of teaching are further broken down by Augustinus into five sub-types. Teaching can occur (1) through the creation of a light (sometimes called the infusion of a light); (2) through the determination or unification of a light; (3) through the impression of an intelligible species; (4) through the formation of propositions or words from a previous impression; (5) through the expression and explanation of those formed propositions or words.

Like Giles, Augustinus believes it belongs to God alone to create new lights. Theology especially can only be taught by God in the first mode, because it belongs to God alone to infuse the light of faith. Likewise, the second mode is proper to God and angels, who are able to strengthen (comfortare) an existing light. But stages three, four, and five are especially interesting since they touch upon the teaching role of Christ and

7 Augustinus de Ancona, *Lectura*, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, 9rb; “Responsio: dicendum quod aliqui dicunt duo esse requirenda ad hoc, quod in aliquo doctrina causetur. Primum est lumen; Secundum est ordinatio specierum.”
9 Augustinus de Ancona, *Lectura*, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 9va; “Primo modo possimus docere quod hanc doctrina docet solus Deus, quia cum ista scientia innitatur immediate lumeni fidei.”
10 Augustinus de Ancona, *Lectura*, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 9vb; “Hic igitur modo angelus potest nostrum lumen confortare, et angelus superior potest angelum inferiorem illuminare, quia angeli multa sciunt et multa vident in divina essentia, quae nos ignoramus. Ex hoc igitur quod nobis illa tenebant nostrum lumen determinatur et unitur, ut sicut antequam sciamus, noster intellectus vacillat et fertur in diversa, sic, postquam scimus et causam rei cognoscimus, noster intellectus unitur et determinatur, sic etiam angelus superior plura videt et limpidius et clarius cognoscit aliqua in lumen gloriae vel in divina essentia quam angelus inferior; potest angelus superior illa, quae sic clare cognoscit, angelo inferiori revelare, ex qua revelatione incipit angelus inferior cognoscere prius non cognoscebat, et eius lumen unitur et determinatur, sicut prius erat sparsum et diversum. Et per consequens lumen eius dicitur esse fortificatum, quia virtus unita fortior est se ipsa dispersa. Per hunc ergo modum hanc doctrinam potest docere ipse angelus. Ideo, de multis quae in hac sacra doctrina continentur, per revelationes angelorum edocti sumus.”
Chapter 5: Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper Reggio: On the Habit of Theology and the Habit of Faith | 230

the Apostles and the Modern Doctors. As such, they provide welcome detail about how and in what way human beings can teach theology.

Christ, present in the flesh, (*inquantum homo*) was able to impress unique species on those who were present with him, i.e. those who witnessed his passion, resurrection, ascension, and diverse miracles. Augustinus seems to grant that human beings can teach *indirectly* through the impressions of species, for he says: “man is able to impress an intelligible species into the intellect of another indirectly, by pressing something on to the sense.”\(^{11}\) This kind of teaching is only possible for teacher and student who are physically and temporally together. There is nothing particularly supernatural about the general mechanics of Christ’s teaching at this level. What is special about Christ’s teaching was what he chose to impress on the sense organs of those who were present with them.\(^{12}\) As Augustinus says:

> Through his incarnation, he impressed on the senses of his disciples and others believers the mystery of his incarnation, passion, resurrection, and ascension and in some mode the mystery of his divinity through the operation of diverse miracles. From the impression of which, they received intelligible species in the intellect, through which they were able to be taught all the things which were contained in this doctrine [i.e. theology].\(^{13}\)

\(^{11}\) Augustinus de Ancona, *Lectura*, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 9vb; “Nam sicut homo potest imprimere speciem intelligibilem in intellectum alterius indirecte, imprimendo aliquid in sensu, ex qua impressione formatur idolum et similitudo in phantasia, et ex phantasmate illo, virtute intellectus agentis, gignitur species intelligibilis in intellectu potentiali.”

\(^{12}\) The role of miracles in Christ’s teaching and in compelling assent is a topic that will emerge again in the debates between Marchia and Rimini and we would do well to note this connection here. See below, “Interlude,” p. 306 and chapter 7, pp. 338-353.

\(^{13}\) Augustinus de Ancona, *Lectura*, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 9vb; “Per suam incarnationem, impressit sensibus suorum discipulorum et alicorn credentium mysterium suae incarnationis passionis, resurrectionis et ascensionis, et aliquo modo mysterium divinitatis per diversorum miraculorum operationes. Ex quorum impressione, receperunt species intelligibiles in intellectu, per quas doceri poterant de omnibus quae in hac doctrina continentur.”
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Especially important here is what Augustinus emphasizes again at the end of the passage: this kind of teaching and acquisition of theological knowledge is unique to those who were present with Christ and who could be taught by him. With Christ’s temporal departure, this way of teaching theology ceased.14

The fourth way of teaching, therefore, belongs to those who were direct receivers of the teaching of Christ. Only those who were present with Christ are able to take those “intelligible species” “which they have regarding those things about Christ which they heard and saw through the senses” and teach others. The manner of their teaching is to take those intelligible species, which they uniquely possess and to form words and propositions in writing for the benefit of those who were not able to be physically present to Christ’s teaching.15

The fifth and final mode of teaching is the mode of teaching left for “the doctors and teachers who are now” (qui nunc sunt).16 In this mode, we have reached a description of what the modern day theologian does: the function that defines the theological profession. The teaching role of those “who are now” is different from the previous modes, in that it is restricted to the propositions and words (sermones) that were bequeathed to them by the Prophets and the Apostles. Their job is take to take these words and expressions and articulate them and expound them for others (aliis inferioribus

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14 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 9vb; Unde ipse Christus dicebat eis:4 "beati oculi qui vident quae vos videtis."
15 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, ff. 9vb-10ra; “Quarto modo hanc scientiam docuerunt Apostoli, qui ex speciebus intelligibilibus, quas habebant de hiis quae per sensus audierunt et viderunt de Christo debitas propositiones et debitos sermones formaliter et praesentes, docebant; et propter fictos et absentes in Scriptis redigeabant.”
16 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 10ra; “Quinto modo docent istam scientiam doctores et praedicatores qui nunc sunt.”
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_exprimunt et exponunt). Especially characteristic of Augustinus’s position is his insistence that the teaching theologian should have no interest in going beyond what they receive from the Prophets, Apostles, and Evangelists. Nor is there any mention of proving or defending what the Scriptures have handed down. The job is to begin from these formed propositions and then express them (exprimere) and expound (exponere) them.17

Augustinus includes a citation from John the Damascene that furthers this point:

All those things which are handed down to us through the law in the prophets, the apostles, and the evangelists, we undertake and we venerate and we know, while inquiring about nothing beyond these things.18

Through the above schema, Augustinus has provided us with a significant expansion of Giles’s brief description of the teaching function of the theologian, while remaining generally faithful to the basic spirit of the Aegidian position. Where Giles leaves us with the somewhat ambiguous statement that “human beings aid in God’s teaching of Sacra Pagina through the ordering of species,” Augustinus has taken this basic position and added precision. The “ordering of species” available to professional theologians now means to “express” (exprimere) and “expound” (exponere) the propositions and words handed down through the scriptural text by those who were present with Christ. The job for the present-day theologian is to make the consequences of these propositions clear to those who cannot always see them.

17 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 10ra; “…qui illa, quae conscripta sunt per prophetas et apostolos de mysterio Trinitatis et de Christo incarnato, aliis inferioribus exprimunt et exponunt.”
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The defining characteristics of Giles’s position also characterize conception of theology held by Augustinus. The knowledge that the present day professional theologian can make a claim to is [1] a knowledge that is entirely supernaturally given, even if it was initially received through the senses of the Apostles who were present with God incarnate. And, second [2] Augustinus expects the theologian to begin only from what has been given and to arrange this knowledge so as to help others receive it as well.19 Again, there is no hint that the theologian should be looking for ways to prove what God has already given or to ground that knowledge in a naturally acquired knowledge that can be derived from sensible things.

But still confined only to what is given and known through faith, we are still left to wonder if and how the theologian can be distinguished from the simple believer. Augustinus attempts to address this question in the second question of the second part of his prologue, where he addresses the last part of the quotation from De Trinitate XIV that Giles conveniently ignored.

III. Whether Theology Is Something Different from Faith?

In question two of part two of his prologue, Augustinus asks whether theology is a different habit from the habit of faith. He begins his response by citing the pro and contra for each side of the question. One argument, in favor of the distinction, relies on the last part of the all-important passage from Augustine’s De Trinitate XIV, c. 1.20 After

19 See these two characteristics as the conclusion of our treatment of Giles in the previous chapter, p. 218.
20 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 2, f. 8rb; “Praeterea: quando aliqua duo sunt unum realiter, ubicumque reperitur unum, invenitur reliquum. Si ergo habitus et habitus istius scientiae sunt idem
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asserting that this science is somehow tied to faith in its aspirations toward beatitude, the remainder of the quotations reads:

Very many of the faithful do not excel in such knowledge, though they excel very much in faith itself. It is one thing to know only what a man should believe in order to gain the happy life which is nothing if it is not eternal; quite another to know how the godly are to be assisted in this and how the attacks of the ungodly upon it are to be met, and it is this that the apostle seems to call by the proper name of knowledge.21

The quote seems to mandate a difference between those who have this science and the simple faithful, “who do not excel in such a science.” Particularly important is the emphasis on theology’s “defensive” nature against the “impious” or “ungodly.” The ability to defend is a key characteristic that separates the theologian from the simple believer. But just what it means “to defend” and just who the “impious” are remain open questions.

In the sed contra, we can see two clear Aegidian-like concerns with such a rigorous separation: the first is that if faith and theology were distinct habits, then it would be necessary to posit two infused lights, the impossibility of which, Ancona says, was proved in an earlier question. But such a concern is concordant with Giles’s

realiter quicumque haberet unum, haberet reliquum. Sed hoc est contra Augustinum XIV De Trinitate capitulo primo, ubi ait: ‘quod multi pollent ipsa fide qui non pollent ista scientia’.”

insistence that *Sacra Pagina* is a knowledge that is achieved in and through the light of faith alone.\(^{22}\)

In the second place, Augustinus takes it for granted that habits are distinguished through their acts. However, he notes what will be a central conviction of Gregory of Rimini: namely, that the proper terminating act of faith and the proper act of this doctrine (i.e. theology) is “to believe,” and therefore there is only one habit. That theology’s proper act is an act of belief means that if faith and theology were separate habits, they could not co-exist. This is not a consequence for those, like Peter Aureoli, who hold that theology’s proper act is something other than “belief.” For him, faith and theology can be separate and yet co-exist in the same subject, because they do not culminate in mutually exclusive acts. Because Augustinus thinks they both culminate in belief and both belong to the same subject, it is impossible that they should be classified as different habits or abilities.

The rest of Ancona’s response aims to respond to the concern derived from the quotation from *De Trinitate*, while upholding this Aegidian position. So he says:

> Having seen what is meant by the different intellectual habits and the different gifts of grace, we aim to provide some reasons that show that the habit of this science, that is about believable things (*credibilibus*) only (*simpliciter*) is not to be distinguished from faith.\(^{23}\)

He first points out some further problematic consequences of allowing a distinction like this: (1) the merit of faith would be removed; (2) the enigmatic faith in this life would be

\(^{22}\) Augustinus de Ancona, *Lectura*, I, prol., pars 2, q. 2, ff. 8rb-8va; “In contrarium est, quia si habitus istius scientiae esset alius ab habitu fidei, cum uterque esset infusus, oporteret ponere duplex lumen infusum, quod reprobatum est in superiori quaestione.”

\(^{23}\) Augustinus de Ancona, *Lectura*, I, prol., pars 2, q. 2, f. 8vb; “Viso ergo quomodo dixerunt ista, ut sunt habitus intellectuales, et ut sunt dona gratis data, volumus aliquas rationes adducere ostendentes habitum istius scientiae, ut est de ipsis credibilibus simpliciter, non distinguui ab habitu fidei.”
overcome, (3) the most noble habit [i.e. faith] would be overshadowed; (4) a person would know and believe at the same time.

Underlying each of these further concerns, we can see a clearly Aristotelian sense of “to know” (scire or epistasthai) standing in the background. Aristotle first defines knowledge (translated as “understanding” by Barnes) in a general way. We have scientia when “when we think we know of the explanation of which the object holds that it is its explanation, and also that it is not possible for it to be otherwise.”24 But then Aristotle goes on to make a further qualification about the kind of “understanding” or “knowledge” he is talking about.

Whether there is another type of understanding we shall say later: here we assert that we do know things through demonstrations. By a demonstration I mean a scientific deduction; and by scientific deduction I mean a deduction by possessing which we understand something.25

We can see, then, that there are really two criteria of the kind of understanding Aristotle has in mind. The first (1) is that it is deductive; the “knowledge” he has in mind comes through a deduction from other premises. The second (2) is that this knowledge alerts us to both the cause of the conclusion and that such a conclusion cannot be otherwise. This latter criterion comes with certain conditions about the premises, which are employed in a given demonstration. He says:

Then demonstrative understanding must proceed from items which are true and primitive and immediate and more familiar to and explanatory of the conclusions. (In this way the principles will also be appropriate to what is being proved.) There can be a deduction even if these conditions

are not met, but there cannot be a demonstration—for it will not bring about understanding.”

In short, we can see that the requirement that this knowledge be deductive is a necessary, but insufficient condition of “knowledge” or *scientia*. In addition, the deduction must be made from premises that yield evidence and certainty about a given conclusion. From these premises, we can say that knower possesses his or her own justification for the truth of the conclusion in question. It is on the basis of this evidence that the knower *knows that she “knows.”*

Augustinus has this full Aristotelian definition of knowledge in mind in the third question of the second part of his prologue. In his attempt to explain how angels teach, he appeals to Aristotle directly: “For since ‘to know’ is ‘to know the cause of a thing’ according to the teaching of the Philosopher, the one who makes someone to know the cause of something is properly said to teach.” For Augustinus, it is not enough that someone performs a deduction; to have genuine “science,” they must also possess an “explanation” that provides indubitable evidence for the conclusion.

From this definition, we can see why Augustinus presents the above worries. (1) If theology as a science brings its own certainty and justification for the truths of faith, what would be meritorious about this assent? It would simply be a natural compulsion of the intellect. (2) Likewise, what good would faith be, if what was once known obscurely and engimatically, were now known with evidence and clarity? (3) Third, this theological science would be better than mere faith, even though faith is supposed to be the noblest

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27 Augustinus de Ancona, *Lectura*, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 9va; “Secundo modo docere ipse angelus. Nam, cum 'scire' sit 'causam rei congnoscere' secundum doctrinam Philosophi, ille proprie dicitur 'alium docere', qui 'facit eum causam aliquamquicuius[?] cognoscere.”
habit. (4) And finally, if these two habits coexisted, then we would at once be saying we believed something on faith, which we also knew to be certain through evidence that no one could doubt. In each of these rebuttals it is the supposition of evidence in the Aristotelian definition of the knowledge that makes the two habits incompatible.\(^{28}\)

It cannot be, then, that the theologian surpasses the simple believer because he knows with evidence what the simple believer only believes. We know this is not what Augustinus meant because we have already seen that, for him, those with the theological habit begin only from what is supernaturally taught. They begin from inevident principles passed down by those who were taught by Christ, not from self-evident propositions drawn from nature. The quotation from *De Trinitate* XIV must be interpreted in some other way than by appeal to the Aristotelian conception of *epistēmē*. In his response to the principle argument based on the Augustinian quotation, Augustinus attempts to interpret this passage in another way, consistent with the Aegidian tradition. He writes:

For with respect to those things which are contained in this science, which do not exceed our intellect, ‘many are strong in the faith, who are not strong in this science’. Similarly, with respect to those things, which are only able to believed, many are strong in the ‘cognition of faith’, such that they know what ought to be believed, who are not strong in the cognition and aforementioned science, and through this [cognition of faith] they are able to defend the faith against the impious and instruct others in each both. Nevertheless, there is one habit of faith, not in number, but in species, although, in those who are stronger, it exists in a clearer mode and with greater effect than it does in weaker people.\(^{29}\)

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\(^{28}\) See Sweeney, “Aquinas’ Notion of Science,” pp. 149-160 for a helpful discussion of similar concerns about the relationship between faith and science at the turn of the thirteenth century, especially in the writings of William of Auvergne.

\(^{29}\) Augustinus of Ancona, *Lectura*, I, prol., pars 2, q. 2, f. 9ra-9rb; “Secundum autem sic solvitur: nam quantum ad illa quae continentur in ista scientia, quae non excedunt nostrum intellectum, multi pollent ipsa fide, qui non pollent hac scientia. Similiter quantum ad illa, quae sunt simpliciter credibilia, multi pollent ipsa cognitione fidei, ut simpliciter scient quid credere debeant, qui non pollent cognitione et scientia
Of particular interest here is the way the “science” that Augustine speaks of can be two different things depending on which kind of proposition we are talking about. If a truth of the faith or of theology can be proved through metaphysics, it is true that there are many faithful people who are not trained in metaphysics and who therefore do not contain this knowledge. Giles would not want to identify this as theological knowledge, though he might acknowledge its possibility. More interesting is the notion of being strong in the “cognition of faith,” which he contrasts with those who have some skill in theologicometaphysics. Those who are strong in the “cognition of faith” are not necessarily strong in metaphysics, but they seem to be the real theologians that Augustinus has in mind. Augustinus, then, quite helpfully goes on to identify their distinctive ability, which in turn explains how we should understand Augustine’s notion of “defence.” The special ability of the theologians lies in their capacity to “know what ought to be believed.” Here we can see the sense of “express” and “expound” already introduced being carried forward, from those propositions left to us by the Apostles, the present day theologian can draw out what ought be explicitly believed. The defense then cannot be against those who do not begin from a common belief in the truth of Scripture. On the contrary, this conception of theology can only oppose those who begin from the common starting point of faith, but makes errors about the conclusions that can or should be drawn from the initial point of belief.

praedicta, ut per eam contra impios fides defenditur et alii instruetur in utriusque. Tamen est unus habitus fidei, non numero, sed specie, quamvis clariori modo et cum aliquo effectu sit in maioribus quam in minoribus.”

30 Rimini will later show no ambiguity and will restrict theology proper to only those truths deduced from scripture even if the same truth can reached through metaphysics. See below, c. 6, p. 287.
Finally, we need to note that Augustinus allows for a division internal to the habit of faith, similar to a division that will be visible in Gregory of Rimini. Augustinus suggests that the theologian, by having expressed (*exprimere*) and expounded (*exponere*) the teaching passed on through writings of the Apostles, acquires a clearer knowledge. But clearer here cannot be understood in terms of Aristotelian evidence because the theologian never turns to principles other than what are given through faith. Instead “clearer” must be understood as “fuller” or “more robust,” since it is the theologian who is able to explicitly draw out the consequences of what is first only implicitly believed. And this is what Augustinus intends when says the “stronger people” have faith in a clearer mode *with some effect*. The theologian is able to see the effects of faith; she is able to see where the truths of Scripture lead. She is able to show others where they have erred in their deductions and to teach others to see the consequences of their faith.

IV. Prosper of Reggio and His Reading of Ancona

In contrast to Augustinus, the Augustinian Prosper of Reggio at first appears to be an Augustinian hermit who is about to abandon the Aegidian tradition wholesale. In the opening question of his prologue, he opposes Augustinus of Ancona, stating confidently that faith and theology are separate and distinct habits.

Prosper of Reggio Emilia was born sometime in the 1270’s and was presumably educated within the studia of the Augustinian Order. He read the *Sentences* at Paris and

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31 See below c. 7, p. 338.
then revised the prologue and other parts of the first distinction while in Italy sometime after 1318. In 1321 he was sent to Bologna to teach, and he died in 1332.\footnote{For a more extensive biographical overview and further reference points, see William J. Courtenay, ‘Reflections on Vat. Lat. 1086 and Prosper of Reggio Emilia, O.E.S.A’, in Christopher Schabel (ed.) \textit{Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The fourteenth century} (Leiden, 2007), 345-358; Zumkeller, \textit{Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages}, 32–33.}

Prosper’s opening arguments against such a distinction between faith and theology reflect the core arguments of Ancona and further illustrate the basic Aegidian Position. As Ancona argued: habits are said to be distinguished by their acts, but the \textit{proper act} in theology is belief, thus they must be the same habit.\footnote{Prosper de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, f. 1ra. “Item, habitus distinguuntur per actus, ut habetur, \textit{II De anima}, et habitus habentes eundem actum non distinguentur. Sed haec doctrina et fides inclinant in eundem actum, scilicet in actum credendi articulis; ergo etc.”} An even more illuminating argument acknowledged by Prosper (again, visible in the text of Ancona) is the following:

The intellectual habits are enumerated in book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics. But none of these kinds of habits are able to be acquired through the study of Scripture.\footnote{Prosper de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, f. 1ra. “Item, habitus intellectuales numerantur, \textit{VI Ethicorum}. Sed nullus eorum potest adquiri ex studio sacrae Scripturae; ergo etc.”}

The revealing part of this argument comes in the proof of the minor.

The minor is proved because any acquired habit resolves into principles received from the senses. But the [the study of] Sacred Scripture resolves into divinely inspired principles.\footnote{Prosper de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, f. 1ra. “Item, habitus distinguiuntur per actus, ut habetur, \textit{II De anima}, et habitus habentes eundem actum non distinguentur. Sed haec doctrina et fides inclinant in eundem actum, scilicet in actum credendi articulis; ergo etc.”}

In this proof, the criterion for an “acquired intellectual habit” is laid bare; it must be a knowledge that is derived from one’s experience with sensible things. The criterion is similar to what we described above as a criterion for evidence, where one acquires
certainty for himself instead of relying on the teaching and authority of someone else.\textsuperscript{36} Likewise, the inspiration behind this opening negative argument is very similar to Giles and Augustinus’s original understanding of \textit{Sacra Pagina}. First, it does not begin from sensible things. It was this that constituted theology’s superiority over metaphysics and any other science that took its beginning from sensible things. Second and connected to the first, we see once more the criteria that the starting points or principles of this theology must be given; in this case, they are said to be principles, which are divinely inspired, meaning they cannot simply be taken or discovered in the world.

In the opposition to these arguments, we face the familiar concern: what separates the professional theologian from the simple believing \textit{vetula}? This is what Prosper asks in the \textit{Sed Contra}:

\begin{quote}
If besides the habit of infused faith, no other habit were posited in those studying Sacred Scripture, then the \textit{one knowing} Sacred Scripture would \textit{not know} how to defend the faith any better than the baptized \textit{vetula}.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

Prosper shows that he is preeminently concerned with the later part of the \textit{De Trinitate} quotation.\textsuperscript{38} To make room for Augustine’s distinction between the faithful and those who are also “full of this science,” Prosper takes a different strategy. In an effort to recognize that the theologian possess a true ability that the simple believer does not, Prosper does not shy away from admitting that theology is a separate habit. Even more than this, he is willing to call this a “science,” raising for us all the concerns that

\textsuperscript{36} See above, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{37} Prosper de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, f. 1ra. “Si praeter habitum fidei infusae non poneretur alius habitus in studentibus sacram Scripturam non magis sciens sacram Scripturam sciret fidem defendere quam vetula baptizata.”
\textsuperscript{38} See above, p. 234, n. 21.
Augustinus raised about this very position. Prosper avoids these criticisms, not by denying their force, but by redefining the conception of *scientia* so that the criticisms become no longer relevant.

He writes:

> By the word ‘habit’ we mean that thing possessed through which the one having the habit is disposed well or badly for performing an operation. For this is how the Philosopher defines habit in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, saying: ‘Habit is the disposition according to which one is disposed well or badly. And in the second book of the Ethics he states the same opinion saying: ‘Potency is that by which we are able to do something, a habit is that by which we are able to do something well or poorly’. When ‘habit’ is taken in this way, *any science which disposes the one having it so that he can easily and quickly deduce conclusions from principles*, is called an intellectual habit. (emphasis mine).39

Relying on the *Metaphysics* and the *Ethics*, rather than the *Posterior Analytics*, Prosper identifies a science as one of those intellectual habits which disposes us to “deduce conclusions from principles.” Notably this definition makes reference neither to where one begins (from sensible things or from divine inspiration) nor to any criteria of evidence or self-evident principles. This definition focuses solely on the ability (“a habit by which we are able to do something well or poorly”) of a person to take what is given and to deduce further conclusions from the pre-existing data set. As we can now see, this is a long way from Aristotle’s definition of “science” in the *Posterior Analytics*,40 and,

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40 See above, p. 236.
through recognizing this definition, we are able to see a commonality between Prosper
and Giles and Augustinus that is hiding behind the verbal disagreement. Giles and
Augustinus are insistent that the theologian does not acquire an intellectual habit beyond
faith because belief remains the central and only claim to certainty. For them, the
theology never begins from universally evident things, but only from what the authority
of faith imparts. But Prosper has re-defined “science” without reference to evidence,
external justification, or self-evident first principles. Rather a “science” is restricted to the
skill of deduction. This, then, becomes strikingly similar to Giles and Augustinus’s view
of the theologian as someone who can order, express, and expound what the Scripture
says. All three Augustinian hermits believe that this ability is something that the vetula
does not possess.

The important Augustinian criteria of the “ability to defend” against the impious
must be understood in this light as well. The “ability to defend” comes from the power to
“quickly and easily deduce conclusions,” and this cannot be understood as a justification
of belief through proofs taken from the natural world and other natural sciences. On the
contrary, the defense consists of valid deductions aimed at a correcting those who begin
from what is revealed, but draw wrong, misleading, and potentially harmful
conclusions.41

41 There is something Barthian about this idea of “defense.” It is a defense that is inward focused, closely
associated with a defense against the heretic, who exists within the religious community because he
acknowledges the same starting points. But the heretic is classified as such because he makes errors in
drawing on the consequences of the community’s common beliefs. In an extended discussion of the kind of
‘unbelief’ opposed by theology, Karl Barth attributes to dogmatic theology the kind of internal focus seen
in the Augustinian positions presented here. He writes: ‘The conflict of faith with unbelief can be truly
significant only as and when it is a conflict of faith with itself, since in faith unbelief has in some sense
expressed itself and claims a hearing. This paradoxical fact is a real fact. Faith does not stand only, or even
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At the heart of this response is an ambiguity about what it means “to know.” When knowledge, understood as the possession of independently possessed evidence, is contrasted with belief, Giles, Ancona, and Prosper all seem to be on the same page. The theologian does not receive an external justification for what is divinely revealed. The primary act of belief remains central. However, when “to know” is thought of as an ability to make logical connections within a given data-set, the theologian is thought to have an identifiable *acquired* skill which the normal believer does not have. And this is something Giles, Augustinus, and Prosper have all acknowledged, though Prosper, in defining this intellectual habit as the power of deduction, has given us the clearest formulation thus far.

One final confirmation of this reading occurs when Prosper responds to Augustinus’s explicit concern that, if theology acquires a separate habit of knowing, then divine revelation would not be needed. (In this objection, Augustinus clearly shows that he understands this separate intellectual habit as a separate alternative source of evidence, not just a deductive reasoning ability, and therefore he is opposed to it.)

In response Prosper says: Augustinus should understand that I think revelation is made about the articles, the assent to which is called “infused faith.” But, he goes on, this other habit [theology] *does not prove these articles* (i.e. it does not derive or justify the

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in the first and most important sense, in conflict with unbelief. It stands in conflict with itself, i.e., with a form or forms of faith in which it recognises itself in respect of form but not of content ... The paradoxical fact to which we refer is that of heresy. By heresy we understand a form of Christian faith which we cannot deny to be a form of Christian faith from the formal standpoint, i.e., in so far as it, too, relates to Jesus Christ, to His Church, to baptism, Holy Scripture and the common Christian creeds, but in respect of which we cannot really understand what we are about when we recognize it as such, since we can understand its content, its interpretation of these common presuppositions, only as a contradiction of faith’ (Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics 1.1: The Doctrine of the Word of God*, G. W. Bromiley (trans.) (London, 1975) §2.1, 31-32).
knowledge of these principles from another source besides faith or belief in the given revelation). Rather he says: this “other” habit presupposes these articles known only by faith. Thus the “science” possessed by the theologian is an ability to “quickly and easily” deduce conclusions from the principles received through an “infused faith.”

Prosper makes this even more explicit in his response to Augustinus’s concern that the proper act of theology is only belief. Showing some real disagreement here, he says: “the proper act of this habit is not belief itself, but the deduction of conclusion from believed articles.” Here he shows that the proper act of theology is not a competitor with the belief, but an ability to articulate what is believed.

V. A Lingering Question: Theology or Logic?

A lingering oddity remains when Prosper, in one particular argument, says that a person could potentially possess the habit of theology without infused faith. This admission comes in one of his arguments for why faith and theology should be seen as distinct. This argument takes as an example a “Saracen” boy who had previously been schooled in Christian theology, but was never baptized. Such a person lacks infused faith, but Prosper seems to think that he can still acquire the theological-deducing skill. This

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42 Prosper de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, f. 1rb. “Ad primum: cum dicitur quod ‘non oportuisset revelationem fieri’ etc., nego consequentiam. Et cum probas ‘quod scitur habitu adquisito non oportuisset revelari,’ dicendum quod revelationes factae sunt de articulis propter quorum assensum ponitur fides infusa. Iste autem habitus non probat articulos sed supponit.”

43 Propser de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, f. 1rb. “Ad secundum: cum dicitur ’habitus distinguuntur per actus,’ concedo pro nunc, licet bona declaratone indigeat. Et cum additur quod actus credendi est actus utriusque, dicendum quod actus istius habitus proprius est deducere conclusiones ex articulis creditis fide infusa vel adquisita; ideo falsum supponit illa minor.”

44 Prosper de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, 1rb. “Minorem probo, nam si puer Sarracenus instruatur in fide et articulis et studeat in theologia tantum quod efficiatur doctor , sciet fidelendem, Scripturum declarare
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appears to be at odds with his later claim that the habit of theology does not prove or justify what is believed by faith, but presupposes faith.

The incongruity here raises the question of what it means to presuppose faith. Does the presupposition of faith simply mean that the propositions of Scripture or of the creed must be “in hand” as formal sentences or propositions? Or does the presupposition of faith mean that someone must really believe them, i.e. be convinced that reality is as the propositions signify reality to be? The lingering ambiguity in Prosper’s text leads nicely to the second question of his Prologue. Here he asks whether the “science” of theology is merely a science of consequents or whether the theologian can claim to “know” something about reality itself.45 “To know” here should be understood as having a conviction about the way the world is (whether or not some sort of evidence is responsible for this conviction). A mere knowledge of consequents suggests only a conviction that certain conclusions do in fact follow from a set of given premises. It makes no claim about whether or not these conclusions signify something true in reality.

Prosper’s response appears rather confused and contradictory. As we have seen in question one, his method suggests that the theologian always begins from a claim which is received and justified by one’s faith in the revealed data. But his answer in question

sicut doctor habens fidem infusam, et tamen in ipso non est fides infusa, quia non est baptizatus. Ergo hoc facit alio habitu.”

45 Prosper de Reggio, q. 2, Venice, 1va. “Ad secundum sic proceditur et arguitur quod per talem habitum solum habeamus cognitionem de consequentiis et aliis quae in sacra Scriptura traduntur, sciendo loca ubi sancti loquentur de Deo, de angelis, et [de] moribus hominum, ita quod totum studium theologiae est ut habeatur notitia consequentiarum et non eorum de quibus sunt consequentiae, quia notitia rerum non stat cum fide earum.”
two brings together a host of authorities to suggest that the theologian helps the intellect to assent with evidence to what is previously known only by faith.\footnote{\textit{Prosper de Reggio}, q. 2, Venice, 1va. “Alii vero, quod magis credo, dicunt quod hoc est nimis parvipendere theologiam et theologum. Ideo ponunt maiorem notitiam quam consequentiarum ex studio theologiae adgenerari.}

While it is not our purpose here to reconcile these different facets of Prosper’s thought, the tension is illustrative of the kind of dissatisfaction felt by later Scholastic thinkers toward the Aegidian, deductive, and supernatural conception of theology. We will see this dissatisfaction, most clearly in the thought of Petrus Aureoli, but also in his influence on Ockham.\footnote{See below, c. 6, pp. 256-285.} The dissatisfaction centers on how much epistemic value should be placed on the achievement of the theologian who deduced explicit claims from previous claims, but never truly uncovers evidence for those conclusions.

