Reinstatement and back pay for undocumented workers to remedy employer unfair labor practices

Author: Christine Neylon O'Brien


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Reinstatement and Back Pay for Undocumented Workers to Remedy Employer Unfair Labor Practices

By Christine Neylon O’Brien*

Ms. O’Brien is an Associate Professor of Law with Bentley College in Waltham, Massachusetts. © 1989 by Christine Neylon O’Brien

This article examines the National Labor Relations Board’s remedial power with respect to undocumented aliens in light of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,1 which strengthened federal statutory policy against the hiring and retention of undocumented workers. The NLRB’s traditional remedies for employer unfair labor practices include reinstatement and back pay for discriminatees.2 In cases involving employer or union threats that interfere with employee free choice in the organizational setting, the Board will set aside election results and order a new election under “laboratory” conditions to remedy the unfair labor practices.3 Where the employer’s unfair labor practices have been egregious and pervasive such that a fair election cannot be held, the Board will issue an order for the employer to bargain with the union based upon the union’s prior obtainment of authorization cards from a majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.4

It is clear that the NLRB deems threats by union adherents to call the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and report undocumented workers if the union loses an election as serious enough to interfere with free choice such that the Board will order a new election.5 The union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act if it threatens employees during the election campaign with calls to the INS if the union loses.6

The NLRB also found a Section 8(b)(1)(A) violation in Westside Hospital7 when a union organizer threatened an employee with deportation unless he signed an authorization card for the union. In Futuramik Industries,8 an election was set aside by the Board because of an employee’s threats to contact the INS if the employees chose union representation where the employee had apparent authority to act for the employer.

Presently, there are two leading court cases involving employer threats of depor-
tation to union-supporting employees. The timing of this employer tactic is usually just before or after an election. The employer seeks to avoid unionization or retaliate against union supporters by threatening INS deportation of undocumented aliens. Judicial review of such actions thus far has been confined to pre-IRCA cases, in which the courts relied solely upon the provisions of the NLRA and the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) to construe the parties' rights.

Case Law

In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, the United States Supreme Court considered whether NLRA protections applied to an employer's threats to its undocumented alien workers, which occurred just hours after the election in which the union prevailed. Although the employer knew months in advance that most of its employees were illegal aliens, the employer reported their presence to the INS only after the election.

The NLRB affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that the employer violated the NLRA Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by constructively discharging the undocumented alien employees. The Board ordered the remedies of reinstatement with back pay. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Board's conclusions, but modified the order and provided for broader reinstatement rights with at least six months of back pay.

The Supreme Court made the threshold determination that the employer unfair labor practices committed against undocumented workers were within the jurisdiction of the NLRA both because of the Act's broad definition of "employee," and because of the NLRB's interpretation of undocumented workers as employees. The Court concluded that to treat undocumented aliens as protected employees furthered the goals of the NLRA and did not offend the policies of the INA. The finding of the court of

Immigration Reform and Control Act
appeals that the employer committed unfair labor practices when it reported the workers to the INS to retaliate for their union support was affirmed.\(^23\)

The Supreme Court reversed in part the Seventh Circuit's order and remanded to the NLRB. The Court reasoned that the NLRB has primary responsibility to fashion remedies subject to limited judicial review. The Court cautioned courts of appeal not to substitute their judgment for the Board's in trying to undo the effects of unfair labor practices. The Supreme Court did set forth remedial principles as guidance for the Board. The Court noted that remedies must be tailored to the unfair labor practices intended to be redressed. A backpay order, noted the Court, may remedy only actual, rather than speculative, effects of unfair labor practices.\(^24\) The Court addressed the question of reinstatement and concluded that such a remedy must be conditioned upon the employees' legal re-entry into the United States.\(^25\)

The Ninth Circuit decided a similar case four months prior to the enactment of IRCA. \textit{Local 512 v. NLRB} (\textit{Felbro}) also arose in the context of employee selection of a bargaining agent.\(^26\) The employer sought to sabotage union activities and violated the NLRA through a series of events both before and after the election. The NLRB modified the ALJ's remedial order based upon its interpretation of \textit{Sure-Tan}, and conditioned the discriminatees' backpay award upon the legality of their presence in the United States. The question of reinstatement was not reached because the employer voluntarily reinstated the workers.