Through our survey of Giles, Augustinus, and Prosper, we have seen the basic foundation of an identifiable Aegidian conception of the theologian. This basic system, while coherent, still leaves its readers with questions, to which opponents will gladly draw attention. However, the picture drawn here is robust enough to assess the Aegidian character of Rimini’s own description of theological method, and it is to this that we must now turn.

\footnote{See below, c. 6, pp. 256-285.}
Chapter 6: Theological Method

I. Henry of Ghent’s *Lumen Medium* and the Response of Peter Aureoli

Henry of Ghent’s *Summae Quaestionum Ordinariorum* contains an important early concern with Giles’s position: a concern that he could equally level against Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio. Henry’s concern and his proposed solution is a forerunner of a similar concern raised later by Petrus Aureoli. Understanding the full context of Peter Aureoli’s position is important for us, since Rimini severely criticizes Aureoli. Our ultimate goal is to assess to what extent Rimini’s critique of Aureoli can be interpreted as a return to an Aegidian position, which Henry and Aureoli are trying to avoid.

An outstanding example of Henry’s position is in article 13 of his *Summae Quaestionum Ordinariorum*. The overarching title of this article is “concerning the mode of learning theology.” In other words, this article is once again about method, though the question is now about the learner rather than the teacher. The third question of this article wonders whether “faith” is a prerequisite for theology. Henry’s answer is an emphatic yes, and thus he stands in agreement with Giles on this point. But, then, in question four

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1 The date of Henry’s birth is currently not known. Scholarship suggests sometime before 1240. He first appears in official documents in 1267 and he disputed his first quodlibet in 1276. From then on he worked as a Parisian regent master in theology until his death in 1293. Henry’s long career as regent master is attributable to his status as a secular rather than a religious. While the members of religious orders only occupied the seat of regent master for a couple of years to make room for the next generation, this was not the case for seculars. Thus, Henry leaves us with a uniquely long set of Quodlibetal questions in addition to his massive *Summae Quaestionum Ordinariorum*. For a good beginning point see Porro, Pasquale, "Henry of Ghent," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/henry-ghent/>. 
we begin to see a departure. The thesis presented here states: “in order to learn this science the light of faith is not sufficient.”2 The real concern behind this thesis follows directly:

In the first place, if the light of faith alone was able to be sufficient for learning [this science], then the stronger one is in faith, the more perfect one learns this science, since when the cause is posited it is necessary to posit the effect.3

The implicit worry here is a variation on a familiar theme: if one takes a position like Giles’s, then the simplest believer who believes fervently will be a superb theologian. But, for Henry, this is patently false. The theologian is able to do things and understand things that the simple believer is not, no matter how strong their faith is. Henry identifies two different tasks for the theologian, only one of which is shared with the initiated faithful.

This science, since it is about the necessity of salvation for men, it is necessary for them, not only to receive this so that he might assent to the truth of believable things, but also to perceive this, so that he knows how to aid the pious and to defend against the impious from every falsity. The first [task] is necessary for everyone. The second is necessary only for the better and superior people in the church (emphasis mine).4

In the above quotation we can see the now familiar language of Augustine. Henry does not think that the merely received light of faith (or the mere power of deduction, from

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2 Henricus a Gandavo, Summa Quaestionum Ordinararium, a. 13, q. 4, f. 92v M, “Circa quartum arguitur; quod ad istam scientiam discendam non sufficit lumen fidei.”

3 Henricus a Gandavo, Summa Quaestionum Ordinararium, a. 13, q. 4, f. 92v M, “Primo sic, quoniam si solo lumine fidei sufficienter disci posset, ergo plus pollens fide plus proficeret discendo hanc scientiam, quia posita causa necesse est poni effectum.”

4 Henricus a Gandavo, Summa Quaestionum Ordinararium, a. 13, q. 4, f. 92v N, “Dicendum ad hoc: quod ista scientia cum sit homini de necessitate salutis, est ei necessaria: non solum eam sic recipere ut veritati credibilium assentiat; sed etiam sic eam percipere; ut veritatem credibilium piis opitulati et contra impios ab omni falsitate defensare sciat, Primum necessarium est cuilibet. Secundum est necessarium solum maioribus et superioribus in ecclesia...”
revealed truths) is sufficient for his understanding of what it means to defend the faith against the impious. Besides receiving, the theologian must also perceive the truth. This notion of perceiving rather than receiving on the authority of another hints at a conception of knowing that comes close to Aristotle’s requirement of evidence for true demonstrative knowledge. But in order to gain this deeper quasi-evidential understanding, Henry does not think that the natural light of the intellect will work. Instead, he famously introduces to scholastic discourse the existence of another light, unknown to most of his contemporaries. He writes:

> For knowing in the second mode, and thus for learning this science, some illumination is necessarily required, which is superior to the illumination of faith, because in this mode, they know, not only by believing, but by understanding (*intelligendo*) the things believed.\(^5\)

This special light and the “perceptive” understanding it provides distinguish the professional theologian and allow him to defend and encourage the faith of others. In the next quotation, Henry goes on to do two things. First, he shows us that, like Giles, “knowing through the light of faith” is closely identified with “knowing through Scripture” (revelation). Second, he sharply distinguishes theological knowledge from merely knowing what Scripture says. He writes:

> And just as the first [task] comes through the authority of Sacred Scripture, with the help of the light of faith, so the second happens by *perceiving* the truth of the ones who wrote [the Scriptures] with the help of a superior illumination.”

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\(^5\) Henricus a Gandavo, *Summa Quaestionum Ordinararium*, a. 13, q. 4, f. 93r N. “Ad sciendum vero ea secundo modo: et ad sic addiscendum hanc scientiam, necessario requiritur illustratio aliqua superior illustratione fidei; quia hoc modo sciuntur non solum credendo: sed et credita intelligendo…”
This explanation not only shows the point of agreement and divergence with Giles, but also highlights a key characteristic of the theologian. The theologian does not just know what the writer wrote, but possesses the knowledge with which the writer of Scripture wrote; this is a characterization that Peter Aureoli also wants to preserve.6

Aureoli’s criticisms of Henry’s *lumen medium* have been well documented by Reijo Työrinoja in his 1998 article “Auriole’s Critique of Henry of Ghent's *Lumen Medium*.”7 While Työrinoja helpfully describes Aureoli’s criticism of the way in which Henry thinks the theologian arrives at the kind of knowledge which the authors of Scripture had, his article obscures one important fact: the identical impulse that is driving both Aureoli and Henry.

This common impulse is visible first and foremost in Aureoli’s initial list of opposing positions and his early criticisms of these positions. One of these opening arguments makes the following claim: “Theology, to the degree that it can be called a science, is such because it is a habit through which those things contained in divine Scripture, both the understanding (*intellectus*) of them and the exposition of them, are known.”8 Though exactly what it means to have an understanding (*intellectus*) of Scripture is precisely what has been in question this whole time, Aureoli understands this

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6 We can also note here that Gerard of Siena (writing closely after the time of Aureoli) represents a distinctively Augustinian precedent for rejecting Henry of Ghent’s appeal to a *lumen medium* (Gerardus Senensis, *In Primum Librum Sententiarum*, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2, p. 49a. “Primum est, quod detur lumen medium inter lumen Fidei, et gloriae, et possit stare cum lumine Fide; hoc autem videtur falsum…”)


position as implying that theology simply understands the contents of Scripture on its own terms and can share the meaning of the Scriptural author with others.

Aureoli confirms this in his initial objections to the above position. The third objection echoes nearly verbatim the concern raised by Henry of Ghent. Aureoli writes:

In the one studying a book, a habit ought to be generated in that student similar to the habit which the one composing this book has: for the one studying the book of Physics acquires in himself the habit of physics of the same species with that habit that Aristotle had. Therefore the one studying the Bible does not acquire a habit, in which he knows what has been written, but through this he knows about God what the one writing the biblical text knew.9

In short, understanding Scripture does not mean simply knowing what Scripture says, but rather, with the help of Scripture, one comes to know things about God, whereby they become capable of writing books of the same sort.

Aureoli makes a similar point in his fourth and final objection. Here he points out that we sometimes use the term “to know” in different ways. Sometimes we mean it properly, when we mean a conclusion known from its premises, but other times we just mean that we hold something in our memory. Thus when someone holds a Psalm in their memory, we say that they know (scire) the Psalm, and when they forgot the Psalm, we say they do not know. So, someone who studies Scripture and memorizes what they say and the meaning of the words (intellectus verborum), can be said to know (scire), but only improperly. Further, this is not what we mean by theology. When we say someone has the habit of natural science, we do not mean that they have merely memorized

9 Ibid., I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 1 (Buytaert I:150, n. 63). “Quia conformis habitus debet generari in studente aliquem librum ei habitui, quem habuit componens ipsum; studens enim librum Physicorum acquirit in se habitum physicæ eiusdem speciei cum illo, quem Aristoteles habebat; ergo studens in Biblia non acquirit habitum, quo sciat quid est scriptum sed quo cognoscat de Deo id quod scribentes cognoverunt.”
Aristotle’s *Physics*, but someone who knows what Aristotle knew in order to be able to write the *Physics*. The case is similar for theology: for while there are many people who are able to grasp and memorize the words of Scripture, we nevertheless do not say that they possess theological knowledge.

These rebuttals by Aureoli are enough to show that he shares a common concern with Henry, which goes unmentioned in Työrinoja’s expositions of Aureoli’s critiques of Henry. But in laying bare Aureoli’s criticism of Henry’s *lumen medium*, Työrinoja helps us to see that Aureoli does not think Henry’s solution to this problem is successful.

As explained by Työrinoja, Aureoli’s main criticism surrounds the belief that there is no middle between a proper concept and common concept of God. Our knowledge is either one or the other. But Henry thinks that the theologian can get a clear knowledge of complex propositions, without attaining equally evident knowledge of the terms of those propositions. In this way, he thinks the theologian “perceives” necessary truths about God and does not merely “receive” these truths on the authority of another. However, the light of the theologian remains less than the light of glory because

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10 Ibid., I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 1 (Buytaert I:150–151, n. 64). “Unde considerandum est quod scientia aliquando sumitur proprie, et tunc pro habitu quo propter praemissas conclusionibus adhaeretur; aliquando vero sumitur pro memoria; Qui enim recordatur de Psalmo aliquo et tenet illum memoriter, dicitur illum scire; et per oppositum, dum oblivus est, dicitur ignorare. Studens ergo in canone Scripturarum tenesque memoriter quod in eis scriptum est et intellectum verborum, scire dicitur improprie; nec tale scire est habitus theologiae, sicut nec tenere memoriter librum *Physicorum* est habere scientiam naturalem, quoniam multi complectuntur sermones quo non habent scientiam.”

11 Työrinoja, “Auriole’s Critique of Henry of Ghent’s Lumen Medium,” 623. “Auriole does not accept any of these arguments as valid for warranting the idea of a middle light. For him, God cannot give an evident knowledge of himself without giving at the same time a distinct notion and cognition (*notitia et distincta cognition*) of the relevant terms. Of course, God can give such a distinct notion of the terms concerning him, but the question is no longer of the middle light but of the light of glory and an intuitive cognition. Only the latter can involve the proper concept (*conceptus proprius*) and the knowledge of the terms ‘God’ and ‘Trinity of Persons’.”
the simple terms of the proposition are still known in a common and confused way.\textsuperscript{12} Aureoli simply denies that such a middle way is possible. From a confused knowledge of simple realities comes a necessarily confused knowledge of the propositions derived from them. Only from a proper concept of God could one naturally and demonstratively derive the truth that “God is three and one.” However, since Henry admits that such a proper concept of God is not possible for the earthly pilgrim, no evident knowledge (\textit{notitia clara}) of the propositions about God are possible. Työrinoja explains Aureoli’s reasoning this way:

Because we cannot have a proper and distinct notion of the Trinity in this life, but only a common and confused one, we cannot draw any necessary conclusion from this concept. And further, because a proposition is composed of its terms, we cannot get to know a proposition clearly and distinctly without getting to know its terms as well.\textsuperscript{13}

Aureoli’s quasi agreement with Henry about the need for the theologian to do more than know what is contained in the Scripture, and his disagreement with Henry’s way of explaining this difference, sets the stage for Aureoli’s account. Having rejected Henry’s

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\textsuperscript{12} Henry is said to hold that one can have a clear and proper vision of the ‘inheritance of terms’ even one does not have a clear vision of the individual terms themselves. Työrinoja summarizes the argument attributed to Henry of Ghent this way: “There is a real distinction between the knowledge of terms (\textit{notitia terminorum}), the knowledge of the inheritance of terms (\textit{notitia inherentiae}), and the knowledge of a propositional complex. Hence, one can have a better knowledge of the inheritance of terms and of a complex without knowing the simple terms any better than before. For example, one can have a clear knowledge (\textit{notitia clara}) of the proposition \textit{Deus est trinus et unus}, though the single terms \textit{Deus, trinus, unus}, would remain enigmatic and obscure. Such a light is higher than the common light of faith, but inferior to the light of glory and the beatific vision by which the Blessed intuitively cognize God and the Trinity.” Ibid. Cf, Petrus Aureolus, \textit{Scriptum}, I, Proem., sect. 2, q. 2 (Buytaert I:179, n. 13). “Praeterea, alia est notitia terminorum realiter a notitia inhaerentiae et complexionis eorum, ut de se patet; ergo poterit clarificare notitiam de complexione et inhaerentiae terminorum, non clarificata notitia simplici terminorum. Potevit itaque dare notitiam claram de ista propositione: ‘Deus est trinus et unus’, stante aenigmatica et obscura cognitione amborum terminorum, Dei videlicet et trini. Sed tale lumen et talis notitia est altior fide, inferior autem beatifica visione, in qua Deus et Trinitas intuitive cognoscentur; ergo. Deus potest dare tale medium lumen.”

\textsuperscript{13} Työrinoja, “Auriole’s Critique of Henry of Ghent’s \textit{Lumen Medium},” 625.
Aureoli must show how a theologian possesses a kind of knowledge that is something more than a skillful repetition of Scripture and something less than an evident “perception” of the revealed truths of faith.

II. Peter Aureoli and Theological Discourse (an alternative to the *lumen medium*)

One look at the opening of Gregory of Rimini’s discussion of theological method in the third article of the first question of his prologue alerts us to the fact that Aureoli’s positive response in section one, article two of his own prologue quickly became a *locus classicus* for the ensuing tradition. Both Ockham and Rimini will consider this passage in detail. Rimini’s own account of theological method begins by closely paraphrasing Aureoli at this precise point and only subsequently turning to offer a critique of the position found there. Thus in articulating Aureoli’s position, we prepare ourselves for a more complete understanding of the heart of Rimini’s position.

Aureoli opens this important second article by insisting on the fact that professional theologians are using many different types of procedures. As he says: “in theology, many procedures are found,” and he divides these procedures into three main types.

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14 We should note, however, that Aureoli is not the first to recognize that diverse methods are employed within the professional field of theology. In his *Sentences Commentary*, Durandus of St. Pourçain writes: “notandum est, quod Theologia videtur posse accipi tripliciter.” His list includes a sense of ‘theology’ where one simply assents to what is contained in Scripture as it is in Scripture. His second sense is a ‘defensive’ notion of theology which attempts to defend the faith from “principles more known to us”. And his third sense of theology, is a sense similar to that employed by Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio, where the practitioner “deduces things from the Articles of Faith” (*In Sententias commentaria*, I, prol., q. 1, f. 2va). We can also see an acknowledgement of diverse activities within the theological profession in Aquinas’s *Commentary on the Trinity of Boethius*, q. 2, a. 3.

(1) First, there is a procedure through which a conclusion is reached and genuinely known. What Aureoli has in mind here presupposes Aristotle’s definition of what it means “to be known,” which we discussed above. Such a procedure begins from naturally known principles and not only leaves us with a conclusion that is true, but also reveals the reasons for its truth. In other words, we know “that we know,” and we know that it cannot be otherwise. He willingly acknowledges that, as the works of Aristotle themselves appear to show, we can reach and know certain truths about God in this way, and in some manner this procedure deserves to be called theology. As an example of this procedure, he points to those demonstrative syllogisms used to show that God is one or infinite. Of course what is missing here is the element of belief, Scripture, and the so-called light of faith, which have been essential aspects of the Christian theologian’s self-identity. It was this self-identity that was the source of dissatisfaction with an Aristotelian definition of “science.” And it is out of this dissatisfaction that other procedures, besides the Aristotelian demonstrative syllogism, were pursued and recognized as genuine candidates for theology. Thus, the second and third procedures described by Aureoli present themselves as alternative candidates.

(2) The second procedure recognized is when a theologian proceeds toward a conclusion that will come to be believed (and therefore not “known” according to the

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16 See c. 5, p. 236. It is “knowledge” conceived along these lines that Henry wants to impart to the theologian through the *lumen medium*, wherein the theological conclusions are not just “received,” but are “known.” However, Henry was trying to create room for this kind of evidence, while nevertheless restricting it to a particular group of people. The special *lumen medium* was his way of achieving this balance.

criteria of Aristotelian science), the content of which has not yet been determined. The example given here is “whether the Holy Spirit would be distinguished from the Son, if it did not proceed from him.” An Aristotelian demonstration cannot answer this question, and so the question is approached in a different way. (We will see Aureoli’s full description of this approach momentarily.)

(3) The third and final recognized procedure proceeds to a conclusion already determined and already believed through faith. What distinguishes this third and final procedure from the second is the fact that the practitioner assents (through faith, not science) to the conclusion in question from the outset, prior to any kind of procedure. This is in contrast to the second case, where the procedure leads to belief in the conclusion.

Despite recognizing that some truths about God can be demonstrated according to the rules of a demonstrative syllogism, Aureoli wastes no time in ruling out the first procedure as a genuine candidate of theology proper. His reasoning is simply this: although providing genuine demonstrations for truths concerning God, such as, “God exists” and that “God is one,” is sometimes an activity that a professional theologian engages in, this is actually a metaphysical activity rather than a theological one. The science of metaphysics, even when it proves things about God, is a procedure accomplished in the natural light of reason. And if one were to restrict theology to the

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18 Ibid., I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Bunyaert I:154, n. 75). “Aliquando vero proceditur ad conclusionem credendam, de qua nondum determinatum est quid tenendum, ut cum quaecumque: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur a Filio, si non procederet ab eo.”
19 See below, p. 261.
20 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Bunyaert I:154, n. 75). “Aliquando autem ad conclusionem iam creditam et determinatam per fidem.”
range of truths illuminated by this light, many theological truths held dear by the theologian would be left out. With Giles and Henry, Aureoli wants to share the conviction that theology employs something foreign to all other naturally known sciences, which requires a new kind of procedure.21

What Aureoli believes is missing in metaphysics and other naturally known sciences is revealed in a second argument against the classification of metaphysics as theology. The specific language of lights is not present here, but it nonetheless remains clear that Aureoli wants to single out the habit of faith as that which initially separates the theologian from all other sciences. We ought to be especially attentive at this point, since both Ockham and Rimini will say that the eventual procedure that Aureoli singles out as theology proper contradicts the criteria he lays down here.22 He writes:

That habit which does not suppose (supponit) faith, but compels the intellect of a philosopher or pagan is not a theological habit because this habit supposes (supponit) faith, according to Augustine in Contra epistulam Fundamenti: ‘I profess the catholic faith and through this I presume to be able to reach to certain science’ . . . whence Augustine calls theology the science of faith.”23

Perhaps what is most important in this passage is not what Aureoli says about metaphysics, but what he seems to say about theology. Genuinely demonstrated truths

21 Ibid., I, proem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:154, n. 77). “In processu itaque primo acquiritur habitus metaphysicus et non theologicus. Quod sic patet: Omnis nempe demonstrativa notitia de Deo et divinis veritatibus ex propositionibus necessariis et notis naturaliter comprehensa est metaphysica…”

22 For Ockham, see below p. 278; for Rimini, see below p. 285.

23 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:155, n. 78). “Praeterea, ille habitus qui non supponit fidem, immo cogeret intellectu cuisscumque philosophi vel pagani, non potest esse habitus theologicus, quia ille supponit fidem, iuxta illud Augustini, Contra epistulam Fundamenti: ‘Ego fidem catholicam profiteor et per hanc me pervenire posse ad certam scientiam praesumo’ . . . Unde et Augustinus vocat theologiam scientiam fidei.”

Cf. Augustine, Contra epistulam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti, XIV (CAG I:210, ll. 14-15). “Ego namque catholicam fidem profiteor / et per illam me ad certam scientiam peruenturum esse praesumo.”
about God clearly do not fall under theology proper because they are accessible to everyone and do not require belief in any form. Theology proper, in turn, is set apart by the fact that it begins from a starting point not universally recognized or, in other words, it “supposes (supponit) faith.” But critical here is what it means for theology to “suppose faith.” Connected to this, we must be clear about what we mean when we say a procedure “begins from something else.” In anticipation of what is to come, we note that Rimini will explicitly raise a concern with the sense in which Aureoli understands theology to “begin from faith.”^24 The central question here is how a believed proposition is used or involved in theological reasoning.

This question should take on a heightened interest for us in light of our earlier review of Aureoli’s description of the practical task of theology—that theology’s direct and immediate practical task is to direct and strengthen the act of faith, not to immediately elicit an act of love for God. By itself, this directive function could easily prompt us to view the act of faith as a subsequent act that follows upon and is the result of a theological procedure. But in the above passage, Aureoli indicates that this is not the case. Conversely, the above passage suggests that theology, unlike metaphysics, begins from propositions believed on account of the habit of faith alone (or we might say “through the light of faith”) and then proceeds to subsequent truths. But we will see shortly that this also is not the case. Thus Aureoli means something very specific—and not at all obvious—when he says that theology supposes (supponit) faith.

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24 See below, p. 285.
25 See above, c. 3, pp. 169-177.
From his rejection of this first type of procedure, Aureoli turns to the second procedure: a kind of reasoning that leads us to believe something, without having any demonstrable reasons for giving our assent. He breaks down this general procedure into four sub-types.

In order to understand these procedures, we must become familiar with some traditional scholastic terminology. Aureoli’s descriptions centers around the difference between three types of propositions: a necessary proposition, a probable proposition, and a believed proposition, each corresponding to distinct habits: scientific, opinative, and creditive habits, respectively.

In the customary scholastic parlance, a believed proposition is, first of all, an inevident proposition. That is, its truth does not compel the mind to consent. The mind is typically said to be compelled to assent either through the immediate self-evidence of a proposition or through an “acquired” evidence discovered through a deduction from two self-evident principles. But this, in itself, is not enough to distinguish a believed proposition from a probable proposition, which is often described as a mere opinion. Both beliefs and opinions are appropriate propositional attitudes with respect to inevident propositions. However belief, in a strict sense, differs from opinionative assent on account of the type of assent it gives to an inevident proposition. The technical meaning of belief in a believed proposition is that the agent in question assents to the proposition without doubt (sine formidine), just as one does with demonstrated knowledge.\(^\text{26}\) In

\(^{26}\) In the work of Pierre d’Ailly, we can see this phrase used in his definition of faith: “Secundo declarandum est quid sit fides. Unde dico quod multipliciter potest sumi, ut alias videbitur, sed ut ad presens sumitur fides potest describi quod est assensus verus firmus sine formidine non evidens. Vel
contrast, the person who holds a mere opinion assents to the proposition, but always does so with some hesitancy. It as though the one who assents says “it quite possible that this is the way things are though I acknowledge that I don’t really know for sure and I am open to the possibility that things are different than they seem.” The person who assents with faith rather than mere opinion shows no signs of this hesitancy, but assents with the same certitude and conviction that a person does who knows a proposition with genuine knowledge. The person assenting with faith says: “I recognize that I cannot prove, demonstrate, or make evident that this is the ways things are; nevertheless I believe that this is how things actually are, and I do not acknowledge the possibility that things might turn out to be otherwise.” Needless to say, the category of faithful assent is not a category explicitly recognized by Plato or Aristotle, who bequeathed to us the original division between opinion and knowledge.\(^{27}\) Faith as an intermediate category, which shares in the unhesitant conviction of knowledge and the non-evidence of opinion, is a later invention born of the questions and problems peculiar to revealed religions. With these basic meanings in mind we can look at the four sub-type procedures Aureoli has in mind.

(1) First we sometimes assent to an inevident truth when we take for our principles one necessary and evident proposition and one proposition which is merely believed (with faith, not opinion) to be true. This procedure produces a conclusion which we cannot truly claim to know, but to which we are often willing to give our assent without any doubt (\textit{sine formidine}). “Willing” is the key word here because the two

\(^{27}\) See for instance Plato’s \textit{Meno}, 97e-98a
principles by themselves are not sufficient to compel or force the mind to assent. On the contrary, it is through the same initial will “to believe the believed principle” that we can say we also “will to believe the believed conclusion.” The other three types of procedures operate along similar lines, but with a decreasing quality of assent. (2) The second sub-type is simply a procedure where we reason from two principles that carry no evidence in themselves, but are both believed (with faith) to be true. From this, it is quite possible that new conclusion is reached. But again Aureoli insists that the conclusion reached is only a believed conclusion and nothing more. (3) The third sub-type Aureoli imagines is a procedure where a person begins from one believed principle and one probable principle. (4) In the fourth sub-type, a person begins from two different probable principles and then proceeds to produce a conclusion from them. The result in these last two cases is not “belief” in the strict sense, but only an opinion which can co-exist with doubt.

The requirement that theology supposes (*supponit*) faith and the clear reliance on believed (rather than just probable) propositions in sub-type procedures one and two suggest that these are likely candidates for theology proper. In contrast, sub-type three’s reliance on a probable proposition appears to weaken its results, leaving the practitioner with an opinion rather than a faithful conviction. Likewise, subtype four makes no reference to a presupposed belief or believed proposition and therefore is not a likely candidate for proper theological method.

However, Aureoli confounds our intuitions. Not only does he reject subtypes three and four, he also insists that subtypes one and two do not suppose (*supponit*) faith
in the way he understands the phrase. As we said, much depends on how to take this phrase, and through his rejection of subtypes one and two as candidates for genuine theology, he clarifies his meaning.

Treating sub-type procedures one and two as a unit, he declares: “no habit is acquired [here] other than faith.”28 By this he means to say that neither of these procedures can count as a genuinely theological procedure. Up until now, he has displayed a certain like-mindedness with Giles’s exclusion of purely natural demonstrations from the discourse of theology. But at this point, he begins to depart as Henry of Ghent did. Aureoli and Henry believe that in order to preserve the distinction between the simple believer and the industrious theologian, theology cannot simply be reduced to the habit of faith. For this reason, Henry introduced his *lumen medium*. And although Aureoli rejects the *lumen medium* as an unsatisfactory solution, he completely agrees with Henry that the habit of faith and the habit of theology must be sharply distinguished. His complaint, then, about sub-type procedures one and two is not that they do not require faith, but that they actually never move beyond faith. Such procedures provide us with something akin to the knowledge of what was written in Scripture, but not the knowledge that was used to write Scripture.29 Here we may wonder if the literal meaning of *supponit*, “to place under” can actually be illuminating in the sense that Aureoli expects theology to place faith underneath itself as it goes on to practice a new habit. In procedures one and two, faith is never superseded or “placed under.” Instead, 

28 Petrus Aureolus, *Scriptum*, I, proem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:155–156, n. 80). “In processu vero secundo, dum proceditur ex una propositione credita et alia necessaria aut ex ambabus creditis ad inquirendum de aliquo, quod est in fide dubium quid tenendum, non acquiritur alius habitus nisi fides.”

29 See above, p. 252.
these procedures are part and parcel of the habit of faith. The reasoning is this: the type of knowledge obtained through any procedure is only as good as its weakest principle. And in these procedures, whether one begins from one necessary and one believed proposition or from two believed propositions, the conclusion never reaches the kind of evidence required for genuine knowledge, nor is there any reason for doubt or hesitation (*formido*) to creep in. (This latter possibility is the problem that plagues sub-types three and four.)

However, the objection can be raised: it does seem like something is happening here that takes us beyond the initial point of belief, and if we do not call this a theological procedure, how do we distinguish it from a simple belief that never attempts to draw out and articulate the implications of believed principles? Aueroli’s general response is to acknowledge that there is movement taking place from a confused and entangled habit of faith (*fides implicita*) to a clear and untangled habit of faith (*fides explicita*). However, he insists that this movement from entangled to untangled belief “does not diversify habits.” The position taken here is curious. On the one hand, he acknowledges that a type of reasoning process is taking place in this movement from a faith *implicitum* to a faith *explicitum*. Yet on the other hand, he refuses to acknowledge that this is a reasoning process that should be called theology proper because he thinks it would be quite dangerous to classify faith *implicitum* and faith *explicitum* as separate habits. (All the

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30 See Petrus Aureolus, *Scriptum*, I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buylaert I:156, n. 81). “Praeterea, omnis adhaerens certitudinaliter alicii inevidenti propositioni, propter solam veritatem primam, adhaeret illi ex habitu fidei, ut patet ex fidei ratione; sed talis conclusio est inevidens, sicut articulus ex quo probatur; aeque enim inevidens est in Christo duas esse voluntates quemadmodum duas naturas; illi etiam adhaeretur propter divinam veritatem, qua adhaeretur proprie primae propositioni; ergo habitu fidei tenetur veritas eius.”

31 This is the kind of procedure that Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio acknowledge, each in their own way. See chapter 5.

while, he is adamant that theology must be a separate habit from the habit of faith.) On this point Työrinoja’s reading needs a slight correction. He writes:

> By means of infused faith, a person is committed to all revealed truths simultaneously, not discursively to one and then another. This infused habit is for Aureoli the **only** habit of faith. *Theology is* an exposition that specifies, explicates, and clarifies the implicit faith (*fides implicita*) included in the habit of faith. The number of theological truths does not increase so that a person now believes more than she did before. An implicit faith and an explicit faith cannot be two distinct habits; if they were, different people at different times would have different faiths, and not one and the same faith (emphasis mine).\(^{33}\)

Työrinoja is correct to point out that for Aureoli the infused habit of faith is the only habit of faith (a point with which Rimini will disagree).\(^{34}\) But he is wrong to suggest that theology, for Aureoli, is to be identified with the task of drawing out this *fides implicitum* into *fides explicitum*. As Työrinoja himself says, this *fides implicitum* and *fides explicitum* cannot be two distinct habits, and yet we know that Aureoli is quite concerned to show that the habit of faith and the habit of theology are distinct. As evidence for this reading of the proper description of what theology is, Työrinoja actually points to one of the passages where Aureoli is trying to explain why this first and second sub-type **should not** be counted as theology proper.\(^{35}\)

Aureoli presents two arguments for why it would be dangerous to consider this movement from *fides implicita* to *fides explicita* as two distinct habits. In the first place he says: if this were the case, then “the fathers of the Old Testament would not share the same faith with the fathers of the New Testament” (the assumption being that the New

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\(^{33}\) Työrinoja, “Auriole’s Critique of Henry of Ghent’s Lumen Medium,” 627.

\(^{34}\) See Rimini’s discussion of acquired faith below, p. 338.

\(^{35}\) Työrinoja, “Auriole’s Critique of Henry of Ghent’s Lumen Medium,” 627n16.
Testament fathers know explicitly certain things that the Old Testament fathers only knew implicitly).36 The second argument contrasts the priest and the illiterate old woman, the now familiar archetype of the simple but devout believer (vetula). He writes: “Still, to believe explicitly many things or a few things does not diversify the faith, otherwise the priest, who is thought to believe many things explicitly would not have the same faith as the old woman (vetula), who is thought to believe few things.”37 The latter argument is revealing because it gives a professional name to a person who has engaged in the type of discourse identified in sub-types one and two. This person is not the theologian, but the priest. The priest represents a type of person who can draw conclusions from what he holds to be true; however, he is not yet the kind of person who can engage in a “defense of the faith.”38 Someone who does not believe cannot acknowledge his reasoning. His reasoning lacks any universal appeal or connection with the body of truths known in a natural way. This is the kind of person who knows well what is said in Scripture, but still does not possess the knowledge possessed by those who wrote the Scriptures. Aureoli follows this example with a more detailed description of how the priest might partake in this process, while retaining the same faith and never going beyond faith. He writes:

Whence, by explaining (exponens) the canon of the Bible, he [e.g. the priest] acquires for himself an explication and specification. For he takes as an article the fact that he believes the whole of Scripture because he believes the Church and he believes that it has been inspired by the Holy Spirit. Then he takes something else, namely that this or that is written in

37 Ibid. “Adhuc plura vel pauciora credere explicite non diversificant fidem, alias sacerdos, qui tenetur plura explicite credere, non haberet eandum fidem cum vetula, quae tenetur ad pauciora.”
38 But here we should note that a “defense” of faith in the mind of Aureoli looks quite different than the sense of “defense” that emerged from the description of theology in the accounts of Giles, Augustinus, and Prosper. See Chapter 5, p. 239.
the Holy Scriptures, and this he acquires through study and lecture, and accordingly he concludes: ‘Therefore this or that should be held to be certain by faith’. 39

With this procedure laid out, Aureoli interprets for us what has happened: “In this process, a new faith has not been acquired,” but the priest or practitioner (which of course can be a theologian, just not qua theologian) simply knows through anticipating or articulating the consequences of the original belief. Aureoli compares this to what Aristotle says in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, where the one knowing that triangles in general have three sides knows at the same time through an induction (inducens) about this or that particular triangle.” 40 In the case of the priest and the geometer, no new knowledge has been acquired; rather what was known implicitly has simply been made explicit. 41

Finally, we should note Aureoli’s description of sub-types three and four. These too are procedures that he acknowledges are sometimes used in the faculty of theology; however unlike sub-types one and two, these procedures are not classified either as theology or even as part of the habit of pure faith. In the case of the fourth sub-type, this should appear rather obvious; here, both of the principles of the reasoning process are merely probable reasons or opinions. The only result that can be deduced from these

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39 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:157, n. 85). “Unde et exponens canonem Bibliae talem explicationem et specificationem sibi acquirit; assumit enim tanquam articulum quod credit totam Scripturam, quia credit ecclesiae et credit ipsam a Spiritu Sancto inspiratam fuisse. Tune sumit aliam, videlicet quod hoc et illud scribitur in hac Sacra Scriptura, et hanc sumit per studium et lecturam, et sic concludit: Ergo hoc et illud est fide certa tenendum.”

40 Ibid., “In hoc ergo processu non acquiritur nova fides, sed simul inducens cognoscit, sicut Aristoteles dicit primo Posteriorum quod sciens triangulum habens tres simul inducens cognoscit de triangulo isto vel illo.”

41 While this procedure is not recognized as the procedure of theology for Aureoli, we will see that it may still be a part of what they theologian presupposes, and therefore it may be an essential prerequisite for theology proper. See below p. 270.
principles is another opinion: an opinion which lacks both the evidence of genuine knowledge and the certainty that accompanies faith. This is slightly less clear in the case of the third sub-type. This procedure employs one probable principle and one believed principle. But even here, the resulting conclusion only acquires the strength of its weakest principle, thus the conclusion of this kind of reasoning leaves us with nothing more than a mere opinion.

Having seen the four subtypes of the second main type of procedure that Aureoli recognized at the outset, we can finally turn to the third and last procedure he mentions, which he considers to be the proper method of theology. However, we must pause for a moment and ask: what possible procedure has Aureoli left for himself? He has ruled out all genuine demonstrations as not in any way germane to theology proper. At the same time, he has ruled out all procedures that proceed from purely believed propositions or purely probable propositions as well as any combination of known, believed, or probable propositions.

Given the paucity of possibilities left, it is no surprise that this third type is rather idiosyncratic and unusual. Aureoli tries to distinguish this type from the reasoning unique to the pure habit of faith, but also tries to preserve in it an important connection to faith. It must go beyond faith, but must also supponit fidem. Aureoli provides the following description:

In this third process, when, namely, we proceed to some proposition, about which what should be believed and what should be held by faith has

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42 As an aside: it is curious that Aureoli leaves out a fifth possibility, namely, a procedure involving one necessary/evident principle and one probable proposition. However, in this case, the end result would be the same as the end result for the third sub-type.
[already] been determined, but arguments are introduced for this [already
determined] proposition, doubts are removed, and terms are explained,
then a properly theological habit is acquired.43

The result of this procedure is neither science, nor faith, nor opinion, but some kind of
clarification or defense of what is already articulated and believed. However, the
description begs for some explanation. First, why isn’t this procedure a science? The
quotation does not indicate which kinds of reasons “are introduced.” If these were evident
propositions, then we would have a genuine demonstration. Aureoli’s revised description
of theology proper at the beginning of article three specifies the kind of reasons he has in
mind. Here he speaks of theology employing “probable reasons taken from other
sciences.”44 But this first clarification raises the need for a second. If theology employs
probable reasons, then why isn’t this procedure the same as the fourth sub-type, wherein
theology proceeds from two probable propositions to a reach a probable conclusion? This
is precisely the question that will be a prime point of contention for ensuing thinkers.45
However, Aureoli does think he can provide answer. His answer lies in recognizing the
admittedly strange way that that faith is supposed (supponit) in this procedure. In this
procedure, rather than proceeding from probable propositions to a new probable
conclusion, Aureoli insists that the conclusion in question has already been articulated
and assent has already been given. The assent is not the assent of knowledge or evidence,
but of faith. In other words, unlike all the other procedures heretofore considered,

43 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. I, a. 2 (Buytaert I:159, n. 91). “In tertio autem processu, dum
scilicet proceditur ad propositionem aliquam, de qua determinatum est quid est credendum et tenendum per
fidem, et tamen cum hoc inducuntur rationes ad illam solvuntur dubia et termini explicantur, acquiritur
habitum proprie theologicus…”
44 Ibid., I, prooem, sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:159, n. 92). “…rationibus probabilibus sumptis ex aliis
scientiis…”
45 See Rimini’s concern below, p. 285.
theological discourse does not actually start with the principles of a syllogism, but from a conclusion already believed. Here we can see where and how the habit of faith and the different procedures of faith can become relevant. Faith in the articles of the creed or the more nuanced propositions already contained *implicite* in these initial articles can become starting points for theologians. Starting with these believed propositions, the theologian then looks outside of the habit of faith for probable propositions taken from the natural world that can generate support or clarification for what has already been believed. In this case, the reasoning process specific to the priest is extremely important and even necessary for the theologian. The theologian relies on the unfolding of faith *implicita* so that he or she knows for which believed propositions to begin building support, using naturally accessible probable reasons.

As noted above, the sense in which Aureoli understands the phrase *supponit fidem* and the sense in which he thinks theology “starts from faith” are very important for his position. And here we can see that the reliance of faith he has in mind is quite peculiar. The syllogism formed by the theologian does not actually rely on faith for any of the principles it employs. The sense in which the theologian relies on faith is only to the extent that faith determines and articulates what ought to be believed (perhaps performed by the Church as represented by the priest) and thereby directs and orients the efforts of the theologian. Whether Aureoli’s description of theological method really requires the theologian to believe these pre-determined propositions is a lingering question.47

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46 See above, p. 270.
47 For Ockham’s concern, see below p. 278; for Rimini’s similar concern see below p. 285.
It might be asked: why should the theologian’s procedure taken by itself not be said to produce mere opinion, regardless of the attitude one takes through another procedure? After all, it starts from probable propositions. For Aureoli, the conclusion has already been assented to through faith, and thus the probable propositions of the theologian’s syllogism do not denigrate this higher epistemic achievement. Still, the objector might respond: it is true that through the separate and distinct habit of faith this conclusion attains a higher status, but nevertheless the theological habit, as Aureoli has described it, has nothing to do with this separate act of belief.

This concern leads us to pose one final question of clarification. In the above description of a proper theological method Aureoli suggests that among other things this procedure would assuage doubts. The question of clarification first asks: whose doubts? Could they be the doubts of the faithful theologian? This is highly unlikely given the fact that Aureoli insists that the theologian *supponit fidem*. The theologian’s conclusions do not result in mere opinion because he already believes and belief is distinguished from opinion by a lack of doubt. So perhaps it is the case that the theologian’s work is—at least when it comes to assuaging doubts—for the benefit of others who do not yet believe. But this raises another question: how could the theologian’s procedure of moving from probable reasons help to mitigate the doubts of those who do not yet believe? At the very least they could provide probable proofs that make the tenets of faith appear reasonable. However, by necessity of the theological procedure as Aureoli has described it, these proofs can only be probable and therefore result in opinion. Thus, doubts will always linger and will never be completely removed through theology. The focus on
doubts once again draws us to an important conviction: the theologian provides “defense” and support against doubt. It is through this defense that the theologian distinguishes himself from the person of mere belief. The ability to appeal to natural reasons, though these reasons are only probable, and to use them to show the reasonability of faith is the distinguishing mark of the theologian. But the appeal to natural, universally recognizable reasons shows us that Aureoli has a very different understanding of “defense” compared to the internal defense against improper deduction that we saw in Augustinus and Prosper. For Aureoli this defensive task is not suited for nor required of everyone, not the simple believer nor even the priest. However someone in the academy must perform this task or religious truth runs the risk of floating away from its context within the larger body of truths to the point of becoming irrelevant and unimaginable. By sending out casting lines to other sciences, the theologian fights for the relevance of religious truth and defends the conceivability of this truth amidst everything else that is known to be true. To be sure, there is no attempt to demonstrably prove the necessity of the truths of faith, but the theologian is engaged in a process of showing the compatibility of Christian truths with the naturally acquired sciences.  

48 While throughout the corpus of Aquinas one can point to different procedures prescribed for theology, Aquinas’s description of his procedure, at the opening of the Summa Contra Gentiles, I, c. 9, shows some similarities with that of Aureoli. Distinctive of Aquinas’s position is two divide divine truths of theological truths into two – those that natural reason can reach and those that natural reason cannot. Of the second kind he writes: “Nevertheless, there are certain likely [probable] arguments that should be brought forth in order to make divine truth known” (trans. Pegis, I:77). Most interesting about what Aquinas says, however, is the fact that he does not think these probable arguments should be brought forth to convince his adversaries. Instead, they are for the “training and consolation” of the faithful. What is important here is how this procedure effectively console. Aquinas highlights that these probable arguments remind us that “natural reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith” (I:77). This is the similarity I see with what I have called Aureoli’s attempt to throw out “casting lines” to the other sciences in order to show that the revealed claims of faith are “reasonable” and not contrary to natural reason. Both Aquinas and Aureoli state that
by philosophy to oppose or challenge the *reasonability* of faith. To achieve this task, it is essential that probable principles be drawn from other naturally known sciences. To remain within the confines of faith, to support faith from faith, makes no progress towards demonstrating this compatibility with the wider body of truths.

With Henry in the background, Aureoli insists that theology go beyond what is merely “received” and begin to “perceive” the truth of what is believed. This task is accomplished through the contextualization of religious truth within the landscape of natural science. But this stands in contrast to Giles of Rome and the Aegidian tradition, who shows little to no interest in this kind of contextualization. Where Aureoli insists on the appropriateness of probable reasons drawn from the natural light of reason for theology, Giles claims that the knowledge derived from any human science has no place in theology. This then is the remarkable difference between the Aegidio-Augustinian tradition and the version of Augustinianism that Henry and Aureoli purport to represent.

Let us summarize the conclusions of this section. The name that Aureoli gives to his theological procedure is “declarative,” which Durandus of St. Pourçain described as primarily “defensive” in nature, even before Aureoli made the method famous. Theology as “declarative” is characterized by beginning from probable principles (that is, likely but not self-evident principles) acquired through natural reason in the other

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49 Durandus writes: “Secundo accipitur Theologia, pro habitu, quod fides, et ea quae in Sacra Scriptura traduntur, defenduntur, et declarantur, ex quibusdam principiis nobis notioribus . . . Ex quo satis appareat, quod ipse vocat scientiam theologiae habitum, quo fides et scriptura defenduntur, et declarantur…” (*In Sententias commentaria*, f. 2va). For a further description of declarative theology, see also: Brown, “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History’ of the Theologian’s Role.”
sciences. With these principles in hand, the theologian enlists those principles in the support of an already believed conclusion, the content of which has already been determined either by its evidence in Scripture or by a subsequent exposition and specification. To say, therefore, that “declarative” theology begins from probable opinions can be misleading; after all, theology selects the principles it employs by first viewing the previously determined conclusions that the theologian already believes and wants to support. In this way, theology “supposes faith” (*supponit fidem*). This is the method of theology proper according to Peter Aureoli. Though he is more than willing to recognize that other activities occur in the theology faculty, he simply wants to remind us that when the theologian performs these other activities, whether they be a metaphysical demonstration or a Scriptural exposition, he does not perform them *qua* theologian.

**III. Ockham on Aureoli**

Isolating Ockham’s discussion and description of “theological method” is not at first an easy affair. Questions I-II deal with the possibility of theological evidence in this life and the extent to which *evident* theological knowledge could qualify (in principle) as a science (that is, whether, theological knowledge in principle, all of it or even just parts of it, can be the result of demonstrative *deduction* from principles). Questions III-VI deal with the specific components of a scientific habit or demonstrative syllogism. It is in question VII, however, that we come closest to finding an explicit discussion of method specifically *in this life*. Given the importance of Aureoli’s position on the nature of proper theological discourse, it should come as no surprise that Ockham reviews
Aureoli’s position at length and articulates much of his own opinion in direct conversation with Aureoli.

Question VII asks: “whether theology, which is had by the theologians about the common law is a science properly speaking.”50 He first surveys those who hold a positive position, affirming that this theology is in fact a science. He then lists the negative opinion and indicates that he also holds this position; that is, he believes theology is not a science, properly speaking. To establish this position, he states that he will do two things (both of which indirectly help reveal what Ockham sees as the method of theology). In the first place he says: “I will show that every habit, besides faith, which the faithful theologian acquires, the unbelieving theologian is also able to acquire.” And in the second place (more important for our present interest), he states: “it should be seen what sort of habit is acquired in theology besides faith.”51

The latter question is nearly identical to the question which prompted Aureoli to identify the proper method of theology. As we have seen, the question is really just another way of asking how the theologian differs from the person of simple belief. How should we characterize the commonsense difference between the illiterate old woman (vetula) and the learned doctor of theology?

In this second task, Ockham introduces the opinion of Aureoli. Assessing Ockham’s opinion of Aureoli is complicated. The interpreter must wrestle with the early

50 Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:183). “Utrum theologia quae de communi lege habetur a theologis sit scientia proprie dicta.”
51 Ibid., I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:193). “Ideo circa istam opinionem primo ostendam quod omnem habitum, praeter fidem, quem acquirit theologus fidelis potest adquirere etiam infidelis; secundo est videndum qualis habitus acquiritur in theologo praeter fidem.”
and clear assertion by Ockham that “this opinion is false” (52) alongside the later concessions, where he says: “that some other habit besides faith is acquired: this I concede,” (53) and again: “I concede that [this habit] is able to be called declarative.” (54) Reaching a clear picture of Ockham’s opinion about Aureoli and the nature of theological discourse requires us to reconcile these competing claims. In short, we need to be precise about the manner of Ockham’s disagreement with Aureoli as well the nature of his agreement.

Ockham states “this opinion is false, as it seems, because although some habit is acquired, nevertheless the habit is not a type of wisdom.” (55) In the first place, this complaint foreshadows the concession that Ockham will make at the end of his discussion, namely, that some other habit is acquired through theology, which is distinct and separate from a habit of faith. In the second place, it shows that Ockham focuses his critique on the fact that Aureoli wants to call declarative theology a kind of “wisdom.” (56) This is important because, as of yet, Ockham is not disputing the description of the theological method that Aureoli has given, but simply the denomination of this habit as a “wisdom.”

But why are we unable to characterize this declarative procedure as a type of “wisdom”? Of the three arguments given by Ockham, the first and third tell us something about method and where the practitioner of theology must begin. The third confirming

52 Ibid., I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:195). “Sed ista opinio falsa est…”
53 Ibid., I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:198). “Alia dua argumenta probant aliquis alius habitus fide adquiritur. Quod concedo.”
54 Ibid. “Ad aliud, concedo quod potest vocari declarativus.”
55 Ibid., I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:195). “Sed ista opinio falsa est, ut videtur, quia quamvis aliquis habitus acquiritur, tamen ille habitus non habet rationem sapientiae.”
argument states that “wisdom does not stand with error about the same thing.” In pointing out this characteristic of wisdom, Ockham implies that possessing a declarative theological habit is compatible with error, and therefore it cannot be a kind of “wisdom”. The first argument illuminates the kind of error Ockham is referring to in his third argument. The former argument states:

Every habit which is able to be acquired through this kind of study by the believer is also able to be acquired by the unbeliever through similar study. But it is obvious that the unbeliever does not have true wisdom about theological things.

Ockham’s real complaint against the label “wisdom” comes from his belief that Aureoli’s description of proper theological procedure is something achievable by the believer and unbeliever alike. And what is possible for both the believer and non-believer cannot be classified as wisdom, since the person without belief is clearly in error.

Aureoli, of course, would not accept the terms of this critique. As we have seen, he would insist that the theologian cannot proceed in doing theology proper with “supposing” faith. However, we also saw that the reason theology—as Aureoli described it—actually requires faith was ambiguous at best.

As Ockham turns from his direct response to Aureoli to his positive opinion, he implicitly and rhetorically asks this same question. From the very outset he tries to demonstrate the independence of theology from the kind of conviction assumed in a habit of faith. He does this by pointing out the diverse psychological effects that the same

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57 Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:196). “Confirmatur: quia sapientia non stat cum errore circa idem.”
58 Ockham writes: “Sed iste habitus stat cum errore circa credibilia; igitur talis habitus non est sapientia” (Ibid.).
59 Ibid. “Omnem habitum quem potest ex tali studio acquirere fidelis posset etiam acquirere ex consimili studio infidelis; sed manifestum est quod infidelis non habet de theologis veram sapientiam; ergo etc.”
theological procedure can have, depending on the other psychological habits we have. (Today we might call these diverse “propositional attitudes.”)\(^{60}\) For example, Ockham says:

*When* acquired faith precedes this study, the theologian augments the habit of acquired faith. But *when* [acquired faith] does not precede, then, if [the theologian] is a faithful person, he acquires acquired faith” (emphasis mine).\(^{61}\)

Here, I emphasize the conditional “when” to stress the fact that Ockham seems quite open to the possibility that genuine theologians can begin with diverse propositional attitudes towards the same conclusions. A person can proceed in his study, while already believing the conclusion they are attempting support.\(^{62}\) But another person, who appears

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\(^{61}\) Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:196–197). “Ideo dico ad istum articulum quod theologus respectu credibilium augmentat habitum fidei adquisitae quando fides adquisita praeceditstudium suum; quando autem non praecedit tunc adquirit fidem adquisitam, si sit fidelis.”

\(^{62}\) Some confusion exists here as Ockham begins to discuss the idea of acquired faith, which did not appear in Aureoli’s own account. In fact, as we saw earlier Työrinoja insisted that for Aureoli there was only an infused faith and that this faith could only vary with regards to how explicitly it was known. Nevertheless, the kind of pre-established commitment Ockham is pointing to correlates well with the sense of commitment conveyed by Aureoli. However, Ockham’s reference to the person faithfully disposed but not yet having acquired faith, sounds more like the person who currently only possess an “infused” faith. These shifts in terminology are important as Rimini will identify theology with the actual acquisition of acquired faith. But this process of acquisition in Rimini presupposes a kind of pre-existing faith. While he doesn’t clearly identify this pre-existing faith as “infused” faith, it seems likely that this is what he has in mind. The meaning of “acquired faith,” however becomes even more confusing when we jump forward 200 years to the writing of John Mair (cf. Mair, *In Primum Sententiarum*, prol.). Mair is immersed in the sources of Aureoli and Rimini. Nevertheless, he will discuss the acquisition of acquired faith through probable reasons and pious affection. As we will see this is not a very Rimini-like position. Nevertheless, later Mair will explicitly argue against Aureoli’s view of theology and will adopt a picture of theological methodology very similar to that of Rimini. My attempt to makes sense of this confusion is to recognize that there could be diverse ways a conclusion could acquire assent. In one way, probable reasons and a pious affection might persuade us to give our assent to a proposition. But, in the manner Rimini will discuss acquired faith, it sounds more like someone is arriving at a conclusion from principles that have already been assented to with faith (presumably a kind of infused faith), though this is not a genuine demonstration since the principles are believed and not evident. But once they are granted, the conclusion does necessarily follow. Rimini will want to call the acquisition of this “necessary” conclusion “acquired faith.” We will see Rimini’s account of this below “Interlude” p. 306, and c. 7, pp. 318-338.
to engage in the exact same study may begin with doubt about the proposition in question. Ockham then adds a further condition that is initially somewhat odd. He says of the student who has begun with doubt about the conclusion in question: “if he is faithful,” then he will acquire “acquired faith.”

What can Ockham mean when uses the word “faithful?” He cannot mean it in the same way as he spoke of the theologian, who already began with acquired faith in the propositions to be supported and “augmented.” He may mean something similar to the way we see John Mair use the phrase “pious affection” nearly 200 year later in his own prologue to the Sentences. Here Mair insists that in order to achieve “acquired faith,” probable reasons supporting the conclusions in question are important and essential; however, they are not sufficient. Combined with probable reasons, a “pious affection” is needed if assent is to occur. What he means by “pious affection” is simply a good disposition of the will which inclines one toward those things that are beneficial to true religion and shuns those things that are harmful. The possibility exists, therefore, that there are also people in the world who are not so piously affected and for whom no

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63 Ibid., prol., q. 1, f. 1rv–1vb. There appears to be some confusion here in the margin of both the 1510 and 1519 edition of Mair’s work. In the margin, the position on “acquired” faith that Mair argues for (a middle position between two extremes) looks to be attributed to both Ockham and Rimini. R. Neil Wood in his 1997 article on the topic does not question the veracity of these attributions (“John Mair: the human dimension of faith”). The argument of this chapter however will make clear that this attribution to Rimini cannot actually be correct (whether or not Mair or the editor of his text believes it to be true).

64 We can also note an identification between “affectio” and the required willful state prior to Mair, in the work of Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri. He writes, quoting Augustine, using “affectio” as a synonym for “voluntas”: “’Consequens est paululum quaerere, utrum voluntas, id est affectio’…” (Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, Commentarius in Sententiarum, I, prol. q. 4, a. 1 (Eckermann I:125)).

65 Ibid., prol., q. 1, f. 1va. “Quinta propositio: fides acquisita producitur a motivo [i.e. argumentum topicum] et pia affectione…”
amount of probable reasons will be sufficiently persuasive. It could be that this is what Ockhan means when he says, “if he is faithful,” implying that if the person who takes up the discourse of theology, as Aureoli has described it, has the right disposition, then these reasons will be enough for that person to take the next step, consent, and acquire a new propositional attitude toward the conclusion in question. But if this is the case, we can see a departure from Aureoli. Aureoli insisted that theology can only happen if faith is already possessed and operative. Ockham’s reply is simply to say: no, Aureoli, the procedure, as you have described it, does not require this. On the contrary, anyone can engage in this discourse regardless of their current psychological state.

Ockham supports this reading when he considers the person who neither already possesses acquired faith nor has a faithful disposition. He admits that, for this unfaithful person who puts into practice the method described by Aureoli, faith is neither acquired nor augmented. Despite the unambiguous status of unbelief, Ockham discusses this individual alongside the other two types without the slightest suggestion that he is not also doing theology. He says it this way:

But beyond this habit [the habit of pure faith]...when a person studies in theology, whether they are faithful [here we must understand both a person already believing and a person well disposed to belief] or heretics or infidels, they acquire many sciential habits, which would be able to be acquired in other sciences. But besides this, they acquire many sciential habits of consequences, which pertain to no natural sciences."66

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66 Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:197). “Praeter autem istum habitum et de facto in maiori parte studens in theologia, sive sit fidelis sive haereticus sive infidelis, adquirit multos habitus scientiales qui in alis scientiis possent adquiri. Et praeter istos adquirit multos habitus scientiales consequentiarum quae ad nullas scientias naturales pertinent.”
Ockham’s predisposition here is to view theology as a bundle of multiple habits rather than one simple habit. Nevertheless, the method and mode of discourse is common to all practitioners regardless of the propositional attitude they begin with or the disposition of their will. That theology, as a habit, is indifferent to the various results that can be achieved through its procedure is a fact made possible by Ockham’s division between two classes of propositional attitudes or psychological states. Early on in his prologue, Ockham’s introduces a distinction between apprehensive habits and judicative habits.\(^{67}\) An apprehensive habit results in an act of pure apprehension or comprehension. But a judicative habit results in an act of judgment about the truth value of a previously apprehended proposition. In the passage currently under consideration, where he is discussing the person with and without the habit of faith, Ockham relies on this distinction to account for the differences between practitioners of theology. He says:

\[\text{With respect of all of these things [i.e. the sciential habits acquired through a theological discourse] – whether they are complex or incomplex, and whether they are propositions or consequences, whether they are knowable or believable only – anyone studying in theology is able to acquire an apprehensive habit.}\]\(^{68}\)

At this point, Ockham has attempted to do justice to the impetus behind Aureoli’s position, while trying to avoid its problems. On the one hand, he recognizes that there is

\(^{67}\) See Ockham, I, prol., q. 1, art. VI, (OTh I:52ff)

\(^{68}\) Guillelmus de Ockham, \textit{Ordinatio}, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:197). “Respectu autem omnium – sive sint complexa sive incomplexa, et hoc sive sint propositiones sive sint consequentiae quaecumque, sive sint scibilia sive credibilia tantum – quilibet studens in theologia potest adquirere habitum apprehensivum.”
something distinct about someone who engages in the “declarative” theological procedure, who really believes and has already committed themselves to the truths they set out to support. There is something distinctively different about what such a person gains from this exercise in comparison to the person who performs the same exercise, while not yet believing or even dead set against believing. On the other hand, Ockham is cognizant of the kinds of ambiguities we pointed to above, inherent in Aureoli’s description of declarative theology. Ockham is disturbed by Aureoli’s suggestion that only the person with the “propositional attitude” of belief can bring probable propositions in support of previously marked-out propositions. In contrast, he insists that the prior “propositional attitude” is irrelevant to one’s ability to perform this procedure; both the person well disposed to belief and the person dead set against belief are capable of acquiring the exact same apprehensive habit. But this prior “propositional attitude” is not irrelevant to the “judicative habit” that results. Ockham is ready to concede to Aureoli that the results of this identical apprehension vary according to the prior propositional attitudes and dispositions of the will proper to each student. The error in Aureoli’s position is that by failing to make such a distinction, he loses the ability to recognize the possibility common to the believer and un-believer. Ockham can recognize this possibility, while still acknowledging the impact of the student’s initial propositional attitude when engaging in a theological procedure.

This leads us to the end of Ockham’s proper opinion, where he makes the concessions to Aureoli that we noted above. He concedes that the theological discourse

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69 See above p. 271.
does result in a habit different than and beyond faith. Though of course, we now know that Ockham thinks the direct result is only an apprehensive habit. And we also know that a variety of judicative habits are possible depending on the starting point of each practitioner.70

He also concedes that this habit, which leads everyone to a common apprehensive act, can be called “declarative.”71 Ockham is never as precise as Aureoli about the proper method of genuine theology. However, despite his thorough critique of Aureoli’s position, he does not challenge the precise description of theological method given by Aureoli.72 In fact, his critique appears to presuppose the validity of this procedure. He is first and foremost opposed to Aureoli’s classification of this habit as “wisdom.” But this critique stems from Ockham’s more fundamental opposition to Aureoli’s insistence that only the person who already believes can bring probable opinions in support of a predetermined conclusion. For Ockham, everyone is capable of performing this procedure. And since this procedure can often result in the “apprehension” of probable consequences that pertain to no other natural science, they must belong to a genuine theology or risk becoming a habit that has no classification whatsoever. In sum, Ockham

70 Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:198).
71 Ibid.
72 In Philotheus Boehner’s opinion, paraphrased by Courtenay, Ockham is eager to acknowledge the validity and value of bringing “probable reasons” to bear on revealed truths. “[On Boehner’s view, Ockham] maintained the importance of probable arguments” (Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 45–46). However one needs to acknowledge that Courtenay identifies another orientation to Ockham advanced by Moody: “Moody, on the other hand, believes that Ockham radically altered metaphysics. By adopting a strict definition of demonstration and by using an empiricist criterion from the evidence used in demonstration, the so-called demonstrations generally used in metaphysics and natural theology became un-scientific and only probable. Thus natural theology was eliminated in favor of a positive theology based on revelation and faith rather than reason . . .” (Ibid., 46). Despite Moody’s somewhat negative assessment, he still highlights for us the continued importance of probable reasons for Ockham.
is able to do justice to the difference between the believing and unbelieving practitioner of theology by insisting on the following: when it comes to judicative habits, the believing and unbelieving theologian do not share the same habit, but in terms of apprehension, each practitioner’s habit remains the same.

IV. Rimini: Against Aureoli

Rimini’s response to Aureoli’s description of a proper theological method shares some of the same concerns that Ockham raised, but ultimately goes in a very different direction. Rimini starts his critique of Aureoli with the claim that any discourse which begins from probable opinions (i.e. neither self-evident principles nor principles believed without doubt or hesitation) is only able to cause opinion: a conclusion which Rimini believes is incongruous with Aureoli’s beliefs about the results of theology.73 He explains further:

According to Aureoli no discourse from two evident and necessary propositions is properly theological, therefore the same follows for any discourse from two probable principles. The consequence is proved through what Aureoli himself says, since the reason why the first discourse is not theological is, as he says, because the habit resulting from that discourse ‘does not suppose faith (supponit fidem)’. But it is also true for Aureoli that opinion does not suppose faith (supponit fidem). Indeed they [opinion and faith] are not compatible, as he says in the same question, article 3 proposition 2; but from this discourse [what Aureoli calls theology proper] nothing except opinion is acquired, therefore, etc.74

73 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:14). “Primam conclusionem probo primo sic: Nullus discursus ex se natus causare opinionem tantummodo de sua conclusione seu de significato suae conclusionis est theologicus proprie; sed omnis discursus ex mere probabilibus est huiusmodi; igitur etc.”
74 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:15). “Secundo, istum doctorem nullus discursus ex ambabus evidentibus et necessariis est proprie theologicus, igitur nec aliquis ex ambabus probabilibus. Probatur consequentia per dicta eiusdem, quoniam ratio, quare primus non est theologicus, ut dicit, est quia habitus causatus ex eo ‘non supponit fidem’; sed constat secundum eundem quod opinio non supponit fidem, immo nec eam
In this argument, we see Rimini pinpoint that phrase *supponit fidel* that was at once so important for Aureoli and also so ambiguous. For Aureoli it was essential that the theological discourse “suppose faith.” But both Ockham and Rimini are incredulous about the claim that the theological discourse as Aureoli has described really does “suppose faith.”

Ockham and Rimini, however, depart ways at this point. Ockham’s response was to jettison this criterion and more or less preserve the methodology described by Aureoli. Rimini’s response is to keep the criterion and opt for a new method. Accordingly, when Rimini turns from his criticism of Aureoli to his own proper position, we find a different description of theological methodology:

> Therefore, I respond to the article that a properly theological discourse is that which begins *(constat)* from the sayings or propositions contained in Sacred Scripture or from those things which are deduced from latter…

We can acquire a sense of what Rimini has in mind here by recounting the three arguments he introduces to convince us that this is the true method of any genuine theology. These arguments are generally based on recognized theological authorities, and they appeal to the procedure followed by these authorities in their own work.

To support his description of proper method, he first looks to a statement made by Pseudo-Dionysius in his work, *On the Divine Names*. Rimini paraphrases Ps-Dionysius, saying: “for the one not assenting to words of Sacred Scripture, the *manuductio* is not

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secum compatitur, ut in eadem quaestione articulo 3 propositione 2 ipse dicit, et ex tali discurso nonnisi opinio acquiritur. Igitur, etc.”

77 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:18). “Respondeo igitur ad articulum quod discursus proprie theologicus est, qui constat ex dictis seu propositionibus in sacra scriptura contentis vel ex his quae deducuntur ex eis…”
able to become a theological science.”

Rimini goes on to explain that by *manuductio* Ps-Dionysius is referring to a discourse or habit “which alone is properly called theological.” For Rimini, the authority of Ps-Dionysius provides evidence that prior assent to the truth of Scripture is necessary and cannot be sacrificed. Ockham has shown that he disagrees. And while Aureoli would probably insist that he agrees with Dionysius, Rimini does not think the discourse he has described as theology proper demands this prior assent. From the authority of Dionysius he then concludes: “no discourse not proceeding from the sayings of Sacred Scripture or from things which are deduced from Scripture is theological.”

Like Giles, Rimini is opposed to identifying theology as a discipline that first looks outward to the sensible world to draw conclusions about God.