On petition for review and enforcement before the Ninth Circuit, the court considered whether undocumented aliens who remained in the United States throughout the backpay period were entitled to backpay awards.\(^27\) The Ninth Circuit held that the undocumented workers were entitled to back pay,\(^28\) reasoning that such a remedy "promotes the underlying aims of the NLRA and does not detract from the INA."\(^29\) It has been reported that the employer is appealing the decision of the court of appeals.\(^30\) The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the NLRB, and it has yet to issue a modified order, perhaps because the enactment of IRCA has clouded the issue,\(^31\) or perhaps because, as the NLRB's General Counsel stated in a recent memorandum, the Board has not acquiesced to the Ninth Circuit's position.\(^32\)

Both the \textit{Sure-Tan} and \textit{Local 512} courts decided cases in an attempt to reconcile NLRA and INA provisions.\(^33\) With the enactment of IRCA, the equation is sig-


\(^{24}\) See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing enactment of IRCA). \textit{Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB}, 467 U.S. 883, 902-06, 101 LC \$ 11,042 (1984) (remedies conditioned upon legal readmittance to United States so as not to conflict with INA policies of deterring unauthorized immigration). Since the employees were in Mexico and unable to lawfully re-enter the United States, they received protection as "employees" under the NLRA and INA, but were denied remedies. \textit{Id.} See id. at 906-13 (Brennan, J., concurring).


\(^{26}\) \textit{Local 512} v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 722, 105 LC \$ 12,005 (9th Cir. 1986). See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of INA and NLRA).

\(^{27}\) See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing enactment of IRCA).

\(^{28}\) See R. Collyer, Reinstatement and Backpay Remedies for Discriminates Who Are "Undocumented Aliens," Memorandum GC 88-9, Sept. 1, 1988, at 1-2, n. 2 (Board disagrees with \textit{Local 512} court's reinstatement and backpay remedies for undocumented aliens present in United States). See also infra notes 41-44, 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing General Counsel's memorandum).
significantly changed because IRCA makes it unlawful for employers to hire (after Nov. 6, 1986) or continue to employ undocumented aliens (who were unlawfully hired after Nov. 6, 1986). 34

It is therefore now illegal to engage in such an employment relationship which heretofore the courts protected. 35 Courts have not yet been called upon to interpret the NLRA, INA, and IRCA in an employer unfair labor practice case against undocumented aliens who were hired after Nov. 6, 1986, but it is entirely possible that they will depart from the standard set by the Ninth Circuit in Local 512, 36 because that case involved employees hired prior to Nov. 6, 1986.

Because one of the purposes of IRCA is to prevent employment of undocumented workers and consequently deter illegal immigration of unauthorized aliens, 37 the remedies granted in Local 512 pursuant to the NLRA represent a degree of protection for undocumented workers which creates more conflict with IRCA than it did with the INA. Under the INA, employment of an illegal alien specifically did not constitute the felony of harboring, 38 whereas IRCA makes such employment unlawful and prescribes civil and criminal penalties for employers who fail to comply with documentation requirements and who knowingly hire undocumented aliens after Nov. 6, 1986. Although the NLRB has a duty to accommodate other statutory schemes in issuing remedial orders, 39 the Board has at times prioritized protection of concerted activity over other laws in the past. 40

**NLRB General Counsel Memorandum**

In a September 1988 memorandum, 41 Rosemary M. Collyer, the National Labor Relations Board's General Counsel, provided guidance to the Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers of the Board on the issue of remedies for discriminatees where an employer maintains that the discriminatees are undocumented aliens.

The General Counsel appropriately divided her advice between those employees hired on or before November 6, 1986, and those hired after November 6, 1986, the date of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Because the employer penalty provisions only apply to employees hired after November 6, 1986, the General Counsel directed the regions to ignore an employer's argument that the remedy of reinstatement for an employee hired on or before November 6, 1986, who has refused to complete an employment eligibility verification form, commonly

34 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324 (West Supp. 1988). Indeed, Congress provided stiff penalties for violations of IRCA. Id. Violators are subject to a series of graduated fines, and possible imprisonment. Id.


38 NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 1180, 1183, 86 LC ¶11,523 (9th Cir. 1979).


40 Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1978) (NLRB excluded evidence of undocumented status of employees who were charging respondent employer with unfair labor practices).

41 R. Collyer, supra note 32.
referred to as the Form I-9 (as required by IRCA) would create risk of criminal sanctions against the employer. As far as the consequence of unlawful termination on the employee’s status is concerned, the memorandum noted that applicable INS regulations do not deem such a reinstated employee to have suffered an interruption in service.\(^42\)

The General Counsel places the burden on the employer to prove by a final INS determination, as opposed to a mere denial of adjustment to lawful temporary resident status (TRS), that the discriminatee is not entitled to be present and employed in the United States. Because IRCA requires that employees hired after November 6, 1986, comply with certain verification procedures, the General Counsel does not advise the regions to require reinstatement and back pay for discriminatees hired post November 6, 1986, who are unable to complete their portion of the I-9.\(^43\)

The memorandum attributes this limitation on the NLRB’s remedial powers to the Supreme Court’s decision in *Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB*,\(^44\) and not to IRCA. Of particular interest with regard to the future direction of the Board’s orders is the General Counsel’s reference to *Local 512* where she notes that “[t]he Board has not acquiesced to the view of the Ninth Circuit that reinstatement and back pay are appropriate where the discriminatees are physically, albeit unlawfully, present in the U.S.”

**Future Directions**

The most interesting question raised by the foregoing analysis is the direction the Supreme Court will take regarding the issue of remedies for undocumented workers in light of IRCA, and changes in the Court’s composition since *Sure-Tan*.\(^45\) In *Sure-Tan*, Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices White and then Chief Justice Burger, generally approved the NLRB’s original order which entailed the conventional remedy of reinstatement with back pay (to be determined at the compliance stage based upon facts relating to each discriminatee’s individual situation) and the conditioning of any offer of reinstatement upon legal re-entry to the United States to avoid potential conflicts with immigration policies.\(^46\)

Justice O’Connor objected to the Seventh Circuit’s substitution of its judgment for that of the NLRB. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had exceeded its narrow scope of review, in the view of Justice O’Connor, who reversed some of the remedies of the appeals court and remanded to the Board. Justice O’Connor wrote that the undocumented workers were clearly “employees” under the NLRA, and thus entitled to protection from employer constructive discharge.

Although the Court’s opinion was predicated to some extent on the fact that the employment relationship itself was not illegal, a conclusion which will no longer apply to the undocumented hired after Nov. 6, 1986, some of the policy reasons cited by the Court in support of its decision remain valid despite IRCA. For example, if an employer does not expect to be equally penalized for unfair labor practices against undocumented aliens, this creates an economic incentive to prefer their hire over legally documented employees who can recover back pay.

Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, all of

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\(^{42}\) R. Collyer, supra note 32 at 3-4. See also IRCA, Control of Employment of Aliens, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(viii)(E), (G) (1988).

\(^{43}\) R. Collyer, supra note 32 at 6 (discussing discouragement of reinstatement for employees unable to complete I-9 form in light of public policy of United States, as expressed in criminal sanction provisions of IRCA).


\(^{45}\) See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text (discussing Sure-Tan and Local 512).