Rimini’s second argument attempts to strengthen the consequence he has drawn from Ps-Dionysius. Here he begins from what he believes to be a “common conception of all people,” that is, what everyone would recognize as theology if they saw it. Everybody recognizes a proof as “theological” when it is proved from the sayings of Scripture. As an example, Rimini says: take the proposition, “God is eternal.” One might prove this from the eternity of motion as Aristotle does or one might prove this from what is written in John 1. In this example, we see a clear confirmation of what we discussed at the close of chapter two: that a genuinely theological proposition cannot be identified by

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77 Ibid. “Sequitur quod nullus discursus non procedens ex dictis sacrae scripturae vel ex his, quae deducuntur ex eis, est theologicus.”
78 Ibid. “Secundo, idem probatur ex communi omnium conceptione. Nam omnes arbitrantur tunc solum theologice aliquid probare, cum ex dictis probant sacrae scripturae.”
79 Ibid. “Unde, si verbi gratia quaeratur, utrum deus sit aeternus, et unus probet quod sic ex aeternitate motus, sicut processit Philosophus 12 Metaphysicae, alius autem probet ex eo qod scriptum 1 ‘in principio erat verbum etc’…”
content alone. What counts as a theological proposition has as much do with how one reaches it, as it does with what the proposition actually says. The content, however, may still in fact matter and one can certainly imagine that one could deduce all sorts of things from what is expressly contained in Scripture, which remain tangential to the body of knowledge defined as theological. Nevertheless, we learn in this example that content alone is not a sufficient condition to mark out a theological conclusion. Here, the same proposition is proved in metaphysics and in theology. For Rimini, the difference lies in method. The proposition “God is eternal” is proved theologically when one deduces and establishes it on the basis of other propositions found more explicitly in the biblical text.

Especially important for us is where Rimini turns to find real examples of this procedure in action. Regarding the proposition that God is eternal, he points to how this could be derived from the prologue to John’s Gospel, but he finishes by saying: “just as Augustine does in De fide ad Petrum…” Rimini chooses another question, “whether God is in some way changeable.” He points first to the fact that Aristotle answers this question by analyzing the nature of motion in the Physics, but then he turns back to Augustine, who he believes answers this question by deducing an answer from the

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80 See above c. 2, p. 141.
81 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp 1:18). “…alius autem probet ex eo quod scriptum est Iohannis 1 ‘In principio erat verbum etc’, sicut probat Augustinus De fide ad Petrum capitulo 6.” While Rimini clearly believes this work (De fide ad Petrum) to be by Augustine, the Patrologia notes that the real author of this particular work is uncertain. It is suggested that the author might be Fulgentius Ruspensis, but the PL remains hesitant (PL 40, 753-780).
82 For a point of comparison one might look at Wodeham d. 8 of the Ordinatio, where he considers this precise question. One could examine this method in actual practice and compare it to Rimini’s description of theology in theory. If it turns out that Rimini considers this question explicitly, one could consider Rimini’s method in practice as well.
Psalms or from the Apostle Paul. Augustine is clearly the representative example for Rimini of a proper theological procedure. And, as these examples show, such a procedure begins from something explicitly contained in Scripture and then attempts to move to a conclusion not explicitly contained in Scripture.

Rimini’s third example only makes his reliance on Augustine starker. This time, he points first to a specific passage in Aureoli’s prologue, where Aureoli makes an appeal to the authority of Augustine as an example of the kind of procedure he is advocating. Rimini responds with a strong challenge to Aureoli’s reading of Augustine. When Aureoli tries to suggest that Augustine’s treatment of the Trinity is an example of his methodology, Rimini asks rhetorically:

83 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:18–19). “Vel, si quaeratur, utrum Deus sit aliquo modo mutabilis, et probet aliquis quod non per rationem sumptam ex motu, sicut incessit Philosophus 8 Physicorum, alius vero per illud quod scriptum est Exodi 3 ‘Ego sum qui sum’ et in Psalmo ‘Tu autem idem ipse es’, sicut probat Augustinus 5 De Trinitate capitulo 2 et De fide ad Petrum capitulo 7, aut per illud Apostoli 1 Ad timotheum 6 ‘Qui solus habet immortalitatem’, sicut idem Augustinus probat contra Maximinum libro 3, non est dubium quod omnes consentient primas quaestionis probationes non esse theologicas et similiter quaslibet alias, quae ex propositionibus sumptis ex humanis scientiis procederent, reliquas vero et similes quascumque dicerent essent theologicas.”

The last part of this quotation should be emphasized. Here Rimini explicitly denies the label “theology” to any discourse that “proceeds from propositions taken from human sciences.” This is almost exactly the statement Giles makes to distinguish theology from metaphysics and the other sciences (cf. above, c. 1, pp. 84-90).

84 Cf. Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 1, q. 1 (Buytaert I:139, n. 25). “Praeterea, ex studio libri De Trinitate compositi ab Augustino acquiritur theologicius habitus; sed certum est quod ipse in toto libro procedit ad declarandum istum articulum: Deus est trinus et unus, sicut ipsemet dicit primo De Trinitate, capitulo 4o, quod ‘omnes, qui ante’ ipsum ‘scripserant de Trinitate; quae Deus est, divinorum librorum veterum et novorum catholoci tractatores hoc intenderunt secundum Scripturas docere, quod Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unius eiusdem substantiae inseparabili aequalitate divinam insinuent unitatem;’ ergo habitus theologicius ex articulis fidei tamquam ex principiis non procedit, sed magis ipsos declarare intendit.”

To anticipate what we will discuss a little later, we can note here that Rimini and Aureoli can at times be arguing at cross purposes. Aureoli uses this quote to show that Augustine argues towards the conclusion that God is three and one, and therefore the article of the creed does not function as a principle but as a conclusion. Rimini’s focus is on the fact that Augustine does not argue towards this conclusion from “probable” principles, but from what is explicitly written in the Scriptures. As we will see (“Interlude,” pp. 306-317), it is Rimini insistence on the fact that theology begins from Scripture and not necessarily from the articles of the creed that allows him both to critique Aureoli’s reading of Augustine and still acknowledge that Augustine argues towards the conclusion that ‘God is three and one’ (a manifest article of the creed).
Where in the aforementioned books did Augustine prove the aforementioned truths from probable propositions or from other things taken from worldly teachings? I think that he will not be able to find [such a place], but he will find only this: that he has proved [these things] from the authority of Scripture.\(^85\)

To counter Aureoli, Rimini cites a passage from *De Trinitate*, where Augustine states his own method and the method of his own authorities.\(^86\) The quotation as it stands in Rimini’s text reads:

> Everyone who I have been able to read, who wrote before me regarding the Trinity which God is, as Catholics discussing the divine books of the Old and the New Testament, intended to teach *according to the Scriptures* that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit of one equal inseparable substance create one unity.”\(^87\)

Everything Augustine has read about the Trinity in the works of other theologians has its source in the Old and New Testaments. The teaching of theologians on the Trinity, therefore, is only intended to be an extension (or should we say deduction?) of what can be found in these books.

In sum, Rimini’s picture of theological knowledge claims to begin not from probable propositions, but from things contained in Scripture and/or deduced from what


\(^{86}\) In this challenge to “return to the sources,” shows his penchant for historical accuracy and accurate citations, something which Damasus Trapp notes to be distinctive about Rimini’s work as a whole (Cf. “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century”). See also Stephen Brown’s discussion of this passage in “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History’ of the Theologian’s Role.”

\(^{87}\) Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:19). “Omnes quos legere potui qui ante me scripserunt de trinitate quae deus est, divinorum librorum veterum et novorum catholici tractatores, hoc intenderunt secundum scripturas docere quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus eiusdemque substantiae inseparabili aequalitate divinam insinuent unitatem.”; cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, I, 2, n. 7, “The purpose of all Catholic commentators I have been able to read on the divine books of both testaments, who have written before me on the trinity which is God, has been to teach that according to the scriptures Father and Son and Holy Spirit in the inseparable equality of one substance present a divine unity” (trans. Hill, p. 69).
the scriptural authors expressed. In contrast to Aureoli, probable reasons taken from other human and naturally known sciences have no place. Besides this difference, the orientation of a properly theological procedure seems to differ dramatically. For Aureoli, the articles of the creed (those previously determined beliefs) function as the conclusions of a theological procedure. But despite being conclusions, they are the real starting place, since probable principles are sought in support of these predetermined conclusions. But for Rimini, the theological procedure actually leads us toward the articles of the creed. That is, reading Scripture and making subsequent deductions is constructive of those articles that are not explicitly stated in Scripture. Because this concern with the explicit contents of Scripture instead of the articles of the creed represents a slight departure from the traditional way of identifying the principles of theology, we will look at this more closely in the next section. 88 But for now, suffice it to say that from those things contained expressly in Scripture one draws out further conclusions and can then draw out even further conclusions from these first conclusions. In this way the content of faith is expanded while never going beyond what was originally given. For Aureoli this expansion of the particulars of belief has no place in his vision of theology proper. On the contrary, the theologian’s job was to take those conclusions as given and to find support for them from sources other than their scriptural foundation. Earlier we identified this as Aureoli’s vision of how theology ought to defend and protect a space for faith among all the other classes of truth and science. 89 The appeal to probable reasons is an attempt to garner respect for religious truth, by establishing the reasonability of faith claims.

88 See “Interlude” pp. 296-317
89 See above p. 272.
Rimini’s procedure shows little concern for this task, and it is undoubtedly the point at which Aureoli would try to stage a counter attack.

Finally, we can still ask the question: how does Rimini answer the concern of Henry of Ghent and Peter Aureoli, who insist that the theologian must acquire something that truly distinguishes himself from the simple believer.\(^{90}\) Aureoli of course does not deny the validity or importance of the kind of procedure Rimini describes. In his discussion of the “exposition” and “specification” of faith he openly recognizes the possibility of the kind of procedure Rimini has described. We may recall that this process of specification was exemplified in the profession of the priest who was contrasted with the vetula: the simple believer who retained a general faith, but lacked any awareness of the specific implications and consequences of that general faith.

Aureoli’s fundamental objection to calling this process of “exposition” and “specification” theology is that he does not think it produces anything other than faith. The difficulties of identifying this as theology consisted in the fact that, if this process of specification were identified as a separate habit then it was assumed that the simple believer and the priest would actually believe different things and not share the same habit of faith.

But this argument depends on some important prior convictions. (1) First as Työrinoja implied, Aureoli only acknowledges a single habit of infused faith, which is shared by all believers. Little use is made of a notion of acquired faith, where it might be

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\(^{90}\) This question continues to be recognized, even by the immediate predecessor of Rimini at Paris, Thomas of Strasbourg, who lists as an opening argument for why theology should be a science: “If theology were not a science, then those studying theology would labor in vain . . .” / “Si theologia non esset scientia, tunc frustra laborarent studentes in ea: sed consequens est inconveniens, et consequentia patet” (Thomas ab Argentina, Commentaria, I, prol., q. 2, a. 1, f. 5rb).
possible for the priest to share infused faith with the simple believer, but differ from the simple believer when it comes to acquired faith. (2) In the second place, Aureoli remains adamantly committed to the fact that theology and faith are not and cannot be of the same habit. Thus, were a difference identified between infused and acquired faith, theology could never be included in either. The reason for this commitments stems from a third assumption. (3) Aureoli is convinced (as our chapter on the purpose of theology showed) that the theologian is primarily charged with the job of defending the place of revealed truth and faith amidst the other sciences and other truths known by human beings. This is not a task that he thinks can be accomplished by any pure habit of faith. Any discourse that relies solely on revealed premises has already sequestered itself from these disciplines that, without faith, do not recognize the claims of belief. Thus, for Aureoli, denying that faith and theology are different entails the unacceptable consequence that theologian possess nothing substantially different from the person of simple belief.

But Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio are both witnesses to the possibility of an alternative understanding of defense that is inward focused and begins from the assumption that its opponents accept the starting points of faith. Augustinus, in particular, thought that he could recognize this special habit of “expression” and “exposition” within the habit of faith alone, and when we look to Rimini, we see something very similar. Rimini acknowledges this objection of Aureoli directly\(^9\) and delivers a short and blunt reply: “I concede that theology is faith in the sense which will

\(^9\) Gregorius Ariminensis, \textit{Lectura}, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:21). “Quarto, quia sicut supra tactum est in recitando opinionem sequeretur quod theologia esset fides vel opinio; et utrumque est falsum.”
be explained in the fourth article of this question." 92 To say much more would be to jump ahead to our final chapter and Rimini’s discussion of why a theological discourse compels assent in the manner of a science, but nevertheless cannot be classified as a science. 93 At the moment, the most important thing to note is that Rimini recognizes two distinct ways of having the single habit of faith. The theologian distinguishes himself through the possession of acquired faith, which the simple believer does not have. This label then identifies that distinctive deductive skill that both Augustinus and Prosper recognized. It also closely correlates with Aureoli’s understanding of the expository skill of the priests and the notion of fides explicita. But unlike Aureoli, Rimini believes this expository skill can still fulfill the defensive function mandated by Augustine. The defense, however, must be understood in a different way than Aureoli understands it. Auspiciously, at the close of his “proper response,” Rimini discusses the defensive nature of theology and challenges Aureoli’s conception of it. He writes:

This description [Rimini’s description of theology] agrees with the teaching of the Magister [Lombard], which even this doctor [Aureoli] claims for himself; for the Magister says in his prologue that he intends to ‘fortify our faith with the shield of the Davidic Tower’.

And then follows the challenge to Aureoli’s understanding of “defense.”

But by ‘shield of the Davidic Tower’ he surely does not understand probable propositions or even propositions proved in other disciplines, but rather the authorities of Sacred Scripture. 94

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92 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:23). “Ad quartum concedo quod theologia est fides in sensu, qui dabitur articulo quarto huius quaestionis, ubi etiam respondebitur ad auctoritatem Augustini, quae adducta est in contrarium.”

93 See chapter 7.

94 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:19). “Huc accedit illud dictum Magistri, quod etiam iste doctor pro se allegat; ait enim Magister in prologo se intendere ‘fidem nostram Davidicae turris...
Here is a clear witness to the deep but unstated disagreement between Aureoli and Rimini over what Augustine means by “defense.” Each agree that the ability to “defend” is a distinctive ability that separates the simple believer from the professional theologian. But they disagree about what it means “to defend.” And in turn their respective methods of theological discourse reflect their commitments to this more fundamental definition.

It is important to note however that Rimini’s conception of “defense” and its epistemological requirements was subsequently criticized by Hugolinus of Orvieto. He writes: “Item contra Gregorium: Nullus est doctor alio quoad optime solvendas rationes acutas contra trinitatem personarum, nisi sit intelligentior respectu veritatis de ‘sic esse’. Et ipsum intelligere ‘sic esse’, est in theologo assentire. Igitur perfectiorem habet notitiam et assensum” (Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, I, prol., q. 2, a. 2 (Eckermann I:100)).

Here, Hugolinus stats that the ability to defend requires a greater or deeper understanding of Scripture, not simply a knowledge of what can be deduced from Scripture. As an alternative, Hugolinus look back to Henry Ghent and asserts the need for special perceptive knowledge that allows the theologian “to defend” the faith (see above p. 250, n. 4).
Interlude: Post-Aureolian, Augustinian Precedents and a Gregorian Novelty on Theology and Its Principles

I. Gerard of Senis on the “Virtual Habit” of Theology and the Principles of Theology

As we have been looking for continuities and discontinuities between Rimini and the multi-faceted traditions that preceded him, it is notable that we cannot find a precedent for this fundamental disagreement with Aureoli in Ockham. While Ockham’s influence and quick adoption by Rimini have been obvious in many places, we do not find the same level of influence on this point. On the contrary, the important and decisive distinction between the habit of faith and the habit of theology is something Ockham shares with Aureoli. Therefore, instead of following Ockham, we find Rimini holding fast to a prior conviction or alternative influence against the influence of Ockham. But if Ockham does not set a precedent for Rimini here, what influences and sources can we find for this decisive tradition?

At least one member of the Parisian Aegidio-Augustinian tradition offers us a clear precedent for Rimini’s stand against Aureoli. Gerard of Senis lectured on the Sentences about 1325 only a short time after Aureoli, and Gerard died in 1336. Besides being of the same order as Rimini, Gerard shared his deep-seated opposition to Aureoli.

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1 See above, c. 6, pp. 275-285.
2 Zumkeller, Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages, 35–36. For more biographical information, see also Schabel, Theology at Paris, 184. And also Vecchio, “Gerardo da Siena” URL = http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/gerardo-da-siena_(Dizionario-Biografico)/.
But Gerard also saw himself as closely following the teaching of Giles, and he was active in defending Aegidian positions. For these reasons, he is an important source that represents an early response to Aureoli by a self-identified member of an Aegidio-Augustinian tradition.

What Gerard has to say that is relevant for us is found in a discussion more directly connected to our earlier chapter on the end of theology, namely whether theology is practical or speculative. But here, in the face of a particular objection, Gerard remarks about the distinction (or lack thereof) between the habit of faith and the habit of theology.

The objection—common to the Aegidian position and everyone who insists that the end of the theological habit is love—goes like this:

If the love of God was the end of theology, no one would be able to love God, unless through the habit of theology, which is false. The consequence is proved, since the proper end of one habit is not able to be had as the end in another habit, otherwise it would not be proper.

Gerard responds to this objection by denying any fundamental distinction between faith and theology. On the contrary, he affirms that the simplest believer, in a way, possesses the habit of theology, and it follows that the most astute theologian never goes on to possess something specifically different that the habit of faith with which he began. He writes:

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3 Zumkeller writes: “In his theological views, too, he shows himself to be a faithful, and not very independent disciple of Giles, whom he calls ‘doctor fundamentalis’ and again and again defends against Duns Scotus and Peter Aureoli” (Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages, 35). In the same vein Schabel writes: “Gerard’s main opponent generally was Auriol, through whom he also attacked Scotus. Gerard often supported Giles of Rome, calling him ‘Doctor Noster’” (Theology at Paris, 184). For the source relied on by both Zumkeller and Schabel see Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century,” 161–164 and 170–173.

4 Gerardus Senensis, In Primum Librum Sententiarum, I, prol., q. 5, a. 5, p. 73a. “Si dilectio Dei esset finis Theologiae nullus posset diligere Deum nisi per habitum Theologiae, quod est falsum. Consequentia probatur, quia finis proprius alicuius habitus non potest haberis fine tali habitu, alioquin non esset proprius.”
Moreover we are able to admit that the one loving God has the habit of the theology, if indeed he has faith, which contains the principles of theology and, as a consequence, contains the whole theology virtually. And because no one loves God without charity, unless they have faith, it therefore follows that no one loves God in the mode we speak of unless they have the habit of theology in some way (emphasis mine).\(^5\)

The Aegidian tradition portrayed by Gerard has taken the “faith-knowledge” of the simple believer and included this knowledge within the category of strictly theological knowledge. Faith-knowledge and theological knowledge are not specifically distinct.\(^6\) Nevertheless, as we saw in Rimini (and Augustinus and Prosper), a difference can still be recognized with respect to ability. For Gerard, the simple believer assents to the principles of theology and thus knows everything the theologian knows in a virtual way. But the theologian knows everything that flows from these principles in an actual or explicit way.

In the previous chapter, we saw that Rimini was beginning to identify the principles of theology with the “explicit contents of Scripture” rather than the articles of the creed (though, of course, some of the articles of the creed can be counted as explicit propositions of Scripture as well). Thus we are eager to see if precedent can be found for this as well.

\(^5\) Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 5, p. 74b. “Possemus etiam concedere, quod diligens Deum habeat habitum Theologiae, si quidem habet fidem quae continet principia Theologiae, et per consequens totam Theologiam virtualiter. Et quia nullus diligit Deum cum charitate, nisi habens fidem, idcirco sequitur, quod nullus diligat Deum hoc modo, quo loquimur nisi habeat aliquo modo Theologiae habitu.”

\(^6\) We can see further evidence of this from Gerard in the second article of his fourth question. There he responds to an objection against the assumption that the theologians operates in the light of faith alone, since this does not allow for a distinction between the simple believer and the theologian. Gerard writes: “Tertio ponit praefata opinio, quod in lumine Fidei solo non possit haberis maior notitia de credibilibus illa, quam habet simplex fidelis, quod est falsum: non enim oportet quod omnes, qui conveniunt in uno lumine, habeant aequalem notitiam de his, quae possunt cognosci in tali lumine; nam videmus, quod omnes conveniunt in lumine naturali, et tamen non habent aequalem notitiam de his, quae possunt cognosci naturaliter: similiter constat, quod omnes beat conveniunt in lumine gloriae, et tamen non omnes vident aequaliter illud obiectum beatificum” (Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2, p. 50b).
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In general, Gerard’s position is that the “articles of the creed” are indeed the principles of theology. 7 Gerard’s insistence, however, that the theologian begins from the “articles of the creed” faces a major Aureolian objection: namely, no science defends its own principles, but theology defends the articles of the creed, therefore, etc. Further, Aureoli and Rimini both considered the passage from De Trinitate where Augustine discussed his defense of the claim that “God is three and one.” 8 While they disagreed about how Augustine defended this claim, they did not disagree that this important article of the creed was functioning as a conclusion. 9 Thus even Rimini is willing to acknowledge that the articles of faith are sometimes conclusions.

Gerard has four responses to the Aureolian objection, all of which generally hold to a recognizably Agedian position. He insists that the starting point of faith contains all the truths of theology, or in other words no conclusion falls under the title of theology that is not derived from what has first been give through faith. 10 He also maintains that all the truths of this discipline are judged by their harmony with the articles of the creed and that the truths of theology can all be resolved or traced back to the articles of the creed,

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7 Ibid., I, prol., q. 3, a. 1, p. 31a. “Utrum articuli Fidei sint principia theologiae?”

In defending the affirmative, Gerard holds a traditional position that has a clear pedigree as far back as Thomas Aquinas and his statement in Summa Theologica I, q. 1, a. 2, that “sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science” (trans. Benziger Bros, 1947). But we should note that this complicates Aquinas’s own view of theology proper, who elsewhere advocates a “declarative” type theology that employs probable reasons in attempt to show the reasonability of the claims of faith. See Summa Contra Gentiles I, c. 9 and above c. 6, p. 273, n. 273.

8 For this discussion see above, c. 6, p. 289, esp. n. 84.

9 For Gerard’s review of the Aureoli position see Gerardus Senensis, In Primum Librum Sententiarum, I, prol., q. 3, a. 1, p. 31a–b.

10 Ibid., I, prol., q. 3, a. 1, p. 32a. “Secundo, illa sunt principia in aliqua scientia, quae suo ambitu includunt omnes veritates pertinentes ad scientiam, et omnes non pertinentes excludunt; sed articuli fidei sunt huiusmodi, ergo.”
thus they are the true principles of theology. 11 He also claims that principles are those things that are not proved through anything else, but the articles of the creed are of this type. 12 Once again, he insists that theology uniquely begins from faith and can be derived from no other source without ceasing to be theology.

However, Gerard makes an interesting remark at the end of text, which identifies a strange dynamic between the scriptural text and the articles of the creed. He notes that sometimes a kind of “declaration of the article” can take place. He does not say much about what this declaration involves, except that this declaration of the article is judged according to “its general truth, according to which the proposed things is known to us through Scriptures.”13 He goes on to say:

When we want to certify whether an explication of a particular article is true, we immediately look to the truth of the article proposed to us in general through Sacred Scriptures. And if the explication is in agreement, we judge it to be true. But if it is not true, we oppose this declaration (emphasis mine) 14

There is not much here to go on, but at the very least, Gerard speaks of a kind of an explanation or clarification of articles of the creed which are judged by the general truth of the article as it is known directly through Scripture. The definitive meaning or truth of the article, by which its special or specific formulation is judged, is dependent on the

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11 Ibid. “Tertio illa, per quae regulatur, et mensuratur tota consideratio scientiae, sunt principia in illa, sed per articulos fidei tota consideratio Theologia mensuratur, ergo etc….Quarto illa, ad quae stat ultima resolutio totius considerationis Theologicae, sunt eius principia; articuli fidei sunt huiusmodi ergo etc.”
12 Ibid., I, prol., q. 3, a. 1, p. 31b. “Primo: illae propositiones, quae formantur de subiecto alicuius scientiae, et non possunt probari per alias propositiones a priori.”
13 Ibid., I, prol., q. 3, a. 1, p. 33a. “Intelligendum tamen, quod in tali discursu, qui fit, ipse Articulus semper est principium, nam quamvis aliqua assumantur ad declarationem artifici, veritas tamen eius in generali, secundum quod est nobis proposita per sacras scripturas, tamquam regula, et mensura permanet.”
14 Ibid., “…quando volumus certificari, an explicatio facta de aliquo articulo in speciali sit vera, statim aspicimus ad veritatem articuli propositam nobis in generali per sacram scripturam, quae si concordat, apprehendimus tamquam veram; sin autem non, illam declarationem reprobamus.”
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reading of Scripture. This dependence or reliance on Scripture makes for an uneasy compatibility with Gerard’s early argument that the principles of theology are those propositions which are not proved through anything else. One can look, then, to Rimini’s transition from the articles of the creed as the principles of theology to those propositions which are “explicitly contained in Scripture” as an attempt to smooth out this tension.

II. Thomas of Strasbourg on the Principles of Theology

We can find a similar precedent for Rimini’s approach to theological knowledge as a whole in his immediate predecessor at Paris and fellow Augustinian, Thomas of Strasbourg. Strasbourg lectured on the Sentences in 1335/1337 and was promoted to the rank of Master in 1337. Of Strasbourg’s connection to Giles and the Aegidian tradition, Zumkeller writes:

He is possibly the most important representative of the older Egidian direction in the Order. He often defends the “doctor illustrissimus,” as he once calls Giles, against the objections of his opponents . . . Although Thomas does not yet use the expression “schola nostra,” the awareness of forming a common front with other theologians of his Order following Giles repeatedly finds clear expression in his work.

Thomas of Strasbourg opens his question on whether theology is a science with a concern very near and dear to Aureoli’s heart. The concern (attributed to Aureoli in the margin, though not actually representative of Aureoli’s opinion, since Aureoli identifies theology as a “wisdom” and not a “science”) is that if theology is not a science then those

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15 For a full biography see Zumkeller, Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages, 37–39.
16 Ibid., 38.
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students who labor in theology, do so in vain. Strasbourg offers a now recognizably Aegidian response.

The *Sed Contra* pinpoints the Aristotelian meaning definition of “science” as the main problem, just as we saw in Augustinus of Ancona.\(^\text{18}\)

It is not valid [that theology is a science], because when speaking about ‘to know’ properly speaking . . . ‘to know’ is to investigate the thing through its cause, and again, “we think we know something when we know its cause, and that this is the cause of this and that it is impossible to be otherwise.”\(^\text{19}\)

To this definition, Strasbourg replies: “But we are not able to know the cause of God or of the divine things.”\(^\text{20}\) In short, theology begins from authorities. It is not able to trace its knowledge of God back to first and evident principles.\(^\text{21}\)

However, Strasbourg is also attentive to the Aureolian objection, and he notes that this does not mean the study of theology is in vain; the theologian does acquire something that distinguishes him from the simple believer. He is even willing to call this acquisition a “science” in qualified sense.\(^\text{22}\) Discussing the meaning of a demonstration,

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\(^\text{17}\) Thomas ab Argentina, *Commentaria*, I, prol., q. 2, a. 1, f. 5rb. “Si theologia non esset scientia, tunc frustra laborarent studentes in ea: sed consequens est inconveniens, et consequentia patet.”

\(^\text{18}\) See above c. 5, esp. 236.

\(^\text{19}\) Thomas ab Argentina, *Commentaria*, I, prol., q. 2, a. 1, f. 5va. “Sed illud non valet, quia loquendo de scire proprie dicto, de quo isti intendunt loqui, tunc sic diffinitur I Poster: Scire est per causam rem investigare, et ibidem, Tunc opinamur scire unumquodque, cum causam eius cognoscimus, et quoniam illius est causa, et impossibile est aliter se habere.” Knowing the cause and that the proposition cannot be otherwise is a near verbatim line from *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 2.

\(^\text{20}\) Ibid. “Dei autem, et divinorum nulla poterit esse causa, ergo, etc.”

\(^\text{21}\) Making this explicit, Strasbourg singles out “evidence” as that criterion that theology lacks: “quod studens talis acquirit habitum nobilissimum non nobilitate scientiae evidentiae, sed nobilitate subiecti” (Ibid.).

\(^\text{22}\) Therefore like Prosper and unlike Augustinus he is willing to discuss theology as a separate habit from faith. However, again like Prosper, we will see that this distinction is contingent on re-defining *scientia* as a deductive power.

In his proper opinion he writes: “Dico, quod theologica viatoris est vere scientia, non tamen sicut natura rei scibilis patitur, sed sicut natura scientis patitur” (Ibid., I, prol., q. 2, a. 1, f. 6vb).
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Strasbourg claims that this can be understood two ways: “either as the most perfect demonstration, and thus only mathematics would be a science…or as a syllogism effectively leading to a conclusion, although it proceeds from suppositions and not first principles.” Strasbourg does more than anyone else we have seen to bring theology on par with the other sciences by noting that few if any sciences really meet the exacting standards of a scientific demonstration. However, more important for us is the the looser sense of a demonstration he provides. Here the criteria of evidence and first principles have been removed, and now we see, just as we saw in Propser’s re-definition, that “science” is defined as merely a deductive power, moving from premises to conclusion.

Having shown that theology cannot provide a natural and properly scientific demonstration of its conclusion, Strasbourg’s last step in defining theology proper is to identify the principles from which the deductive practice of theology proceeds. This is a critical step because we have seen that Aureoli and Rimini also do not think theology is a strict science, yet their disagreement about the principles of theology yields very different

23 Ibid., I, prol., q. 2, a. 1, f. 6va–b. “Aut per demonstrationem intelligis potissimam demonstrationem, et sic solum mathematica esset scientia, quia ipsa sola potissime demonstrat, et est in primo gradu certitudinis, ut patet per Averroes. Aut intelligis per demonstrationem syllogismum efficaciter concludentem, quamvis procedat ex aliquibus suppositis, et non omino ex primis; sic rationes theologicae possunt dici demonstrationes.”

24 But this is actually a growing belief which is visible in his later and fellow Augustinian Hugolinus de Urbe Vehri (1348-1349) and even later in the Sentences Commentary of Peter Plaoul. Hugolinus writes: “…Tamen illa probatio demonstrativa non cogit sic, quin sit possibile oppositum apparere. Iam Academicis videbatur, quod nihil esset evidens esse verum. Nec est alicui evidens, quod impossibile sit falsum ita viatori apparere verum illud verum et econtrario” (Commentarius in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum, I, prol., q. 2, a. 2 (Eckermann I:99)). And Plaoul writes much later: “Secundo notanda est…quod materiae debent recipi secundum quod sunt, ita quod evidentia mathematica in alici genere quam evidentia theologica vel moralis” (Commentarius in Libris Sententiarum, I, lectio 29, d. 3, a. 5, n. 41 (Witt, ed. 0.2 <jeffreycwitt.com/plaoul>)).

25 See above, c. 5, p. 242.
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pictures of proper theological method. Strasbourg must grasp this connection because his very next question is to ask “whether the articles of the creed are the principles of theology.”

Like Gerard, Strasbourg wants to defend the affirmative and fairly traditional position, but he faces a number of Aureoli-inspired objections. The objections center around the idea that no science proves, asks questions about, or defends its principles, but theology performs these tasks regarding the articles of the creed; therefore these cannot be the principles of theology. Notable among these arguments are two passages from Augustine. One is the familiar passage from *De Trinitate* XIV, c. 1 which is used to suggest that the theologian’s primary job is to “defend” the principles of faith as conclusions. The other passage is from *De Trinitate* I, c. 2, and it is the passage that Aureoli invoked to show that Augustine follows his method: an interpretation which Rimini in turn harshly criticized.

Strasbourg is not daunted by these objections and holds that the articles of faith are in fact the principles of theology. In response, he insists that the objections are misguided because, contrary to the assumption of the objection, a science can prove and defend its principles. Our interest, then, is in how these principles are defended. What kind of defense does he have in mind? And how does this method fit into the larger habit of theology?