\(^{46}\) 467 U.S. 883, 902-03, 101 LC ¶ 11,042 (1984). Chief Justice Burger has since retired from the Court. The opinion of Justices O’Connor, White, and Burger is hereinafter referred to as Justice O’Connor’s opinion.
whom remain on the Court, partially concurred and partially dissented in Sure-Tan. Justice Brennan agreed that undocumented workers are employees under the NLRA and that the employer's report to the INS constituted a Section 8(a)(3) violation. Justice Brennan did not, however, support the remedy issued. Unlike the opinion written by Justice O'Connor, Justice Brennan interpreted the NLRB's acceptance of the modifications made by the appeals court as reason to eliminate a remand. Justice Brennan's dissent objected to the new standard of review detailed in the Court's opinion, a standard which determines "whether the terms of a remedial order are 'sufficiently tailored' to the unfair labor practice it is intended to redress."

The usual standard of judicial review with respect to a backpay order of the NLRB is that "the order 'should stand unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act.'" Justice Brennan recommended affirmance of the six-month minimum backpay award because the Board supported that remedy on appeal to the Supreme Court, which the dissent inferred as an indication that the Board judged the award to estimate "with a fair degree of precision the period that these employees would have continued working" if petitioners had not reported them.

Justice Brennan saw no reason to restrict the other remedial modifications of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit because the NLRB had accepted them, but Brennan did concur with conditioning the offers of reinstatement upon legal re-entry to the United States in order to avoid conflict with federal immigration policies.

Current Chief Justice Rehnquist joined with Justice Powell in the third opinion in Sure-Tan. In partial dissent, Justice Powell was of the opinion that illegal aliens should not be included within the definition of "employees" under the NLRA because of the aliens' status as violators of our criminal laws. Justice Powell would have granted no remedy to the discriminatees, but because the Court held that the undocumented aliens were entitled to NLRA protection, Justice Powell joined in Justice O'Connor's opinion, concluding that this remedy provided less incentive for aliens to illegally enter and re-enter than the remedies recommended in Justice Brennan's opinion.

Now that Justices Burger and Powell are retired from the Court, neither of whom favored extensive remedies for undocumented aliens subjected to unfair labor practices, one might conclude that the remedial climate for undocumented workers would improve. Current Supreme Court Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., Inc. which supported NLRA protection, including reinstatement, for employees who were undocumented. He wrote: "If the NLRA were inapplicable to workers who are illegal aliens, we would leave helpless the very persons who most need protection from exploitative employer practices such as occurred in this case."

Of course, NLRB v. Apollo Tire was decided in 1979 prior to the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Sure-Tan, and prior to the 1986 enactment of IRCA. Yet the case continues to be of interest both because it may be portentous of Justice Kennedy's future position on this issue and because it involved a California statute that provided in relevant part that "[n]o employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful

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47 Id. at 906 (hereinafter Justice Brennan's opinion).
50 Id. at 913 (hereinafter Justice Powell's opinion). Justice Powell has since retired from the Court.
51 604 F.2d 1180, 1184, 86 LC ¶ 11,523 (9th Cir. 1979).
52 Id. The case involved NLRA Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) violations. Id.
residence in the United States” (emphasis added). The respondent employer, Apollo Tire Co., argued unsuccessfully that a reinstatement order would violate state law even if it were not inconsistent with federal immigration laws. The Ninth Circuit upheld the NLRB’s decision to exclude evidence that the charging parties were undocumented aliens who were not entitled to work and reside in the United States.

Another Ninth Circuit case, Bevies Co., v. Teamsters Local 986, which was decided five months prior to the enactment of IRCA, upheld an arbitration award granting reinstatement and back pay to undocumented employees who were terminated in 1983 by their employer under color of the same California statute. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that regulations implementing Section 2805 of the California Labor Code had been repealed in 1982 due to the confused state of the law surrounding Section 2805.

The standard of judicial review “of an arbitrator’s interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is much more limited than its review of a decision of the NLRB in a labor dispute” (citations omitted). Thus, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s confirmance of the award which was not in “manifest disregard of the law.” The two grievants in Bevles had not been subjected to INS proceedings and remained in the country. The Ninth Circuit distinguished the facts from Sure-Tan where the discharged employees had left the country. In Sure-Tan, an unconditional reinstatement offer would have encouraged illegal re-entry and created potential conflict with the INA.