26 Thomas ab Argentina, *Commentaria*, I, prol., q. 2, a. 2, f. 7rb. “Utrum in scientia theologiae articuli fidei sint principia?”
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. See above c. 6, p. 289, esp. n. 84.
29 Ibid., I, prol., q. 2, a. 2, f. 7va. “Sed illa non concludunt, igitur ad primum dicendum, quod maior est falsa, metaphysicus enim IV *Metaphysicae* probat principia sua.”
In his response to the second Aureoli-inspired argument, drawing on Aristotle’s *Topics*, he states that we can “seek” or “ask” (*quaerere*) about something in two different ways. In one way, we ask about something that is in doubt. But he insists that this is not the way we ask about theological principles. The other way is to ask about something which is not in doubt in and of itself, but whose application in a special or specific matter is in doubt.30 Here we see a parallel to the distinction between an article’s “general truth” and the article *in speciiali* employed by Gerard. Strasbourg, like Gerard, is not precise about how the special application of the article is clarified. Unlike Gerard, he does not mention an appeal to Scripture. However, he does mention who this kind of clarification is for, or for whom this clarification is necessary. He writes, “In the second mode it is necessary to seek (*quaerere*) about these [articles], so that *heretics*, who take up these principles and syllogize falsely, will not make false applications in particular matters.”

The concern with “heresy” is suggestive. It echoes the alternative kind of understanding of “defense” that we have seen underlie the fundamental disagreement between Aureoli and Rimini. For Strasbourg, the clarification, “proof,” or even “defense” of the articles of the creed is not aimed at combating “unbelief” in general or making the truths of faith appear “reasonable.” On the contrary, he is concerned with a very specific type of “unbelief” or “impiety.” His “defense” is aimed at those who claim to accept the truth of Scripture and the articles of the creed, but draw incorrect conclusions or “syllogize falsely.”

30 While Strasbourg indicates that he is drawing from the Aristotle, *Topics*, I cannot, at the present, find the explicit passage he has in mind.
In the end, both Gerard and Strasbourg hold on to the idea that the articles of the faith are the principles of theology, but they both make concessions about the need to clarify and defend them. This creates a kind of ambiguity about their status as principles. Rimini, I suggest, attempts to stand in concord with the overall impetus of these traditional positions, but turns his attention to the “explicit contents of Scripture” rather than “the articles of the creed” to give the tradition more precision and to avoid the oft repeated Aureolian critique that “sciences do not defend their principles.”

We can close by looking at how Rimini explains our assent to the first principles of theology, and in the process we can show once and for all that Rimini really does identify the “explicit contents of Scripture” as the principles of theology instead of the “articles of faith.”

III. Gregory of Rimini on the Principles of Theology

Rimini’s fullest articulation of the nature of theological principles comes in an objection to his overall description of the theological method. The objection comes in his final list of objections after he has given his proper opinion. The first of the four objections begins from a statement made by Aristotle in the *Topics*: “principles are ‘things that have faith [assent], not through other things, but through themselves.” The objection then invokes this authority to oppose Rimini’s position that the explicit contents

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31 At the very least, it is notable that Rimini never has to ask the question that both Gerard and Strasbourg feel compelled to ask (viz. Whether the articles of the creed are the principles of theology?) Rimini appears to have abandoned this line of thinking, and therefore never has to face Aureoli’s objection that theology defends the articles of the creed. Beginning from the explicit contents of Scripture, Rimini can acknowledge that theology “defends” many of the articles of the creed without having to concede to Aureoli that theology begins from probable propositions drawn from other natural sciences.

32 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:20). “Sed contra hoc, quod dictum est de principiis theologiae, potest argui, quia, ut dicitur 1 Topicorum, principia sunt ‘quae non per alia, sed per se ipsa habent fidem.’” Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 1 100a30-b19, “Things are true and primary which command belief through themselves and not through anything else” (trans. E. S. Forster, p. 273).
of Scripture can function as the principles of theology proper.33 The objection reads: “but those authorities contained in the Sacred Canon do not have faith (assent) through themselves, but through other things.”34 The objection then provides an example:

Consider the authority of the church, about which Augustine wrote…‘I would not believe the Gospel, except on account of the fact that the authority of the Catholic Church moves me to do so’ and later, ‘I believed the Gospel on account of Catholics, who teach.’35

The objector is wary of the idea that core claims of faith can function as principles because it assumes that the assent of faith is the result of a procedure relying on a prior reasons, but Aristotle’s definition of principles states that principles must be assented to for their own sake, not on account of the truth of something else. Rimini’s reply begins with a qualification of the major premise and the operating interpretation of the Aristotelian quote. “It should not be understood,” he writes, “that the sense in which Aristotle says principles do not have faith (assent) ‘through another’ means that nothing other than the principles themselves can be the cause of our assenting to them.”36 On the contrary, what Aristotle means is that these principles “do not have faith (assent) through other principles, from which the principles in question would be demonstrated.”37 Rimini believes Aristotle must be understood this way because he thinks that, even in regular

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33 For Rimini express identification of the principles of theology as the “explicit contents of Scripture” see below, n. 51.
34 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:20).p. 20, “Sed auctoritates contentae in sacro canone non per se ipsas, sed per alia habent fidem…”
36 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:21). “Ad primum dico ad maiorem quod non est intelligendum quod principia non habent fidem per alia, sic quod nihil alius ab ipsis principiis sit causa assentiendi eis.”
37 Ibid. “Sed intelligendum est quod non habent fidem per alia, supple, principia, ex quibus ipsa demonstrentur, ita quod assensus illorum aliorum sit per se causa assensus circa ipsa.”
sciences, we assent to principles on account of “external” motivations, which at the same
time are not higher principles. Rimini has in mind here the fact that individual
“experience” (rather than the self-evidence of the proposition) is a common motivation
for assent to principles.\textsuperscript{38} He points to Aristotle’s notion of *epagogē* or induction from
*Posterior Analytics* B19 to support this interpretation.\textsuperscript{39} It is through our repeated
experience with a given singular that eventually causes our assent to the general principle
in question. In this case, it is neither self-evidence nor a higher proposition that compels
assent.

Rimini employs this subtle distinction between “assent through something else”
and “assent through another principle” to explain Augustine’s reliance on the Church for
belief in the truth of Scripture. When Augustine says he believes the Gospel or the truth
of the Scripture *on account of* the Church, he is not saying he believes the truth of the
Gospel text because he has deduced this truth from higher principles.\textsuperscript{40} On the contrary,
for Augustine, the authority of the Church functions as cause of assent inasmuch as it is

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. “Nam hoc est falsum, sicut patet in principiis, quae sumuntur ex experientiis singularium, quorum
assensus causa est experimentum, cuius causae etiam fuerunt experientiae multae singularium, ut dicitur 2
Posteriorum in fine…”

We should highlight that is another likely debt to Ockham. In Ockham, “indubitable experience”
became an increasingly legitimate starting point for science alongside the “self-evidence” of principles and
what can be deduced from them. Rondo Keele provides the following helpful explanation of the growing
importance of “indubitable experience” for Ockham: “If, as per (a), we should trust conclusions drawn
from premises based on indubitable experience, quite obviously we should also trust indubitable experience
itself. This clause shows clearly how negligibly philosophical skepticism shaped Ockham’s intellectual
temperament. Modern philosophers might object that no philosophical distinction should be held to such a
standard, since no experience is indubitable, and that the best we can do is to build a reasonable and
coherent theory of our (always doubtable) experiences. But this level of anxiety about skepticism is alien to
Ockham’s mind” (*Ockham Explained: From Razor to Rebellion*, 95–98, esp. 97).


\textsuperscript{40} Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:21). “Nec auctoritas Augustini est contra,
quoniam Augustinus non dicit se credere evangelio propter assensum, quem habeat ad aliquod alium
principium, ex quo evangelium demonstretur vel syllogistice probetur esse verum…”
“moving (movente) him toward faith in the Gospel.”\textsuperscript{41} What is the difference between this type of “moving” and the kind of impetus provided by a syllogism? Rimini poses a rephrasing of the original Augustinian quotation so as to illustrate the difference. The rephrasing connotes the sense of “inspiring” rather than the notion of “compelling” or “persuading” that might accompany syllogistic reasoning. He writes: “I would not believe except for the fact that the sanctity of the church jolts /awakens/stirs (commoveret) me.”\textsuperscript{42} This is as close as we get to a discussion of “infused” faith in Rimini’s prologue. This consent to the truth of Scripture and the Gospel is the precondition for all theological activity and the process of specification and exposition that follows. It therefore must be clearly distinguished from the “acquired faith” which separates the theologian from the simple believer. Thus, the explicit contents of Scripture can function as first principles even though they are believed on account of something other than their self-evidence.

To this initial response, another objection is proposed, wherein we see two possible processes of reasoning emerge. These two processes can help us to further clarify the distinction between the person of simple belief and the theologian in Rimini’s schema rather than Aureoli’s. To Rimini’s initial response, the rebuttal attempts to identify a plausible line of syllogistic reasoning that could lie behind Augustine’s claim to believe in the truth of the Gospel. The argument asks us to imagine the following syllogism:

P1) Everything that the Church obligates us to believe, should be believed and is true

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid. “…sed solum ex auctoritate ecclesiae tamquam ex causa movente ipsum ad fidem evangelii.”
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. “Et est quasi simile huic dicto, quod iste vel alius dicere potuisset; Non crederem evangelio, nisi me ecclesiae sanctitas commoveret…”
The Church obligates us to believe the Gospel
Therefore, The Gospel is true

The objection ends by asserting that this same procedure could be used to establish the truth of propositions contained in other parts of Scripture.43

Rimini’s response is noteworthy because he does not begin by challenging the possibility or legitimacy of this kind of reasoning. On the contrary, he begins by conceding the hypothetical. Assuming this is what Augustine actually meant (though Rimini does not think this is what Augustine meant), he still insists: “it still does not follow that this [P1] was in him as a theological principle per se, such that the theological assent acquired by him through a theological discursus would ultimately be reduced into this proposition per se.”44 In short, Rimini accepts the above syllogism as a possible process of reasoning, but he does not think it can be classified as a “theological” discursus. He gives two reasons, the second of which is the most important for us.

The second argument against this rebuttal is a reductio ad absurdum based on the unacceptable consequence that would seem to follow if the above reasoning was accepted as a genuinely theological procedure. Rimini explains:

If this were a per se principle of a theological discourse, then it would follow that any article of faith could be concluded by arguing: ‘everything that the Church obligates us to believe, etc’, but the Church obligates us to

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43 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:22). “Dices: Immo, scilicet istud ‘Omne quod ecclesia iubet esse credendum est credendum et verum’; et ex isto principio, cum minore illa habita per experientiam ‘Evangelium iubet ecclesia esse credendum’, concluditur evangelium esse verum et ita esse, sicut ipsum enuntiat, et simili modo probatur de qualibet parte scripturae.”
44 Ibid. “Posito tamen quod ita fuerit, adhuc non sequitur quod illud fuerit in eo per se principium theologicum, ita quod assensus theologicus acquisitus in eo per aliquem theologicum discursum reduceretur ultimate in ipsum per se.”
believe this article, for example, ‘the Holy Spirit proceeds from the father and the son,’ therefore, etc.\textsuperscript{45} Rimini then notes, while the form of this deduction is sound as far as syllogisms go, it is not theological reasoning.\textsuperscript{46} He qualifies this slightly: this could count as theological if P1 were actually the conclusion of another theological discourse and therefore only functions as a principle in a derivative way. However, to insist that, before P1 became a principle, it was a conclusion of a genuine theological discourse it would have to be derived from Sacred Scripture.\textsuperscript{47} Thus the belief that “everything the Church obligates us to believe should be believed” is actually a theological conclusion, able to be derived from the prior conviction in the truth of Holy Writ. The notion that the above syllogism by itself represents a genuine theological procedure is dismissed as absurd in the following \textit{reductio}:

Any faithful person, who is a newly baptized adult and has never read or heard the Sacred Scripture, but receives the symbols to be believed by the Church, and holds to this principle [P1], would be able to conclude \textit{theologically} any article of faith, and thus without study and knowledge of the Sacred Scripture, he would be a theologian, which no one, who is wise, would say.”\textsuperscript{48} Rimini’s \textit{reductio ad absurdum} hangs on the common sense observation that there is something different about the person who studies sacred text diligently and the person

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. “Secundo, quia, si illud esset per se principium discursus theologici, sequeretur quod quilibet articulus fidei concluderetur sic arguendo: ‘omne quod ecclesia iubet etc’; sed hunc articulum, verbi gratia ‘spiritus sanctus procedit a patre a filio’, ecclesia iubet esse credendum; ergo etc.”
\item\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. “Sed constat quod, quamvis vere et bene concludatur, non tamen theologice.”
\item\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. “…nisi illa maior sumatur tamquam conclusio alterius theologici discursus, quo scilicet ipsa ex sacra scriptura sit deducta.”
\item\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:22–23). “… alioquin quilibet fidelis et noviter baptizatus adultus et qui numquam legit vel audivit sacram scripturam recipiens symbolum credendum ab ecclesia et habens illud principium, theologice posset concludere quemlibet articulum fide, et sic absque studio et notitia sacrae scripturae foret theologus, quod nullus sapiens diceret, sicut puto.”
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who merely believes the articles of faith are true including the fact that Scripture is true. Even if at the end of the day they both believe the same thing, the theologian knows it in a different way despite never finding external justification or evidence for that belief.

This absurdity also teaches us something else about the way the simple believer possesses his or her knowledge of the articles of faith. Gerard of Senis said that the simple believer, who is also an inchoate theologian, possesses the principles of theology and therefore contains “the whole of theology virtually.” But we can now see that Rimini would in a way agree with this and in a way not. The newly baptized does possess by faith many of those propositions which Rimini sees as “expressly contained” in Scripture. However, the above example suggests that the simple illiterate believer possess these propositions as conclusions rather than as theological principles. In fact, they appear to hold these propositions in a jumbled and un-ordered way. The above example shows that the illiterate believer draws the conclusion that “Scripture is true” from their principal belief that “what the Church says is true, is true.” Rimini’s theologian, in contrast, can show why the Church should be believed from the truth of Scripture.

While the simple believer relies on the authority of the Church for the content of his or her faith, the theologian is distinctive for his or her ability to see *why* theological truths are obligated. However, this *why* does not trace the conclusion back to evident reasons, but instead back to the “explicit contents of Scripture.” It is true to say that both that illiterate believer and theologian begin with infused faith. But the theologian stands apart

49 See above, p. 298, n. 5.
50 On this point, we anticipate the discussion in the next chapter where Rimini indicates that the miracles of Christ and the Apostles do not actually give us evidence or motivate us to believe because we believe in those miracles is predicated on our trust in the veracity of Scriptures. See chapter 7, p. 348.
because he is able to arrange these infused beliefs into their proper dependent order, while the simple believer holds them together in confused kind of jumble.

Finally, it is notable that Rimini chooses as his example (quoted above) the article of faith that “the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.” This example is telling because, as the source of much controversy between the East and West, this article is well known for not being *expressly contained* in Scripture. Accordingly, it only *became* an article of faith as this proposition came to be viewed as a necessary consequence of what was “expressly contained in Scripture.” Therefore, just because the simple believer through infused faith assents to this proposition does not mean that he is necessarily holding a true theological principle. In this way, Rimini further qualifies the position of Gerard of Senis.

All of this is confirmed when we look at Rimini’s explicit discussion of principles and conclusions at the end of his main response in article 2. There he writes:

> It is clear that the principles of theology…are the truths of the Sacred Canon, since to *these stands the ultimate resolution of all theological discourse* and from this all theological conclusions are first deduced. But theological conclusions—by distinguishing conclusions against principles—I say are all the truths not formally contained in Sacred Scripture, but which follow necessarily from those things contained in Scripture, *and this can be either the articles of faith or not*, or even things knowable or known through other sciences or not, or things determined by the church or not. But of all other truths, namely those not following from what is said in Sacred Scripture, I say that none of these are theological conclusions (emphasis mine).

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51 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:20). “Ex hoc ulterius patet quod principia theologiae sic sumptae, quae scilicet per theologicos discursus acquiritur, sunt ipsae sacri canonis veritates, quoniam ad ipsas stat ultimata resolutio totius discursus theologici et ex eis primo cunctae conclusiones theologicae deducuntur. Conclusiones autem theologicas — distinguendo conclusiones contra principia — dico omnes veritates non secundum se formaliter in sacra scriptura contentas, sed ex contentis in ipsa de necessitate sequentes, et hoc sive sint articuli fidei sive non, sive etiam sint scibiles vel scitae per scientiam
What I have emphasized in the above quotation is the explicit evidence that, for Rimini, the articles of faith and the principles of theology cannot be identified in all cases, though it may often be the case that the two are identical. Nevertheless, the distinction here should set Rimini apart from other similar descriptions of theology. Besides Aureoli’s “declarative” methodology, as far back as Durandus a competing methodology, called “deductive theology” was identified. Deductive theology claimed to proceed from the articles of faith as principles and to deduce the consequences that follow. We saw something similar to this in both the work of Gerard and Strasbourg. However, Rimini distinguishes himself from earlier descriptions of “deductive theology” on account of his repeated focus on what is “expressly (or formally) contained in Scripture.” Because of this insistence on the primacy of Scripture, some articles of faith must be properly identified as theological conclusions rather than principles. In short, the older model that identifies the principles of theology with the articles of faith relies on a prior Magisterial work to define and articulate these articles of faith in much the same way that Aureoli’s “declarative theology” relied on this earlier predetermination so that theologians would know what conclusions to support with probable reasons. In contrast, Rimini’s vision of the theologian and proper theological procedure can be removed from any dependence on a prior determination of the articles of the creed. In fact, in light of his method’s immediate orientation to the express words of Scripture, the theologian can easily be seen as taking part in the otherwise Magisterial work of defining the articles of faith. Very little about Rimini’s proposed methodology suggests a reliance on the decrees

aliam sive non, sive etiam sint determinatae per ecclesiam sive non; ceterarum autem veritatum, scilicet non sequentium ex dictis sacrae scripturae, nullam dico esse conclusionem theologicae.”
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of the Church. If anything, the theologian’s job is never to start from them, but to always
trace them back to their roots in what is “expressly contained in Scripture.”

Finally, we cannot turn away from the above quotation without noting its
significant Aegidian ending. In the final line of the quotation, Rimini excludes from the
category of theology any truth which is not derived from Scripture as a necessary
consequence. In other words, the explicit and implicit content of Scripture do not just
define a part of theology, but they constitute the whole of it. This stands in contrast to any
view which suggests that, while Scripture teaches us about what is necessary for
salvation, theology itself contains much more that any eager theologian can now pursue
and which all beatified Saints will eventually enjoy. Thus, in a good Aegidian fashion,
theology remains limited to a contracted field of truths. Not everything that could
possibly be said or known about God can be included in theology. Only those things that

52 Here one should consider the work, O’Malley, “A Note on Gregory of Rimini.” (1965). This work begins
by acknowledging the unprecedented importance Rimini puts on Scripture as the principle starting point of
theology in comparison to other scholastic thinkers. O’Malley writes: “In the Prologue Gregory puts an
extremely heavy emphasis upon the role of Scripture in theology. Theology is understood in terms of
Scripture alone. The principles of theological reasoning are *ipsae sacri canonis veritates*, and its
conclusions are *omnes veritates non secundum se formaliter in sacra scriptura contentas, sed ex contentis
in ipsa de necessitate sequentex*” (Ibid., 366). Here we see O’Malley citing the key passages we have just
looked at. However, the main thrust of O’Malley’s essay is to note that in practice Gregory continues to
appeal to tradition as an aid in the interpretation of Scripture. Thus O’Malley writes: “The fact that already
in the Prologue Gregory speaks of the *determinatio ecclesiae* indicates that, no matter how extensive his
claims for Scripture may seem to be, he means to interpret it in the light of “tradition,” i.e. in the light of
the great stream of orthodox Christian thought, identified in a general way with the Church” (Ibid., 368).

With respect to his article, a few remarks are in order. First, our primary purpose is to look at
Rimini’s theory of method. This should be kept distinct from his actual practice. If he ever contradicts that
theory in practice, this does not change what he said from at theoretical point of view. But secondly, and
more importantly, the question of how to interpret Scripture is a different question from the one we are now
considering. The main methodological point Rimini is arguing for is not “sola scriptura” or “scriptura per
traditionem.” On the contrary, his target is the “declarative” approach of Aureoli and its reliance on
probable natural reasons. It is Rimini’s re-orientation of the theological project back to articulating the
consequences of Scripture that throws into sharp relief the further question about how to interpret Scripture.
are explicitly found in Scripture or necessarily follow from these scriptural principles can be granted the name “theological knowledge.”
Chapter 7: Scientific Acts and Faith: The Epistemic Achievement of Acquired Faith

I. Introduction

In this concluding chapter, we move from the proper method in theological reasoning to the “epistemic status” of the results of this *discursus*. This primarily means: what kind of certainty can be ascribed to the achievement of this discipline? Is it possible for doubt to linger? Is the mind at liberty to assent or dissent from its conclusions?

The main burden of this chapter will be to resolve two paradoxical claims. The first is that Rimini thinks theology *is not* a science because it lacks the kind of evidence one needs to reach a scientific conclusion: a conclusion which compels the mind’s assent. Instead of evidence, Rimini argues that theology begins from a primary act of faith and, as the previous chapters hinted, results in “acquired faith.”¹ The epistemic status of theology’s conclusions therefore will never go beyond the level of pure belief. The paradox lies in the second claim that this process of reasoning performed by the practitioner of theology still compels the mind to assent to the conclusion (as is the case in a scientific procedure and as is not the case in reasoning that begins from mere opinion). How theology can compel or force the mind to assent without evidence is the knot that we must untie.

¹ See above, c. 6, p. 285.
This chapter is structured around these two claims. First, we look at why Rimini thinks theology, as a discourse embedded in the habit of faith, compels assent. Then, secondly, we look at why this compulsion cannot be described as scientific in any way.

II. Claim I: Theology Compels Assent

A. A Rebuttal from Ockham

Let us consider, first, a potential Ockhamist complaint that could be leveled at Rimini’s position. The complaint facing Rimini is a version of the same complaint Ockham raised against Aureoli. Against Aureoli (who insisted that theologian must begin with faith in what he intends to prove in order to actually acquire the habit of theology), Ockham asked why faith was actually necessary. After all, cannot anyone attempt to bring probable opinions in support of a predetermined proposition, regardless of where they stand on the truth of that proposition? In light of this question, Ockham distinguished between an apprehensive habit and judicative habit, asserting that theology proper is an entirely apprehensive habit, while the nature of the judicative habits that succeed this apprehension are determined by factors external to theology and its methodological procedure.

In light of the new procedure Rimini describes, it is still reasonable to wonder if the same criticism could be aimed at Rimini. Is it only the true believer who can read the words of Scripture and identify the claims made therein? And is it only the person who truly believes that can trace the logical consequences that follow from the contents of Scripture? What difference does our judicative attitude make to the simple task of reading
what the Scriptural text says and deducing those things that would follow from it, if it were true? We have actually already encountered this question in a different form. In our treatment of Prosper of Reggio, we pointed to the critical question that followed his position on theological method. The question was: doesn’t this just make theology a “science of consequents?” That is, isn’t this is a knowledge of the logical consequences that follow from any given proposition, but not a knowledge of how reality actually is?

Rimini has an answer to this, but it is somewhat involved, and it will momentarily draw us back into a discussion of the distinction of apprehension and judgment. At the heart of the disagreement is the fact that Ockham and Adam Wodeham believe that the procedure described by Rimini merely results in an apprehension, while the judicative attitudes one begins with and ends with may differ. But Rimini uniquely believes that apprehension and judgment are concomitant phenomena, both in normal scientific procedures as well as in theological ones, and thus to differ in one’s judicative attitudes is to also diverge at the level of apprehension.

To go deeper here we need to look at this distinction and the phenomenological reasons offered on its behalf. Then we can turn to (1) why Rimini thinks this distinction is problematic, (2) how he explains the problematic phenomena, and (3) how all of this impacts his conception of a theological procedure or discursus.

Rather than focus on Ockham, we turn our attention to his disciple Adam Wodeham, who vigorously defends the distinction between apprehension and judgment, because it is with Wodeham that Rimini directly engages. However, to understand

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2 See above, c. 5, p. 246.
Wodeham’s position, the first thing we need to recognize is that Wodeham shares a fundamental position with Ockham about the formation of mental propositions (actus enuntiandi), i.e. apprehension. The shared belief is that mental apprehensions are complex constructive acts. This means that they are complex ideas not directly caused by some inherently “complex reality” but constructions from our simple knowledge of simple things.³

Ockham explains this construction and joining act of simple acts of knowledge in the following way—not as an act of the intellect, but as a choice of the will:

An act of the will contributes to cause the act by which a proposition is apprehended and that which we call composition – whether the intellect is active or not. Because incomplex notions (notitiae/concepts) of terms and the intellect (if it is active) are agents naturally, they are also not inclined to form a true or false proposition, affirmative or negative. And thus, they either form no proposition or both at the same time, which is contrary to experience, though formally it is not a contradiction to form both because it is not repugnant to apprehend contradictory things at the same time; to assent at one and the same time to contradictories is a contradiction on account of the repugnance between those assents (...). Therefore I say that the reason that a proposition is formed as true or false, affirmative or negative is the will, because the will wishes to form one and not the other. And therefore the act by which a complex is apprehended in the first place is caused by the incomplex knowledge of the terms of the proposition and from the act of the will and this happens naturally. Since, when the act of the will is posited, by which the will wishes to form such a complex and with the posited incomplex knowledge of the terms of that complex, an act of apprehension or formation of that complex necessarily follows, just as an effect follows necessarily from its cause.⁴

³ It is important to note that Ockham and Wodeham disagree very much about whether “knowledge” ends up being about the mental propositions itself or some “complex” reality. Wodeham with Rimini affirms that such “complex realities” do exist, while Ockham denies such a notion. However, despite this, Wodeham follows Ockham by insisting that our complex ideas are caused by complex conjoining acts of the mind. But Wodeham will go further to say that this mental utterance actually signifies a quasi-reality that is only signifiable in a complex way.

⁴ Ockham, Quaestiones Variæ, q. 5, (OTh VIII, p. 169-170: “Ad causandum tantum actum quo apprehenditur complexum, qui dicitur compositio, concurrit actus voluntatis—sive intellectus sit activus
In a qualified way, Wodeham also shares this view of the constructed nature of mental propositions from simple apprehensions. He says: “I call an evident proposition, that which is composed from simple apprehensions…” It is because of the constructed nature of our mental propositions that Wodeham thinks they require approval. So he writes:

No complex judgment has intrinsic evidence and no complex judgment is an apprehension. But such a judgment is only a certain approval (adnutio quaedam) through the mind agrees that something is just as the proposition or propositions signify, without this acquiescence it is only an
apprehension that this is so. And this is a mental concession or negation always pre-required by nature and also co-requiring a complex apprehension, which when posited one is able to acquiesce or to not acquiesce, as if mentally saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ or ‘hesitate’. And according to this line of argumentation, one such act will be an act of the soul more in conformity with an act of desire (actui appetendi) than with an act of apprehending. And so, it becomes necessary to distinguish apprehensive acts, and judicative and appetitive acts.8

For Ockham and Wodeham, the process goes a little like this. From the knowledge of two simple realities, the will can decide to join them into a complex proposition. This is the formation of mental proposition, and this is what they mean by apprehension. So from “this man” and “animal” (a genus term connoting an individual with certain, in this case, essential characteristics), the proposition “this man is an animal” can be constructed. But while this is an affirmative statement, Wodeham believes the knower still needs to affirm it because, at the present, it has only been formed by the mind. As Tachau says: “Wodeham recognizes that without any introspective means of distinguishing erroneous and veridical apprehensions, …sensory illusions would ineluctably result in intellectual

8 Adam De Wodeham, Lectura Secunda, I, prol., q. 6, a. 3 (Wood I:173, sect. 18). “Hic respondeo, sine praeiudicio, quod nullum iudicium complexum aequivalenter habet evidentiam intrinsecam, nec est apprehensio. Sed est tantum adnuetio qua mens adnuit sic esse sicut propositio vel propositiones significant, absque hoc quod illa adnuetio sit apprehensio aliqua de sic essendo. Et est quaedam mentalis concessio vel negatio semper per naturam praeexigens et etiam coexigens apprehensionem complexam, qua posita potest anduere vel non adnuere, quasi mentaliter dicendo ‘sic’ vel ‘non’ vel haesitando. Et secundum hoc talis actus esst quidam animae conformior actui appetendi quam actui apprehendendi. et tunc essent actus animae imprimis distinguendae in apprehensivos, iudicativos et appetitivos” (qtd. in Bermon, L’assentiment et son objet chez Gregoire de Rimini, 314–315).

This appetitive element in judgment, which is absent in Rimini’s account, is the reason why Bermon characterizes Ockham and Wodeham’s accounts of judgment as “volitional” in contrast to Rimini’s “intellectualist” account of judgment. The key difference is that in a “volitional” account, error is attributed to will. The will is faulted for assenting to what the evidence does not warrant. This is an account of error that Bermon identifies as forerunner to Cartesian accounts of intellectual error. In the intellectualist account, the error of judgment lies in the apprehension, whether sensitive or intellectual.

errors.” And at this level, as we saw in the Ockham quotation above, it is also possible to construct the contrary proposition (“this man is not animal”) without a contradiction. Thus, Wodeham thinks another step is necessary, whereby the mind says yes or no to the adequacy of what has been constructed to reality. Here we should not think of another term added to proposition, but of mental “nods” or “shakes” given to each formulated proposition: +(“This man is an animal”) and ~(“this man is not an animal”).

Rimini is critical of this conception of apprehension or mental utterance (enuntio), and through his revisions, he points out that the mental “nod” and “shake” become redundant. His critique can be found in a section of q. 1, a. 3 titled “A doubt about mental enunciation (apprehension),” and it comes after his solution built around the denial of a distinction between apprehension and judgment. The doubt asks whether mental utterances or apprehensions are composite acts built from partial knowledge of simple things or a simple act not constituted from parts. The implication is that if the act were a composite, then the distinction between apprehension and judgment would be necessary.

In response to the doubt, Rimini denies that mental propositions are the result of complex acts of the mind. Pascale Bermon states: “Concerning the formation of

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10 Rimini, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:33) “Sed posset moveri dubium utrum ipsa enuntiatio mentalis sit essentialiter composita ex partialibus notitiis quibusdam simplicibus, quarum unam sit subiectum et alia praedicatum, an vero sit actus non ex talibus partibus constitutus.”
propositions, Gregory of Rimini holds one thesis very strongly. For him, the proposition is not an act composed in the mind.”

In his own concluding words, he states:

The affirmation and the negation in the intellect are not truly acts composed and complexes in a strict sense whereby they would be composed of partially distinct knowledge acts, such that one would be the subject and the other the predicate, as many believe.

But what are his concerns? His main complaint can be summarized as a lack of sufficient reason to explain the conjoining of two simples. For instance, he writes: “Why will one part be the subject or predicate over the other and vice versa?” There seems to be no “cause” that assigns one to the position of subject and one to the position of predicate.

As an alternative, Rimini thinks that despite the complex nature of a proposition, the mind’s utterance of that proposition is a simple rather than a complex act. Bermon, who has done extensive work on this issue, provides a helpful explanation:

The intellect understands the composition-division in beings without itself performing the act of division or composition. It remains simple in its acts, to the point that in one passage, Gregory of Rimini states that the judicative act is also essentially simple, as the act of “simple understanding.”

11 Bermon, L’assentiment et son objet chez Gregoire de Rimini, 319. “Concernant la formation des propositions, Grégoire de Rimini soutient une thèse forte. Pour lui, elle n’est pas un acte composé dans l'esprit.”

12 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:35). “Ex istis patet quod affirmatio et negatio in intellectu non dicuntur actus compositi vel complexi in vero sensu, quia sint compositi essentialiter ex talibus notitiis partialibus distinctis, quarum una sit subiectum et reliqua praedicatum, ut multi putant…”

13 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:34). “Praeterea, cur una pars erit subjectum vel praedicatum potius quam alia vel everso?”

14 Ibid. “Certe non videtur posse assignari causa, cum sint in eodem subiecto primo et aequaliter natae sint subici et praedicari, supposito quod sint.”

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The exact quote from Gregory states: “the act is essentially simple and only objectively complex.” Bermon continues:

Rimini maintains the distinction between two types of acts: “simple understanding” which Arabic-Latin philosophy called, since the translations of Avicenna, *formatio* and the complex understanding called *fides* [assent]. But this distinction is not found in the essence of the intellect, which is always simple; it comes from the object. [Therefore] if the intellect relates to an incomplex thing, it is an act of simple intelligence; if relates to an “enuntiable,” then it judges.

This final remark about the intellect relating to an “enuntiable” begs a few questions. Gregory and Bermon’s reference to the “enuntiable” is a reference to a kind of quasi-ontological entity that Rimini adopts from Wodeham, but which Ockham does not recognize. This ontological entity has been the subject of large body of secondary literature. Wodeham and Rimini recognize independent realities that can only be signified complexly, that is, through a proposition. What is commonly known as the *complexe significable* or the “enuntiable” is akin to what modern discourse often refers to as a state-of-affairs.

One of the best ways to understanding the impetus behind positing such quasi-entities is considering some of the unsavory consequences that might follow if we asserted that the truth of all propositions was dependent on simple things alone (the

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17 Ibid. “Il maintient certes la distinction entre deux types d'actes: l'intelligence simple que la philosophie Arabo-Latine appelle, depuis les traductions d'Avicenne, *formatio* et l'intelligence complexe appelée *fides*. Mais cette distinction ne repose pas sur l'essence de l'intellect, qui est toujours simple, elle provient de l'objet. Si l'intellect se rapporte à une chose incomplexe, son acte est de simple intelligence; s'il se rapporte à un enuntiable, il en juge.”

18 See my article “Adam Wodeham,” *Standford Encyclopedia*, forthcoming, for a survey of this literature.
position of Walter Chatton) or dependent on the existence of a knowing mind contemplating simple terms (the position of William of Ockham). If we supposed that nothing exists, we might wonder if it is still true to say that “nothing exists.” From the perspective of Walter Chatton, it might be difficult to explain why this proposition is true, since there is no thing to which this proposition could refer. Ockham might still have a chance at rebuttal if he were to contend that God still exists, and he is actively aware of the mental utterance “nothing exists.” Because knowledge is about the truth or adequacy of this linguistic phrase, not its direct correspondence to the world of being, Ockham might still find a way to escape. But if it were supposed—per impossible—that even God did not exist, and there were no one to be aware of the mental utterance “nothing exists”, Wodeham and Rimini still want to assert the truth of this proposition. They can assure this truth by pointing to the quasi-realities which are only able to be signified through a complex utterance. These signified realities retain a kind of ontological weight even when no real thing (substance or accident) exists.

Despite sharing the same conviction about the complexe significabile, Wodeham does not put it to the same use as Rimini. In order to signify what can only be signified complexly, Wodeham believes the mind must compose a mental proposition, and he further believes that the adequacy of this formation must be independently verified. Rimini, in contrast, thinks in terms of the mind’s direct and simple relation to an “enuntiable” or the actual state-of-affairs. To relate to reality in this way, rather than to its
simple parts, is what it means to judge. As an example: one might think of a situation where one enters a room to find that: “a cat is on the mat.” For Rimini, to be in this reality and to relate to this state-of-affairs is at once to perceive and judge that the cat is on the mat. Any reflection about the accuracy of this judging-perception comes subsequent to the judgment that has been made. In contrast, for Wodeham, one enters the room, sees cat and mat, and then decides to put them together. After performing this conjoining act, one must reflect on its adequacy to the state-of-affairs and then make a judgment. Here the reflective act breaks up the apprehensive and judicative act.

This difference in opinion about how the intellect relates to a given state-of-affairs is significant for Rimini, in that he thinks it makes Wodeham’s appeal to a judicative “nod” or “shake” redundant. Because the intellect’s perception of the state of affairs is already an affirmation, it is a redundant move to then subsequently affirm what has already been affirmed.

With this essential difference in place, we can turn to see the phenomenological cases Wodeham uses to support his position. For him, these are all too common experiences that make Rimini’s position untenable. In Rimini’s response, we will not only see how his position can makes sense of these common experiences, but also why a true theological procedure must begin and end, not merely in apprehension, but in an apprehensive judgment.

Interestingly, Bermon points out that Rimini’s position here is preceded by Walter Chatton, the infamous nemesis of Ockham and Wodeham. Bermon writes: “In the 6th question of his Prologue, Wodeham cites the objects of Walter Chatton, who prefigures in many ways the position of Gregory of Rimini. For Chatton, the intellect does not form the propositions, it receives them. ‘It is not in the power of the intellect to compose thing together’ (Chatton, in Wodeham, Lectura Secunda t. 1, p. 159 (Prol., q. 6, a. 2 section 11)). Every proposition is a certain appearance that it is so in reality as it the proposition signifies it to be” (Bermon, L’assentiment et son objet chez Gregoire de Rimini, 315).
B. The Distinction between Actus Enuntiandi and Actus Sciendi: the Phenomenological Reasons of Adam Wodeham

Rimini reviews nine arguments in favor of the distinction between apprehension and judgment, seven of which he takes verbatim from the prologue Wodeham’s Lectura Secunda, q. 6. I will focus on just a couple of pairs of arguments. The first pair gives us a good example of the kinds of normal experiences that might prompt us toward the common sense belief that apprehension and judgment are distinct. The second pair nicely illustrates the kind of position on theology and faith that one appears committed to by upholding this distinction.

The sixth and seventh arguments listed by Rimini, but taken from Wodeham, are closely related. The seventh is a concrete example of the general reasoning of the sixth. First Wodeham argues: we know that apprehended propositions are distinct from assent because a demonstrative proof can cause us to assent to a new proposition, which stands in opposition to a previously believed proposition. Yet this earlier apprehended proposition can remain in the mind, even though the assent does not. If this were not the case, we would have both assenting and dissenting propositional attitudes about the same thing, at the same time.20

The concrete example of this argument, found in the seventh argument, goes as follows: imagine a scenario in which we first judge a stick to be broken when it is partially submerged in water, but then, after a demonstrative proof, no longer agree (or

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20 Gregorius Arimindentis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp 1:26). “Probo, quia demonstrativa probatio oppositi causat vel causare potest dissensum sic esse illis stantibus in mente, igitur illae manente, et non manet assensus per eas causatus, quia tunc simul homo assentiret et dissentiret sic esse; quod est impossibile.” Cf. Adam De Wodeham, Lectura Secunda, I, prol., q. 6 (Wood I:176, sect. 20).
assent to the fact) that the stick is broken. Wodeham notes that the original proposition may remain in the mind, even though we no longer assent to it. But if our apprehension of a given state-of-affairs was at the same time a kind of judgment about that very same state of affairs, it would not be possible for this mental proposition to linger. If Rimini is going to reject the distinction between apprehension and judgment, he is going to have to provide some explanation of this all too recognizable experience.

The eighth and ninth reasons illustrate the theological position Rimini would like to avoid. The eighth argument claims, as Ockham did, that the believer and the non-believer are able to have the same simple acts of knowing, and as a consequence are able to form propositions from those acts of the same kind (ratio) (meaning they would fall under the same genus of acts). Nevertheless, only one of them assents to the formed proposition while the other does not assent. Thus it seems clear to Wodeham that the formation and apprehension of the proposition in question is something different from our assent to it.

The closely related ninth argument states: if the acts were not distinct, then the faithful would have to assent to a proposition even if he or she did not want to. Drawing

\[\text{[Footnotes]}\]

21 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:26). “Sicut patet de illo, qui videns baculum, cuius pars est in aqua, format hanc propositionem, ’ille baculus est fractus’ et iudicat sic esse.’ Quod enim ipsa non sit talis assensus probatur, quia postquam est certificatus per tactum vel per demonstrationem aut alio modo quod ille non est fractus, adhuc habet eandem propositionem in mente, nec tamen assentit, alias simul assentire et dissentiret.” Cf. Adam De Wodeham, Lectura Secunda, I, prol., q. 6 (Wood I:176, sect. 20).

22 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:26). “Fidelis et infidelis in omni actu simplici cognoscendi convenire possunt et per consequens formare possunt propositiones ex illis eiusdem rationis, et tamen unus assentit ei quam format, et alius non assentit alii quam format eiusdem rationis, igitur neutra est assensus fidei.” Cf. Adam De Wodeham, Lectura Secunda, I, prol., q. 6 (Wood I:177, sect. 20).

23 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:26). “Non ‘quacumque propositionem formet fidelis, nisi velit, non assentiet; si autem assensus esset aliqua illarum propositionum vel multae propositiones, vellet nollet, assentire’, igitur assensus fide non est propositio, cui assentitur, et eadem
on the implied absurdity of this conclusion, we can conclude that Wodeham assumes that theology is not productive of a judicative habit of any sort. He further assumes that the will determines assent, independent of the theological *discursus*. This, of course, speaks to the motivating paradox of this chapter, namely, how can Rimini really hold that theology compels assent and yet still results in a kind of faith? Wodeham clearly finds this absurd and can consequently appeal to this absurdity in order to argue for a distinction between apprehensive and judicative acts.\(^2\) It turns out, however, that Rimini does not believe this paradox is as absurd as Wodeham thinks, and therefore the distinction between apprehension and judgment is not required.

**C. Rimini: Against a Distinction between Apprehension and Judgment**

In order to solve the problems Wodeham creates, Rimini turns to a distinction between two kinds of mental propositions, a precedent for which he finds in Augustine. He directs us to *De Trinitate* Book XV, where we find Augustine speaking of two sets of utterances:

> So thoughts are a kind of utterance of the heart, which also has its mouth. . . One sentence includes the two sorts of mouths a man has, one of the body, the other of the heart.\(^2\)

Of these utterances Augustine identifies the utterance of the heart with an inner mental language which corresponds to no human language. These are what Rimini calls natural
signs, and they are the immediate effects of the intellect’s encounter with “objectively complex” realities. The utterances of the mouth, on the other hand, are the conventional signs of ordinary human language which we use when we want to express ourselves either audibly or through the written word. Augustine goes on to say one more thing that is of importance to Rimini. He states that we can often think silently using only the conventional signs of human language. Augustine writes:

…do not look at that word of ours which sounds in the ears, neither when it is uttered vocally nor when it is thought of silently. The words of all spoken language are thought of silently, and people run over songs in their minds while their mouths remain silent…26 (emphasis mine).

With this emphasis on our ability to think silently using conventional (or spoken) language, Rimini makes a key distinction between two kinds of mental propositions. The first kind of propositions he identifies are those which are images or likenesses in the soul of written or spoken propositions. While these are propositions that employ conventional language designed for interpersonal communication, Augustine notes that sometimes our mind runs over these conventional signs silently and privately.27 What is critical for Rimini about these first kinds of expressions is that they are not genuine expressions of understanding, but copies or imitations of thought.28 That is, they do not represent an immediate and simple encounter with a given state-of-affairs. In the context of his discussion of these spoken conventional utterances, Augustine quotes Matthew 15:16:

“Are you still without understanding? Do you not understand that everything that goes

26 Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 3, 20 (Hill, 410).
27 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp 1:30). “Quoddam enim est earum, quae sunt vocalium enuntiationum imagines vel similitudines ab exterioribus vocibus in animam derivatae . . .”
28 Rimini even describes these as akin to those “fictae” that the mind creates when the mind creates concepts of things that do not actually exist (Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp 1:30)).
into the mouth passes into the belly and is got rid of in the privy?” And then Augustine explains the verse: “Here, certainly, [Jesus] was obviously alluding to the mouth of the body.” 29 In other words, these spoken utterances do not indicate understanding or genuine apprehension, but represent lip-service and imitation. Gabriel Nuchelmans describes the signification of these images of vocal words as signifying in a “non-ultimate way” meaning that “they are not something in which the cognitive process comes to a stand still, but rather a means to a further end.” 30 We do not understand the ultimate reality itself until we think it through all the way and then utter that understanding from the heart.

In contrast to this first kind of utterance, Rimini identifies the formation of a second kind of mental proposition that imitates no spoken language, but precedes all conventional signs. 31 Included under these kinds of propositions are all manner of first principles and first impressions, but only when they are genuinely understood. The idea of first principles highlights what is important about these mental propositions for Rimini. When the mind relates to the “objectively complex” reality, the mind’s apprehension is also a judgment.

But under this same category of mental propositions, Rimini also includes the conclusions of demonstrations. He writes: these are the kinds of propositions someone

29 Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 3, 18 (Hill, p. 408).
30 Nuchelmans, Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition, 16. Nuchelmans also gives the following summary of what late-scholastics generally thought these kinds of mental images signified: “What the mental images of written and spoken propositions signify in a formal, natural, and non-ultimate way is the written and spoken propositions of which they are the likeness” (Ibid., 17).
31 Rimini writes: “Quoddam vero est genus enuntiationum mentalium, quae nullarum sunt similitudines vocum, nec secundum illarum diversitatem in hominibus diversificantur, sed eadem sunt secundum speciems apud omnes, id ipsum naturaliter significantes quod vocales eis subordinatae ad significandum ad placitum et per institutionem significant. Et istae sunt illa verba, quae nullius linguae sunt” (Lectura, 1, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:31)).
forms, when they demonstrate some truth. If someone genuinely apprehends a conclusion as a conclusion—rather than simply as a free-floating string of words—then its formulation is at the same time an assertion of its truth. Apprehended within the context of a syllogism, it is also an act of assent. The formulation of the concluding proposition, in Rimini’s mind, is not a neutral combination of words to be judged later, but rather a kind of declarative assertion: “Socrates is a man” (emphasis on the “is”).

Furthermore, the same connectivity between genuine expression and judicative attitudes applies for propositions that result from processes of reasoning other than purely demonstrative syllogisms. This is particularly important for us in our effort to not only understand scientific assent in general, but also the kind of assent proper to theology. Under the same category of mental proposition—i.e. those which are uttered from the heart and indicate a genuine apprehension—Rimini includes both the attitudes of opinion and belief. He writes:

Indeed some of these propositions [employing natural language, “uttered from the heart”] are not caused in one of the aforesaid ways: from the primary type of knowledge of such realities. Propositions of this type are those in which someone forms a proposition (enuntiat) in their mind and judges that it is so or is not so, while not knowing (cognoscens) intuitively or by another prime knowledge or by something derived from intuitive knowledge that it is so or that it is not so, just as it is formed in the mind. This happens when a person believes or has an opinion.

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32 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I: 31). “Huiusmodi sunt enuntiationes illae, quas quis absque prolatione exteriori enuntiationum vocalium et interiori etiam formatione illis similium format, dum aliquam veritatem demonstrat.”

33 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:31). “Quaedam vero sunt, quae non ex rerum talibus primis notitiis aliquo praedictorum modorum causantur. Cuiusmodi sunt enuntiationes, quibus quis enuntiat mente et iudicat sic vel sic esse aut non esse non cognoscens tamen intuitive aut alia notitia prima vel ex intuitiva derivata quod sic sit vel non sit, sicut enuntiat in mente quis, dum credit vel opinatur.”
At this point, there is not much more to say about the kinds of mental propositions Rimini recognizes and which ones count as genuine apprehensions or an *enuntiones*. If there is an articulation born of genuine understanding, then it cannot be divorced from an awareness of what the proposition signifies. But, for Rimini, to form such a proposition as the product of reasoning is also to immediately make a claim about reality. He is, of course, willing to acknowledge that we can hold some propositions in our mind to which we do not give assent or for that matter take any propositional attitude. But he insists that these can only be propositions of the first type (propositions formed from conventional language). Such propositions are fundamentally different in nature and are more similar to the kind of imitation seen in parrots than acts of genuine reasoning. In short, they are not real acts of thought, but only imitate genuine thinking according to the conventional rules of grammar.

With this distinction in place, we can turn to observe how Rimini uses it to explain the kinds of experiential phenomena that Wodeham put forward as evidence of a necessary distinction between apprehension and judgment. Rimini’s answers to Wodeham’s stated concerns are fairly straightforward and predictable. The basic strategy is the same in all cases. Where Wodeham thinks he identifies a case of genuine apprehension without assent, which would threaten a contradiction if assent were

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34 Rimini’s unique position on apprehension and judgment is not with a legacy. We find the Augustinian Peter Gracilis (a contemporary of Peter D’Ailly) employing this position to defend a similar point about the importance of faith for doing genuine theology. For instance he writes: “licet assensus theologicus a propositione theologica non sit distinctus…” (ms. Royal 10 A I, f. 12v) and “si ponatur quod fideles foret illam propositionem ‘Christus est passus’ et infidelis etiam eadem quoad terminos, tunc sic fideles assentit significato propositionis per eum formante et infideles non assentit, ergo specie distinguitur” (f. 12v).
35 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:32), “Ulterius sequitur ex istis quod non omnis mentalis enuntiatio est assensus, licet omnis assensus sit mentalis enuntiatio.”
concomitant with it, Rimini remarks that we are not talking about a proposition of natural signs and “uttered in the heart.” In other words, it is not a case of genuine thinking, but imitation. A further action would be required for these conventional signs to be understood as natural signs and therefore to be genuine representatives of some object in an ultimate way.

We can see this general reply at work if we look once more at the example of the stick appearing to be broken in the water. When I first apprehend this as the result of some form of reasoning and believed it to be genuinely broken, my apprehension is at once an understanding of the significance of what my natural language signifies and at the same time an assertion about the truth of that signification. I do not simply think: “stick+is+broken,” but I think: “there is a stick in reality which is in fact broken.” However, when I come to demonstrate that the stick is not broken, it is not the case that I retain this same proposition, but lose a corresponding propositional attitude. On the contrary, the former proposition remains in my mind only as a shadow of its old self, presumably as a kind of memory of something once possessed, which is now lost. The proposition no longer exists in my mind as an apprehension of genuine thought. Rimini states the case as follows:

I say that the proposition, by which one first judges that the stick is broken does not remain in the mind after the opposite has been proved. But if one forms a proposition afterwards or even if some proposition remains, which one formed before declaring that the stick is broken, this is not the same proposition by which one earlier judged formally that the stick was broken. It is different both individually [different in number] and in
species. For it is now a mental proposition of the first type, none of which, as it was said, are a form of assent or dissent.36

From this basic response, we can see how Rimini responds to the argument Wodeham makes from his presuppositions about the nature of theological reasoning. Once again, Wodeham’s argument proceeds from the Ockhamist belief that the unbeliever and the believer can perform the same reasoning while they hold contrary judicative attitudes. Rimini counters by asserting that, despite the similarity of appearances in the respective reasoning processes, the believer and unbeliever are actually constructing different arguments from diverse apprehensions.

This can be illustrated by looking at an example of a simple syllogism that Rimini would recognize as “theological.”37

\begin{align*}
P_1) & \text{ Christ had human flesh} \\
P_2) & \text{ Everything with human flesh is a human being} \\
C) & \text{ Christ was a human being}
\end{align*}

When the person without belief “appears” to take P1 from Scripture, Rimini insists that they are actually playing with the logical relationship between conventional signs. When they deduce C from P1 and P2 they are apprehending and assenting to a conclusion about predicates and subjects. Not only do they not assent to the conclusion that “Christ was a

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36 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:38). “Dico quod illa propositio, qua primo iudicat baculum esse fractum, non manet in mente, postquam certificatus est de opposito, sed, si postea aliquam formet vel etiam si qua remaneat, quam prius formasset enuntians baculum esse fractum, non est illa, qua formaliter iudicavit prius ipsum esse fractum, sed alia et secundum individuum et secundum speciem; est enim de prima maniere mentalium, quarum nulla, ut saepe dictum est, est assensus vel dissensus."

37 The following syllogism can actually be found in the work of John Mair who identifies it as an example of a true theological argument. Mair’s own account of proper theological method mirrors Rimini’s and thus his own example provides us with a trustworthy example with which to work. The example reads: “Secundo patet quod conclusiones proprie theologicae (distinguendo conclusiones contra principia) sunt veritates non contentae expresse in Sacro canone, sed ex eis deducuntur: ut ‘Christus habet nervos’, ex hac deducitur ‘Christus est homo’” (Mair, In Primum Sententiarum, prol., q. 4 (1519, f. 11ra)).
human being,” but neither do they actually apprehend it. For those who begin without belief, the words in this syllogism function as variables. What we really have is the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
P1) & \text{ if } x \text{ exists, then } P(x) \text{ (where “Christ” functions as variable } x \text{ and flesh as predicate } P) \\
P2) & \text{ for every } x, P(x) = H \text{ (where “human being” functions as } H \text{ does)} \\
C) & x = H
\end{align*}
\]

The conclusion “Christ is a human being” is, in the case of the person who begins without belief, equivalent to \(x = H\). If the practitioner in question is doing more than simply mouthing words he heard someone else say, then Rimini would likely accept that there is some “judgment” taking place. But he is assenting to the fact that, granted the condition of P1, then logic and intelligibility demand that \(x = H\). This assent, therefore, is a statement about possibility, not about an actual state-of-affairs. The unbeliever who performs this logical syllogism using the variables taken from Scripture is simply not performing the same reasoning process, nor apprehending the same things as the theologian, despite the fact that from an external perspective the syllogisms look identical. The unbeliever apprehends something about the way conditionals work and the consequents that follow when variables align in certain ways. This is something quite different from beginning from the claim that it is true that there actually was a historical person named Christ who had human flesh.

From Rimini’s more general rebuttal to the Ockhamist argument that the reasoning, and therefore apprehension, of the believer and non-believer is identical, we must pass to what this means for faith. Without the proposed Ockhamist distinction, it appeared quite clearly to Wodeham that a given apprehension necessarily determines
assent. Accordingly, in the process of a theological syllogism there is no room for any volitional component to influence the judicative attitude one takes toward that conclusion. This was unacceptable for Wodeham, who began from the assumption that faithful assent was a separate choice: a product of an independent judicative habit. Yet as we have seen, Rimini rejects this independence and declares that a true theological discursus is inseparable from judgment. This is what leads us to our paradox. Despite the fact that theology compels assent as a scientific demonstration does, Rimini continues to insist that theology also results in faith. To see why the “compelling” reasoning of the theologian still only results in faith and can therefore be distinguished from science, we must move forward toward Rimini’s final declaration of why theology is not a science.

III. Claim II: Theology is not a Science

A. Acquired Faith and Its Principles

In the fourth and final conclusion of the final article of question one (thus the culminating moment of all the effort put into question one), Rimini declares: “a kind of faith is acquired through theology, and therefore it is clear that the habit of theology is a ‘creditive’ habit and a certain ‘acquired faith.’

Critical is the affirmation that creates our present problem: the procedure of theology results in a kind of faith—not science—but again we know that this assent cannot be distinguished from the apprehension of theological conclusions as conclusions. Thus this act of faith appears to be compelled.

38 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:53), “Quarta, quod acquiritur fides quaedam; ex quo patebit quod habitus theologiae, qui consequenter acquiritur, est quidam habitus creditivus et fides quaedam acquisita.”
In the defense of this fourth conclusion we can see how Rimini answers our fundamental problem. Here, he gives us a definition of what he means by “acquired faith,” which we can contrast with his account of how scientific assent is acquired, provided in his first conclusion of this final section.

First, let us note his declaration about acquired faith: “Every assent without evidence and doubt (formidine) is faith.” The key is to keep in mind that such an assent cannot be divorced from the manner of its apprehension as a theological conclusion. The distinctive feature of this faith is that its apprehension comes from a syllogism that begins without evidence, and yet its conclusion is believed without any hesitation our doubt. This differs from Rimini’s definition of scientific assent provided just prior to this definition of acquired faith:

Every discourse, through which science is acquired per se, is from first and immediate propositions or from those things, which are known immediately or mediately through these first and immediate propositions.

The lack of evidence characteristic of acquired faith stands in contrast to the requirement that scientific knowledge begin from first principles and immediately known propositions. To begin from such propositions was generally understood in scholastic

39 In the context of his fourth conclusion he mostly talks about faith simply as “faith,” not “acquired faith.” Nevertheless, the original articulation of the conclusion in terms of “acquired faith” must indicate to us that he has “acquired faith” in mind.

40 Gregorius Ariminesis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:55). “Omnis assensus absque evidentia et formidine est fides.”

As we will see below this is a combination Francis of Marchia will explicitly challenge. For evidence is the condition of the absence of doubt, thus it is impossible to be without doubt when one lacks evidence. See below p. 346.

41 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:53). “Omnis discursus, per quem per se acquiritur scientia, est ex propositionibus primis et immediatis vel ex his, quae per tales medieate vel immediate notae sunt.”
terminology to be beginning from evidence. The proposition is known immediately because the truth of the proposition is self-evident and relies on no other proposition for support. But Rimini’s consideration of method has already shown us that theology, inasmuch as it is theology proper, does not begin from such evident propositions. In supporting his conclusion that theology does not meet the criteria of science, Rimini appeals directly to his earlier discussion of method: “but theological discourse does not begin from such principles, since it begins from believed things, as was made clear in article two.”

It is possible to become confused at this moment: confused, that is, about how an already believed proposition can be invoked to explain how faithful assent is acquired in the first place. The matter seems circular; how do we acquire faithful assent? Answer: by proceeding from already “believed” propositions.

Our suspicions of circular reasoning are justified when we recognize that Francis of Marchia raised this precise objection against the kind of position Rimini is putting forward. Rimini is aware of Marchia’s concern and provides an explicit rebuttal. As paraphrased by Rimini, Marchia argues:

‘Since one cannot proceed in believed things into infinity, it is necessary’ to reach one or many first beliefs. Then concerning this first belief, I ask: Why do you assent to it? For either you assent to it ‘on account of itself or on account of some other’ believed thing ‘or on account of some other thing known per se. It cannot be on account of some other believed thing,’ because then this would be the first belief. If on account of itself, then this is known through itself, ‘since no object of inferior order is able to cause assent to an object of superior order, but the object known through itself

42 See our earlier discussion, c. 5, p. 236.
43 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:53). “Sed discursus theologicus non est ex talibus, cum sit ex creditis, ut patet ex articulo secundo.”
is’ the supreme object ‘in the class of knowable things’...If one assents to it on account of something else known per se, then it has been deduced from something known per se.44

Marchia’s argument is designed to support his own claim that theology as Rimini has described it (viz. a theology which deduces things from the explicit contents of Scripture) can still be considered a science. We will consider Rimini’s larger refutation of Marchia below. But for now, understanding Rimini’s response to this specific charge of circularity is necessary for understanding his positive position. The answer he gives is an abbreviated presentation of an important point he made more fully in article two in his discussion of method, which we considered in the last section.45

He first concedes the major premise of Marchia’s rebuttal. Francis is correct, there is, in fact, some “first believed thing” which one adheres to on account of itself, or, in other words, not on account of some other believed proposition.46 On Marchia’s reasoning, this concession mandates that the proposition in question be self-evident or per se nota; it must be known to be true by the evidence it presents immediately to the mind. Further, any procedure that begins from such an evident premise must result in

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44 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:41–42). “Cum in creditis non sit procedere in infinitum, oportet’ devenire ad aliquid unum vel plura primo credita. Tunc de primo credito quaero: Cur sibi assentis? Aut enim assentis ei ‘propter se aut propter aliid’ creditum ‘aut propter aliid per se notum. Non propter al iid creditum’, quia ipsum ponitur primum creditum. Si propter se, igitur est per se notum, ‘quia nullum objectum inferioris ordinis potest causare assensum objecti superioris ordinis, sed objectum per se notum est’ supremum objectum ‘in genere cognoscibilium’, et proprius modus assentiendi sibi est assentire ei propter se, igitur nullum non per se notum, quod est inferioris ordinis, poterit causare assensum propter se, igitur omne, quod potest causare assensum propter se, est per se notum, et sic primum creditum erit per se notum. Si vero ei assentiatur propter aliid per se notum, igitur ipsum est deductum ex per se noto.” Cf. Franciscus de Marchia, Commentarius, I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, n. 22–25 (Mariani, 451–452).
46 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:48). “Ad quartum concedo quod est aliquid primo creditum, cui adhaereo propter se, idem est non propter aliid creditum.”
scientific knowledge, not mere faith, as Rimini himself would admit. But Rimini denies this consequence for reasons that should already be clear to us.

In our earlier discussion, we saw that Rimini, speaking of the merely believed principles, made the following assertion: it should not be thought that principles do not receive the assent of faith on account of something else, so that nothing besides the principle itself is the cause of assenting to it. Such an assertion appears to be in contradiction to the concession he later makes to Marchia. But Rimini avoids the contradiction by distinguishing between [1] believing on account of some other believed premise and [2] believing a premise for some other reason besides the evidence of the proposition itself. This is a distinction Marchia does not recognize. As we discussed previously, Rimini employs this distinction in his interpretation of the Augustinian quotation whereby Augustine claims fidelity to the Gospel because of the authority of the Church. Two interpretations of this authoritative text were given. On the one hand, it could mean Augustine has performed a syllogism leading him to assent to the truth of the Gospel.

\[
P1) \text{Whatever the Church says is true, is true} \\
P2) \text{The Church says the Gospel is true} \\
C) \text{Therefore, the Gospel is true and ought to be believed.}
\]

For Rimini, this is an example of believing something on account of some other thing believed (\textit{propter aliud creditum}).

On the other hand, Rimini notes that Augustine’s famous statement can be interpreted as a proposition assented to, not because of some other believed proposition,

\footnote{\textsuperscript{47}See above “Interlude,” p. 307 n. 37.} \footnote{\textsuperscript{48}Ibid.}
but because of a unique and mysterious compulsion. In a normal scientific procedure, this compulsion is achieved by self-evidence and is generally what we mean when we say something is *per se nota*. But in this case, Rimini claims that something other than the internal evidence of the proposition prompts us to make this movement of assent. This is also a fundamentally different kind of assent than that which accompanies the conclusion of a theological procedure. This assent does not occur as a deduction from prior beliefs, but is more akin to the irresistible compulsion usually associated with an “indubitable” experience. As Rimini interprets the Augustinian quotation, it was the sanctity of the Church that *stirred* a person to this initial assent.49

However, despite this difference, there remains a fundamental similarity between the type of assent given to believed principles and theological conclusions. This similarity comes from the fact that neither proposition enjoys “evidence” derived either from itself or from evident premises. But likewise neither can be classified as mere opinion, since the knower adheres to both propositions without doubt or hesitation (*sine formidine*). On account of this similarity, both types of assent must be classified as faith. Rimini identifies the assent given to theological conclusions as “acquired faith.”50 However, due to the difference between these conclusions which are believed *propter aliud creditum* and those premises which are not believed *propter aliud creditum*, but only *propter aliud*, this latter type of assent to believed-principles cannot also be

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49 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:21). “Nec auctoritas Augustini est contra, quoniam Augustinus non dicit se credere evangelio propter assensum, quem habeat ad aliquod aliud principium, ex quo evangelium demonstretur vel syllogistice probetur esse verum, sed solum ex auctoritate ecclesiae tamquam ex causa movente ipsum ad sidem evangelii; et est quasi simile huic dicto, quod iste vel alius dicere potuisset: Non crederem evangelio, nisi me ecclesiae sanctitas commoveret…”

50 See above, p. 338.
classified as “acquired faith.” The only alternative to “acquired faith” available in scholastic parlance is “infused faith,” and although Rimini does not explicitly identify this kind of faith as such, it is hard to know what else he could have in mind. The idea of “infusion” fits well with his notion of a mystical compulsion that prompts us to assent even though no other proposition or evidence mandates this assent.

In sum, we can construct an analog between the types of assent used in a theological procedure and the types of assent employed in a scientific demonstration.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Conclusions</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Scientific Demonstration</strong></td>
<td><em>Nous, intellectus, pure understanding, evidence, per se nota</em></td>
<td><em>epistēmē, scientia, scientific knowledge, assent compelled by evidence of principles</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theological Syllogism</strong></td>
<td>infused faith, believed proposition, not caused by another believed proposition, not-caused by evidence</td>
<td>acquired faith, conclusion of a theological syllogism, assent compelled by assent to believed principles</td>
</tr>
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The mark of scientific knowledge is the uniqueness of the premises from which it begins. These are premises truly known *per se*, which are assented to on account of the evidence they have within themselves. In a similar way, acquired faith is distinctive because of the kinds of premises from which it proceeds. These premises are neither evident premises nor premises believed on account of other premises; they are premises that a person has been “moved” to give assent to, though no deduction from prior beliefs has occurred. And just as it was in the case of what is known through evidence, the epistemic status of these believed premises gives a unique epistemic status to the conclusions reached from them. The knower does not reach scientific knowledge, but
acquired faith. However, acquired faith shares with scientific knowledge the status of a necessary consequence; that is, given the prior assent to the premises, the mind is compelled by the *discursus* to assent to the conclusions that follow.