Although Bevies was decided prior to IRCA’s enactment, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in December, 1987, leaving the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation undisturbed despite the enactment of IRCA in November, 1986. This outcome can be reconciled with IRCA in that the discriminatees had been hired prior to November, 1986, the date after which hiring of unauthorized aliens became unlawful pursuant to federal law. In addition, the grievants in Bevles might have qualified for the legalization program under Section 245A of IRCA. IRCA also created a new public policy issue that favored the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Bevles. Public policy against employer discrimination on the basis of national origin was extended to reach smaller employers under IRCA than had previously obtained under Title VII. IRCA antidiscrimination provisions also authorized complaints alleging employer discrimination based upon an individual’s status as a non-citizen, whereas under Title VII, it was not illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage.

**Conclusion**

The NLRB can lawfully order reinstatement for victims of unfair labor practices as long as the discriminatees remain in the country or are required to legally re-enter the United States prior to reinstatement. The Board is correct to require from the employer an INS determination that a discriminatee is not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the U.S. before precluding the normal reme-

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54 604 F.2d 1180, 1183, 86 LC ¶ 11,523 (9th Cir. 1979).
56 Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d 1391, 1395, 105 LC ¶ 12,006 (9th Cir. 1986).
57 Id. at 1393.
dies of reinstatement and back pay for those hired on or before November 6, 1986.\(^\text{63}\) This method succeeds in avoiding the concerns expressed by the Ninth Circuit in *Local 512*, that "the Board exceeds both its authority and its expertise in requiring its compliance officers to determine the immigration status of an individual discriminatee."\(^\text{64}\)

In light of IRCA, it makes sense to distinguish discriminatees who were hired after Nov. 6, 1986. If such employees are unwilling or unable to complete the Form I-9 prior to reinstatement, the General Counsel would neither seek reinstatement nor back pay for subsequent periods, in light of the public policy expressed in IRCA.\(^\text{65}\) In *Sure-Tan*, the Supreme Court did not totally reject the notion of back pay for undocumented workers, rather the Court approved the Board’s original order of reinstatement with back pay to be determined at the compliance proceedings.\(^\text{66}\)

However, the Court stated that “the implementation of the Board’s traditional remedies at the compliance proceedings must be conditioned upon the employees’ legal readmittance to the United States.” Thus, entitlement to back pay even for those hired on or before Nov. 6, 1986, is limited to those who legally re-enter, and discriminatees “must be deemed ‘unavailable’ for work (and the accrual of back pay therefore tolled) during any period when not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States.” The Board will permit an employer to present evidence that bears on the issue of the discriminatees’ legal presence in the country at the compliance stage.\(^\text{67}\)

[The End]

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**Contingency Contract Does Not Limit Attorney Fees**

Contingency fee agreements do not place a cap upon the amount of fees an attorney can recover in a successful action under the Civil Rights Attorney Fee Awards Act, the Supreme Court ruled (*Blanchard v. Bergeron*, 49 EPD ¶ 38,722). To rule otherwise would be inconsistent with Section 1988, which provides for “a reasonable attorney fee” to plaintiffs who prevail in actions brought under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871. Section 1988 contemplates reasonable compensation for the time and effort of a prevailing lawyer, and while the presence of a fee agreement may aid in determining reasonableness, it is only one factor to be considered. Where a contingency agreement specifies a fee that is less than reasonable in the court’s estimation, the defendant should be required to pay the higher amount. The stricture that fees be reasonable precludes any undue windfall for attorneys, the court determined.

\(^\text{63}\) R. Collyer, supra note 32 at 2, citing *Local 512*, 795 F.2d 705, 720-22, 105 LC ¶ 12,005 (9th Cir. 1986).

\(^\text{64}\) 795 F.2d 705, 722 (9th Cir. 1986).

\(^\text{65}\) R. Collyer, supra note 32 at 6.


\(^\text{67}\) R. Collyer, supra note 32 at 2; *Caamaño Bros., Inc.*, cited at note 10.