Here, finally, we can see the answer to our original concern with Rimini’s paradoxical position, viz. that the conclusions of theology are believed by faith, even though the internal logic of the method compells assent. The answer lies in the nature of the assent given to the first premises. Acquired faith proceeds only from premises that are adhered to without evidence. Infused faith is the distinctive kind of assent given to these premises. Acquired faith is the required assent for anyone who already has this habit of “infused faith” and is able to see the consequences to which their “infused faith” commits them.

### B. Marchia’s Attempt to Save the Scientific Status of Theology

Francis of Marchia was a Franciscan Friar, who flourished at Paris between the heyday of Aureoli and the arrival of Gregory of Rimini. He gave his Parisian lectures during the academic year of 1319/1320.\(^{51}\) For much of the twentieth century, scholarship was content to label Marchia as a simple transmitter of the doctrine of Duns Scotus. But in recent years there has been a boom in Marchia studies the results of which suggest “that Francis of Marchia was *not* a faithful Scotist.”\(^{52}\) Nevertheless, as Schabel states, “Scotus forms much of the backdrop for Marchia’s theology.”\(^{53}\) Perhaps most important

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\(^{51}\) Schabel, “Francis of Marchia,” sect. 1.  
\(^{52}\) Ibid., sect. 2.  
\(^{53}\) Ibid.
for us is the fact that the other dominant influence on Marchia was Peter Aureoli, of whom he was frequently critical.

Marchia’s position on the scientific status of theology, according to Rimini, is characterized by three distinctive features. (1) The first, is that, as we have already seen, Marchia thinks the articles of faith and those things which are “expressly contained” in Scripture are not only believed, but acquire demonstrative evidence from prior evident principles. From this claim, our analogy between theological and scientific discourses above explains Marchia’s second claim, which is: (2) through theology, the practitioner acquires a genuine science. (3) The third characterization of Marchia’s position is that, despite the above conditions, faith is still necessary for our assent.\footnote{Gregorius Ariminensis, \textit{Lectura}, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:40). “Et est una opinio, quae circa hoc tria dicit: Primum est quod articuli fidei et eadem ratione ea, quae continentur in sacra scriptura, ex quibus velit principiis constant discursus theologici, non tantum sunt nobis credita, sed etiam evidentia et intellecta. Secundum, quod theologia per huiusmodi discursus acquisita est scientia proprie dicta. Tertium, quod his non obstantibus adhuc fides est nobis propter assensum necessaria.” Cf. Franciscus de Marchia, \textit{Commentarius}, I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, nn. 5–53 (Mariani, 447–460). Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, n. 52 (Mariani, 460). “Ex quo patet quod, non obstante quod habitus theologicus sit ex principiis per se notis, adhuc tamen salvatur quod fides est de non per se notis nec evidentibus…”}

Rimini would readily acknowledge that a discourse that begins from evident and “understood” principles results in genuinely scientific knowledge. The real point of disagreement, however, turns on two points: (1) how can those things expressly contained in Scripture be known and assented to with demonstrative evidence derived from self-evident principles, and (2) why would faith still be necessary if one began with such evidence in the first place?

The main force behind Marchia’s first claim comes from his belief that theology must produce results that are held \textit{sine formidine} or indubitably. For Marchia, the total
absence of doubt requires principles that are either *per se nota* (that is, evident) or deduced from what is *per se nota*. The fourth and final argument in support of this claim is the argument regarding the perceived circularity of Rimini’s account, which Rimini proposed to answer by distinguishing acquired faith from the kind of faith one has about the first premises of a theological discourse.

As noted, Marchia’s second claim appears to logically follow. In contrast, his third claim stands out as disconcerting and fundamentally opposed to the logic of Rimini’s argument: if a person begins with evident and *per se nota* premises, then it is not all clear why faith (which for Rimini is defined precisely by the absence of evidence) should still be needed for someone to give assent to the conclusion of theological reasoning.

However, when we look at the reasoning behind Marchia’s third claim, we can see that we cannot so easily pass over his second point; his argument for why faith is still necessary, even with evident principles, rests on the reasoning behind his claim for the scientific status of theology.

Everything rests on the claim that a prior syllogism precedes and justifies the propositions that Rimini identifies as the proper principles of theology.

The prefatory syllogism is stated by Marchia to be:

P1) Everything revealed by God is true

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55 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, n. 12 (Mariani 449). “Contra hoc arguo, primo, sic; nullus tenetur indubitanter credere et inconcusse illud quod sibi non proponitur sicut per se notum nec deductum ex aliquo per se noto; set quilibet fidelis tenetur indubitanter et inconcusse credere articulos fidei; ergo vel illi sunt per se noti vel deducti ex alis per se notis. Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:40). “Nullus tenetur indubitanter credere aliquid, quod non est sibi per se notum vel ex per se notis sibi deductum; sed catholicus tenetur indubitanter credere articulos fidei…”
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P2) Everything contained in Scripture is revealed by God

C) {supply proposition contained in Scripture/article of the creed} \(^{56}\)

In Rimini’s stated methodology, C is really P1, and the theologian does not assent to C on account of any other proposition (believed or otherwise), but simply because he is mysteriously moved to do so.

The question still lingers as to how Marchia can identify P1 and P2 as evident (\textit{evidens}) and understood (\textit{intellecta}) propositions. But he has an answer for this. Regarding P1, he thinks this really is uncontroversial and self-evident. Regarding P2 he claims that what was revealed in Scripture was accompanied by supernatural miracles, and the presence of these supernatural effects necessitates a supernatural cause.\(^{57}\)

Oddly, Marchia and Rimini come close to agreement on what initially motivates our assent to those things expressly contained in Scripture. Both appeal to the miracles of Christ and or miraculous sanctity of the Church to get the ball rolling. However, they strongly disagree about how this works psychologically.\(^{58}\) For Marchia, the existence of miracles is sufficient to provide a natural, scientific, and universal justification of the truth of Scripture, rendering P2 – “everything contained in Scripture is revealed by God”

\(^{56}\) Franciscus de Marchia, \textit{Commentarius}, I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, n. 53 (Mariani, 460). “Dico ergo breviter quod habitus theologicus procedit ex principiis per se notis, puta ex istis: omne revelatum a Deo est determinate verum; sed omnia contenta in canone sunt revelata ab ipso; ergo etc.”

\(^{57}\) Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, n. 54 (Mariani, 461). “Sed dices; quomodo est notum vel constat quod ista sint revelata a Deo? Dico quod ex aliquibus per se notis, puta per signa supernaturalia per se nota et certa, saltem secundo genere certitudinis, quater boni sunt nota et certa principia philosophica vel moralia, licet non tant certitudine quanta est in mathematicis,…per se enim notum est cuicumque, etiam philosopho, signa excedentia limites et facultatem totius naturae, qualia sunt resurrectio mortuorum et miracula alia quae sunt visa pluries, oportere reduci in causam primam, limites totius naturae excedentem.” Gregorius Ariminensis, \textit{Lectura}, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:42). “Et hoc probatur, quia revelatum est ab illo, qui faciebat opera supernaturalia, quae necessario arguente causam supernaturalem, sicut effectus naturales arguunt causam naturalem; causa autem supernaturalis deus est; igitur omne contentum in sacra scriptura est verum.”

\(^{58}\) The role of miracles becomes even more interesting when remember that, for Augustinus of Ancona, it was precisely through Christ’s miracles that the Apostles were originally taught theology. See above, c. 5, pp. 228-233.
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– perfectly evident and allowing theology to take its place as a rightful science among all the other sciences, capable of being recognized by other sciences as a legitimate universally accessible knowledge.

Rimini disagrees; he thinks that the motivation to assent caused by miracles or sanctity is not the result of evidence, but is part of a mysterious “moving” or “prompting” that we have labeled “infused faith.” We can speculate here whether Marchia, though critical of Aureoli in many ways, is still trying to preserve the identity of theology as a common science, which can demand respect from the other sciences and can argue for its credibility with universally recognizable arguments. If so, then there is a common thread between Rimini’s criticism of both Aureoli and of Marchia; namely, theology is not a public or universal discourse. Its arguments do not demand respect outside of a particular community: a community whose membership presupposes that certain epistemic conditions have been met. Specifically, membership assumes assent to the principles of theology via infused faith, not acquired faith.

A large part of the reason Rimini rejects the strength of miracles to be universally persuasive is that Rimini finds considerable epistemic uncertainty in each of the premises that Marchia believes to be evident. Regarding P1, Rimini points out that many theologians erroneously believe that God can reveal something false. And while they err in this respect, the very ability to err nevertheless shows that such a position is not per se nota and is open to doubt. With respect to P2, Rimini once again doubts the certainty

59 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4, (Trapp I:45). “Non enim maior; constat enim quod ipsam negasset Philosophus, cum ipsa implicit um, quod etiam Philosophus falsum reputat scilicet deum intelligere aliquid extra se. Non est igitur per se nota. Praeterea multi theologi tenent, quamvis non recte, ut infra probabitur, quod deus posset revelare falsum; igitur illa non est per se nota.”
assumed by Marchia. Reasoning from miracles, Rimini remarks, faces the problem that we have no way of knowing for sure that what is contained in Scripture was really revealed by Christ. We can only believe this.⁶⁰ Likewise, he says a little later, “it is not knowable per se that this was God or that he made these miracles, and therefore the minor [P2] remains merely believed.”⁶¹ Noteworthy here is that while disparaging any kind of certainty one can derive from miracles, whether revealed in Scripture or even ex hypothesi observable today, Rimini still thinks these events have a role to play in motivating assent. However, this motivation does not make the veracity of Scripture evident, but is part of a more complex and mysterious process whereby we assent to the truths of Scripture despite a lack of evidence.

The most daunting question for Marchia, however, still lingers; namely, why he thinks faith is still necessary, if P1 and P2 are per se nota. Marchia’s argument is based on a unique relationship between the demonstrating premises and the resulting conclusion. He first points to the fact that demonstrating principles can be of two types. Some premises are intrinsic to the subject and predicate terms of the proposition. But there are also other propositions, which are extrinsic, meaning the necessity of the proposition cannot be derived from the terms of the proposition. The premises that Marchia has in mind are of the latter type. The truth of the fact that “God is three and

⁶⁰ Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:45). “Minor etiam non est per se nota nec certe deducibilis ex per se notis, nam mere creditum est quod contenta in sacra scriptura fuerint a Christo revelata.”

⁶¹ Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 4, (Trapp I:45). “Item, non est nobis per se notum nec per se nota notificabile quod ipse fuerit Deus aut etiam quod ipse fecerit miracula illa, et ideo minor illa remanet nobis mere credita.”
one” cannot be derived from the terms of the proposition “God has revealed that God is three and one.” Rimini’s paraphrases the argument this way:

This premise (medium), though it is necessary, nevertheless, because it is extraneous and not taken from either the subject or predicate but from the condition of the agent, namely of God who is revealing [this truth], though it necessarily makes us assent to the conclusion, it does not make sufficient evidence about the conclusion.

Oddly, Marchia’s solution seems to reorder the usual connection between necessity and doubt. Usually, when something follows necessarily, it also follows that it cannot be doubted. But in this case, it appears that, while the conclusion is necessary, the extrinsic nature of the premises leaves the necessary conclusion still open to doubt. Thus, once the theologian reaches the conclusion, he still needs faith in order to remove these lingering hesitations.

Rimini’s response drives right to heart of Marchia’s creative solution by pointing to a subtle distinction employed in this reasoning. Marchia is attempting to use a distinction between apprehending the truth of an article of faith and simply knowing the proposition itself, i.e. that P is said of S. On Marchia’s reasoning, the evident premises

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62 Franciscus de Marchia, *Commentarius*, I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, nn. 58–59 (Mariani 462). “Respondeo, et dico quod medium per se notum est in duplici differentia; quoddam enim est proprium, quod videlicet est ex natura terminorum; alius autem est ab extrinseco; medium proprium facit evidentiam, non tantum de veritate propositionis in se, sed primo et immediate de connexione terminorum propositionis inter se; tale enim medium est subiecto intrinsecum et causa neccessaria inhaerentiae praedicati; medium autem extrinsecum, licet possit facere evidentiam de veritate propositionis, non tamen de connexione terminorum; est enim subiecto extraneum et, per consequens, non est causa neccessaria inhaerentiae praedicati; tale autem est medium habitus theologiae.”

“Medium enim ad probandum veritates theologicas est esse revelatum a Deo, ideo tale, etsi facit certitudinem de veritate propositionum, ut quod ‘Deus est trinus et unus’, et quod ‘Virgo peperit’ etc., non tamen de connexione terminorum, et ideo, ratione talis inevidentiae, neccessaria est fides ad assentiendum connexione terminorum, et ideo infidelis, fide carens, non assentit.”

63 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:43). “Istud autem medium, licet sit necessarium, quia tamen est extraneum nec sumptum ex natura subiecti vel praedicati, sed ex condicione agentis, scilicet Dei revelantis, licet faciat necessario assentire conclusioni, non tamen facit ‘sufficientem evidentiam de conclusione’.”
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are capable of giving us scientific knowledge that “the proposition ‘S is P’ is true,” while we remain ignorant of the intrinsic reasons why “S is P.” In calling our attention to this distinction, Rimini builds on his earlier conviction that the apprehension of “S is P” cannot be separated from the judgment “that ‘S is P’ is true.” In other words, Rimini argues that knowing (C) that “the proposition ‘S is P’ is true” from the presumed evident principles (1) that God has revealed this proposition and (2) that what God reveals is always true, is not distinguishable from knowing that “S is P.” By knowing this truth, one knows that “S is P.”

Rimini explains this in following way:

If someone knows that a proposition attributing (*enuntiantem*) a predicate to a subject *is true*, then he knows that this [P] is in the thing, just as the proposition signifies, since for the proposition to be true signifies nothing other than the fact that, what is, *is* . . .

With this conviction in mind, Rimini points to the words of Marchia himself, who acknowledges that if a person knows something *to be in* a thing, then he knows the

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64 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:44). “Tertia conclusio, quod, si propositio enuntians veritatem de articulo aut alia veritate sacrae scripturae esset scita, etiam ipse articulus esset scitus vel faciliter posset sciri. Et ex hoc inferam quod, si talis propositio enuntians veritatem de articulo aut alia veritate scripturae esset scita, non esset necessaria fides propter assensum illius. In toto autem isto processu, cum dico propositionem aliquam esse scitam vel creditam, intelligi iuxta sensum datum supra in articulo primo.”

65 It is interesting to note how similar Marchia sounds here to Henry of Ghent’s description of our knowledge through the *lumen medium*. It was Henry’s opinion that we are able to acquire evident knowledge of propositions without distinct knowledge of the individual terms. Rimini’s critique of Marchia therefore is on par with Aureoli’s similar criticism of Henry, viz. distinct or evident knowledge of a proposition mandates distinct or evident knowledge of the terms/realties involved. For the discussion between Henry and Aureoli see above c. 6, p. 254.

66 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:46). “Sed, si aliquis scit propositionem enuntiantem passionem de subiecto esse veram, ipse scit sic esse in re, sicut talis propositio significat, quoniam nihil aliud est propositionem esse veram quam significare esse, quod est, si est affirmativa, vel non esse, quod non est, si est negativa.”
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predicate of a subject. For Rimini, this also means that: “If anyone knows that a proposition attributing a predicate to a subject is true, he also knows the predicate attributed to the subject.” In short, Marchia tries to find room for faith, even while evident premises are in use, by using the Ockhamist distinction between apprehension and judgment in the reverse way that Ockham and Wodeham did. Marchia thinks that we can reach a scientific judgment about the truth of a given proposition without fully apprehending it. And because of this lack of genuine apprehension, Marchia thinks we are prone to doubt what we scientifically know to be true! Faith is required to steady us against this oncoming doubt. For Rimini, this paradox is intolerable. We either know the proposition scientifically or we do not. If we know it, there is no place for doubt and no need for faith. Rimini, therefore, makes the concession that if the premises Marchia identified really were evident, then we could have scientific knowledge of these articles of faith and everything expressly contained in Scripture. But Rimini’s argument is that these premises, P1 and P2, are not actually evident and there is much to doubt about them. The most they can do is contribute to the background context in which God infuses the initial assent of faith. It is only after this initial moment of faith takes place that theology can go further and produce a very specific kind of faith, not infused faith in the believed premises, but acquired faith in theological conclusions.

67 Ibid. “Si aliquis scit sic esse in re, sicut significat propositio enuntians passionem de subiecto, scit passionem de subiecto loquendo more illius opinionis.”
68 Ibid. “Igitur, si aliquis scit propositionem enuntiantem passionem de subiecto esse veram, ipse utique scit passionem illam de subiecto, et per consequens, si propositio enuntians veritatem de articulo aut alia propositione sacrae scripturae est scita, etiam ipsa propositio, de quae enuntiatur, est scita.”
C. The Thomist Position and Gregory of Rimini

After considering the position of Marchia, Rimini turns to a well known position first introduced by Thomas Aquinas and frequently discussed for many years to come. Considering Aquinas’s position Rimini’s response is an effective way to bring this chapter to a close from a couple of reasons. The first is that few new conceptual pieces are needed in order to understand Rimini’s response. Thus, his answer to Aquinas functions as an effective review of all that we have seen so far. But second, we can also glimpse Rimini’s response within the context of the Aegidian tradition. Giles himself qualifies the Thomistic position, but Rimini takes this even further and fundamentally cuts off theology from any designation as a science, whether in a strict or qualified way.

The central texts for the Thomistic position are the prologue to his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1254-6), the opening questions of his commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius (1255-1259), and in his Summa Theologiae (1267-73). In these contexts, Aquinas repeatedly faces the question that Rimini is considering; is theology a science, meaning, is theology demonstrative in an Aristotelian sense? Aquinas’s answer is complicated by his identification of two senses in which we can speak of theology: a distinction made clearly in the commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius.

Here Aquinas distinguishes between a theology which begins from “our way of knowing” and proceeds from sensible things towards God. But a second way of knowing exists which proceeds from the first truth and divine realities themselves. The former way
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is characterized by its movement upwards, and the latter way is characterized by its downward movement. Aquinas writes:

Now the knowledge of divine things can be interpreted in two ways. First, from our standpoint, and then they are knowable to us only through creatures, the knowledge of which we derive from the senses. Second, from the nature of divine realities themselves. In this way they are eminently knowable of themselves.69

Aquinas is quick to point out that, while strictly speaking the latter sense of theology is not available to us in this life, there is a way we might still participate in this type of theology. Faith makes this participation possible. Aquinas speaks of a participation and assimilation with the divine through a faith “infused” in us.70 Through our belief in the articles of faith, Aquinas says, we *grasp the primary truth* and are able to come to know other things, “namely by drawing conclusions from principles.”71 This procedure is not a new method for us. It actually fits very well with description of theology given by Gerard of Siena and Thomas of Strasbourg, where the articles of faith function as the true principles of the theology proper.72

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69 Aquinas, *Super De Trinitate in Boethium*, q. 2, a. 2 (trans. Maurer, *Faith, reason, and theology*, p. 41); “Et secundum hoc de divinis duplex scientia habetur. Una secundum modum nostrum, qui sensibilium principia accipit ad notificandum divina, et sic de divinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam primam scientiam divinam dicentes. Alia secundum modum ipsorum divinorum, ut ipsa divina secundum se ipsa capiantur, quae quidem perfecte in statu viae nobis est impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu viae quaedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam inhaeremus ipsi primae veritati propter se ipsam.”

70 Ibid.


72 From these two senses of “theology” Aquinas goes on to discuss three ways that philosophy (and natural reason) is helpful to theology. All three of which function in a supportive role leading up to (but never replacing) the deductive procedure of theology proper.

The first way that philosophy or natural/common reason is a part of theology (broadly conceived) is in the sense that theology can demonstrate the preambles of faith—not the articles of the faith per se, but those beliefs that would appear to a precondition for faith in the articles of the creed. Common reason is operating here in the first genre of theology, which moves from sensible things according to our way of knowing.
In Aquinas’s later works, the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologica*, he reiterates this distinction between theology proper and what is included under the umbrella of theology because of its auxiliary role. When it comes to theology proper, Aquinas continues to insist on the deductive methodology from *believed* principles that we see in his early commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius.\(^{73}\)

However, Aquinas is eager to avoid denigrating the certainty of the second type of theology and to preserve its respect among the other sciences, despite the fact that it begins from inevident premises. In his attempt to ground theology within a scientific context, without self-evident principles, Aquinas uses as a model the kind of subordination that music enjoys with respect to arithmetic or that optics (*perspectiva*) enjoys with respect to geometry.\(^{74}\) In the case of both music and optics, Aquinas assumes...
that the practitioner begins where the mathematician or geometer leaves off. That is, the science of music or optics takes as its first principles what are conclusions of mathematics or geometry. It does not know its principles as self-evident nor as the product of a demonstration (in Aristotelian terminology, there is neither nous nor epistēmē of the subalternated principles). Rather, it takes them on a kind of faith or hypothesis and begins from this point. The reason that they can still be sciences, albeit a subalternated sciences, is because they are imbedded in a context where evidence could be provided for the principles at work. It is simply the case that the practitioner of optics and music does not provide this evidence for herself.

When it comes to the theology of the second and proper type, Aquinas thinks the process of reasoning works in a similar way. The theologian begins from articles of faith that are neither self-evident nor concluded through a prior demonstration. (Aquinas would, therefore, share Rimini’s criticisms of Marchia’s attempt to ground the articles of faith in a prior demonstration.) The theologian really does begin with mere belief in these articles. The subsequent task is to deduce consequences that follow from these believed articles. Despite the strictly inevident nature of these principles, Aquinas identifies theology as a subalternated science because he thinks these articles of faith are genuine conclusions known with evidence and certainty by God and the Blessed. The only difference, then, between optics and theology is that in the case of optics it is possible for other human beings to know the principles of optics even if the practitioner of optics does

musica ex principiis per arithmeticam notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.” See Rimini’s paraphrase of this position, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:49).
not. Such a subordinated scientist can always fall back on the claim: “I could always go back and prove to myself that these principles are true, if I wanted to take the time to do it.” This is a privilege not available to theologian. While the principles are known scientifically by God and the Blessed, it is not possible for any human being in this life to establish these principles on their own. Therefore, instead of receiving this principle from other scientists, the theologian must receive them from a supernatural source, namely the special revelation of God.

This subtle difference between the subalternation of human sciences and the subalternation of theology to the divine science did not go unrecognized by the Aegidian tradition, which on the whole was open to the Thomistic position, but felt the need to qualify it. This is most clearly seen in the treatment of Thomas of Strasbourg, who, in offering his own position, makes an explicit appeal to what Giles of Rome had to say on the subject.

Taking up the question immediately after establishing that the articles of faith were indeed the principles of theology, Strasbourg asks whether theology is a subalternated science.\footnote{Thomas ab Argentina, Commentaria, I, prol., q. 2, a. 3, f. 7vb. “Quantum ad tertium huius quaestionis articulum, utrum theologia sit scientia subalterna?”} His first reply gives the impression of a general agreement with Aquinas: “theology loosely speaking is able to be called a subalternated science, since it does not reduce into things known in themselves (per se nota), but presupposes its principles as if they were perfectly known in the science of God and the Blessed…”\footnote{Ibid. “Patef ex iam dictis, quod theologia large loquendo, potest dici scientia subalterna; cum non reducat in per se nota, sed praesupponat sua principia tanquam notissima in scientia Dei, et beatorum, quae principia Deus, cum voluerit, poterit revelare.”} But Strasbourg follows this up by saying: “But strictly speaking, theology is not a
subalternated science.” The reason for this qualification comes from his identification of the difference between subalternated human sciences and theology identified above. He says it this way:

Whenever one science is subalternated to another science, the evidence of its principles is clear in the subalternating science. Therefore, anyone who has the subalternated science is naturally able to attain to the subalternating science, so that the evidence for the principles of the subalternated science becomes clear. But the one having the science of theology is not naturally able to attain to the science of God and the Blessed, therefore, etc (emphasis mine).78

With this distinction between “loose” and “strict,” Strasbourg thinks he is once and for all solving the debate between the two extremes: between those who say that it is a subalternated science and those who say it is not. Those who say it is are using the loose sense. Those who say it is not are employing the strict sense. More interesting than anything else is Strasbourg’s noted inspiration for this solution: he points to Giles of Rome as the real authority behind the position that “strictly speaking” theology is not a subalternate science.80

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77 Ibid. “Nota tamen, illa scientia proprie non est subalterna.”
78 Ibid. “…quia quandocumque una scientia subalternatur alteri scientiae, ex hoc, quod causa evidentiae, suorum principiorum patet in scientia subalternante, tunc quicunque habet scientiam subalternam, ille naturaliter potest attingere scientiam subalternantem, inquantum evidentia suorum principiorum patet in subalternante, sed habens scientiam theologiae non potest naturaliter attingere scientiam Dei, et beatorum, ergo etc.”
79 Ibid. “Ista ergo distinctione bene intellecta, cessare poterit murmur argumentorum duarum opinionum, quarum prima dicit, quod scientia theologiae sit subalterna; alia econtra negat. Rationes primae opinionis verum concludunt quod ad similitudinem, quam habet cum scientia subalterna. Rationes secundae verum concludunt, quo ad proprietatem subalternationis; quia non est proprie subalterna…”
80 Ibid. “…sicut sufficienter ostendit doctor noster frater Aegidius in scripto super prologo primi Sententiarum.”
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A quick look at the Giles’s prologue confirms this Aegidian attribution. Giles’s main response begins with a repetition of one of his central claims about theology: *Sacra Pagina* does not begin from principles known per se, but operates in the light of faith alone. (Here he actually says “[it] begins from the articles of faith”.)

Given this method, two possible classifications follow: “either theology is not a science, or its principles are manifest in a superior science.” Giles solves this disjunctive argument by appealing to Augustine (notably, not Aristotle). Augustine says that theology is a science, therefore the latter alternative must be true. But the only science higher than our theology is the science of God and the Blessed (a point Giles believes he made in the previous article). The qualification that Strasbourg relies on comes next in the following lines: “if it is asked in what mode this science is subalternated to the divine science or the science of the Blessed, it should be said that no mode that we see in human sciences is suitable to this kind of subalternation.” Like Strasbourg, Giles qualifies the Thomistic position by stressing that if we want to say theology is subalternated to God’s knowledge and the Blessed, this is fine, but we must recognize that there is something fundamentally

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81 Aegidius Romanus, *Primus Sententiarum*, prol., pars 2, q. 1, a. 2, f. 4va. “Illa autem in qua illa principia declarantur est subalternans, et quia scientia theologiae utitur principiis ut articulis fidei quae non apparent nobis per se nota…”

One minor observation can be added here. Damasus Trapp in a footnote to his edition of Rimini’s text points us to Giles’s treatment of subalternation in the Venice 1521 printing. However, while referring us to right part and question of the prologue, he also refers us to folio 7, when the discussion actually begins on 4rb and ends on 4va (See Trapp I:49).

82 Ibid. “Vel oportet dicere quod theologia non sit scientia; vel quod illa principia sint in superiori scientia manifesta.”

83 Ibid. “Sed quia theologia sive cognitio de divinis scientia dici potest, ut dicitur 13o De Trinitate ca. 19, oportet quod articuli fidei in superiori scientia noti sint. Superior autem theologia non est nisi scientia Dei vel scientia beatorum. Subalternabitur igitur theologia divinae scientiae, vel scientiae beatorum.”

84 Ibid. “Quae autem modo subalternationis eis subalternetur, si quaeritur, dicendum quod nullus modus qui conspicitur in humanis scientiis isti subalternationi competit.”
different going on here than in any of the analogous types of subalternation found among the human sciences.\(^85\)

Peter Aureoli’s dominant reply to the Thomistic position alerts us to where the more fundamental disagreement lies. He remarks first: “In this position, [Aquinas] says that the articles of faith are principles of our theology.” Then, he accuses Aquinas’s theory of being inconsistent with his practice.\(^86\) He writes:

[The position of Aquinas] cannot stand, for no science attempts to prove its principles, but rather concludes things from them. But it is certain that this doctor, in his Summa, and universally all doctors of theology, form questions about articles of the faith and they attempt to solve, declare, and conclude these articles.\(^87\)

This is the first of the four objections. But the remaining three have a lot more to do with whether a discourse that takes its principles from others should receive the name

\(^85\) We should note that here that, Gerard of Senia’s opposition to the classification of theology as subalternation is much stronger than what we see in Giles or Strasbourg. His opposition is notable considering that he is typically described as an all too faithful follower of Giles. But here he appears to show some independence. See Gerardus Senensis, In Primum Librum Sententiarum, I, q. 3, a. 2, pp. 33–36. Strasbourg himself discusses Gerard’s opinion and replies to it, see Thomas ab Argentina, Commentaria, I, prol, q. 2, a. 3, f. 7vb–8ra.

We can add this final note: Besides the qualification to Thomas’s notion of subalternation, there at least two other important thing for us to take away from this account. One is that Giles, with Thomas, continues to insist that theology proper begins from the articles of faith and proceeds downward, deductively. The second important feature is that Giles, with Thomas, rejects any attempt to make these articles of faith somehow evident. Both acknowledge that these are “inevident” principles, only known through faith. Furthermore, Giles shows us from where the real impotence comes to continue to calling theology a “science”. While he fully acknowledges that theology does not meet the true conditions of an Aristotelian science, he is too aware of Augustine’s designation of theology as a science to let the name go. Therefore, by calling theology a subalternate science, Giles and Thomas preserve all the features of theology that distinguish it from a common and universally accessible science, while still providing themselves with the linguistic space to call theology a unique kind of science.

\(^86\) Accounting for the inconsistencies that Aureoli appeals to in Thomas corpus can undoubtedly be explained by the fact that Thomas recognizes multiple possible theological procedures, but means to call only the explicitly deductive procedure of theology a subalternated science. Thus, when Thomas asks a question about a particular article of the creed, like whether God is one, it may be that this is a question for a different kind of theological procedure, a distinction which Aureoli does not appear to recognize.

“science,” whether it is subalternate or not. These arguments take it for granted that theology does begin from articles of faith.

But as we can see, Aureoli’s first critique questions this assumption entirely, and therefore disagrees with Aquinas for a fundamentally different reason. He disagrees with Aquinas not because a discourse that begins from believed principles should in no way be called a science, but rather because Aureoli does not think theology begins from articles of faith at all. This, we have already seen.

William of Ockham also responds to the Thomistic position, but his response is far more abbreviated than that of Aureoli. It focuses on the fact that it is impossible to know a conclusion better than one knows the principles. His point is: there is no way you could move from principles known either by faith or opinion and end up with certain and evidently known conclusions.  

However, to this we must also add what we know about Ockham’s perception of proper theological method. As we saw above, he never distances himself from the procedure that Aureoli defines as “declarative.” In fact, at the end of his discussion, he explicitly states that “theology is declarative as Aureoli states.” He only distinguishes his position from Aureoli’s by pointing out that a prior faith is not required to perform this theological procedure. The resulting judicative habit is a product of one’s prior disposition to believe or not believe. Therefore in opposing Aquinas’s position, his

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88 Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:199). “Dico quod quamvis hoc sit verum in scientia subalternata, tamen nunquam aliquis scit illas conclusiones evidenter nisi sciat eas per experientiam vel per aliquas praemissas evidentem notas. Unde nihil est dicere quod ego scio conclusiones aliquas, quia tu scis principia quibus ego credo, quia tu dices ea. Et eodem modo puerile est dicere quod ego scio conclusiones theologiae, quia deus scit principia quibus ego credo, quia ipse revelat ea.”

89 See above, c. 6, p. 277, n. 54.
primary concern is to point out that theology is an entirely apprehensive habit and does not cause assent. Therefore it should not be classified as any type of science, whether subalternated or not.

Finally, we can turn to Rimini. He presents two central arguments, and predictably none of them express any doubt about the kind of principles with which one begins, as is the case with Aureoli. Instead both arguments have something to say about the nature of true scientific principles.

The first argument focuses on the fact that to have a genuine science one must naturally know the principles of the demonstration. But taking the “explicit contents of Scripture” as our authority, we do not have any evidence about these principles. Thus theology cannot be classified as a science. The second argument shares the same focus; it points out that if a “subalternated” science could be called a science while the practitioner only believes its principles, then nothing is to stop us from attributing scientific knowledge to anyone who merely believes the principles of their intellectual habit.

The obvious rebuttal to Rimini’s second argument is to point out that his concern would only be a problem if we called these habit “sciences” in an unqualified way. But we don’t speak of them in an unqualified way; thus there is nothing wrong with calling these habits that begin from believed principles “subalternated sciences.” Rimini’s response to this rebuttal is more extreme than what we have seen in either Giles or

90 The heart of the argument is this: “. . . non sufficit principia esse alteri nota, ut ego scientiam havem de conclusione, quoniam per nullam notitiam existentem in alio causari potest immediate et naturaliter aliqua scientia in mente mea. Cum igitur principia theologiae non sint neque fuerint nobis nota, ut isti concedunt, theologia, quae acquiritur de communi lege in theologis, de qua etiam nunc est sermo” (Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:51)).
Strasbourg. Instead of distinguishing the uniqueness of theology from these other types of subalternation, he simply denies that the musician or the practitioner of optics really has any kind of science, assuming they have not derived their principles from mathematics and geometry for themselves. Thus, for Rimini, it is not just that theology is subalterated in a “loose” sense. Rather he rejects the idea of subalternated sciences altogether, whether they be human or divine.  

IV. Conclusion

With this last rebuttal, we can see that Rimini carries forward a line begun by Giles to sharply distinguish theology from scientific knowledge. But he also goes further than either Giles or Strasbourg and completely breaks the connection between theology and evidence. Theological knowledge begins in faith and stays in faith. It cannot even claim a kind of certainty from a higher science performed by someone else. Therefore, and in conclusion, the knowledge and certainty proper to this habit of reasoning is entirely internal. It is a process of reasoning that parallels a scientific discourse, in that it proceeds from premises and leads to conclusions. Likewise, when done properly, it compels us to assent. But all of this takes place within a specific community rather than within the universal community. Those within the community of belief can recognize the theologian as someone who “knows” what many within the community do not know. But

91 Ibid., “Ad probationem de musica respect arithmeticae dico quod nullus ignorans arithmetican, nisi principia musiceae per experientiam aut aliam viam nosset, sed tantummodo crederet, acquireret musicam, quae est scientia, sed tantummodo quendam habitum creditivum et quandam fidem, quam, si vellemus, possemus appellare musicam creditivam.”
to those outside the community who do not begin from belief, the claim to knowledge is specious.

This chapter began by labeling Rimini’s position on the scientific nature of theology as paradoxical, yet internally coherent. The position was that the “knowledge” produced through theological discourse was both an “inevident” knowledge and a “compelled” knowledge. Thus it contains features of both faith and science. It can be called faith because it is inevident and not universally recognizable. To perform the theological syllogism in a meaningful way and to reach the result of acquired faith, one must have the benefit of a previous “stirring” or “moving of the heart.” Theology is therefore a discourse for a particular community somehow initiated into a body of truths, which are neither self-evident nor argued for. These are for Rimini the first principles of theology. But theology is also like science because, for those initiated, into this particular discourse, the method of theology is deductive and becomes demonstrative, compelling the mind’s assent. That is, the conclusions of theology, qua conclusions, go beyond mere apprehension to produce a compelled judicative attitude. Assent to such conclusions requires neither a supernatural act of infused faith nor a choice to assent on a part of the agent, but only a valid syllogism. The kind of assent that accompanies this valid syllogism which begins from believed principles is what Rimini calls acquired faith. The possession of this kind of assent is what he thinks separates the theologian from the simple believer, and this is what constitutes the essence of properly theological knowledge.
Conclusion: Hypothesis in Aid of Continuing Research

While this study has been primarily a work of exposition guided by the discussions and debates that occur in the primary texts, I close by offering some thoughts about how the results of this exposition contribute to a larger story about the history of philosophy, the development of the wegesstreit of the fifteenth century, the reformation, and early modern philosophy. This is a story that still cannot be told in full; lack of research and inaccessibility to texts place a cloud over our understanding of the intellectual milieu from the mid-fourteenth century to the end of sixteenth century. As such, I offer a few suggestions about how Rimini’s position on theological knowledge (vis-à-vis Giles, Aureoli, Ockham, et al.) fits with the few other pieces of the puzzle we possess.

I. Via Buridensis

Running parallel to Rimini’s description of the theological profession as a discipline of self-description rather than self-justification, a related development emerged in the arts faculty at Paris around the same time.

This development is intimately tied to the long teaching career of John Buridan, a secular who chose to remain in the arts faculty rather than move on to the theology faculty. Buridan received his license to teach in the arts faculty around the mid-1320’s
and died sometime before 1361. An important study on Buridan by Jack Zupko, written in 2003, provides some helpful details. At the close of his book, Zupko writes:

Buridan never says why he remained a career arts master, but beneath the official posture of deference to the theologians was someone who felt very passionately about the independence and autonomy of his faculty, who believed that philosophy as a properly practiced belonged to the faculty of arts, not to theology, or law, or medicine. It is not difficult to see how such an idea might lead to the secularization of philosophical practice, which of course is one of the features distinguishing later medieval philosophy from that of the early modern period. Whether or not Buridan’s teachings played any discernible role in this development remains to be seen. But he would have approved of it, I think, since it was in this newer, secular space that he exercised his own philosophical genius (emphasis mine).

I quote Zupko here to emphasize what he calls the “growing secularity” of philosophical practice within the arts faculty. This means that at the same time that Rimini emphasized that theology’s sphere of practice should be limited only to what can be deduced from Scripture, Buridan warned the arts faculty about meddling in matters that go beyond the purview of natural reason. At the same time that the Aegidian tradition honed its definition of theology proper as restricted in subject matter and set a part by method, Buridan inversely distinguished the proper activity of philosophy in the arts faculty.

Zupko continues to develop his discussion in chapter ten of his book and introduces a critical passage of the Buridanian corpus. Here Buridan highlights the

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2 Zupko, John Buridan, 274.
3 Consider also what Zenon Kaluza says about the Buridan school: “From the beginning then Burdanism existed without a clearly determined following in Theology, if not an outright rupture with the superior faculty / Dès le début donc le buridanisme s’activait sans une suite clairement déterminée en théologie, sinon dans une rupture avec la faculté supérieure” (Kaluza, “Les débuts de l’Albertisme tardif (Paris et Cologne),” 218).
defining difference between theology and metaphysics (and why they are often confused).

It should be noted that [when we ask whether metaphysics is the same as wisdom,] we are not comparing metaphysics to theology, which proceeds from beliefs that are not known, because although these beliefs are not known *per se* and most evident, we hold without doubt that theology is the more principal discipline and that it is wisdom most properly speaking. In this question, however, we are merely asking about intellectual habits based on human reason, [i.e.,] those discovered by the process of reasoning, which are deduced from what is evident to us. For it is in this sense that Aristotle calls metaphysics ‘theology’ and ‘the divine science’. Accordingly, metaphysics differs from theology in the fact that although each considers God and those things that pertain to divinity, metaphysics only considers them as regards what can be proved and implied, or inductively inferred, by demonstrative reason. But theology has for its principles articles [of faith], which are believed quite apart from their evidentness, and further, considers whatever can be deduced from articles of this kind.⁴

It is this kind of understanding that leads Buridan—a thinker acutely aware of his status as a philosopher and not a theologian—to be continually wary of transgressing the bounds of philosophy and to be critical of theologians who make forays into philosophical matters. So Zupko writes:

Just as Buridan is loathe to pursue the consequences of intellectual memory for *post mortem* existence, since he would then be an arts mater teaching theology, so a theologian would have no business making pronouncements about Aristotle’s account of memory, since he would then be a theologian teaching arts. As we shall see . . . Buridan reserves some his harshest criticisms for Nicholas of Autrecourt, a theologian who dared to interpret Aristotle . . .”⁵

The result of these two forces—[1] of Rimini’s critique of Aueroli and Marchia’s attempts to justify theological knowledge in the eyes of the other sciences and [2] of

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⁵ Ibid., 140.
Buridan’s continued vigilance never to transgress the bounds of philosophy and speculate about what only faith can teach—is an easy contentment among the faculties to leave one another alone. This was a contentment that we can document into the twilight of the fourteenth century. But it is also a contentment that becomes radically challenged at the turn of the century. Therefore understanding both the positions and influences of Rimini and Buridan is essential for understanding this later story. Our exposition of Rimini’s position can contribute to this foundational understanding and thereby illuminate what is still to come.

II. Rimini, Oyta, and Gerson

In order to point out Rimini’s lasting influence on the topic of theological knowledge and the nature of the discipline called “theology,” a few observations about two later thinkers ought to be made. The first is Jean Gerson, a well studied late-medieval thinker, in comparison to his contemporaries, who flourished at the turn of the fifteenth century. While a reformer in many ways, Gerson was also a part of the old guard at Paris, generally content with the autonomy of the faculties and resistant against those who tried to import uncommon or “untraditional” theories into the theological discipline. A look at his views about the proper task of theology suggests why. Mark Burrows writes specifically about Gerson’s view of proper theological method:

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6 For a starting point on Gerson see: McGuire, Jean Gerson and the last Medieval Reformation; Hobbins, “The Schoolman as Public Intellectual.”

7 As an example consider Daniel Hobbins description of Gerson’s criticisms: “Gerson understood the power of intellectual binding as one of the great purposes of the University of Paris and made no real distinction between internal and external correction. In 1398, he applied the principle of theological terminology to the teaching of the Spanish mystic Ramon Lull, which he and other masters had prevented
The Theologiae traditio usually derives, however, directly from the literal sense of the revealed Scriptures themselves; these are the horizon in which theological discourse finds it bearings and into which it constructs its arguments, since the revealed text establishes both the matter and the form of theological argument.8

The preceding study has shown that there is a clear Aegidian precedent for this view. The last line is particularly resonant of Rimini’s approach to the discipline of theology. Sacra Pagina or the “explicit contents of Scripture” not only contain the principles of this discourse, but they also definitively determine and restrict the scope of the theological enterprise.

Beyond these Aegidian echoes, we can also follow Mark Burrow’s suggestion of the source and inspiration behind Gerson’s position. He writes: “[Gerson] thus aligns theology, here following his elder colleague Henry Totting of Oyta quite closely, directly with exegesis: the text itself establishes the arena of theological discussion…”9 According to William Courtenay Oyta was at Paris from 1373 to 1378, around the same time that Gerson would be engaged in study at Paris.10 While Oyta is not a figure we

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8 Burrows, Jean Gerson and De consolatione theologiae, 108.
9 Ibid. Burrows writes of the connection between Gerson and Oyta: “we know from citations found in various passages throughout his works that Gerson held Oyta in high esteem and positioned his own view of scripture squarely in line with his predecessor at Paris. On this point see G 10, p. 241, in which Gerson builds his approach to scripture on the basis of Oyta’s position as expressed in the prologue to his Quaestiones sententiarum. It should be noted that Oyta completed this work during the period in which Gerson was teaching in the arts faculty at Paris, and just before he commenced with his theological training (1382). Several decades later, in writing his own university lectures Contra curiositatem studentum, Gerson spoke of ‘venerabilis et venerandus doctor Henricus de Hoyta, qui pro suo merito veteribus aequari et inter eruditissimos logicos metaphysicos et theologos numerari potest, dum hanc materiam tractaret, ad concordiam conatus est extremia reducere…’ G 3, pp. 241-242” (Ibid., 108, n. 16).
10 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, 147. For the standard bibliographical reference see Lang, Heinrich Totting von Oyta. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten deutschen Universitäten und zur Problemgeschichte der Spätscholastik, (Munster i. W. 1937).
have looked at, he is, however, a figure that scholarship links to Rimini and the Aegidian tradition: a connection which a reading of his own text confirms.

Albert Lang draws the following conclusion about Oyta:

Oyta has recognized the fundamental importance of Scripture for theology and faith. Present in the truths of Scripture, he saw the essential basic principles for theological knowledge/science (wissenshaft). In the end all theological statements must be tied to Scripture.11

And Burrows goes on to summarize Lang’s historical findings: “Here Lang aligns Oyta within the Augustinian tradition which included Alfonso Vargas of Toledo, Gregory of Rimini, Hugolin of Orvieto, etc.”12

In his own prologue, Oyta offers a familiar conclusion about the proper nature and method of theology that suggests a strong connection to Rimini and the Aegidian tradition. He writes:

Third conclusion: neither merely probable propositions taken from other sciences nor propositions evident in the natural light are sufficient principles for our theology. This is proved: the articles of faith are like the principles of our theology, but they are not probable propositions taken from other sciences nor evident in the natural light. This is clear in the case of the article of the Trinity and incarnation, therefore etc.13

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12 Ibid.
In taking this very Rimini-like position, Oyta is especially notable on account of the pair of Franciscans he singles out as the opposing authorities to this conclusion. On the one hand, he identifies Peter Aureoli as standing in opposition to the first part of the above conclusion, and on the other hand, he identifies Francis of Marchia as the opinion he wants to oppose with the second part of the conclusion. Working in an Aegidian tradition, Oyta continues to oppose any attempt to provide a foundation or justification for theological truth that goes outside and beyond faith. The “defense” and argumentation of theology is confined for Oyta, as it was for Rimini, to the believing community. “Theological knowledge” is a category that only makes sense within the believing community and is meaningless and unrecognizable outside of it.

III. A Time of Transition: Notes from Kaluza.

From the time Oyta wrote his commentary in the late 1370’s to the turn of the fifteenth century we have few witnesses to the intellectual culture and climate at Paris. (Besides Oyta, Peter of Candia, Nicholaus of Dinkelsbühl, and Pierre D’Ailly are some of the latest accessible commentaries of the fourteenth century, and they were all written in the late 1370’s and early 1380’s.) Nevertheless, we know that things were changing. The easy autonomy of the arts and theology faculties was beginning to be questioned, and we see a revival of speculative theology (what we might call natural theology) and a renewed eagerness on behalf of theologians to contribute to philosophy and the natural sciences.

14 For the Oyta paraphrase of Aureoli’s position see, f. 12ra, “Contra [tertiam] conclusionem quo ad primam eius partem arguit Aureolus sic…”; Oyta’s response comes at f. 12rb; Oyta’s list of the objections of Marchia are visible at f. 12vb “Contra secundum partem conclusionis tertiae est opinio Francisci de Marchia…”; Oyta’s response comes on f. 13ra.
This story of transition continues to be hard to tell because of lack of study and lack of accessible texts. But Zenon Kaluza has provided us with helpful details. The particular movement Kaluza is interested in tracing is the emergence of late-Albertism, closely associated with a revival of neo-realism, later referred to as the *via antiqua*. Somewhat paradoxically, the *via antiqua* is not the conservative movement trying to protect the status quo. On the contrary, it is the avant-garde movement attempting to shake up the institutional practices established at Paris since the time of Buridan and Rimini. On the whole the movement of late-Albertism is really a story that belongs to the fifteenth century, with thinkers like Hemericus de Campo and the emergence of Dominican dominance at schools besides Paris, notably, Cologne.

Kaluza, however, is eager to track down the early influences of this fifteenth century school. In his article on the beginning of late-Albertism, Kaluza identifies four possible causes of a backlash against the status quo at Paris. First, he mentions the outright attack on the “school of Buridan” by Jean Maisonneuve at the beginning of the century.15 Second, he notes the abandonment of an old statute, of which Rimini and Buridan would likely approve—namely, that no student of a higher faculty could at the

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15 Kaluza, “Les débuts de l’Albertisme tardif (Paris et Cologne),” 217. “La première et peut-être la plus difficile à éclairer, c'est l'importance et l'exclusivité accordées par l'école buridaniennne de Paris et de Cologne aux *parva logicalia*, clef de leurs analyses logico-sémantiques qui remplçaient la speculation des anciens. Au début du XVe siècle, Jean de Maisonneuve attaque l'école de Buridan sur ce point précis – la doctrine des suppositions - et lui reproche une rupture avec l'aristotélisme. Plus tard, en 1414 à Cologne, en 1474 à Paris, les nominalistes se limiteront à défendre les *parva logicalia*, comme s'il s'agissait d'une philosophie unique, et ne se réclameront pas souvent de la tradition aristotélicienne. Les Colonais diront même que l'école de Buridan réduisit "l'enseignement des arts au style humble, aux termes et aux modes de parler" qui n'ont rien en commun avec des doctrines traditionnelles. Tel qu'il se manifeste dans les statuts, le programme des buridanistes semble donc fondé sur un canon des écrits-manuels qui limite la philosophie à une technique de l'analyse logico-linguistique et la fige dans un minimalisme programme et dans une sorte d'introduction à la lecture d'Aristote.”

See also Kaluza, *Les querelles doctrinales à Paris: Nominalistes et realistes aux confins du XIVe et du XVe siècles.*
same time be a Regent Master (that is, serve in the highest teaching role) in the arts faculty. Kaluza documents that at the turn of this century, this rule was frequently ignored, which, in turn, encouraged collusion (and perhaps confusion) between philosophical and theological practice. Third, Kaluza suggests that theologians were uncomfortable with the restriction of “nominalist” practice, and this discomfort with merely arranging words inclined theologians to “reconnect with a more traditional notion of speculation.” We know that this is not true in all cases. Henry of Oyta and Pierre d’Ailly represent clear examples of people committed to a restricted conception of the theologian’s professional tasks. However, their own discussions show that this continued to be a hot topic, and this, in turn, suggests that the peace between the independent arts and theology faculties was uneasy at best. Fourth and finally, Kaluza suggests that rupture between the faculties in the fourteenth century was so great that the simple inescapable awareness of this rupture “may have stimulated reflection on the nature of

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16 Kaluza, “Les débuts de l’Albertisme tardif (Paris et Cologne),” 217. “La seconde raison, c'est l'abandon d'une vieille tradition exigeant qu'aucun étudiant des facultés supérieures ne soit régent à la faculté des arts. La première rupture de cette tradition fut faite à titre exceptionnel pour les sociétaires de la Sorbonne en 1317. Je ne peux pas indiquer la date exacte à laquelle l'ancienne réglementation est tombée en désuétude j'observe seulement qu'en 1379 la règle n'est plus en vigueur, comme le montre le rôle (rotulus) de cette même année, où l'on voit une trentaine d'étudiants et de bacheliers en théologie, pour la plupart originaire de la province de Reims, exercer simultanément la régence en philosophie. Cette pratique sera plus tard reprise par d'autres universités, et notamment par celle de Cologne, où elle jouera un rôle important dans le renouveau du réalisme.”

17 Ibid., 218. “...les théologiens de la seconde moitié du XVe siècle ne s'accommodaient pas facilement du nominalisme qui remplaçait l'analyse des réalités et le discours portant sur les réalités par l'analyse des termes et des propositions qui parlent de ces réalités. Dans la mesure où elles désiraient conserver les liens avec la foi religieuse, les théologies étaient obligées à dépasser le mode nominaliste et, ce faisant, à renouer avec un mode traditionnel de spéculation.”
the two disciplines” to the point that “at the end of the fourteenth century voices arose to affirm the organic unity of philosophical-theological speculation.”

The final suggestion about the impulse to “affirm the organic unity of philosophical-theological speculation” is provocative, but proves frustrating when further inquiry is made. Kaluza mentions a couple of names, Henry of Langenstein and Giles of Charlier, as examples of thinkers who began to question that independence of the faculties. But in general, scholarship has access to few Sentences Commentaries between 1380 and 1410, especially Parisian commentaries. One exception is a commentary written in 1392 and 1393 at Paris by Peter Plaoul. Plaoul was a secular Master of Theology at Paris during the the 1390’s and was contemporary of Jean Gerson and Pierre D’Ailly. Kaluza mentions Plaoul’s commentary as having some potential relevance to the rise of late-Albertism, and it is a commentary that shows remarkable readership by neo-Albertists in the late fifteenth century. Kaluza, however, could not speculate further at the time of his writing because the text remained unedited. A critical edition of Plaoul’s text is now underway and, in its partial form, is already returning

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18 Ibid. “Finalement, il est très probable que l'expérience d'un désaccord et d'une rupture entre la philosophie buridaniennedes artiens et leurs travail et vocation de théologien suscita et stimula une réflexion sur la nature de ces deux disciplines et de ces deux spéculations. Toutefois, dès la fin du XIVe siècle les voix se lèvent pour affirmer l'unité organique de la spéculation philosophico-théologique.”

19 Ibid. “Telle est, par exemple, la conviction de Henri de Langenstein, pour qui la théologie s'écoule de la métaphysique et la prolonge. Tel est aussi le sens de l'éloge de Thomas d'Aquin et de l'unique reproche fait à Albert le Grand par Gilles Charlier.” Langenstein probably wrote his commentary in the 1370’s and Gilles of Charlier was a pupil of Jean Gerson and therefore probably wrote his commentary in after the year 1400.


21 Ibid., 219. “Une autre trace, ce sont les manuscrits des ouvrages d'Albert le Grand copiés à Paris dès les premières années du XVe siècle. Ils sont assez nombreux et témoignent d'un accroissement d'intérêt pour le grand dominicain. Parmi les copistes et possesseurs de ces manuscrits on voit plusieurs sociétaires de la Sorbonne, Gérard de Perfontaines et Girard Martel, auparavant Pierre Plaoul, plus tard Henri d'Aimart et Alard Palenc.”
some interesting anecdotal evidence.\textsuperscript{22} A few select passages are sufficient to show the blurring of the lines that Rimini and Buridan each strove to establish.

First, there is Plaoul’s definition of theology that would surely grate against the ears of Rimini. Plaoul writes:

I call theology: knowledge of the articles of faith deduced in the natural light and of those things following from them either directly or indirectly, such that [it knows] conclusions about the matter of the Trinity or of God and of creatures in themselves and in comparison to God; this type of habit of knowing such things with the help of faith, I call theology.\textsuperscript{23}

No doubt it is strange that Plaoul talks both about knowing “in the natural light” and about the “help of faith” in the same breadth. It is Plaoul’s belief that faith acts as a restorative agent of the natural intellect, not just an additional source of knowledge.\textsuperscript{24} Thus, infused by faith, the theologian is ready to bring “natural arguments” to bear on the articles of faith; arguments that are naturally available (or evident) but are still hard for most people to see.\textsuperscript{25} For Rimini and the Aegidian tradition, the starting point of theology was the revealed data of faith. Theological knowledge was defined by its opposition to

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\begin{enumerate}
\item Petrus Plaoul, \textit{Commentarius}, I, prol., lectio 12 (Witt, ed. 0.2 n. 15) “Ex praedictas intendo describere theologiam et ostendam quod theologia est communis scientia. Pro cuius evidentia, describendo theologiam, sciemdem est quod ego voco theologiam notitiam articulorum fidei deductorum in lumine naturali et aliorum sequentium ex eis sive directe sive indirecute, ita quod, conclusiones circa materiam Trinitatis sive ipsius Dei et creaturarum inter se et in comparatione ad Deum et huismodi habitus cognoscendi talium cum adiutorio fidei, vocabo theologiam.”
\item Petrus Plaoul, \textit{Commentarius}, I, prol., lectio 17 (Witt, ed. 0.2, n. 2) “Pro cuius tamen materiae determinatione, ponam istam conclusionem ‘quamvis fides non intret processum theologicum tamquam pars antecedentis theologicae conclusionem probantis, ipsam tamen requiritur ad sic scientifice assentiendum”.
\end{enumerate}

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beginning in sensible things. But Plaoul is a witness to an alternative kind of theology that views faith as of liberation to begin from sensible things with clear eyes.

Even more interesting is that Plaoul follows this definition of theology with an explicit critique against Henry Totting of Oyta. Like Gerson, Plaoul would have been studying and teaching in the Arts faculty at Paris while Oyta was preparing to lecture on the Sentences. In light of his proposed definition he writes: “From this I argue against those who believe theology to be different, just as Oyta who says that that theology is not superior to faith . . .” In the following lecture, he proceeds with a rather clear critique of the idea that theology begins from the principles of faith. (Surprisingly, Plaoul, writing 70 or so years since Aureoli wrote, also includes him in his critique: specifically targeting Aureoli’s unwillingness to call theology an “adhesive” habit, that is one that compels belief as a true science does.)

Therefore if theology presupposes faith and takes it as its principles, it would then follow that what has been proposed is able to be inferred against Peter Aureoli (who says that theology is not an adhesive habit, and therefore is not a science because a science is an adhesive habit). On this account, theology is, as some say, nothing other than a knowledge of consequences and it does not deserve any description other than the following: [theology] speaks commonly concerning the posited articles and Sacred Scripture and the things contained in Scripture which are commonly known and infers from one what follows next. In this way theology is nothing other than a part of logic, namely, an obligatory art, which should not be said because in this mode it would have to be concluded that Claudianus was a theologian, as is clear from the fact that he wrote: ‘Christus potens verax,’ etc., which also should be not be

26 While Oyta was preparing his lecture and reading them in the late 70’s (see above n. 10), we know that Plaoul received his arts degree at Paris in 1371 and was listed as a bachelor in 1385 (CUP III: 418; cf. Millet, “Pierre Plaoul (1353-1415): une grande figure de l’université de Paris éclipsée par Gerson,” 181.). At the present we have no indication that he was away from Paris in the interim.

27 Petrus Plaoul, Commentarius, I, prol., lectio 12, (Witt, ed. 0.2, n. 16): “Ex hoc inferam contra aliquos qui aliter imaginantur de theologia sicut Huta, qui dicit quod theologia non est superior fide, quia licet assensus theologicus sit clarior fide, non tamen est perfectior.”
conceded. Therefore it should be said that theology is a scientific habit and adhesive of the articles of the faith.”

This quotation reveals a lot. First, Plaoul wants to take an even more extreme position that is visible in either Aureoli or Ockham. Not only is theology oriented toward supporting and proving the articles of faith, but its discourse is said to be an “adhesive scientific” habit, compelling assent to the articles of faith. Likewise, we also find in Plaoul familiar worries against the position advanced by Oyta, which is recognizable as Aegidian and Ariminensian in character. The worry is that we are just playing with words: simply knowing what was said in Scripture and knowing its logical consequence, but never acquiring that knowledge which the apostles and prophets used to write the Scriptures. This is the familiar worry, which Henry of Ghent and Peter Aureoli were eager to avoid, and now we see the same concern emerging once more in Plaoul.

In addition to shaping Plaoul’s conception of theology proper, the curative nature of faith, by extension, carries implications for theology’s relationship to philosophy and the natural sciences. For example in the tenth lecture of his Prologue he offers a provocative corollary: “From these things, I infer some corollaries. First corollary: that no truth of human investigation is repugnant to sacred theology or faith. This corollary is

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28 Petrus Plaoul, *Commentarius*, I, prol., lectio 13, (Witt, ed. 0.2, n. 18); “Ergo si theologia praesupponit fidem et assumit tamquam principium, sequitur propositum posset etiam inferi contra Petrum Aureoli, qui dicit quod theologia non est habitus adhaesivus, et per consequens non est scientia, quia scientia est habitus adhaesivus, ita quod aliqui dicunt quod theologia non est nisi notitia consequentiaria, ita quod theologia non deservit ad alium nisi ad hoc: quod positis articulis et Sacra Scriptura et contentis in ea quod homo sciat communiter loqui et ex uno inferre reliquum. Et secundum hoc theologia non est nisi una pars logicae, scilicet, ars obligatoria, quod non est dicendum, quia isto modo praedicto concedendum esset quod Claudianus fuisset theologus, ut patet per illud quod scripsit 'Christus potens verax,' etc., quod non est concedendum. Ideo dicendum est quod theologia est habitus scientificus et adhaesivus articulorum fidei, sicut dictum fuit in alia lectione.”

29 See above, c. 6, p. 252.
clear because every truth is consonant with every other truth."\textsuperscript{30} This is just the kind of sentiment that would infuriate Buridan who would see it as an excuse for the theologian to mettle in matters that belong to the domain of the arts faculty and philosophy. Likewise, it is a far cry from the kind of restriction on the subject matter of theology so important to the Aegidian tradition.\textsuperscript{31} Plaoul continues this line as follows: “It follows finally that true philosophizing requires theology, indeed this is true philosophy.”\textsuperscript{32} The long and short of it is, Plaoul thinks philosophy left to itself is prone to excessive error. However, when reason is restored by faith, there is nowhere that it cannot and \textit{should not} extend, opening up possibilities for speculation both about the natural world and about divine realities.

\textbf{IV. Rimini: a Prologue to the Story of the Long Middle Ages}

As part of our final assessment, I offer the following quotation from William Courtenay, who was attempting to assess the changing nature of theological work at Paris after Ockham. Speaking loosely of a kind of “Ockhamism” he notes:

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\item \textsuperscript{31} Recall Augustinus of Ancona’s poignant use of John the Damascene who said: “All those things which are handed down to us through the law in the prophets, the apostles, and the evangelists, we undertake and we venerate and we know, while inquiring about nothing beyond these things.” See above, c. 5, p. 232, n. 18.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Petrus Plaoul, \textit{Commentarius}, I, prol., lectio 11 (Witt, ed. 0.2, n. 1): “Sequitur finaliter quod ad vere philosophandum requiritur theologia, immo ipsa est vera philosophia.”
\end{itemize}

Despite his belief in the raw power of restored natural reason, Plaoul is quite critical of the philosopher left to himself. In the preceding paragraph he writes: “Ex praedictis patet quod articuli fidei relinquenti sunt neuter apud vere philosophantes, id est, quod ex puris naturalibus philosophus vere philosophando non potest devenire ad notitiam articularum, et sic non potest determinare quae pars sit vera vel non” (Plaoul, \textit{Commentarius}, I, prol., lectio 10 (Witt, ed. 0.2, n. 18). This, it seems to me, is a rather large slap in the face to the kind of autonomy Buridan desired from the arts faculty, and which Rimini was willing to grant.
One aspect of this increase in Biblical theology and the Biblical conception of God [which he thinks is characteristic of ‘Ockhamism’] is that theology became less apologetic in the process. The apologetic focus of so much of thirteenth century theology—one thinks especially of Raymund Lull, Roger Bacon’s Opus Maius, Thomas’ *Summa contra gentiles* and Raymond Martin’s *Pugio fidei*—was designed to convert the Jew and the Moslem and reconvert the heretic. The emergence of a scientific theology that could be rationally demonstrated, a theology that begins with the existence and nature of God, established a common ground for dialogue between Christian and non-Christian. All this began to change in 1277. With the attack of the scientific nature of theology and the limitation of the amount of knowledge of God that could be gained through the unaided reason, theology as a tool for defending the faith and converting others was replaced by a more internal and internally consistent theological system.33

As we end this study, I find it apt that Courtenay has zeroed in upon the “internal” nature of the theological enterprise in the fourteenth century. This notion of internal defense, self-description, and self-identification are key characteristics that have emerged throughout this study. But more to the point, there cannot be any doubt that Rimini had a great part to play in this shift in orientation and might appropriately be heralded as the primary champion of this approach.

But this study prompts another question. Should this changing orientation really be associated with “Ockhamism” *per se*? This dissertation argues that it is better to see this as the fruit of a recognizable Aegidian tradition: a tradition that places special emphasis on the restricted interest of theology and its strict starting point in the revealed data of faith. It is true that in what we recognize as “Ockhamism” there is a decreasing confidence in our ability to demonstrate the truths of faith. But this does not automatically demand the kind of re-orientation we see in Rimini. We have seen,

33 Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 58.
especially in the work of Peter Aureoli, that our inability to demonstrate did not mean one must reject the idea that theology is the task of external contextualization and justification of religious truth within the pantheon of other sciences. Our inability to demonstrate the truths of faiths only demands that we adjust our expectations. We saw this most clearly in Aureoli’s interpretation of the Augustinian criterion of “defense” and the deployment of an arsenal of “probable reasons” drawn for the natural sciences. Ockham’s criticism of this method focuses solely on its categorization as a “wisdom.” But he appears to offer no critique of the general approach or methodology; thus, at the end of question seven of his prologue, he firmly states that he agrees with Aureoli that theology is indeed “declarative.”

Rimini, therefore, draws from another source. Whether our natural arguments turn out to be demonstrative or probable, he refuses to acknowledge these arguments as properly theological. The theologian is, as Courtenay said, internally focused; concerned with creating a “consistent theological system” and defending that system only within the context of the community of belief. This is a unique kind of knowledge: a knowledge of self and a knowledge of what one believes, rather than a knowledge of causes. It is a view that dominated Paris for the next 50 years and remained one of the dominant options through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, though these are both stories that still need to be told. But beyond their historical influence, Rimini’s prologue and the Aegidio-Augustinian tradition as whole continue to represent a cogent articulation of one of the limited number of ways that faith can be “seeking understanding.”

34 See above, c. 6, p. 277, n. 54.
35 Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 58.
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